

RUSSIA *at* WAR

From the Mongol Conquest
to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond



TIMOTHY C. DOWLING, EDITOR

Russia at War

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FROM THE MONGOL CONQUEST TO AFGHANISTAN,
CHECHNYA, AND BEYOND

Volume 1: A–M

Volume 2: N–Z

Timothy C. Dowling, Editor

Foreword by Bruce W. Menning



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These volumes are for Hubert, Schroeder, Otto, Max, Sophie, and their wonderful parents.

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Foreword

This encyclopedia fulfills two important functions: it explicitly serves as a reference for the Russian and Soviet martial past, and it implicitly serves as entrée to a non-English-speaking military culture. For readers in pursuit of greater breadth and detail than individual entries can possibly afford, there is a considerable body of literature in English, which can be found in the bibliography. Perusal of these and related works would make the perceptive reader more than conversant with the history of Russia at war. Mastery of Russian military culture (and its Soviet offshoot) comes at a steeper price, for it is a subset of a larger culture that is ambiguously Western and non-Western. As David R. Stone notes in the introduction to *A Military History of Russia*, this very ambiguity “undermines the idea that [Russian] military history is best understood through a Western vs. non-Western dichotomy.”

The wisdom underlying this assertion first came home to this writer nearly a half-century ago, during his first direct—if glancing—acquaintance with the Russian army in its Soviet incarnation. He had just arrived in Moscow by air for advanced Russian language study at Moscow State University. In those days the airport was still far from the city center, not just in the suburban outskirts. The transit bus was rickety, the roads were bad, and there was nothing resembling the

current eight-lane speedway the Russians call “the ring road.” Like the wide-eyed 22-year-old this writer was, he stared at the outlying villages through which his bus motored. Nearly a decade after Sputnik, he marveled at the log-frame huts and the lack of paved streets, not to mention the absence of running water. Then, in the open fields between two villages he spotted what seemed like several hundred soldiers, all stripped to the waist and all sweating over shovels under the early summer sun. Thinking of his own infantry experiences with the art and toil of field fortification, the writer’s heart went out to them. It was only as he drew closer that he realized they weren’t digging foxholes or emplacements, but a long waist-deep trench for a pipeline. Strange way to employ troops in the field, he thought. Thus began a long journey of discovery for an American son of the middle order, who gradually came to understand the limits of conventional homebred wisdom in understanding a different kind of military establishment. In ways much larger than ideology this establishment only superficially resembled that with which he was familiar.

Some four decades later, this writer passed another milestone on his long journey into the vagaries of another military culture, after having spent several months’ researching in Moscow’s Russian military archives. A major

purpose of the research was to determine the impact of military intelligence on pre-1914 Russian war plans and the conduct of initial operations. One set of research materials was particularly striking. They dealt with the testimony of Stepan Aleksandrovich Voronin, a long-forgotten czarist general who, after 1905, established an intelligence center in Warsaw to study likely adversaries. In this case, the accent was on the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians. Voronin recounted all the means and methods used to collect information for actionable intelligence in the event of a European war. He acknowledged the necessity to deal with numbers, and units, and fortresses, and dispositions.

Yet, in an assertion that now seems axiomatic, Voronin held the most important thing was not necessarily numbers and details. Instead, he wanted to know how the potential opposition would likely think. A century later, this bit of wisdom holds just as true, for thought more than physical attributes is a key way to discern potential behavior. And, yet patterns of adversarial thinking are now probably just as neglected as in Voronin's time.

Unwittingly, Voronin came close to repeating one of the more important maxims of the classical Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu. In very vivid terms he wrote,

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

Separated by four decades, perceptions of Soviet ditchdiggers and of Voronin's diggers for information go far in explaining the unfolding of this writer's own intellectual odyssey. During that odyssey, he tried to

understand a military that sometimes corresponded with conventional notions and more often than not diverged. The two circumstances just recounted form convenient departure points for the remarks that follow on the Russian army of yesterday and today. The main contention is that in looking at the Russian army, or indeed, traveling with it, the observer must see things through quite different eyes. This proposition seems so self-evident—indeed, so much like common sense—that it should amount to a truism. Yet, how difficult it is to observe this proposition in practice; how does one proceed? And, with what conclusions?

Answers to these questions assume the form of a small handful of propositions for the reader's consideration. In generalizing on the basis of much experience, the writer's intent is to walk the fine line between the self-evident, on the one hand, and the obscure, on the other hand. The present commentary is based not only on serious academic study but also on firsthand observation. On numerous occasions this writer has literally been a fellow traveler with the Russian army, to paraphrase a well-worn comment with quite different connotations.

First, as preceding comments have indicated, it is nearly impossible to overemphasize the importance of culture. In military and academic studies, culture matters. Indeed, cultural awareness has lately become something of a "buzzword" within the American military establishment. Like chastity, however, it is probably less observed than preached about. As an aside, one might note that since 9/11 there has been much talk about understanding other cultures, especially those associated with the varieties of Islam. But, how many of our erstwhile warriors in the struggle against terrorism have read either Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones*, or even more prosaically, *The Arab Mind* by

Patai and DeAtkine? Voronin had this right a hundred years ago, but Americans still experience difficulties with execution, even (regrettably) among specialists. Perhaps the comic strip character Pogo was right with his now well-worn expression, “we have met the enemy, and he is us.” With respect to the Russian army, the cultural imperative means that the observer starts with the poet Pushkin and proceeds with many stops in-between to the strategists A.A. Svechin and V.D. Sokolovsky, and beyond.

Why start with Pushkin? What does poetry have to do with the military, or even strategy? There are at least two answers to these questions. First, if you can read Pushkin in the original, then you have enough language mastery to gain entry not only into Russian culture but also into Russian history, the Russian military, and so on. Second—and more pragmatically—even in English translation, Pushkin has something to say about contending with Russia’s potential adversaries. An important aspect of his legacy was the codification of Russian fairy tales, including the celebrated “Golden Cockerel.”

In this story, Czar Dodon has grown old and tired from fighting his kingdom’s many enemies. For purposes of early warning and economy of force, a sorcerer gives the aging czar a golden rooster. The creature’s sole purpose in life is to perch on the highest cupola and warn Dodon of approaching foes and their direction of advance. The story ends in tragedy, of course, as such tales often do, but there are lessons. One is that without the equivalent of a golden rooster, Russia’s rulers must maintain a large military force to defend the far-flung reaches of empire from multiple potential adversaries. Even now the official Russian story line is that potential adversaries lurk everywhere, especially within the ranks of the NATO. And, the territory of the Russian Federation makes up

something like one-sixth of the world’s land mass. From this realization comes the writer’s second proposition: Russia’s geographic circumstances, including the possibility for diverse and numerous foes, require a substantial ground force. For various reasons, the Russians have discovered that magic roosters are hard to come by.

The third proposition is that perceived requirements for a large ground force have generated a seemingly endless debate over a single question. That question is: “what kind of army do we need?” The analyst must read the fine print in various answers to this question to perceive that the answers almost always involve two major issues. One, of course, has to do with size and composition. Throughout the modern era, the rough rule of thumb has been that the mobilized Russian (or Soviet) army must approximate the aggregate size of Russia’s major potential adversaries. It follows that no Russian army could ever be too big.

Composition has been more difficult to determine, since it varies with the intricacies of technology and changing organizational requirements. Suffice it to say, Russian expanses have invariably encouraged a large mobile component, whether horse cavalry or armor. Still, no matter what the composition, the emphasis has always been on size and mass. During the 1930s, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky perhaps best summed up the prevailing sentiment. He was attentively tracking the interwar British transition to a small mechanized force. When a reporter asked him about the efficacy of such a force, Tukhachevsky replied something to the effect that “Large mechanized forces always defeat small mechanized forces.”

This assertion naturally leads to the second size-related issue: how does a large armed force relate to its parent society? The sheer requirement for recruitment and

maintenance means the answer is “quite intimately.” In the United States, except for the period of the Civil War, the Americans experience with a form of military conscription stretched over a little more than six decades of the 20th century. In contrast, the Russians have known one or another form of recruit levy or conscription throughout the last three centuries. If various levies are included for the Muscovite period, that is, the pre-1700 era, then the tradition reaches back even farther. With all the exceptions that occur in various systems, this fact means that the prospect for military service has always loomed large for most physically able adult males.

This writer’s travels underscore some of the starkness associated with this prospect. Many readers are probably familiar with Clint Eastwood’s “Letters from Iwo Jima.” There is one wartime scene in the movie, during which the neighborhood block captain knocks on the sliding panel of a domicile to congratulate a down-and-out baker with his summons to serve the emperor. In Moscow, it has not been unusual for visiting foreign scholars to stay with families or acquaintances while doing research. Not far into the 21st century, the doorbell rang at 8 o’clock in the morning at the apartment of this writer’s host. It was the building commandant, who had arrived to present the host with his second son’s conscription notice. As in the movie version of wartime Japan, the news evoked little rejoicing and more than a little soul-searching.

Why should this summons have been viewed as a source of consternation, rather than an opportunity to serve the motherland? The answer to this question lies with a fourth proposition: the very size of the armed force and its manner of recruitment mean that the lower ranges of the military establishment will reflect virtually all the pluses and

minuses of its parent society. These pluses and minuses extend to long-ingrained habits and traditions, including abuses.

Since 1991, there has been something of a crisis within the Russian ground forces over issues of balanced recruiting, discipline, and declining qualifications. Part of the crisis finds its roots in uneven Russian economic development. Large cities, especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, are hubs for thriving economic development. The rural countryside resides in the economic doldrums. This unevenness in development means that unemployment is rife in the countryside, while the large cities prosper—albeit with their own varieties of uneven development. Country boys will flock to the colors, simply to find predictable room and board. Opportunity costs make the city boys more circumspect. All things being equal, the city boys would still serve, albeit more grudgingly than their rural cousins.

However, the fly in the ointment is something the Russians call “*dedovshchina*.” It is important to understand that any word in Russian ending with the suffix “*shchina*” invariably means something bad. In this case *dedovshchina* is a term used to describe what many observers translate into English as “hazing.” However, the Russian reality goes far beyond the antics of college-age fraternity boys. It involves groups of older or stronger recruits abusing the weaker and newly arrived. Abuses may begin with jibes and insults and end with beatings, extortion, and outright robbery. Because recruits are paid the equivalent of pennies per month, money for cigarettes and other amenities is always scarce. Thus, the strong and the poor prey on the weak and the more prosperous. This equation often translates into a form of gang warfare that pits the country boys against the city boys. It is understood that the latter have access to money and “care

packages” from home that exceed the resources of their rural counterparts. The result is endemic low-level conflict in virtually all traditional line units.

Another consequence of abuse is conscription evasion by eligible males in Moscow and other big cities. The month of April is the opening of spring conscription season, and it is not unusual to see military officers teamed with police in the subways. There, they lurk at the entrances to stations frequented especially by students. The purpose is to check internal passports and service cards to identify shirkers. Apprehension means direct dispatch to a military unit. There is no Monopoly-like chance to escape jail and receive the ruble equivalent of \$200.

Strict enforcement measures flow from the perception that Russia must have an armed force that represents all segments of the population—save perhaps the sons of the higher elite—and urban residents are no exception. Declining literacy in the rank and file of the armed forces is another perceived problem. City dwellers have access to better and more robust educational advantages. Because rural illiteracy has once again reared its ugly head, enforcement of balanced conscription is crucial to maintaining a diverse and literate armed force.

Yet, there is more to the story than balance. For the last century and a half, ever since the advent of a large cadre-and-reserve army, the Russians and their Soviet-era counterparts have viewed the army as school for the nation. Where and when necessary, the task has been to stamp out illiteracy. Meanwhile, always and everywhere, a collateral role has been to instill patriotism and devotion to shared sacrifice and service to nation. These convictions are crucial to the development of a shared civic identity and commitment to the state. They are all the more important in a land where political power is not fully

institutionalized, and in a land where the rule of law always seems to rest on a precarious footing. More than in a direct military way, the purpose of the army is to serve the political ends of the state. However, these ends are viewed more broadly than is usually the case in the West.

The continued emphasis on a cadre-and-reserve force in an era of ever-smaller professional military establishments leads to a fifth proposition. It is the understanding that Russian military eyes are generally larger than the economy’s stomach. Despite the existence of various experimental units recruited on a “contract” or voluntary basis, the Russian High Command continues to insist on conscription because the country cannot afford—or chooses not to afford—an all-volunteer professional military force. Conscripts are paid next to nothing, and they subsist largely on a diet of soup, porridge, and potatoes. As one former soldier once told this writer, after five or six weeks of service a conscripted man develops an insatiable hunger for anything fried, especially good meat, which is unusually hard to come by.

Back in 1989, during the heyday of “glasnost,” or “openness,” this writer was part of a formal visit during mid-summer to one of the top units near Moscow, the Taman Guards Division. At lunch the division commander proudly announced that most of our fare had been raised in the division’s own gardens. This revelation seemed striking to everyone except the military historians within the visiting delegation. They had long understood the importance of “the regimental economy,” including gardens and even livestock farms, dating at least to Imperial times. Historically, the country simply has not supported the size of the armed force that it seems to want.

Again, this reality was brought home during this writer’s recent conversations with

several officers who are intimately familiar with the system. One was a reserve officer who had been released after an unexpected call-up to active duty. He had to live at home while enduring a several-hour daily commute each way to his duty station. When asked why he had not taken an apartment closer to his assignment, he responded that there was no quarters allowance for reserve officers called up to active duty. Quarters were inadequate even for regular officers, not to mention reservists. And, regular officers also find themselves strapped. Although they retain a number of privileges, including access to commissary-like stores, their pay often does not keep up with inflation, especially in large urban centers. This blunt fact means that many regular officers take second jobs during off-duty hours to supplement their meager pay.

History again repeats itself, because officers in the Imperial Russian Army often had to take second jobs to get by on chronically underfunded wages and allowances. The Soviet period, especially after World War II, with its emphasis on the economics of privilege and position, was possibly an exception to the historical rule. The new Russian army appears to have reverted to the norm, at least for the moment. There has been sentiment to support regulations against outside work, but like everything else, reality does not always conform to the niceties of law and prescription.

A good part of the reason for this lies with the fact that the Ministry of Defense and its constituent service organizations seem almost bulletproof against reform. For many of the reasons mentioned above—and more—the Russian military appears intent on pursuing “business as usual,” even during a period of significant military change. A large cadre-and-reserve force justifies officers’ billets, and who would want to dismantle the system that assures officers a niche and a source of livelihood?

Moreover, the same large-scale military force justifies what remains of a more complex version of the old military economy. That is, the military continues to manage an extensive network of plants and factories devoted to military production. There is money to be made for senior officers in skimming from this economy and from granting less than fully supervised defense contracts. The result is hard to document, but it is estimated by such sources as *Jane’s Defence Weekly* that billions of rubles simply disappear into a military-controlled “dark hole.” Only recently have governmental initiatives to sell off military property threatened to close—or at least diminish—this hole.

This writer’s sixth proposition is that persistent inertia and the web of relationships that foster self-service and corruption have produced a modern military variant of “Jurassic Park.” The generals argue for a ground force with sufficient numbers (at least in expandable terms) and sufficient armored vehicles to match NATO forces, especially across the now more vulnerable central and southern fronts. However, there is no genuine enemy in sight, since NATO is currently preoccupied with Afghanistan and busily defining its linkages with both the European Union and Russia. Still, the Russians have found it useful to challenge the existing balance of conventional forces agreements as a means for justifying altered deployments and addressing internal threat preoccupations and allocations. Meanwhile, the Russians continue to maintain—albeit at a reduced level—a somewhat more modern version of the force that brought them to victory in World War II, or the “Great Patriotic War,” as they called the mammoth struggle on the Eastern Front, 1941–1945. It remains to be seen whether the shift in emphasis to the brigade (instead of the division) will remain permanent as the fundamental building block for operational formations.

There is another more insidious continuity. Throughout much of the 1990s, the Russian Army did not count the largest ground force in Russia. First place went to military formations belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. Thanks to a combination of factors ranging from internal insecurities to the conflict in Chechnya, the Ministry of the Interior counted its own substantial army. Over the last decade, as that conflict has died down from a boil to a simmer, the ranks of the internal troops have been reduced to fewer than 150,000. This figure now pales in comparison with the conventional army's roughly half-million. Moreover, the latter number can be rapidly expanded, thanks to the trained manpower pool inherent in a conscription system.

Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the ranks of the internal troops are fed by the same system of conscription. It is also interesting to note that, with the exception of heavy armored formations and armaments, interior troops amount to a ground force with far more than the traditional paramilitary capabilities. History tends to repeat itself in odd cycles. In czarist times, the Ministry of the Interior had its Corps of Gendarmes within the Third Section, and in Soviet times, the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs or *Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*) maintained its own troops separate from the Red Army.

This writer's last proposition is the assertion that behavioral habits, especially those deeply embedded in the society and culture, tend to replicate themselves in the armed forces. This understanding is especially true with regard to the impact of political culture and circumstance on command behavior and staff operations. Something permeating both this writer's research on and direct dealings with the Russian army is the realization that the larger culture—especially political

culture—has exercised an important influence on the way the Russians do military business. It should be remembered that this is a country in which, traditionally, the pursuit of power and its retention have more often than not been viewed as things and ends in themselves. The pursuit and exercise of power often occur with little or no reference to such seemingly mundane considerations as civic duty and the common good.

In much of what we would loosely call “the West,” especially within the Anglo-American governing and constitutional tradition, there is an idealized sense of institutionalized political (and military) power as a public trust. In its most idealized version, this trust, like the notion of “imperium” in Republican Rome, exists as an abstraction and an entity independent of personality and personal whim. This understanding is so ingrained in the Western constitutional tradition that it is taken for granted. For the U.S. military, in particular, the whole notion finds its embodiment in the West Point motto that is virtually a byword for the military professional: “Duty, honor, country.”

The same devotion to abstractions is often not true for a Russian society that has long been accustomed to viewing political and military power not as public trust but as private property. What are some of the consequences and implications? The first consequence is that authority over something is viewed as ownership, not stewardship. Since property cannot be subdivided without a sense of physical loss to the owner, the first imperative is to retain one's estate intact. Thus, retention of power and authority come to be viewed as a “zero-sum game.” To cede authority is to cede ownership, and as the writer Ernest Hemingway once noted in quite a different context, “Hawks do not share.”

The implication is that power remains clearly demarcated, with every proprietor

governing his own closely guarded fiefdom. In such a situation, lines of subordination and information flow tend to remain in stove pipes, with little value ascribed to collaboration and cooperation with external entities. In military practice, this situation makes both interservice and interagency coordination and cooperation very difficult, if not at times impossible.

A century ago, a failure in collaboration and cooperation at the highest levels of Russian government led to a failure to develop a well-integrated strategy to coordinate defense procurement, military preparedness, and war planning. The result was catastrophe during the onset of hostilities in World War I. Perhaps worse, failures in cooperation and coordination continued to dog the actual conduct of operations in the field throughout the war. The same set of problems confronted the Soviets during the Great Patriotic War, especially during its early stages.

Recently, these lapses repeated themselves during the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya. At least three different agencies, including the Russian army, bore responsibility for prosecuting the fight against guerilla secessionists and, for various reasons, none of them has worked well together. Each agency would prefer to govern its own bailiwick. Therefore, commanders worked at cross-purposes, plans were not well integrated, and communications were not networked. In the end, only a resort to scorched-earth tactics and the employment of local proxies achieved a modicum of success, but not before the conflict witnessed its own share of military catastrophes so reminiscent of the Muscovite, Imperial Russian, and Soviet past.

Another consequence of the emphasis on power as private property is an exaggerated perception of the importance of precedence and location. Proximity to the center has

always been a mark of distinction, while rank is viewed as a singularly distinguishing symbol of stature. To anyone familiar with military organizations, these assertions do not seem strange. What seems strange in Russian context is their exaggerated significance. For purposes of economy, a single example must suffice. One of the causes for catastrophic Russian failure in the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg was that, for reasons of seniority, one corps commander failed to subordinate himself to another.

A third consequence of narrowly conceived notions of power sharing has been impaired staff function. Under ideal circumstances, military staffs operate as extensions of a commander's thinking processes, with an emphasis on collective problem solving. If the system becomes too command-centric and too dismissive of dissent, then staffs are reduced to the status of field chanceries. There is good evidence to indicate that this phenomenon was exactly the case at Tannenberg, when General A. V. Samsonov refused to accept valid staff input that suggested a radically changed threat estimate, therefore justifying a radically changed course of action. How staff function evolved under the even more authoritarian Soviet system remains a valid subject for additional study.

A fourth consequence of power as private property has been an exaggerated reliance on patron-client relationships. These exist in virtually all organizations, but the Russians sometimes elevate the practice to new heights. Historically, within the military, the emphasis on patron-client has sometimes meant the creation of parallel, unnecessary, and even contending staff structures. More importantly, the practice has meant the retention of incompetent officials and officers far longer than the limits of tolerance would ordinarily ordain. One needs only to cite the examples of the networks established by the

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (Emperor Nicholas II's cousin) before and during World War I, or problems at the outset of the Great Patriotic War stemming from crony-like mutual-protection schemes. When institutional guaranties to power and position are lacking, humans resort to building coalitions of like-minded and mutually indebted individuals. Even the new post-1991 Russian government itself was not immune. During the mid-1990s, Boris Yeltsin created more than 500 generals, presumably from among officers who owed their loyalties to him and not to contenders for power.

To be sure, each of the foregoing propositions requires examination in greater depth and at greater length. However, in a preliminary way they provide grounds to consider at least three important implications. The first is that for reasons with deep-seated cultural, structural, and behavioral roots, the Russian army—like all conservative organizations—is likely to display all those atavistic impulses that make attractive a continued flirtation with Jurassic Park. With this assertion though, goes the caveat that the love affair with dinosaurs does not extend across the board.

Nor should this affair necessarily be construed as ultimately persistent for the new Russian Federation. The requirements for modernization retain their own dynamic, especially in areas related to ballistic missile

systems. These systems not even the Russians are prepared to hold hostage to a love affair with at least a partially mythical past.

The second implication is that the same faults ascribed to cultural, structural, and behavioral factors tend figuratively to make the Russians poor chess players at the outset of conventional and unconventional wars. Some 150 years ago, a young artillery captain named Sergei Urusov noted that the Russians began all their wars like chess players with poor opening moves. That is, the Russians needlessly sacrificed pawns and knights until they reached that point at which recovery became possible only through superhuman effort and sacrifice. Urusov wrote after the Crimean War of 1854–1856, but he might just as well have written the same lines at the beginning of the 21st century. His assertion retains validity after a century and a half, in no small part because of the propositions put forth in the foregoing discussion.

A final implication is the understanding that the Russian military and its wars must be studied *sui generis*, as things worthy of study in themselves. For travelers along the road to understanding, the role of this encyclopedia is to point out the path and indicate the signposts.

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Adjunct Professor of History
University of Kansas

Preface

In this age of readily available information, no resource can hope to be “complete”—not even an encyclopedia. *Russia at War*, therefore, seeks to provide not just a compendium of names and events, but references for further investigation and, more importantly, some explanation of the importance of the people and events listed here. The introduction to these volumes investigates at some length some of the enduring curiosities of the Russian military: why it is that Russia’s army is always so large, and yet so poorly led; why it is that almost any Russian military venture starts poorly but gathers momentum over time; and why it is that the Russian military looks “Western” but is not, at its heart.

These are not questions that can be answered in an article on, for example, Russia in the Seven Years’ War; yet the answers to these questions—in fact, the very act of investigating these questions—will shed light on the information contained in that article. Facts do not speak for themselves, after all; they require interpretation, and interpretation requires some grounding in the culture and history. Thus the contributors to this volume all possess training in some aspect of Russian or military history, or both, that provides some insights on their topics. Dr. Bruce Menning, who penned the introduction to this volume, has spent a lifetime investigating and thinking about things

Russian and things military; he is one of the leading experts on the czarist military in particular. He offers here some answers, and some propositions for the student of Russia or the Russian military.

Such essays, and such articles, are important because the Russian military is not “Western” or easily accessible to the casual student. For long periods of time—particularly during the Soviet era—information on the Russian military was hard to come by. Sometimes the information simply was not collected; sometimes the archives were closed. Either way, scholars and military experts were left to guess or (better) to use their deep knowledge of Russian and military cultures to extrapolate answers. For those without military backgrounds and Russian language skills, Russia’s military remained an enigma shrouded in a riddle wrapped in a mystery.

These volumes attempt to remove some of those obstacles, but removing all of them is impossible. The Russian language is used at some points from necessity; translations are provided, but translation and transliteration are inexact processes. Every effort has been made here to be consistent, above all else. The editors have adopted a slightly modified version of the Library of Congress system for transliteration, thus rendering names in versions “truer” to their Russian sound: “Aleksandr” rather than “Alexander,” and

“Pyotr” rather than “Peter,” for instance. Exceptions have been made in cases where a historical figure or place is already well-known in the West by the Roman spellings; thus “Catherine II” rather than “Ekaterina,” and “Peter I (the Great)” instead of “Pyotr I (the Great).”

Dates are likewise given in their Russian versions. Prior to January 31, 1918, Russia followed the Julian calendar, which was between 10 and 14 days behind the Gregorian calendar commonly used in the West. So while the Bolshevik Revolution, by Western reckoning, occurred on the night of November 6–7, 1917, on the Julian calendar it happened on October 24–25, 1917, and therefore is known in Russia as “The Great October Revolution.” Likewise the abdication of

Czar Nicholas II is referred to here as part of “The February Revolution” although it occurred in March by Western standards. From February 1, 1918, all dates follow the Gregorian (i.e., “Western”) calendar.

All of this can be confusing. Every effort has been made to demystify the Russian military experience though, and to be consistent, clear, and concise. If errors remain, responsibility lies with the editor, for the contributors and the publishers have been patient, diligent, and thorough. What is right, good, and useful to you, the reader, is the product of their labors; hopefully, that will be the greater portion of this work.

Timothy C. Dowling
Lexington, VA
2014

A

Aa, Battle of the (January 7–9, 1917)

World War I Eastern Front battle. The river Aa is a small tributary that runs through present-day Latvia, once part of the Russian Empire. The Aa empties into the Baltic Sea, near the Latvian capital of Riga.

On January 7, 1917, Russian General Aleksei Brusilov launched an attack with his Twelfth Army on German positions along the Aa at the northern end of the Eastern Front. With the exception of fighting in Romania and limited action in the Bukovina, the Aa battle was the only sizable military action on the Eastern Front in the first half of 1917. The Russian attack, carried out without preliminary bombardment on a 30-mile front, was reminiscent of tactics employed in the Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916). It caught the German defenders by surprise and pushed them back. The Russians took the towns of Mitau and Takkums, advancing up to 4 miles between the Aa and the Tirul Marsh. In the process, the Russians took upwards of 8,000 German prisoners and captured 36 guns. The Germans denied these figures, but the international media substantiated the Russian claims. German counterattacks from January 22 ceased by the end of the month.

The Battle of the Aa seemingly heralded a turning point on the Eastern Front. Czarist generals hoped the victory was a harbinger for their planned, aggressive spring offensive against the Germans. At a conference with British and French representatives in December 1916, they had agreed to coordinate

their attacks with their allies' planned offensives on the Western Front. But revolution in Russia in March and the institution of a new government curtailed these ambitious plans. The Germans, moreover, launched their own offensive in the summer of 1917 and inflicted substantial casualties on the Russian forces.

By August 1917, the Russian army abandoned its position gained at the Battle of the Aa, and German forces occupied Riga the next month. A second revolution in Russia that November brought the Bolsheviks to power, effectively ending the war on the Eastern Front.

John Thomas McGuire

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918)

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ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty

Signed on May 26, 1972, by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, and ratified 88–2 by the U.S. Senate on August 2, 1972, this agreement ostensibly limited the United States and Soviet Union to two anti-ballistic

2 | Adrianople (Edirne), Treaty of

missile (ABM) sites within their national territories. One U.S. site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, housed Safeguard ABMs and another site, which was never built, was intended to defend the Washington, D.C., area. Moscow was the primary Soviet site. Treaty provisions also limited each site to 100 missiles and launchers, 15 additional launchers at test sites, regulated the types of radars at each site, and implicitly recognized the value of space-based reconnaissance to ensure compliance with arms control agreements. A 1974 protocol reduced the number of ABM sites each country could deploy to one. This agreement represented the apex of the nuclear doctrine of mutual assured destruction and had many defenders in international foreign policy and security communities who believed it would regulate proliferation of nuclear missiles.

It was repeatedly violated by the Soviets, however, as evidenced by ABM facilities at Krasnoyarsk and Plesetsk. The treaty also encountered increasing criticism from Republican presidential administrations and congressional critics who believed it limited the United States' ability to defend itself from emerging ballistic missile threats. Its value deteriorated drastically after the Cold War, as ballistic missile technology proliferated in countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Pakistan. China never adhered to the treaty. Increasing U.S. concerns that proliferation of this technology would also reach transnational terrorists, as well as rogue regimes, and inhibit United States and other countries' efforts to develop ballistic missile defense systems led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2001.

This withdrawal met a muted reaction from Russia, and the ABM Treaty's legacy must be seen as an example of an arms control agreement failing to keep up with

proliferating and advancing weapons technologies, and the desire of countries such as the United States and its allies to defend themselves against the increasing threat posed by conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles.

Bert Chapman

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982)

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Adrianople (Edirne), Treaty of (1829)

Treaty concluding the Russian-Ottoman (Russo-Turkish) War of 1828–1829. It was signed on September 14, 1829, in Adrianople by Russia's Count Aleksei Orlov and by the Ottoman Empire's Abdul Kadyr-Bey. The war had been sparked by Russian interference in the Greek War of Independence at Navarino Bay, leading the Ottomans to close the Dardanelles to Russian ships. The Russians surprisingly launched a trans-Balkan offensive and forced the Ottomans to sue for peace.

Russia, whose forces had advanced as far as Adrianople during the war, abandoned

most of its conquests beyond the Danube River but gained territory at the mouth of the Danube, and acquired substantial territories in the Caucasus and southern Georgia. The Porte (the government of the Ottoman Empire) recognized Russia's possession of western Georgia and of the khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, which had been ceded to Russia by Iran (Persia) in the Treaty of Turkmenchay that concluded the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828.

The Ottomans further recognized the autonomy of Serbia and agreed to the removal of their troops, except for the frontier garrisons, and the ending of Ottoman collection of taxes in return for Serbian payment of a fixed annual tribute to the sultan. They also accepted the autonomy of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia under Russian protection, and fixed the border between the Ottoman Empire and Wallachia on the valley of the Danube. The Porte also recognized the autonomy of Greece, which achieved full independence in 1830. The treaty opened the Dardanelles to all commercial vessels, and Russia was granted the same capitulatory rights enjoyed by other European states.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Greek War of Independence (1821–1829); Orlov, Count Aleksei Grigorievich (1737–1808); Russo-Iranian War (1826–1828); Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829)

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Afghanistan Border Dispute. *See* Basmachi Insurgency (1918–1933)

Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989)

The Soviet military engagement in Afghanistan was one of the USSR's most consequential decisions during the Cold War. It led to increased antagonism with the United States, and contributed significantly to the decay of the USSR itself. The war was, at that time, the longest continuous foreign occupation in the modern history of Afghanistan.

The invasion marked the end of détente. To repay the Russians for their earlier support of North Vietnam, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency cooperated with Pakistani military intelligence in running training programs for the mujahideen (instructing over 80,000 men in seven camps in Pakistan), in supplying them with money and arms, and in coordinating foreign aid from China, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. While in 1980 the Carter administration allocated \$30 million in assistance for the mujahideen, under President Ronald Reagan it climbed to \$630 million in 1987. Saudi Arabia almost matched the American aid. Additionally, between 1986 and 1989, the United States supplied the mujahideen with 500 Stinger missiles. The Soviet commitment (the 40th Army, or “Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces”) varied from 90,000 to 115,000 troops; in the course of the war, over 500,000 servicemen and more than 60,000 officers served on a rotational basis.

Causes

The Soviet intervention originally aimed to save the Marxist government of Hafizullah Amin, who seized power in September 1979 by ousting Nur Muhammad Taraki. Taraki had overthrown President Mohammad Daoud Khan in the aftermath of the Saur Revolution in April 1978, when the



Afghan guerrillas atop a downed Soviet MI-24 helicopter gunship, near the Salang Highway, a vital supply route north from Kabul to the Soviet border. The picture was released in Pakistan by the Jamiat Islami insurgent group on January 12, 1981. (AP Photo)

(communist) People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power. The Party's radical reforms, mainly concerning land distribution and the emancipation of women, met with opposition from armed, conservative Muslim fighters: the mujahideen. As the regime lost control, the Islamists' rise to power threatened to take the country out of the Soviet sphere of influence. Numbering 80,000 fighters, the mujahideen forces nearly equaled the number of government troops. In 1978, the Afghan army relied on nearly 3,000 Soviet military advisers, and in 1978–1979, Taraki's and Amin's governments requested the USSR to intervene on 16 separate occasions.

Officially, under the provisions of the 1978 treaty of friendship, cooperation, and good neighborliness, the Soviet Union thus carried out an “invited intervention” by

responding to a call from Afghan authorities for help in fighting the mujahideen. The USSR deployed an improved scenario of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. At first, the main Soviet objectives in Afghanistan were (1) the prevention of the collapse of the communist regime, (2) seizing and holding strategic sites, (3) stabilizing the country, (4) strengthening the Afghan forces in fighting the mujahideen, (5) keeping Soviet casualties to a minimum, and (6) a prompt withdrawal.

Conduct of the War

Operations began on December 25, 1979, when airborne and elite striking forces seized Kabul; ground forces under the command of Marshal Sergei Sokolov simultaneously entered Afghanistan. On December 27, a

special KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*; or Committee for State Security) unit assassinated Amin, whom the Soviets accused of destabilizing the situation and being disloyal to Moscow, and replaced him with Babrak Karmal. The Soviet Army quickly took control of major urban centers and strategic sites in the country.

Initially, the 40th Army met little opposition, but soon it had to fight well-trained guerillas. The Soviet tactics had been designed for a regular enemy, and the troops were both trained and organized for large-scale, conventional warfare that could not succeed against irregulars. Although the coup-de-main in Kabul and the first phase of the intervention were successful, the Soviets were strategically, tactically, and psychologically unprepared for the mujahideen resistance. They simply lacked an anti-guerilla doctrine.

Soviet troops struggled with problems similar to those the British had experienced in the 19th century: a mobile, determined, tribal enemy fighting a guerilla war in a harsh, vast, dry, mountainous terrain. The mujahideen, who came from a traditional warrior society, proved well trained and highly motivated. They numbered by 1979 some 80,000 full-time fighters organized into hundreds of small groups of 20–50 rebels loosely structured into battalion-like units called *jabhas* operating throughout the countryside and in major cities. They fought in small and highly mobile units, avoiding open actions.

The mujahideen aimed at disrupting the communication routes vital for the supply of the Soviet and government forces; their favorite targets were convoys. Using “hit-and-run” tactics, they conducted most of their operations after dark, which forced the Soviets to give prominence to night operations. The insurgents also conducted various sabotage attacks: they damaged power lines

and pipelines; destroyed radio stations; and bombed government offices, air terminals, hotels, and so forth. In the mid-1980s, nearly 600 such acts were reported per year. To increase confusion among Soviet troops, they also used psychological warfare, spreading false rumors about planned ambushes or the location of rebel units and their leaders. Guerillas commonly used light arms and a limited number of heavy weapons, such as machine guns, mortars, 107-millimeter (mm) and 122-mm rocket-launchers, short-range antitank rockets, and, starting in 1987, portable American surface-to-air Stinger missiles. Making use of the latter, they intensified attacks against Soviet helicopters and aircraft, hitting on average one target per day.

The Soviet army was extremely sluggish in adopting tactics to cope with the guerilla warfare and with the terrain; it initially lacked even equipment and uniforms suitable for mountain combat. By 1981, Soviet activity had evolved into three main types of operations: (1) immobile defense of key centers; (2) the “highway war” (protection of communication and supply lines—mainly keeping the roads open between Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, as well as the Salang Highway between Kabul and Termez in the USSR); and (3) direct operations against mujahideen.

The 40th Army conducted periodic multidivisional offensives into the mujahideen-controlled areas; during 1980–1985, for example, it launched nine operations into the strategically vital Panjshir Valley. These offensives usually started with a few days of heavy bombardment by aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and missiles followed by maneuvers of mechanized columns of tanks and motorized rifle units moving along major routes into mountain valleys. Because such massive conventional attacks were rarely effective and exposed Soviet units to

ambushes, in 1980–1981, more airmobile elements were introduced with the aim of clearing the key terrain of enemy units and reducing the number and severity of mujahideen attacks on Soviet ground columns. Later, the use of helicopters developed into a sort of blocking tactic aimed at searching out and destroying the guerillas. By 1983, motorized rifle units were withdrawn from direct anti-guerilla operations (except for large offensives) and assigned to protect cities, highways, garrisons, airports, and other strategic centers. They were also used in economic warfare operations designed to weaken the mujahideen such as burning crops, destroying irrigation systems, and bombing villages.

In direct counterinsurgency actions, the elite airborne, air assault, reconnaissance, and special operations units (*spetsnaz*) were deployed. Although these forces had been in use since the beginning of the war, they now numbered 18,000–23,000 and were given the major role of ambushing the mujahideen. Even these special units did not adapt well, since they remained vulnerable to ambush and relied too much on technological advantage rather than on greater mobility and tactical deception.

Unable to establish unquestioned air superiority within Afghanistan, the Soviets escalated attacks on villages and cities. Atrocities were not uncommon. By destroying the infrastructure, livestock, and crops, and forcing people to flee their homes, the Soviets hoped to deprive the guerillas of resources and safe havens. This tactic of crude firepower, indiscriminate bombing, mining, and the use of chemical weapons (rockets filled with toxins and mycotoxins) depopulated many areas. In 1979, for example, the second largest city of Kandahar was inhabited by 200,000 people, but in 1989, there were only 25,000 people left.

Soviet forces fared little better. The 40th Army suffered serious morale problems resulting from a lack of motivation, boredom (conscripts were often assigned dull routine and guard tasks, especially in the remote outposts), sickness (largely due to bad sanitation and a poor diet—some 65% of all servicemen suffered from dysentery, typhoid, hepatitis, pneumonia, or skin diseases endemic to the region), abysmal living conditions, racial and ethnic tensions, cruel superiors, discrimination by older soldiers (*dedovshchina*), and substance abuse. Because alcohol was scarce and expensive, hashish, marijuana, opium, and even heroin and cocaine became the common drugs self-prescribed by many soldiers who illegally traded equipment, including arms, for drugs. Morale was also undermined by the inequality in recruitment caused by favoritism and corruption.

Withdrawal

Informal negotiations for withdrawal began already in 1982, but disengagement became possible only after Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985. With the introduction of *glasnost*, discussion of Soviet performance and casualties was allowed for the first time, and even encouraged, as Gorbachev sought to prepare an “honorable” withdrawal. The exit strategy involved transferring the burden of fighting to the Afghan army (“Afghanization”). Troop withdrawal began on May 15, 1988.

The Soviets left behind a substantial stockpile of weaponry and, until its collapse, the USSR continued to support the Afghan government. In April 1988, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the United Nations (UN)-sponsored Geneva Accords with the United States and USSR as its guarantors. The agreement aimed at ending the interference

in Afghanistan's internal affairs, withdrawing Soviet troops by mid-February 1989, repatriating Afghan refugees, and stabilizing the country. Because the mujahideen had been excluded, the full implementation of the Accords was doomed to failure. The civil war continued, and in 1996, the Taliban, which derived from the mujahideen movement, seized power.

The burden of the conflict was severe for both sides. The Soviets reported almost 15,000 dead, 309 missing in action, and 50,000 wounded, including 11,600 maimed or crippled. The ratio of wounded to dead was high (1.61) compared with the Americans in Vietnam (6.4). The Soviets lost 118 airplanes, 332 helicopters, 147 tanks, and nearly 12,000 supply trucks. Afghan casualties were between 1.24 million and 2 million dead, 5 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and another 2 million internal refugees in what Louis Dupree, a scholar of Afghan culture and history, has called "migratory genocide." More than 26,000 Afghan soldiers lost their lives.

Because the conflict was unpopular in the USSR, returning soldiers were usually met with indifference, injustice, and even hostility. In opinion polls, fully 46 percent of Soviet civilians regarded the war as a national shame; only 6 percent were proud of their soldiers' efforts. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet government openly criticized the war, blaming veterans for spreading addiction and crime. By the end of 1989, some 3,000 veterans had been imprisoned for criminal offences, and some 44 percent of veterans required professional psychological help. The so-called Afghan Syndrome (paralleling the United States' Vietnam Syndrome) also manifested itself in the October 1989 declaration by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that intervention in Afghanistan deserved both moral and political

condemnation. Certainly, the action marked the greatest military humiliation for the USSR since the opening days of World War II.

Like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was not beaten militarily, but could not win the protracted, asymmetrical war. Afghanistan is often referred to as *the Soviet Vietnam*, as the unpopular military involvement not only ended in strategic failure but also exhausted the Soviet budget (the estimated cost was \$8 billion for each of the nine years, with every day of deployment consuming roughly \$15 million–\$22 million) and overstretched the communist state, thus contributing, in a way, to the domestic changes that culminated in the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

Lukasz Kamiński

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); *Dedovshchina*; Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Sokolov, Sergei Leonidovich (1911–2012); Vietnam War(s), Soviet Union and (1945–1975)

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Air Forces, Russia (to 1917, and since 1991)

Russia's interests in aeronautics can be traced back to the 17th century with Mikhail V. Lomonosov (1711–1765) and the founding of the Academy of Sciences in 1725. His research in aerodynamics led to a demonstrated model of a helicopter in 1754, but as with his counterparts in the West, he was unable to get a heavier-than-air machine off the ground due to engine requisites. In the 1880s, Alexander F. Mozhaisky (1825–1890) constructed a monoplane with a 40-foot wing span, which was aerodynamically sound, but the two steam engines did not have the power to get the aircraft into sustained flight. It did get off the ground for a few feet in 1883, and later Soviet historians claimed that Mozhaisky was the inventor of the first successful heavier-than-air flying machine. Russian chemist Dmitry I. Mendeleev (1834–1907), a friend of Mozhaisky and fellow researcher in high-altitude ballooning, designed a working altimeter. Russia's efforts in aerodynamics until 1903 were directed toward lighter-than-air vehicles, balloons, and airships.

Following the success of the Wright brothers in the United States, Andrei N. Tupolev (1888–1972) began to design and construct gliders and experiment with designs without engines. It was Nikolay Y. Zhukovsky (1847–1921) who built the first wind tunnel in Russia for his research in flight theory and established the Institute of Aerodynamics at Kuchino outside Moscow. It was Igor I. Sikorsky (1889–1972) who designed and flew the first heavier-than-air engines for flight, and in 1911 produced the S-5, which flew for a sustained 30 minutes at an altitude of 1,000 feet. By 1912, he developed *The Grand* weighing 9,000 lbs, with a wing span

of 92 feet, powered by four 100-horsepower four-cylinder, water-cooled Argus engines. An instant success, *The Grand* was officially designated the *Rusky Vityaz* (Russian Knight).

Besides Sikorsky, other designers were making their mark on aerodynamics and design prior to World War I. Some notables were Yakov M. Gakkel (1874–1945), also known as Joseph Hackel, whose aircraft could climb at a rate of 300 feet a minute. A.A. Porokhovshchikov (1892–1943) produced the *Bi Coque* (a biplane with a twin tail), which flew over 60 miles an hour, climbed 600 feet a minute, and could be folded up for transport and storage. Dmitry P. Grigorovich (1893–1938) began experimenting and building hydroplanes regarded as the best in the world. Despite all the successes, the main output of these aircraft was of foreign design under license in Russia.

On the eve of the First World War, Sikorsky developed the renowned *Ilya Muromets* with a payload of 3,000 lbs. The *Nieuport-4* and *Farman-16* and *-22*, however, were the major aircraft in use in Russia. It must be noted that no other major power at the beginning of the war had a significant inventory. Russia's weakness was its poor industrial base, and the government's inability in the organization of its potential. The result was that in Russia's 40 months in the war, it fell behind its enemies, except for the *Ilya Muromets*, which made the first raid over Germany and dropped 600 lbs. of bombs.

Ace Yevgraph Kruten (1890–1917) studied Allied tactics in France and the German art of aerial combat. Russian air doctrine during this period was the same as the rest of Europe, which saw the development of the airplane as a reconnaissance tool for artillery spotting and intelligence for commanding officers. As the airplane developed into a weapon system, so did the concept of its

use in ground support and interdiction. But throughout the war, the Russian air force was never to be competitive, as noted earlier, due to Russia's weak industrial base.

The major contribution to air combat that is strictly Russian was the art of *taran*, or ramming. Different forms of *taran* were employed: using the propeller of the aircraft to destroy the tail controls of an enemy aircraft; using the wing to cut off an opponent's wing or tail; and direct ramming, which was the easiest, but almost always fatal to the attacker. The first *taran* was made by Pyotr Nesterov against an Austrian enemy aircraft on September 8, 1914, where neither pilot survived. Alexander Kazakov (1889–1919) was the first Russian pilot to survive and become the highest Russian decorated ace in the war, with a total of 17 victories. The use of *taran* was considered heroic by the general population. It was the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 that was to change the course of the air force and its development.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Air Service (VVS) declined due to the new Russian political and economic realities. The VVS lacked financial resources, which led to an abundance of older aircraft; a lack of personnel; and affected areas of maintenance, training, research, development, and modernization. Budget allocations for the new Russian air forces have been consistently below requirements by as much as 70 percent. By the late 1990s, the VVS admitted that it could no longer conduct any large-scale conventional operations. Morale was at its lowest, with many of its personnel living in substandard housing or homeless. This led to many protests and hunger strikes, and many senior VVS officers were found to be involved in criminal activities.

Even with all the difficulties the VVS faced, it was able to conduct limited operations in

Chechnya during Russia's two wars there (1994–1996 and 1999–2002). The VVS also supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Nations' operations in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Studying these operations, along with other global operations around the world, has led to a modernization program, which they hope to complete by 2020. They will face many difficulties along the way.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Kazakov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1889–1919); Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich (1889–1972); Sikorsky Ilya Muromets Heavy Bomber

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Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991)

With the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, the communists were able to gain power through "Order No. 1" that created soldier and sailor committees and subordinated all officer decisions to their approval. Air forces were an insignificant part of the overall Red (Bolshevik) military organization and hardly received any attention.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, ended Soviet involvement in World War I. On May 24, 1918, the Central Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Air Force was created, and in August,

the Field Administration of Aviation and Aeronautics of the Revolutionary Military Soviet (*Aviadarm*) was formed to direct the combat activities of all Red Air Force units. The *Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily* (military air force, abbreviated as VVS) was formed on May 24, 1918, from the remnants of the Russian Imperial Air Force. The air force at this time was almost nonexistent, and during the Russian Civil War from November 1917 through June 1923 its role in the conflict was insignificant. The few Red Air Fleet units that existed were used for reconnaissance and interdiction (*Shturmovik*) when possible.

It was at the end of the civil war that the nature of the air war changed. Poland entered the conflict in 1920 by seizing Kiev in the Ukraine. An effort was made to consolidate the use of a single type of aircraft to maximize repairs and spare parts. The Soviet account states that they flew over 2,000 missions that dropped over 14,000 pounds of bombs, and downed 35 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat.

With the end of the civil war, the Soviets began the economic development called the New Economic Policy (NEP) in March 1921. This spurred inroads in the development of air power. The Zhukovsky Military Air Academy was founded during this time. The Air Force was removed from domination of ground-force oriented strategy by 1924. The Soviets began to build their own aircraft, mainly reconnaissance and fighter planes, and continued with bomber development.

A major boost in the development of Soviet aviation came from the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in April 1922. In exchange for the ability to set up military bases in the Soviet Union, Germany would train Soviet personnel in the latest techniques in military doctrine. By 1925, a training field was set up and running at Lipetsk, just south

of Moscow. This highly effective program coupled with *Osoaviakhim*, trained millions of young Soviets, male and female, in aeronautics and communications “to the defense of the Motherland.”

With the death of Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin in 1924 and the emergence of Josef Stalin as the new leader, the modernization of air power increased further. According to an official Soviet source, between 1928 and 1932, the labor force in the aviation industry increased by 750 percent and the number of engineers and technicians by 1,000 percent. These figures are almost certainly inflated, however. The Soviets nonetheless were pioneers in the use of airborne troops in strategic and tactical maneuvers. The rest of the world followed soon afterwards. On the international level, the VVS would test its abilities in the Spanish Civil War of 1936, and against the Japanese in China in 1937. These small wars were beneficial for the testing involving the use of artillery, tanks, and aircraft.

Soviet air doctrine theorists favored an independent bomber operation such as proposed by Italian General Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), which was popular among theorists throughout the world. Soviet theorists not only pointed out the importance of strategic bombing but also advocated a heavy commitment to close support for the ground forces. With the building of a large bomber fleet, the Soviet doctrine mirrored the German doctrine, which was tactically offensive and strategically defensive. Their first aim was air superiority through bombing raids of enemy air force ground installations, followed by bombing missions in the enemy’s rear area. The Soviets also had a doctrine for fighter escort for their bombers, but the implementation order never came from the High Command and left the bombers defenseless.

The period of 1937–1939 would spell disaster for the VVS and the aeronautic industries. The great purge of military officers ordered by Stalin in 1937 saw the elimination of 5,616 airmen, many of whom had gained experience in Spain and China. Hundreds of civilian designers, engineers, and specialists were executed or imprisoned only to perish in labor camps. The devastating effects were soon seen in operations in Finland and Poland in the late 1930s, where the air force performed poorly, and reforms were immediately necessary.

A Five-Year Plan was developed for the VVS, and new combat aircraft were developed: MiG-3, LaGG-3, and Yak-1 fighters. Pe-2 bombers and the Il-2 Shturmovik arrived in air units. New flight schools were developed, and the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy became the center for advanced command and leadership training. Before the reforms could take effect, however, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

The surprise attack by Germany devastated the armed forces and the VVS. By September 1941, Soviet aircraft losses had reached over 7,500, though many of these were of old design. As the Germans advanced on Moscow, Stalin had the industrial VVS factories moved to the Ural Mountains. Desperate preparations were made for the defense of the capital. Po-2 (U-2) night bombers flown by women pilots, named “Night Witches” by the Germans, harassed the enemy every evening. The Il-2 *Ilyushas* made their first appearance in force during the day. Even though the Luftwaffe still had air superiority, the strain of constant combat was beginning to take its toll on pilots and equipment. The VVS was credited with the first German defeat of the war in the skies over Moscow.

On December 5, the Soviets counterattacked; the VVS flew 16,000 combat sorties,

half in support of ground troops, during the first 30 days. From January through March 1942, the VVS flew 49,000 combat sorties against Germany’s Army Group Center. The Soviet pilots had an impressive operations record in weather conditions that grounded the German opponent. By the end of the winter offensive though, the VVS was suffering from attrition and weary from continuous combat.

Reforms began in April 1942, with the appointment of General A. A. Novikov (1902–1976) as VVS commander. He aggressively reorganized and reformed the VVS to become a modern weapons system, with mobile air armies under a centralized command that provided enormous flexibility for future campaigns. Stalin also monitored the VVS with strong and critical opinions.

Air operations over Stalingrad saw the effect of the changes. Soviet pilots in updated aircraft were now on a rough par with their German counterparts. Novikov came to the front and implemented radios and radio guidance network systems that gave the VVS time to counter the Germans. This improvement was extremely effective during the blockade of German aid to Stalingrad. VVS pilots were ordered to avoid enemy fighters and strike only at bombers, a tactic called *zasada* (ambush). The use of *taran* (aerial ramming) was also used by desperate Soviet pilots.

The pivotal change to Soviet air superiority, however, came in the battles over the Kuban in April and May of 1943. The VVS went from a defensive to an offensive phase in the war. Large numbers of aircraft were now available, through manufacturing and Lend-Lease, and the VVS began emulating German tactics, first gaining parity and then superiority. Confidence grew within the VVS and, by the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, the VVS showed a solid logistical

base. The *Okhotniki* (free hunters) first used at Stalingrad, were now used in force with impressive success. Air superiority was now complete and would last till the end of the war.

With the end of World War II and during the Cold War period (1945–1991) the VVS became a remarkable air power in competition with the United States. They sold air weapons systems to other countries and trained their personnel in the USSR. The USSR developed jet aviation with the 1948 introduction of the MiG-15 fighter, which was equal to the U.S. F-86 and used during the Korean conflict. The VVS normally used proxy pilots, who were quite successful against the United States at the beginning of the conflict. Soviet pilot Semyon Khomich, however, became the first in history to be credited with a jet-versus-jet victory in 1950.

Soviet aces during the Korean War have been numbered at 52, even though they were officially not combatants. They fought in the area known as “MiG Alley.” The best day for the VVS during the war was on October 30, 1951, when 21 B29s escorted by approximately 200 U.S. F86s and F84s tried to attack the Soviet airfield at Namsi. They were intercepted by 44 MiG-15s, with a loss of 12 B29s and 4 F4s. By the end of the conflict though, the United States was able to gain air superiority over the VVS.

After the Korean conflict, the VVS kept its research and development of aerial combat and technology secret from the rest of the world. It was through North Vietnam, Egypt, and Syria that the West could gain significant knowledge. Each of these conflicts had Soviet proxy pilots, and it was believed that Soviet fighter pilots were controlled by GCI (Ground Control Intercept) measures. During the so-called War of Attrition in 1970

over the Suez Canal, five Soviet-flown MiG-21s were destroyed in aerial combat against no losses to Israeli F-4s and Mirages. The fighter pilots lacked free-form tactical abilities, and situational awareness in multiparticipant engagements. Foreign pilots in the USSR were trained by following a syllabus approach with Soviet instructors asking set questions and the answers coming in unison from all students. Individuality and aircraft abilities were not stressed. During all three Israeli-Arab conflicts (1956, 1967, and 1973), the losses of Soviet and satellite pilots were high, and revised VVS tactics left the force in support of ground operations.

During the Soviet-Afghanistan War (1979–1989), aerial combat between fighters was nonexistent. The air war was conducted by helicopters, which were given a variety of tasks, to include fire and air support with gunships (Mi-24 Attack Helicopter), armed transport (Mi-8 Transport helicopter) for the movement of troops, and special mission helicopters. These various weapons’ platforms were suited to the rugged terrain. Gunships took the place of tanks and performed escort duties. Helicopters though, were vulnerable and, due to their lack of speed, became significant targets for the mujahideen. Even though the reinforced armored helicopters were resistant to machine-gun fire, it was the introduction of the Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) that altered air superiority. Soviet losses during the conflict were 118 jets and 333 helicopters.

By the 1980s, the VVS could deploy over 10,000 aircraft around the world, solidifying its superpower status. There were three main branches: *Dal'naya Aviatsiya* (Long-Range Aviation); *Frontovaya Aviatsiya* (Frontal Aviation); and *Voенно-Transportnaya Aviatsiya* (or Military Transport Aviation). Air defense was

a separate service from the VVS. Aircraft development included the Tu-95, MiG-25, MiG-29, Su-27, and MiG-31. Later developments include the Tu-16, MiG-23 MLD, Sukhoi Su-15, and Sukhoi Su-24 ground-attack aircraft.

With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the VVS pulled its forces out of the former Warsaw Pact (WTO or Warsaw Treaty Organization) countries. The reorganization to a new Russian Air Force has seen many obstacles, and progress has been slow.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Korean War (1950–1954); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Mi-G (Mikoyan-Gurevich) Aircraft; October (November) Revolution (1917); Order No. 1 (March 1, 1917); Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Russia and Arab-Israeli War (1956); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Six-Day War (June 5–10, 1967); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Suez Crisis (1956); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991), Women in

Women aviators in Russia and later in the Soviet Union developed more slowly than in the West. In 1917, Defense Minister Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky (1881–1970) opened military service to women, and Sofia Alexandrovna Dolgorunaia flew for the Air Services, but by the end of the Russian Civil War, few women had followed.

Only a small number of women served as pilots before the Second World War, beginning in 1923. There was great opposition to women in military service. It was through the *Osoaviakhim* (Society of Assistance to Defense and Aviation—Chemical Construction of the USSR) in 1927 and military flying schools that women were offered the opportunity to become pilots. By the 1930s, *Osoaviakhim* developed a network of air clubs, with large support from the Soviet government. Although young women were encouraged to participate with legal support, it was extremely difficult for them to seek a career as a pilot. There still were those women such as Zinaida Kokorina, who in 1925 graduated from the Egorevsky Military Aviation School, or there with a first class degree.

It was during the mid- and late-1930s that women aviators achieved recognition through world record long-distance flights. The most noted of these women was Marina Raskova (1912–1943), who truly pioneered women in Soviet aviation. In 1933, she became the first woman to qualify as an air force navigator and taught at the Zhukovsky Air Academy when she was 22 years old. She began a series of long-distance world record flights and by 1939 entered the prestigious M. V. Frunze Academy. Her national notoriety came with the long-distance record flight

of the *Rodina* (Motherland) with two other known women aviators: Polina Osipenko and Valentina Grizhodubova. With Josef Stalin's support, they embarked on their journey in a twin-engine ANT-37 (converted DB-2 bomber). Bad weather forced the plane to land, but not before Raskova bailed out. She was injured and wandered for 10 days before being reunited with her other crew members and rescued. All three became national heroes and were the first women to receive the Hero of the Soviet Union award prior to the war.

With the German invasion on June 22, 1941, the *Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily* (VVS, Military Air Forces) lost most of its aircraft within the first operations of the war. Many Soviet women who had graduated from the *Osoaviakhim* volunteered, but were turned down. It was Marina Raskova who was able to form the all-women's aviation group, despite a reluctant military. As a member of the Supreme Soviet, hero of popular culture, and with access to high levels of government to include Josef Stalin, she was able to get acceptance for the formation of the women's regiments. She met resistance, but with her famous speech of women against Fascism on September 8, 1941, and with the support of Stalin, the Aviation Group 122 was formed.

On October 8, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense issued Order No. 0099 that stated by December 1, three regiments of women pilots would be trained for combat, through Aviation Group 122. Volunteers began to be recruited and trained at the Engels Air Base. Only the most skilled pilots were accepted, and there was a lack of trained navigators. The program was to take three years of training and condense them into less than six months. Many of the staff at the Engels facility did not accept the women and found it difficult to work with them. Through the support of Stalin and

Raskova, however, the training was successful. Three groups were formed and sent off to combat.

The 46th Guard Night Bomber Aviation Regiment, later designated 46th Guards Night Bomber Aviation Regiment, flew the Po-2 bi-wing aircraft from May 1942 through May 1945. They earned the designation as Guards in February 1943, Tamansky, Orders of the Red Banner and Suvorov III Class, and were disbanded in October 1945. They flew over 24,000 combat missions and earned 24 Hero of the Soviet Union awards. The Germans referred to them as the *Nachthexen* (Night Witches), a name they took with honor and pride. They remained an all-women unit throughout the war.

The 125th Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment was named for Marina Raskova upon her death and designated the 587th Bomber Aviation Regiment from January 1943 to September 23, 1943. On their way to Stalingrad for their first combat mission, bad weather set in and Marina Raskova's Pe-2 crashed, killing all aboard. She never saw combat. Honorary designations earned by the unit included: Guards; Borisovsky, and the orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, III Class. They were disbanded in February 1947. They flew the Pe-2 and completed 1,134 combat missions, dropping 980,000 tons of bombs, and earning five Hero of the Soviet Union awards. The 586th Fighter Aviation Regiment was the most controversial. They received no honorary designations, even though they flew the Yak-1/7b/9 in 4,419 combat missions, destroying 38 enemy aircraft in 125 air battles. None of the women pilots of this group received the prestigious Hero of the Soviet Union medal. They were integrated with male units and their primary task was to protect fixed targets in air defense duties. Their first commander, Tamara Kazarinova, was involved in controversy

and was dismissed due to numerous deaths among her pilots.

After the end of World War II, Soviet women were demobilized, and rapidly discharged, except for a few specialists. Many felt that that with the war over there was no reason for service and wished to return to former jobs, and start families.

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See also: Frunze Academy; Grizhodubova, Valentina (1910–1993); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970)

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AK-47

The *Avtomat Kalashnikova 1947*, commonly known as the AK-47 or Kalashnikov, is a durable, lightweight, gas-operated assault rifle created by Mikhail Kalashnikov in 1947. Since then, Russian manufacturer IZH has produced over 70 million of the assault rifles. Widely used during the Cold War, the AK-47 has become the most replicated small arm in the world. Frequently smuggled by arms traffickers, the AK-47 has been used to cause the deaths of millions of people throughout the world. Despite efforts by

nongovernmental organizations to limit its production and trafficking, the AK-47 and its derivative weapons continue to permeate borders worldwide.

After being wounded in the Battle of Briansk during World War II, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 in response to a call from the Soviet government for higher quality arms. Fusing and simplifying designs from German and American arms, Kalashnikov created a prototype carbine. The Soviet Army chose the Simonov SKS instead, but continued to seek new light arms that could stand up to the harsh weather conditions and still match German firepower. Kalashnikov kept improving his 1943 carbine and eventually designed a gas-operated breech-block rifle that the army accepted for testing in late 1946. After resolving complications with the original model discovered during 1948–1949, the Soviet Union began issuing updated AK-47s to its troops in 1956 with further upgrades coming in 1959.

The AK-47 clearly draws on the design of the German *Sturmgewehr 44* and U.S. Army rifles of the same period. Its large gas cylinder, generous clearances, and heavily machined receiver provide functionality in almost any conditions; however, these features also render the weapon less accurate. The AK-47 has both semiautomatic and automatic (“gas”) modes, and is considered useful at ranges up to 350 meters. The real attraction of the AK-47, however, is its firepower. The gun’s 30-round magazine is noted for its durability and ease of use, and most AKs can also mount grenade launchers.

With the intensification of the Cold War and related wars, the Soviet Union began exporting AK-47s around the world. Virtually every East Bloc nation and Soviet ally featured some form of the AK-47 in its arsenal, and even today the weapon often is associated with anti-colonial, anti-imperialist,

or anti-Western “liberation struggles.” Ironically, the United States even purchased AK-based “Type 56” weapons from Communist China to arm the *mujihadeen* against the Soviets after 1979.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the widespread smuggling of these weapons to other countries. Weapons smugglers prize the AK-47 for its effectiveness, as well as for being easily concealable, highly portable, and cheap. It continues to be perhaps the most widely used and best-known small arm in the world.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kalashnikov, Mikhail Timofeevich (1919–2013); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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ALBION, Operation (October 8–18, 1917)

From 1915 on, the Germans held most of the Russian province of Courland, which formed the western shore of the huge Gulf of Riga. At the head of the gulf, the three large islands of Ösel, Dagoe, and Moon sit astride the entrance, forcing vessels to thread the narrow Irbe Strait along the coast to the west or Moon Sound to the east of the islands. Both passageways into the gulf were sufficiently narrow to permit interdiction by coast artillery.

The Russians occupied the islands and had fortresses covering both straits. Ships of the Russian navy could operate at will in

the Gulf of Riga from their base at Pernau, using the Baltic islands as a shield. In the summer of 1917, the German High Command decided it would seek to drive Russia from the war or at least neutralize Russia so that German armies in the east could be sent westward for a decisive blow in 1918 before American forces arrived in France in strength. The Russians were reeling, but even the loss of Bukovina in July and Riga to the German Eighth Army in September did not lead to a capitulation. The Germans therefore could not exploit this gain until they opened the sea lines of communication at the mouth of the gulf.

On September 8, 1917, both the army and navy staffs agreed to mount an operation, code-named **ALBION**, to take the islands in the Gulf of Riga. General of Infantry Hugo von Katheren’s XXIII Reserve Corps served as the army component of the joint force. The navy formed a special task force under Vice Admiral Erhard Schmidt, commander of High Sea Squadron III. Until the landing forces reached the shore of Ösel, they came under the authority of Schmidt; once the soldiers went ashore, Katheren would take over. The islands presented no formidable difficulties except for their few and generally poor roads. The Sworbe Peninsula in the southwest of Ösel was the most heavily defended. At its end at Zerel, the Russians had mounted 305-millimeter (mm) naval gun batteries that controlled the Irbe Strait. On the north coast, the two points at the mouth of the Tagga Bay—Hundsört and Ninnast—had batteries of 120-mm and 150-mm guns, respectively. Farther to the east, batteries at Pamerort (Ösel) and Tofri (Dagoe) controlled Soela Sound between Dagoe and Ösel. At Orissaare, on the east side of Ösel, Russian forces guarded both ends of the causeway between Ösel and Moon Island.

The Germans estimated that the Russians had an infantry division or its equivalent on Ösel. The Russians had airfields at Pappensholm on the west coast, and at Sworbe and Arensburg. They had mined the waters extensively around the island. Shallow water and the guns on the Sworbe Peninsula prevented the German ships from coming close to the coast on the south side of the island. As a consequence, the Germans chose an amphibious landing on the northern part of the island. Once ashore, German forces could attack the batteries at Sworbe from the land side. Tagga Bay on the north coast permitted adequate anchorage for the invading forces and became the landing site.

Colonel Erich von Tschischwitz, chief of staff of the German XXIII Reserve Corps, largely devised the ground campaign plan. The corps had the mission of taking Ösel and Moon Islands, and it mostly consisted of Lieutenant General Ludwig von Estorff's 42nd Infantry Division, reinforced with an additional infantry regiment and a brigade of cycle troops commandeered from Flanders. The division's first major objective was to capture Arensburg, Ösel's capital, blocking the retreat of enemy forces northeast toward Moon Island. At the same time, the 131st Infantry Regiment was to march overland and capture the Russian fort at Zerel at the tip of the Sworbe Peninsula.

An ambitious landing farther east at Pamerort had two goals. The first was to confuse the Russians over the location of the main landing. The second was to employ the bicycle troops, taking advantage of their ability to move faster than regular infantry, to seize the causeway bridgehead at Orissaare leading to Moon Island, and block the escape of any Russian troops. Once the landing forces were safely ashore, the German fleet was to force the Irbe Strait and support the ground force in the assault upon Arensburg. In

addition, naval gunfire was to assist the regiment attacking the Sworbe Peninsula. After Arensburg fell, the Germans planned to base their naval operations there.

The Germans set September 27 for the assault, but poor weather forced several delays. On October 8 the weather lifted, loading commenced, and at dawn on October 11, the fleet sailed from Libau for Ösel. The voyage was nerve-wracking, since poor weather had prevented the minesweepers from completing their work. Nonetheless, surprise was complete.

Once ashore, German units moved rapidly toward their objectives. German seaplanes, launched from a tender, provided invaluable reconnaissance. Poor communications and roads that turned to mud under heavy rains hampered both the German advance and the feeble Russian response. In places, the Russians did offer spirited but brief resistance. The Russian artillery garrison at Zerel held on for a day or two under heavy naval bombardment from 4th Squadron battleships, surrendering on October 16 to the 131st Infantry Regiment. The sharpest fighting occurred at Orissaare, the terminus of the causeway from Ösel to Moon.

The navy had landed the special strike force as close to Orissaare as shallow waters allowed, namely at Pamerort, some 30 miles west. Two battalions of infantry cyclists raced ashore and, after a strenuous advance, Captain von Winterfeld's cyclist battalion captured the causeway terminus at Orissaare, while the other battalion interdicted the road from Orissaare to Arensburg.

For two days trapped Russian forces tried to break through Winterfeld's cyclists at Orissaare. Just in time, however, the 42nd Infantry Division, which had taken Arensburg, conducted a difficult forced march in driving rain and relieved the hard-pressed cycle troops on October 14. German naval

forces hugging the shores of the shallow Kassar Inlet also provided support to Winterfeld's battalion.

With Ösel in the hands of the Germans by October 16, attention turned to Moon Island. Its capture would render the Pernau-Moon Sound area untenable for the Russian fleet and force it from the Gulf of Riga. Several attempts to storm across the causeway failed, but on the morning of October 17 a company of the 138th Infantry Regiment landed on Moon Island and, after a brief engagement, captured the fortifications at the causeway. The remainder of the regiment came across, and the island was secured the next day.

A large number of prisoners were taken, including an infantry regiment and four additional battalions, plus substantial small arms and artillery. The Reval (Tallinn) Naval Battalion of Death, led by Captain Pavel Shisko, fought to the end. On October 19, the 17th Infantry Regiment went ashore on Dagoe Island to the north and moved inland, encountering minimal resistance. Vice Admiral Mikhail Bakhirev's naval forces defending the Gulf of Riga fought a rearguard action, losing the battleship *Slava* to German ships under Vice Admiral Paul Behncke, and marking the end of the operation.

German casualties in Operation ALBION were surprisingly light. Army losses totaled 9 officers (including poet Walter Flex, one of a group of writers who had celebrated rural life and folklore, and was popular with the *Wandervögel* youth group) and 186 men; the navy lost 191. Most navy casualties came from small craft lost to mines. Russian casualties are unknown, but the Germans captured 20,130 Russian soldiers and sailors, most of them on Ösel. The Germans also secured 141 artillery pieces, 130 machine guns, more than 2,000 horses and 1,200 wagons, 2 tanks, 10 aircraft, and 6 airfields in addition to substantial quantities of military supplies.

Securing these islands meant that the Germans could proceed with a major land operation along the Baltic coast toward the Russian capital of Petrograd. As it turned out, however, Albion marked the last major fighting in the East in 1917. The Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in early November (October by the Russian calendar) and sued for peace.

Michael B. Barrett

See also: October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Aleksandr Nevsky (Frigate)

The *Alexander Nevsky*, a large vessel for its class, was a screw frigate of 5,100 tons, and mounted 51 cannon. The ship's cannon were all 60-pounder smoothbores, divided into long- and medium-class guns. The ship was named after the famous Russian historical figure. The *Nevsky* was designed by Americans and carried American armament, with the ship's cannons being manufactured in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This Russo-American cooperation came about as relations with the UK were at their lowest point in both countries. The vessel was part of the expansion of the Russian Imperial Navy, in cooperation with the United States, which aimed to challenge then-rival Great Britain's Royal Navy. The Russian Empire was one of the few countries to stand

by the United States during the American Civil War, as many European countries proclaimed neutrality or took a pro-Confederate stance. Once completed, the *Alexander Nevsky* served as the flagship of the Imperial Russian Navy.

Once commissioned, the vessel was part of the Atlantic Squadron of Rear Admiral Stepan Stepanovich Lessovsky. In 1863, Lessovsky sailed the Atlantic Squadron, with the *Alexander Nevsky* as his flagship, to New York City. The cruise of the squadron sailed to America in order to show the flag and as a way of showing solidarity with America. The ship's commander at the time was Captain Federovski. The *Alexander Nevsky* and the other vessels of the Atlantic Squadron stayed in American waters for seven months, despite the state of Civil War then existing in the United States. They even dropped anchor at Washington, D.C., having sailed up the Potomac River. At one point during this extended stay, the *Alexander Nevsky* developed engine problems during a local cruise and had to return to New York for repairs.

On September 25, 1868, on its way home from a visit to Piraeus, Greece, where it had participated in the celebration of Greek King George's wedding to Grand Duchess Olga of Russia, and while carrying Grand Duke Alexei, son of Czar Alexander II, the *Alexander Nevsky* became shipwrecked off the coast of Thyboron, a fishing village in Jutland, Denmark. The vessel was traveling by sail at that time, and both the admiral (who had been responsible for Grand Duke Alexei's naval education) and the ship's captain miscalculated the ship's position due to incorrect drift information recorded in the pilot book. In a rainstorm, the *Alexander Nevsky* struck a sandbar, and its masts and some of the ship's cannon had to be thrown overboard to prevent the vessel from immediately capsizing.

Local fishermen responded to the ship's distress signal of a cannon firing. The fishermen sailed out and rescued all of the ship's crew, aside from five crewmen who had drowned while attempting to reach shore in one of the ship's life rafts. The warship eventually sank, the wreck settling in roughly 60 feet of water, only 300 feet from the present coast of Thyboron. The captain and admiral aboard were convicted of dereliction of duty at a court-martial, but the czar intervened and pardoned them due to their long service to the fleet. Grand Duke Alexei often claimed that he almost drowned when the ship went down, and enjoyed telling the story through the rest of his life.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918)

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Alekseev, Evgeny I. (1843–1917)

Russian admiral and viceroy of the Far Eastern region; supporter of Russian expansion.

Born in 1843 in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, Evgeny Ivanovich Alekseev graduated from the Russian Naval Academy in

1863 and served in a variety of sea-going and staff appointments. Posted to Russian Pacific fleet in 1895, Alekseev became the fleet's commander in chief the following year.

Alekseev returned to Far East in 1899 as commander of all Russian forces in the region. During the Boxer Rebellion (1900) Russia occupied Manchuria, and Alekseev undertook personal diplomacy to protect the Russian gains. Russian military leaders and statesmen were divided on the question of whether to pursue peaceful, economic expansion in the Far East or rely on military force. Ultimately, despite promises to the contrary, Russia withdrew only a portion of its occupation forces and in July 1903, Czar Nicholas II appointed Alekseev as regional viceroy with administrative, military, and diplomatic authority.

As viceroy, Alekseev teamed with Aleksandr M. Bezobrazov (1855–1931), an expansionist who sought to exploit the region's resources. The two manipulated Russian policy to favor their projects, though their actions antagonized Japan, which considered Korea and Manchuria vital to its national security.

By early 1904, negotiations had failed, largely due to Alekseev's unyielding position and Nicholas II's arrogance and apathy. Japan accordingly suspended diplomatic relations. Despite this implicit warning, Alekseev's forces were unprepared when Japan attacked Port Arthur without declaration of war on the night of February 8–9, 1904.

Alekseev's military shortcomings led the czar to appoint General Aleksei N. Kuropatkin as army commander, but Alekseev remained in place as commander of all forces in the region. This divided war management compounded Russian logistical and military inadequacies, and led to several early and humiliating defeats. In October 1904, Alekseev was removed as viceroy and recalled

to St. Petersburg. In later years, Alekseev served in the Russian State Council. Following Nicholas II's abdication, Alekseev left the government. He died on May 27, 1917.

Larry A. Grant

See also: Boxer Rebellion, Russia and (1899–1903); Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaeovich (1848–1925); Makarov, Stepan Ossipovich (1848–1904); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918); Port Arthur; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

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Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918)

Russian Army general, chief of staff of the army under Czar Nicholas II, and commander in chief under the provisional government. Born November 15, 1857, in Tver Province, Mikhail Alekseev was the son of a noncommissioned officer. He transcended his humble origins and secured admission to the Moscow School for Military Cadets. Upon graduation in 1876, he entered the army as an ensign. Alekseev's background would have destined him for an undistinguished career as a junior infantry officer had it not been for his admission to the General Staff College in 1887. There he graduated at the top of his class in 1890.

Promoted to general in 1904, Alekseev served as the quartermaster general of the Third Army in Manchuria during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. In 1905, he was posted to the Kiev Military District, where he became chief of staff in 1908 and commander of the XII Corps in 1912. While some of Alekseev's superiors (most notably Nikolai Ivanov, the prewar commander of the Kiev Military District), appreciated his talent and work ethic, his advocacy of military and political reforms did not earn him favor among conservatives at court or with War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov.

On the outbreak of World War I in early August 1914, Sukhomlinov secured the post of chief of staff of the army for his protégé, Nikolai Yanushkevich, although the commander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, preferred the more able Alekseev. Instead, Alekseev was appointed chief of staff of the Southwestern Front.

Alekseev's early offensive successes in Galicia, which nearly forced Austria-Hungary out of the war, led to his appointment as commander in chief of the Northwestern Front in March 1915. Because of his refusal to dispatch reinforcements to Southwestern Front commander General Nikolai Y. Ivanov, he bore at least some responsibility for the disastrous German breakthrough at Gorlice-Tarnów in May 1915, but Alekseev redeemed himself by organizing the Great Retreat from the Polish salient. This withdrawal, although costly, saved the Russian Army from complete destruction.

Following the Great Retreat, Czar Nicholas II decided to assume the post of commander in chief himself, and Alekseev became his chief of staff in September 1915. The czar's lack of interest in and ignorance of military affairs assured Alekseev overall control of the army. During the latter half of 1915, Alekseev and other able civil and



Mikhail Alekseev was perhaps Russia's most capable military strategist in World War I. (Michael J. F. McCarthy, *The Coming Power*, 1905)

military officials, including the energetic new War Minister Aleksei Polivanov, succeeded in rebuilding the army.

Despite Alekseev's considerable abilities, his failure to delegate tended to cloud his ability to appreciate the larger strategic picture. His concern for the czar's image as commander in chief led him to adopt a cautious posture that stabilized the Eastern Front but did not produce any significant gains. Alekseev played little role in the planning or execution of General Aleksei Brusilov's offensive in the summer of 1916, and he refused to commit troops to assist Romania in 1916 until Russia's own borders were threatened.

Over time, Alekseev's dedication to the czar waned due to mounting frustration with the incompetence of czarist officialdom. Unable to convince Nicholas II to initiate reforms, Alekseev, who by that time was suffering from cancer and heart disease, retired

in November 1916. He was recalled just in time to play an instrumental role in securing the abdication of Nicholas II during the March 1917 revolution.

Following the fall of Nicholas II, the provisional government appointed Alekseev commander in chief of the army. Alekseev's opposition to an offensive being planned by new War Minister Alexander Kerensky (the so-called Kerensky Offensive) led to his resignation in May 1917. He was briefly recalled in September to arrange a settlement of the political dispute between Kerensky and General Lavr Kornilov, but the attempt failed, and Alekseev resigned after only 12 days. Following the Bolshevik takeover in November 1917, Kornilov and the terminally ill Alekseev formed the White (anti-Bolshevik) Volunteer Army in southern Russia. Alekseev died in Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar) on October 8, 1918.

John M. Jennings

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); February (March) Revolution (1917); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); October (November) Revolution (1917); Polivanov, Aleksei Andreevich (1855–1920); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1848–1926); Yanushkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1868–1918)

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Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676)

Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov was born in Moscow in 1629, the son of Czar Michael I and Eudoxia Streshneva. His father founded the Romanov dynasty in 1613, bringing an end to the period known as the “Time of Troubles.” From an early age, Aleksei’s education focused upon preparation for his future role. Michael enlisted Boris Morozov to advise and tutor the young prince. Morozov also arranged for approximately two dozen boys from the most prominent families to serve as a form of youthful court; many of them eventually occupied important positions in Aleksei’s government.

In 1645, Michael died; the young Aleksei continued to rely heavily upon Morozov for advice, leading some to assume Aleksei was weak. Morozov encouraged Aleksei to forego traditional Russian garb for Western styles and recommended importing Western experts to modernize Russian bureaucracy, beginning with the military. To pay for improvements, Morozov instituted a series of unpopular taxes, including an increase of the salt tax. This led to the “Salt Rebellion” of 1648 in Moscow. Although Aleksei ruthlessly crushed the uprising, he also agreed to a new legal code, the *Ulozhenie* of 1649, and sent Morozov into protective exile.

Like his predecessors, Aleksei sought to expand the Russian dominion, particularly to the south and west. In 1653, Ukraine revolted against Polish rule and offered to serve the czar in exchange for his protection. Aleksei quickly moved to seize and defend the region. The first campaign season saw the conquest of dozens of towns

and a handful of cities in Ukraine, including the seizure of Smolensk. The following year, Swedish king Charles X entered the war against Poland, opening the Polish possessions along the Baltic coast to Russian advances. As a result of the Russian and Swedish campaigns, Poland collapsed. Aleksei and Charles soon began squabbling over the spoils, however, leading to open conflict between the erstwhile allies in 1656.

Although Russia possessed a far larger army and more economic resources, the Swedish had the advantages of resupply by sea. Russian troops advanced slowly into the disputed zone, paying an enormous price for miniscule gains. The Poles used the Swedish distraction to reorganize and threaten a counteroffensive. Fearing a two-front war, Aleksei pursued a peace treaty with Sweden, giving up all of the Russian Baltic seizures as a part of the Treaty of Kardis (1661).

This allowed him to focus upon the Ukraine. Although the war sputtered on until 1667, neither side could make much headway. The Truce of Andrusovo returned captured territories in Poland proper and in the Baltic to the Polish, but allowed Russia to retain its Ukrainian conquests, including Smolensk and Kiev.

Aleksei attempted to reform the military, including a massive increase in the number of new-style regiments of infantry. These troops used Western drill manuals to increase the number and effect of musket volleys. They also proved capable of combined operations, working with the gentry cavalry that remained a staple of the army.

Several revolts erupted in the last decade of Aleksei's reign. The most dangerous began in 1670, when Stenka Timofeyevich Razin led a Cossack uprising along the Volga River. At its height, Razin commanded 200,000 troops, but his army was no match for the Western-style Muscovite army

at Simbursk in 1671. Razin was captured soon after and brought to Moscow, where he was publicly quartered.

Aleksei married Maria Ilishna Miloslavs-kaya in 1648. She died while birthing their 13th child in 1669. Two of their sons, Fyodor III and Ivan V, succeeded to the throne, although both died without heirs. In 1671, Aleksei married Natalia Kirillovna Naryshkina, who bore him another eight children, including Peter I, who assumed the throne after Ivan V. Aleksei died of renal and heart failure in 1676, and was buried in the Archangel Cathedral of the Kremlin.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Razin, Stepan (ca. 1630–1671); Thirteen Years’ War (Russo-Polish War, First Northern War, War for Ukraine; 1654–1667)

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Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825)

Czar Alexander I of Russia was a failed reformer best remembered for his heroic role in bringing down French emperor Napoleon I. Despite liberal tendencies in his youth, Alexander ended his reign as a reactionary and a mystical hermit.

Alexander was born in St. Petersburg on December 12, 1777, as the eldest son of Czar Paul I and Sophia Dorothea of Württemberg. He was raised in the court of his



Russian emperor Alexander I (1801–1825).
(Chaiba Media)

grandmother, Empress Catherine II (the Great), who oversaw his early youth and education. Alexander was closely tutored by Swiss philosopher Frederic-Cesar de La Harpe, who imparted the liberal, humanistic teachings of the Enlightenment. Curiously, Alexander never mastered the Russian language, being fluent only in English and French. He was also forced to share the militaristic, barracks-like existence of his father, whom many regarded as mad. Following this unhappy and somewhat unstable childhood, Alexander agreed in principle to a plot for removing his father by force in 1801. When the coup succeeded, Paul was killed—supposedly against Alexander’s wishes. It is generally accepted that this weighed heavily on his conscience throughout his life.

Once installed as Alexander I in 1801, the young leader embarked on an enlightened

path to political reform. Torture was abolished, censorship eased, travel abroad permitted, a state school system established, and serfdom abolished in the Baltic states. Alexander also toyed with the notion of adopting a liberal constitution for Russia, but this seems to have tested the limits of his political inclinations. Despite much discussion and solicitation of political advice, the young czar never pushed for the kind of dramatic reform that would have placed Russia on par with the countries of Western Europe. One reason was the excesses of the ongoing French Revolution, and the rise of Napoleon. Although Alexander initially admired the French leader, Napoleon’s military conquests and his treatment of other crowned heads of state convinced Alexander of a rising danger to Russia. Rather than risk political instability at home, Alexander stayed his reform efforts in favor of military confrontation abroad.

In 1805, Alexander joined in the War of the Third Coalition against France. He was nominal commander of the Russian forces in the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805, which knocked Austria out of the war. The young leader wept upon viewing the field, but rather than surrender, he formed an alliance with Prussia. That country’s army was annihilated at the twin battles of Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, after which Alexander confronted the French alone. Following a hard-fought encounter at Eylau in February 1807, the Russians fell back into Poland and were finally defeated at the Battle of Friedland that June. Alexander sued for peace, and in July 1807, he met Napoleon at Tilsit to conclude a treaty of friendship. Alexander agreed to join Napoleon’s Continental System, which forbade trade with England, even though this restriction placed great strain upon the Russian economy. The treaty also allowed Russia

time to rearm and strengthen itself in the face of continued French aggression.

With Napoleon's encouragement, Alexander declared war on Sweden and conquered Finland. When Napoleon refused to condone an offensive against the Ottoman Empire, however, Alexander began reevaluating his alliance with France. In 1810, he removed Russia from the Continental System and began trading with England. Napoleon's response came in June 1812 with a massive invasion of Russia. The czar wanted to lead his armies in the field but was persuaded to remain behind. When a series of defeats led to the replacement of General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly with Prince Mikhail Kutuzov, Russian fortunes changed dramatically. Following the bloody September Battle of Borodino, Russian forces fell back, abandoning Moscow to the invaders. Napoleon briefly occupied the city but fell back following the onset of winter while much of the city burned. (The Russians set the fires to deprive the French of shelter.) Bitter weather and determined Russian resistance culminated in the destruction of the French Army.

At this point, Alexander sprang to the fore. He departed St. Petersburg to lead Russian armies in the field and instigate further resistance against Napoleon. Joined by Prussia, Austria, and Sweden, the czar's coalition fought several bloody encounters with French armies through the summer of 1813 before finally defeating the French at the Battle of Leipzig in October. Alexander then marshaled his forces and led a campaign into France itself, which by April 1814 resulted in Napoleon's first abdication.

True to his enlightened inclinations, Alexander forbade Prussia or Russia from dismembering or severely punishing France, and the Bourbon monarchy was peacefully restored. Alexander was hailed by many as the savior of Europe throughout peace talks

at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815. Despite intrigues by French foreign minister Comte de Talleyrand and Austrian foreign minister Prince Klemens von Metternich, Alexander negotiated in good faith for the restoration of European stability. His perseverance transformed Russia into a major world player.

The experience of war appears to have hardened Alexander's attitude to liberalization and reform, however. After 1815, his domestic policies became increasingly conservative, much to the frustration of many reform-minded aristocrats. His only real legacy was the Holy Alliance, an agreement between Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France that they would militarily crush any revolutionary movements in Europe. Alexander also reneged on a promise to Poland for a constitutional government; it was forced to settle for limited political autonomy with Alexander as king.

Over the years, the czar, a rather moody and religious individual, withdrew further and further from the realm of politics and allowed the country to be run by reactionary ministers like General Alexis Arakcheev. By the time Alexander died from an illness on November 19, 1825, he had all but withdrawn from affairs of state. He was so little seen that many people believed he had staged his own death and retired to a monastery. His refusal to pursue liberal reforms as promised led to an unsuccessful uprising by military officers in December 1825, a month after his passing. The unhappy sovereign was succeeded by his brother Nicholas I.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Arakcheev, Alexis; Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of; Kutuzov, Mikhail

(1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812; Third Coalition, War of the (June 14, 1807); Tilsit, Treaty of; Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

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Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881)

Czar of Russia from 1855 to 1881. He led Russia through a period of many unprecedented and sweeping reforms in an attempt to modernize the country. Though the reforms were important, they failed to cure Russia's ills and spawned additional social and political unrest.

The oldest son of Czar Nicholas I, Alexander was born on April 29, 1818. His two tutors, General P. P. Ushakov and the poet V. A. Zhukavsky, taught him military strategy and the rules of statesmanship, as well as humanities, sciences, and etiquette. Alexander lived a life of privilege, luxury, and isolation from the Russian populace. He married Princess Maria Alexandrovna from Hesse-Darmstadt in St. Petersburg on April 16, 1841.

Alexander ascended the throne upon his father's death in February 1855. The new czar was initially conservative in his views, but nonetheless would lead his country through a period of liberal reforms. When Alexander came to power, Russia was fighting the Crimean War, which had gone badly and exposed the weaknesses of the Russian

state. The country did not have a strong industrial base, and much of the Russian peasant class was still indentured servants or serfs. Both of these factors contributed to a weak Russian economy, which could not compete with the other major powers of the world, and reduced Russia's status as a great power. One of Alexander's first acts was to end the war, though he had to accept humiliating terms in the Treaty of Paris (1856).

With even the Russian aristocracy embracing the need to reform the country, Alexander next initiated a series of measures to modernize Russia. The first and perhaps most important step was the construction of railroads in Russia, which Alexander encouraged by authorizing the creation of joint-stock companies and banks to provide financial support. At the time, Russia had only one major railroad and roughly 600 miles of track. By the time Alexander died in 1881, Russia had several major railway lines and nearly 14,000 miles of track; this bolstered the Russian economy and facilitated the export of grain, Russia's major commodity.

The centerpiece of Alexander's "Great Reforms," however, was the abolition of serfdom in Russia. With the passage of the Emancipation Act on March 3, 1861, Alexander provided millions of Russian serfs with their personal freedom and modest allotments of land. The reform was opposed by the landowning classes, but Alexander insisted that Russia needed a solid class of small peasant landowners to ensure social stability. About 52 million peasants were freed by Alexander's decree.

This had a tremendous psychological impact on Russia, but it did not create the class of stable peasant landholders that Alexander had hoped. The emancipated serfs were required to pay their former landlords for their freedom, which in most cases took many years. In addition, the serfs were actually

given 18 percent less land than they were supposed to receive. Emancipation, while a momentous decision, thus disappointed both the peasants and Russian liberals and radicals, and sowed the seeds of social and political revolution.

Alexander followed with other attempts to modernize Russia. In 1864, he reformed the weak local governments (*zemstvos*) to encourage modernization, democratization, and stimulate local governmental activity. Under the new system, the *zemstvos* were able to provide education, medicine, veterinary services, insurance, roads, and supplies for emergencies. Alexander I went on to reform the judicial system, separating the courts from government administration for the first time in Russian history.

The military was reorganized in 1874, so that all levels of Russian society had to serve in the military, not just the lower classes, as was the case before Alexander's reign. Some scholars have argued that this was not only the culmination of the Great Reforms but also the ultimate goal of the Alexander's program: to provide Russia with an army of citizen-soldiers on a Western European model. Alexander's other reforms included the creation of a state treasury, publication of the annual budget, and the creation of a state bank in 1866.

Although many of these reforms were welcomed by the Russian people, these reforms did not enjoy universal support. Alexander was criticized as too liberal by some and too conservative by others. One of the most serious threats to his regime came from a populist organization called "People's Will" (*Narodnaya Volya*). The group believed that if they killed government officials, the centralized state would collapse; and naturally, their primary target was Alexander.

Russian authorities knew about the group and its plans but could do little to protect

the czar. Alexander narrowly escaped death many times. On March 13, 1881—the same day Alexander planned to consider some of the revolutionaries' proposals for reform—his luck ran out. A bomb exploded beneath his sledge, and he died of his wounds. The government did not collapse, however; Alexander was succeeded by his son, Alexander III, who proved to be a more autocratic and conservative leader.

David Elliott

See also: Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Crimean War (1853–1856); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855)

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Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894)

Conservative ruler who, from 1881 until his death in 1894, promoted reactionary and repressive policies reversing many of the reform measures initiated by his father, Alexander II. Foremost among these policies were the persecution of Jews and the systematic Russification of minorities.

Born in St. Petersburg on March 10, 1845, Alexander was the second of seven children born to Czar Alexander II and Princess Maria of Hesse-Darmstadt. As the second son, he was trained as a soldier rather than as heir to the throne. His strong, massive build



As the ruler of Russia from 1881 until his death in 1894, Czar Alexander III promoted repressive policies that reversed many of the reforms that had been initiated by his father, Alexander II. (Library of Congress)

and slow tempo earned him the nickname of “Bull.” He became czarévitch, or heir apparent, after the unexpected death of his older brother, Nicholas, in 1866.

That same year, Alexander III married Princess Marie Dagmar, the daughter of King Christian IX of Denmark and the sister of Queen Alexandra of Great Britain. She took the Russian name Maria Fyodorovna and became a strong influence on her husband, prodding him to prepare for the duties that awaited when he became czar. Alexander was a devoted husband and a doting father to their five children.

Alexander III had been openly critical of his father’s liberal, reforming policies before his accession, however, and he followed a repressive policy in domestic affairs

once he became monarch. He actively promoted the interests of the nobility over those of the peasant and working classes. Autocracy, orthodoxy, and national homogeneity were Alexander’s three principal aims as summarized in the doctrine of “Official Nationality.” He therefore actively enforced Pan-Slavic values, imposing the use of the Russian language and the adoption of Russian traditions in the Baltic provinces and in Poland. He enthusiastically promoted the Russian Orthodox Church, while also encouraging the persecution of Russia’s substantial Jewish population. Rioting and raiding against the Jews became commonplace in the 1880s.

In the last years of his reign, the autocratic Alexander worked toward a closer alignment with France, even though he abhorred that country’s republican values. Such was his mistrust of the Triple Alliance that he secretly pledged Russia would come to France’s aid if that country were attacked by Germany or by Italy with German support. In exchange, France committed to supporting Russia if Germany, or Italy supported by the Germans, were to attack Russia. Alexander also consolidated Russia’s hold on Central Asia to the frontier of Afghanistan, provoking a crisis with Britain in 1885.

Like his father, Alexander survived several assassination attempts; his health began to fail in the early 1890s. On November 1, 1894, Alexander called for his confessor after a sleepless night; he died peacefully later that afternoon. Alexander was succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, who was ill-prepared for his role as Russia’s ruler.

Elizabeth Dubrulle

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Great Game (Russia in Central Asia); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918)

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Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918)

Last empress of Russia. Born Princess Alix Victoria Helena Louise Beatrice of Hesse-Darmstadt in Germany on June 6, 1872, she was the daughter of Louis IV of Hesse-Darmstadt and Alice Maud Mary, daughter of Queen Victoria. Alix had two brothers and four sisters. Her nickname, Sunny, reflected a sparkling personality despite the loss of her brother, sister, and mother—all before she was six.

Alix met her husband to be, the future Czar Nicholas II of Russia, in 1884, when she was 12. She was forced to convert from Lutheranism to the Russian Orthodox faith, and they married on November 26, 1894, three weeks after the death of Czar Alexander III.

Theirs was an unusually happy marriage. Crowned together on May 26, 1896, Nicholas II and Alexandra strongly adhered to the divine right of kings theory and ruled as autocrats, but Alexandra dominated her weak-willed husband. The two had four daughters and one son, Alexis, born in 1904. He was a hemophiliac. That illness was known to originate in Alexandra's family through her grandmother, Queen Victoria. Alexandra became fanatically religious, although much of this was centered in unorthodox faith healers.

Grigory Rasputin, a Siberian monk who appeared around 1905, exerted great



Russian empress Alexandra Fyodorovna, ca. 1910. (Bettmann/Corbis)

influence. He allegedly healed Alexis on several occasions when doctors had given up hope of his recovery. Alexandra increasingly fell under Rasputin's spell, creating a poisonous atmosphere of distrust among those close to the throne. Unfounded, malicious stories soon circulated of a sexual relationship between Alexandra and Rasputin. Russia's noble elite hated Alexandra, and she in turn despised them for the problems besetting the crown. Alexandra gradually withdrew from society and into her family circle.

Despite her unpopularity, Alexandra founded schools, built hospitals, and worked to improve the conditions of the poor. During World War I, she nursed soldiers and converted the palace into an infirmary, and gave money to the war effort. Her German origins and domination of her husband, however, led to untrue accusations that she was spying for Germany and betraying Russian war plans.

When in September 1915 Nicholas II ill-advisedly took command of the army at the front, he left Alexandra in charge in St. Petersburg. Not politically astute, she made grievous errors. She increasingly relied on Rasputin's advice concerning key government appointments, leading to the installation of a number of incompetents in high positions, and incessant turnover.

Following the Russian Revolution of March 1917, Nicholas abdicated on March 17. Subsequently arrested by the Bolsheviks, Nicholas, Alexandra, and their entire family were held at Ekaterinburg in central Russia. There they were shot early in the morning of July 17, 1918, under orders from Vladimir Lenin in Moscow, although official Soviet accounts sought to shift responsibility for the decision to the Ural Regional Soviet. The remains were then secretly buried.

In 1998, on the 80th anniversary of the execution, the remains of Alexandra, Nicholas, and three daughters, identified through DNA, were reinterred in the St. Catherine Chapel of the Peter and Paul Cathedral of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul in Saint Petersburg. In 2000, the Russian Orthodox Church canonized Alexandra, along with Nicholas II and their children.

Annette Richardson

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922)

Immediately upon seizing power in Petrograd in November 1917, the Bolsheviks announced that Russia was withdrawing from World War I. Russia's former allies of Britain, France, and the United States wanted to keep that country in the struggle against the Central Powers and also prevent stocks of weapons from falling into the hands of the Central Powers by reversing the political situation in Russia, but they had no coordinated plans to accomplish this end. Even after the Allied Supreme War Council decided to intervene on the side of the anti-Bolshevik (White) forces in Russia, the action was haphazard and ineffective. In part this was because the Allied governments provided only military assistance and not the economic support indispensable to victory. Throughout, the Western powers pursued short-range military goals, but they never seriously discussed the political future of a non-Bolshevik Russia.

During a conference of Allied leaders at Rapallo in November 1917 concerning military cooperation, the British and French representatives were unsuccessful in securing an agreement on a common policy toward Russia. Then on December 23, 1917, London and Paris signed a convention agreeing to enter the Russian Civil War in support of the White forces against the Reds (Bolsheviks). This gave rise to the Bolshevik charge that the Western Allies had agreed to dismember Russia.

German occupation of the strategically and economically important Ukraine triggered the Allied intervention. Also, negotiations at



Soldiers and sailors from several countries line up in front of the Allied Headquarters building in Vladivostok, Russia, in September 1918. (National Archives)

Brest-Litovsk between the Bolshevik government and the Germans led to concern in the Allied capitals that the Baltic states, eastern Poland, Ukraine, and part of the Caucasus would come under either German or Ottoman/Turkish control.

The French took the lead in the Allied intervention. French General of Division Ferdinand Foch, later supreme Allied military commander, strongly favored intervention in Russia to keep that state in the war against Germany. His plan envisaged a multinational military force under his own command. On December 24, 1917, the Allied Supreme War Council proclaimed that the Allied powers would provide military assistance to any political faction in Russia that supported that country's participation in the war against Germany. The French government strongly

supported the Czech Legion in Russia, and between March and May 1918, during the Ludendorff Offensives (March 21–July 18) on the Western Front, it made every effort to reopen the Eastern Front and encouraged Japan to take part.

The Allied intervention in Russia began with the landing of British troops at Murmansk on March 9, 1918, although London was less concerned than Paris about a Bolshevik Russia and feared a Japanese thrust into the Russian Far East more. The British government was also far more pragmatic in its Russian policy in that it was willing to support any Russian government, including the Bolsheviks, which would guarantee British economic interests in the Russian market. In Ukraine, British economic interests met French competition; White leaders were



able to use this rivalry to play the Allies off against each other.

In early 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, British prime minister David Lloyd George and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson

encouraged negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Wilson suggested a conference of all factions in the Russian Civil War to begin on February 15, 1919, on Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmara. This effort came to

naught because leading White leaders Aleksandr Kolchak and Anton Denikin, as well as the Bolshevik leaders, sought to continue their military offensives. The Bolsheviks also feared that a peace conference under Allied auspices would necessarily favor the Whites, as they were the clients of the Western powers.

Lloyd George and Wilson believed that the Whites only deserved to win, however, if they could gain the support of the Russian population. Moreover, there was no agreement between the Allies and the White leaders concerning Russia's political future after an end to the Bolshevik regime. The political values of the Western democracies and the authoritarian White generals were so different that the Allies could not be certain that a White regime in Russia would be an improvement on the Bolsheviks.

Meanwhile, the Russian Civil War continued. Although the Allies provided military equipment and advisers, they made no effort to force political change that would bring about an efficient political system on territory occupied by the Whites. Moreover, French–British and U.S.–Japanese rivalries prevented unified action in the Russian Civil War.

Following the death of Admiral Kolchak in February 1920, the Western Allies did seek a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik regime. As a first step toward that end, they lifted the economic blockade of Bolshevik Russia. At the same time, the Allied powers began their withdrawal from Russian territory. According to an official French government report of October 1919, France alone had spent more than 7 billion francs in its Russian intervention, with nothing to show for the massive outlay. There was also some sentiment among Western politicians to cultivate Bolshevik Russia as an ally against a resurgent Germany.

Japan's approach was quite different, however. Even before Japan's gains of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, that nation's leaders had sought to expand Japanese influence on the Asian mainland in Korea and Manchuria. Japanese expansionists perceived in the Russian Civil War a splendid opportunity to enhance their holdings in Russia's eastern territories. Japanese General Tanaka Giichi in Manchuria proposed the creation of an independent noncommunist Siberian state, allied with, and presumably dominated by, Japan. Whereas the United States sent to Siberia 9,000 soldiers, Great Britain sent 7,000, China 2,000, Italy 1,400, and France 1,200; Japan dispatched some 73,000 troops to eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. In addition, Japan had 60,000 soldiers deployed in neighboring Manchuria.

Some Japanese leaders predicted that Siberia would be the site of an eventual clash between the civilizations of the “Yellow” and “White” races in the Far East. Thus the Japanese intervention into Siberia was directed not only against Russia but also to forestall U.S. engagement in the region. Most White leaders, however, harbored strong patriotic, and often racist, suspicions of the Japanese, seeing in them only a temporarily useful force in the struggle against Bolshevism. They saw no long-term advantage in an alliance with Japan. This was one reason for the failure of Japan's intervention in Siberia. Finally, in large, not only because of the financial strain of the enterprise but also under pressure from the United States, the Japanese were compelled to withdraw from Siberian territory. Japan's departure was completed by the end of October 1922.

Eva-Maria Stolberg

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Czech Legion (August 1914–December

1919); Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Japanese Intervention in Siberia (1918–1922); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); White Armies in the Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Alma River, Battle of the (September 20, 1854)

The Battle of the Alma River of September 20, 1854, was a significant victory for

allied British and French forces fighting against Russia during the Crimean War. Their battle success significantly weakened the Russian naval base at Sevastopol and helped the allies take the city.

The Russian force, under Prince Alexander Menshikov, had blockaded Sevastopol and was stationed on the heights overlooking the Alma River. The British and French, under the command of Lord Raglan and French marshal Armand-Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, respectively, landed in Calamita Bay in Crimea, about 35 miles north of Sevastopol, on September 14. Although weakened by cholera and dysentery, the Anglo-French force began a march on September 19 toward Sevastopol to capture the port. The British had some 25,000 men, and the French about 30,000. About 7,000 Ottoman soldiers accompanied the Anglo-French force.

The allied forces had to cross three rivers on their way to Sevastopol. The 35,000-man Russian force decided to defend its position at the Alma River at noon on September 20 because it had a superior position on the cliffs of the south side of the river. According to a British soldier's letter home, the Russians were "so convinced [. . .] of the impossibility of our taking [the Alma] that ladies were actually there as spectators." The Russians repulsed the first attack but were caught off guard when the allies persisted, and began to withdraw.

The British and French forces thus were able to move under the Russian fire. The allies then sent a British and French contingent up one side of the cliffs to distract the Russian force from making an attack on their flank. The Russians retreated toward Sevastopol. The Alma position was taken in three hours.

Losses were heavy for both sides. The British lost about 2,000 men, most of whom

were Highlanders or from the Light Brigade, which became famous at the later Battle of Balaclava. The French lost about 1,000 men, and the Russians lost about 6,000 men. It took two days for the allies to bury their dead. Consequently, the British and French did not immediately pursue the Russians toward Sevastopol.

Philip J. MacFarlane

See also: Balaclava, Battle of (October 25, 1854); Crimean War (1853–1856); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Altwater (Alfater), Vasily Mikhailovich (1883–1919)

Russian navy admiral born on December 16, 1883, either in Warsaw or Moscow, into a military, noble family. Vasily Mikhailovich Altwater (Alfater) graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps in 1902. He served at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), distinguishing himself in the rescue of survivors from the battleship *Petropavlovsk*, which was sunk by a Japanese mine on April 13, 1904.

After the war, Altwater served in the Baltic Fleet, and in 1910, he was appointed head of the Baltic Operations Section of the Naval General Staff, a post he still held at the outbreak of war in 1914. When the Baltic Fleet was placed under the authority of the Sixth Army, responsible for the defense of St. Petersburg (soon renamed Petrograd), Altwater and the Baltic Operations Section

were transferred to that army's headquarters, where it served as a liaison between the fleet and the army. When the naval staff at *Stavka* was formed in February 1916, Altwater was transferred to it.

After the Revolution of March 1917, Altwater, a political liberal, sided with the revolutionary forces. That year, he was promoted to rear admiral; after the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, he was willing to serve under them, not out of any belief in their cause, but because he thought they were the only party strong enough to rebuild Russia. He served as the naval adviser during the peace negotiations with the Germans that resulted in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918), and he was a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Naval Affairs (May–December 1918).

Altwater organized the Red Navy's flotilla on the Volga River. On October 12, 1918, he was appointed commander of the Naval Forces of the Republic, a post he held until his death from a heart attack on April 20, 1919.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Navy, Russian (191–)

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Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984)

Soviet diplomat, head of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (Committee for

State Security; KGB) during 1967–1982, and the fifth leader of the USSR during 1982–1984. Born on June 15, 1914, in Stavropol, Russia, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov dropped out of school when he was 16 and worked at odd jobs, eventually joining the Komsomol, a communist youth organization. He became a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1939 and served in the newly founded Karelo-Finnish Republic from 1940 to 1944 as the first secretary of the regional Komsomol.

During World War II, Andropov participated in partisan guerrilla activities. After the war, he held positions in regional CPSU bureaus before being appointed to the CPSU Central Committee in 1951. In the immediate wake of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's death



Soviet leader Yuri V. Andropov in January 1983. (AP Photo)

in 1953, Andropov was appointed counselor to the Soviet embassy in Budapest. Promoted to ambassador in 1954, his tenure witnessed the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Andropov had warned Moscow of growing unrest in Hungary prior to the revolution and then requested Soviet troop deployments to Hungary after the revolt began. He played a crucial role in establishing the new Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party under the leadership of Janos Kadar.

Andropov returned to Moscow in 1957 as the head of the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. He also succeeded Mikhail Suslov as a member of the Central Committee Secretariat in 1962 and became the head of the KGB in 1967. In 1973, he assumed a permanent membership in the politburo but continued to serve as KGB leader until 1982.

On November 10, 1982, Andropov was elected the new general secretary of the CPSU, succeeding the late Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev. Andropov soon thereafter became the Soviet president and chairman of the Defense Council. During his 15-month rule, he sought to improve the Soviet economy by increasing productivity. He gave priority to the fight against corruption in the Soviet bureaucracy and attempted to improve Soviet work habits through vigorous campaigns against alcohol and for the improvement of work discipline.

In foreign policy, Andropov sought to maintain the status quo. He kept Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and despite efforts to improve his image in the West, relations with the United States continued to deteriorate. He strongly opposed President Ronald Reagan's stationing of Pershing missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and relations took a nosedive after Soviet forces shot down a civilian South Korean jetliner (KAL Flight 007) in September

1983 when it strayed into Soviet airspace. All 269 passengers perished. The Soviets claimed clumsily and falsely that the plane was designed to spy on Soviet installations.

After months of poor health, Andropov died on February 9, 1984, in Moscow. He had declared Mikhail Gorbachev to be his successor, but on February 12, 1984, Andropov was instead replaced by Konstantin Chernenko.

Sedat Cem Karadelli

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Hungarian Rebellion (1956); KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security); Partisans (*Partizans*, Guerrillas), World War II; SALT II (1972–1979)

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Anglo-Russian Entente (August 31, 1907)

Pact signed between Great Britain and Russia on August 31, 1907, in St. Petersburg, Russia, that settled a number of disputes between Russia and Britain in Central Asia. The Anglo-Russian Entente completed the Triple Entente, a diplomatic alignment linking Russia, France, and Britain. The Triple Entente countered the Triple Alliance, composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy in the decade before the outbreak of World War I in August 1914.

In the final negotiations leading to the agreement, British minister to Russia Sir Arthur Nicolson represented Britain, while the Russians were represented by Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky. The agreement resolved a number of differences between Russia and Britain in Central Asia, which had been an area of intense rivalry between the two powers for much of the 19th century. Tibet, over which China claimed suzerainty, was to be an independent, neutral buffer state in which neither Russia nor Britain would predominate. China's claims to Tibet were ignored. Afghanistan would remain in the British sphere of influence. This removed a major source of anxiety for the British, who had long feared that the Russians would use Afghanistan as a springboard to threaten British India.

Persia (modern-day Iran) was the major focus of the agreement. While nominally independent, Persia was now divided into three spheres of influence. The Russians dominated the north of Persia, adjoining the Russian borders east and west of the Caspian Sea. Central Persia was to be neutral, while the British would control the south of Persia that guarded the strategically important entrance to the Persian Gulf. The British and Russian objective here was to exclude Germany from making inroads into Persia.

Russia had additional motives for signing an agreement. Russia had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and the subsequent revolutionary upheavals in Russia had nearly overthrown the czarist system. The understanding with Britain helped insure against another war and gave Russia time to recover.

Paul William Doerr

See also: Bukhara and Khiva, Conquest of; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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**Anglo-Soviet Treaty
(May 26, 1942)**

Diplomatic agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom finalized in London on May 26, 1942, in which both nations agreed not to seek an armistice or peace with any of the Axis powers without first consulting the other. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which was negotiated chiefly by British foreign secretary Anthony Eden and his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov, was an agreement dictated by the exigencies of war. It was signed only after months of often contentious negotiations.

Talks began in earnest in December 1941, only days after the United States entered the war, when Eden traveled to Moscow to hammer out a war-time agreement with the Soviets. British prime minister Winston L.S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt were quite concerned that the Soviets might exit the war early or sue for a separate peace, ending Germany's ill-advised two-front war. There was precedent for such a scenario, as Russia had exited World War I in early 1918, well before the fighting was over.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin and Molotov drove a hard bargain; Stalin insisted no treaty would be forthcoming unless the British officially recognized the Soviet Union's sizable territorial acquisitions made after the

German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 23, 1939) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941). These included the Baltic states, eastern Poland, northern Romania, and part of Finland.

Churchill, in constant communication with Roosevelt, refused the Soviet demands, and when Molotov traveled to London, the negotiations remained deadlocked. In mid-winter 1942, with the war going badly in Europe and the Pacific, Churchill cabled Roosevelt and hinted that perhaps the Soviets' demand should be met. Roosevelt, however, steadfastly refused and counseled Churchill not to give in. In the end, Molotov—still in London—decided to sign the Anglo-Soviet Treaty without recognition of the Soviet Union's prior territorial acquisitions.

Other parts of the treaty included agreement that neither nation would seek further territorial expansion or interfere in the other's internal affairs. Ancillary clauses dealt with specific actions to be taken during the war. Although the treaty accomplished little of substance, it clearly indicated the precarious and ad hoc nature of the Grand Alliance.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Poland Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Angolan Civil Wars (1975–1996)

The Angolan Civil Wars were among the longest postcolonial wars fought for control over a newly independent state. The wars saw the superpowers backing their own clients, with Cuba contributing a large expeditionary force and South African soldiers assisting the black troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Even after the initial war ended, the different sides were not reconciled and later battled for another six years.

Before 1975, Angola was a colony of Portugal. The April 1974 military coup d'état in Lisbon, however, recognized Angola's right to independence. The three main anticolonial parties in Angola—the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), the National Liberation Front for Angola (FNLA), and UNITA—agreed to a coalition, but the agreement fell apart before formal independence arrived on November 11, 1975. The Soviet Union had already airlifted Cuban troops into Luanda, the new nation's capital, during the previous week. Some 60 Soviet officers joined them on November 12, with instructions to contain South Africa but avoid involvement in a civil war. The country already was divided effectively into three zones though.

Foreign support exacerbated the situation. The Soviet Union and Cuba recognized the MPLA's government and provided military support against the other two parties. The Soviet role was mainly logistical, as they airlifted Cuban troops into Angola. The Soviets also provided some funding for the MPLA, however, and Soviet diplomats supported the urban, socialist-leaning party internationally. China, the United States, and South Africa supported the UNITA-FNLA alliance.

South African troops invaded Angola, hoping to draw in American support. The U.S. Congress refused to permit U.S. intervention so soon after the Vietnam War, but the Central Intelligence Agency did provide covert military assistance to UNITA during 1975. South Africa soon withdrew its soldiers.

By the end of February 1976, the MPLA had effectively gained control over the whole country, aided by Cuban technical and military expertise. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, conscious that Soviet heavy-handedness had backfired in Africa in the past, debated to what extent they should continue to support the MPLA, but ultimately concluded to carry on as before. They shipped thousands of propaganda pamphlets and more thousands of busts of Lenin into Luanda for distribution. The MPLA proclaimed itself nonaligned, but the party was divided internally; the pro-Soviet wing of Nito Alves eventually carried out a coup, with Soviet permission, and took control of the movement in 1977. The UNITA forces withdrew to Zaire and Zambia. From those bases, they continued a guerrilla war against the MPLA government.

In 1980, the MPLA held elections based on the Soviet model, but their hold on Angola was slipping. In 1984, the last remnants of FNLA surrendered, but UNITA continued to expand its activities in Angola. The leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, appealed to farmers displaced by the MPLA land reforms. He also received large-scale support from South Africa. South Africa was interested in preventing a hostile regime from taking power in neighboring Namibia, and it regularly struck into MPLA-controlled areas of Angola in pursuit of Namibian guerrillas. South Africa also supplied arms to UNITA as a part of its strategy. By 1984, UNITA controlled large areas of central and southern Angola.

The Soviets responded by upping their military aid to the MPLA, providing perhaps \$2 billion in aid in 1984 alone and an additional \$1 billion in 1986. This left UNITA unable to match the MPLA and Cuban firepower, but it disrupted the normal activities in the country. The Angolan economy collapsed, and one-sixth of the population was displaced from their homes.

As both sides became more deeply enmeshed in the struggle, both U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leadership pushed for a negotiated peace. Both sides feared another Vietnam, and preferred *détente*. South Africa and the United States refused to accept the MPLA government until the Cuban troops were withdrawn, however, while the Soviets wanted the South Africans out of Namibia. Formal negotiations were held in Geneva, Switzerland, in August 1988.

On August 8, a joint statement of a cessation of hostilities was issued by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. A formal agreement was signed by the parties on December 22, 1988. As part of the deal, Namibia was given its independence in 1990. South African troops returned to their own borders. The Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola. Fighting continued between the MPLA and UNITA. Another cease-fire was signed in June 1989, but a formal peace treaty was not signed until May 31, 1991.

In the 1990s, peace appeared in sight as the Soviet Union dissolved and further economic aid halted for the beleaguered Angolan government. The United States also lost interest in the fight against communism in Angola and withdrew its support for UNITA. The United Nations (UN) brokered a cease-fire and the removal of Cuban mercenaries in 1992. Despite a large turnout at the first free national elections in September of that

year, political unity dissolved once again into violence in the mid-1990s.

In the third round of violence since 1974, the Angolan government, led by a less rigidly Marxist MPLA, aligned with South African mercenaries to fight against UNITA. The United States and the international community watched as millions of Angolans became refugees of war. Another round of UN negotiations following two years of stalemate led to a cessation of violence in 1996.

UNITA forces never disarmed despite political compromise with the Angolan government. That fact led to sporadic fighting in the late 1990s as the government attempted to harness its oil and diamond resources to recover from three decades of civil war.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Vietnam War(s), Soviet Union and (1945–1975)

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Antonov, Aleksei Innokentievich (1896–1962)

Soviet general. Born the son of a czarist artillery officer in Grodno, Belorussia, on September 15, 1896, Aleksei Antonov attended the Pavlovsky Military School in Petrograd. He was commissioned as an ensign in the Russian army in 1916 during World War I

and was wounded in the last great Russian offensive of 1917, the so-called Kerensky Offensive. In 1918, Antonov joined the Red Army and had his first experience with staff work as chief of staff of a brigade in the Russian Civil War. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1931 and was then posted to the Kharkov Military District. In 1937, he graduated from the General Staff Academy and, from 1938 to 1940, he was a lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy.

Antonov held numerous staff positions during World War II. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 (Operation BARBAROSSA), he was promoted to major general and became chief of staff of the Kiev Military District. He was chief of staff of the Southern Army Group from August 1941 to July 1942. In December 1941, he was promoted to lieutenant general. During 1942, he was chief of staff first of the North Caucasian Army Group, then of the Transcaucas Army Group. Appointed chief of operations of the General Staff in December 1942, after April 1943, Antonov was also deputy chief of the General Staff and was thus at the center of events for the remainder of the war. Antonov was promoted to general of the army in August 1943, a rank he held for the remaining two decades of his military career.

Because chief of the General Staff Aleksandr Vasilevsky was absent so frequently, Antonov acted in that role much of the time. A meticulous planner, he helped to orchestrate the major Soviet offensives of the war, including Operation BAGRATION, the encirclement of the German salient in Belorussia and East Prussia that brought the Red Army to the river Elbe.

In February 1945, Antonov replaced Vasilevsky as chief of the Soviet General Staff. He was a member of the Soviet delegation

to both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Demoted in 1946 to first deputy chief of the General Staff and then to first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, Antonov became commander of that same military district in 1950. In April 1954, he was again first deputy chief of the General Staff, and in 1955, he also assumed the post of chief of staff of Warsaw Pact forces. He held these posts until his death in Moscow on June 16, 1962.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Frunze Academy; Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945); Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization, WTO); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Apraksin, Count Fyodor Matveevich (1661–1728)

Russian admiral, governor of Estonia and Karelia, and head of the Russian admiralty.

The younger brother of Peter, Fyodor Apraksin was born on October 27, 1661, and entered the service of Czar Fyodor III at age 10. He moved to the service of Peter Romanov when the latter, along with his sister Sophia, succeeded to the throne. Apraksin became part of Peter's Guards Regiment, and assisted Peter in building a small flotilla. In 1692, after Peter had become czar

in his own right, he appointed Apraksin as governor of the port of Archangelsk. Five years later, Peter sent Apraksin to Voronezh, where he would supervise the construction of Russia's first Black Sea Fleet.

When that fleet proved instrumental in taking the Ottoman fortress of Azov, Apraksin was promoted to colonel and became the first Russian governor of Azov. He also oversaw the construction of the forts protecting Azov at Taganrog and Tavrov. In 1700, Peter appointed Apraksin to head the new Russian admiralty. During 1705–1706, Apraksin served in Moscow as head of the mint before returning to his post at the admiralty.

Apraksin led the Russian naval forces successfully against the Swedes during 1708–1709, for which he was ennobled in 1710, the same year, his forces successfully took the Swedish fortress of Vyborg. He commanded the Black Sea Fleet during the 1711 Pruth Campaign, then returned north and led the Russian forces that took Helsinki, in 1713.

In 1715, a corruption scandal led to Apraksin's removal from the admiralty; he was sent to govern Estonia as punishment. He returned to St. Petersburg after the death of Peter I in 1725 and served on the Privy Council of Czarina Catherine I, Peter's widow. He died in Moscow on November 10, 1728.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Apraksin, Stepan F. (1702–1758); Navy, Russian (1991–); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725)

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Apraksin, Stepan F. (1702–1758)

Field Marshal Stepan Fyodorovich Apraksin was commander in chief of the Russian forces mobilized early in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Earlier in his career, Apraksin served in the Russo-Turkish War (1735–1739) where he was the chief staff officer in the army under Burchardt C. Muennich, and later served as head of the War Collegium. Well connected politically, Apraksin had little practical military experience and few capabilities of a military leader. A staunch opponent of the pro-Prussian party, his loyalty to Aleksei Bestuzhev-Ryumin ensured Apraksin's promotion to field marshal and his appointment to command the Russian Army in 1756.

Apraksin led the main Russian army slowly into East Prussia. Ill-prepared for the campaign, the Russians were attacked by a smaller Prussian army at the village of Gross Jaegersdorf (August 30, 1757). Even though Apraksin's army won the battle, he failed to take advantage by moving further into Prussia. Instead, after hearing that Empress Elizabeth had suffered a relapse in health, Apraksin crossed the Neman River and returned to Russia. Whether his motive was to ensure the Russian army was not caught outside of Russian territory in case of Elizabeth's death, or the general councils of war ordered his return to Russia for lack of supplies, Apraksin was implicated in a conspiracy to remove Elizabeth from the throne.

Removed from his command, Apraksin was taken to Narva and placed under house arrest where he faced a court-martial for treasonous activity. Apraksin died of a stroke in August 1758, before the military tribunal reached a decision.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Apraksin, Count Fyodor Matveevich (1661–1728); Bestuzhev-Riumin, Count Aleksei Petrovich (1693–1766); Fermor, William (ca. 1702–1771); Gross-Jaegersdorf, Battle of (August 30, 1757); Muennich, Count Burkhard Christoph von (1683–1767); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Arab-Israeli War (1956). *See* Suez Crisis (1956)

Arakcheev, Alexis (1769–1834)

A military officer who had a knack for administration, Count Alexis Arakcheev dominated the domestic affairs of Russia with an iron hand from 1815 to 1825, a period that came to be known as the *Arakcheevshchina*.

Arakcheev was born on his family's estate in Garusovo, near the city of Bezhetsk, Russia, on October 4, 1769. Although of nobility, his family was not really wealthy. His father was only a small provincial landowner. At age 13, Arakcheev became fascinated with military life after becoming acquainted with the sons of a neighbor who were training at the artillery academy in St. Petersburg. In the spring of 1783, he pursued this life by convincing his father to exhaust the remaining family funds to move the family to St. Petersburg. Arakcheev then begged his way into the artillery school, where he proved a diligent and disciplined student, winning

many honors. After four years at the school, he was promoted as a lieutenant instructor at the academy; in 1791, he became an assistant director of the school.

Arakcheev's abilities quickly caught the eye of people in high places. In September 1792, he was transferred to the personal estate of Grand Duke Paul (the estranged son and heir of the reigning Empress Catherine II) at Gatchina, where he served as an artillery instructor to the grand duke's personal guard. Arakcheev made a good impression on the future czar and was promoted to captain within a month of his arrival. Three years later, Paul appointed him governor of Gatchina, although he was an unpopular administrator because of his harshness. Arakcheev did establish a close friendship with Paul's son Alexander though.

Arakcheev's career reached even greater heights after Catherine's death in November 1796. Now on the throne, Paul I appointed Arakcheev as military commandant of St. Petersburg, a position that entitled him to living quarters in the czar's luxurious Winter Palace and a grand estate at Gruzino, near Novgorod. At the age of 27, he was promoted to the rank of major general and a year later, was named quartermaster general of the army. After Paul's death on March 11, 1801, Arakcheev's young friend Alexander ascended the throne as Czar Alexander I. Their friendship brought Arakcheev even further promotions and honors.

Partially over the guilt of having been a somewhat unwilling accomplice in his father's assassination, Alexander conferred great favor upon his old friend Arakcheev, and the latter was made minister of war in 1807. When the czar established the Council of State in 1809, Arakcheev was appointed President of the War Department. In this role, Arakcheev began to set up a series of military colonies throughout Russia in

which a large portion of the standing army would be stationed.

The colonies included peasants and other civilian inhabitants who were kept under a code of strict order and discipline. These colonies offered the advantage of allowing the military to produce its own supplies and granted military men the privilege of having family lives. In practice, however, they were dehumanizing organizations that demanded an unreasonable standard of discipline and order that eventually culminated in several mini-revolts. Arakcheev's reputation for harshness and brutality that had caused many at Gatchina and St. Petersburg to fear him now had the same effect across the country.

Arakcheev's organizational and administrative skills led him in 1815 to supervise the Council of Ministers. With Alexander spending a lot of time abroad in Western Europe over the next 10 years on matters of foreign relations, Arakcheev was left with enormous power to control domestic affairs. His expectations for order and discipline reached a much wider scope in these years, the infamous *Arakcheevshchina* period, and Arakcheev truly became the most feared man in Russia in his attempts to impose regulations and control Russian life.

During this 10-year period, no progressive legislation was passed in Russia, and the country quickly fell even further behind in the important areas of industrialization and reform. This period lasted until Alexander's death on November 19, 1825, at which time Arakcheev gave up his official duties and retired to his estate at Gruzchino, where he lived peacefully until his death on May 3, 1834.

Christopher Borhani

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Paul I (1754–1801)

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
Arctic Convoys, World War II

Convoys transporting war matériel from the United States and Britain to the Soviet Union. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the British government made the political decision to support the Soviet Union with armaments and, almost simultaneously, the United States extended the benefits of the Lend-Lease Act to include supplying Russia. The first convoy, seven merchant ships in Operation DERVISH, left Liverpool on August 12, 1941, and the final round-trip transit (convoys JW/RA 67) occurred during May 12–30, 1945, just after the surrender of German forces in Europe.

Shipping headed to or from Soviet Arctic ports faced a quadruple German threat in addition to the hazards of navigation in stormy, fog-bound, icy seas. Germany based large numbers of U-boats in Norway, and, from the spring of 1942, most of its modern heavy surface warships transferred there, too. The Luftwaffe stationed substantial forces in Norway and transferred specialist anti-shiping units there as the Allied convoy system became more established. Finally, Germany conducted a steady mining campaign against the ports themselves.

The proximity of the convoy route to Norway and the deployment of German heavy surface units and anti-shiping aircraft had

ARCTIC CONVOY, 1941 - 1942



a profound influence on the conduct of convoy operations. Almost all Arctic convoys were more heavily escorted than regular trade convoys. In addition to the usual small escort vessels, the close escort usually included several fleet destroyers. Furthermore, the British Home Fleet often deployed heavy covering forces for the convoys, ranging in size from one or two cruisers (plus escorts) to large squadrons that also included battleships and fleet and escort carriers.

Actual sorties or threats of excursions by German heavy surface warships precipitated several notable actions. Intelligence that the German battleship *Tirpitz* had sortied led to Convoy PQ 17 being ordered to disperse on July 4, 1942. The unescorted merchantmen were easy targets for German aircraft and submarines; 23 of the 34 ships in the convoy were sunk. Other significant actions were the Battle of the Barents Sea (December 31, 1942), in which a British combined cruiser-destroyer force fought off an attack by the pocket battleship *Lützow*, heavy cruiser *Hipper*, and destroyers, allowing the entire convoy to reach the Soviet Union unscathed, and the Battle of the North Cape (December 26, 1943), in which the German battleship *Scharnhorst* was sunk. In addition, the presence of the *Tirpitz* precipitated a series of underwater and air attacks between September 1943 and its sinking on November 12, 1944.

A total of 848 merchantmen sailed to Russia in 42 convoys and one major unescorted operation, of which 65 were sunk. Of 735 ships that sailed from Russia in 36 convoys and one major unescorted operation, 40 were sunk. Overall, this loss rate was slightly higher than that of North Atlantic convoys, and it was distorted by the high casualties of PQ 17.

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See also: Lend-Lease (March 1941–August 1945); Navy, Soviet (1917–1991); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Armed Neutrality, League of (1801)

Response to the Napoleonic “Continental System” and the ensuing British blockade.

In 1800, the Baltic states of Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden formed the League of Armed Neutrality to protect their vessels against inspection and seizure by British warships and to guard against full-scale incursions by the Royal Navy in the Baltic.

By 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte had shattered the coalition designed to contain revolutionary France and conquered much of continental Europe. In response, Britain had instituted a policy of armed impressment (the seizure of men to serve aboard warships) to acquire manpower. Britain also harassed neutral shipping and confiscated several shipments, which aggrieved neutral nations like Russia, Denmark, and the United States. Denmark responded by arming its maritime convoys. This proved insufficient, however, as British privateers continued to pester Danish ships with impunity. The Russian navy, though largely

confined to the Baltic Sea, also suffered, and the British policy severely hindered Russian trade. Czar Paul I therefore decided to reintroduce the League of Armed Neutrality.

Originally formed in the 1780s to counter French aggression on the high seas, the League served the temporary purpose of aligning neutral nations to protect their trade. In 1800, it seemed the alliance could also act as a regional balance; that hope went unfulfilled. In the summer of 1801, the British attacked and decisively defeated the Danish fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen, instantly discrediting the League of Armed Neutrality. The assassination of Paul I on March 23, 1801, dealt the coalition a further, mortal blow. His successor, Alexander I, had no interest in upholding the principles of the League, and Russia's arrangement with the other Baltic states came to a formal end in June 1801. The League of Armed Neutrality vanished as quickly as it had appeared. It had introduced, however, the idea of uniting neutral nations against aggressive naval powers, a concept that lingered for the next century.

Jaime Ramón Olivares

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Paul I (1754–1801)

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Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918)

According to tradition, Czar Peter I (the Great) created the first standing Russian Army in the late 18th century; however, he merely built on the foundations of his forefathers. The basic structure of the army, for

instance, came from the armies of Muscovy. Czar Ivan IV (the Terrible) had introduced artillery (and perhaps even firearms) units in the 16th century and, briefly, established a quasiprofessional force, the *Oprichniki*. The early Romanovs—Mikhail Fyodorovich and Aleksei Mikhailovich—carried those traditions forward, maintaining professional units of musketeers (*Streltsy*; literally, “shooters”) and creating permanent units staffed by foreign military experts (“foreign formations”) to train Russian units raised to campaign. Peter I welded these together and added some innovations of his own, but the traditions upon which he drew were still evident in the Imperial Russian Army at its end, in 1917.

Riurikad Armies (1230–1609)

In the years after the Mongol conquest of Russia, the rulers of Muscovy and the other principalities of the emerging Russia faced two threats. To the south and east were the Mongol hordes (Tatars, to the Muscovites) and their allies, while in the north and west they faced competition from the Teutonic Knights, the Hanseatic League, and a series of emerging European states such as the Habsburg (Austrian) Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Mongols fought largely on horseback, relying on small composite bows; their tactics relied on speed, surprise, and terror. The Europeans, as Muscovite chronicles record, fought “with the lance”; their armies featured heavy cavalry and disciplined foot soldiers in formation.

The armies of the Muscovite princes had characteristics of both. Like the Mongols, they deployed cavalry armed with composite bows as both rapid-strike forces and mass armies. Like the Europeans, however, the Muscovites fought in regimental formations. Most frequently, there were five regiments in an army: front (advance), left, right, center,

and rear (guard). Occasionally, they took the field in a diamond pattern (front, left, right, rear), and only rarely with three regiments. In all formations, the central regiments tended to be heavy cavalry—often denoted as *warriors*—armed with bows, lances, and swords, and wearing leather armor and protective caps. Wing formations were lighter cavalry (“troops”) and, depending upon the location and enemy, sometimes foot elements (“people”) bearing lances, swords, and other hand weapons.

Because no individual prince was powerful enough to resist the Mongols, and because the princes were divided amongst themselves, armies had to be gathered anew for each campaign and usually dispersed thereafter—though details are sparse in the historical record. The size of these forces thus varied greatly. Some chronicles record armies as small as 300 men, while estimates of Dmitri Donskoi’s army at the 1380 Battle of Kulikovo range from 150,000 to 400,000 men. Numbers given for the Mongol forces at Kulikovo range between 200,000 and 900,000.

As the princes of Muscovy emerged as leaders in the struggle against the Mongols, more permanent defensive systems, including armed forces, emerged as well. During the reign of Grand Prince Vasily II (1425–1434), the boyars of Muscovy and the surrounding principalities agreed to submit themselves to a centralized authority to better ward off the Tatars and maintain order. The boyars formed a council, or *sinklit*, from which military commanders would be drawn in time of need. During the time of Ivan III (the Great, r. 1462–1505) and Vasily III (r. 1505–1533), service to the prince (*prikaz*), and military service in particular, became a universal requirement for the boyars.

In their new status as servitors of the prince, the boyars and lesser nobles comprised the skeleton of a primitive “garrison

state.” With each advance against the Tatars to the south, the Muscovite princes established elaborate lines of defense (*zaseka*) anchored by fortified towns. Beginning in 1480, Ivan III made land grants to the nobles conditioned upon the provision of military forces to defend the region (*pomestie*). These defensive lines were constructed and administered in segments and sequences—for instance, the Belgorod Line and the later Orenburg Line. Troops for the garrisons, or any required defensive forces, were recruited from the area by the noble commander (*pomeshchik*) at a proscribed rate based upon the size of the landholding. Towns behind the defensive lines (e.g., Starodub, Tula, Putivl) were utilized as muster points.

This system, which evolved into the Russian recruitment, training, and planning system based on military districts, was not only cheaper and more efficient but it allowed the Muscovite princes to call upon larger forces and maintain them for longer periods of time. Ivan II ordered the construction of some 150 frontier fortifications and developed a series of fortress cities (e.g., Potolsk) in the west to guard against incursions from Europe. With the “gunpowder revolution” spreading across Europe, Muscovite armies also gained new classes of specialists, ranging from artillery men to musketeers (*Streltsy*) to siege (explosives) engineers. Russian artillery production during this time was considered among the best in the world.

By the time Ivan IV (the Terrible) acceded to the throne in his majority 1547, many of the troops serving on the frontier were salaried, in a rather loose sense. In addition to a small cash payment, they often received a small garden or pasture from which they were expected to support themselves. The *Streltsy* had special, tax-exempt cantonments where they augmented their income running artisanal shops. A semipermanent regiment

of courtiers, perhaps 2–300 men at any given time, served as both the prince’s bodyguard and his core of military advisors and administrators. Thus, as Muscovy emerged from under the “Tatar yoke,” its military began to look increasingly modern and European.

Early Romanov Armies (1609–1696)

A great deal of what had been gained in professionalism and efficiency was lost, however, during Ivan IV’s experiment with the *Oprichniki* and the “Time of Troubles” (*smutnoye vremya*) that followed his death. Established in 1565, the *Oprichniki* were technically a standing army, funded directly from the proceeds of the czar’s landholdings—which amounted to almost half of Russia at the time. Ivan used the *Oprichniki* mostly as an internal police force, however; when the undisciplined troops proved useless during the Livonian War, he disbanded them. Any sense of unity and loyalty that remained among the boyars, the essential military servitors of the czar, vanished in the civil wars that extended from 1604 to 1613. It was only with the coronation of Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov as czar, and especially with the 1619 return of his father, Filaret, from Polish captivity that Russia again established regular military forces.

During this “Period of Reconstruction,” the Romanovs ordered the establishment of casting foundries in Moscow and Tula, increased the cash payments for both garrison service and the gentry cavalry, and distributed land to the lower echelons of military servitors. As before though, both the payments and the land grants were conditional upon continuing military service. Filaret recognized that a force so comprised was hardly a match for the European forces of the day, however; during the Time of Troubles,

Russian armies had been defeated repeatedly by much smaller, professional forces of both Swedes and Poles. He therefore made large purchases of carbines, pistols, and armor from Sweden and, in 1631, hired some 190 Swedish and Scottish mercenaries to command and train Russian regiments—the so-called foreign formations. By the end of the Smolensk War in 1634, there were six “foreign regiments” of 1,600 men each. There were three musketeers for every two pikemen, and no cavalry; they drilled in the tactics and forms made famous by Dutch general and statesman Maurice of Nassau.

The costs of such modern forms of warfare were tremendous. The foreign formations alone cost Moscow some 500,000 rubles during the Smolensk War, and providing the new, larger armies with food, weapons, and ammunition had proven beyond the capabilities of the Russian military administration. Mikhail I created a new class of military servitors, the *odnodvortsy*, in an attempt to close the gap; his successor, Aleksei Mikhailovich, focused initially on consolidating imperial control in the southern border regions. He increased the number of garrison towns (forts) and extended the Russian defensive lines by some 800 kilometers. Over the course of his reign, he centralized and consolidated the administration of the border regions into nine military districts.

These modifications still proved insufficient, as Aleksei found during the early portion of the Thirteen-Year War (1654–1667). Although his troops performed reasonably well when he was at the front, overseeing both actions and supply directly, as soon as he left, the Russian logistical and strategic efforts began to falter. His officers and his troops, moreover, continued to suffer defeat at the hands of smaller but better trained European armies. Aleksei’s initial response was to increase the number of men available

through annual levies of about 100,000 men from 1658 through 1663. Technically, the term for each military servitor was life but service was usually seasonal except for officers, who trained year-round.

The shift toward a standing army brought other changes. In addition to an increase in pay, Aleksei implemented a system whereby the government supplied all necessary equipment and food. The new troops thus formed, known as *soldaty*, essentially replaced the gentry cavalry. By 1663, more than three-quarters of the Russian army was infantry units. They were equipped with pikes, matchlocks, muskets, rapiers, and grenades; Moscow also supplied a helmet, bandolier, and fur coat for each soldier. The heavy cavalry units remained, but were armed and armored more heavily and generally referred to as *dragoons*. Most officers were foreigners employed directly by the czar. Of the 277 staff officers only 18 were Russian, while among the lower ranks (captain, lieutenant, and ensign) the ratio was 648:1,274.

The costs associated with this new force were tremendous. For every 10,000 soldiers, the government had to supply an estimated 3.5 tons of powder, 1.5 tons of match, and 35.5 tons of ball per battle. Aleksei therefore ordered supply depots built at strategic points behind the defensive lines, and attempted to increase the domestic armaments industry. The majority of arms, uniforms, and military supplies, however, still had to be purchased in the West. To pay for all of this, Aleksei debased the currency, issuing copper coins while collecting taxes and debts in silver, and thus touched off massive inflation that resulted in riots in Moscow in 1663. Aleksei also worked to centralize and strengthen the fiscal administration of the army. During the Thirteen Years' War, he had subordinated virtually all business to his new Secret Chancellery; thereafter, the Military Chancellery

increasingly coordinated the activities of the 21 administrative departments dealing specifically with the army.

Peter's Army (1696–1796)

Peter I thus inherited the structure and core of a modern standing army built along Western lines. It “stood” only in theory though, and because of the limited and irregular training, its performance was erratic. Russian soldiers were noted as stout fighters, particularly on the defensive, but they frequently panicked and broke formation. The quality of officers, both foreign and Russian, varied widely. Even the best, however, were often hamstrung by the centralized system of command Aleksei Mikhailovich had implemented, where directives from Moscow overrode decisions in the field no matter how distant the campaign was. It might fairly be said then, that Peter the Great stabilized and standardized the Russian army rather than creating it. He brought it from a skeletal force to a true standing army consistently capable of fighting successfully against European opponents.

Peter's earliest initiatives replaced the *Streltsy*, who had risen in favor of his sister Sophia, with the Preobrazhensky and Semeonovsky Guards regiments as the core of the army. These regiments had been the “playthings” of his youth, drilled and outfitted according to Western standards; now they were the model for his real army. He reimplemented conscription and made service year-round; these peasant levies were augmented with volunteers, and led by officers drawn from the lower nobility who received basic training as privates before being promoted. Otherwise, they closely resembled army regiments from the later period of Aleksei Mikhailovich's reign.

Peter's army, however, was a truly permanent force of much greater size and (eventually)

ability. When he launched the initial campaign of the Great Northern War against Sweden in 1700, the Russian army counted the two Guards regiments, two supporting regiments of Guards dragoons, and 27 infantry regiments organized into three divisions. Another 10 infantry and 9 cavalry regiments were added during the first year of the conflict. Between 1705 and 1710, Peter added another 20 infantry regiments and, in a marked departure from the Western model, 26 cavalry regiments. The latter were all light cavalry units, useful in the broad, sparsely populated expanses of southern and western Russia that Peter aimed to take. Musketeer units, the basis of Aleksei Mikhailovich's force, still existed in small numbers. Regular units no longer served in garrisons, however, as new resident militia formations (*landesmilitsia*) were created for that purpose.

Over the course of the war, Peter's army became increasingly flexible and diverse. Dragoons, by definition, can serve unmounted as infantry, but Peter often deployed infantry regiments on horseback as well. Distinct artillery units were formed for the first time, but almost any unit of the army could be assigned any task at any given time. Infantry served on the ships of Peter's new navy, performed hard labor in St. Petersburg, and augmented garrisons along the southern frontier during campaigns.

This lack of specialization was matched by an increasing lack of social segregation within the military as it expanded. Members of the lower gentry and freedmen (taxpayers) were enrolled in the infantry as heavy cavalry units disappeared and the distinction between infantry and cavalry blurred. The sons of the nobility now served as junior officers in the regiments at the beginning of their career, rather than forming separate cavalry units; on a few occasions, they even served in units alongside Cossacks. Even the officer corps was not socially exclusive

though, as there were hardly enough nobles and sons of nobles to fill the many slots provided by the growing force. By the time of Peter's death, roughly one-third of the officer corps was of nonnoble lineage, although the increase in administrative officer posts accounted for some of this.

The officer corps remained a bastion of the social elites nonetheless, particularly after the Table of Ranks defined the relationship between military rank and social status, but Peter's army was by-and-large a mass of undifferentiated troops. To support it, Peter had implemented the hated soul tax—a general levy against the number of serfs owned or people supported—and ripped soldiers away from their families via conscription and full-time service which, even though Peter had reduced the term of service to 25 years, was generally viewed as a death sentence. The army's size and flexibility, however, freed Russia from the generally defensive posture it had been forced to adopt previously. With a sizeable standing army equally capable of fighting European or Tatar forces, Russia was set to emerge as a power to be reckoned with in Europe, and in the world. During the 1730s and 1740s, Russian power projected into central Europe on several occasions, although Peter's heirs were far less able in military matters.

It was during the Seven Years' War (better known in Russia as "The Prussian War") that the Russian army truly came of age though. Nearly 500,000 men served in the Russian military during the conflict; many of them were drawn from the garrison forces that had been designed to provide a reserve of trained troops. Carrying out a series of campaigns deep inside Polish and Prussian territory, they demonstrated remarkable endurance, marching on average 30 kilometers per day, and recorded a few forced marches of 40 kilometers a day. In battle, their artillery

was unmatched, firing at a top rate of 18 rounds per minute. The accuracy of Russian musket fire was questionable at best, however, and a great deal of the success the army enjoyed was due to the stalwart nature of the Russian soldier.

The logistical organization of the army was weak, and soldiers survived for most of the campaign on biscuit and kasha; troops carried 10 days' supply on their backs, and the regimental wagon trains carried another 20 days' worth. Rations were seldom fulfilled, however, and troops often had to live off the land for extended periods. Attempts to supply the army by sea failed when Danzig refused to accommodate Russian ships and an attempt to take Kolberg failed in 1758. Poor roads, rough terrain, and uncertain weather further conspired against the Russian supply efforts.

The Russian armies nevertheless fought steadfastly and, in most respects, outperformed the forces of the vaunted Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia. They fought to draws at Gross Jaegersdorf (1757) and Zorn-dorf (1758), defeated the Prussians soundly at Paltzig and Kunersdorf (both 1759), occupied East Prussia, raided Berlin, and appeared ready to deal Prussian ambitions a death blow in 1762. In December 1761 (January 1762 by the Western calendar), however, Czarina Elizabeth I passed away; she was succeeded by Peter III, an ardent admirer of Prussia. He immediately took Russia out of the war—which almost certainly saved Prussia from collapse—and was preparing to switch sides when he was deposed. The Prussian War thus demonstrated the capabilities of Peter's army and Russia's weight in European affairs.

The experience of the Seven Years' War also gave rise to a new generation of Russian commanders, more able and innovative than any before. The most prominent among

them were Pyotr Rumiantsev and Aleksandr Suvarov, and they changed not just the tactics of the Russian army, but its ethos. Suvarov, in particular, had a lasting influence. In addition to adopting the Western method of attack in columns, preceded by skirmishers, Suvarov instilled in the Russian army a discipline and morale not seen again until Soviet days. Suvarov's system centered on troop morale, and stressed their well-being both in peace and in preparation for battle. He emphasized rapid maneuvers and decisive attacks, training his troops to attack in bayonet charges rather than relying on firepower. "The bullet is a fool, the bayonet a hero" became the watchword of the Russian army during the next century, for better or for worse.

The "Suvarov Period," although brief, in many ways marked the high point for the Imperial Russian Army. The Russians easily defeated much larger Ottoman forces during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, crushed two rebellions in Poland, and thus added huge swaths of territory to the Russian Empire under Catherine II (the Great). Even the armies of revolutionary France proved no match for the Russians. During 1799, Suvarov led the Russian army to a series of victories in Italy, driving the French from the peninsula. Suvarov's career ended on a sour note, as an ill-advised campaign in Switzerland led to his defeat and retirement, but the overall result vindicated the reforms of Peter the Great.

"Policeman of Europe" (1796–1853)

Suvarov's disciples, notably Pyotr Bagration and Mikhail Kutuzov, strove to maintain the reforms he had brought, but the short, reactionary reign of Paul I (1796–1801) undermined the foundations of the army. The son of Catherine II, Paul was raised largely

by his grandmother, Elizabeth I, and her trusted minister, Nikolai Panin. Upon his ascent, Paul set about reversing many of Catherine's policies. He replaced the army's cheap and comfortable uniforms, which were distinctly Russian and eminently practical, with Prussian-style parade uniforms. Paul was also fond of parade and drill, and in 1796 he introduced *The Infantry Codes*, a set of instructions that focused on discipline, formation, and the outward appearance of both soldier and unit. Suvarov had largely ignored them, but common soldiers did so at their peril, for Paul was also an advocate of corporal punishment. His choice for quartermaster general, Alexis Arakcheev, so shared this temperament that during 1798 several units mutinied and an officer committed suicide rather than follow his orders.

Deprived of his offices upon the murder of Paul I, Arakcheev was soon reinstated and provided useful services to the new emperor, Alexander I. The damage had largely been done though; during Paul's reign, the upper echelons had become corrupt, and officers, largely drawn from the upper nobility, cared little for the soldiers and knew less of military strategies and tactics. The Russian armies that fought Napoleon at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland performed admirably in the face of such difficulties, but were defeated in the end. Alexander signed the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807, which pledged Russia to support the Continental System against Great Britain. Russia also lost the Ionian Islands, and had to evacuate the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

During Russia's brief interval of peace, Alexander and Arakcheev worked to reform the army. Taking the lessons of Austerlitz, Arakcheev had already introduced reforms to the artillery known as the "System of 1805"; this reorganization deployed 6- and 12-pound guns throughout the army, and

created light and heavy foot artillery battalions that operated independently. He further improved officer training, and issued a new series of regulations that incorporated many of Suvarov's ideas. Promoted to minister of defense in 1808, Arakcheev improved the army's supply operations, and the grading of the general staff. During the Patriotic War of 1812, he supervised army recruiting and managed supply.

Alexander I's turn back to the enlightened military ideals of Suvarov appeared of little worth in the early stages of the Patriotic War. Under the command of Field Marshal Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly the Russian armies fell steadily back before the onslaught of Napoleon's 500,000-man *Grande Armée*. Tolly made a brief stand at Smolensk in August 1812, but left the city smoldering and resumed the retreat, scorching the earth to deny the French ready supply. After three months of avoiding battle, Tolly was replaced with Kutuzov, who practiced similar tactics. Kutuzov had the good fortune—or cleverness—to engage Napoleon outside of Moscow at Borodino, however, just before winter was to arrive. The Russians arguably lost the battle, with Kutuzov leaving the field that evening having suffered some 40,000 casualties from a force of about 150,000, but it was there that Napoleon lost the war. When he departed Moscow at the end of October, the French emperor found Kutuzov waiting for him; the Russians successfully blocked an attempt to retreat via Kaluga and then harassed the emperor's forces all the way back to East Prussia.

Contrary to popular belief, the Russian armies of Tolly and Kutuzov were not large forces; they retreated because they could not match the strength of the French. Even as the *Grande Armée* returned west, it remained equal to or larger than Kutuzov's force for most of the way. Not until the spring and

summer of 1813 did the Russians' mass reserves sufficient not only to pursue the French but to engage them. The immediate results again were not good; Kutuzov had passed away in April 1813 and his successor, Peter Wittgenstein, was defeated at both Lützen and Bautzen. Russian armies did take part in the allied victory at Leipzig though, and in January 1814 they invaded France under the direct command of Alexander I.

While the Russian armies thus were ultimately successful in returning to the ways of Suvarov, the Patriotic War changed something in Alexander. Scholars have debated whether it was the malevolent influence of Baroness de Kruedener, a revolutionary conspiracy among his imperial guardsmen, or a putative kidnap plot—or all of these—that turned the former supporter of liberalism (at least in a limited sense), but something did. Upon his return from Paris, where he had constructed the conservative Holy Alliance, Alexander set about restoring the discipline and methods of Arakcheev and Paul I in the army. In the Semeonovsky Regiment, which he personally commanded, Alexander introduced such strict discipline, enforced by endless drill, personal abuse, and floggings that a mutiny ensued. There were at least 14 other such incidents between 1816 and 1825.

An additional feature of Alexander's attempt to restore discipline and morality to the army was the creation of military colonies in Novgorod and southern Ukraine. Benignly interpreted, these establishments were designed to reduce the costs of maintaining an army, foster camaraderie among units, and instill discipline. Essentially, they consisted of large estates populated by government serfs organized into battalions of "farmer-colonists." Each farmer-colonist had an obligation to support not only his family but also two "soldier-lodgers" from his allotment of land. The soldier-lodgers

provided labor for the many projects Alexander and Arakcheev lavished upon the colonies, including roads, sidewalks, and well-designed houses. The farmer-colonists also received decent farming equipment and livestock from the government.

They hated the colonies nonetheless. Both farmer-colonists and soldier-lodgers were required to wear uniforms at all times. They spend mornings at drill, and lived on military time, their activity governed by the call of bugle and drum. Male children began drill at age 6, and were sent to special military schools at age 12; they began regular military service at 17. In some colonies, and notably on Arakcheev's personal estate, women were expected to bear children annually to supplement the levy. These strictures and others led to a number of rebellions; in 1819, two cavalry regiments revolted in Ukraine and over 2,000 men were arrested.

Others, notably those who had served as junior officers with Alexander in France, revolted in other ways. Many of the Guards and army officers joined secret, liberal societies dedicated to the reform of Russian institutions, including the army. When Alexander banished the rebels from his Semeonovsky Regiment to Ukraine, he merely dispersed the movement without destroying it in the capital. By 1825, there were two groups involved in a widespread conspiracy: the Northern Society of St. Petersburg, and the Southern Society housed in Second Army in Ukraine. Both groups hoped to abolish serfdom; disband the military colonies; institute responsible, representative government; and reform the military system. Alexander I died before they could enact the plot to assassinate him; however, the Northern Society seized the opportunity to attempt a coup—the Decembrist Revolt—and force the successor to bow to their demands.

If Nicholas I had ever had any grand intentions of reform, the Decembrist Revolt likely stifled them, for among the plotters were 16 major generals, 115 colonels, and 315 company officers representing 40 of the army's 256 battalions. The failed coup thus not only stripped the army of many of its best officers, it instilled a distrust between officers and between units.

Nicholas did work to alleviate the harsh conditions Alexander had imposed upon the army, however; he dismissed Arakcheev and eased restrictions on farmer-colonists. The general term of service was reduced to 15 years, and Nicholas sponsored military legislation that eliminated some of the harsher punishments and generally encouraged more humane treatment of the enlisted. Provisioning was improved notably, and a system of dedicated military hospitals was created. Military education also improved, as Nicholas established 18 additional cadet corps and, in 1832, a military academy to train general staff officers. Training remained largely for show, however, and military equipment was little improved. While the Russian Imperial Army thus appeared magnificent and overwhelming, and produced a string of triumphs when pitted against the Persian and Ottoman armies, or against Polish or Hungarian rebels, by 1853 it could no longer stand against the modern armies of Europe as it had half a century before.

The Era of Reform (1853–1907)

The main impediments to the advance of the Russian army, and the main contributors to its defeat in the 1853–1856 Crimean War were Nicholas's distrust of the officer corps and the institution of serfdom. The first prevented talented officers from rising through the system, as they had in previous generations. Instead of able, intelligent generals,

the Russian army therefore was officered by nobles who usually had little or no military training, and were accustomed only to following orders from the czar. These generals and colonels in turn demanded unthinking obedience from their troops, whom they educated and trusted just enough to maintain drill formation. There was no question of establishing small, independent units of skirmishers, much less allowing field commanders leeway to respond to developing circumstances. It would have been difficult in any case, as the continuation of serfdom in Russian society produced few conscripts who were not illiterate and used to harsh conditions and brutal punishments. There is an argument to be made, therefore, that while the Russian defeat in Crimea instigated reforms in all areas of society, the main target was the military.

One of the goals of the manifesto emancipating the serfs signed by Alexander II in 1861 was the creation of a civil society in which individuals realized their rights and their identities in their highest form: the nation. A series of decrees reforming local government, the judiciary, and the police followed. Capping it all off was the introduction of universal conscription in 1874. In theory, young men from all classes of society would now be subject to annual conscription. Those drafted would serve a maximum of six years on active duty, then spend 12 to 20 years in either the reserves (*zapas*) or the home guard (*oplocheniya*). The intent was to create the military as “the school of the nation,” melding men from various regions, ethnic minorities, religious groups, and social classes into a cohesive whole.

The reality fell far short of the ideal. To begin with, the government could only afford to equip and train about one-third of the number of men eligible to be drafted each year. It therefore implemented a series of

exemptions of one kind or another that allowed almost three-quarters of the annual levy to evade conscription. Only sons, “sole providers” and sons of veterans were only some of the excluded categories. Muslims, Finns, and many of the ethnic groups of Central Asia had no obligation to even register for the draft, while Jews and Poles faced severe restrictions on their numbers and the types of service they were allowed to perform. A cursory medical exam weeded out another 50 percent of conscripts who had not yet been exempted.

The system of exemptions also undermined any improvement in the command of the army, as the best and brightest were excluded almost from the outset. Merely attending university qualified a male for full exemption during his studies, and anyone who had attended even a single university class had his service reduced to 18 months. Anyone who had completed four years of secondary school served only four years, and anyone could reduce their time significantly by passing an officer’s exam, thus ensuring that the best trained officers served the least time. Most officer billets thus remained in the hands of the hereditary nobility, who were no better trained, in general, than they had been prior to the Crimean War.

They were, however, better educated. The military reforms, carried out largely under the stewardship of War Minister Dmitry Miliutin, did have several positive aspects, including the establishment of a general staff academy, an artillery academy, a military engineering academy, and an academy for military justice. The standing army, moreover, was reduced from 1.2 million men to just under 750,000—which allowed the government to not only save money but also maintain a trained reserve of more than 500,000 men. New regulations also clarified the direction of the army in wartime, and

subordinated all branches of the military to the Ministry of War in peace. Miliutin further initiated a modernization program, arming the troops with breech-loading Berdan rifles during 1867–1869, and introducing breech-loaded bronze artillery.

Tactics and training did not always keep up with the technology, in part because the government spent increasingly less on the army, but this “reformed army” sufficed, as it had before, for contests against non-European foes. During the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, Russia extended its landholdings in Central Asia considerably as part of the “Great Game” with Britain. The Russians took Kokand and Tashkent in 1864 and 1865, respectively, and conquered Khiva and Bukhara in 1873. Russian forces also overwhelmed the Ottoman armies in the Balkans during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, seizing huge swaths of land and forcing the Porte to recognize many Slavic territories as either independent or autonomous. When the European powers objected, however, Russia was forced to back down at the 1878 Congress of Berlin. Russian successes against Chinese forces during the 1900–1901 Boxer Rebellion likewise did not lead to victory in the Russo-Japanese War that followed during 1904–1905.

The forces that initially faced the Japanese in Manchuria were largely reservists, and the regional Siberian and Trans-Amur forces intended as a reserve for the Russian forces in Europe, even if not officially designated as such. Their task was, according to the plan devised by the commander of land forces in Manchuria, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, to fight a series of delaying actions that would allow Russia to ship superior fighting troops from its western military districts in sufficient numbers to defeat the Japanese. In this they largely failed, but the blame lay more with the commanders and with the

army's infrastructure than with the common soldiers.

The Japanese forces outmatched the Russians technologically. Russia had few rapid-fire artillery pieces when the war began, and few machine guns. Smokeless powder was new to the Russians, as were techniques such as placing artillery on the back-facing slope of a hill and firing "blind" or laying telephone wire in great quantities to facilitate communication with the front lines. Japanese commanders also were more consistently aggressive, forcing attacks where Russian defenses appeared sufficient and thus unnerving the inexperienced Russian commanders. From the initial land battle at the Yalu to the conclusive engagements at Liaoyang and Mukden, Russian commanders proved unable to cope with the scale and speed of the Japanese engagements. Their passiveness and defeatism, moreover, led to generally poor morale among the troops. This spilled over into revolution during 1905, as troops called upon to suppress protests in the capital (and in other cities) frequently sided with the protestors. Although the most notable mutiny took place aboard the battleship *Potemkin*, there were more than 400 smaller mutinies in the army during 1905–1906.

The End of the Imperial Russian Army (1907–1917)

The Russian Imperial Army thus barely had time to recover before the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. Officers at the various academies studied the results of the Russo-Japanese War intently, seeking answers as to how modern warfare should be conducted. The czar, taking at least one lesson to heart, increased the funding for the military significantly, launching a "small program" to modernize both the

army and the navy in 1907, and a more significant "large program" in 1910. Infantry units were therefore equipped with modern Mosin-Nagant rifles and Maxim machine guns. Artillery was the equal of any in the world, particularly since the Russians imported Japanese officers to train their gunners. Military railroad construction had been prioritized, and over 40 percent of the army was already stationed in the western military districts of Russia, ready for mobilization. In the cities, young men flocked to the colors. But there still were not enough noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or officers—fewer than 41,000 for an army that had grown to 1.3 million men—and those that were in place generally were poorly prepared.

As was often the case for the Russian army, things started out poorly. Massive, stunning defeats at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes drowned out the Russian successes against Austria-Hungary in the south. The high casualty rates in both ventures dampened enthusiasm for the war quickly; by the end of 1914, Russia had already lost nearly 1.5 million men dead, wounded, captured, or missing, and few were eager to replace them. In theory, the army had more than enough men in reserve; however, with the example of 1905 in mind, the regime was reluctant to revoke exemptions or otherwise extend conscription. The government tried all other measures to reduce desertion, mass surrender, and self-inflicted wounds: the czar awarded medals to units en masse; legislation deprived the families of deserters of pay and rations; and Nicholas II donated lands to be awarded to valorous soldiers. None of it worked, as morale on the "home front" dropped steadily.

The army reached its nadir, it seemed, during 1915, as the Central Powers advanced deep into Russian territory. While the Germans perfected the creeping barrage,

the Russians watched helplessly, since their shell supplies were exhausted. By the summer of 1915, the army had suffered another 1.9 million casualties. Another 500,000 were thought to have deserted somewhere between conscription and the front lines. The Russian officer corps, in strict numerical terms, had lost 150 percent of its original strength. Desperate for manpower, the army not only called up draft classes early but also pushed the reserves with minimal training into the front lines. When even those measures proved insufficient, the government began targeting protestors, political agitators, and the medically unfit. In September, more sweeping revocations—termed *re-examinations*—of previously granted exemptions led to open resistance as the government attempted to conscript university students and some ethnic minorities.

The winter of 1915–1916 brought some relief as the Central Powers, having failed to drive Russia from the war, focused their attention on the Western Front again. Under new War Minister Aleksandr Polivanov, the Russian Imperial Army was slowly rebuilt. Mandatory military education courses were introduced in secondary schools, and officer training schools were set up behind the front lines. The Russian general staff let frontline units operate at half-strength or less during this “quiet” period, allowing new conscripts six to eight weeks of training and then rotating them into calm sectors to gain experience before deploying them in battle. Conscripts who had completed secondary school were pulled out of the line and trained as officers and NCOs, creating an entirely new officer corps of some 30,000 men. Polivanov also worked hard to improve the supplies of both ammunition and food, putting the army back on a war footing by April 1916.

The subsequent Brusilov Offensive of June–September 1916 undid much of this

work. Although it gained back much of the territory lost on the southwestern portions of the front, the offensive cost Russia another 1 million men, including most of the newly trained officers. To make good the losses, the government began shifting men deployed in the rear as conscientious objectors or political risks to the front lines. All exemptions were revoked. This had two effects: it created an armed insurrection in Central Asia that required nearly four months and tens of thousands of troops to suppress; and it moved the protests from the home front to the front lines.

Beginning in October 1916, at latest, reports of political agitation and revolutionary “plotting” began to filter into military headquarters. A reorganization intended to disperse the new recruits throughout the army instead resulted in the creation of entire units of malcontents, and several cases of open rebellion. One infantry division had to be shelled into submission in late 1916. Throughout the front lines, officers found themselves facing insurrections both minor and major; many had already lost their faith in the government. Thus when unrest again struck the capital in February 1917, first the troops in St. Petersburg and then the generals at Mogilev declined to support the regime. It was the General Staff that diverted the czar’s train to Pskov, where they suggested he abdicate.

The generals had hoped for a national government that would command the respect of the people and restore discipline to the Russian army. They were disappointed. Revolutionary calls to defend the nation fell on largely deaf ears. Maria Bochkareva formed the Women’s Battalion of Death both to draw women to the colors and to shame Russian men into fighting, but failed in both. Most women who joined quickly dropped out when faced with real military discipline

and the men, instead of being shamed, were angered and fired on Bochkareva's unit from behind as it went into action. The Provisional Government's "revolutionary offensive," better known as the Kerensky Offensive, shattered the Russian army. Desertions mounted, and those who remained on the front lines fraternized openly with the Germans. Over the course of 1917, the Imperial Russian Army simply melted away, to the point where only a handful of cadets and one female battalion remained to defend it when the Bolsheviks staged their coup in October 1917. It is perhaps fitting that they named as the last commander of the Russian Imperial Army Ensign Nikolai Krylenko, who had been sent to the front in 1916 as a punishment for political agitation.

Conclusions

From its origins in the 14th century, the Russian army took a different track than those of Western Europe. The Russians faced different challenges—of geography, weather, opponent, and culture—and met them in different ways. For most of the existence of Russia, they worked. Under Aleksei Mikhailovich and Peter I, the Russians imported enough foreign experts and purchased enough foreign expertise to compete with contemporary European forces. Doing so placed tremendous strains on the Russian population and the Russian economy, but it was a question of self-preservation. The sacrifices paid off during the 18th century, and in the first half of the 19th century, when the Russian Imperial Army was nearly invincible. Under Catherine II and Nicholas I, Russia expanded its territory by leaps and bounds, making the Black Sea into a Russian lake. Even after the Crimean War, Russian forces proved capable of extending the empire deep into Central Asia.

By the 20th century, however, the structure and simplicity that had served the Russian army so well were no longer adequate. Faced with advanced technology, mass armies, and specialized forces that required training, education and—most importantly—a loyal and reliable supply of manpower, the Russian system simply collapsed under its own weight. Its leaders could not conceive of permitting the types of freedom and initiative required by a modern army, and those who could conceive of it were not allowed to lead. In peace, the system could still function because it did so in the background of society; as the Russian joke of World War I had it, the army was a collection of those too inept to avoid conscription. Under the strain of war, that proved fatal.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Arakcheev, Alexis (1769–1834); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Crimean War (1853–1856); Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825); Donskoi, Dmitry (October 12, 1350–May 19, 1389); February (March) Revolution (1917); Gentry cavalry; Gordon, Patrick (1635–1699); Great Northern War (1700–1721); Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kulikovo, Battle of (1380); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Livonian War (1558–1583); Miliutin, Dmitry (1816–1912); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); October (November) Revolution (1917); *Oprichniki*; Patriotic War of 1812; Paul I (1754–1801); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Polivanov, Aleksei Andreevich (1855–1920); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709); *Pomestie (Pomestie)*; Revolution of 1905; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Seven Years’ War (1754–1763); *Streltsy*; Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800); Table of Ranks (1722); Time of Troubles; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Army, Russian (1991–)

The Russian Federation Army has declined from the pinnacle of power in Red Army days. Under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin's leadership it has experienced decline in financial and personnel resources while continually struggling to successfully conduct operations meeting current and emerging Russian national security requirements instead of Cold War–era scenarios.

The emerging post–Cold War security environment saw the emergence of asymmetric threats on the federation's periphery. Russia has conducted two wars against separatist, Islamist Chechen rebels. The First Chechen War (1994–1996) was disastrous for Russia, with Moscow unable to defeat the Chechens and having to settle for a negotiated peace. The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) saw the Russians rather brutally reassert control of this region, which remains highly volatile and has attracted foreign Islamist fighters.

Russia also seeks to use its army to assert control over former Soviet Republics. In August 2008, it invaded Georgia after each country accused the other of exacerbating tensions in the separatist Georgian republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On August 7–8, Georgia launched an offensive against South Ossetia in hopes of reclaiming the territory. Moscow responded with increased military force, and fighting continued until a cease-fire on August 12. A European Union–sponsored cease-fire occurred, and Russia pulled back its forces by October 8, 2008, although regional tensions remain acute.

The Russians won militarily, but the conflict revealed significant weaknesses in the form of antiquated Soviet-era tactics, nearly nonexistent command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) and night vision systems, and a deficient and obsolete global navigation satellite system. The conflict also showed that the Georgians were better equipped tactically than the Russian Army, and were more flexible.

In response, Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdiukov and president Dmitry Medvedev attempted to introduce reforms to transition the army from a Soviet massed-base model fighting conventional wars on European plains or northern China.

They sought to reduce the Russian military from 1.13 million to 1 million men; to trim a bloated officer corps from 355,000 to 150,000; to replace conscripts with professionals; to attract and retain high-quality contract volunteers; and to develop a more agile, mobile, and professional force capable of effectively combating terrorist and insurgent forces. These reforms have had some success but have met significant opposition within the officer corps and other military-oriented interest groups.

There is a significant disconnect between the army's physical capabilities and doctrine. Russia's population has declined in the post-Soviet era, and the army has struggled to attract and retain quality forces, which has been demonstrated in its unsuccessful conventional and counterinsurgency military operations. The persistence of the *dedovshchina*, a sadistically harsh but long-entrenched system of brutalizing conscript troops, has produced numerous personnel deaths and suicides—which does not make the army a desirable career option.

The Russian Federation's *2010 Military Doctrine* considers NATO's force potential and desire to expand to Russian national borders and adjacent waters as the chief threat to Russian security. This doctrine also warns of the purported dangers of Western missile defense systems while emphasizing the dangers of terrorism and outside powers promoting subversion against countries surrounding Russia. It acknowledges the increasing importance of information warfare, places critical reliance on nuclear weapons, and claims that Russia seeks to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The Russian Army has conducted military exercises with China and various central Asian nations for ostensible antiterrorism purposes. It still retains significant

conventional weapons forces which, although aging and unable to compete with superior Western technologies and capabilities, could be used to coerce neighboring non-NATO member countries. The Russian army should be concerned about how a nuclear Iran would affect its southern borders, but there is no effective legislative oversight of Russian army activities. China's increasing demographic presence in Russia's Far East is another problem that may impact the Russian army's structure and operational planning.

The army still has significant political clout in Russia but its operational and doctrinal aspirations are far beyond its personnel and technological capabilities. Western countries' budget restraints, however, give it the chance to threaten Western security interests in areas not under NATO's security architecture. Russia's annexation of Crimea and its threatening posture toward eastern Ukraine during 2014 further served to demonstrate this paradox of Russian power.

Bert Chapman

See also: Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Chechen War, Second (War in the Northern Caucasus; October 1999–February 2000); *Dedovshchina*; Georgian War (2008)

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Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991)

The Red Army was created in 1918, after the Bolshevik revolution, renamed the Soviet Army in 1946, and formally ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Russian army was created from its remains.

Origins and the Civil War

During the Conference of Bolshevik Organizations in June–July 1917, the decision was made to abolish the czarist army and form a new one that would serve the party and the revolution. Although the demobilization of the imperial army continued until April 1918, the Soviet government created the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (*Raboche-Krest'ianskaia Krasnaia Armiia*), recruited from the class-conscious workers and toiling peasants in January 1918. All prerevolutionary grades, ranks, orders, and titles were abolished. The name *Red Army* referred to the traditional color symbolizing the communist movement. The new force underwent its baptism of fire on February 23, 1918, fighting German troops at Narva and Pskov. This date became the Soviet Army Day, still celebrated in Russia as Defender of the Fatherland Day.

Initially, the army was a small voluntary force based on the Red Guards (*krasnaya gvardiya*), formations created in major cities during 1917 by factory workers. These small militias of 100–150 men patrolling the streets grew into irregular infantry brigades of up to 1,200 partisans under the loose command of a democratically elected officer. In November 1917, the Red Guards numbered over 200,000 men who fought in a fierce but undisciplined way. Although it was the Red Guards of Petrograd who made possible the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks,

it quickly became evident that these poorly trained, ill-armed, decentralized militias could not uphold the revolution. After a breakdown in peace talks with Germany, the Bolshevik forces were defeated in the “Eleven-Day War,” which led to the disastrous Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918. Russia left the First World War with tremendous territorial losses. The German onslaught and the treaty demonstrated that the Bolsheviks needed an army able to protect their revolution.

In March 1918, Lenin assigned Leon Trotsky, the people's commissar for war, the task of creating a regular army of traditional style: tightly disciplined and with a centralized chain of command. Trotsky (re)introduced authority and harsh discipline, and abolished the popular election of officers. His most controversial decision was the deployment of the former czarist officers, termed *military specialists* (*voyenspetsy*), as a temporary solution to overcome the shortcomings of the Bolsheviks' military expertise. During the Russian Civil War, the army used over 300,000 *voyenspetsy*, who proved vital in building the organizational and administrative structure of the Red Army, improving the quality of training, and introducing a military culture. Some 130,000 former non-commissioned officers (NCOs), who were promoted to Red Army platoon commanders, trained new recruits and led them in combat. Two distinguished czarist NCOs, later to become marshals of the USSR, were Semyon Budenny and Georgy Zhukov. In May 1918, Trotsky established the post of commander in chief of the army; the first person to hold it was Mikhail A. Muravyev, though he was replaced in July 1918 by Ioakhim I. Vatsetis, who was followed in 1919 by Sergei S. Kamenev. All three were former czarist colonels.

The reality of war challenged the utopian communist vision of a new type of army

distinct both from imperial forces and the Western military model. Bolshevik principles were gradually replaced by the rules typical of traditional armies, and the last to give way was the volunteer system. The military defeats at the hands of Cossack and Czech units in May and June 1918 demanded the introduction of a compulsory conscription, and the first drive in June–August brought about 540,000 men. The Red Army's capture of Kazan in September 1918, a turning point in the Civil War, marked the end of the Bolsheviks' constant retreat and the beginning of the army's centralization and massive growth. By the end of 1918, the army had grown 800,000 men; in 1919 it had 3 million men and increased to almost 5.5 million by October 1920.

The force was not yet strong enough, however, to export the revolution, as demonstrated by its defeat in the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920. Even at the height of its growth there were only some 2,250,000 men at the front, of whom no more than 700,000 were active combatants and fewer than 500,000 were properly armed. The rest were recruits under training (2,250,000), reserve units (391,000), labor armies (159,000), wounded, sick, or deserters.

The development of the army as a mass conscript force generated a few inter-related problems. First, the Red Army's membership initially was restricted and required a recommendation from a military body, trade union, or other organization associated with the Bolshevik Party; then it was limited to workers and poor peasants. Because there were not enough workers to fill the ranks though, the army had to be based overwhelmingly on the peasantry. Contrary to Marxist ideology and the early Bolsheviks' intentions, therefore, the majority of servicemen (almost 80% of recruits in 1919) were not workers but peasants, whom the Bolsheviks did not trust.

Second, the army grew much faster than the state's ability to sustain it, despite large sectors of the economy having been militarized under War Communism. It was difficult to supply sufficient food, uniforms, weapons, transportation, and medicine. Trotsky captured the essence of this problem: "We have mobilized millions, but our bayonets are numbered in hundreds of thousands." It was also increasingly difficult to train the ever-growing numbers of recruits.

Third, the resulting coercive requisitions of supplies and forced conscription provoked peasant uprisings. Severe shortages in military supplies also meant poor living conditions, malnutrition, the spread of epidemics (during the war fewer people died in battle than from disease), a rise in disobedience, and chronic desertion. From June 1919 to June 1920, the Red Army lost from desertion almost as many men (2.64 million) as it recruited (2.7 million). Overall, some 3.7 million soldiers deserted during the war. As a countermeasure, in November 1918 Trotsky ordered all captured deserters executed on the spot, but the commanders rarely enforced this, usually only relocating deserters. The most effective means were the "amnesty weeks"; during the first one, in June 1919, as many as 98,000 deserters returned in exchange for an exemption from punishment.

In 1918 the first higher-level operational structures were formed: the field armies and the fronts (or army groups). By the end of the year there were 12 field armies. The fronts created in June 1918 were comprised of two to five field armies, reserve units, and detached forces. They were given geographical names—for example the Eastern, Western, Northern, Ukrainian, or Caspian-Caucasian Front. They changed over time and were often integrated (e.g., in February 1919 the Northern Front was incorporated into the Western Front).

In March 1918 the Supreme Military Council headed by Trotsky was created; it was replaced in September by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which accommodated the Field Staff to command combat operations. The first Army Staff was formed in 1921, and retitled the General Staff in 1935.

Despite opposition from Josef Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov, and others who accused Trotsky of copying the Imperial Army and departing from proletarian principles, Trotsky transformed the Red Army into an effective and massive fighting force. It was a new type of army to a much lesser extent than originally intended. There were significant continuities from the Imperial Army, because the ex-czarist personnel carried into the Red Army the traditional military culture.

The Party's Army

The Red Army originated as a political force—as an instrument for implementing the Bolshevik Party's goals, spreading its principles, consolidating its power, defending a new regime, and building a new Soviet identity. The best representation of this integration of the Party with its fighting force was the Main Political Administration, which oversaw the political loyalty of the military. To impose political control over the military and prevent a counterrevolutionary coup, the military commissar system was developed, with political officers (*politruks*) assigned to every unit. Under the policy of dual command (*dvoyenachaliye*), they had the power to abrogate commanders' decisions if they contradicted the principles of communism and the Party's interests. At the regiment, brigade, and division levels, the commander shared power and responsibility with the *politruk*, and his orders were valid only when countersigned. By introducing the

death penalty for military failures, Trotsky hoped to enhance combat performance and develop a terror-based mechanism of cooperation and control. (The first to be shot was the commissar, then the commander.)

In 1925, with a sufficient number of communist commanders already trained (the Bolsheviks condemned the use of the word *officer*, which connoted czarism), the system of dual leadership was lessened in favor of the unity of command (*edinonachaliye*). Apart from *politruks*, the *Cheka's* special punitive brigades operated within the army to suppress the forces of counterrevolution, espionage, and desertion. Regular purges (*chistki*) aimed to expel undisciplined and antisocialist elements.

From its birth, the Red Army played the vital political role of molding young conscripts into “new Soviet men” endowed with a “Red” identity through indoctrination and basic education. Unsurprisingly, during 1925–1933 the number of Communist Party members among the ranks increased from 19 to 49 percent.

The Inter-War Period

The demobilization that followed the end of the Civil War reduced the army to a small regular force of 562,000 *krasnoarmeets* (“Red Army men”) backed by a large territorial militia of part-time conscripts. For nearly two decades this mixed territorial system remained the organizational form of the armed forces. Mikhail Frunze, who in November 1924 replaced Trotsky as the head of the War Commissariat, established military districts, introduced standardization of regiments and divisions, restructured conscription, and modernized armament. Having enough “Red Commanders,” Frunze downsized the number of *voyenspetsy*, who by the late 1920s made up only 10 percent of

the officer corps. Until 1941, however, the General Staff was still headed by ex-czarist officers Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov, and Aleksandr Yegorov. Frunze also implemented a policy of “militarization” aimed at strengthening the authority of commanders and weakening the power of commissars (*edinonachaliye*), which was continued by his successor, Voroshilov, in 1925. In 1936, the age of draftees was reduced from 21 to 19, and all previous restrictions on military service (e.g., the prohibition on enlisting kulaks) were abolished.

World War II

The Red Army was not prepared for an all-out war in 1941, and the German attack on June 22 took it by surprise, exposed its numerous weaknesses, and forced it into retreat. The deficiencies of the Soviet military had been brought to light earlier, during the Winter War with Finland. Planned as a Soviet Blitzkrieg, it turned into a clumsy war in which the Red Army suffered almost 127,000 dead and missing, and 265,000 wounded.

The Supreme Military Soviet therefore recommended reforms and a review of military policy. The role of *politruks* was reduced, the prerevolutionary type of ranks and means of discipline were (re)introduced, and intensive training programs were framed. The mobilization of industry improved the supply of clothing and equipment. By the time of the German attack, however, these reforms had not been completed.

Perhaps the greatest weakness resulted from Stalin’s Great Purge of the military cadres (1937–1938). Three of five marshals were executed (Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Vasily Blyukher, and Aleksandr Yegorov), along with 15 of 16 army commanders of first and second rank, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 division commanders, all 17 army

commissars of first and second rank, and 25 of 29 corps commissars. Among the high-ranking officers killed were such prominent commanders as: Iona Yakir, Ian Gamarnik, Ieronim Uborevich, Avgust Kork, Boris Fel’dman and Vitaly Primakov. The purge, which removed over 22,000 officers, caused a severe shortage of experienced servicemen on the eve of the German attack. By late 1938, the army lacked 93,000 officers; 25 percent of these shortages resulted from purges, and the rest from the army’s growth.

The purge not only diminished the army’s combat capabilities but also threw military thought into chaos. With the execution of Tukhachevsky, his concept of in-depth combined-armed operations, which had guided army organization and training, was abandoned. Soviet strategy stalled, and the military was caught between preparations for a war of maneuver and a war of position.

The problem was that Soviet forces were arranged not to defend the motherland but to launch an attack in Central Europe. In the early days they fought so badly, losing one-fourth of their forces, that Western intelligence predicted the fall of Moscow in one month. The Soviet performance improved, however, particularly with the replacement of linear tactics with mobile warfare. Mastering defensive operations (defense-in-depth) enabled the Red Army to return to the offensive, and in the Battle of Stalingrad, it finally fought a war of maneuver.

Stalin created the State Committee for Defense, which took control of the conduct of military operations for the duration of the war through *Stavka* (the Supreme Headquarters of the Main Command), with Stalin as the supreme commander in chief. To withstand the German offensive, manage the conduct of great battles such as Moscow (October 1941–January 1942), Stalingrad (August 1942–February 1943), and Kursk

(July–August 1943), and roll back the *Wehrmacht*, at any given time the Red Army maintained a strength of some 7 million men. At the war’s beginning, ground forces comprised 303 divisions and 22 separate brigades, but by August 1941 they had reached 401 divisions, in spite of losing 46. The enormous losses were constantly replaced by new recruits. In June 1941, the army had almost 5 million troops, and during the war an additional 30 million men were conscripted.

Various methods were used to increase the size of the army. One was the creation of a citizen militia army (*opolchenie*), which merged the mass patriotic voluntary mobilization with the need for more divisions. The *opolchenie* were later incorporated into the regular army. Almost 4 million volunteers served in the citizen formations. Other methods were front mobilization (the draft of eligible men at the theater of operations), the use of prisoners (mainly Gulag inmates), the use of women (approximately 800,000), and the formation of foreign forces (the first being the Polish People’s Army, established in the summer of 1943). The system of dual command reintroduced in July 1941 by Stalin continued until October 1942, when the best *politruks* reinforced the military command ranks.

The Red Army paid a heavy price for its victory in the war. There were a few reasons for the enormous death toll of 8.66 million soldiers (6,329,600 killed in action, 555,400 deaths from disease, and 4,559,000 missing in action). First, there was the treatment of *krasnoarmeets* as cannon fodder. Second, because of the speed at which the massive losses were replaced, recruits lacked proper training, and units were insufficiently prepared and ill-equipped for battle. Third, the rapid growth of the army required the quick promotion of officers regardless of their experience, training, or qualifications. While

in the late 1930s it took three or four years to educate officers, during the war training often lasted only two months. Officers thus were unprepared for command and did not know how to conduct combined infantry-armor operations, often using them separately. Fourth, Stalin’s order of the summer of 1942 demanded “not one step backward,” which meant fleeing the battlefield would result in execution by an NKVD division or rotation to penal combat battalions used for hazardous (usually suicidal) tasks. All Soviet prisoners of war were regarded as traitors, and after liberation were commonly sent to penal battalions or the Gulag. Fifth, because of strategic imperatives, a quick operational tempo, which inflicted heavy casualties, was maintained even after the Germans had withdrawn from Soviet territory. Stalin urged the Red Army to gain territory and thus political leverage for postwar negotiations.

The Cold War Era

In 1946, Stalin renamed the Red Army the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, or simply the Soviet Army (*sovietskaya armiya*). This was a reminder that the army’s mission was the protection of the first socialist state. In the years after World War II, demobilization reduced the size of the army from 11.3 million men to 2.8 million men in 1948. It slowly but steadily increased to 5.7 million by 1955, however, only to be reduced by Nikita Khrushchev to 3.6 million in 1958. Leonid Brezhnev again raised the manpower to nearly 6 million by 1985. In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev made drastic cuts, declaring in 1989 a reduction by 12 percent (or 500,000) by 1990.

The changes introduced in 1967 to military service involved universal military service, lowering the conscription age from 19 to 18, a reduction of the term of service from

three to two years, a biannual draft instead of once a year (every six months about one-fourth of the enlisted soldiers were replaced with new conscripts), and preinduction military training through such organizations as the *Komsomol* (Leninist Youth League).

In the postwar years, the Soviet Army became a fully motorized and mechanized force with no simple infantry divisions. The Cold War arms race made the Soviet Armed Forces one of the most technologically advanced armies, and by the early 1980s, they were the largest in the world by every measure: in manpower, numbers, varieties of weapons, and mobilization potential. Having great power projection capabilities, the Soviet military, however, transformed into a “Moloch,” powered by an immense industrial-military base.

One of the unique features of the Soviet Army was that its NCO corps was made up mostly not of professionals but of conscript sergeants. The country was divided into military districts (MDs) with “main staffs” resembling the General Staff in Moscow. MDs had similar functions to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff: control over military commissariats (*voenkomaty*), supplies, training, and military education.

The Armed Forces consisted of five services:

- Strategic Rocket Forces—established by Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 as a separate service (previously under the artillery branch of the Ground Forces) and favored as the primary service; the instrument of the implementation of Soviet nuclear strategy responsible for intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles;
- Ground Forces—the largest service comprised of nearly 70 percent of all conscripts; it consisted of five main branches: the Motor Rifle Troops, Tank

Troops, Rocket and Artillery Troops, Army Air Defense Troops, and Army Aviation Troops. Its combat organization was based on two basic types of divisions: the motor rifle divisions and tank divisions;

- Air Defense Forces—formed in 1947 through the separation of the air defense artillery from the Ground Forces; it consisted of such branches as Anti-Missile Defense (operating antiballistic missile sites around Moscow and Leningrad) and Space Defense;
- Air Forces—formed by the Bolsheviks in 1917. During the Cold War they were divided into three main branches: Long Range Aviation (long-range bombers); Frontal Aviation (battlefield air defense, close air support, and interdiction); and Military Transport Aviation; and
- Navy.

Although administratively independent, the first four traditionally constituted the Soviet Army, which included two security formations: the Border Guards (the KGB’s military force for securing the Soviet borders) and the Interior of the Army. The MoD also controlled some dozen separate branches of Special Troops (e.g., Engineer, Chemical, Signal, Road-Building, Rail-Road Building, Rear Services, Inspectorate, Armaments, and Cadre Troops).

On a few occasions, the Soviet Army was involved in military operations abroad. The first was the November 1956 invasion of Hungary to pacify the revolt against the communist rule and Soviet control. The second was the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, to halt the Prague Spring and prevent political liberalization. The third was the December 1979 intervention in Afghanistan, which developed into an occupation lasting until February 1989. The Soviet military was also involved in advisory and

assistance missions during the Korean War (instructing the North Korean Army and providing fighter pilots), during the Vietnam War (advising the North Vietnamese and sending crews to operate air defense missile batteries), and instructing, training, and advising communist rebels and governments in Latin America and some regimes in the Middle East. Throughout the Cold War, Soviet Army contingents were also stationed in eastern and central European satellite countries.

With no fear of purges and the institution of political commissars abolished, the Soviet Army suffered from corruption, protectionism, inefficiency, racism, ethnic and national antagonisms, widespread desertion, and *dedovshchina*. These negative tendencies became widespread and acute, in particular during the Afghan campaign. Thus, in the course of the Cold War, the Soviet Army slowly degenerated and stagnated, particularly after Brezhnev gave up purges for a policy of “stability of cadres.”

Gorbachev initiated military changes that were necessary for his political and economic reforms. To reduce the burden on the economy, he introduced far-reaching cuts in conventional forces, reductions in arms, the withdrawal of troops (from Afghanistan and partly from Eastern Europe), and the conversion of defense industries to civilian production. This attempt to reverse seven decades of Soviet military policy threatened the corporate interests of the Soviet military. The military was partly involved in the failed August Coup against Gorbachev, with some important generals, such as the commander of the army’s ground forces, General Valentin Varennikov; commander of the Airborne Forces, General Pavel Grachev; and commander of the Air Force, General Evgeny Shaposhnikov coming out in opposition. The coup attempt revealed that “the army was no longer a defender of the legitimate government, but neither was it

a force that would promote alternatives.” The force created to uphold the Bolshevik revolution and defend the communist regime now, without serious resistance, allowed the USSR to collapse.

Lukasz Kamiński

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Cheka (*Chrezvychaynayakomissiya*); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); *Dedovshchina*; Frunze, Mikhail (1885–1925); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Navy, Soviet (1917–1991); Order No. 1 (March 1, 1917); Order 270 (June 1941); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (1919–1920); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Vietnam War(s), Soviet Union and (1945–1975); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet

The Soviet atomic weapons program began during World War II through domestic scientific research and development efforts led by nuclear physicists Igor Kurchatov (1903–1960) and Andrei Sakharov (1921–1989), and assisted by captured German scientists. These programs also involved foreign espionage by individuals such as Klaus Fuchs (1911–1988) and Ethel (1915–1953) and Julius Rosenberg (1918–1953), targeting the United Kingdom and United States. Enhancing their nuclear arsenal through espionage against the United States and NATO was an ongoing Soviet goal during the Cold War era.

These efforts succeeded in producing the first Soviet atomic bomb, exploded on August 29, 1949 at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The first Soviet hydrogen bomb exploded on August 12, 1953, also at Semipalatinsk. Subsequent decades saw the Soviets develop an extensive nuclear weapons research and testing program at various locales including Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tomsk.

This program featured a nuclear weapons triad covering air-, land-, and sea-based legs whose size continually increased and eventually surpassed the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This arsenal consisted of intermediate-range nuclear missiles such as the SS-20, which threatened Western Europe; the SS-18 ICBM, whose 11,000 kilometer range made it capable of reaching the United States; the Typhoon class SLBM SS-N-5 missile with a 1,650 kilometer range; and the Backfire and Blackjack nuclear bombers. Moscow's arsenal eventually reached 8,043 warheads in 1981, with some of these being capable of delivering multiple strikes to divergent targets from a single missile.

For several decades the Soviet nuclear weapons program was a major factor in international politics and security. Its potential use in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the specter of its use in other Cold War confrontations limited the flexibility of the United States and allied countries to militarily pressure the Soviets for fear of Moscow's military retaliation.

The Soviet nuclear weapons buildup continued despite rhetoric from Soviet leaders about the dangers of a nuclear arms race; their advocacy of arms control agreements with the United States such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (1972) and ABM Treaty (1972), which they never intended to keep, and repeatedly broke; and active and unsuccessful propaganda and intelligence

efforts to keep the United States and its NATO allies from deploying Pershing II intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe in 1983.

An extensive nuclear doctrine was also developed by the Soviet military governing the use of these weapons. Characteristics of this doctrine included preemption or first strike capability, quantitative superiority since a nuclear war could be of extended duration, counterforce targeting, combined arms operations supplementing nuclear strikes, and defense against nuclear weapons attacks.

During the 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviets expressed increasing concern against U.S. efforts to develop ballistic missile defenses through the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). Both sides held off on deploying ballistic missile defenses, but research into these systems continued. The United States would eventually withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2001.

The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 resulted in the dispersal of its nuclear arsenal to successor states such as the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—although these weapons would eventually be consolidated into the Russian Federation. The early years of the Russian Federation saw hard economic times that negatively affected the Soviet nuclear weapons workforce. Many scientists lost their jobs due to government spending reductions and moved to the licit and illicit international nuclear markets to offer their expertise. There was also international concern over securing the Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal, which the United States addressed by establishing the Nunn-Lugar Program in November 1991 to provide funding and technical expertise to safeguard and dismantle Russia's large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.

The Soviet atomic weapons program left a legacy of environmental damage in many areas of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation retains significant stockpiles of nuclear weapons and using nuclear weapons remains a significant part of Russian military doctrine two decades after the Soviet Union's collapse. Russia's withdrawal from Nunn-Lugar in October 2012 raises additional questions about Russia's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.

Bert Chapman

See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Fuchs, Klaus Emil Julius (December 29, 1911–January 28, 1988); Kurchatov, Igor (1903–1960); Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989); SALT I (November 1969–May 1972)

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August Coup (1991)

On August 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, was placed under house arrest when eight high-ranking government officials tried to take control of the Kremlin to allow the Soviet Communist Party to implement necessary procedures to block any changes to the government.

During the 1980s, the Soviet Union began struggling economically, which prompted



Russian president Boris Yeltsin, atop a tank outside the “Russian White House,” urges the people to resist a hard-line coup attempt in August 1991. (AP Photo)

younger members of the Communist Party to explore the possibilities of reform. On March 11, 1985, Gorbachev became general secretary and ruler of the Soviet Union. Realizing the need for change, he initiated a policy of political openness known as “glasnost” and economic restructuring known as “perestroika.” Within the Soviet Union, those changes resulted in free elections in 1989, and reformist politicians won many of the seats in the Soviet Congress. Eastern European nations took advantage of those developments, and by 1990, many of them had revolted against their communist oppressors.

Even as the tide of reform grew within the country, change remained slow, and reformers grew restless. The leaders of the

various Soviet republics fought for a greater share of power, which forced Gorbachev to draft a treaty of alliance that would alter the power structure within the central government. Gorbachev was warned of a possible coup attempt by hard-line Communist officials who opposed the measure because they feared the loss of their jobs and political power. He nevertheless proceeded with his plans to vacation in the Crimea before meeting with the leaders of the republics, including Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia.

On Sunday, August 18, 1991, Yuri Plekhanov, a high-level KGB official, knocked on the door of Gorbachev’s home. When an aide informed him who was there, Gorbachev attempted to call Moscow, but the lines were

dead. Plekhanov and one of Gorbachev's top aides, Valery Boldin, informed Gorbachev that the State Committee of Emergency instructed them to demand that he sign a declaration of emergency that would allow the Communist Party to implement procedures to block changes to the government. When Gorbachev refused, he was placed under house arrest; the world was told he had serious health problems.

The eight conspirators—Gennady Yanayev, vice president; Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB; Dmitry Yazov, defense minister; Valentin Pavlov, prime minister; Oleg Baklanov, Soviet Defense Council member; Vasily Starodubtsev, member of the Soviet Parliament; Alexander Tizyakov, president of state enterprises, industrial construction, transport, and communications; and Boris Pugo, interior minister—then ordered thousands of troops into Moscow. They failed to arrest Yeltsin, however.

When tanks entered the city, Yeltsin mobilized the citizens, climbed atop a tank in front of 20,000 protesters at the Russian Federation building (known as the White House), and declared the coup unconstitutional. He then ordered a general strike and proclaimed himself the “Guardian of Democracy.” When the troops threw their support behind Yeltsin, the members of the so-called Gang of Eight realized that their efforts had failed. They tried to arrange a meeting with Gorbachev, but he refused to talk with them.

The attempted coup lasted three days. By the end of August, Yeltsin issued a decree that suspended the activities of the Communist Party, and the government seized all party records. Within the next few months, negotiations continued over the transfer of power from the Soviet Union to the republics. On December 21, 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union was complete. Four days

later, on Christmas Day 1991, Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, resigned from office, and the former Soviet Union formed a new 11-member Commonwealth of Independent States.

*Raymond D. Limbach and
Timothy C. Dowling*

See also: Baltic Rebellions (1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Yazov, Dmitry (November 8, 1924–); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaeovich (1931–2007)

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Aurora (Protected Cruiser)

Aurora was built as first-rank protected cruiser of the *Pallada* class, a type of battleship that does not have the belt of armor along the sides. Constructed as sailing ship, the *Aurora* operated as a long-range, self-sufficient warship that could outrun heavier, armored warships. The keel was laid down at the New Admiralty shipyard in St. Petersburg on May 23, 1897. The cruiser was launched on May 11, 1900, and put in service with the Baltic Fleet of the Imperial Navy on July 16, 1903. The ship was in service with the Russian and Soviet fleet until 1948.

Only vital parts of the ship were protected by armored shields and belts. An armored deck protected the machine rooms and coal bunkers. Gun shields protected twenty-four

76-millimeter (mm) quick-firing anti-aircraft artillery guns, eight 152-mm-L/45-Cannons (Kane System), eight 37-mm canons, one deck-mounted torpedo launcher and two underwater torpedo launchers, and two 635-mm-L/19-quick-firing “Baranowski” cannons for use on deck or land. The *Aurora* is a symbol of the October Revolution of 1917, since a shot from the 152-mm bowgun gave the signal for the storm of the Winter Palace, which launched the Bolshevik Revolution and the end of czarist Russia.

Its many long-range trips brought the 478-man crew to all major European ports and to Asia, when it became part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron during the Russo-Japanese War. It deployed to the war theatre on October 2, 1904, and entered the Korea Strait on May 14, 1905. Despite being hit 21 times, it survived the Battle of Tsushima but failed to escape to Vladivostok. The crew navigated to Manila for repairs before returning to Russia in 1906.

Moored at St. Petersburg, the crew participated in the February and October revolutions in 1917, and played a significant role in the Civil War fighting international, anti-communist intervention. A 1927 expedition to the Arctic Sea ending in Arkhangelsk was the first major trip after the Bolshevik Revolution. During the 1920s and 1930s, *Aurora* completed only a few journeys and served as training ship for the Naval College until 1940.

The ship anchored at Lomonossov as a defense bulwark during the German siege of Leningrad from 1941 through 1944. In summer 1944, it was taken into dock for repairs and permanently moored at the Petrogradskaya Embankment in Leningrad in 1948. *Aurora* has been on permanent anchorage since, though it served as a training ship for the Leningrad Nakhimov College until 1956.

In 1956, the cruiser was transformed into a museum. In 1968, it was decorated with the

Order of the October Revolution, which was replaced in 1992, when the symbol of Russian naval power, the Saint Andrew Naval Banner, was raised over the ship again.

Christiane Grieb

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805)

Known as the “Battle of the Three Emperors” and won by Napoleon I against the allied Austro-Russian army near Austerlitz (the modern Czech town of Slavkov u Brna).

The Allied army, commanded by Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov and accompanied by the Czar Alexander I and the Habsburg emperor Francis I, deployed 81,112 men (68,590 Russians and 13,522 Austrians) and 190 cannon. It stood against the *Grande Armée* under Emperor Napoleon amounting to nearly 75,000 men and 140 cannon. On December 1, the allies pushed forward and occupied the key central position at the Pratzen Heights and its environs. According



French emperor Napoleon I defeats the Russians at Austerlitz during the winter of 1805. (Library of Congress)


to Austrian general Franz von Weyrother's plan, the advance guard as well as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Allied columns (totaling 35,900 men) were to advance under General Friedrich Wilhelm von Buxhoeveden in a wide flanking movement south of the Pratzen Heights, which would block the French links which occupied Vienna and shift the battle line up the Goldbach Stream. This maneuver would be aided by the 4th column (20,200 men) under generals Franz Anton von Kollowrath and Mikhail Miloradovich advancing from the Pratzen Heights. Meanwhile, a secondary movement by the 5th column under General Pyotr Bagration (13,700 men) would attack Santon Hill on the French left. The Russian Imperial Guard (10,600 men) was to form a central reserve near the village of Austerlitz, east of the Pratzen Heights.

In the early morning, a thick fog covered the ground and brought confusion to the Allied advance. Nonetheless, at 7:00 a.m., Buxhoeveden's columns attacked General Claude Legrand's right flank and occupied the villages of Telnitz and Sokolnitz, but the French were assisted by Marshal

Louis-Nicolas Davout's III Corps (5,650 men), which stabilized the situation. By 9:00 a.m., in their general advance, Allied troops cleared most of the Pratzen Heights, and Napoleon, seeing their mistake, sent his IV Corps under Marshal Jean-de-Dieu Soult (25,900 men) to attack and seize the heights. This attack split the major Allied forces in two; soon, Marshal Jean Bernadotte's I Corps (11,280 men) assisted on Soult's left.

Meanwhile, a fight was flaring around the French left flank at Santon Hill, where Marshal Joachim Murat's cavalry clashed with Joseph, Prince of Liechtenstein's Hungarian hussars. At 10:30 a.m. Kutuzov counterattacked Soult's divisions on the Pratzen Heights from three sides. After 1:00 p.m., the Russian Imperial Horse Guard, led by Grand Duke Constantine, almost overran Soult's troops but the troops were saved by the French Horse Guard, which charged and pushed back the Russian squadrons while Bernadotte's division rushed up to Soult's aid.

After Napoleon reoccupied the heights, he ordered his Horse Guard, along with



remnants of Soult's corps, to move south and envelope Buxhoeveden's dispersed troops. By 4:00 p.m. the maneuver was completed, and French artillery was firing from the hills onto the massed Allies below. Trapped among some frozen fish ponds (just few feet deep), Buxhoeveden tried to extricate his men in orderly fashion, but the overall panic and heavy French bombardment prevented this. By now Kutuzov and the allied monarchs were leaving the field; Bagration, on the far right, also broke off the action after a heavy rearguard fight and headed back to join the main forces, which concentrated near Olmütz (modern-day Olomouc). The French lost nearly 10,000 men (including 1,530 killed); the Allied losses were about 24,500 (including 6,100 killed and 12,000 prisoners), and almost all artillery cannon.

The battle was the climax that brought down the forces of the Third Coalition of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden (formed on August 9, 1805) with the desire

to restrict French expansion in Europe. The day after the battle, the Emperor Francis I sued for an armistice and on December 26, 1805, the Peace of Pressburg was signed. The Russian army returned home, only to reenter in the war against Napoleon a year later.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Austrian State Treaty (May 15, 1955)

Ended Allied occupation of Austria and established the Second Austrian Republic as an independent state.

Despite Austrian participation on the German side during World War II, the Allies decided at Yalta (February 1945) to treat Austria as a liberated nation and not a defeated one when the war was over. It took more than a decade, however, to decide exactly what that meant. During that time, Austria and its capital of Vienna remained divided between and occupied by the four victorious Allied Powers.

The Soviets demanded reparations from Austria, but never considered the territory of Austria a necessary part of their postwar sphere of influence. Although they watched him carefully, they established and supported a government led by Dr. Karl Renner, a Social Democrat. The Western Allies, on the other hand—and the United States and Britain in particular—viewed Austria’s geopolitical situation as an essential outpost in the burgeoning Cold War. They accordingly made a massive financial and military investment in the state during the decade of occupation. Renner’s government carefully and cleverly played upon this divide to gain independence in return for a promise of neutrality in 1955.

The Austrian State Treaty, signed at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna on May 15, 1955, was one of the great achievements of Cold War diplomacy. It resolved a decade of political and economic conflict between the Austrians, the Soviets, and the western Allies in a series of neat compromises and demonstrated that “peaceful coexistence” between the Soviets and the West was indeed possible.

It was the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev that took the initiative. Once the incorporation of German forces in NATO became inevitable, Khrushchev saw little need to haggle over a divided Austria and instructed his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, to settle the problem. Austrian chancellor Julius Raab was therefore invited to Moscow on March 24, 1955 to discuss terms.

The Britain and the United States feared the Austrians would be lured or pressured into becoming a Soviet satellite, or that a pending settlement in Austria was being used to draw the Germans out of NATO. The Soviets, however, were more interested in keeping Austria out of NATO and made generous concessions in return for an Austrian promise of armed neutrality. Without waiving reparations entirely, the USSR accepted a staggered payments schedule for \$150 million in assets, a 10-year agreement for oil deliveries from Austria, and a lump sum for the return of Austrian shipping installations.

Western diplomats made few changes to the Austro-Soviet proposal, but convinced the Austrians to sign secret agreements protecting Western oil companies prior to the conclusion of the State Treaty. At the last minute, the Austrians maneuvered the Allied Powers into striking a clause holding Austria “responsible” in part for the World War II. The treaty thus enshrined the myth of Austrian victimization that would persist until the Waldheim Affair of 1986 forced a reexamination of the national past. It did not enshrine Austrian neutrality, nor did the Allied Powers guarantee it. Instead, on October 26, 1955, one day after the last Allied soldier left Austrian soil, the Austrian Parliament passed a law making permanent neutrality part of the constitution of the Second Republic. The Soviet hope that the Austrian

settlement would serve as a model for Germany, however, proved a chimera.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Azov Campaigns (1695–1696). *See* Holy League, War of the (1686–1696)

B

Babi Yar Massacre (September 29–30, 1941)

German mass shooting of Soviet Jews outside Kiev, Ukraine. Following the German army's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, four SS *Einsatzgruppen* (SS mobile killing squads) entered Soviet territory, their task being the physical annihilation of Communist Party functionaries, Red Army commissars, the physically and mentally handicapped, partisans, and Jews.

As the *Wehrmacht* drove into the Soviet Union, the *Einsatzgruppen* followed, rounding up and slaughtering their victims in mass shootings. By the time of their disbanding in 1943, the *Einsatzgruppen*—with the assistance of the German army and a host of enthusiastic collaborators from the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian populations—had committed a multitude of unspeakable atrocities and murdered an estimated 1.5 million Soviet Jews and others.

Among the numerous *Einsatzgruppen* crimes, the slaughter of Jews at Babi Yar in late September 1941—perpetrated by SS colonel Paul Blobel's *Sonderkommando 4a*, a subunit of SS commander Otto Rasch's *Einsatzgruppe C*—was arguably the most notorious. On September 19, 1941, units of the German Army Group South occupied Kiev, the capital of Soviet Ukraine. In the days following, a series of explosions rocked the city, destroying German field headquarters, burning more than one-third of a square mile of the Kiev city center, and leaving some 10,000 residents homeless. Although

these explosions were likely the work of the Soviet political police, or Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del'* or NKVD), the Germans saw them as a convenient justification to massacre the city's Jews—a task Blobel's *Sonderkommando* would have carried out regardless.

Following discussions among Blobel, Rasch, and Major General Kurt Eberhard, the German field commander in Kiev, the latter ordered the city's Jews to assemble with their possessions—including money, valuables, and warm clothing—near the Jewish cemetery by 7:00 a.m. on Monday, September 29. The posted order indicated that the Jews were to be resettled and warned that failure to comply would be punishable by death.

Once assembled, Kiev's Jews were marched to Babi Yar, a partially wooded ravine just outside the city. There, the Germans, following the procedure used by *Einsatzgruppen* since the mass shootings of Soviet Jews began in late June, forced the Jews to strip, dispossessed them of their belongings, and shot them to death in groups of 30 to 40 people. In the course of two gruesome days, Blobel's men, relying exclusively on automatic weapons, murdered 33,771 innocent men, women, and children. They reported that the Jews had offered no resistance and, until the last minute, had believed they were to be resettled.

During the months that followed the initial Babi Yar Massacre, the Germans periodically used the ravine as a murder site,



A German firing squad shooting Soviet civilians in the back as they sit beside their own mass grave, in Babi Yar, Kiev, 1942. (AP Photo)

killing several thousand more Jews there, plus an untold number of Gypsies and Soviet prisoners of war. In July 1943, with Soviet forces having seized the military initiative and advancing rapidly, the Germans launched Operation SONDERAKTION (“Special Action”) 1005 (or AKTION 1005) to eradicate evidence of their crimes in the Soviet Union.

Blobel, who had been transferred to Berlin in early 1942, returned to Kiev. There he oversaw efforts to obliterate traces of the executions at Babi Yar. Throughout August and September, Blobel’s men and conscripted concentration camp inmates reopened the mass grave, crushed bones, and cremated the remains of the dead. Despite this, significant evidence of the massacres remained and was discovered by Soviet forces following the liberation of Kiev in November 1943.

The Babi Yar Massacre of late September 1941 was not the largest German “special action” against the Jews. In October 1941, the Germans and their Romanian allies murdered an estimated 50,000 Jews at Odessa. Nevertheless, more than any other, Babi Yar has come to symbolize an aspect of the Holocaust that is invariably overshadowed by the horrors of Auschwitz and the other death camps.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Holocaust in the Soviet Union; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the (August 21–September 26, 1941)

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Bagramyan, Ivan Khristoforovich (1897–1982)

Soviet military commander, marshal of the Soviet Union, and the first non-Slavic military officer to command a front.

Bagramyan (Bagramian) was born on December 2, 1897, in Elizavetpol (now Ganca), Azerbaijan. During World War I he volunteered to join the Russian army in September 1915 and spent the rest of the war fighting the Ottoman Empire on the Caucasian Front. In 1917 he became a junior officer when he attended the Leningrad Higher Calvary School. In 1920, after a failed Armenian coup, he volunteered to join the Red Army.

After attending the Frunze Military Academy in 1935, he lectured there until July 1940. Returning to unit service, Colonel Bagramyan wrote a paper titled “Conducting a Contemporary Offensive Operation” for General Georgy Zhukov, the commander of the Kiev Special Military District. Zhukov quickly promoted Bagramyan to Head of Operations for Twelfth Army. Three months later, Zhukov recalled Bagramyan to Kiev as his deputy chief of staff.

Bagramyan, now a major general, escaped the Kiev encirclement in 1941, where the Germans captured 665,000 Russians. By April 1942, Bagramyan was chief of staff of the Southwestern Front (army group). In June 1942, he became deputy commander

of Sixty-First Army on the Western Front and then, in July 1942, he was appointed to command Sixteenth Army. During Operation KUTUZOV, as part of the Battle of Kursk, his unit breached the German lines and advanced 45 miles in six days. This earned him a promotion to colonel general.

In October 1943 Bagramyan was given command of the First Baltic Front and promoted to army general, tasked with ridding the Baltics of German forces. In January 1945 he took Memel, cutting off 20 German divisions. In April 1945 he was appointed commander of the Third Belorussian Front.

Bagramyan commanded the Baltic Military Front from 1946 to 1954. In 1955 he was promoted to marshal and appointed inspector general of the Ministry of Defense. From 1956–1958 he commanded the General Staff Academy. He was head of the home front services for the next decade. Bagramyan died in Moscow on September 21, 1982.

Brian Tannehill

See also: Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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BAGRATION, Operation. *See* Belorussia Offensive (June 23–August 29, 1944)

Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812)

Pyotr Bagration was one of Russia's best field officers of the Napoleonic Wars. Fearless and highly skilled, he gave his life at the famous Battle of Borodino, an act that quickly made him a martyr to the Russian effort to stave off French domination.

Bagration was born at Kizliar, north of the Caucasus Mountains, in 1765, the son of an old Georgian aristocratic family. He joined the Russian army in 1782 as a sergeant and served in a variety of infantry and cavalry regiments against the Ottomans in the Caucasus and against the Poles at Warsaw. By 1798 he had advanced to colonel and was made major general the following year. Bagration then came to the attention of the famous General Aleksandr Suvorov, who recruited him for his Italian and Swiss campaigns against French encroachment.



General Prince Bagration, a distinguished Russian officer, served in the wars against the Swedes and Turks, as well as the French. He died of wounds received at the Battle of Borodino in 1812. (George Dawe (1781–1929)/Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia)

An aggressive, tenacious commander, Bagration was at his best commanding either the vanguard or rearguard of an army. He fought valiantly against the French, won significant victories at Adda, Trebbia, and Nova, and distinguished himself at the capture of Brescia. Bagration also fought well against great odds during the Russian retreat through Saint Goddard and the Devil's Pass. Described as short, swarthy, and possessed of flashing eyes, he soon established himself as a favorite among his soldiers. In a play on words, they christened him *Bog-rati-on*, or "God of the Army."

Bagration's reputation continued to rise throughout the Napoleonic Wars. He commanded a corps in General Mikhail Kutuzov's army as it advanced along the Danube River into Austria. Following the capitulation of General Karl *Freiherr* Mack von Leiberich at Ulm in November 1805, when the Russians had to make a hasty retreat, Bagration won fame as the commander of a 6,000-man rearguard. Defying great odds, he successfully parried several attacks by French marshal Joachim Murat's 30,000 men at Hollabrunn, thereby enabling Kutuzov to escape with his army intact.

During the Battle of Austerlitz, Bagration provided stout resistance against larger forces under French marshal Jean Lannes and successfully extricated his men from the ensuing rout. During the 1807 campaign in east Poland, Bagration commanded the advance guard and intercepted French dispatches that brought on the heavy encounter at Eylau in February. He also fought at Heilsburg and the Battle of Friedland before Emperor Napoleon I and Czar Alexander I signed a peace accord. Thereafter, Bagration was employed in numerous small conflicts against the Swedes and Ottomans. In 1808, he led a column of men on a daring march across the frozen Gulf of Bothnia and captured the

Åland Islands. This victory led to the Russian acquisition of Finland. He later enjoyed similar success against Ottoman armies in Bulgaria. On the cusp of renewed hostilities with France, Napoleon considered Bagration as the czar's greatest soldier.

When French forces invaded Russia in June 1812, Bagration was commanding the Second West Army, consisting of 60,000 men. Despite his calls for a counterinvasion into Poland, he was placed under Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, an officer with less seniority, and ordered to retreat. Bagration complied but made public his opinion that Barclay's passivity was no less than traitorous. He inflicted great loss upon the invaders at Mir, Romanov, and Saltanovka but could not stem the French onslaught. At length, he was attacked by French marshal Louis Davout at Mogilev and defeated, but he evaded the trap set for him and united his forces with Barclay's army. The ensuing loss of Smolensk and bad relations between Bagration and Barclay caused the czar to appoint Kutuzov as supreme commander.

The Russians made a decisive stand at the Battle of Borodino. Bagration's 24,000 men occupied the center and overextended left wing of the Russian army, which he strengthened through the construction of three V-shaped trenches known as the "Bagration fleches." Throughout the ensuing battle, Bagration was in the thick of the fighting as usual until he was wounded in the leg by a musket ball. At first he refused to leave the field, but the loss of blood necessitated his removal. Bagration died of an infection three weeks later on September 24, 1812, at Simi, east of Moscow. True to his heroic character, he declared he could die happy knowing that negotiations with Napoleon were impossible so long as a single armed Frenchman remained on Russian soil. His death was greatly mourned by

the Russian army, and he became a national hero. In 1839, Czar Nicholas I ordered his remains interred at the Borodino battlefield with a monument erected to his memory.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812; Saltanovka, Battle of (July 23, 1812); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich. (1729–1800)

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Balaclava, Battle of (October 25, 1854)

Battle to maintain the siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean War.

The Battle of Balaclava is best remembered for the Charge of the Light Brigade. That futile action was only one small part of a Russian defeat during the Crimean War. The more important result of the battle was the failure of the Russians to break the allied siege of Sevastopol, which led to the city's capitulation in 1855.

War between Russia and the allied Ottoman Empire, France, and Great Britain broke out in 1854. The allies were determined to prevent Russian expansion at the

Ottoman Empire's expense. They used their naval superiority to land a small expeditionary force on the Crimean Peninsula at the beginning of October 1854. They blockaded the port and fortress of Sevastopol, center of Russian power in the area. The allies had too few men to encircle the fortress completely, but they opened a bombardment aimed at forcing the Russians to surrender.

On the morning of October 25, the allies were surprised by a sudden sortie of 30,000 Russians under Prince Aleksandr Menshikov, aimed at the port of Balaclava. That port was the base for the British contingent, and its loss would have been a severe blow. The Russian attack went well at first. The Russians stormed six redoubts on the Causeway Heights and routed the Turkish defenders. The only British defenders were the 93rd Highlanders, about 550 men, under Sir Colin Campbell. The Highlanders stopped the Russian advance dead. Their stand was immortalized by war correspondent W.H. Russell, who wrote of "the thin red streak tipped by a line of steel." The quotation was later corrupted into the much more famous "thin red line."

As the Russians began to fall back, the British Heavy Brigade of cavalry assaulted them. The 500-man unit was greatly outnumbered, by about eight to one, but the brigade's audacity threw back the Russians, and it lost only 78 men. The Russians were in disorder, and conditions were ready for a decisive British victory.

The remaining British reserve was the Light Brigade of cavalry. Instead of charging the shaken Russians, the Earl of Cardigan, commander of the Light Brigade, led his 700 men in a pointless charge against 30 Russian guns supported by unbloodied infantry. Cardigan, personally brave but strategically clueless, rode at the head of his men as they assaulted the line of guns through a heavy crossfire.

Only 195 men returned from the charge. Their retreat was covered by the French *Chasseurs d'Afrique*, who silenced the Russian cannons on the neighboring heights.

Alfred Lord Tennyson immortalized the charge of the Light Brigade in his poem of the same name. Although a tribute to the bravery of the British troopers, the charge was a terrible waste of men and horses. The Russians were able to establish themselves firmly on the British right flank and hamper them in their siege operations.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Sergeevich (1787–1869); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

Series of sharp and bloody conflicts in southeastern Europe that led to World War I.

Most of southeastern Europe had come under Ottoman domination by the end of the 14th century. During the 19th century, nation-states emerged from the weakened structure of the Ottoman Empire. These states—including Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—all harbored irredentist aspirations against the Ottomans, and many of these aspirations overlapped, especially in Macedonia.

For some time these rivalries precluded the formation of a Balkan alliance directed

against the Ottomans. The Young Turk revolution in 1908 and its objective of an Ottoman revival, however, engendered closer cooperation among these Balkan states. An opportunity to realize their nationalist objectives arose when the weakness of the Ottomans became apparent during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912.

With the support of Russia, which sought to regain the position lost in southeastern Europe during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909, Bulgaria and Serbia signed an alliance in March 1912. This contained provisions for the rough division of Ottoman territories, including a partition of Macedonia into a Bulgarian zone and a contested zone to be arbitrated by the Russian czar. Bulgaria and Serbia then signed bilateral agreements with Greece and Montenegro during the spring and summer of 1912. Other than the Bulgarian–Serbian agreement, the Balkan allies made little effort to arrange the division of any territories conquered.

The fighting between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire began on October 8, 1912. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia entered the war on October 18. Each of the Balkan allies separately confronted their common enemy. The most important theater was in Thrace, where a strong Bulgarian offensive overcame Ottoman resistance at Kirk Killase (Lozengrad) and at the massive battle raging from Buni Hisar to Lyule Burgas. At the same time, the Bulgarians surrounded and besieged the Ottomans at Adrianople (Edirne).

The Bulgarian offensive thrust the Ottomans to the final defensive positions at Chataldzha (Çatalca), about 20 miles outside of Constantinople. Only on November 16–17 did Ottoman forces rally to defeat a Bulgarian attempt to cross the Chataldzha lines and seize their capital. Smaller Bulgarian units, meanwhile, proceeded against little opposition into western Thrace and toward Salonika.

Elsewhere, the Greek army advanced in two directions against slight opposition. The northwesterly thrust moved into Epirus and besieged Janina (Ioannina). The northeasterly push overran Thessaly and entered Salonika only a day ahead of the Bulgarian unit moving south with the same objective. An uneasy condominium ensued in that city. The Greek navy held the Ottoman fleet at bay and seized the Aegean Islands. One section of the Montenegrin army advanced into the Sandjak of Novibazar, while most of the Montenegrin force besieged the northern Albanian town of Scutari (Shkodër). The main part of the Serbian army easily defeated the Ottomans at Kumanovo in northern Macedonia (October 23, 1912) and then proceeded to take most of the rest of Macedonia. Other Serbian units occupied Kosovo. By the time the warring parties agreed to an armistice on December 3, the only territories in Europe remaining to the Ottomans were the besieged cities of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari; the Gallipoli Peninsula; and that part of eastern Thrace behind the Chataldzha lines.

While the Balkan allies and the Ottomans assembled in London on December 16 to negotiate a peace settlement, the ambassadors of the Great Powers convened nearby to direct the peace settlement and protect their own interests. This conference, on the insistence of Austria-Hungary and Italy, recognized the independence of an Albanian state that some Albanian notables had proclaimed in Vlorë on November 28. This state blocked Serbian and Montenegrin claims to territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, which had the strong support of Russia. At the same time, the Austrians demanded Serbian troops evacuate those portions of northern Albania occupied that autumn. Talks between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans soon stalled, mainly over the

issue of Adrianople, and hostilities resumed on February 3, 1913.

On March 6, Janina fell to the Greeks. On March 26 the Bulgarians, with Serbian help, took Adrianople. The Montenegrins and assisting Serbian units bogged down around Scutari. Only on April 23, after the departure of the Serbs, did the Montenegrins succeed in entering the city. Nevertheless, the major powers, especially Austria-Hungary, refused to sanction a Montenegrin occupation of Scutari because the London Ambassadors Conference had assigned it to the new Albanian state. After threats and a show of force, together with the promise of generous subsidies, the Montenegrins evacuated Scutari.

On May 30, 1913, the Balkan allies and the Ottomans signed a peace treaty in London. The Ottoman Empire ceded its European territories west of a straight line drawn between Enos and Media (Enez-Midyé).

By then the loose Balkan alliance was disintegrating. The Serbs sought compensation for Albania in Macedonian areas assigned to Bulgaria by the alliance treaty but occupied by Serbia during the previous autumn fighting. At the same time, the Bulgarians and Greeks were skirmishing over Macedonia. On May 5, 1913, the Greeks and Serbs signed an agreement directed against the Bulgarians. A feeble Russian attempt at arbitration in June failed.

On the night of June 29–30, the Bulgarians launched probing attacks against Serbian positions in Macedonia. The Greeks and Serbs utilized these attacks to implement their alliance, resulting in the Second Balkan War. Greek and Serbian counterattacks thrust the Bulgarian forces back. Taking advantage of the situation, Romanian and Ottoman troops joined in the attack on Bulgaria. The Romanians objected to the establishment of a strong Bulgaria on their southern frontier and sought compensation in the town of

Silistra and in southern Dobrudzha. The Ottomans sought to recover Adrianople. The Bulgarians found themselves attacked on all sides.

The result was a Bulgarian catastrophe. With no aid forthcoming from any Great Power, the Bulgarians had to seek terms. In the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) with Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, and in the Treaty of Constantinople (September 30, 1913) with the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians acknowledged defeat and the loss of much of the gains from the First Balkan War.

The two Balkan Wars changed the map of southeastern Europe. A fragile Albanian state emerged, largely dependent on the Great Powers. Serbia acquired Kosovo and much of Macedonia, almost doubling its territory. Serbia and Montenegro divided the Sandjak of Novibazar. Montenegro also gained small areas on its southern border with the new Albanian state. Greece obtained clear title to Crete and also obtained Epirus, including the city of Janina; a large portion of southern and western Macedonia, including Salonika; and the Aegean Islands. Bulgaria, even after the Second Balkan War, gained central Thrace, including the insignificant Aegean port of Dedeagach, and a piece of Macedonia around Petrich. Romania obtained southern (Bulgarian) Dobrudzha. The Ottomans managed to regain eastern Thrace, which remained its only European possession.

The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 were the first armed conflicts on European soil in the 20th century and presaged World War I. Mass attacks against entrenched positions, concentrated artillery barrages, and military use of airplanes made their first appearances in European warfare. The two wars resulted in at least 150,000 military dead, with the Bulgarians and Ottomans suffering the heaviest losses. Many more soldiers were wounded and missing. These wars also brought about

the deaths from disease of tens of thousands of civilians, and many more were displaced.

The Balkan Wars left a legacy of frustration for the Bulgarians and Ottomans, providing a basis for continued conflict in World War I. They also imparted a sense of inflated success among the Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs. On two occasions during the Balkan Wars, Austria-Hungary had resorted to threats of force against Serbia to protect Albania. The Austrians would make one more such threat, in October 1913, before finally resorting to force. Less than a year after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, war again erupted in southeastern Europe, but this “Third Balkan War” metamorphosed into World War I.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich (1860–1927); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Baltic Fleet Mutiny (March 1917)

A series of mutinies occurred in the Russian Baltic Fleet in March 1917. The outbreak of war in August 1914 had exacerbated many of the existing stresses and strains within the Russian navy, particularly the gulf between officers and seamen. The mutiny aboard the Black Sea Fleet battleship *Kniaz Potemkin Tavrichesky* in July 1905 was only the most

famous in a series of mutinies; in the Baltic, there had been rioting at Kronstadt in October 1905, a bloody rebellion aboard the old cruiser *Pamiat Azova* in July 1906, and an abortive revolt at Helsingfors (Helsinki) in 1912. During World War I there had already been several incidents, including a riot aboard the battleship *Gangut* in October 1915.

Many of these events had been triggered by grievances regarding the conditions of service. Officers, who almost always were drawn from the aristocracy, frequently subjected their men to harsh and degrading discipline. Food was poor, ships were overcrowded, and older reservists resented being recalled to service. One of the most serious problems was the tendency of frontline commanders to rid themselves of troublemakers by sending them to the rear-area base of Kronstadt, where Admiral Robert N. Viren, a strict martinet, commanded a restive mass of new draftees and men being trained at the specialist schools.

Kronstadt was only about 15 miles west of Petrograd, so when food riots in the capital became a full-scale rebellion on February 27, 1917, this soon became known among the sailors. On the evening of February 28, stored-up resentments exploded in an orgy of violence against authority: 24 officers, including Admiral Viren, were killed, as were 19 petty officers.

At Helsingfors, the ships were still locked in the ice of the frozen harbor. Baltic Fleet commander Admiral Adrian I. Nepenin received only incomplete and garbled reports about events in the capital and at *Stavka* (the Russian military headquarters), while Mikhail V. Rodzianko, an ambitious Duma deputy, muddied the waters further by issuing orders without legal authority. When Czar Nicholas II abdicated on March 2, Rodzianko ordered Nepenin to keep this

momentous event secret from the crews, but since most communications were processed by enlisted clerks, the news soon spread through the fleet. Nepenin's failure to announce the abdication was taken as a sign of his involvement in some sort of right-wing plot.

On the evening of March 3 there was a series of mutinies, beginning in the battleships *Andrei Pervozvanny*, *Imperator Pavel I*, and *Slava*. The most unpopular officers were killed, and gangs of sailors were soon roaming over the ice, urging other ships to join in the revolt. The next day, Admiral Nepenin agreed to meet with representatives of the mutinous sailors, but he was murdered on his way to the meeting. All told, about 40 officers were killed at Helsingfors.

Events took a different course at Revel, the fleet's third main base. Destroyers and submarines, which had seen a more active war, were based here, and morale was higher than at Helsingfors or Kronstadt. The trouble here began not in the ships, but with workers ashore; and the officers were generally able to cope with events. The fleet's smaller bases avoided bloodshed entirely.

The aftermath of the Baltic Fleet mutinies was complex. Sailors' committees were established aboard the ships, with their authority theoretically limited to the internal management of the individual ships and to discipline; but the widespread distrust of the officers led to orders often being questioned or rejected, despite the fact that quite a few officers, disenchanted with the czarist regime, sympathized with the goals of the revolution. The authority of the officers declined rapidly, as did that of the Provisional Government, whose policy of continuing the war was increasingly unpopular.

The Bolsheviks, initially only a minority among the ships' crews, grew more popular, thanks to their strong organization and

antiwar policy. It therefore was no accident that the sailors and ships of the Baltic Fleet played a leading role in the Bolshevik seizure of power that November. It was the cruiser *Avrora* (*Aurora*) that fired the blank round that signaled the storming of the Winter Palace, and revolutionary sailors led the way in arresting the ministers of the Provisional Government.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: *Aurora* (Protected Cruiser); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nepenin, Adrian Ivanovich (1871–1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); *Stavka*

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Baltic Operations, Land, World War I

The Baltic area comprises present-day Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Under Russian control in 1914, this region saw considerable fighting between Germany and Russia during World War I. In 1918, Germany conquered all this territory; the Baltic states then became independent.

In August 1914 when the war began, the Russian army planned to invade the German province of East Prussia with two army groups. The northernmost of the two was General Pavel Rennenkampf's First Army. The Riga-Schaulen Group of four and a half divisions was charged with protecting First Army's open right flank in the Baltics. Despite the defeat of Rennenkampf's army, no

major fighting occurred in the Baltic area until the summer of 1915.

In mid-April 1915, German Army chief of staff General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn ordered the commander of German forces on the Eastern Front, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, to create a diversion in order to draw off Russian troops from Galicia. Hindenburg and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Erich Ludendorff decided to accomplish this with an offensive in Kurland, a barren stretch of land marked by a lack of transportation facilities. The Russians believed that their fortress of Kovno to the south would prevent any more northerly German advance. For the offensive, Ludendorff established a force of 12 divisions, 7 of which were cavalry. This group was first known as Army Group Lauenstein, for its commander Lieutenant General Otto von Lauenstein. Later it was renamed the Neiman Army.

Russian commander in chief of the Northwestern Front General Mikhail Alekseev wrote off the defense of the Baltic area as a waste of troops. Even if the attack were to succeed, Lauenstein would only have managed to conquer a wasteland. Still, the German advance here forced Alekseev to send in more and more men, especially as the Germans threatened Riga, the capital of Latvia. By June, Alekseev had committed 18 divisions.

A Russian counterattack near Szawli (Schaulen) failed, and the Germans were then in excellent position to move either against Riga or on Kovno. Meanwhile, Alekseev had committed two armies, one each to protect Riga and Kovno. These armies remained in close proximity to their bases, leaving a wide gap between them into which the Germans now moved. By mid-June, the situation had become perilous for the Russians.

In mid-July the Russians feared that Riga would soon fall. The Germans had taken Mitau, and their cavalry had reached Kovno. Another Russian army, the Twelfth, was now inserted to protect Riga. Ludendorff wanted a full-scale offensive in Kurland to turn the Russian northern flank, but Falkenhayn rejected this approach. His offensive in Poland had forced the Russians into a long retreat, and Falkenhayn, worried about lengthy supply lines, preferred a slow, deliberate advance that would simply keep pressure on the withdrawing Russians.

The perilous situation in the Baltics prompted the Russian High Command (*Stavka*) on August 17 to establish a new Northwestern Front of three armies commanded by General Nikolai Ruzsky to defend the approaches to Riga and Dvinsk. By this time Russian strength in the area had grown to 28 divisions. The Russian reinforcement came too late to prevent the fall of Kovno on August 17, however. The Tenth Army then withdrew east toward Vilnius, while the Fifth Army fell back on Riga. In Ruzsky's redeployment of forces, he opened a 50-mile gap between the Russian armies. Alekseev, who was appointed chief of staff of the entire Russian army in early September, refused to reinforce the area further as this would have meant weakening Russian lines elsewhere.

In early September, Ludendorff, in violation of Falkenhayn's orders, launched an attack. With pressure on the Russian center having diminished and with shorter supply lines, the Russians were better able to reinforce in the north, and although the Germans took Vilnius on September 18, it came at a high cost. The Germans had sustained 50,000 casualties over a two-week span. Further German efforts to advance encountered stiff Russian resistance, and on September 16 Ludendorff called off the

offensive and ordered construction of a permanent trench line in place.

The Baltic region was then again free of major military activity until the first days of January 1917. The Germans took Dvina, but the Russians recovered it. Then in the Battle of the Aa, on January 5, the Russian Twelfth Army launched an attack on a 30-mile-wide front between Lake Babit and the Tirul Marsh. Carried out without preliminary bombardment, it caught the German defenders by surprise and pushed them back. The Russians captured the towns of Mitau and Takums, advancing their lines some 4 miles. The Russians captured 36 guns and took approximately 8,000 Germans as prisoners. German counterattacks ceased by the end of the month, and the front again stabilized.

The Baltic Front was largely quiet until the fall of 1917, when the Germans launched a major offensive there. On September 1, General of Infantry Oskar von Hutier put his Eighth Army in motion against Riga. The German attack began with a preliminary bombardment carefully planned by Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchmüller. Three German divisions got across the Dvina on pontoon bridges, protected by low-flying aircraft. The German effort to trap the defending Twelfth Army failed, and the Russian defenders were able to withdraw in good order. The Germans secured Riga on September 5.

In order to secure Riga Bay and make its harbor usable as a Baltic base, the Germans conducted amphibious operations against Russian bases on Dagö, Ösel, and the Moon Islands off the Estonian coast between October 12 and 21, 1917. This operation, code-named ALBION, was the largest German amphibious operation of the entire war. The Germans established a front line in Livland and controlled the Baltic Sea south of Tallinn.

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd in early November and immediately announced their intention to end Russian participation in the war. Peace negotiations between the Germans and Bolshevik representatives broke down, however, over the harsh German demands, including the cession by Russia of most of the Baltic area. When the Bolshevik side tried to stall for time in a declaration of “neither war nor peace,” Major General Max Hoffmann, chief of staff of *Oberost*, the German High Command East, renewed offensive operations on February 18, 1918. German advances farther into Livonia and Estonia continued until March 4. The day before, on March 3, the Russians signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk ending the war against Germany.

For the newly independent Baltic states, however, the fighting was far from over. Warfare continued against Russia, which sought to reacquire its Baltic provinces. The Baltics then enjoyed a brief period of independence between the wars before they were reabsorbed into the Soviet Union as a consequence of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. They did not regain their independence until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Thomas J. Weiler and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Aa, Battle of the (January 7–9, 1917); ALBION, Operation (October 8–18, 1917); Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Baltic Operations, Sea, World War I; Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Kurland (Courland) Offensive (April 26–September 26, 1915); Poland, German Offensive in (September 28–December 16, 1914); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Riga, Battle of (September 1–3, 1917); Schedule 19 (Plan 19)

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Baltic Operations, Sea, World War I

Although naval operations in the Baltic Sea are usually accorded scant attention in British and American accounts of the war, this theater was nonetheless very important, especially to Germany. Control of the Baltic assured Germany a supply of high-grade Swedish iron ore and denied the Western Entente powers an easy route to ship military supplies to Russia via Peter the Great's "window to the west" of St. Petersburg (Petrograd). In the warfare in the Baltic, the mine was the chief naval weapon.

In the past, Russia had maintained a powerful fleet in the Baltic, but this had been destroyed by the Japanese in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima Straits and by 1914 had not yet been fully reconstituted. At the beginning of hostilities in August 1914, Russian commander in the Baltic Vice Admiral Nikolai von Essen had at his disposal only four pre-dreadnought battleships, although in the course of the war the Russians were able to complete construction of their four *Gangut*-class dreadnought battleships. In addition to

battleships, the Russian navy also operated in the Baltic six old armored cruisers, four light cruisers, and a limited number of destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines.

The Germans could establish unchallenged control of the Baltic whenever they chose to do so, simply by moving major fleet assets there from the North Sea via the Kiel Canal. In effect, however, during most of the war, Germany's High Seas Fleet remained concentrated in the North Sea against the British Home Fleet. Throughout the war, German navy commander in the Baltic Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich skillfully employed the limited naval assets available to him.

The Russian General Staff had set the objective for the navy in the Baltic as the defense of the Gulf of Finland and Russian coasts to prevent any German attempt to land troops and capture Petrograd. A major aspect of these essentially defensive operations was the laying of extensive minefields off both the Russian and German coasts. On July 18, 1914, in anticipation of the German declaration of war, Essen's ships laid more than 2,000 mines over a four-hour period, securing the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. Prince Heinrich responded by sending light cruisers on August 17 to lay his own mines off the Gulf of Finland.

A week later, under cover of fog, German cruisers actually laid mines inside the gulf, but on August 26 the cruiser *Magdeburg* was stranded on Oldensholm Island following a clash with Russian cruisers and was lost. Russian divers recovered the German code book, which they then shared with the British. This coup gave Admiralty cryptanalysts (Room 40) a tremendous advantage in their efforts to decode German wireless communications.

In early September, Prince Heinrich in the armored cruiser *Blücher* led seven old

battleships into the Gulf of Finland, and on September 6 they exchanged fire with Russian cruisers off the Åland Islands. On October 11 the German submarine *U-26* sank the Russian armored cruiser *Pallada*. The torpedo explosion detonated the cruiser's magazine, and the ship went down with all 597 members of its crew.

Essen then ordered that in the future all battleships and cruisers would be escorted by destroyers. He also shifted operations to the southern area of the Baltic, closer to German sea lanes. Under Ludvig Kerber, Viktor Kanin, and other admirals, Russian ships laid approximately 1,500 mines. The Germans lost the heavy cruiser *Friedrich Karl*, four minesweepers, and 15 merchant ships.

The British also sent submarines to the Baltic. In October, the *E.1* and *E.9* arrived there and were stationed off Finland. These submarines helped disrupt iron ore traffic from Lulea in Sweden, although most German ship losses in the Baltic were caused by Russian mines.

In the spring of 1915, German forces drove the Russians from Poland and the Courland Peninsula, with German warships assisting in the capture of Libau and Windau. In late July 1915, in order to assist their army in a drive on Riga and perhaps even Petrograd, the Germans transferred substantial naval assets from the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea to the Baltic in a plan to break through the Gulf of Riga. On August 8, Vice Admiral Erhard Schmidt led seven pre-dreadnought battleships accompanied by 11 cruisers and 56 destroyers in an attempt to penetrate the Gulf of Riga. Schmidt hoped that this might force the Russians to send their major fleet units from the Gulf of Finland, whereupon another German force commanded by Vice Admiral Franz Hipper and consisting of 8 dreadnoughts, 3 battle cruisers, 5 cruisers, and 32 destroyers would annihilate them.

The Germans commenced operations in the Gulf of Riga on August 8 and assumed that they would last two days. The Russian minefields proved too thick for the German ships to pass through, however, and Russian forces there, including Captain Sergey Vyazemsky's pre-dreadnought Russian battleship *Slava* supported by the gunboats *Khrabri* and *Grozyaschi* and some aircraft, contested the German advance. Schmidt then broke off the operation at a cost to his own forces of two minesweepers sunk and a destroyer and cruiser damaged, all by mines.

Meanwhile, on August 10, the German cruisers *Roon* and *Prince Heinrich* bombarded Russian positions at Zerel on the tip of the Sworbe Peninsula. Russian destroyers anchored off Zerel were caught by surprise, and one was damaged. On August 11 the *Hipper* sent in the battle cruiser *Von der Tann* and cruiser *Kolberg* to shell Utö to the north of the entrance of the Gulf of Finland.

On August 16, Schmidt tried again with another attack on the Irben Straits, this time employing the dreadnoughts *Posen* and *Nassau* accompanied by 4 light cruisers, 1 large destroyer, 31 torpedo boats, 1 minelayer, and minesweepers and block ships. This time Schmidt allowed more time for minesweeping, with the entire operation to take at least five days. The dreadnoughts kept the *Slava* at bay and scored three hits on it, but the Germans lost a minesweeper and a destroyer before breaking into the gulf early on August 19.

The Germans then sank the Russian gunboat *Sivutch* and forced the gunboat *Koritez* ashore, where its crew blew it up. The Germans lost another destroyer to a mine, and on August 20, after receiving reports of submarines, Schmidt decided to forego laying mines off Moon Sound and retired. Although three Russian submarines were operating in the gulf, the Germans got away without further losses.

In the Baltic, meanwhile, the British submarine *E.1* torpedoed the German battle cruiser *Moltke*. The torpedo struck the German ship in the bow, severely damaging it. German destroyers prevented a second attack, and the *Moltke* was able to return to base. German navy leaders now concluded that they would not undertake such operations again unless in cooperation with forces on land. Chief of the German General Staff General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn was preoccupied with operations on the Western Front rather than the capture of Riga, and this would have to wait two years.

The stalemate continued in the Baltic in 1916, but following their rebuff in the May 31–June 1, 1916, Battle of Jutland and the replacement of Falkenhayn by “Easterners” Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his first quartermaster general (de facto chief of staff) General of Infantry Erich Ludendorff, the Germans shifted substantial naval assets to the Baltic in early 1917. The Germans planned a combined arms effort to secure the Baltic islands to open Estonia and Livonia in order to drive on Petrograd. The offensive did not get underway until late summer, but by September 3 the Germans had taken Riga.

There followed a German amphibious operation to capture the Russian Baltic islands. Code-named ALBION, it began on October 12 when Admiral Schmidt sent 11 dreadnoughts against Orel Island, easily reducing its defenses. Torpedo boats and motorized barges then carried in troops of Lieutenant General Ludwig Gustave Adolf von Estorff’s 42nd Infantry Division. These defeated the defending Russian 107th Division, which was already in a state of disintegration thanks to Russian revolutionary upheaval. On October 17, the German dreadnoughts *König* and *Kronprinz*, which had managed to pass through the minefields into the Gulf of Riga,

engaged and badly damaged the battleship *Slava*, forcing its crew to scuttle it. The German ships also scored hits on the battleship *Grazhdanin* (*ex-Tsesarevich*) and armored cruiser *Bayan*, putting them to flight. On October 21, the Germans secured Dagö Island, in effect concluding Operation ALBION.

This marked the effective end of the Russian Baltic Fleet’s operations in the war. On November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd and immediately announced their intention to end Russian participation in the war. In March 1918, the Bolshevik government and the Germans concluded the formal Treaty of Brest Litovsk.

Meanwhile, the German Baltic Fleet assisted the Finns in winning their independence against Red Bolshevik forces. Fleet units transported German-trained Finnish volunteers and in April landed Major General Rüdiger von der Goltz’s “Baltic Division” to aid the Finns. The dreadnoughts *Rheinland* and *Posen* covered these operations. Germany was unable to capitalize on the situation, however, as it was defeated on the Western Front and forced to sign an armistice in November 1918.

*Raymond Westphal Jr. and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: ALBION, Operation (October 8–18, 1917); Baltic Operations, Land, World War I; Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Essen, Nikolai Ottovich von (1860–1915)

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Baltic Rebellions (1991)

Popular movements in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that eventually brought political independence and secession from the Soviet Union.

In February–April 1990, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) organized the first truly contested elections since 1917; it permitted officially recognized social and democratic parties with noncommunist orientations. Newly organized “popular fronts” in the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania won majorities and formed their new respective governments. On March 11, 1990, the new Lithuanian government declared independence, followed by Estonia (March 30) and Latvia (May 4). The Soviet regime refused to recognize these declarations, and instituted an economic blockade of the Baltic states.

On January 7, 1991, the Lithuanian government was forced to increase food prices and almost collapsed in the resulting economic crisis. Taking advantage of popular discontent, the pro-Soviet (Russian) Lithuanian Salvation Committee organized meetings, with the hope for a help from Moscow, and tried to storm government buildings. Moscow, in turn, claiming people in Lithuania required protection, decided to bring in troops. On January 10, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev demanded that the Soviet constitution be restored in Lithuania. On his order, Soviet troops occupied many strategic sites in the country the following day, but the Lithuanian government asked their people to stay together. Soviet tanks and Special Forces (*Otriad Mobilny Osobova Nasnatchenia*, OMON) moved to seize the Vilnius television tower on January 13, but met resistance from the common Lithuanians, who massed there. The tanks began firing blank rounds and then, as large crowds gathered, fired live rounds over the crowds. When the crowds did not disperse, the Soviet tanks drove into them, firing live rounds directly at the people. At least 14 were killed and several hundred wounded (one Soviet officer was also killed). Gorbachev claimed he had no knowledge of the operation and blamed it on local extremists.

Boris Yeltsin, newly elected chairman of the Russian Federation, flew to Tallinn that day and signed a declaration establishing bilateral relations between Russia and the Baltic states. Trying to win time, Yeltsin called upon Soviet troops not to act against people. Several foreign governments, stirred by broadcast footage of the TV tower attack, called upon the Soviet Union to halt the violence. On January 20, however, five civilians trying to defend a government building were killed by OMON.

These events fueled the independence national movements. The Baltic governments ignored Gorbachev's proposal for a referendum. On February 9, however, Lithuanians conducted their own referenda where they voted in favor for independence (91%). On March 3, 78 percent approved Estonian independence, and that same day Latvia voted for independence as well (74%).

The turning point came during August 19–21, 1991, when several conservative Communist leaders organized a putsch in Moscow. They opposed Gorbachev's reform programs, including those that would devolve much of the central government's power to the republics, including the Baltics. Yeltsin denounced the coup and urged the military not to take part. The Baltic Military district commander, being part of the conspiracy however, declared martial law. But by August 22 the coup attempt collapsed—mainly, because it had no support with the majority of population either in Moscow or in the Baltics. Gorbachev's inability to act firmly compromised his position as leader of the Soviet Union, as neither conservative Communists nor liberal democrats felt they could trust him or support his program. From that point on, Yeltsin steadily became the dominant political figure in the nation; he was elected as president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in June 1991. On September 6, 1991, he recognized the independence of the three Baltic republics, which were admitted to the United Nations two weeks later.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: August Coup (1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941)

Surprise German offensive against the Soviet Union.

Soviet premier Josef Stalin signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Adolf Hitler in August 1939, fearing Hitler might approach Great Britain with the same offer and thus allow Germany to focus military operations against the Soviet Union. Stalin was under no misconception: war with Germany would come; however, he completely miscalculated German capabilities, and the time and place of the attack. Stalin foresaw a German offensive into the southern Soviet Union in 1942 at the earliest, targeting the grain supply of Ukraine and the coal fields of Donbas. The German ambassador and the British both warned Stalin of a coming Nazi attack, earlier, and intelligence supplied by Richard Sorge, among others, also indicated that Hitler had planned an invasion for 1941. Yet when Germany massed 112 divisions on the Soviet border in the spring of 1941, Stalin accepted Hitler's assurances that these troops were moved east to protect them from Allied bombing runs. Stalin obviously was ill at ease though, and had General Georgy Zhukov hastily make plans for the coming war. Unfortunately, as the Soviet leadership was reviewing the plan, the Germans invaded.

The German invasion began at 5:00 a.m. on June 22, 1941. Ironically, Soviet trucks en route to Germany with supplies for the German army passed German units crossing into Soviet territory. A German force of 3.5 million



Soviet tanks roll toward the battlefield on June 22, 1941, to defend Soviet territory from German troops. This was the first day of Operation BARBAROSSA, the German drive to defeat the USSR. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

men poured into the Soviet Union, supported by units from Finland, Hungary, and Italy. Aerial bombardment covered the ground forces.

Soviet air and ground forces were completely unprepared. The Soviet warplanes sat on runways, undefended. Some 1,800 fighters and bombers were destroyed on the first day; most never left the ground. Additionally, the Soviet pilots lacked leadership and training, and were completely overmatched in the air. Ground forces fared little better. German forces destroyed or captured many Soviet units in the first days of BARBAROSSA.

The impact of the attack was compounded by the state of the Red Army. During 1934–1938, Stalin purged many officers who previously fought in the czar’s army and during the Civil War. He replaced them with nonmilitary professionals solely based on their standing in the Communist Party. In 1941, therefore, the Red Army was not well trained; it had questionable morale, poor leadership, and ineffective strategy. Political ideology and propaganda slogans, irrelevant to military goals and modern military

development shaped the Soviet army. Hitler believed the Soviet edifice would crumble under the initial offensive and could be defeated in a matter of weeks. The German strategy turned on a wide, fast moving force. Operation BARBAROSSA, named for the Hohenstaufen emperor Friedrich Barbarossa (“Red Beard”), called for three different forces. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led the Army Group North in the Baltic states toward Leningrad. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock moved his Army Group Center into Belorussia, surrounding the city of Minsk. Army Group South was commanded by Field Marshal Gerhardt von Rundstedt; his forces moved into the Ukraine accompanied by two Romanian armies.

The sheer size of the Soviet landscape quickly became a factor though, as Stalin called on the Soviet people to wage a scorched earth campaign similar to the Russian strategy used against Napoleon in 1812. Nikita Khrushchev, the Ukraine Party leader, emerged as a formidable figure during the invasion. He evacuated machinery from factories in the west, sending it east,



out of range of the Luftwaffe. Lenin’s mummified body, the Soviet gold reserves, and other treasures were sent to Tyumen, Siberia.

The vast expanses of Russian countryside rightly concerned the *Wehrmacht* leadership.

Their forces had made astounding progress. Minsk fell in June. Smolensk and Vitebsk fell in July. The Soviets experienced extreme losses: 300,000 men in the battle for Vitebsk alone, and almost 1.5 million overall. German

military planners knew their supply lines were thin and the Russian winter was approaching, but the leadership was divided on which course to pursue. Most of the German General Staff favored a drive on Moscow, believing its fall would bring a Soviet surrender. Hitler instead ordered the German central army to slow its advance so the northern and southern army groups could catch up and secure the resources of Ukraine.

Stalin's parallel reluctance to face the reality of the battle field caused differences with Red Army leadership as well, and cost millions of lives. Bock's forces cut off Tallinn, the Estonian capital, in late August. Stalin refused to evacuate the city until August 28, however. Ships sent to rescue the civilians and remnants of the forces defending the city were attacked by Finnish naval forces and the Luftwaffe as they departed. Sixty-five ships sank and over 10,000 people died. Kiev met a similar fate in September. Zhukov advised Stalin to abandon the city. Stalin refused. Zhukov resigned as chief of staff. Kiev fell to the German Sixth Army. The Soviets lost 600,000 men. The civilians were left to starve, and the Jews in the city were executed.

Army Group North approached Leningrad, where it would conduct the longest siege in modern history. A Soviet counterattack led by Lieutenant General Nikola Vatutin and the terrain of the area around the city slowed the German advance. Some 1.5 million civilians dug fortifications around the city. These same civilians, untrained and with few weapons, then attacked the approaching German forces. By September 7, German forces nevertheless encircled the city. Hitler had no intention of breaching the city. He planned to starve the 3,000,000 civilians, demolish the city, and hand it over to Finland.

Stalin placed Zhukov in charge of military operations in and around Leningrad. As

Hitler thought, the munitions works in the city were vital to the Soviet war effort. Zhukov ordered the Soviet Baltic Fleet to move their guns in range of the German positions. This and the remaining Soviet planes supported the city through the siege. Either the Germans or the NKVD shot anyone who tried to flee. The munitions works continued to operate, and the ammunition produced was shipped along an evacuation route across the frozen Lake Lagoda, north of the city. Life in Leningrad during the siege was horrifying. An estimated 1.5 million people died in the first winter. Food that made its way into the city was handed out according to Party status and productivity in the munitions plant. Many without such privileges resorted to cannibalism. Despite this, Leningrad never tried to surrender. In mid-September, as Leningrad persevered, Hitler gave in to the calls for an offensive on Moscow.

The German offensive on Moscow began on September 30, 1941. Within a week, the Germans had the Soviet forces pinned down with no reinforcements, food, or supplies. On October 7, Stalin called on Lavrenty Beria, head of the NKVD and one of Stalin's most trusted lieutenants, to seek out the Germans and discuss terms for surrender. More than 250,000 civilians, mostly women, dug earthworks and erected defenses around Moscow. Muscovites of German descent were deported, though the NKVD prevented all others from leaving and made plans for a guerrilla war. Stalin and the State Defense Committee evacuated the government to Kuibyshev. This created widespread panic and looting. Stalin's vow to remain in the city, along with the activities of the NKVD, quelled the pandemonium. Rains turned the Soviet roads into torrents of mud and blunted the German advance. Yet at the end of November, the German 3rd Panzer Division was only 40 kilometers from Moscow.

Then the Russian winter came. December was reminiscent of Napoleon's ill-fated campaign more than 100 years before. Temperatures were well below zero. Engines would not start in the fierce cold. Weapons froze because they had the wrong kind of oil. Horses were useless. The ground was frozen. Food froze. German troops did not have the right gear. Most lacked the right kind of boots or gloves. Frostbite was rampant; and the Soviets were fighting back.

On December 1, German heavy artillery began pounding the Soviet capital. German forces had initial success, but were beaten back by counterattacks. These strikes used 11 new Red Army units. Some were from Siberia and adept at cold weather combat. The Second Guards Cavalry Corps, for instance, used Cossack ponies that could move in the deep snow. The Soviets also commanded a technological advantage. Russian T-34 tanks moved well in the snow, and they had the right kind of oil for cold weather operations. As the Germans pulled back, they were attacked by a variety of Soviet units, including a corps of paratroopers Zhukov dropped behind them. The German army eventually retreated 80 kilometers to a fall back point. There they would try to wait out the Russian winter.

William Eger

See also: Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); NKVD; Patriotic War of 1812; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); T-34 Tank; Vatutin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1901–1944); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818)

A skilled administrator and reformer, Russia's Prince Mikhail Barclay de Tolly was a steadfast soldier of the Napoleonic Wars. He originated the Fabian strategy of retreating deeper into Russia, a ploy that led to the destruction of French forces during 1812–1813.

Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly was born in Livonia on December 27, 1761, a fourth-generation Russian of Scottish descent. Throughout his life, he spoke Russian with a thick accent, a fact that aroused the suspicions of many of his countrymen. Barclay joined an infantry regiment at the age of 15 in 1776 and served capably as a sergeant for the next 15 years. It was not until he distinguished himself in the Battle of Ochakov against the Turks that Prince Repnin took notice and commissioned him a lieutenant. After minor campaigning against the Swedes in 1790, he was transferred to Poland in 1792, serving there until 1795 and rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1799, Czar Paul I elevated him to major general in time for service against future French emperor Napoleon I as the Napoleonic Wars threatened to overwhelm Europe.

In 1805, Barclay commanded the advance guard of the army under General Levin Bennigsen, but he failed to reach Austria in time for the Battle of Austerlitz, thus missing the Russian defeat. He served with distinction during the 1806–1807 campaign in eastern Poland, however, particularly at the Battle

of Pultusk on December 26, 1806. French forces under Marshal Jean Lannes managed to storm the town, but Barclay roused his men and drove him out before Bennigsen called off the action. Barclay subsequently commanded the rearguard as the Russians retreated and handled himself well at Frauen-dorf and Hof against superior numbers.

Just prior to the bloody engagement at the Battle of Eylau, Barclay was severely wounded and evacuated to Memel. There, he was visited for the first time by Czar Alexander I, and the two men struck up a lasting friendship. Barclay was an officer distinguished by his honesty, and in all frankness, he informed the czar it was better for his forces to fall back into Russia and allow geography to work on their behalf than to fight Napoleon at a disadvantage. This fact was borne out by the heavy Russian defeat at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807, a loss that compelled the czar to sign the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon.

After recovering from his injury, Barclay was dispatched with General Pyotr Bagration on a war against the Swedes. In 1809, the two generals led a daring, across-the-ice attack against Umea, after which Barclay was promoted to full general and governor general of Finland. Alexander continued to be impressed with Barclay's administrative abilities, so in 1810 he appointed Barclay minister of war. It was generally feared that a final showdown against Napoleon was imminent, and Barclay set about reorganizing and reforming the Russian army. During Barclay's tenure as minister of war, the army nearly doubled in size to 400,000 men, and regulations in place since the time of Peter I were revised and updated. Consequently, the Russian Army was on a much sounder tactical footing when Napoleon invaded Russia in June 1812 at the head of 600,000 men.



A skilled administrator and reformer, Russia's Prince Mikhail Barclay de Tolly was a steadfast soldier of the Napoleonic Wars. (George Dawe (1781–1929)/Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia)

In addition to his duties as minister of war, Barclay was also appointed commander of the First Western Army, a 100,000-man force. Badly outnumbered, he enacted his strategy of retreating and drawing the enemy deeper and deeper into the endless expanse of Russia where Napoleon's supply lines would become vulnerable. It was a practical plan, but Barclay's reputation as a foreigner caused great resentment among the more nationalist elements of the Russian officer corps, who found the retreat humiliating. Bagration, his greatest critic, regarded the plan as treasonous and only sullenly cooperated. Lack of trust between the two generals and their armies led to the loss of Smolensk, at which point public outcry made Czar Alexander

appoint General Mikhail Kutuzov supreme commander.

When the Russians finally made a stand at the Battle of Borodino, Barclay was entrusted with command of the right wing. His men fought well, although critics blamed him for the loss of the battle and the ensuing loss of Moscow. Barclay then applied for sick leave and played no further role in the destruction of French forces during Napoleon's famous winter retreat that destroyed the French forces by disease and starvation. Barclay's strategy had worked beyond all expectations.

In the spring of 1813, Czar Alexander I summoned Barclay back into the field as commander of the Third Western Army. He captured the fortress of Thorn on the Vistula River and also commanded troops during the defeat of Bautzen in May 1813. Nonetheless, Alexander saw fit to make him commander in chief of joint Russian–Prussian forces, and Barclay went on to fight well at the engagements of Dresden and Kulm. For helping to capture an entire French army there, Barclay received the Order of St. George, Russia's highest military honor. After the famous victory over the French at the Battle of Leipzig, Alexander made him a count.

Barclay then led his Russian–Prussian forces directly into France, where after a severe, four-month campaign, they finally occupied Paris, forcing Napoleon to abdicate. Czar Alexander then awarded Barclay promotion to field marshal, and he replaced General Gebhard von Blucher as commander of the Army of Silesia. After accompanying Czar Alexander to London for victory celebrations, Barclay led his exhausted but victorious Russians back to their homeland.

Napoleon's return to power in March 1815 forced Barclay back into the field again. He led 200,000 troops westward into Germany when word of Napoleon's decisive defeat at

the Battle of Waterloo was received. Following a second occupation of Paris, Czar Alexander I bestowed upon him the title of prince. Barclay was still supreme commander of Russian military forces when he died at Insterberg, Prussia, on May 26, 1818. While not a combat commander of the first rank, his modernizing reforms and sound military sense were potent factors in the ultimate victory over France in the Napoleonic Wars.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Bennigsen, Leonty Levin (1745–1826); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Dresden, Battle of (August 26–27, 1813); Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812; Paul I (1754–1801); Russo-Turkish War, (1787–1792); Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18, 1812)

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Basmachi Insurgency (1918–1933)

The Basmachi were the Muslim resistance fighters who fought against the Red Army's conquest of Central Asia from 1918 to 1931.

The term *Basmachi* is a derogatory Turkic term meaning “bandit,” and it was applied by Bolshevik propagandists to label the Muslims who resisted Bolshevik rule in Central Asia. The Basmachi were presaged by the 1916 revolt of 50,000 Central Asian Muslims against military conscription. Following the 1917 February Revolution in Russia, Muslims organized a government in the city of Kokand and called for autonomy for Central Asia. In January 1918 Bolshevik forces sacked Kokand, an act that enflamed the Muslims of Central Asia and ignited the Basmachi rebellion.

The Basmachi lacked centralized leadership and were only dominant in rural areas, conceding control of urban centers to the Bolsheviks. While the Basmachi had a number of charismatic commanders, including Madamin Bek in the Fergana Valley, they were poorly armed and incapable of organizing large-scale offensives. In 1919 Lenin dispatched Mikhail Frunze, commander of the Fourth Army, to Tashkent to assume command of Bolshevik forces in Central Asia. At this time Bolshevik military personnel in Central Asia numbered around 50,000 and included the Fourth Army, consisting of three rifle divisions, and the First Army, which was composed of three rifle divisions and a Tatar Brigade. While these forces appeared to have numerical superiority, the Red Army in Turkestan lacked sufficient arms and included prisoners of war captured during World War I.

In 1920 the Red Army overthrew the rulers of the Russian protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara, and decreed military conscription for Muslims. These two acts were unpopular and expanded the Basmachi rebellion to Bukhara. The ranks of the Basmachi were buttressed by Muslim soldiers who defected from the Red Army. In 1921 Ottoman Turk revolutionary Enver Pasha, who had been

working with the Bolsheviks in Turkestan, joined the Basmachi. Under his leadership the Basmachi held most of the territory of Bukhara, but in 1922 Enver was killed.

At this point the Red Army in Central Asia numbered more than 100,000 and Basmachi operations were relegated to pockets of resistance. Frunze favored deploying concentrated forces against the Basmachi and avoided creating vulnerable isolated outposts. In 1924 the Soviet government politically reorganized Central Asia, abolishing Bukhara and Khiva and creating the new republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. By this time the Basmachi in the Fergana Valley had been defeated and the epicenters of resistance shifted to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, where Basmachi could flee to sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Junaid Khan led the Basmachi resistance in Turkmenistan before fleeing to Iran in 1927, while Ibrahim Bek held out in Tajikistan until relocating to Afghanistan in 1926. In 1930 Ibrahim Bek again crossed into Tajikistan and fought against the Red Army until he was captured in 1931. That same year Junaid Khan briefly captured a Soviet fort on the Caspian Sea before being driven back into Iran. Though the Basmachi remained active until 1933, they were never able to stage another large-scale rebellion.

David P. Straub

See also: Frunze, Mikhail (1885–1925); Great Game, The (Russia in Central Asia); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Batov, Pavel Ivanovich (1897–1985)

Soviet army general who served on the Bryansk Front and in the Battle of Kursk, among many other engagements. Born on June 1, 1897, in the village of Filisovo in the Rybinsk region of Yaroslavl Province, Russia, Pavel Batov entered the army in 1915 during World War I and fought on the Russo-German (Northern) Front. He won two St. George crosses and was wounded in combat in 1917. On his recovery, he was assigned to the noncommissioned officer school in Petrograd, where he became a convert to Bolshevism. Batov joined the Red Army in August 1918 and fought in the Russian Civil War. Between 1926 and 1927, he attended the Vystrel Officers' School. On graduation, he took command of a battalion of the First Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. He served with this division for nearly nine years, commanding its Third Rifle Regiment in 1933. In 1936 and 1937, he served as an adviser to the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War and was wounded twice.

Promoted to brigade commander on his return to the Soviet Union in December 1937, Batov took command of the X Rifle Corps. In early 1938, he assumed command of the III Rifle Corps. At the same time, he served on a special commission to recommend the restructuring of Red Army mechanized and motorized forces. The commission's report, approved in November 1939, unwisely recommended abolishing the army's 4 tank corps and replacing them with 15 smaller motorized divisions.

Batov's III Corps of four divisions participated in the September 1939 Soviet invasion

of Poland and in the February–March 1940 phase of the Soviet invasion of Finland. His service in Finland earned him promotion to lieutenant general in June 1940, and soon thereafter, he was named deputy commander of the Transcaucasia Military District.

In June 1941, Batov was summoned to Moscow and given charge of the IX Separate Rifle Corps in the Crimea. No sooner had he taken up his post than the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. In October 1941, Batov became deputy commander of the Fifty-First Special Army. From January to February 1942, he commanded Third Army on the Bryansk Front, and from February to October 1942, he was deputy front commander. He then headed Fourth Tank Army, redesignated Sixty-Fifth Army, in the Stalingrad area. Following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943, Batov fought in the Battle of Kursk, the crossing of the Dnieper River, and the drive through Belorussia into East Pomerania and across the Oder River. During the war, Batov was popular with his men because he was one of the few senior officers who visited the front lines and conversed with the soldiers.

Promoted to colonel general in June 1944, Batov was in the Northern Group of Forces between 1944 and 1948 and was first deputy commanding general of Soviet forces in the occupation of East Germany. Promoted to general of the army in 1955, he commanded the Carpathian Military District from 1955 and 1958 and participated in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He then commanded the Baltic Military District between 1958 and 1959 and the Southern Group of Forces between 1961 and 1962. He served as chief of staff of Warsaw Pact forces between 1962 and 1965. He then served as inspector general in the Soviet Ministry of Defense until his death in Moscow on April 19, 1985.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Hungarian Revolution (1956); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Bautzen, Battle of (May 20–21, 1813)

Fought in Saxony on the eastern bank of the Spree River, near the Bohemian border, then in the Austrian Empire. A Prusso-Russian army of 96,000 men under the Russian general Peter Graf Wittgenstein faced 115,000 men under Napoleon on the first day, joined by 84,000 men under Marshal Michel Ney on the second day. The allies intended to use a prepared position to offset Napoleon's numerical superiority and fight him to a standstill. Then, by moving up reserves, the allies hoped to force Napoleon back onto the Bohemian frontier, where he would have to surrender. Napoleon still sought the decisive victory that had eluded him earlier that month at Lützen, hoping that a flanking attack by Ney would achieve victory. After two days of hard fighting, the allies fell back, beaten but intact.

Napoleon's forces on the first day included the Imperial Guard and the corps of Henri Bertrand, Auguste Marmont, Jacques Macdonald, and Nicolas Oudinot, as well as Marie-Victor Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. The allied army consisted of the corps of generals Mikhail Miloradovich, Gorchakov,

Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, and Grand Duke Constantine (Russians), and generals Friedrich von Kleist, Johann von Yorck, and Gebhard von Blücher (Prussians). The allied position was on the eastern bank of the Spree, with the town of Bautzen forming the anchor point. Earthworks had been constructed along much of the front, and a series of lakes secured their right flank.

Anticipating news of Ney's approach, Napoleon waited until noon on May 20 before ordering Oudinot to commence his attack on the heights south of Bautzen. He sent Macdonald and Marmont against Bautzen itself and ordered Bertrand to advance on the heights of Burk. The Imperial Guard remained in reserve. Yorck covered the heights of Burk. Prince Eugen of Württemberg was to his south. Colonel von Wolff's brigade occupied Bautzen. General Engelhardt's brigade was south of the town, with General St. Priest's division covering up to Doberchau. Cavalry covered the allied left.

The object of Napoleon's attack was to draw attention from Ney's planned flanking move and to tie down the allied forces to his front while Ney executed this maneuver. Oudinot's attack drew in allied reserves. Macdonald then commenced his assault on Bautzen, but he became bogged down in the face of strong resistance and only made further progress once Marmont's attack from the north of Bautzen, which started at 1:00 p.m., had cleared the way. By 4:00 p.m., once the French had crossed the Spree in force, using both fords and temporary bridges, the allies were forced to withdraw, and Eugen retired to the ridge between Auritz and Jenkwitz by 6:00 p.m.

Marshal Nicolas Soult's forces (Bertrand's and Latour-Maubourg's divisions) made little headway against Yorck, despite his superiority in numbers. At 3:00 p.m. he ordered the

divisions of General von Franquemont and General Charles Morand to advance against Gottlobsberg, Nieder-Gurig, and Briesing. Gottlobsberg was first to fall, then at 6:00 p.m., Nieder-Gurig fell. The allies did not contest Briesing, so the French were able to move as far forward as Plieskowitz that afternoon. By 7:00 p.m., the entire allied front line being in French hands, Kleist fell back.

Most allied senior commanders considered the advance of General Guillaume de Latrille, Comte de Lorencez's division from Oudinot's corps on the far left, to be Napoleon's main thrust, so Gorchakov was ordered to counterattack there and did so between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. Lorencez was forced to retire to Denkwitz. Ney engaged General Tschaplitz's vanguard at Klix, forcing the Russians to retire across the Spree.

By the end of the day, Napoleon had achieved most of his objectives. He had tied down the Allies frontally and drawn in much of their reserves. Although the Allies had made Napoleon pay a price to cross the Spree, they had not been able to launch the planned counterattack.

The next day's fighting commenced at daybreak with a Russian assault along the line from Falkenberg to Thromberg that drove back Oudinot's vanguard. At 6:00 a.m. Oudinot counterattacked, with Lorencez advancing on the village of Mehltheuer and General Michel-Marie Pacthod on the village of Daranitz, with Lieutenant General von Raglovich's Bavarians in reserve. Macdonald moved up in support. Facing superior numbers, the Russians withdrew, giving Macdonald's artillery the opportunity to deploy on the heights between Daranitz and Rabitz. By 10:00 a.m. the French artillery had gained the upper hand, and their infantry now closed in for the assault. In the next hour, the entire allied left retired.

Oudinot's determination convinced Czar Alexander that he was facing the main French assault here, so he ordered in further reinforcements, although this was against Wittgenstein's wishes. This counterattack forced the French back, making Oudinot's position critical. Napoleon ignored his requests for reinforcements, telling him to hold on until 3:00 p.m., when he was certain of victory. Oudinot did so.

Napoleon's center held its positions against determined allied support. Marmont deployed his men to the east of Bautzen and awaited events. At 9:00 a.m. he moved to the right to be able to support Soult and Ney.

Hearing the sounds of battle on the morning of May 21, Ney sought clarification of his orders from Napoleon before continuing his march. This delay likely cost Napoleon his one chance for a decisive victory in this campaign. Napoleon had failed to inform Ney fully of his intentions. At 6:00 a.m., General Nicolas-Joseph Maison's division of General Jacques Lauriston's corps crossed the Spree at Klix. Tschaplitz did his best to delay the French advance but fell back when his flanks were threatened. The Allies now became aware of the threat posed to the right and attempted to extricate themselves from the trap, fighting a withdrawal action. Ney waited for reinforcements before pressing on.

Barclay de Tolly abandoned Preititz, thereby endangering Blücher's line of retreat, but a local counterattack gained sufficient time for the Prussians to begin falling back. Ney then sent in fresh troops, regaining Preititz. Once Napoleon heard the sounds of fighting at Preititz, he knew Ney had arrived, so he sent in the Imperial Guard to take the heights west of Kreckwitz. Blücher was attacked from three sides and fell back around 3:00 p.m., as did Yorck. Covered by their cavalry, the Allies then quit the field of

battle. Napoleon lost around 25,000 men, and the allies around 11,000.

Peter Hofschröder

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Gorchakov, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich (1793–1861); Konstantin, Nikolaevich Grand Duke (1827–1892); Lutzen, Battle of (May 2, 1813); Second Coalition, War of the (1798–1802); Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

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Belorussia Offensive (June 23–August 29, 1944)


Massive Soviet offensive in Belorussia in 1944, code-named Operation BAGRATION, commencing exactly three years after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet offensive was in part timed to meet Soviet leader Josef Stalin's pledge at the Tehran Conference for an operation to prevent the transfer of German forces to the west to meet the Allied invasion of Normandy. The operation—named for Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, a well-known Russian general of the Napoleonic Wars—resulted in the most calamitous defeat of German forces in the war to date.

By the beginning of 1944, the Red Army clearly held the initiative on the Eastern



Soviet troops during a combat action to the southeast of the city of Vitebsk, Belorussia, 1944. (UIG/Getty Images)

OPERATION BAGRATION JUNE 22-AUGUST 29, 1944



Front. The campaign opened in January with offensives at Leningrad and in the Ukraine. The Leningrad offensive broke the German siege and ended with Soviet forces on the Estonian border. The Ukrainian offensive ended after nearly all of the Ukraine had been regained and after a southern salient had been created that nearly reached L'viv (Lvov), with the Red Army threatening the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia. These offensives destroyed five German armies, causing well over a million German casualties and untold equipment losses, and put pressure on Finland and Romania, Germany's allies.

Because of these Soviet successes, particularly in the Ukraine, German leader Adolf Hitler believed the Soviet summer offensive would continue from the Ukraine. The Soviets needed favorable terrain for mechanized operations, and two options seemed the most advantageous for them. First, they could push west from Ukraine and then south, removing Romania and its resources from German control. Second and most likely, they could push west and then north toward the Baltic to cut off both Army Group Center in the Belorussian "bulge" and Army Group North along the Baltic coast. A direct thrust in the north seemed possible but provided less strategic advantage, and an attack into Belorussia against Army Group Center seemed least likely because of the poor road network and the restrictive terrain in the forests and the Pripet marshes.

The Soviets considered roughly the same options and chose the Belorussian thrust primarily because the others would leave large German forces on their flanks, and because an assault straight into Belorussia would free the Soviet territory that remained occupied. In many respects, Operation BAGRATION was the reverse of

Operation BARBAROSSA, fought over many of the same battlefields.

Arrayed against German Field Marshal Ernst Busch's Army Group Center were four Soviet fronts (army group equivalents). From north to south were the First Baltic Front and the Third, Second, and First Belorussian fronts, commanded by generals Ivan Bagramyan, Ivan Cherniakhovsky, Georgy Zakharov, and Konstantin Rokossovsky, respectively. In addition, Soviet leader Josef Stalin appointed two veteran commanders as *Stavka* (Soviet High Command) special representatives, with Marshal Georgy Zhukov overseeing the First and Second Belorussian fronts and Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky coordinating the operations of the First Baltic and Third Belorussian fronts. The Soviet fronts counted 168 divisions, plus a large Belorussian partisan movement. Army Group Center numbered only 54 divisions.

German intelligence keyed on identifying main thrusts by the location of Soviet tank armies, of which there were six in 1944. The Soviet's air supremacy, however, along with their own shortage of assets denied the Germans long-range aerial reconnaissance. German military intelligence was forced to rely on signal intercepts, and Soviet deception focused on disguising heavy reinforcements moving into Belorussia and tank concentrations behind the front lines.

Operation BAGRATION began on June 22, with Soviet battalion- and company-sized infantry raids along the front probing for weaknesses, while several divisions conducted major attacks to create openings in the line. Between June 23 and 28, the Red Army broke through German lines in six places and encircled large German forces at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, taking 20,000 prisoners. On July 3 the Soviets, striking from two

directions, entered Minsk, the Belorussian capital, and captured nearly 100,000 Germans east of the city.

After five weeks, the Red Army had advanced almost 360 miles while destroying Army Group Center. The operation ended inside Poland on the Vistula River. Between June 23 and August 29, 1944, along a more than 600-mile-wide front, the Soviets defeated Army Group Center and advanced from 300 to 360 miles. In the process, the Soviets destroyed 17 German divisions and 3 brigades; 50 German divisions lost over half their strength. The German army High Command's official figure for losses was about 300,000 men, or 44 percent of those engaged, but this number may be low. Soviet losses were also high, with more than 178,000 dead and missing (8% of the total force involved) and more than 587,000 sick and wounded.

The advance into Belorussia led to advances in other sectors of the front: the Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia, where Army Group North's link to other German forces was temporarily cut. Operation BAGRATION was one of the greatest Soviet victories of the war and one from which German forces never recovered.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Bagramyan, Ivan Khristoforovich (1897–1982); Bagraion, Pyotr (1765–1812); BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Cherniakovskiy, Ivan Danilovich (1906–1945); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Rokossovskiy, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Vasilevskiy, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977); Zhukov, Georgiy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Belov, Pavel Alekseevich (1897–1962)

Soviet army general. Born at Shuya, Russia, on February 18, 1897, Pavel Belov joined the army as a private in 1916 and rose to noncommissioned officer. In 1919, he joined both the Red Army and the Bolshevik (Communist) Party. During the Russian Civil War, he commanded a cavalry squadron.

Between 1922 and 1929, Belov led a cavalry regiment. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1934 and then was deputy commander and later commander of a cavalry division. From 1935 to 1940, he was chief of staff of a cavalry corps.

In 1940, Belov took command of the II Cavalry Corps, later redesignated I Guards Cavalry Corps, which played a major role in halting the German advance on Moscow in December 1941. Promoted to lieutenant general, Belov took command of Sixty-First Army from General Markian Mikhailovich Popov in June 1942 and participated in heavy fighting with the Germans in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943) and also around Voronezh. Promoted to colonel general in July 1944, Belov fought with his army in the recovery of Ukraine (November 1943–July 1944) and the Soviet invasion of Poland (July 1944–April 1945). He then participated in the Berlin Offensive (March 31–May 2, 1945).

Following the war, Belov commanded the Southern Ural Military District from 1945 to 1955, then chaired the Voluntary Association for Support of the Army, Air Force, and

Navy. He retired in 1960 and died in Moscow on December 3, 1963.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Poland–East Prussia Campaign (July 1944–April 1945); Popov, Markian Mikhailovich (1902–1969); Ukraine Campaign (November 1943–July 1944)

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Bennigsen, Leonty Levin (1745–1826)

Russia's plodding General Levin Bennigsen was the first general to inflict a major reverse on French emperor Napoleon I. Capable rather than brilliant, he served throughout the Napoleonic Wars against France with tenacity and distinction.

Levin August Theophil Bennigsen was born at Braunschweig, Hanover, on February 10, 1745, the scion of an old German noble family. After spending his youth as a page at the royal court, he became an ensign in the foot guards at age 15 and fought in several campaigns in Westphalia and along the Rhine in 1762. The following year, he left the military to administer his estate, but the death of his wife and numerous debts forced him to join the Russian army as a major in 1773. Bennigsen fought against the Turks during 1787–1792, and

he distinguished himself at the Siege of Ochakov.

Promoted to brigadier general, Bennigsen next saw service against the Poles, and in 1796 he campaigned with success against the Persians. He was instrumental in arranging the capture of Derbent, and Russian Czar Paul I consequently promoted him to lieutenant general. He returned that favor by conspiring against Paul, whose unstable policies toward the military angered several senior leaders. With the approval of the czar's son, Alexander, Bennigsen set in motion a coup that led to the murder of Paul in 1801. Consequently, Czar Alexander I appointed him governor of Lithuania and promoted him to general of cavalry the following year.

Following Russia's declaration of war against Napoleon in 1805, Bennigsen led a column of 50,000 soldiers into Austria. He was forced to retreat after the decisive French victory at the Battle of Austerlitz and saw no action until the winter of 1806. While operating in eastern Poland on December 26, he fought French marshal Jean Lannes to a draw at the village of Pultusk and successfully disengaged at the approach of French reinforcements.

Over the next several weeks, Bennigsen skillfully evaded several attempts by Napoleon to ensnare his forces before finally being brought to battle at Eylau. On February 8, 1807, Napoleon, with 45,000 men, launched a frontal assault against the Russian center until it became blinded by an inopportune snowstorm. Bennigsen, commanding 67,000 men, directed the fire of a 70-gun battery against the oncoming troops of French marshal Pierre Augereau, causing heavy losses. The ensuing Russian counter-attack drove in the French center and nearly captured Napoleon himself. The situation

was reversed by a brilliant cavalry charge led by Marshal Joachim Murat, whose troops rode through the surprised Russians and back again, causing them to halt. Further fighting by both sides achieved little, and that night Bennigsen held a council of war to decide the next move. Although many officers pleaded with him to hold his ground, Bennigsen decided that caution was the best course, and he ordered a retreat. For a loss of 15,000 men, he had managed to inflict 25,000 casualties on the hitherto invincible *Grande Armée*.

Through the spring of 1807, the Russians fought additional battles at Guttstadt and Heilsburg, neither of which was conclusive. It was not until June 14 that Napoleon cornered Bennigsen at Friedland and gave battle. After much hard fighting, Bennigsen was clearly outmaneuvered and retired with more than 18,000 casualties to a French loss of only 8,000 men. Soon after the Battle of Friedland, Czar Alexander I called for a truce and signed the Treaty of Tilsit. Bennigsen bore a measure of responsibility for the defeat and withdrew to his estate at Zakret, near Vilnius, for several years.

In June 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia at the head of 600,000 men, and the Russian government called Bennigsen out of retirement to help stave off the threat of invasion. He became chief of staff under General Mikhail Kutuzov, but the two leaders were mutually loathsome toward each other and did not work well together. He fought well at the bloody Battle of Borodino in September and subsequently defeated Murat at Tarutino the following month. Owing to continuing disagreements with Kutuzov, however, Bennigsen again withdrew from military service. After Kutuzov's death in the spring of 1813, Czar



General Leonty Bennigsen, a German-born officer in Russian service, held field commands at many prominent battles during the Napoleonic Wars. (George Dawe (1781–1929)/Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia)

Alexander I recalled Bennigsen into service, and he assumed command of the Army of Poland. After much marching and countermarching, his men arrived at Leipzig to support General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly's decisive final attack on October 19, 1813, whereupon Alexander made him a count. Bennigsen remained in Germany during the invasion of France and besieged French marshal Louis Davout in Hamburg for several months.

After Napoleon's abdication, Bennigsen assumed command of the Second Army in Bessarabia, where he remained until 1818. The aged general then retired from active service to his estate in Hanover to compose his memoirs. Bennigsen died there on December 3, 1826, a distinguished veteran of the Napoleonic Wars.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Paul I (1754–1801); Tilsit, Treaty of

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Lavrenty Beria headed the Soviet Union's secret police and supervised the notorious Gulag prison system under Josef Stalin. (Library of Congress)

Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953)

Soviet politician, head of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD; secret police), and Stalin's most powerful executioner of political crimes.

Born March 29, 1899, to a poor family in Georgia, Lavrenty Beria joined the revolution in Russia in 1917 and soon belonged to the inner circle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He served in the *Cheka* during the 1920s, became member of the Central Committee of the Party in 1934 and deputy head of the NKVD in 1935. In November 1938, Stalin made him head of the secret police. Beria purged the organization; under his guidance, it became the most feared institution in the USSR. Beria's influence reached into every sphere of Soviet life; the NKVD not only prosecuted dissent but also had independent military capabilities.

Beria was appointed deputy prime minister of the USSR in February 1941. A member of the State Defense Committee during World War II, Beria was made marshal of the USSR in 1945; although he had never been in combat, he controlled the NKVD forces that ensured discipline in the military. He also sent legions of deportees and prisoners of war to the slave labor camps of the Gulag for war production.

As one of the Soviet representatives to the Yalta Conference in January 1945, Beria helped shape the future of Eastern Europe. In August 1945, Stalin entrusted him with the creation of a Soviet atomic program, allowing him almost unrestricted, extrajudicial powers. By employing captured German scientists and developing an extensive network of informants in the West,

Beria's organization had developed an atomic weapon by 1949.

Appointed a member of the Soviet politburo in March 1946, Beria wielded extensive power in the Soviet administration of eastern Germany. Special departments of the NKVD in Berlin-Karlshorst reconstructed the Soviet system of repression in the Soviet zone of Germany. Beria became a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee in 1952, but his tenure was short.

Beria's downfall came with Stalin's death in March 1953. Following an internal coup led by Nikita Khrushchev, Beria was arrested in July. Publically, he was charged with high treason and espionage for the British. More privately, Beria was also portrayed as sexual predator and condemned for aggression against legions of women, for sexual debauchery, and for personal excesses. He was convicted and supposedly executed on December 23, 1953, but it is likely he had already been shot after secret interrogations by the military in July 1953.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; *Cheka* (*Chrezvychaynayakomissiya*); Fuchs, Klaus Emil Julius (December 29, 1911–January 28, 1988); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); NKVD; Stalin Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II; Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945)

The battle in Berlin was the last campaign of World War II in Europe. The Soviet Red Army suffered almost 500,000 casualties over two weeks in a fight as hopeless for the Germans as it was hopeful for the Allies. The capture of the *Reichstag* and the collapse of organized resistance around Berlin led to Germany's unconditional surrender. Some writers conjoin the Soviet Oder-Niesse Offensive with the fighting in Berlin itself, delineating a "battle of Berlin" and a "battle in Berlin."

From the late summer of 1944, it was clear that Germany would lose the war, but there were no serious peace overtures from the German government. The Italians had already



A Soviet soldier raises his nation's flag over the German Parliament building in Berlin on April 30, 1945. (AP Photo)

surrendered, there were no Germans left on Russian soil, and the bombardment of German industry and transportation was slowly destroying any means of resistance. Unconditional surrender was not palatable to the German leadership, but their winter and spring offensives were all futile, underpowered gestures that only delayed the inevitable on increasingly senseless orders from Hitler. Still, as the Soviet campaigned in the east ground toward Berlin, the Germans summoned every last man, woman, and child to resist.

Soviet planning for Operation BERLIN began in January 1945. It has been billed by some scholars as a “race to the Reichstag” between the Red Army’s most successful field general and deputy supreme commander Marshal Georgy V. Zhukov, and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin’s personal favorite Marshal Ivan S. Konev. Zhukov’s First Belorussian Front (roughly equal to a British or American field army) was to approach Berlin from the north, while Konev’s slightly smaller First Ukrainian Front would attack from the south. The First Polish Front, commanded by Marshal Konstantin Rossokovsky, provided additional combat power in the northern area. Combined, the Soviets and their Polish allies deployed about 1.5 million soldiers to capture Hitler’s capital.

This was not the army of 1943, and barely that of 1944: Soviet combat methods made not veterans, but casualties. The Red Army of World War II was effective, not efficient, and as a result, most combat units were full of raw conscripts considered as expendable as ration cans. Soviet battalion commanders could count on one hand the soldiers who had first fought in 1943; most front commanders could barely count a score of survivors from 1941.

The Soviet plan to capture Berlin was relatively simple: encircle Berlin and grind through the German defenses until there was

no more resistance. Part of the early plan was to kill, loot, rape, or burn everything German in revenge for atrocities committed in Russia. This order was officially rescinded, but German civilians and institutions nonetheless suffered horribly as the Red Army marched west. With so many conscripts, discipline in ordinary infantry units was somewhere between lax and non-existent, though they continued to be formidable fighters. Soviet female soldiers, in frontline duty since 1943, showed less mercy than their male counterparts, shooting wounded soldiers and civilians indiscriminately.

The Germans started the battle with about 45,000 soldiers in a mishmash of units. Armored divisions with no tanks, infantry battalions with no trained infantrymen, and artillery units without ammunition were the norm in *Festung* (Fortress) Berlin. Bolstering this force were about 40,000 *Volkssturm* volunteers (essentially militia), some 15,000 uniformed police and firemen, a number of *Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth members, perhaps as many as 30,000), and another 2,000 Chancellery guards. Foreign fighters, clerks, naval cadets, children as young as 12, old men, women, and crippled veterans also were expected to sacrifice themselves against the Soviet juggernaut. Many grandfathers and *Hitlerjugend* donned the *Stalhelm*, shouldered old and captured rifles with little or no ammunition, and went off to fight the Russians, never to be heard from again. Unorganized civilians armed themselves with the ubiquitous *Panzerfaust* (anti-tank gun) or magnetic mines and fought for their homes and their lives.

The German plan was to oppose the Soviets wherever they were and encourage inter-Allied antagonism with an eye to bringing the West into an anti-Soviet alliance. The latter came from the *Führerbunker*; Hitler frequently ordered long-destroyed forces

to make counterattacks as well. Anything construed as “defeatist” was denied, with its author facing execution, so no plans were made for evacuation or siege.

Still, Berlin was not an easy target, although the city had been under constant air bombardment since late 1944, and by March 1945 fighter aircraft were strafing the city regularly. The residents of Berlin had been living in reinforced cellars, railway stations, and anti-aircraft (flak) towers for months. Food shortages were growing acute, but adequate explosives, equipment, and fuel were available to create traps for armor in which anti-tank guns could blaze away from bunkers under buildings.

The battle for the city began on April 16 with a massive artillery bombardment that the Germans had prepared for by withdrawing from their forward positions. By April 23, Soviet forces were in the suburbs, and most of the city was in artillery range. Numerous accounts from both sides describe the continual, horrific noise of battle from April 24 onward. Dust and smoke shrouded everything, and polluted the few water sources that existed. The fighting was not as desperate as at Stalingrad, since the Soviets were so strong and the Germans comparatively so weak, but tales of squads of boys or young women hunting down T-34s in the streets are legion. Even accounts of anti-tank gun posts commanded by mothers with children literally at the breast are not unusual.

German resistance around the city became weaker by the hour. There were few natural defensive barriers that the Soviets could not simply bypass or overwhelm, and the German collapse was marked by an exodus of refugees, both in and out of uniform, to the Allied lines along the Elbe. Berlin was cut off by land by April 25, but air traffic continued right up to the end. Though the Luftwaffe had been largely swept from the skies, it still

mounted small bombing attacks as late as April 25, although it had stopped supporting dive-bombing missions earlier. Resupply by air was abandoned after many failures and the loss of many aircraft. Ironically, Soviet air operations were complicated more by the presence of Allied aircraft, sometimes attacking the same targets. Though the Western Allies offered coordination, Soviet air operations were not centralized enough to take advantage of the offer.

Soviet ground operations were typical of the late war period (1943–1945). Soviet commanders seen as lacking in aggression were dispatched to penal battalions, and NKVD units still shot “slackers” who were not hurt enough to satisfy them or took their units too far backward. Stalin played Zhukov and Konev against each other up to April 28, when much of Konev’s forces were ordered to Prague, leaving the honor of capturing Berlin to Zhukov. By then, German-held Berlin was a strip 5 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers long.

Soviet fighting methods centered on streets. Usually, an infantry regiment bolstered by artillery, engineers, and armor was assigned to capture a main thoroughfare between two points. One battalion would clear one side of the street with a frontage of about 350 meters, and another would clear the other side, with a third battalion in reserve. German strongpoints were isolated by blowing up surrounding structures, then infantry teams cleared upper floors or underground spaces. By April 28, fighting in the subways, storm sewers, and steam tunnels reached the level of full-scale battles.

By April 30, Soviet tanks were in gun range of the *Reichstag* and the *Führerbunker*, and Red Army units were clearing the Interior Ministry only 400 meters away. German divisions commanded by majors, mustering fewer than a thousand men, clung to

basements, dynamited buildings to block streets, and scrounged for fuel to evacuate their wounded. The Soviets, running short of manpower, pressed newly liberated camp inmates into the fighting. Machine guns chattered day and night, small teams of women and children still stalked the city with *Panzerfausts*, and the occasional air sortie carried high-ranking German officers in and out (mostly out) of Berlin. The Zoo flak tower, which had withstood direct hits from 230-millimeter howitzers at point-blank range, surrendered about noon on April 30. That afternoon, Hitler killed himself.

In the early hours of May 1, an assault team of 1,000 Russian troops finally reached the Reichstag, defended by 1,000 German naval cadets and *Hitlerjugend*. The Spandau Citadel, a 300-year-old *trace Italiene* fortress, surrendered at 3:00 p.m. German and Soviet troops fought over the *Reichstag* all day until the Soviet flag was raised on the roof at about 10:30 p.m.

The unconditional surrender of *Festung Berlin* was still to come. On May 1, General Hans Krebs, the senior German officer available, discussed surrender with Soviet General Vasily Chuikov, who commanded the 8th Guards Army in Berlin. Krebs, following the directive of Joseph Goebbels, refused to surrender unconditionally; however, Goebbels killed himself that evening and Wiedling agreed to order the surrender of any remaining German defenders who would obey on the following day.

Though most uniformed units put down their arms in a few hours, fighting continued north of Berlin until May 9. The surviving *Hitlerjugend*, *Volkssturm*, roving tank hunters, and snipers active in the city center often took longer; in some places as much as a week, to lay down their arms. Some Soviet apologists used this delay to justify the mass rapes (more than a million), murders

(upward of 800,000), and other atrocities that followed the end of organized fighting. Even before these horrors, the cost of taking Berlin had been high: some 275,000 Germans dead (half of them civilians), and more than 375,000 Soviet casualties, including over 80,000 dead.

John Beatty

See also: Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich (1900–1982); Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); NKVD; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); T-34 Tank; War Crimes, Soviet, World War II; Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Berlin, Congress of (June 13–July 13, 1878)

The Congress of Berlin was a meeting of representatives of the major European powers

(Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire) held from June 13 to July 13, 1878, to discuss and settle the fate of the Balkans. The Congress of Berlin harkened back to the “Congress System” established at the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, in which the European powers would consult each other on mutual problems and to maintain the balance of power.

At the heart of the Congress of Berlin lay the “Eastern Question,” concerning the fate of the Ottoman Empire. In the latter half of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had entered a period of decline. Dubbed the “Sick Man of Europe,” its possessions—particularly in the Balkan Peninsula—became a tempting prize for the European powers. This coincided with the rise of nationalist movements inspiring the peoples of Europe to throw off the chains of dynastic or imperial oppression. Diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups that had been ruled by the Ottoman Turks for about five centuries were now demanding their independence. For various selfish and altruistic reasons, the Great Powers supported them to some degree.

The Russian government, for instance, had long been interested in expanding its influence into the Balkan Peninsula. The Ottoman Empire controlled the Straits of the Dardanelles at the entrance to the Black Sea, cutting off the Russian Empire’s access to the Mediterranean Sea. The city of Constantinople (Istanbul) also held great cultural and religious significance for Russian Orthodox Christians, having been the capital of the Byzantine Empire until it fell to the Islamic Ottomans in 1453. By the late 19th century Russia’s Pan-Slavic vision called for the liberation of Slavic Christians under Ottoman rule, with the Russian people to lead the way in establishing a new Slavic empire and reunifying the Orthodox world.

The Bulgarian uprising against the Ottoman Empire in April 1876 provided the perfect opportunity. Under the guise of protecting their fellow Slavs and Orthodox Christians, but against the advice of his ministers, Czar Alexander II called for a war against the Ottoman Empire. Alexander saw the war as an opportunity to unite the Russian people in the wake of his “Great Reforms” as well as to take advantage of the Ottoman Empire’s decrepitude. The Russo-Turkish War opened on April 24, 1877, with Russia aiming to liberate the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Great Britain, however, saw Russian expansion in the Balkans as detrimental to its own strategic interests. A Russian fleet with unfettered access to the Mediterranean could easily threaten British shipping to India, the lifeline of the British Empire. As Russian troops crossed the Danube River, therefore, the British government ordered its Mediterranean fleet to Besika Bay, where it could protect British interests and prevent, if necessary, a Russian grab for Constantinople and the Straits.

After some initial setbacks, the Russian army gained control of Plevna and Adrianople and marched toward Constantinople. On January 31, 1878, the Ottomans called for negotiations. On March 3, 1878, they signed the Treaty of San Stefano, which granted the Russians significant concessions in the Balkans. In essence, Russia would emerge as the dominant power over the Balkans, with the chastened and severely weakened Ottoman Empire under its influence.

The reaction to the treaty was hostile. Great Britain led a coalition of European powers advocating the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and a diminishment of Russia’s gains. The British threatened war should the Russians occupy Constantinople and, in a secret deal of June 4, occupied the

strategic Ottoman island of Cyprus. This enhanced its naval presence in the Mediterranean and put Great Britain squarely in the Ottoman camp. The Russians protested such interference, and it appeared that a second war was on the horizon. German chancellor and foreign minister Otto von Bismarck, fearing his alliance system might be endangered by a meaningless conflict in the Balkans, called for a European conference to resolve the dispute. Germany was tied to Russia through the Three Emperor's League, and Austria-Hungary, Germany's partner in the Dual Alliance, also had a keen interest in the Balkans as many of the ethnic groups there were represented within the Habsburg Empire. France claimed the right to protect Christians and Christian sites in the Holy Land controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The Russians feared they would be out-voted on every issue, but Bismarck promised to act as an "honest broker" in the dispute.

The Congress convened at Bismarck's chancellery in the former Radziwill Palace on June 13. The leading delegates in attendance were Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli and his Foreign Minister, the Marquess of Salisbury, representing Britain; Foreign Minister Count Gyula Andrassy for Austria-Hungary; Prime Minister William Henry Waddington for France; Count Ludovico Corti for Italy; and Alexander Gorchakov for Russia. Romania, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro were also represented. Bismarck and Gorchakov played the leading roles, with Gorchakov attempting to cement Russia's gains and Bismarck trying to placate all sides.

The Congress of Berlin restored the balance of power in the Balkans, but the settlement pleased none of the participants. Greater Bulgaria now was divided into three parts: Bulgaria proper was reduced to an autonomous principality with no access to the

Mediterranean; Eastern Rumelia would be separated as another autonomous province under a Christian prince; and Macedonia would be returned to Turkish rule. The Ottoman sultan, however, had to guarantee the civil rights of non-Muslim subjects in the latter territory. The European powers also guaranteed Bulgarian autonomy, thus blocking Russian influence while preventing any protest that the Ottomans might still dominate the region. Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania gained full independence from the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary would occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the dismay of Serbia, but was not allowed to annex the territory. Russia would occupy Bessarabia, Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Greece acquired Thessaly and Epirus.

The arrangement was met with great disappointment in Russia. The Slavophiles were dissatisfied with Russia's failure to take Constantinople, and they resented British intervention. Most Russians also believed the Germans had betrayed them, giving away the fruits of a long-sought Russian victory over the Turks. Serbia likewise resented Habsburg control over Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Italians and Greeks were disappointed by the Great Powers' support for the Ottomans, which left them with unrequited territorial aspirations in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. The British and French, who had supported the status quo antebellum, were perhaps the least disappointed. Even they, however, recognized that the Congress of Berlin had merely forestalled a conflict between the European powers.

Bismarck, despite a credible performance as the "honest broker," found it hard to maintain good relations with Russia and was driven into a tighter embrace with Austria-Hungary and, eventually, Italy. Russia began to seek allies elsewhere and would end up

joining forces with France. As the Ottoman Empire continued to decline, the shifting boundaries of the Balkans added to the already volatile ethnic tensions in the region. The new rivalries and disappointments created by the Congress of Berlin led to two further Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, and the simmering disputes finally boiled over into a global conflict in 1914.

Dino E. Buenviaje

See also: Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Battle of (January 15–17, 1878); Plevna, Siege of (July 20–December 10, 1877); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); San Stefano, Treaty of (1878); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949)


The first serious crisis of the Cold War, precipitated by the Soviet Union's attempt to cut off access to West Berlin, which lay within Soviet-occupied East Germany. As part of the Potsdam Agreements, Germany and Berlin were divided into occupation zones by the victorious World War II Allies (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain), reaffirming the principles laid out earlier at the Yalta Conference. Although the agreement allocated occupation

sectors of Berlin to the other three Allies, no formal arrangements had been made for access to Berlin via the Soviet zone.

After the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West deteriorated steadily, as demonstrated by disputes in the United Nations, Soviet hostility toward the Marshall Plan, and a growing Western commitment to consolidate occupation zones in West Germany into a single, independent state. The Soviets, who had been invaded by Germany twice in the first half of the 20th century, were alarmed at the prospect of a reunited, independent Germany.

In late 1947, discussions on the fate of Germany broke down over Soviet charges that its allies were violating the Potsdam Agreements. After the decision of the Western powers to introduce a new currency in their zones, on March 20, 1948, the Soviets withdrew from the Four-Power Allied Control Council, which controlled Berlin. Ten days later, guards on the eastern zone border began slowing the entry of Western troop trains bound for Berlin. On June 7, the Western powers announced their intention to proceed with the creation of a West German state. On June 15, the Soviets declared the *Autobahn* entering Berlin from West Germany closed for repairs. Three days later all road traffic from the West was halted, and on June 21 barge traffic was prohibited from entering the city. On June 24, the Soviets stopped all surface traffic between West Germany and Berlin, arguing that if Germany were to be partitioned, Berlin could no longer be the German capital.

Located 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, West Berlin was a Western outpost deep within the communist bloc, a hotbed of intelligence operations by both sides, and the best available escape route for those fleeing communism and Soviet control. U.S.



president Harry Truman was convinced that abandoning Berlin would jeopardize control of all of Germany. He further believed that the Soviets were determined to push the Western powers out of Berlin, thereby discrediting America. Stalin probably also intended to demonstrate to the Germans his control of Berlin, and his ability to provision the city where the West could not.

A military response to the blockade was considered but rejected, as the Western powers lacked the manpower to counter the massive Red Army's numerical and strategic advantage. Thus the United States, working with its European allies, undertook to supply West Berlin via air corridors left open to them in a postwar agreement. The Berlin Airlift began on June 24, 1948, and continued uninterrupted for the next 324 days. Western fliers, under the leadership of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, made a total of 272,000 flights into West Berlin, delivering thousands of tons of supplies every day.

The airlift was at first meant to be a short-term measure, as Allied officials did not believe it could support the whole of Berlin for any length of time. The situation in the summer and fall of 1948 became tense as Soviet planes buzzed U.S. transport planes in the air corridors over East Germany, but the Allies only increased their efforts to resupply the German city once it became apparent no resolution was in sight. The Soviets never attempted to shoot down any Western aircraft.

Hundreds of aircraft flew in a wide variety of cargo items, including more than 1.5 million tons of coal. By the fall, the airlift, called by the Americans "Operation VITLES," was transporting an average of 5,000 tons of supplies a day. At the height of the operation on April 16, 1949, an aircraft landed in Berlin every minute around the clock.

The airlift was an international effort; airplanes were supplied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but there were also flight crews from

Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. The three main Berlin airfields involved in the effort were Tempelhof in the American sector, Gatow in the British zone, and Tegel in the French sector. The British even landed seaplanes on the Havel River.

The airlift gained widespread admiration, and on May 12, 1949, the Soviets, concluding the blockade had failed, reopened the borders in return for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, hoping to influence the Western Allies' plans for Germany. The airlift did not end until September 30, however, as the allies sought to build up sufficient reserve supplies in West Berlin in case the Soviets blockaded it again. In all, the United States, Britain, and France flew 278,118 flights transporting more than 2.3 million short tons of cargo. Thirty-one Americans and thirty-nine British citizens, most of them military personnel, died in the airlift. No Soviet casualties were recorded.

In the end, the blockade was completely ineffective, and it backfired on the Soviets in some ways. The blockade provoked genuine fears of the Soviets in both Germany and the West. Instead of preventing an independent West Germany, it actually accelerated Allied plans to set up the state and thus precipitated the creation of East Germany. Germans, moreover, now were convinced that the Western Allies were committed to preventing Soviet expansion. The blockade also hastened the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an American–West European military alliance.

James H. Willbanks

See also: Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Berlin Rising (June 16–17, 1953)

The government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), like all the other states of the Soviet Bloc, altered its policy drastically in the wake of the death of Josef Stalin in March 1953. The new leadership of the Soviet Union, the so-called troika of Lavrenty Beria, Nikita Khrushchev, and Georgy Malenkov, urged the East German regime to make economic concessions. Walter Ulbricht, the leader of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), initially refused. Under his direction, the SED was in fact preparing to raise taxes, raise prices, and raise the "work norms" (the amount of production expected per hour or day), effectively lowering wages. Only after being summoned to Moscow for a conference at the beginning of June 1953 did Ulbricht and the SED toe the line.

The "New Course," announced on June 9, 1953, shifted the emphasis in both production and investment from heavy industry to consumer goods, and mandated lower prices for those goods. It also admitted that previous SED policies were erroneous, which opened the door to criticism. Citizens of the GDR quickly demanded additional concessions, ranging from the revision of the Oder-Neisse border to holding new elections. What actually triggered the Berlin Rising, however, was the government's refusal to rescind the recent increase in work norms.

In protest, construction workers in East Berlin laid down their tools on the morning of June 16, 1953, and marched to the

government building to demand better working conditions. Workers from other areas of Berlin, both east and west, soon joined them. Hurried official announcements that the production norms had been reduced, however, were ignored. The demonstrations grew and continued through the evening.

Thousands of workers across the GDR, informed of the developments in Berlin by Radio in the American Sector, joined in demonstrating against the SED regime the following day. More than 300,000 citizens of the GDR participated in strikes and marches in some 350 cities and towns, including traditional communist strongholds like Halle, Leipzig, and Magdeburg. In Berlin, demonstrators shouted down the few SED officials brave enough to speak to the crowds. The mob stormed the government building, but Soviet military vehicles and tanks quickly arrived. Within an hour, they had put down the demonstration, though not without bloodshed.

What had begun as an economic protest thus quickly took on political overtones. Among other things, protestors called for the release of all political prisoners, a general strike against the SED regime, the resignation of Walter Ulbricht, new elections, and German unification. Some turned to vandalism and violence, with government and SED offices serving as primary targets.

Units of the GDR “People’s Police” (*Volks-polizei*) that intervened often were chased off; in some instances, the police actually joined the demonstrators. Only the arrival of Soviet tanks and troops reversed the tide of revolution in many areas. Some 16 Soviet divisions (about 200,000 soldiers) mobilized throughout East Germany to suppress the demonstrations. In Berlin, Soviet and government troops opened fire against demonstrators on the Unter den Linden, the central axis of the city on which the Brandenburg

Gate sits. By most accounts, however, the forces of the Red Army acted with restraint and discipline. Reports that some 15 to 20 Soviet soldiers were executed for failing to fire on demonstrators have never been confirmed. Nevertheless, at least 55 people lost their lives during the Berlin Rising and more than 400 more were wounded. Though there were a few wildcat strikes across the GDR the following day, the Soviet action effectively restored order in eastern Germany on June 18.

Ulbricht and the other leaders of the GDR spent most of June 17 under Soviet protection, having been ordered to the headquarters of the Soviet Military Command in Karlshorst (an eastern suburb of Berlin) early that morning by the Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Semenov. While defending the SED’s actions ran contrary to Moscow’s policies and placed the Soviet leadership in a difficult position internationally, the troika evidently felt they had no choice. The alternative appeared to be a Germany united under Western aegis, which they could not accept. The rising thus ironically strengthened Ulbricht’s hand to some degree, and he used that leverage to cajole the Soviets into sanctioning a continuation of martial law for some days afterward.

The SED regime denounced the events as the work of “fascist provocateurs” in the service of the Western Allies who aimed to bring about the destruction of socialism in Germany. More than 6,000 people were arrested in connection with the Berlin Rising, and over 1,300 eventually received prison sentences. Internal investigations, however, never supported the SED’s claim. Many SED members participated in the demonstrations, and several party leaders acknowledged that the protests had been justified, by and large.

They could not, of course, admit these facts publicly at the time. The Berlin Rising

thus became a Cold War icon for both sides. The SED regime now had proof that the Federal Republic sought to overthrow socialism and restore fascism in Germany. Ulbricht even raised the specter of June 17 in his campaign to build the Berlin Wall, which also ran against Soviet wishes. After the collapse of the GDR, the name became the subject of a highly politicized debate, as did the Berlin Rising itself, about the nature of the Cold War and the reasons for the division of Germany that they symbolized.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Bestuzhev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1797–1837)

Writer and Decembrist.

Born to a noble family in St. Petersburg on November 3, 1797, Aleksandr Bestuzhev was trained for a career in the military from a young age. He entered the Guards as a dragoon, and rose to officer rank in 1818. He joined the Decembrist Rising in 1825 along with three of his brothers and many of his friends; when the plot failed, he was arrested and tried. Bestuzhev admitted his involvement at the trial, and was sentenced to exile in Yakutia. In 1829, he requested and received permission to serve as a private in

the army fighting in the Caucasus, joining a Chasseur regiment. He was restored to officer rank in 1836 as a result of bravery in action, but killed during the storming of the Adler fortress the following year. His literary works, written under the pseudonym “Marlinsky”, were popular during the 1830s as part of the Russian Romantic movement.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825)

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Bestuzhev-Riumin, Count Aleksei Petrovich (1693–1766)

Russian diplomat.

Aleksei Petrovich Bestuzhev-Riumin was born to a noble family in Moscow on June 1, 1693. His father served in the Russian diplomatic service, and Bestuzhev-Riumin was educated abroad. In 1712, Czar Peter I appointed him as an attaché to Prince Boris Kurakin for the Congress of Utrecht. Bestuzhev-Riumin subsequently served as a diplomat in the Hanoverian court and, when the ruler of Hanover became king of England in 1714, Bestuzhev-Riumin moved with him. He returned to Russia in 1719, and two years later was appointed minister to Copenhagen, where he worked to protect Peter’s gains in the Great Northern War.

Bestuzhev-Riumin remained in Copenhagen until 1741, when Czarina Elizabeth appointed him vice chancellor. In this post,

Bestuzhev-Riumin directed Russian foreign policy for the next 20 years. He constructed a fragile alliance with Great Britain near the end of 1742, which, in part, allowed Russia a free hand in its war with Sweden. Elizabeth undermined his attempts to secure Finland in the peace, however, and also forced him into signing a defensive alliance with Prussia the following year. Court intrigues convinced Elizabeth to support Bestuzhev-Riumin though, and she appointed him grand chancellor in July 1744.

Bestuzhev-Riumin quickly reversed Russian policy and constructed a successful anti-Prussian coalition that included Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, and the Ottoman Empire. He proved inflexible, however, during the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756 and soon fell from favor. Russia joined the Seven Years’ War on the side of Austria, France, and Poland against Bestuzhev-Riumin’s wishes and, although Russia met with some success, he was deposed as chancellor by 1759. After several years in internal exile, Bestuzhev-Riumin returned to St. Petersburg in 1762 and was promoted to field marshal by Czarina Catherine II. The post was only symbolic, however; Bestuzhev-Riumin died in St. Petersburg on April 21, 1768.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Elizabeth I, Czarina (1709–1761); Northern System; Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Seven Years’ War (1754–1763)

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Birilev, Aleksei Alekseevich (1844–1915)

Russian admiral.

Born into a poor noble family in Tver on March 16, 1844, Aleksei Birilev joined the Russian navy in 1859 and graduated from the Sea Cadet Corps three years later. He was commissioned as a lieutenant in 1862, and by 1880 rose to command a frigate. He subsequently commanded a wide range of ships before being promoted to rear admiral in 1894. After serving as head of the naval ordinance department during 1894–1900, Birilev commanded the Russian Mediterranean Squadron and was promoted to vice admiral in 1901. In February 1904, just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he was appointed commander of the Baltic Fleet. In May 1905, Birilev was appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok. While he was en route, however, the Russian Second Pacific Squadron was routed in the Battle of Tsushima. Birilev asked to be relieved of command, and returned to St. Petersburg.

Birilev was appointed minister of the navy that same year, and undertook a minor rebuilding program. At the conclusion of the Russian Revolution of 1905, Birilev joined the new State Council; he also served on the Admiralty Council and the Council for National Defense. He was promoted to admiral in 1907, and died in St. Petersburg on February 6, 1915.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Rozhdestvensky (Rozhdestvensky), Zinovy Petrovich (1848–1909); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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Black Hundreds

Following the Russian Revolution of 1905, the major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg were thrown into a general state of social unrest. There were worker's strikes and student rebellions. Soldiers mutinied, and even beyond the reaches of most metropolitan centers, there were peasant revolts. This breakdown in authority created an atmosphere in which myriad political groups vied for power and influence. Many were left-wing radicals like the Socialist Revolutionary Party but there were also ultraconservative, ultra-right-wing organizations whose sole purpose was to defend the current regime. The most influential of these groups were the Black Hundreds or Black Hundred.

Numerous Black Hundreds organizations formed all over the Russian Empire. They were composed of individuals from varied segments of Russian society. These included members of the aristocracy, civil servants, landowners, clergy, merchants, artisans, and industrial workers. Despite the differences concerning their "rightful status" in society the varied factions of the Black Hundreds were bound by unifying doctrines.

The most important was their devotion to Czar Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russians. Their allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church and their undying love of "Mother Russia" was the bond that made the Black Hundreds a powerful force in the Russian Empire during the first decade of the 20th century. Their motto, like that of Czar Nicholas I, was "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and National Character."

At their peak, the Black Hundreds numbered several hundred thousand. Although there were several hundred factions spread throughout Russia, the two most prominent were the Union of the Russian People (URP) and the Russian Monarchist Party. Of the two, the URP was the most successful in building a mass movement. The URP was founded in November 1905, under the leadership of Aleksandr Dubrovin, Vladimir Purishkevich, and Nikolai Markov II. Dubrovin, the real catalyst behind the movement, was a successful physician. Purishkevich was a politician, and Markov an engineer.

Several factors contributed to the URP's success. Because of its ideology of Russian Nationalism, its allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church, its unyielding devotion to Czar Nicholas, and its determination to purge Russia of revolutionaries and other "rabble" that sought to overthrow the status quo, the URP won sympathy and support from many segments of Russian society. The clergy generally supported their cause. So did local and state authorities. Even Czar Nicholas was not unaware of the efforts the URP made on his behalf.

It should not be overlooked that the URP was quite industrious. At one point they had over 3,000 headquarters. URP's newspaper, *Russkoye Znamya* (*The Russian Banner*), was successful in propagating URP's ideology and winning converts. Furthermore, members of the URP were not reluctant to use violence to further their cause. Many local branches formed paramilitary forces that perpetrated violent acts like pogroms against people they considered undesirables. Besides Russian Jews, liberals, and even capitalists were targets.

By the time of the February Revolution in 1917, the Union of the Russian People and the Black Hundreds had faded from the political scene. Their demise was due mostly

to internal conflicts. Purishkevich and Dubrovin clashed over ideological conflicts. Following that conflict, Markov became leader of the URP, and Dubrovin founded a splinter group.

Purishkevich gained national notoriety when he helped kill Grigory Rasputin, the royal family's spiritual advisor, in early 1916. After continued infighting, Markov immigrated to Germany. Dubrovin, the most prominent leader of the Black Hundreds, died of typhus in 1920.

John G. Hall

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916); Revolution of 1905

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Black Reichswehr

German military units trained inside Soviet Russia. The term *Black Reichswehr* describes German efforts to evade the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. For a time, a major thrust of the German army (*Reichswehr*) was keeping more men under arms than the 100,000 allowed by treaty in order to secure Germany's borders and suppress insurgent movements, which the Allies tolerated briefly. Another element in the campaign to escape treaty restrictions was the development of

forbidden weapons and the conduct of maneuvers outside Germany, primarily in the Soviet Union, from the early 1920s through the early 1930s.

Both the Soviets and the Germans felt isolated diplomatically and threatened by enemies, especially Poland, which had been reestablished by carving off portions of the former German and Russian empires. After the Poles defeated the Red Army in 1920, Soviet authorities asked Germany for military assistance, although thoughts about collaboration had been circulating earlier. Soviet–German military cooperation was part of a larger Soviet effort to learn from capitalist countries. The military drive was realized through the construction of training bases in the Soviet Union, sharing of information about military doctrine and technology, mutual observation of maneuvers, and various types of training activities. There were several major German–Soviet undertakings. One was an aircraft factory at Fili, in the vicinity of Moscow. More successful activities were air training, tank schools, and a chemical weapons factory.

The *Reichswehr* enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy during the Weimar Republic (1918–1933), which facilitated secret rearmament. Even public criticism of the process by noncommunist leftists in Germany did not stop it. On the Soviet side, the secret police warned repeatedly of the possible dangers of working with the *Reichswehr*, but the Red Army persisted. The Germans were sometimes suspected of holding back information about their military innovations, however. Military cooperation was largely confined to the two armies. The Soviet and German navies worked together to a degree, but they lacked the concern about Poland that bonded the soldiers.

The numbers of people involved were relatively small, but their experiences had

wide repercussions. Many leading German generals of World War II had worked in the Soviet Union under this program. Most of the major Soviet commanders associated with the military assistance were executed during Stalin's purges of the late 1930s, often after admitting, at least ostensibly, to charges that they were betraying their country to the Germans.

Military cooperation ended soon after Hitler became the German chancellor. The Soviets did not regard Hitler's appointment as necessarily barring its continuation, however, and continued to put out feelers to Germany, although perhaps with less conviction. The severance of military exchanges between the two countries was short-lived, in any event. The years 1939 to 1941, when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was in effect, were marked by intensive military and naval collaboration. Paradoxically, Germany and the Soviet Union helped each other prepare for the titanic struggle waged from 1941 to 1945.

Benjamin R. Beede

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Black Sea, Area of Operations, World War II

The Black Sea is an oval-shaped inland sea stretching 600 miles west to east and ranging from 300 to 140 miles north to south. In 1941, the Soviet Union occupied a coastline along the northern shore of more than 2,200 miles (including the Sea of Azov), with the neutral state of Turkey to the south and the German allies Bulgaria and Romania to the west. The only maritime route into the Black Sea runs through the Turkish-controlled Bosphorus Straits. The inability of the Soviets to construct major warships during the conflict, and that of the Axis powers to send ships through the Bosphorus, forced both sides to fight with the large warships with which they had started the conflict. Another prominent geographic factor affecting naval operations was the Crimean Peninsula, which juts into the middle of the Black Sea. Possession of the Crimea and its great port Sevastopol ensured domination of the entire body of water.

In 1941 the Soviet Black Sea Fleet included 1 battleship, 3 heavy and 2 light cruisers, 17 destroyers, 2 guard ships, 44 submarines, and 120 other warships from gunboats to motor torpedo boats (MTBs). Sevastopol and Novorossiysk were the fleet's major bases. The fleet's mission was to control the Black Sea, to prevent enemy naval forces from entering the region, to destroy the Romanian navy, and to support the Red Army. Romania had bases at Sulina and Constanta, and its navy consisted of 4 destroyers, 3 small torpedo boats, 1 submarine, 11 smaller warships, and a flotilla of river monitors. Germany had no naval forces in the Black Sea, and Bulgaria prudently declined to fight the Soviet Union. Berlin believed that the capture of the coastline would eliminate the need for naval forces.

The first major operation of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was an ineffective bombardment of Constanta, Romania, by two destroyers. One was mined and sunk and the other damaged. Two Romanian destroyers contested the attack in what was the only encounter between major warships in the Black Sea during the entire war.

Romania was a major supplier of oil to the Axis Powers, and, while most of Germany's allotment went up the Danube River, Italy's share was shipped through the Bosphorus. Soviet submarines attacked this vital traffic, but, beginning in October 1941, the Romanians fenced off the coastal route with a mine barrage. Thereafter, the Romanian navy focused on the protection of the sea lanes in the western Black Sea. Through December 1941, Soviet submarines (or submarine-laid mines) accounted for only 10 ships totaling 19,000 tons.

The rapid German advance into the Ukraine during the summer of 1941 cut off large Soviet forces in the major port of Odessa. The Black Sea Fleet effectively supported Odessa until the Soviet High Command decided to evacuate. This highly successful operation, conducted from October 1 to 16, extracted 86,000 soldiers and 15,000 civilians, along with most of their weapons and supplies, without the Axis even being aware of the operation, and just in time to meet Axis forces advancing into the Crimea.

German and Romanian forces besieged Sevastopol beginning on October 30, and for the balance of the year the Black Sea Fleet supported the fortress. The most important operation was the December 26–28 landing of 42,000 men on the Crimea's eastern finger, the Kerch Peninsula, and around Feodosia in the largest and most complex Soviet amphibious operation of the war. This

operation disrupted a German offensive to capture Sevastopol and guaranteed that the fortress would hold out another six months.

Sevastopol's resistance convinced the German command that they needed a navy and led to the shipment of MTBs, barges, and small submarines overland and down the Danube into the Black Sea. The captured shipyards at Nikolaiev began fabricating barges as well. Italy contributed a flotilla of MTBs and miniature submarines.

During 1942, the Black Sea Fleet continued to support Sevastopol until its capture in July, bringing in supplies and reinforcements and conducting almost nightly shore bombardments. The months of May to July cost the fleet six destroyers and one light cruiser to mines and aircraft. Italian MTBs torpedoed the cruiser *Molotov* after a bombardment of Feodosia on August 3, 1942.

The Germans crossed the Kerch Strait at the end of August using a flotilla of barges and small craft and captured Novorossiysk on September 6. This forced the fleet to retreat to the minor ports of Poti and Batumi near the Turkish border. In 1942, Soviet submarines accounted for as many as 17 Axis and neutral ships of 12,660 gross register tonnage. The surface fleet remained active.

On December 1, a cruiser and destroyer bombarded Fidonisi, Romania, at the cost of mine damage to the cruiser. In a subsequent raid by a destroyer and four large minesweepers, the Soviets struck a convoy escorted by a Romanian torpedo boat and four German R-boats (125-ton motor minesweepers). In a two-hour action, the Soviets demonstrated heart but a lack of training and doctrine, failing to harm their vulnerable targets.

In 1943, the Soviet winter offensive forced a precipitous Axis retreat. Sea power, however, allowed the Germans to defend the

Kuban bridgehead on the Taman Peninsula. This required up to 2,500 tons of supply per day, nearly all delivered by barges. The Black Sea Fleet retained 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 29 submarines, and more than a hundred smaller warships, while the Germans had accumulated a mosquito fleet of 6 small submarines, 16 MTBs, 23 R-boats, 26 subchasers, and more than a hundred barges. The Romanian navy continued to escort shipping along the sea's western shores. During the year, Soviet submarines sank 20 ships of 34,000 gross register tonnage.

After the Soviet summer 1943 offensives threatened German land access to the Crimea, the Germans abandoned the Kuban bridgehead. Between September 15 and October 10, the *Kriegsmarine* pulled out a quarter million men with their supplies and equipment. The Soviet navy failed to effectively contest this evacuation. In a costly defeat, German aircraft sank three Soviet destroyers after they had engaged in a melee with German MTBs. Following this episode, Moscow ordered that large surface warships could only operate with its authorization, a restriction that kept the warships in port for the remainder of the war.

Soviet armies cut off the Crimea by November 1943, but the German High Command decided to retain the peninsula as a fortress to control the Black Sea and protect the Romanian oil fields. The Soviets tried to hustle the Germans out of the Crimea by landing at the tip of the Kerch Peninsula and at Eltigen, south of Kerch, on November 1, 1943. The Germans contained these landings and blockaded the more isolated beachhead at Eltigen with R-boats, MTBs, and barges. After an intense battle for maritime access, the Germans eradicated the Soviet position by December 11, 1943. Both sides had suffered greatly, and a lull in operations ensued

as the Germans concentrated on supplying and reinforcing their 200,000-man Crimean garrison.

The Soviets, with a limited ability to repair their hard-used forces, regrouped; however, their westward advance ensured that the German tenure in the Crimea would be limited no matter what the naval situation was. Nikolayev fell on March 28, 1944, and Odessa was isolated shortly thereafter, necessitating the evacuation of this port by sea, an activity completed by April 9 and one which the Soviets permitted without interference.

Soviet forces then broke into the Crimea, and on May 9, German leader Adolf Hitler finally authorized a retreat from Sevastopol. Soviet submarines, MTBs, and aircraft contested this evacuation. The Black Sea Fleet continued to hold back its major warships, although their deployment could have turned a rushed and costly evacuation into a debacle. The Germans and Romanians brought off 130,000 men by sea (more than 30,000 in the last three days), but they lost 7 transports, 11 small warships and auxiliaries, and 11 barges, mainly to air attacks. More than 8,000 Axis troops drowned. This was the last major naval operation in the Black Sea. The campaign ended with the surrender of Romania on August 23, 1944.

Vincent P. O'Hara

See also: Navy, Soviet (1917–1991); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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
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Black Sea, Naval Operations, World War I

The Black Sea is about 610 miles long and 350 miles wide at its greatest extent. It is bordered by modern-day Ukraine to the north, Russia and Georgia to the east, Turkey to the south, and Bulgaria and Romania to the west. The sea is quite deep, with half of it more than 1,000 fathoms (6,000 feet). The sea is largely ice-free in winter. Three major rivers—the Danube, Dnieper, and Bug—empty into the Black Sea, and a surface current flows toward the Bosphorus Straits. In peacetime, the amount of trade through the straits was almost equal to that of the Suez Canal. During World War I if the Bosphorus and Dardanelles could be kept open for Allied use, Russia could export grain and import arms vital to its war efforts on the Eastern and Caucasus fronts.

As a consequence, both the Central and Entente powers sought to enlist the neutral Ottoman Empire into the war on their side. Germany was particularly anxious to secure this end, which would enable it to close off the straits, threaten the Suez Canal, and move against Allied possessions in the Middle East and North Africa. Before the war, Germany had supplied military advisers to the Ottoman Empire, while Britain had furnished naval assistance. On August 2, 1914, two days before the British declaration of war against Germany, the British government had taken possession of the dreadnought *Sultan Osman I* (which became HMS *Agincourt*), and on August 22 it seized the dreadnought *Reshadije* (later the HMS *Erin*). Both dreadnoughts were nearing completion in British yards for the Ottoman navy. The two ships had in part been paid for by popular subscription, and the failure to deliver them



angered many Turks. Thus, the arrival off Constantinople on August 10, 1914, of German Vice Admiral Wilhelm Souchon's battle cruiser *Goeben* and light cruiser *Breslau* had a dramatic impact on Ottoman policy.

Because the Ottoman Empire was still at peace and as a means to win it over to the German side, Germany transferred its two ships to Ottoman navy. Although the ships received Turkish names, the German seamen wore fezzes for the transfer, and a small number of Turkish sailors came aboard the ships, this was a sham because Souchon and the German crews still ran the ships. The official transfer occurred on August 16. The *Goeben* became the *Sultan Yavuz Selim*, and the *Breslau* became the *Midilli*. On September 24, Souchon was made a vice admiral and commander of the Ottoman navy, a position he held for much of the war.

Souchon, with his lone battle cruiser, hoped to win control of the Black Sea. Pro-German minister of war Enver Pasha authorized him to engage Russian ships there, and Souchon on his own authority expanded this operation into attacking Russian ships in port. Both men in effect sought an international incident that would bring war with Russia.

On October 27, 1914, Souchon took the Ottoman fleet into the Black Sea. His announced "training mission" on October 29 turned into minelaying operations and shelling shore installations along the Russian coast. Souchon falsely claimed that the Russians had initiated hostilities. The Russians suffered six merchant vessels, a minelayer, and a gunboat sunk, and three small warships and more than a dozen merchant ships damaged, in addition to some destruction ashore. The *Sultan Yavuz Selim* sustained three minor shell hits from a Sevastopol shore battery. As a result, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on November 2.

Although Souchon conducted other forays into the Black Sea in which Ottoman warships bombarded Russian coastal defenses, these occurred less frequently as the war continued and as the Russian naval strength increased.

Russian naval officers had learned from their country's bitter defeat at the hands of Japan a decade earlier. The army exercised command over the Russian battle fleet of pre-dreadnoughts on the Black Sea, with the aggressive Vice Admiral Andrei Eberhardt having nominal command. He planned a holding action until four new Russian dreadnoughts under construction would join the fleet in 1915. Eberhardt also employed sea-plane carriers early in the war, later using them effectively in combination with battleships and lighter warships to attack the Turkish coasts.

The Russian dreadnoughts, the *Imperatritsa Maria* (commissioned in June 1915), the *Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya* (October 1915), the *Volya* (June 1917), and the *Imperator Nikolai II* (never completed) would be equipped with the advanced Pollen system of long-range fire control utilizing a rudimentary computer. This enabled them to provide aimed fire from their 12-inch guns at ranges of more than 21,000 yards, thus outranging the *Sultan Yavuz Selim*.

As the war unfolded, both the Germans and Russians deployed submarines in the Black Sea. Submarine activity was sharply limited, although both sides sank coastal steamers belonging to the other. The presence of the submarines also caused both sides to be more conservative in the deployment of their capital ships. Later in the war the Russians employed their more numerous submarines to dominate the Black Sea. Russian ships were also active in minelaying, at first to protect the Russian Black Sea coast; later, Russian ships laid offensive fields off the Bosphorus.

Eberhardt did not entirely remain on the defensive, however. During November 4–7, 1914, he mounted a raid on the Turkish coast near the coal center of Zonguldak, an area known as the “Coal Coast,” which claimed several Ottoman merchant ships. The Ottoman’s ability to ship coal and other supplies, especially grain, along its coast diminished as the war went on. Thanks to repeated Russian raids, by late 1915 most Ottoman colliers had been sunk. The Russians also sank several small Ottoman warships and dozens of small sailing vessels, which had become the primary means of transporting coal. As Russia’s naval strength increased, its ships also bombarded the forts at the mouth of the Bosphorus and then Varna, after Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915.

In the Battle of Cape Sarych on November 17, 1914, off the Crimean Peninsula, the Russian battle fleet of five pre-dreadnoughts encountered the *Sultan Yavuz Selim* and *Middilli*. In a 14-minute action, the Russian flagship *Evstafi* was hit five times and the *Sultan Yavuz Selim* once. The Ottoman ships then retired.

Russian light warships centered on large 1,000-ton destroyers carried out raids against the Turkish coast. One sortie on December 22, 1914 resulted in the laying of 600 mines near the Bosphorus. The *Sultan Yavuz Selim* hit two of these mines, requiring it to dock for repairs. Then on May 10, 1915, in a brief skirmish with two Russian battleships, the *Sultan Yavuz Selim* was damaged by two hits.

The only dreadnought action in the Black Sea during the war occurred on January 8, 1916. The *Sultan Yavuz Selim* was pursuing two Russian destroyers near Zonguldak when it came within range of the guns of the Russian dreadnought *Imperatritsa Ekaterina*. The action lasted 30 minutes before

the *Sultan Yavuz Selim* retired, unable to bring its guns into range.

In July 1916 Vice Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak replaced Admiral Eberhardt as commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Kolchak carried out offensive mining of the Bosphorus on a larger scale than heretofore. By this point in the war, the Russians had also developed a substantial amphibious capability, which involved shore bombardment and the movement and landing of troops on the Caucasian Front and later the conveying of troopships to Romania after it entered the war on the Allied side in November 1916. Although the Russians developed the capability to carry out a landing operation at the Bosphorus, a conservative army defensive strategy in part predicated on lack of resources precluded any such attempt.

On May 13, 1918, following the Treaty of Brest Litovsk between Germany and Russia, German troops entered Sevastopol by land to disarm the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The two operative Russian dreadnoughts, along with smaller warships, fled east to Novorossiysk with all-volunteer crews under the command of Vice Admiral N.P. Sablin. Later, some of the crews of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet declared their loyalty to Ukraine, flew its flag on their ships, and voted to return to Sevastopol and German control. While the ships were steaming to that port, a destroyer under Bolshevik control attacked the fleet and torpedoed the dreadnought *Imperatritsa Ekaterina*, sinking it. The remnants of this squadron became the nucleus of the White fleet opposing the Bolsheviks (Reds) in the unfolding Russian Civil War.

In the final months of World War I, the few remaining ships of the Ottoman navy convoyed troops to Russian Black Sea ports. In April 1918 the Austro-Hungarian government had dispatched Captain Olaf Wulff and

his Danube Squadron of four monitors and two patrol craft to the Black Sea coast, and by that summer, more than 600 Austro-Hungarian navy sailors under Rear Admiral Egon Klein were on duty in the Black Sea. Allied concerns that the Central Powers might seize the Russian Black Sea Fleet and use it to upset the naval balance in the Mediterranean never materialized. Both Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire tried to obtain some of the Russian vessels for their own navies but with little result. The Turks did recover a captured protected cruiser and also secured from the Germans a Russian destroyer and some tugs. Meanwhile, on January 20, 1918, the ex-*Breslau* was lost to a mine in the Dardanelles during a sortie against Allied ships. The ex-*Goeben* was itself badly damaged by mines in the same operation and was not fully repaired until after the war, when it continued in Turkish service.

Jack Greene

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Cape Sarych, Battle of (November 17, 1914); Eberhardt, Andrei Augustovich (1856–1919); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1917); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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
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Bloody Sunday

On January 22, 1905, Russian troops fired on a peaceful procession of demonstrators led by Father Georgy Gapon outside the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. This dramatic event kicked off the Russian Revolution of 1905 and set the stage for the Russian Revolutions of 1917.

Before Bloody Sunday, Gapon, like hundreds of his followers, believed labor reform could occur without revolution and that the czar, their “Little Father,” was divinely appointed and had their best interests always in mind. The union Gapon led, in fact, was



Father Georgy Gapon makes an entreaty to the czar on behalf of the workers on January 9, 1905, the key event marking the beginnings of “Bloody Sunday” and the Revolution of 1905. (Cassell’s *History of the Russo-Japanese War*, vol. 4, 1905)

sponsored by the government, and Gapon was a government agent. Because the “Gaponovites” trusted Czar Nicholas II, however, they did not join the radical workers who called for a violent revolution. Gapon and hundreds of on-strike workers nevertheless planned to march on Sunday and ask the czar for better working conditions and higher wages. The demonstrators would begin their march to the czar’s Winter Palace from all corners of the city.

Tired of the weeklong, citywide strike and fearing the more radical workers, Nicholas called additional troops to St. Petersburg on January 21. Russia was still embroiled in a war with Japan, however, and the availability of trained troops was limited. After being briefed by the director of the police and the minister of the interior, Nicholas decided not to obstruct the march. On Sunday morning, the police preceded the separate groups of demonstrators and cleared the traffic for them. A few processions were stopped by mounted troops and forced to disperse. Some demonstrators built barricades and drew swords. Near the Peter and Paul Fortress, demonstrators ignored the police and pressed forward with their march.

The largest group of marchers, led by Father Gapon, marched on, singing hymns. At the Tarakanovska River, they refused to halt for the police or the military troops behind the police. When the police heard the troops’ bugler sound a firing order, the police parted and retreated. The troops fired several times into the crowd of marching workers, who ran toward them while singing hymns. Gapon was knocked off his feet and shuffled off by a radical worker.

Czarist officials reported 130 people killed that Sunday; other sources say 1,000 people died that day or from their wounds in

the days following. The events of that Sunday reverberated throughout Russia; workers went on strike, troops were called in to control them, and Father Gapon, renouncing the czar, now called for revolution.

Mark Schwartz

See also: Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Revolution of 1905; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadievich (1861–1911)

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Bluecher (Blyuker), Vasily Konstantinovich (1889–1938)

Vasily Bluecher was born into a peasant family in the Yaroslavl Region on December 1, 1889. Bluecher left for the city at a young age, and worked in a factory until he joined the army in 1914, upon the outbreak of the World War I. He was wounded and discharged with the rank of corporal in summer 1915, and soon became active in the Russian social democratic movement. Bluecher joined the Bolshevik Party during 1917, and in November of that year he was sent to Chelyabinsk as commissar of a Red Guards unit charged with suppressing rebellion there. He officially joined the Red Army in 1918, and during August–September of that year he commanded the South Urals Partisan Army fighting against White (monarchist) forces.

His actions there made him the first recipient of the Order of the Red Banner.

Following the Russian Civil War, Bluecher served as military commander of the Far Eastern Republic (1921–1922), and as a military advisor with Chiang Kai-Shek’s headquarters in China (1924–1927). He helped plan Chiang’s Northern Expedition before returning to the USSR to command the Ukraine military district. In 1929, Bluecher returned to the Far East to command the Special Red Banner Army based in Khabarovsk. His forces engaged and defeated some Chinese warlords in a brief border war during 1929–1930, for which Bluecher became the first recipient of the Order of the Red Star. In 1935, he was appointed marshal of the Soviet Union. He led the Soviet forces in the Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938.

The unimpressive performance of Bluecher’s troops during that battle led to his dismissal and arrest, on charges of spying for the Japanese, in October 1938. Bluecher was never tried, but several sources report that he was tortured and killed in early November. He was officially rehabilitated, posthumously, in 1956. Despite his surname, Bluecher was not of German extraction.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Chinese Civil War (1911–1949); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Lake Khasan, Battle of; Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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BMP-I Series Infantry Fighting Vehicles

The *Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty* (BMP; literally “fighting machine of the infantry”) series of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) represented a revolutionary shift in doctrinal thinking not only for the Soviet military but also for other nations, including the United States. Prior to the introduction of the BMP series in 1966, the predominant thinking about the use of mechanized infantry on the battlefield was that of the battlefield taxi, whereby the troops were moved to the combat area and then dismounted to fight on foot.

The BMP dramatically changed this picture. It combined the qualities of a light tank with those of an armored personnel carrier, and was fully amphibious. The idea was to allow infantry to operate safely on a nuclear-contaminated battlefield while otherwise improving mobility and providing fire support. While other nations, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), were working on their own IFVs, the BMP was the first to be fielded in any quantity.

Soviet doctrine in the 1950s was shifting to that of a nuclear battlefield, and to have infantry fighting on foot, there was a serious liability. The BMP was specifically designed with the nuclear battlefield in mind. The production model was armed with a 73-millimeter (mm) smoothbore gun that fired projectiles similar to those used in the handheld RPG-7 antitank launcher, along with a rail to mount the new AT-3 Sagger 9M14M Malyutka wire-guided antitank missile (ATGM). The driver and vehicle commander rode in tandem in the left-front of the hull, while the gunner for the 73-mm gun and AT-3 was alone in the small turret basket. The infantry squad of eight men sat in

the rear, four on each side back-to-back, and each with a firing port and vision block to allow them to fight from within the vehicle.

The Soviet BMP went into production in 1966; it was superseded by the BMP-1 in 1969. Significant modifications were introduced in 1973, and again in 1979. Some 20,000 BMP-1s (or similar vehicles) were produced in the Soviet Union. BMPs were also produced under license by Czechoslovakia and Romania within the Warsaw Pact, and by India. The People's Republic of China introduced an unlicensed copy, Type 86, in 1986, and Iran produced a very similar vehicle, the Boragh, in 1997. The last Soviet version of the BMP-1 was produced in 1983.

BMPs first saw combat service in the October 1973 Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War as well as action in southern Lebanon in 1982 and the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s. In the latter, BMPs were used by both sides. Crews liked the BMP's speed and maneuverability but discovered that the Sagger ATGM was virtually useless when fired from within the vehicle, mostly due to the inability of inexperienced gunners to guide the missile onto the target. Infantry also found it difficult to engage targets with any effectiveness from inside the vehicle. As a consequence, tactics began to develop that appeared to be a return to the battlefield taxi role of previous carrier designs.

The lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War led to an overhaul of the BMP design, culminating in the BMP-2 and BMP-3. As the Soviets continued to improve and modify the design, remaining BMP-1s were shipped off to client states such as Iraq. Thus, it was the BMP-1 (NATO designations M1967 or BMP-76PB), constantly upgraded and modified, that continued to see the lion's share of combat service in Middle East wars. The Iraqis also received an unknown quantity of BMP-2s equipped with a 23-mm autocannon and the AT-4 Fagot 9M111 ATGM.

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War though, coalition forces encountered a strange oddity. For years, British, French, and American tank and infantry personnel had engaged targets meant to look like Soviet tanks and infantry vehicles. Coalition forces were deployed along with Egyptian and Syrian units, equipped with large numbers of BMPs, and that created some initial confusion regarding vehicle identification, as it was sometimes hard to distinguish friendly BMPs from Iraqi vehicles. When the campaign began, it was deemed critical to keep forces properly organized and separated to limit allied fratricide.

Combat units engaged BMPs only on limited occasions, as these were largely grouped with the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions that generally avoided serious ground action. When coalition forces did manage to engage BMPs, they typically found them integrated with T-72 or T-62 Soviet-made tanks in combined arms company and battalion-sized groups. Some BMPs of the Medina Armored Division were destroyed by tankers from Colonel Montgomery Meigs's 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, on February 27, 1991, but it would be the destruction of the Tawakalna Mechanized Division that saw one of the greatest losses of Iraqi BMPs in any one area.

The Tawakalna Mechanized Division was equipped with 220 T-72 tanks and more than 280 BMPs. It regularly trained in task-oriented battalion formations, and thus whenever tanks were encountered, BMPs were alongside. A typical formation was composed of 30–40 T-72 tanks and 12 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, with the infantry dug in around the vehicles. Soviet equipment was designed mostly for massed attack formations, however, not for flexible defensive tactics in small formations. The division was spread out over a large area and was hit

by the concentrated power of the U.S. VII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Frederick Franks Jr. On February 26, in the Battle of 73 Easting; M1-A1 Abrams tanks and M3 Bradleys of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Leonard Holder engaged and destroyed 37 T-72s and their escorting BMPs in a matter of six minutes, all in a swirling sandstorm at a range of more than 2,200 yards.

During the Iraq War of 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), U.S. Army tanks and helicopters engaged some BMPs, again in mixed combined arms formations with tanks. Advancing elements of the 3rd Infantry Division encountered small combined arms groups attached to larger formations of Iraqi infantry during their drive north to Baghdad. On April 4, 2003, just south of the city at a crossroads marked “Objective Saints” on battle maps, American forces destroyed several dozen BMP-1s and BMP-2s that were part of the Medina Armored Division.

The Iraqi forces had bravely resisted, and at one point, a platoon of BMP-2s had engaged the advancing Americans with accurate fire from their 30-mm cannons before they were destroyed by tankers of the 464 Armored Battalion. Later, as American columns pushed into Baghdad, BMPs individually and in pairs attempted to ambush the Americans from the numerous narrow alleys of the city. As the Battle for Baghdad came to a close, there were numerous Iraqi tanks and BMPs littering the roadways. Unfortunately, precise loss statistics for the BMPs are not readily available for either the Persian Gulf War or the Iraq War of 2003. In the case of the former, the losses may have been as high as 200.

Even though the BMP was outclassed by tanks and infantry vehicles of American and other Western nations, when used by smaller armies against comparable foes it proved an

effective vehicle, as attested to by the Iraqi experience during the Iran–Iraq War. Therefore, BMPs of various configurations will likely be encountered on Middle Eastern battlefields into the foreseeable future.

Specifications of the BMP-1 are:

Armament: one 73-mm 2A28 smoothbore gun with a rate of fire of 7–8 rounds per minute; one coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun
 Main Gun Ammunition: 40 Rounds
 Armor: 23-mm maximum
 Crew/Passengers: three, with eight infantry
 Weight: 13.28 tons
 Length: 22 feet 2 inches
 Width: 9 feet 8 inches
 Height: 7 feet 1 inch
 Engine: V-6 diesel; 300 horsepower at 2,000 revolutions per minute
 Speed: Road, 45 miles per hour
 Range: 340 miles

Russell G. Rodgers

See also: Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973)

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Bochkareva, Maria (Mariya or Yasha; 1889–1920)

Commander of the First Russian Women’s Battalion of Death.

Maria (Yasha) Bochkareva was born in Nikolsko, Siberia. She was physically



Maria Bochkareva, commander of the Russian Women's Battalion of Death. In 1914, Maria was allowed to join the Russian 25th Reserve Battalion as a woman soldier. She was wounded twice and awarded three times for her bravery. (S.J. Duncan-Clark, *Pictorial History of the Great War*, The John A. Hertel Co., Toronto, 1919, p. 176)

abused by her alcoholic peasant father. At age 15, she married Afansi Bochkareva, who also abused her. She left him and her job as a construction worker and worked on a river steamer. Her second husband, Yakov Buk, was also violent. In 1914, Maria left him. Czar Nicholas II granted her permission to join the Tomsk 25th Reserve Battalion as a woman soldier. She was wounded twice and decorated for bravery three times.

In May 1917, she persuaded Alexander Kerensky, then minister of defense of the Russian provisional government, to allow her to form a women's battalion. Her goal was to set an example for the men of Russia, who had been reluctant to support the new government; Bochkareva also hoped to

shame Russian men into fighting by having women lead the way.

She was able to recruit 2,000 women. There were many young women from prominent families and university students, often swept away by patriotic emotion. Some of these became officers, but after Bochkareva culled the ranks and drove away most of her recruits with her draconian discipline, only 300, predominantly peasant women, remained. Men from the Volhynia Infantry Regiment provided instruction for Bochkareva's recruits. Before shipping to the front, the battalion was praised by the British suffragette-turned-patriot Emmeline Pankhurst.

The battalion, bolstered by male officers and rank-and-file male volunteers, fought credibly in the July (Kerensky) offensive, driving through three German trench lines. To her dismay, however, the battalion was left in the lurch by all-male units, who refused orders to support its attack. According to some accounts, nearby Russian male units fired on Bochkareva's soldiers as they advanced against the Germans. Some of her unit and their reinforcements faltered. During the fighting, Bochkareva discovered one of her women soldiers making love with a Russian male soldier. She ran the woman through with a bayonet, but the man escaped before she could kill him.

The women were forced to fall back to avoid encirclement and suffered staggering casualties, between 109 and 210 of its 300 soldiers including Bochkareva, who was wounded. After recovering, she was attacked and almost lynched by disgruntled male on-lookers when she attempted to impose discipline on a women's unit in Moscow. She returned to the front and her unit, but defeatism was rampant. Her effort to shame men into fighting led to insults and threats. Finally, 20 of her soldiers were lynched by defeatist men. At that point, Bochkareva

dissolved her unit; despite rumors to the contrary, it was not involved in the defense of the Winter Palace during the Bolshevik (October) Revolution.

Asked by an old officer acquaintance to confer with General Lavr Kornilov, she went to an area in the south where Kornilov and the Bolsheviks were fighting. Captured by the Bolsheviks, she narrowly escaped execution. After being recognized as a soldier who had saved wounded soldiers on the battlefield at great personal danger, she was released. Bochkareva made her way to Vladivostok, and on April 18, 1918, she left for the United States.

While in the United States, Bochkareva met President Woodrow Wilson, and dictated her memoirs for publication. She left the United States in July and returned to Arkhangelsk via England, where she had an audience with King George V. On arrival in Russia, Bochkareva attempted to form another women's unit to fight on the side of the White (czarist) forces, but was unsuccessful. She then went to Tomsk and tried to assemble a medical unit attached to the White army of Admiral Kolchak; the Bolshevik (Red) forces captured Bochkareva before she could complete her work. She was interrogated at Krasnoyarsk, found to be an "enemy of the people," and was executed on May 16, 1920.

Bernard Cook

See also: Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Bogolyubsky, Andrei (1111–1174)

Prince Andrei of the Monomakh lineage, more commonly known as Andrei Bogolyubsky (Beloved of God or God-loving), was born in Rostov. He was the second son of Yuri Dolgoruky (1099–1157) and a grandson of Vladimir Monomakh, the Grand Prince of Kiev from 1113 to 1125. As the Prince of Rostov-Suzdal and the Grand Prince of Vladimir, Bogolyubsky increased the importance of the northeastern Russian lands and contributed to the development of government and Christianity in the region. Bogolyubsky was very religious and strictly observed fasting periods, and attended services of prayer and meditation at church. His religious beliefs also influenced his approach to warfare and governing. Reputed to be a courageous warrior, Bogolyubsky always tried to reach a peaceful resolution to conflicts and disputes. He was, however, astute enough to know how and when to use force.

After his father's death in 1157, Bogolyubsky became prince of the Vladimir, Rostov, and Suzdal regions, and wielded considerable power. Bogolyubsky did not desire to rule Kiev; he understood he had little chance of gaining control. Instead, Bogolyubsky moved his capital to Vladimir, where he built a new center of religious and civil life, and developed a large feudal estate in the region. Seeing nine of his relatives rise and fall in the struggle to control Kiev, none of whom lasted more than two years, Bogolyubsky wanted to make Vladimir the strong

capital of his realm. In doing so, he gained more power than the princes in Kiev did.

Bogolyubsky tried to unite the Russian lands under his authority by both military and diplomatic means. He also planned to bring Kiev and Novgorod under his control. He compelled Novgorod to accept a prince of his choice and, in 1169, attacked Kiev, which he conquered and laid waste.

After plundering Kiev, Bogolyubsky returned to Vladimir. His refusal to rule in Kiev was a milestone in Russian history; it underlined the declining importance of Kiev and showed that the political and religious center moved to the north. Murdered in June 1174, Bogolyubsky did not realize his goal of uniting the Russian lands under one authority.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Dolgoruky, Yuri (1099?–1157); Novgorod, Siege of (1169)

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Bolotnikov Rebellion. *See* Time of Troubles or Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608)

Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608)

Rebel commander during the Time of Troubles.

Ivan Bolotnikov was born in a *deti boyarski*, or small landholding family, in Krapvina, near Tula, though the details of his youth are largely obscure. He was indentured as a military slave to Prince Andrei

Taliatovski as a young man, but ran away to join the Cossacks. Some accounts have him rising to the post of hetman, but no one is certain even whether he was with the Don or Volga Cossacks.

Either way, he was captured by the Crimean Tatars during a raid and subsequently sold into slavery in the Ottoman Empire. Bolotnikov eventually was liberated from his post as a galley slave in the aftermath of a sea battle; tradition has it he was rescued by Germans.

Bolotnikov then made his way to Venice, and eventually back to Poland, where he encountered the court being established on behalf of the second false Dmitry at Sambor. Whether Bolotnikov offered his services or was selected is unclear, but in early 1606 he appeared in Putivl with a fur coat, a sabre, some money, and a sealed letter for the garrison commander.

Shortly thereafter, Bolotnikov appears in the record as the commander of a rebel army consisting of thousands of free Cossacks and a large detachment of gentry cavalry. From Putivl, he led the rebel forces north, fighting and most often winning a series of encounters with the forces of Czar Vasily Shuisky in the course of the summer and fall.

In December 1606, however, Bolotnikov was betrayed and his forces were driven from their forward outpost at Kolomenskoe. Bolotnikov fled to Kaluga, where he led a successful defense of the fort in February 1607, though Shuisky established a siege.

In early May 1607, Bolotnikov led a sortie from Kaluga that succeeded in driving Shuisky's forces off with heavy casualties. Bolotnikov, now joined by Cossacks who had switched sides during the battle, retired to Tula where he set about rebuilding his forces.

Shuisky cautiously advanced on Tula, arriving there at the end of June 1607 and

establishing a siege. Bolotnikov organized the city's defense, and successfully warded off more than 20 attempts to storm the citadel. Shuisky's forces resorted to damming the river, a process that took nearly two months, and flooding the city.

While the czar's engineers worked, Bolotnikov held his troops together with tales of the second Dmitry. Eventually, he negotiated a deal in which he traded himself and the "Czarevich" Peter for an honorable surrender. Any rebel who joined Shuisky's service would do so at an equivalent rank, while those who chose not to would be allowed to take their weapons and go home.

Shuisky initially kept his promise and left Bolotnikov alive, but in solitary confinement. As rebel forces once again approached Moscow in February 1608 though, Bolotnikov was secretly transferred to Karzopol, where he was blinded and drowned.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Kolomenskoe, Battle of (December 2, 1606); Peter, False (?–1608); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles

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Bonch-Bruevich, Mikhail Dmitrievich (1870–1956)

Born to a family of the minor Polish nobility from Mogilev Province, on February 12, 1870, Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich was the

older brother of Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich (b. 1873), who went on to be a key figure in Russian social democracy and briefly served as secretary to Vladimir Lenin. Mikhail chose a career in the military, and graduated from the Moscow Infantry School in 1892. From 1892 to 1895, he served in a Lithuanian Guards regiment stationed in Warsaw; he then graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1898, and by August 1914, he had risen to command the Perevolochensky Regiment at Chernigov.

Bonch-Bruevich rose rapidly during World War I. He served briefly as quartermaster general for the Russian Third Army before being promoted to lieutenant general and transferred to the staff of the Northwestern Front in September 1914. From August 1915 to September February 1916 he was chief of staff and deputy commander of the Northern Front. Bonch-Bruevich commanded the Pskov garrison during the February Revolution, was elected to the soviet there, and served as head of troops on the Northern Front during August 29–September 9, 1917. Bonch-Bruevich then transferred to command of the Mogilev garrison, which he led over to the Bolshevik side during the October Revolution.

On November 20, he was appointed chief of staff for the Supreme Commander Leon Trotsky, and military director of the Supreme Military Council during 1917–1918. During March 1918–June 1919 he served as chief of field staff for the Supreme Military Council; he then held the same post with its successor organization, the Revolutionary Military Council. Bonch-Bruevich also participated in the military history commission that wrote the official history of Russia in World War I, and helped create both the Supreme Geodesic Administration and the State Aerial Photography Bureau during the 1920s.

In 1928, Bonch-Bruевич was appointed to command the USSR's Revolutionary Military Council. He wrote many books on tactics, and published several works in the fields of science and pedagogy as well. His work on military theory contributed significantly to the reform of Soviet doctrine in the early 1930s. In 1944, he was promoted to lieutenant general; his main work, however, was editing a scientific volume. Bonch-Bruевич died in Moscow on August 3, 1956.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Deep Battle; February (March) Revolution (1917); October (November) Revolution (1917); Operational Art

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Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812)

Turning point in the Napoleonic Wars, during French emperor Napoleon I's ill-fated invasion of Russia.


After the Russians had lost several smaller engagements, Napoleon's multinational *Grande Armée* (less than half of the soldiers were from France at that point) advanced deep into Russia and continued to pursue the retreating Russian army. Because of the logistics of the oncoming Russian winter and the inadequacies of the French supply lines, Napoleon needed a complete victory before the onset of winter to secure the safety of his troops.

On September 7, Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov made a stand near Borodino, a small town roughly 70 miles west of Moscow. While the opposing forces were relatively equal in

strength (approximately 120,000 men fit for duty on each side), the terrain was rough and broken up by many streams, forests, and small villages, providing the Russians a notable defensive advantage. The Russian position, anchored on the right at Borodino and on the left at the town of Utitsa, was further strengthened by the construction of several earthwork fortifications; the largest of them, the Great Redoubt, was built near the center of the Russian line and was packed with artillery batteries.

Before the battle, French marshal Louis Davout advocated a large-scale flanking maneuver against the Russian left. Napoleon, likely fearing that might allow the Russians to withdraw and escape a decisive engagement yet again, opted for a massive frontal assault. The crude plan of attack lacked the creativity and tactical genius typical of Napoleon, which many scholars attribute to the fact that he had fallen ill.

The battle began at 6:00 a.m. with a French artillery bombardment aimed at breaking up the formidable Russian defenses. Massed frontal assaults along the entire front subsequently commenced, against which the Russians offered a stubborn and determined resistance. Italian troops from the IV Corps, commanded by Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, were able to capture and secure Borodino relatively quickly, but further attacks were halted. While the French assaults in the center—spearheaded by Davout's I Corps and Marshal Michel Ney's III Corps—initially succeeded in capturing some of the lesser Russian fortifications, they were eventually driven back by Russian counterattacks. Prince Josef Poniatowski led his corps of Polish soldiers against Utitsa, where he fought a back and forth battle with the Russians for much of the day. With the initial French assaults resulting in no major breakthroughs, the battle settled into a heated contest of attrition.



By late afternoon, the French had managed to take control of many of the strategic Russian defensive positions, including the Great Redoubt, though at a high cost. Both armies, having suffered extremely heavy casualties, were thoroughly exhausted. The Russian line was beginning to waver, but Napoleon refused the pleas of his officers to commit his only remaining reserves, the elite Imperial Guard. A decisive victory thus eluded Napoleon; the Russians held on until nightfall, at which point Kutuzov ordered his battered army to withdraw.

The fighting at Borodino was some of the bloodiest and most brutal of the Napoleonic Wars. Casualties amounted to more than 40,000 for the Russians and more than 30,000 for the French, including the deaths of many high-ranking officers on both sides. The French soon after occupied Moscow, as the Russian withdrawal following the battle left the road to the city open.

Shortly after the French entered, several fires broke out in the city; it has never been determined whether the cause was carelessness or sabotage. Moscow burned for almost four days, and was over two-thirds destroyed. Napoleon waited several weeks there for an offer of peace from Czar Alexander I, but it never came. Dangerously short on supplies and with no hope of reinforcement, Napoleon was left with no choice but to abandon Moscow and order a retreat from Russia.

Between October and December, snow and freezing cold undermined Napoleon's starving *Grande Armée* and imposed tremendous losses on the French forces during the long march out of Russia. Russian troops—particularly Cossacks—harassed the French the entire way, inflicting further casualties as they continually pounced on stragglers. The massive loss of men suffered by the French in the Russian campaign convinced many of France's allied nations to turn against Napoleon during the War of Liberation in 1813,

and he was subsequently unable to raise new forces matching the size and strength of the *Grande Armée* prior to the Russian invasion.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815)

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Bosnian Annexation Crisis (1908)

Following the victory of the Russian and allied Balkan states over the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Russia imposed a harsh peace settlement on the Ottoman Empire. One of the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano was that Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Czar Alexander II in 1867 had pledged to cede to Austria-Hungary should Russia intervene in the Balkans, receive a measure of autonomy in the interests of their Christian subjects. Nothing was said about handing it over to Austria-Hungary.

With most of the rest of Europe opposed to the treaty and indeed threatening war, Russia agreed to an international conference to discuss the Balkans. The ensuing Congress of Berlin of June–July 1878, hosted by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, completely undid the Treaty of San Stefano. Russia saw its battlefield gains largely taken away.

Among the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary gained the right to occupy and administer, although not annex, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dual Monarchy immediately dispatched 72,000 troops. Roman Catholics welcomed the occupation

but Muslims deplored it. In Sarajevo, Muslims took up arms and organized resistance. Austro-Hungarian forces found themselves fighting a classic guerrilla campaign. Ultimately it required 250,000 Austro-Hungarian troops, about one-third of the total combat strength of the Dual Monarchy, to bring victory by the end of 1878.

Russia now nursed a profound grievance, not only against Austria-Hungary but also against Germany. This brought the end of the *Dreikaiserbund* or the Three Emperors' League—the informal alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia—and forced Bismarck to choose between the two Balkan rivals.

In 1908 Bosnia-Herzegovina was again at the forefront of an international crisis. Russian foreign minister Aleksandr Izvolsky secretly suggested to Austrian foreign minister Baron Alois von Aehrenthal a trade-off, whereby Austria-Hungary would be allowed to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Russia would secure the opening of the Straits for its warships to transit the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. He carried this demarche out in defiance of Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, who cared not a whit about the Straits and knew Russia was unready for a test of strength. Izvolsky also apparently sounded out the British and French governments; they favored holding an international conference.

Aehrenthal agreed to support Russia at such a conference but insisted it be put in writing. Izvolsky foolishly agreed. Also written into the document on Aehrenthal's express demand was a statement that there would be no compensation for Serbia. Austria-Hungary then quickly annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina without consulting with the other signatories of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 as it was obligated to do.

Europe was plunged into crisis. The German government supported the Dual

Monarchy. Izvolsky demanded a conference, but the British and French now were opposed. Also the German Ambassador to Russia threatened to reveal the secret agreement with Aehrenthal, and Izvolsky was obliged to back down. Serbia, which supposedly had Russian backing to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, was greatly angered. Russia, which had not yet recovered from its humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, also had no support from its Entente allies. The upshot was that Russia backed down and the crisis passed.

The price for this Austro-Hungarian victory was high. Serbia now hated Austria-Hungary more than ever and strengthened its military, with the assistance of France. Russia also began to make preparations for a war that its leaders now regarded as inevitable. After the Bosnian humiliation of 1908, no Russian statesman could appear to yield any advantage to Austria-Hungary.

Karl Roeder and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Balkan Wars (1911–1912); Berlin, Congress of (1878); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Sazanov, Sergei Dmitrievich (1860–1927); Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadievich (1861–1911); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Boxer Rebellion, Russia and (1899–1903)

Xenophobic peasant uprising in China used as justification for Russian expansion in Manchuria.

In 1899, The Society of the Harmonious Fist, a Chinese organization that aimed to expel foreigners from China, staged a rising in northern China. With the tacit approval of the ruling Qing Dynasty, these “Boxers,” as Westerners called them, entered Beijing in June 1900 and laid siege to the foreign quarter there, killing two diplomats. To defend its interests, Russia sent sizable forces into Manchuria; the garrison at Port Arthur was increased to 20,000. Six other nations also dispatched military forces, including Japan, which sent almost 10,000 men.

Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, the Russian foreign minister, and Count Sergei Witte, the finance minister, worked hard to try and minimize the consequences, fearing Japan might demand greater influence in China and thus threaten Russia’s investments in Manchuria, especially the burgeoning railway system. Aleksei Kuropatkin, the Russian minister of war, opposed the idea of a peaceful solution, and sent 4,000 men to augment the international relief force. When Chinese regular forces working with the Boxers attacked a Russian ammunition dump in Manchuria, killing about 30 men, Kuropatkin responded by occupying the three eastern provinces of Manchuria.

In August, following a 55-day siege, the combined intervention force dispatched the Boxers in Beijing; Baron Anatoly Stoessel headed a 2,000-man allied force (1,500 of them Russian) that relieved the Russian legation at Tientsin. Russian forces then withdrew from Beijing, but not Manchuria. Where the international agreements ending the rebellion forced the Chinese to make reparations and allowed foreign powers to send limited forces to defend their nationals, Russia forced the governor of Manchuria to sign a treaty granting them unlimited control.

The Russians attempted to formalize the agreement in early 1901, drafting a treaty they presented to the Chinese as protection against Japanese predations but in reality maintained

the status quo. The Japanese, meanwhile, worked to get China to press for the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops. Japan's minister to China rallied international support for this withdrawal, but Russia merely stonewalled, arguing the matter was one of protection and concerned only Russia and China. No agreement, Lamsdorf said, would infringe upon China's sovereignty in Manchuria.

Russia's actions spurred Japan's alliance with Great Britain in January 1902. Faced with this, and clear signs the Japanese were preparing for war, Russia signed a convention with China on April 8, 1902, in which they agreed to a three-phase withdrawal of their forces from Manchuria over the next 18 months. The Russians indeed made preparations for the withdrawal, but never executed even the first phase; as each deadline passed and the Russians remained in Manchuria, the Japanese became increasingly convinced only war could dislodge them. Thus, in a roundabout fashion, the Boxer Rebellion helped cause the Russo-Japanese War.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Lamsdorf, Count Vladimir Nikolaevich (1845–1907); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Stoessel (Stessel), Baron Anatoli Mikhailovich (1848–1915); Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

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Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918)

Peace treaty signed between Russia and the Central Powers in the Polish city of Brest-

Litovsk on March 3, 1918, which ended Russia's participation in World War I. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was essentially forced upon the Russians by Germany, was a major humiliation for the Russians. In February 1917 Czar Nicholas II of Russia was overthrown, the result of the terrible cost of World War I to Russia. The new provisional government vowed to continue the war, however, which was a major miscalculation. Vladimir Lenin, leader of the revolutionary Bolshevik Party, pledged a program of "Land, Peace, and Bread," and the Bolsheviks did everything they could to undermine army morale and authority.

With the failure of the Kerensky Offensive in the summer of 1917 and the accompanying collapse of the army, on November 7 the Bolsheviks seized power in a second revolution—actually a coup d'état—and Lenin, whose party had been the beneficiary of immense amounts of German money, immediately announced that Russia would leave the war. Indeed, Lenin promised a peace that would result in no land annexations, no indemnities, self-determination, and a commitment to make public and repudiate all prior secret treaties among the Great Powers. The new Bolshevik government thus broke Russia's treaties and commitments with its former allies.

On December 3, 1917, the two sides opened truce talks behind German lines in Brest-Litovsk, and on December 17, an armistice went into effect on the Eastern Front. On December 22, the first peace conference of the war began, also at Brest-Litovsk, although meaningful talks there did not begin in earnest until January 9, 1918.

Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky headed the Russian delegation, and he adopted a defiant attitude. The Russian strategy was to stall the talks until an expected Bolshevik-inspired revolution swept Europe and drove Germany from the



Arrival of the Russian peace delegation to meet with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, January 3, 1918. Leader of the Russian delegation, Leon Trotsky, is in the center. (National Archives)

war. The Russians also naively expected the Germans to negotiate on the basis of no annexations or indemnities. But German army chief of staff in the east Major General Max Hoffmann soon disabused Trotsky of this when he presented the German demands. The German General Staff had formulated extraordinarily harsh terms that shocked even the German negotiator and career diplomat Richard von Kuhlmann.

During a brief Christmas recess, Trotsky returned to Petrograd and urged the Bolshevik leaders to pursue a policy of “no war, no peace.” This was unacceptable to the Germans, although the conferees did manage to agree to extend the armistice until February 12. Two days before its expiration Trotsky proclaimed that the Russians simply considered the war at an end. An astounded Hoffmann responded by signing a separate peace with Ukraine and informing

the Russian delegation on February 16 that the German army would resume offensive military operations against Russian forces in two days.

On February 18, German troops crossed the Dvina River to capture the city of Pskov, and Trotsky returned to Petrograd for urgent consultations. Most of the Bolshevik leadership preferred continuing the war, but because they had destroyed the army in their rise to power, Russia was in no position to fight. The German army, meanwhile, rolled forward in the easiest offensive of the war. It required all Lenin’s argumentative skills to convince the Bolshevik leadership to agree to peace, which it accepted in a vote of seven to six. Lenin secured the narrow agreement by telling the leadership that the treaty would not last. Germany, he said, was on the brink of revolution. The most important thing was to consolidate Bolshevik power in Russia,

without which there would be no hope for world revolution. Lost territory could be recovered later. The German advance continued even after the Russians had returned to the negotiating table. The Germans reached Narva, only 100 miles from Petrograd, precipitating transfer of the Russian government to Moscow.

On March 3, 1918, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Trotsky, replaced as commissar of foreign affairs by Georgy Chicherin, refused to attend the ceremony. Russia lost Poland, Courland, and Lithuania, leaving Germany and Austria-Hungary to determine their future status. The Russians also had to evacuate Livonia, Estonia, Finland, and the Åland Islands. Russia was also forced to evacuate Ukraine and recognize the treaty between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Central Powers. It had to surrender the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum to Turkey as well as eastern Anatolia and had to agree to cease all Bolshevik propaganda. Finally, Russia agreed to pay Germany an indemnity the Russians estimated at from 4 billion to 5 billion gold rubles.

The treaty also forced the Russians to disarm. Their army was to be immediately demobilized, and their navy was not to venture out of Russian ports. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk stipulated commercial ties between Russia and the Central Powers that were highly beneficial to the latter, and forbade the Russians from levying export tariffs on Russian ores or lumber.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk virtually pushed Russia back to its pre-Petrine frontiers. Russia lost nearly 1.3 million square miles of land and 62 million people, that is, one-third of its population. The losses included approximately one-third of Russia's arable land, three-fourths of its coal and iron, one-third of its factories, and one-fourth of its railroads. In view of German

protestations over the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, it is worth remembering that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was much harsher on the defeated power. It is a point of historical debate whether the infant Soviet regime would have collapsed had Germany refused the armistice and peace talks, and continued offensive action. Some historians believe that the peace treaty saved the Bolshevik regime.

The German *Reichstag* accepted the treaty overwhelmingly. For the Allies, the punitive treaty helped to forge a unity of purpose, hitherto lacking. It also forced many Allied leaders to conclude that they would be unable to forge a reasonable peace with the Germans and that only the complete defeat of Germany would bring about an acceptable peace on their terms.

If there had been any doubts as to the future of the surrendered territories, these were laid to rest when they were immediately brought under the control of the Central Powers. In April, German troops landed in Finland, and Kaiser Wilhelm II offered the Finnish throne to his brother-in-law Prince Karl of Hesse. That same month, German and Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the Ukraine, vital for its grain production, and established a military dictatorship there under General Pavlo (Pavel) Skoropadsky. The Kaiser also accepted the invitation of the Estonians to be their king, and in July, Lithuania offered its throne to Prince Wilhelm of Urach, a younger member of the ruling family in Württemberg.

The treaty was of immense importance to Germany. First quartermaster general of the German army Erich Ludendorff had already transferred perhaps half a million men to the Western Front for his great spring offensive. He would move more men later; had he sent them initially, he might have had the victorious peace in the West that he and German

army's chief of staff and field marshal Paul von Hindenburg sought. As it was, the Ludendorff Offensives failed, and in November 1918 Germany was defeated. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was thus voided, not as Lenin had assumed by revolution in Germany, but by an Allied military victory. The Paris Peace Conference failed, however, to return much of the territory to Russia, retaining it as a buffer of new states to contain Bolshevism. Not until World War II would Soviet leader Josef Stalin regain the lost territory.

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See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Skoropadsky, Pavel (Pavlo) Petrovich (1873–1945); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982)

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was the third general secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from 1964 until his death in 1982. He was born at Kamenskoe, Ukraine, into a

Russian worker's family on December 19, 1906. He studied at Dniprodzerzhynsk Metallurgical Technicum, became a metallurgical engineer, and worked in the steel industry. He joined the Komsomol (Communist Party youth wing) in 1923, and in 1929 he became an active member of the CPSU. He served in the Red Army during World War II, first as a political commissar and then as deputy political administrator on the Transcaucas Front. In 1943, Brezhnev was promoted to head of the political department of Eighteenth Army, which however then became part of the Ukrainian Front (army group) where he served under Chief Political Officer Nikita S. Khrushchev. At war's end, Brezhnev was the chief political officer for the Fourth Ukrainian Front; he left the army in 1946 with the rank of major general.

With the support of Khrushchev, Brezhnev rose rapidly thereafter. He became a member of the Supreme Soviet in 1950. When Khrushchev became the first secretary of the CPSU in 1953, Brezhnev was appointed to the CC and later joined the politburo. He became the second secretary of the CC in 1959, and was promoted to chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the titular head of the Soviet state.

Khrushchev's failure to enforce various Communist ideological campaigns to deal with the Cuba crisis, and to develop the economy during the early 1960s led to a movement within the CPSU to replace him. Brezhnev, now secretary of the CC and second secretary (deputy Party leader), led the plot. Khrushchev was removed as chairman of the Party in October 1964, and the politburo elected Brezhnev as general secretary.

Brezhnev used Stalinist tactics to purge the opposition. He imprisoned antigovernment figures, implemented stricter censorship, and exercised near-total control of education, reversing the liberalization and reforms



Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev speaks at a meeting in Russia in 1980. (AP Photo)

undertaken by Khrushchev. In 1968, he used military force to crush the “Prague Spring” reforms in Czechoslovakia, which he deemed a threat to world communism. Brezhnev approved the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for similar reasons.

For the first 10 years of his rule, the Soviet Union developed well economically. By 1973, the Soviet Union had become the second largest industrial economy in the world. The Soviets developed sophisticated nuclear programs, including nuclear missiles and submarines that could carry and transmit nuclear bombs, and extended their capabilities in outer space. Brezhnev’s Soviet Union managed to balance the United States’ military development in an arms race that created tensions in the world and forced the United States to the negotiating table. The tension was relieved after several meetings between Brezhnev and U.S. president

Richard Nixon established the policy famously called Détente.

The final decade of Brezhnev’s reign, however, was marked by economic stagnation. The economy worsened with the development of the so-called Soviet Military-Industrial Complex. About 90 percent of the Soviet military budget was allocated to support the arms race with the U.S., to conduct interventions in Afghanistan, and to support to Arab states in the Middle East. Economic recovery efforts stalled, and the Soviet Union experienced a prolonged crisis that led to the collapse of the Union itself, following the perestroika programs conducted by Michael Gorbachev.

Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982. Despite his repressive tendencies abroad, his Cold War successes made Brezhnev one of the most popular Soviet leaders.

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See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984); Brezhnev Doctrine; Commissars, Military (1917–1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Prague Spring (1968); SALT I (November 1969–May 1972); SALT II (1972–1979); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Brezhnev Doctrine

Term referring to the foreign policy of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in the late 1960s. Neither Brezhnev nor the Soviet government officially announced a “Brezhnev Doctrine,” though pronouncements from both clearly contained strict guidelines for the implementation of foreign policy. These guidelines, first laid out in *Pravda* in September 1968, were reiterated by Brezhnev in November to justify retroactively the military action of August 1968 aimed at preventing Czechoslovakia, a Soviet ally, from changing its political system and leaving the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The Soviet leader stated that:

The measures taken by the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, in defending the socialist gains of the

Czechoslovak people are of great significance for strengthening the socialist community, which is the main achievement of the international working class. [. . .] Discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had to act decisively and they did act against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia. (Brezhnev speech, November 13, 1968)

The Brezhnev Doctrine essentially stated that any shift away from socialism in any one state threatened all socialist states. According to the doctrine, other communist states, under the Warsaw Pact, therefore had an obligation to prevent this from happening. The Soviet Union thus proclaimed unilaterally its right to intervene anywhere in the world to strengthen communism, just as the United States had proclaimed its right to intervene in support of democracy in the 1947 Truman Doctrine.

In both doctrines, principles of freedom and self-determination theoretically exist, but they were limited when they dealt with political interests. In 1979, Brezhnev invoked the same principles in sanctioning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Brezhnev Doctrine remained a fundament of Soviet foreign policy until the 1980s. Mikhail S. Gorbachev publicly renounced the doctrine in 1985, and in 1989 refused to intervene as Poland and the other states of Eastern Europe repudiated communism and left the Warsaw Pact.

Abubakar Eby Hara

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Prague Spring (1968); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO)

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Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926)

Russian army general. Born in Tbilisi on August 19, 1853, Aleksei Brusilov was a fourth-generation professional soldier. He was commissioned in the cavalry at age 19 and served with distinction during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. After completing officer training and teaching for several years, he became commandant of the Cavalry School in 1902 and held that post for the next four years. Promoted to general in 1906, Brusilov assumed command of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. During 1909–1912 he commanded XIV Corps. Promoted to general of cavalry in 1912, he was then deputy commander of the Warsaw Military District to 1913. He then commanded XII Corps during 1913–1914. He took command of the Russian Eighth Army in Galicia in July 1914.

In the initial Russian offensive of 1914, Eighth Army took Lvov and pressed west beyond the San River to clear the Carpathian passes, investing the Austro-Hungarian fortress of Przemyśl in the process. Brusilov resisted relief efforts until the garrison surrendered in March 1915. Two months later,

German counterattacks forced Brusilov to yield Przemyśl, driving the Russians back behind their August 1914 border.

Brusilov managed the retreat well and was advanced to replace General Nikolai Yudin as commander of the Southwestern Front in March 1916. He immediately petitioned for his troops to participate in an offensive planned in relief of Verdun and the Italian Front that summer. Brusilov prepared meticulously and utilized tactics new to the Eastern Front. Each of the four armies under his command directed its main thrust against a preselected point on a 200-mile front.

The initial attacks of June 4, 1916 broke the Austro-Hungarian lines in four places, capturing some 40,000 prisoners. By July, Brusilov's forces again threatened to take the Carpathian passes. The main Russian attacks planned on the northern sectors of the front never came, however; this allowed the Germans to shift forces south and prop up the crumbling Austrian armies. The Brusilov Offensive petered out in August 1916, though sporadic attacks continued through October 1916. Without adequate preparation and having lost control of the air, Brusilov's repeated attacks against hardened positions were unsuccessful and inflicted heavy casualties on the Russian army. The losses erased most of the improvements made in training and to the officer corps in the months preceding the offensive, and contributed significantly to the collapse of the Russian army in 1917.

Brusilov nonetheless had achieved his objectives, drawing the Austrians from their offensive against Italy and preventing the Germans from reinforcing their Western Front. He had also brought the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the verge of collapse. Overall, the Central Powers lost more than 1 million men killed, wounded, or captured; the losses forced the Austrians to consent to



Aleksei Brusilov was among the most successful Russian commanders of World War I. His breakthrough on the Eastern Front against Austria-Hungary in 1916 helped turn the tide of the war in favor of the Allies. (Library of Congress)

unified command on the Eastern Front, with Germany clearly in control. Had the Russian commander in the north, General Aleksei Evert, attacked as planned, Austria-Hungary might well have been driven from the war. The Brusilov Offensive thus stands as the war's most significant Russian military contribution, having also convinced Romania to throw its lot in with the Allies.

Brusilov accepted the Russian Revolution of March 1917 and received promotion to commander in chief of the army in May 1917. The offensive he carried out in conjunction with then minister of war Alexander Kerensky during July, however, was not successful. After limited gains, the discipline and morale of the Russian forces collapsed and Brusilov's army melted away in the face

of German counterattacks. Kerensky dismissed Brusilov in July 1917, replacing him with General Lavr Kornilov.

Brusilov retired, but remained in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. He was wounded by an artillery shell during fighting in Moscow in 1918, and briefly hospitalized. He eventually joined the Red Army as a military specialist with the cavalry, and held a command during the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1920. He retired in 1924 and died in Moscow on March 17, 1926.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); February (March) Revolution (1917); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919);

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
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Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916)

Russian attacks in Galicia. General Aleksei A. Brusilov, only recently appointed commander of the southwestern front, opened a large-scale offensive against the Austro-Hungarians in the early hours of June 4, 1916. Almost alone among Russian commanders in believing that the army was fit for offensive action, he intended to provide relief for both the French, hard-pressed at Verdun, and the Italians, who were being pushed back in the Tyrol. As a secondary goal, Brusilov also hoped to perhaps draw Romania in on the side of the Allies. In the overall plan, however, the southwestern front was merely an ancillary designed to draw off German reserves. The main Russian attacks would come in the north, where General Aleksei Evert's armies would drive toward Vilnius through the holes thus created in the German line.

Brusilov nonetheless prepared meticulously. Using aerial photographs, he mapped enemy positions along a 200-mile front in great detail and distributed sector maps to the relevant officers and subalterns. Each of the four army commanders under Brusilov selected one sector on which to focus their attack. Chosen troops then were ferried to rearline positions, while their officers went to the front to reconnoiter. Units already at the front dug several lines of trenches approaching to within 75 feet of enemy lines. At some points, the Russians dug tunnels under their own fortifications and obstacles to speed the attack. To confuse the enemy, false trenches were painted on the ground, and wooden batteries were constructed and constantly moved. Large dugouts were prepared for reserves and hidden behind huge earthen berms. Artillery moved into forward positions, within 2 miles of the front, as Brusilov insisted on close coordination with the infantry. In the rear, the troops practiced the attack in models of the Austrian trenches. With all preparations in place, Brusilov waited a week while *Stavka* hesitated; then, even though the headquarters continued to voice doubts, Brusilov moved.

The initial attacks came on a front stretching from Ostrovets, on the Styr River in the north, to the Romanian border in the south. Brusilov's forces, comprised of Seventh Army under Dmitry Shcherbechev, Mikhail Kaledin's Eighth Army, Ninth Army commanded by Pavel Lechitski, and Eleventh Army under Vladimir V. Sakharov, numbered over 600,000 men. Facing them were some half a million Austro-Hungarian and German troops in six armies: First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Austrian, along with the mixed South Army. The Central Powers held a decided advantage in heavy artillery, with nearly 600 pieces against



165, but the Russians had nearly 1,800 light guns against 1,300 of the Austro-German forces.

Using the detailed maps, Russian artillery silenced many Austrian guns on the first day.

Infantry then broke through the enemy lines in several places, pushing to the Styr River on the northern end of the front. At the southern end, the Austrian Seventh Army crumbled; the Russians drove toward the Carpathian

Mountains, dividing the Austrians and leaving their commander, Colonel General Karl Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin, isolated with only a small force. Within three days, the Russians inflicted well over 100,000 casualties and took over 70,000 prisoners. On June 8, the Russians took Lutsk, an important rail junction, and threatened the next westernmost junction of Kovel.

To staunch the flow, the Austro-Hungarian High Command halted the offensive in Italy, sent two divisions east, and begged the Germans to send reserves south. General Erich von Falkenhayn, head of the German General Staff, responded sullenly but transferred two divisions from the northern sectors of the front and withdrew three divisions of reserves from the Western Front for service in Galicia. This steadied the lines of the Central Powers in the north, but in the south, Russian forces continued their advance across the Dniepr River. The German High Command transferred additional troops south in aid of Austria-Hungary, leaving the northern sectors of the Eastern Front with mere battalions as reserves. The Russian plan was working; however, Evert did not attack. He claimed first that bad weather prevented a move, then that the Germans had reinforced the points he intended to assault, necessitating a change in plan. Not until June 18 did Evert move, and then he quickly halted the weak attacks his forces made against the Germans.

His reserves exhausted, facing critical shortages of shell and ammunition; with his supply lines overextended, and confronted by fresh German troops, Brusilov paused to regroup. By the time the offensive resumed on July 28, Austria-Hungary had shifted three more divisions to Galicia and shortened their front by ceding control of the sector south of Brody to Germany. Brusilov's troops overwhelmed the Austrians regardless, pushing

into the foothills of the Carpathians in the early days of August 1916.

The German General Staff, already hard-pressed on its northern sectors of the front, drew two divisions from the west to service in Galicia and created two more service divisions from reserves on both fronts. Turkey also sent two divisions to aid the Austrians, who appeared on the verge of military collapse. Unable to muster resistance at any level, the Austrians reluctantly agreed to a unified command for the Eastern Front—essentially handing control of all military operations to the Germans—on August 28, one day after Romania entered the war on the Allied side.

Brusilov's offensive had, by that time, petered out against the stiffening resistance and mounting casualties. German forces seized control of the air and destroyed the Russian Guards Army near Kovel. Brusilov's attacks had cost the Austro-German forces over a million men captured, killed, or wounded, and reclaimed some 250 square miles of territory. The cost in men for Russia was nearly twice that, however, and critics regarded the offensive as a failure overall. Certainly the tremendous losses among the corps of officers and noncommissioned officers, many of them newly trained during the "quiet winter" of 1915–1916, contributed to the collapse of discipline in the Russian army in 1917.

Had Evert attacked as planned, it is possible that Brusilov's action might have driven Austria-Hungary from the war. As it was, the Brusilov Offensive appeared to have more than fulfilled the original goals. The Italian Army had been saved when Austria was forced to withdraw its troops from Tyrol; German pressure at Verdun lessened as troops were siphoned off to reinforce the Eastern Front, and any attempt to preempt or counter the Allied attacks on the Somme was rendered null. Falkenhayn, his strategy in

ruins, was replaced by Ludendorff as head of the German General Staff. Just how much of this was due to Brusilov's efforts, however, is debatable. Romania's entry into the war, though not strictly positive for the Allies, did drain German power further. Though the Brusilov Offensive may have dealt a severe blow to the Russian Army in terms of numbers and morale, it may also have saved the Allied war effort at a critical juncture. It was undoubtedly the greatest Russian military contribution in World War I and, some have argued, the first use of combined arms tactics.

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See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); Galicia Campaigns (1914–1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Budapest, Battle of (November 3, 1944–February 13, 1945)

A long siege that ended with the expulsion of German troops from Budapest by the Soviet army. During this one battle, Soviet forces sustained half of all its casualties during the campaign in Hungary.

The city of Budapest stretches along both sides of the Danube River and consists of Pest on the east bank and Buda on the west bank. During the siege, there was heavy

fighting for virtually every building. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were trapped in the city, and soon were caught in the cross fire without food and bereft of essential services, such as electricity. The siege lasted 108 days, and for 52 of those days, the defending Germans were surrounded.

In September 1944, Soviet troops invaded Hungary from Romania. The Hungarian government was desperately trying to leave the war, and on September 28, representatives of Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya went to Moscow. There, they signed a preliminary armistice on October 11, which Horthy announced four days later. This led to the German army's occupation of Budapest. Using Horthy's son as a hostage, the Germans forced Horthy to appoint Ferenc Szálasi, head of the German Arrow Cross (Fascist) Party, as "Leader of the Nation."

SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch commanded the German defense of Budapest. He had at his disposal the 8th and 22nd SS cavalry divisions and elements of the 13th Panzer Division, the 60th *Panzergrenadier* Division, and the 271st *Volksgrenadier* Division. Some units of the Hungarian army under General Iván Horthy fought alongside the Germans. Altogether, the defenders numbered some 92,000 men. Adolf Hitler ordered that Budapest and Hungary be held at all costs. He needed Hungary not only for its agriculture and industry, but also as a location from which to mount a future counterattack in the Carpathian Basin.

Josef Stalin's goal was to drive Hungary from the Axis alliance and introduce a Soviet-style political and social system. His plan was threatened, however, by a British proposal to send forces to the Adriatic in autumn 1944 and perhaps move against the Carpathian Basin. Stalin was determined to forestall any British presence in the area and, on October 28, 1944, he ordered the capture

of Budapest. He did not anticipate a lengthy battle for the city.

The Soviet Second Ukrainian Front (army group), commanded by Army General Rodion Y. Malinovsky, and the Third Ukrainian Front, commanded by marshal of the Soviet Union Fedor I. Tolbukin, converged on the Hungarian capital. In all, the Soviets committed some 157,000 men, including a Romanian contingent, to the operation. Red Army troops first reached the east bank of the city (Pest) on November 3, 1944, but operations then halted.

After several attempts, Soviet forces completed the encirclement of the city on December 25. On January 1, 1945, the Soviets took the first buildings in Pest proper, and by January 18, they had all of Pest under their control. Many civilians and defending army units escaped across the Danube to the Buda side, but before the evacuation was completed, all the bridges connecting the two halves of the city were blown. Meanwhile, on December 24, 1944, fighting had begun in Buda on the west bank.

Pfeffer-Wildenbruch wanted to break out on December 28, when the Soviet encirclement was still loose, but Hitler ordered his troops to stand fast. Hitler did attempt to relieve the German garrison, however. The first effort was made in early January 1945 by SS-*Obergruppenführer* Herbert Gille's IV SS Panzer Corps from Komárno, about 30 miles west of Budapest. Gille then tried again from the vicinity of Lake Balaton, to the southwest, but got no closer than 15 miles.

Intense fighting continued between German and Soviet forces in a small area of Buda, only some 3 miles by 4 miles in size. On February 11, 1945, Pfeffer-Wildenbruch authorized his remaining men to break out of the city westward through the Buda Hills to join up with other German troops just outside the Soviet encirclement. Only some 800

men succeeded. The Soviets declared Buda secure on February 13. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch was among those captured; he remained a prisoner in the Soviet Union until 1955.

The fighting claimed the lives of about 60,000 German troops. The Soviets lost 72,000 confirmed dead, with another 80,000 missing. Some 105,000 Hungarians, mostly civilians, were also dead. Among the survivors were some 100,000 Jews who had managed to escape Arrow Cross roundups. The last German army units did not leave Hungary until April 4, 1945.

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See also: Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tolbukin, Fyodor I. (1894–1949)

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Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973)

Cavalry officer, marshal of the Soviet Union, deputy commissar of defense, and commander in chief of the Soviet armies on the Southwestern Front during World War II.

Semen Mikhailovich Budenny was born in Koziurin, in the Cossack district of the Don Oblast, on April 25, 1883. The son of non-Cossack peasants, he was conscripted into the Russian army in 1903 as a private,

having previously taught himself to read. He fought in the Russo-Japanese War in a cavalry regiment, eventually becoming a non-commissioned officer.

At the beginning of World War I, Budenny was still in the army; he rose to sergeant major by 1917. He actively participated in the October (Bolshevik) Revolution and in the Russian Civil War, at one point winning a guerilla engagement against the vastly superior forces led by Anton Denikin that made him a legend of Soviet folk tales and songs.

During the Russian Civil War, Budenny raised a guerilla unit, the nucleus of the Red Army cavalry, to fight White Army forces on the Don. His unit grew to 100 men, and in second half of 1918 he was instrumental in winning the Battle for Tsaritsyn under the leadership of Josef Stalin, then local chairman of the military committee. Budenny was promoted quickly during 1919, commanding a cavalry division in January, a cavalry corps in June, and the First Cavalry Army in November. That same year he became a member of the Bolshevik (Communist) Party.

He served during the war with Poland in 1920, relieving Kiev but being defeated by General Maxime Weygand at Warsaw. Budenny then fought in the Crimea, virtually wiping out General Pyotr Wrangel's army. Under the sponsorship of Stalin, now chairman of the Communist Party, his career continued to flourish. In 1924 he became a member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet Union. From 1928 to 1932 he attended the Moscow Military Academy, graduating with honors, and in 1935 became a marshal.

In 1937 Budenny was appointed commander of the Moscow Military District, and in 1939 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. At the outbreak of World War II, he commanded an army in the war against Finland. In August 1940, he was appointed Deputy Commissar



Russia's Semen Budenny was a hero of the Russian Civil War and a political favorite of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. (Ivan Shagin/Slava Katamidze Collection/Getty Images)

of Defense. After the German invasion he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Southwest Front (army group), comprising 69 divisions, in which capacity he served from July to November 1941. He managed to escape the German encirclement at Kiev; however, as a result of this disastrous defeat, he was relieved of his command by Marshal Semen Timoshenko.

Budenny was a crack shot and an avid horseman. He remained a member of the Central Committee until 1961. He died on October 27, 1973, having been awarded the Order of Lenin several times.

Kevin S. Bemel

See also: Kiev Pocket, Battle of the (August 21–September 26, 1941); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905);

Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970); Warsaw, Battle for (August 16–25, 1920); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

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Bug Offensive (June 29–September 30, 1915)

German and Austro-Hungarian offensive against the Russians that occurred during June 29–September 30, 1915. The offensive was mounted north from Galicia on a broad front between the Bug and Vistula rivers. It was part of the Central Powers' triple offensive on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1915, along with a drive in northeast Poland over the Narev River toward Warsaw and one in the far north against Courland.

German army chief of staff General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn decided to launch a double attack on Poland from the north and south as well as maintain pressure in Courland. The Central Powers badly needed a military success, so Falkenhayn shelved his plan to defeat Serbia in order to open communications with the Ottoman Empire, while Austro-Hungarian army commander Colonel General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf set aside his own plans to attack Italy.

Falkenhayn, a staunch believer that the Western Front was the war's only center of gravity, had limited aims for this campaign,

however. He feared the vastness of Russia and problems of supply, and he claimed that his strategy was to demonstrate German military invincibility rather than to destroy Russia. His very limited objective in this campaign was to drive the Russian army from Poland, a goal that would not overly task German supply capabilities. Lieutenant General Erich Ludendorff, chief of staff of the Eighth Army in the north, objected. He favored a far more ambitious plan that he claimed would cut off and destroy the Russian forces, but Falkenhayn favored attrition tactics and rejected Ludendorff's suggestion on the claim that the German logistics system could not sustain this. Field Marshal August von Mackensen, who would make the major effort from the south, agreed with Falkenhayn's approach.

The plan was set on June 19. The southern prong would strike north from the Austro-Hungarian border. In this Galician theater, Central Powers' forces in Marshal Mackensen's Army Group would move north toward Brest-Litovsk. Mackensen had in his own army group of the German Eleventh Army and Bug Army and the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, a total of 33.5 infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions. To his right there were eight infantry and three cavalry divisions in the Austrian First Army, also under his overall command. These faced a smaller force of 33 infantry and 6.5 cavalry divisions of the Russian Third, Eighth, and Thirteenth armies, many of them fresh troops. The Russian trench system was poorly prepared to meet a major attack, and the army was short of supplies; however, *Stavka*, the Russian army headquarters, had rejected any talk of a strategic withdrawal.

Hötzendorf had hoped to move his own forces to the northeast and carry out a pincer movement to catch the Russians in the

rear. Falkenhayn, however, opposed this, fearing that German supply lines would be overstretched; he also had little faith that the Austrian units involved would be able to carry out such an operation. Mackensen agreed with Falkenhayn that the best approach was a simple pushing action with massed artillery fire.

By June 29, Austro-Hungarian and German forces were in position toward the Bug and Vistula rivers. The opening German bombardment of June 30 was extremely effective against the crowded Russian frontline positions. Some units there were reduced to one-half or even one-third their original strength. Although four corps of the Russian Thirteenth Army managed on July 9 to halt a thrust by the Austrian Fourth Army around Krasnik, the Russians were soon forced to retreat thanks to breakthroughs elsewhere. At Krasnostav on July 18, Mackensen's forces punched a hole in the Russian lines and took 15,000 prisoners. This defeat, coupled with the German drives on the Narev and in Courland to the north, forced *Stavka* on July 22 to abandon to the Germans both Warsaw and the fortress of Ivangorod.

The German Bug offensive inflicted more casualties on the Russians than even the Battle of Tannenberg (August 26–30, 1914). The offensive progressed at a slow pace, for it required vast quantities of supplies that could only sometimes be brought forward by rail. The Russian railway system only went as far as Rozwadów and later on to Lwów (Lvov); the German field railway constructed in mid-August went as far as Lublin.

Following a series of limited offensive actions, by the end of August the Central Powers had taken Lublin, Cholm, and Brest-Litovsk and driven the Russians as far back as the Pripet Marshes. At this point, the offensive came to an end; troops were removed to take part in the combined Central Powers

offensive that Mackensen himself would command against Serbia, and the marshy terrain slowed down transport and led to widespread sickness. Hötzenendorf managed to capture Lutsk on August 31, but the Russians attacked the left flank of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Fourth Army, taking 70,000 prisoners and recapturing Lutsk on September 22. A week later, the Germans recaptured it. The new Russian front line was now some 220 miles east of Warsaw.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915)

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Bukhara and Khiva, Conquest of

In the wake of the Crimean War, Russia was impotent in Europe and therefore focused its ambitions on Central Asia, especially the rich khanates of Kokand, Khiva, and Bukhara. The American Civil War (1861–1865) created a shortage of cotton in Russia and gave another incentive for the conquest of Central Asia. Perhaps the most important reason for Russian expansion in Central Asia, however, was aggressive military commanders on the spot. Generals such as Mikhail Chernaiev and Konstantin von Kaufman conquered these regions despite the counsel of restraint from the Foreign and War ministries in St. Petersburg.

Most Russian expeditionary forces were small because of logistical problems. Small numbers of Russian troops with modern

weapons, however, could stand against masses of Central Asians. Sieges were not difficult for the Russians, and major cities were easily conquered; a few artillery pieces could breach the earthen walls. Telegraphs and railroads followed the Russians into Central Asia, but did not impact the campaigns there. The three khanates, moreover, were unable to form a coalition and present a united front; they were thus picked off in succession.

Kokand was quickly subdued by Chernaiev with the capture of Tashkent in June 1865. Bukharan forces led by Muzaffar ad-Din (emir of Bukhara 1860–1885) fought Russian forces at the siege of Tashkent. Chernaiev then attacked the Bukharans at Dzhizak in January 1866, but the Russian soldiers were poorly supplied and met defeat. Chernaiev was replaced by General Dmitry I. Romanovsky.

In spring 1866, Romanovsky led an attack at Irdzhar with 3,600 men against 5,000 regular Bukharans and 35,000 Kazakhs. The Russians routed them at the loss of only one killed and 11 wounded; the Central Asians lost over 1,000 men killed. After this victory, Romanovsky laid siege to the town of Khodjent. The Russians took this town, again with only light casualties, and forced Muzaffar to negotiate a settlement leaving them in control of the area. The Russians saw the domination of Bukhara as a necessity to forestall any British advance.

In August 1866, General Nikolai A. Kryzhanovskiy, the theater commander, arrived in Tashkent and formally annexed the city and surrounding regions. Negotiations with the Bukharan envoys therefore broke down. Kryzhanovskiy responded by attacking and capturing the cities of Dzhizak, Ura-Tube, and Yani-Kurgan. Despite this, he was replaced by Kaufman in 1867.

In the spring of 1868, Kaufman learned that the clergy of Bukhara had declared *jihad*

against Russia, and that Muzaffar was gathering troops near Samarkand. On May 2, Kaufman captured Samarkand. Leaving a garrison of 700 behind, he then led 3,500 men in search of the Bukharan forces. Near Katta-Kargan, Russian forces located and defeated 21,000 Bukharans in a decisive battle. Upon his return to Samarkand, Kaufman found the 15,000 inhabitants of the city had attacked the garrison; he suppressed the rising, and rescued his men within a week.

Not long after, in June 1868, the emir signed a treaty that ceded Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan, and adjacent territory to the Russians. He further agreed to indemnify Russia for the conflict. Muzaffar remained as ruler, but Russian pacification of the region continued until 1870. Even in the 1920s, however, the Russians would have to fight occasional insurgencies in Central Asia.

Khiva was Russia's most troublesome neighbor and constantly launched raids on the Russian frontier. This remote khanate lay in the midst of a desert, over 600 miles from Tashkent. Russian occupation of Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, thus was crucial to the conquest of Khiva. In 1873, War Minister Dmitry Milutin finally authorized an attack on Khiva. Five Russian columns totaling 13,000 men, with 62 artillery pieces and several Gatling guns converged on Khiva. This was the largest Russian operation conducted in Central Asia during the period of conquest.

As always, there were numerous logistical problems; the Tashkent column alone lost 8,000 of 10,000 camels and there was a shortage of water. More men died of disease than combat, and the desert posed more difficulties than the enemy garrison at Khiva. As the Russians approached the city, the emir Muhammad Rahim fled; the city fell without a fight at the end of May 1873. Muhammad Rahim eventually returned and

surrendered to Kaufman. Khiva became a Russian protectorate, and the slave trade, one of the main activities of the city, was abolished. The Russian frontier now shifted south, from the Sir Darya River to the Amur Darya River.

William T. Dean III

See also: Cherniaev, Mikhail Grigorevich (1828–1898); Panjdeh Incident (1885); Raids in the Pamir Mountains, Soviet (1930s–1940s)

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Bulavin, Kondraty Afansievich (1660–1708)

Leader of a Cossack revolt, 1707–1708.

There are few records of the early life of Kondraty Bulavin. He fought with the Kuban and Crimean Tatars as a youth and, by 1704, had risen to the post of “ataman,” or head, of Bakhmut. As such he led a raid that destroyed the salt works at Seversky Donets in retaliation for his Tatars being evicted by the Russian government as illegitimate settlers. When Bulavin was elected head of the Don Cossacks in 1706, he used his power to lead a full-scale rebellion against the Russian state.

The Cossacks were aggrieved by the encroachment of the Russian state on their territory, which they held to be autonomous, during the reign of Peter I. The territories of what are today Ukraine and the Crimea were then the refuge of serfs, criminals, and the urban poor fleeing Peter’s Westernization and growing bureaucracy. In 1707, Peter sent a punitive expedition south under Prince Yuri Dolgorukov to capture and return escaped serfs. On October 8, a group of Don Cossacks led by Bulavin ambushed the Russian force and killed Dolgorukov.

Bulavin’s rebellion never amounted to much. He failed to coordinate his movement with other enemies of the emerging Russian state, and never articulated a positive alternative to Russian rule. Bulavin, likely illiterate, was also not a very good leader. The forces he led suffered repeated reverses at the hands of Russian frontier forces, and in July 1708, he was found dead, likely shot by his own men. The revolt petered out thereafter, and Peter sent forces to tighten Russia’s grip on Ukraine.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Cossacks; Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Razin, Stepan (ca. 1630–1671)

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Cairo Conference (November 23–26 and December 3–7, 1943)

Code-named *SEXTANT*, this two-part conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, during November and December 1943 to discuss military strategy and post-war settlements. The primary participants were U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. The meetings in Cairo took place before and after a meeting that brought together Roosevelt, Churchill, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin at Tehran. The Tehran Conference (code-named *EUREKA*) proved necessary after Stalin refused to attend *SEXTANT* because a Chinese delegation, headed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), was to participate. Because the Soviet Union was not then at war with Japan, Stalin did not want to attend or allow any other Soviet representative to take part in *SEXTANT*. Churchill had doubts about a meeting with Jiang, too, for he regarded China as a sideshow until the war in Europe was won. Roosevelt, however, envisioned China as a fourth great power after the war. In addition to large American, British, and Chinese delegations, Lord Louis Mountbatten, supreme commander of the Allied Southeast Asia Command, attended *SEXTANT* with his own delegation.

Roosevelt traveled across the Atlantic in the battleship *Iowa* and met with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Algeria before flying on to Cairo, where he met with Jiang. At the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Jiang restated their determination to fight on until the war was won. Jiang pressed for

an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to coincide with Chinese participation in the fighting in Burma. Roosevelt initially agreed to this plan but was forced to withdraw his pledge following discussions at Tehran.

The Allied leaders announced at the Cairo Declaration that after the war, Japan would be reduced to the territories it held before World War I. China would regain Manchuria, the Pescadores Islands, and Formosa, and Korea would, “in due course,” be restored to independence. In the meantime, a joint U.S., Chinese, and Soviet trusteeship would hold sway in Korea, an arrangement that might last for 40 years. The mandated Japanese islands would, in all probability, pass to U.S. control, and it was implied that the Soviet Union would regain South Sakhalin Island (lost in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War) and secure the Kuriles (which had never been Russian territory). Stalin also wanted a warmwater port for the Soviet Union, probably at Dairen, Manchuria.

The second part of *SEXTANT*, which followed the Tehran Conference, included discussions with Turkish president Ismet İnönü in an effort to draw his country into the war on the Allied side. In addition, Roosevelt informed Churchill of his decision to appoint General Eisenhower to command the Normandy Invasion.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Kurile Islands; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943)

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Cape Sarych, Battle of (November 17, 1914)

Black Sea naval battle between the Russian and Ottoman navies and significant as one of the handful of dreadnought versus pre-dreadnought naval actions. The battle occurred on November 17, 1914, off Cape Sarych on the Crimean Peninsula between the Ottoman battle cruiser *Sultan Yavuz Selim* (ex-German *Goeben*) and light cruiser *Midilli* (ex-German *Breslau*) under Admiral Wilhelm Souchon and the Russian battle squadron under Vice Admiral Andrei Eberhardt.

Eberhardt had sortied from Sevastopol with 5 pre-dreadnoughts (the *Evstafy*, *Ioann Zlatoust*, *Panteleimon*, *Tri Sviatitelia*, and *Rostislav*), 3 cruisers, and 13 destroyers to bombard the Ottoman coast of Anatolia. Souchon's *Sultan Yavuz Selim* and *Midilli* encountered the Russian ships as they were withdrawing off Cape Sarych at short range and in low visibility.

The Russians utilized a unique system of fire control derived from lessons learned during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. The second battleship in line, the *Ioann Zlatoust*, controlled range-finding for all the other ships, because the first ship was assumed to be the chief target of enemy fire. In this case, the fifth battleship in line, the *Rostislav*, was to fight on its own because it lacked the uniform armaments of the other four.

The Battle of Sarych occurred in mist at between 6,800 and 7,700 yards range and lasted just 14 minutes. In the exchange, the Russian flagship *Evstafy* sustained five hits and suffered 34 dead and 21 wounded, while

the *Sultan Yavuz Selim* was hit once and suffered 13 dead (12 Germans and 1 Turk). Souchon, realizing that he was heavily out-gunned, utilized his ships' superior speed to break off the engagement.

Jack Greene

See also: Eberhardt, Andrei Augustovich (1856–1919); Navy, Russian (1991–); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Carpathian Campaign (January 23–March 1915)

Major Austro-Hungarian offensive on the Eastern Front that ultimately failed, costing the Dual Monarchy heavy casualties. After setbacks in Galicia in 1914, the Austro-Hungarian High Command sought to regain the initiative and relieve the 130,000 defenders of the besieged fortress of Przemyśl in early 1915. This offensive gained limited ground, however, and drained the army of most of its experienced officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

The Habsburg assault from the Carpathian Mountains was the brainchild of the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff (and de facto army commander) Colonel General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. In addition to attempts at relieving Przemyśl, Conrad wanted to discourage Italy from entering the war on the Allied

side, to prevent the Russians from passing through the Carpathian barrier on the Hungarian plain, and to restore the reputation of the Austro-Hungarian Army, which had been overshadowed by the German campaigns of 1914. Conrad's plan called for a feint by General of Cavalry Baron Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin's army group toward Czernowitz on the southern end of the front, followed with the main thrust toward Przemyśl by General of Infantry Svetozar Boroević von Bojna's Third Army and German Lieutenant General Alexander von Linsingen's largely German South Army in the center. In fighting among the German High Command between the chief of the general staff, General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn, and the command team in the east, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Lieutenant General Erich Ludendorff led to only limited support for the Habsburg effort, which reflected in the creation of Linsingen's South Army.

The offensive began on January 23, 1915, and it was the Austro-Hungarian secondary thrust that achieved the most success. The Carpathian Mountains were not as high in the southern sector, and Pflanzer-Baltin's group drove the Russians back and took Czernowitz along with 60,000 Russian prisoners. Despite the losses, the Russians were able to stabilize their line and halt the Austro-Hungarian advance.

The main offensive toward Przemyśl was less successful. In this region, the mountains were from 3,000 to 4,500 feet in altitude, presenting daunting obstacles to the attacking Austro-Hungarian soldiers, especially in the dead of winter. Boroević's forces attempted to press their attack through the three main mountain passes in the region: Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok. In the passes and surrounding mountains, both sides suffered heavy losses in horrific conditions of cold and deprivation. Supplies could only be carried by pack animals, artillery was almost useless in

the snow and fog, and soldiers froze to death in appallingly large numbers. The Austro-Hungarian Third Army lost 80,000 men, half of its strength, in the first two weeks of the offensive while making little progress, taking only the Uzsok pass. Farther south, Linsingen's force fared no better.

The Russians also suffered severe losses, but General Aleksei Brusilov's Eighth Army doggedly held its ground. The Russian High Command (*Stavka*) transferred a fresh corps to the sector, and Brusilov launched a counterattack. On February 5, the Russians retook the rail junction at Mezölaborcz, but then their attack ground to a halt in the same agonizing terrain and climate conditions that plagued the Austro-Hungarians.

Undeterred by his setbacks, Conrad decided to renew the offensive at the end of February. He shifted General of Cavalry Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli's Second Army from the south and inserted it between Boroević and Linsingen's armies. The new offensive began on February 27, but it also failed against the determined Russian defenders and imposing natural obstacles. Böhm-Ermolli's main strike force, led by Lieutenant General Karl Ritter Tersztyánsky von Nádas, dwindled from 50,000 to 10,000 men in the intense cold of the mountains while gaining negligible ground. The offensive sputtered, and the Austro-Hungarian garrison at Przemyśl finally surrendered on March 22.

The Carpathian Campaign was one of the most tragic operations of World War I. The rugged terrain and cold weather added misery to offensives hindered by poor planning and the dominance of defensive firepower. The Austro-Hungarians lost 800,000 men in a fruitless attempt to save the 120,000-man garrison at Przemyśl. While their own casualties were nearly as high, the Russians were able to sustain their effort for another two years. The Austro-Hungarian Army, never able to recover from its losses in officers and

NCOs, required increased German support to remain in the war.

Curtis S. King

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Casualties, Russian, World War I (1914–1917)

Russia's participation in the Great War (or World War I) may have only lasted from July 19, 1914 to October 26, 1917, but in terms of numbers and casualty figures, the cost in lives to Russia, in comparison to other belligerent nations, was among the highest. Precise casualty figures are difficult to determine, as different methodologies and means of calculating have been employed in different reports, both official and academic. Understanding and interpreting these numbers is complicated by the passage of time, lost and destroyed reports, official historians often trying to downplay the numbers, the casual omission of World War I from the Soviet historical narrative, and the reconsideration of subsequent historians.

By the end of Russian participation in the war, at least 15 million men had served as soldiers. At the beginning of the war, Russia had a total population of approximately 167 million–169 million; however, statistics suggest that within the 50 provinces of Russia from whence men were mobilized, just

under 60 million were males. Furthermore, not all of these 60 million men were eligible for mobilization. Thus, allowing for variation from district to district, this figure indicates that between 34 percent and 54 percent of all able-bodied males were mobilized. Half of this number—7,445,000 to be precise—were mobilized in the first year of the war alone. During the second year, 4,155,000 were called up to serve, and 2,575,000 were inducted into the army in the third year of the war (1916). These numbers do not include the standing peacetime army that had existed before the war began, or those who were exempted from service. The decreasing enlistment numbers for each additional year of war are indicative of the diminishing number of able-bodied men available to be called up. As the war progressed, it thus became more and more difficult for the Russian high command to find men to replace those lost on the battlefield; as early as 1915, the Russian military had lowered the draft age from 21 to 19 in an effort to bolster enlistment numbers in addition to revising draft laws to include previously exempt groups.

At least 4 million enlisted men, and perhaps as many as 5 million, were in captivity at one time or another (at least 1 million by the end of 1914), and an additional 2 million men died on the battlefield or as a result of infectious disease or wounds. In October 1916, the report of the Narkomzdrav Commission noted that between 1.5 and 2.5 million men had to be evacuated from the front to the safety of hospitals in the rear; a later study gives a significantly higher figure of 4 million wounded soldiers.

A quarter of a million men perished in just the first few months of the war alone, most of them in East Prussia in battles between August and September 1914 when the German army virtually decimated five corps of the Russian army at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes. Already by the beginning of 1915, Russia was running short of trained officers and soldiers,

with casualty figures reaching 1.4 million by February of that year. The Russian high command was forced by sheer necessity to send untrained, and often unarmed, soldiers into the battlefield. The situation only worsened, as the German and Austro-Hungarian armies continued to advance into Poland and Galicia. Russian casualties were accruing at a rate of 300,000 per month; by August 1915 the number of captured, wounded, or killed men had climbed to 4 million. Even when the army was successful on the field of battle, Russian casualties were high, sometimes as high as 40 percent, largely because of outmoded tactics and poor leadership.

An additional 200,000 soldiers were still reported as missing at the end of the war. (In an example of the variance in casualty figures, it is worthwhile to note that the Russian general staff reported the figure of a little over 626,000 as missing, while a certain Dr. Avramov reported the astronomical figure of a little over 2.3 million missing.) Somewhere between 40,000 to 65,000 Russian soldiers were gassed; about 6,000 men died as a direct result of being gassed.

By the end of the war, total casualty figures (which include killed, wounded, disabled, prisoners of war (POWs), and missing) estimate Russia's losses at between 7.2 and 8.5 million men, just around 50 percent of the total number of men mobilized. One commission report from the end of the war breaks the numbers down thus: 1,661,804 casualties were fatal, of which 664,890 soldiers died on the battlefield; 18,378 died of wounds before receiving medical aid; 300,000 died of their wounds in the hospital; 285,000 died of disease; 285,000 died while being POWs; 7,196 were sudden deaths (presumably illness or natural causes); and an additional 50,000 deaths that were not included in previous categories. Another later report, from the 1930s, claims that just under 1 million men died as a result of wounds sustained in battle, while 2.5 million

men contracted diseases, with an additional 2.5 million wounded in action. With such high casualty figures and a correspondingly diminishing birthrate, it is not surprising that by 1917 there were 133.7 women per every 100 men, a significant increase from the pre-war ratio of 103.2 women to every 100 men.

As in other countries, lifelong scars and wounds served as constant reminders to the Russian men who did not immediately die of on the battlefield or in the hospital. A conservative estimate suggests that there were 1.4 million disabled soldiers by the war's end, though most historians currently believe that this number is significantly lower than the actuality; figures of the wounded and shell-shocked from 1917 official reports hover around 3 million men.

One reason for Russia's heavy casualties was the lack of munitions and war matériel, particularly in the first two years of the war. Already by 1914, the Russian Army had expended its entire supply of shells, and over 80 percent of its 5.6 million reserve shells had also been delivered to the front. Defeats in East Prussia followed by the Russian Army's retreat also resulted in the further loss of artillery and munitions abandoned in the retreat. By 1915, newspapers openly reported a shell shortage or crisis. This problem of a shortage of war matériel was one that the Russian government and army never completely resolved. In 1915, some 150,000 soldiers on the Southwestern Front were dispatched without rifles and over a quarter million men were still awaiting their rifles on the Western Front (the Russian term for the area corresponding to contemporary Galicia) in January 1916; soldiers literally waited for their comrades to fall so that they could pick up their weapons. This severe shortage of rifles led the army to offer civilians a bounty for rifles and other arms recovered from the battlefields. Such tactics only resulted in more bloodshed and casualties, even when the Russian Army emerged victorious.

Civilians are oft-forgotten victims of war. Few official reports contain statistics on civilian deaths and casualties, but contemporary eyewitness reports and memoirs of Russia during wartime certainly indicate that the war's toll on civilians was equally harsh. In particular, Russia had a huge refugee population, as Russian citizens either fled from the advancing enemy armies or sometimes were forced by the Russian Army to relocate. Conservative estimates are that 3.3 million refugees were forced to flee to the interior, often trudging in the mud and bitter cold alongside the army, carrying what belongings they could, begging for sustenance where charity could be found. Russian citizens on the frontiers perhaps suffered the most of all, their land becoming a battlefield between two opposing armies, their villages often reduced to rubble and anarchy, soldiers on either side engaging in rape and looting, and everything often laid waste by the scorched-earth policy of the retreating Russian Army, especially in the "Great Retreat" of 1915.

This was particularly true for Jews in the shtetls in the Pale of Settlement and Galicia, who were subjected to some of the worst of the horrors of war; Russian Jewish writer Ansky reported that one shtetl was conquered and reconquered 14 times. It is difficult to accurately determine how many civilian deaths were a direct result of enemy action, but around 1914–1915, one estimate reports about 318,000 died; this number is mostly comprised of refugees caught in the battlefields of Russia's Western Front. When considering the total effect of war on the civilian population, how the war affected access to basic necessities such as food and medicine, and how these deprivations contributed to the spread of disease and the falling standard of living, some historians have argued that an additional 10 million Russian civilians might be counted as casualties,

having been killed, wounded, or died of disease and starvation during the war.

Jenna L. Kubly

See also: Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Galicia, Battle of (1914); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Lake Naroch (Narotch), Battle of (March–April 1916); Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); Przemyśl, Siege of (September 24, 1914–March 22, 1915); Vistula River (Warsaw), Battle of the (September 29–October 31, 1914); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Casualties, Russian Civil War (1918–1922)

Tabulating the number of deaths and injuries resulting from the struggle between the Bolshevik revolutionary government and the White Russian counterrevolutionaries is a difficult task. The Russian Civil War of 1918–1921 was a no-quarter-given struggle between forces willing to take any measure, no matter

how barbaric, to further their cause. Counting deaths from the actual fighting and the attendant political terror, famine, and disease, estimates range from 7 to 13 million dead.

Best estimates for the number of military dead total approximately 800,000 for both sides, including losses from the Polish–Soviet War. The Red Army suffered 125,000 killed in action and 300,000 dead from disease including cholera, typhus, and influenza. White/Polish losses included 175,000 combat deaths and 150,000 dead from disease. That more soldiers died from disease than enemy action reflects the primitive state of medical care in both armies.

An equally difficult task is arriving at an accurate figure for both the Red and White terror. In Communist-controlled areas, as many as 400,000 may have died at the hands of the Cheka and the Red Army, through summary execution, prison, or during the suppression of anti-Bolshevik uprisings. White forces kept no records, but executed thousands of suspected Bolsheviks in the cities they occupied and, in the countryside, shot scores of captured Red partisans and villagers they believed aided those partisans. In the White-occupied areas of the west-central Ukraine, scores of Jews perished in pogroms during 1918–1919.

The vast majority of deaths during the Russian Civil War, however, were due to civilians suffering from famine and disease. The scale resulted from war-related shortages of medical service personnel, the lack of sanitation, and the inability to harvest and distribute vital food supplies. The Soviet government's own statistics showed almost 900,000 deaths from typhus and typhoid fever in 1919, and over 1 million dead in 1920.

These epidemics went hand in hand with the famine of 1921–1922, which hit particularly hard in the Volga region. Massive requisitions of food by the Bolshevik government under the policies of War Communism brought the peasantry, particularly those living in the far

eastern Ukraine, to the edge of ruin and starvation. In the Samara region on the east bank of the Volga alone, 700,000 people had died of starvation by the end of 1921.

The massive loss of life in the Russian Civil War of 1918–1921 profoundly affected the Soviet society. Analysts of Soviet Russia's political, economic, and demographic development differ over whether the brutality with which both sides waged the Civil War was implicit in the nature of the Russian Revolution or an inevitable projection of traditional Russian authoritarianism carried to extremes by the violence of World War I and the social upheaval of the Revolution. What cannot be argued is that the Civil War, with its massive losses, was the first of a series of catastrophes that affected Russia's demographic development to this day.

Walter F. Bell

See also: *Cheka (Chrezvychaynayakomissiya)*; October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); War Communism; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Casualties, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945)

The numbers of Soviet casualties from 1939 to 1945 are so numbingly large that they beggar the imagination:

- In the summer of 1941 the Red Army lost more people than lived in the state of Minnesota at the time;

- In nearly 900 days of siege, Leningrad lost more of its residents to battle, disease, and starvation than lived in Oregon and New Jersey from 1940 to 1945 combined;
- Between 1941 and 1945 the Soviet Union probably lost the equivalent of the entire U.S. population living west of the Missouri River in 1940.
- Taking the generally accepted (but unofficial) figure of 30 million Soviet dead, in the 1,417 days between June 21, 1941 and May 8, 1945, the Soviet Union lost about 800 lives every minute.

At least one scholar believes the number of total Soviet casualties might be as high as 50 million, but generally accepted figures are between 20 million and 30 million, with roughly twice the civilian deaths as military fatalities.

Like much of the Great Fatherland War (or Great Patriotic War), it is hard to know how to define “Soviet casualties” for the period, but rather than knowing where to start, it’s hard to know where to stop. The biggest challenge to counting these casualties is ideological: inflated numbers make the Soviets look as if they suffered more than their allies in the West, but lower numbers make it look as if they were better at fighting the much vaunted Germans than they really were. Over seven decades later, accuracy may be impossible for a conflict where the numbers are so large (second only to China’s losses in World War II) and so dependent on what purpose the creators have for them.

The “official” casualty figures for the Soviet Red Army and navy run from 8.6 to 14.3 million dead, 12–18 million permanently disabled by illness, wounds, or injury, and up to 2 million missing. These are generally “combat zone” casualties, or those who were killed during combat. The official Russian figure still is between 7.4 and 8.6 million military dead or missing (“irrecoverable” losses) killed in combat or “direct, intentional violence.” This is without

counting the 1.9 million returned prisoners of war (POWs) (nearly 3 million were captured in 1941 alone) and nearly 1 million “surviving missing.” There are also 2.2 million who died while performing forced labor in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, many of whom would have been POWs. On top of this, some 4.1 million civilians died of famine and disease in occupied areas, some 7 million or so were killed in combats large and small, and perhaps 3 million died as slave laborers or were executed as undesirables, rendering a total of about 13.7 million civilians dead. Unofficial figures for civilians run much higher, in some cases up to and beyond 20 million. Two million civilians or more are said to have died at Leningrad alone; about half a million were killed at Stalingrad.

Those intentionally shot by NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs; Soviet secret police) units or SMERSH (counter-intelligence) agents, commissars, other officers, or soldiers for any number of reasons are impossible to segregate, as are those who died by any other form of friendly fire. Those who died of starvation or of wounds or disease or exposure are sometimes separated into “died of wounds” and other categories, but the numbers are so large that the distinction loses meaning. Most of the returned POWs would have been imprisoned for life, exiled, or executed, as would most of the “surviving missing.” The hapless POWs were regarded as having been too exposed to the West, and those who survived outside the Soviet view were much too independent to be loose in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Just how these might have been counted (if at all) is an open question. Worse, high figures are entirely credible given Soviet combat techniques, since the Soviets lost more than 5,000 men a day in the 22-day campaign in Manchuria, when the Japanese fighting them were a mere shell of an army.

Part of the challenge in calculating Soviet casualties is determining the number of people

who were actually in uniform during the war, and many authorities are unclear on that elementary number. In 1941 especially, millions found themselves amidst soldiers, sailors, and airmen with nowhere else to go and no other means to eat other than work for the military. These nominal civilians found that fighting, no matter how hopeless, was better than German occupation or running away and risking arrest and execution. With no other resources around, they put on the uniform when their old clothes became unserviceable. These people were just as often eventually inducted as they were killed before they could become official unit members, though often even that distinction was vague. In some cases, these “ghosts” and “volunteers” were counted even after death for ration and pay purposes, corruption in the Soviet system being what it was. Either way, they were counted as casualties for propaganda purposes—or not—as the need arose. Organized partisan numbers were subject to political inflation and deflation, depending on requirements of the instant. The Jews and others murdered in concentration camps or along the roads and fields could be counted in any number of ways, and may have included military personnel or not.

Civilian figures suffer from some of the same issues. Officially, the Soviet population in June 1941 was 197,700,000, but that figure is in dispute. Counting who was supposed to be there, however, was a political problem, since officially the millions who died during the forced collectivization and in the Great Terror were not on the books. Moreover, a completely accurate census had not been conducted since the Lenin era, and those early figures were state secrets until the 1990s. The partition of Poland made things even worse, as thousands of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in the German General Government area of Poland (some of whom really were Russians and Ukrainians) were executed, worked

until death, or simply starved before 1941 but got counted in the census anyway.

Since 1945 there have been several different estimates, various means of calculation, and many different parties doing the counting and calculating. Cold War Soviet sources generally undercounted the dead while dissidents outside the country overestimated, but all estimates have been climbing steadily since 1991, both inside and outside Russia. Access to the Soviet archives has helped, but since the first official counts using them in 1993–1995 began, ever more numbers are put forth, muddying the waters even more. Where the numbers are so numbingly high, the causes of death so varied, and the means of counting so tied up in political meaning, it is difficult to have any objective accuracy. The millions who died uncounted—and now uncountable—are the last Soviet casualties of World War II.

John Beatty

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Holocaust in the Soviet Union; Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); NKVD; Order No. 270 (June 1941); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); War Crimes Soviet, World War II

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Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796)

Catherine II of Russia, born on May 2, 1729, as Sophie Friederike Auguste von Anhalt-Zerbst and best known as Catherine the Great, ruled Russia from 1762 until 1796. During her reign, Russia made significant territorial gains within western Europe (through the three partitions of Poland) and southern Europe (at the expense of the Ottoman Empire). Catherine founded many new towns and cities, and undertook many administrative reforms. An enlightened despot, Catherine often attempted or toyed with notions of democratic reform. The diplomatic importance and influence of Russia grew considerably during this period. Her reign is often considered the Golden Age of the Russian Empire.

Though Catherine’s father was a minor German noble, the family was well-connected on her mother’s side; two of her cousins later became kings of Sweden. Sophie was considered rather plain as a child, though also unusually clever. She received a good education, and read voraciously on her own. She was selected at a young age to be the bride of Peter of Holsten-Gottorp, the prospective czar of Russia, through the diplomatic maneuvering of Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia, among others. Sophie met the young Peter when she was 10, and found him repugnant. Sophie nevertheless took pains to ingratiate herself with the Russian court and quickly learned Russian, which earned her the favor of the Empress Elizabeth. On June 28, 1744, Sophie converted to Russian Orthodoxy and became *Ekaterina*, or Catherine.

The following day, Catherine and Peter were formally betrothed, with the wedding taking place on August 21, 1745. The couple’s relations were chilly from the outset, and both Catherine and Peter likely engaged in multiple liaisons; according to some reports, the

marriage was never consummated. While Peter spent most of his time drinking with companions or drilling his personal regiment, Catherine spent her time alone, reading; she also became the focal point for those at the court who opposed Peter’s pro-Prussian tendencies or simply disliked the abrasive czarevitch.

When Elizabeth passed away on January 5, 1762, therefore, Catherine quickly found herself at the heart of a coup. On the night of July 8, 1762, prompted by the arrest of a co-conspirator, Catherine went to the barracks of the Ismailovsky Guards Regiment to request protection. Having secured their loyalty, she proceeded to the barracks of the Semenovsky Guards Regiment, where she was ordained as the true sovereign of Russia. Catherine immediately ordered Peter arrested and forced him to sign a letter of abdication. His guards strangled him shortly thereafter.

Catherine and her foreign minister, Count Nikita Panin, quickly withdrew Russia from the Prussian side in the Seven Years’ War and established a loose alignment of powers including Russia, Britain (through a trade treaty), Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and Saxony. One of Catherine’s former consorts, Stanislaw Poniatowski, became King of Poland with her support. This so-called Northern System was intended to counter the power of France and Austria, and maintain a balance of power within Europe. Russia remained neutral for the remainder of the war.

In 1766, Catherine sought to take advantage of Poniatowski’s position, petitioning the Polish king to grant civil rights and the freedom to worship to Orthodox Poles. When he refused, Catherine bribed the Polish Parliament (*Sejm*) to pass the legislation, which infuriated Catholic nobles. The rising of 1768, led by the Catholic Confederation of the Ban, brought both Russian and Prussian troops in; when they infringed on Ottoman territory, the Turks joined in the fray,

ironically claiming they were coming to the defense of Catholicism.

Catherine dispatched a fleet from the Baltic under Count Alexis Orlov to the Black Sea. While her armies crushed the Polish rising and drove the Turks back in the Balkans, Orlov proceeded to destroy the Ottoman navy. Fearing Russian success would bring other powers into the conflict, Frederick II of Prussia proposed a peace settlement in which he and Catherine would each take a portion of Poland. Austria also got some territory in this first partition of 1772, but Russia gained by far the largest chunk: all of the lands east of the Dnieper River, with about 1.8 million people. Russia also retained the Crimea in its settlement with the Ottomans.

The Russian enterprise against the Ottomans had aroused unrest in Ukraine, however, by imposing greater taxes and taking more military levies from the area. Many scholars have also linked the rebellion to the unsuccessful end of Catherine’s Legislative Commission, which had been designed to bring Enlightened (democratic) reforms to Russia but ended in 1772 without result. The resulting rebellion, named after its leader, Emelian Pugachev, who claimed to be Peter III, “the true czar,” spread rapidly in 1773. By the end of that year, the rebels were within 120 miles of Moscow and the Ottomans had seized the opportunity to renew their war with Russia.

Catherine quickly negotiated a settlement favorable to the Ottoman Empire that allowed her to concentrate on ending Pugachev’s reign of terror. This marked an end to the “liberal” or “idealist” phase of Catherine’s reign, as she gave the army a free hand in suppressing the rebels and, with the 1775 Statute of Provincial Administration, granted the nobles sweeping powers in local government. Catherine, who had once dreamt of legislative government in Russia, also extended serfdom to the new Russian territories. For the remainder of her reign,




Catherine II, czarina of Russia from 1762 until her death in 1796, oversaw a vast expansion of the Russian Empire. (Library of Congress)

stability, not progress, was Catherine’s watchword. When tension grew in its North American colonies, for instance, Britain hoped for Russian support. Catherine, however, feared British dominance and remained aloof.

In 1775 Britain even attempted to hire some 20,000 Russian troops to be used against the colonists. Catherine’s rather sharp refusal of this proposal in September was governed by her determination that Russia should not appear to be subservient. She was particularly troubled by the British policy of detaining neutral ships and confiscating naval stores as contraband. In 1780, Catherine proclaimed the principles that should govern the rights of neutral shipping and formed a league of neutral nations (the League of Armed Neutrality), comprising at first Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and the Dutch Republic.

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA, 1300-1825



THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND, 1772–1795



Catherine’s main interest lay not in Europe, however, but in expanding Russian control to the south and southeast. Her “Greek Project,” the creation of a new Byzantine state with its capital at Constantinople, consumed much of her capital and attention. Directed by the court favorite, Prince Grigory Potemkin, the project was launched in 1783 after years of preparation. The Tatar khan of Crimea retired that year in favor of Catherine (and with an annual pension of 100,000 rubles). Potemkin proceeded to expand the harbors of the peninsula, to build arsenals, fortifications, and entire cities, including Ekaterinoslav (“the glory of Catherine”).

The Ottomans, however, soon demanded that Russia evacuate the Crimea, interpreting its occupation as a violation of their previous

agreements. When Catherine ignored this, they launched a new war in 1787, catching Potemkin unprepared. After some initial success, Ottoman forces were driven back in 1790 by Russian armies under Pyotr Rumiantsev and Aleksandr Suvorov. By 1792, Catherine’s forces were again threatening Constantinople, but had to settle when Britain made it clear they would intervene if the Russians pressed ahead.

Stymied there, Catherine turned back to Poland, where Poniatowski was preparing a series of liberal reforms. Feeling these would stir unrest and possibly threaten Russia, Catherine arranged a “confederation” of dissatisfied Polish, conservative nobles who invited Russia in to preserve the peace. In

spring 1792, Russian troops accordingly occupied Warsaw; the settlement of 1793—the second partition of Poland—gave a slice of Poland to Prussia, and the remainder of Belorussia and a section of western Ukraine—a further 3 million people—to Russia.

When this act spurred resistance in the form of the Kosciuszko Rebellion, Russia, Prussia, and Austria acted to eliminate Poland. In the third partition, 1794, Russia gained Courland, Lithuania, and the remainder of Ukraine. Catherine was also preparing to act against the expansion of French liberalism when she died in St. Petersburg on November 16, 1796.

Although she styled herself an Enlightened monarch, and had made efforts to bring reform to Russia early in her reign, Catherine II ranks among Russia's most memorable rulers largely because she expanded Russian power significantly. Though she did not complete her Greek Project, she did extend the southern border of Russia to the Crimean Sea, and regained much of the lands won by Ivan IV and Peter I.

Timothy C. Dowling and Janet Hartley

See also: Armed Neutrality, League of (1801); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); Northern System; Orlov, Count Aleksei Grigorevich (1737–1808); Panin, Nikita Ivanovich (1718–1783); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791); Seven Years' War (1754–1763); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Caucasus Campaign (July 22, 1942–February 3, 1943)

German military campaign, dubbed Operation EDELWEISS, to capture the rich Caspian oil fields. Although the offensive was unsuccessful, the territory taken in this operation represented the farthest points to the east and south reached by the German army during the war.

The great German summer offensive, Operation BLAU (“Blue”), opened on June 28, 1942. General Erich von Manstein had argued for a concentration in the center of the front. He believed that Soviet leader Josef Stalin would commit all available resources to save Moscow and that this approach offered the best chance of destroying the Red Army; it would also result in a more compact front. German leader Adolf Hitler rejected this sound approach and instead divided his resources. In the north, he would push to take Leningrad, still under siege, and link up with the Finns. But the main effort would be Operation BLAU to the south, with the ultimate prize being the Caucasus oil fields located near the cities of Baku, Maikop, and Grozny. Securing these would severely cripple Soviet military operations, while at the same time aiding those of Germany.

Hitler's original plan was for army groups A and B, commanded by Field Marshal Siegmund List and Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs, respectively, to cooperate in a great effort to secure the Don and Donets valleys and capture the cities of Rostov and Stalingrad. The two could then move southeast to take the oil fields. The Germans expected to be aided in their efforts there by the fact that most of the region was inhabited by non-Russian nationalities, such as the Chechens, whose loyalty to the Soviet government was suspect.

On July 13, however, Hitler ordered a change of plans, now demanding that Stalingrad, a major industrial center and key crossing point on the Volga River, and the



Caucasus be captured simultaneously. This demand placed further strains on already inadequate German resources, especially logistical support. The twin objectives also meant that a gap would inevitably appear between the two German army groups,

enabling most Soviet troops caught in the Don River bend to escape eastward.

On July 22, Army Group A's First Panzer and Seventeenth armies assaulted Rostov. Within two days, they had captured the city. A few days later, the Germans established a

bridgehead across the Don River at Bataysk, and Hitler issued *Führer* Directive 45, initiating EDELWEISS. He believed that the Red Army was close to defeat and that the advance into the Caucasus should proceed without waiting until the Don was cleared and Stalingrad had fallen.

Securing the mountain passes of the Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian seas was crucial in any operation to take the oil fields. To accomplish this task, Army Group A had special troops trained for Alpine operations, including Seventeenth Army's XLIX Mountain Corps. Supporting Army Group A's eastern flank was Army Group B's Fourth Panzer Army.

At the end of July, List had at his disposal 10 infantry divisions as well as 3 Panzer and 2 motorized divisions, along with a half dozen Romanian and Slovak divisions. Hitler expected List to conquer an area the size of France with this force. Despite these scant German and allied forces, the Soviets had only scattered units available to oppose the German advance. On July 28, the Soviets established the North Caucasus Front, commanded by Marshal Semen Budenny, and Stalin ordered his forces to stand in place and not retreat. But even reprisals failed to stem the Soviet withdrawal before Army Group A's rapid advance, which had all the characteristics of a Blitzkrieg. Indeed, the chief obstacles to the German advance were logistical, created by the vast distances involved and terrain problems. The Germans used aerial resupply where possible and also horses and camels to press their advance.

By August 9, the 5th SS Panzer Division had taken the first of the Caucasus oil fields at Maykop. To the west, infantry and mountain formations of the Seventeenth Army had made slower progress, but also on August 9, they took Krasnodar, capital of the rich agricultural Kuban region. They then moved in a

broad advance into the Caucasus Mountains, with the goal of taking the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, and Sukhumi. Soviet forces, meanwhile, continued to fall back into the Caucasus. As Budenny's North Caucasus Front prepared to defend the Black Sea ports, the Soviets sabotaged the oil fields, removing much of the equipment and destroying the wellheads. So successful was this effort that there would be no significant oil production from the region until after the war.

By the end of August, the German advance had slowed to a crawl. For the Seventeenth Army, the problems were terrain and stiffening Soviet resistance. Bitter fighting occurred in Novorossiysk, beginning on August 18 when the Germans threw six divisions against the city. It fell on September 6, although the Soviets managed to evacuate their defending marine infantry by sea.

To the east, the advance of the First Panzer Army, pushing toward the oil fields at Grozny, also slowed. Problems there were largely logistical, with a serious shortage of fuel impeding forward movement. In addition, Hitler was gradually siphoning off First Army's strength, including two divisions, some of its artillery, and most of its air support (diverted north to the cauldron of Stalingrad). Weather now became a factor, with the first snowfall in the mountains on September 12. Displeased with the progress of his forces in the Caucasus and despite List's objections, Hitler assumed personal control of Army Group A on September 10 and sacked List.

Hitler's plan proved far too ambitious for the assets committed. The weather had become a critical concern, as did continuing German logistical problems. The Soviets, meanwhile, were able to feed additional resources into the fight. On October 14, the Germans suspended offensive operations in the Caucasus, except for the Seventeenth Army's efforts on the Terek River and around Tuapse. The Germans

took Tuapse several days later but then called a halt to offensive operations on November 4.

Events at Stalingrad now took precedence. By the end of November, Soviet forces had encircled the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and Soviet successes there placed the Axis forces in the Caucasus in an untenable situation. Then, on November 29, the Soviet Transcaucasus Front launched an offensive of its own along the Terek. The Germans repulsed this attack, but on December 22, German forces began a withdrawal from positions along the Terek River. At the end of December, with the situation in the north growing more precarious daily, Hitler reluctantly ordered Army Group A to withdraw. This movement began in early January, with Soviet forces unable to disrupt it seriously. By early February, German forces had withdrawn to the Taman Peninsula, from which Hitler hoped to renew his Caucasus offensive in the spring. In October 1943, however, German forces there were withdrawn across Kerch Strait into the Crimea.

Germany's Caucasus Campaign turned out to be a costly and unsuccessful gamble. Ultimately, by splitting his resources between Stalingrad and the Caucasus, Hitler got neither. In many ways, the campaign marked the beginning of the end for Germany, and the end of the beginning for the Soviet Union.

*Michael Share and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973); Crimea Campaign (April–May 1944); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

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Caucasus Front, World War I

Caucasia or the Caucasus is a geopolitical region marking the border between Europe and Asia and is located between the Black and Caspian seas. During World War I this region saw fighting between Ottoman Empire and Russia. The 300-mile-wide area of mountain ranges and high plateaus constituting the Turco-Russian frontier in the Caucasus had, in spite of its forbidding nature, long been the primary battlefield of those two powers. Yet in 1914, Russian leaders did not regard this as a major theater of war. They rightly expected the war to be decided by the clash of mass armies on the battlefields of Europe.

Ottoman leaders, especially War Minister Enver Pasha, nourished fantastic Pan-Turkic schemes and devoted a major military effort to offensives in the Caucasus region, forcing Russia to follow suit. A four-year struggle ensued in which the Ottoman Empire suffered some bitter defeats but also scored its most spectacular success of the entire war.

The two opposing armies entered the war on the Caucasus Front insufficiently prepared for major operations. Russia normally maintained three corps in the area in peacetime, but with the war starting and the Ottoman Empire still neutral, two had redeployed to the Eastern European Front. The I Caucasus Corps that remained had been reinforced only by the II Turkestan Corps and some Cossack divisions. Split in five separate groups, this Russian army of about 100,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, and 256 guns, commanded for all practical purposes by its chief of staff, the capable Major General Nikolai Yudenich,



guarded the major communications across the frontier and maintained a general reserve around Tbilisi. The Ottoman Empire's Third Army opposed the Russians. Commanded by Hasan Izzet Pasha, it contained three corps: IX, X, and XI. These were understrength and desperately short of munitions.

Even before the Russian declaration of war on November 2, 1914, the weak Russian forces advanced across the frontier to secure better defensive positions. Within a week, Izzet Pasha had concentrated four divisions of the IX and XI corps against the main Russian body on the Kars–Erzurum Road. He checked the Russians with heavy losses in fighting around Köprüküy, pushing the attackers back toward the frontier where the latter consolidated their position after being reinforced. The Russians were more successful on their left flank, where they encountered only weak Ottoman forces. On the other hand,

Russian defenses on their right flank, around the Black Sea port of Batum, collapsed under the pressure of Ottoman irregulars.

This situation encouraged Enver Pasha to order the Third Army to undertake a major offensive, in spite of the approaching winter that would cover the area with 10–12 feet of snow and drop temperatures to -50°F . The Third Army was reinforced to 120,000 men, outnumbering the Russians, who had about 80,000 men, by 50 percent. Enver's plan was a single encirclement with IX and X corps moving through the Oltu River valley to place them in the right rear of the Russian salient, while XI Corps pinned the Russians in front. But the grandiose operation that began on December 22, 1914, resulted in disaster. Although the flanking force advanced rapidly, taking Oltu within two days and the key city of Sarikamiş within four days, XI Corps failed to pin the Russian Army.

With the aid of fresh reinforcements, Yudenich trapped the Ottoman left wing in the Turnagel Woods north of Sarikamiş. On January 4, 1915, the Ottoman IX Corps surrendered wholesale. Having suffered 50,000 casualties to Yudenich's 28,000, the remnants of the Third Army withdrew in confusion.

Fortunately for the Ottomans, the Russians were too exhausted to follow up their victory with a rapid advance on Erzurum. During the spring, the battered Third Army, having been additionally reduced by a typhus epidemic to about 20,000 men, was slowly rebuilt to combat strength. By June 1915, it numbered more than 50,000 effectives, not counting the Erzurum fortress garrison, while Yudenich, now formally commander of the Russian Caucasus Army, had about 80,000 men.

Assuming that the Third Army was still weakest on its right, as it had been in 1914, Yudenich resumed the offensive in June 1915 by pushing his new IV Caucasian Corps down the northwestern shore of Lake Van for a drive on the key city of Muş. The Ottomans, however, succeeded in concentrating in the area a total of 70,000 effectives, formed around the rebuilt IX Corps as a new wing under Abdul Karim Pasha, a fact that the Russians failed to detect. Caught in the restricted terrain by superior Ottoman forces, the Russians' advance ground to a halt.

The ensuing battle focused on the city of Malazgirt, which the Ottomans captured on July 26. Intoxicated by this success, Abdulkarim pressed on into the Eliskirt Valley, but, repeating the Sarikamiş pattern, was then checked by a Russian counteroffensive that recaptured Malazgirt on August 15. This indecisive military operation cost the Ottomans more than 80,000 casualties, with the unlucky IX Corps again almost being wiped out.

Both armies used the remainder of 1915 to rebuild their strength. Then, taking the Ottomans by surprise, Yudenich struck on January 10, 1916, with I Caucasian and II Turkestan Corps down the Kars–Erzurum road, actually where the Ottoman lines were strongest. (Following the fight for Malazgirt, both armies had stripped the Muş sector of all but the bare minimum of troops.) Still, the attackers vastly outnumbered the defenders, who had tasked three understrength corps (the IX, X, and XI) with each holding 20 miles of front line. Within a week, the Russians had carried the fortified lines of Köprüköy. Badly mauled and reduced to some 50,000 effectives, the Ottoman Third Army retreated to the Erzurum fortress area.

As the second largest Ottoman fortress (after Adrianople), Erzurum was regarded as an almost impregnable stronghold by the Ottoman General Staff. That belief may have been one reason it failed to send much-needed reinforcements quickly to the Third Army. On February 11, 1916, the Russians attacked the Ottoman lines around Erzurum. Yudenich concentrated more than 250 guns on a small sector of the line. Losses were heavy, but the Russians' three-to-one numerical superiority told. On February 16, the Third Army withdrew from Erzurum just in time to escape total envelopment. Along with the loss of the fortress, the Ottomans sustained 25,000 casualties and lost 327 guns, their hospitals, and substantial stocks of supplies. Additionally, on April 16, 1916, the only large Black Sea port in the area, Trabzon, fell to the Russians, a logistical disaster for the Ottomans in this mountainous area not serviced by railroads. Reinforced by the veteran V Corps from Gallipoli, the shaken Third Army was barely able to avoid annihilation.

During the spring, the Ottoman General Staff devised a new grand design. On the

right flank of the Third Army, a new Second Army under Ahmed Izzet Pasha appeared, formed of crack divisions no longer needed for the defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula. While the Third Army remained seriously understrength and could not effectively oppose a renewed Russian offensive in July 1916, which cost the Ottomans the cities of Bayburt on July 17 and Erzincan on July 25, the Second Army was slowly brought up to a strength of 10 infantry divisions with ample cavalry and heavy artillery, for a total of 100,000 effectives.

On August 2, Izzet Pasha launched his offensive against the Russian left flank. A month earlier, such an attack might have saved the Third Army from disaster, but now Yudenich could devote his full attention to this new threat to his flank. Izzet Pasha's offensive was poorly planned and was carried out by three widely separated columns against a Russian army that enjoyed interior lines and superior communications. Still, the Second Army's crack troops were initially successful, until they were checked by Russian counterattacks in late August. By September 26, Izzet Pasha's offensive was over. For little ground gained, he had sacrificed 30,000 irreplaceable well-trained infantry.

This proved to be the Ottoman Empire's penultimate major offensive. Soldiers on both sides on the Caucasus Front spent the remainder of 1916 and most of 1917 in the trenches with almost no action on either side. The Ottoman Second and Third armies had exhausted their offensive potential. In the second half of 1917, the Russian forces, plagued by revolutionary discontent, began to disintegrate. The Caucasus became for all practical purposes a political and military vacuum.

On the Ottoman side, the Second Army was dissolved and the entire front again put

under the authority of the Third Army. With its former corps and divisions consolidated into new ones, but still far under authorized strength, the army was hardly capable of offensive operations. However, the disappearance of any organized opposition in its front, save the "National Army" of the newly independent Armenia, seemed to warrant another offensive, the last by the Ottoman Empire.

It commenced on February 12, 1918, and was a great, if short-lived, success. Erzincan fell immediately and Trabzon within a fortnight. On March 12, Vehip Pasha was in Erzurum, and on March 25 he crossed the prewar frontier. On April 3, the Ottomans were in Sarikamiş, on April 6 in Van, and on April 14 in Batum, having reconquered within two months all the ground lost since 1914. On April 25, the 10,000-strong Armenian garrison surrendered the fortress city of Kars, which had been an Ottoman territory until 1878, along with more than 200 guns and substantial quantities of supplies.

Finally assuming a grandiose scale, the Ottoman offensive then fanned out into northern Persia and Azerbaijan. Amidst chaotic peace talks with Russian, British, German, Armenian, and Georgian envoys, the Ottomans took the major Caspian Sea port of Baku on September 15, 1918. Finally, on November 8 their 15th Infantry Division captured Petrovsk, 180 miles north of Baku. By that time, however, the Armistice of Mudros on October 30 and the Ottoman Empire's departure from the war had already rendered the vast territorial gains of its last offensive entirely meaningless.

Dierk Walter

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Erzurum Offensive (January 10–March 25, 1916); February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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Cavalry. *See* Gentry Cavalry

Chantilly Conference (1915)

The Second Inter-Allied Conference, held December 6, 1915, at Chantilly, France. The conference was the first attempt of the Entente powers (Britain, France, Italy, Serbia, and Russia) to organize a common strategy for defeating the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) during World War I (1914–1918).

The commander in chief of the French army General Joseph Joffre presided over the conference. Russian representative General Yakov I. Zhilinsky stressed the importance of cooperation, emphasizing that prior Entente offensives had been uncoordinated. As a result, the Entente had suffered a string of defeats on all fronts (Eastern, Western, Balkan, and Italian). Additionally, the British landings near the Ottoman capital of Constantinople, at Gallipoli, had also failed. To better coordinate the Entente military efforts and achieve decisive victory, the representatives agreed to launch offensives if another member of the Entente were the target of a Central Powers' offensive.

The decision to launch an attack if other Entente members were being assaulted would be tested when the Germans began attacking the French front lines around the

fortress city of Verdun in February 1916. Russia was now bound by the agreement and Zhilinsky's insistence on the requirement to launch offensives. Thus, the Russians had to react quickly to the German offensive against Verdun and launched the unsuccessful Lake Naroch attack in March 1916 and, later that summer, the Brusilov Offensive that broke the Austrian front line and forced the Germans to call off their attacks in the west. Elsewhere, the British launched an attack on the Somme in July 1916, and the Italians launched a string of failed offensives against Austria-Hungary along the Isonzo River that same year.

Tim Wilson

See also: Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Lake Naroch (Narotch), Battle of (March–April 1916); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Zhilinsky, Yakov Grigorevich (1853–1918)

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Chechen War, First (1994–1996)

Conflict between the Russian Federation and the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Chechnya declared independence from the Soviet Union on September 6, 1991. During the chaotic aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was initially unable to exert its authority over the breakaway state. Not all Chechens supported the separatist government, and opposition to



A Russian soldier carries a shell to load a cannon during an attack on the Chechen village of Stary Achkov on May 17, 1996. (AP Photo/Igor Mikhalyev)

Dzokhar Dudayev, president of Chechnya and a former Soviet Air Force general, developed into a small-scale guerilla war.

Boris Yeltsin, then president of the Russian Federation, covertly supported an attempt to depose Dudayev on November 26 and 27, 1994. Some 170 Russian tanks supported 5,000 loyalist Chechens in an attack that was supposed to seize Grozny, the Chechen capital and the heart of the separatist resistance. The effort failed with high casualties.

Separatist fighters destroyed 67 tanks and displayed Russian prisoners on TV, exposing Russian federal involvement. Yeltsin was forced to issue an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of the separatists and the return of the prisoners. Negotiations between Dudayev and Russian defense minister General Pavel Grachev led nowhere; on December 1, Russian troops began moving to the border. On December 11, Yeltsin officially ordered Russian troops into Chechnya.

The separatist fighters were well-prepared, highly motivated, and heavily armed. Chechens have a long history of resistance to Russian rule. To make matters worse, Soviet equipment deployed in Chechnya had fallen into separatist hands, and played an important role in the fighting—especially RPG-7 antitank rocket launchers, which were devastating against Russian armored vehicles. Cell phones provided easy communications between small groups of fighters. Chechen separatist fighters were supported by foreign mujahideen and mercenaries, making up a force 11,000 to 12,000 strong in total.

Russian forces were poorly prepared. Since most Russian units were drastically understrength, the 40,000-man force was cobbled together from all across Russia, including troops subject to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Coordination between the Russian Ground Forces and the MVD was poor, leading to numerous friendly fire incidents.

Russian officers were poorly briefed; conscript soldiers were poorly trained—especially for urban combat—and rules of engagement were overly restrictive or ineffective. Motivation was poor, and the deputy commander of ground forces preferred resignation to leading troops against people who were still technically Russian citizens.

During the march into Chechnya, Russian soldiers both fraternized with Chechen civilians and engaged in violence against them. Chechen separatists and the international media accused the Russians of extensive looting and human rights violations. Some Russian officers disobeyed orders to advance, complaining of insufficient air and artillery support, thus cutting forward units off from support.

Russian troops approached Grozny in three armored columns from the north, east, and west. All three were slowed by crowds of civilians and sporadic sniper fire, but managed to reach the outskirts of the city.

The first official Russian assault began on December 31, 1994. It failed catastrophically, but a second methodical effort secured the city by February 26, 1995. Extensive shelling left the city in ruins.

Resistance fighters retreated to the mountains of southern Chechnya and continued to wage a guerilla war, using snipers, raids, ambushes, and terrorism. They also exported the violence to the rest of Russia. In June 1995 and January 1996, Chechen fighters captured hostages in Russian towns, and the ineffective responses led to high civilian casualties. They continued to be resupplied across the international border with Georgia.

Paramilitary police forces, including riot police units, rotated into Chechnya to perform military functions. These special police units were accused of frequent human rights violations during clearing operations. Use of massed artillery fire inflicted high civilian

casualties and made it even harder to win over the local population. On April 24, 1996, however, a targeted airstrike killed President Dudayev. His death, though a symbolic victory for Russia, was insufficient to dismantle the Chechen resistance.

The MVD troops defending Grozny were unenthusiastic and poorly coordinated with the regular military. They were unwilling to aggressively patrol the city, and limited themselves to holding static checkpoints. Separatist fighters therefore were able to re-infiltrate Grozny. A small force captured it from the MVD in August 1996, and Russian forces began to withdraw from Chechnya.

Yeltsin signed a peace treaty with Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's successor, in May 1997. The separatists remained in control of the region, but Yeltsin put off a formal agreement on Chechnya's status until 2001. After a few years of de facto independence, a second war from 1999 to 2000 returned Chechnya to Russian control, though resistance and violence continued.

Casualties from the first war are heavily disputed. Both sides lost between 4,000 and 15,000 combatants. Estimates for civilian dead range from 50,000 to over 100,000. In total, 10–15 percent of the civilian population was killed, injured, or displaced by the fighting.

Jason Tasharski

See also: Chechen War, Second (War in the Northern Caucasus; October 1999–February 2000); Dudayev, Dzhokhar M. (1944–1996); Grachev, Pavel (1948–2012); Grozny, Battle of (December 1994–January 1995); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Chechen War, Second (War in the Northern Caucasus; October 1999–February 2000)

Conflict between the Russian Federation and the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

The 1997 peace treaty between Russia and Chechnya that had ended the First Chechen War was broken when militant leader Shamil Basayev led a Chechen invasion of Dagestan, a Caucasian republic still under Russian control. Though Russian forces repelled the attack, it and the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings provoked a new attempt to reassert Russian authority in Chechnya. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared war on Chechnya on October 1, 1999.

Russian forces were much better prepared this time. The North Caucasus Military District, which included Chechnya and the surrounding regions, was restructured to facilitate a combined command of Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) forces. The Russian government had clear objectives, and all units were fully manned.

At the start of the intervention, about 80,000 MoD and 30,000 MVD soldiers opposed 25,000 to 30,000 Chechen soldiers and 20,000 to 30,000 guerilla fighters. The Russians again used paramilitary police forces as fighting units, along with loyal Chechen police and militias, like the force led by Beslan Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny, the Chechen capital.

The Russian campaign began with the bombing of Chechen bases, which continued throughout the war. Russian ground forces moved into Chechnya from the north, advancing as far as the Terek River, which divides the northern third of Chechnya from Grozny and the more mountainous south. Russian forces established a new, loyal Chechen government in the occupied region, built strong points to control major roads, and relied on artillery to destroy separatist positions from a distance. These tactics, along with the use of Chechen MVD troops loyal to Moscow, kept Russian casualties low.

The second stage began on October 16, 1999. Under cover of continued bombing, Russian forces bypassed urban areas, instead moving to control territory. Russian commanders used artillery to engage Chechen strong points, and Russian ground troops stayed out of contact with Chechen forces as much as possible.

A third phase involved taking Grozny. As Russian troops advanced, most of the civilian population evacuated, leaving 20,000 to 30,000 civilians and about 4,000 defenders. By December, about 50,000 Russian troops had fully encircled the city. Small units, along with MoD and MVD sniper teams, moved into the city to locate Chechen fighters and spot for artillery fire. Advances were slow and measured. Much of the ground fighting was left to MVD troops, which lacked the extensive artillery support of the MoD.

Artillery fire and air strikes, along with fuel-air explosives, remained the Russian weapons of choice. Tanks were used only as direct-fire artillery support, and every MoD company had an artillery battery assigned to it. The bombardment was imprecise but heavy, paving the way for a cautious, three-week assault that began on January 17, 2000. This attack drove the Chechen resistance from the city. Withdrawing Chechen forces ran into Russian minefields and sustained heavy casualties.

This time, the Russian government offered no ceasefires. Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov made multiple peace proposals, but all were rejected. The remnants of the Chechen resistance retreated to the mountains of southern Chechnya, but Russia had regained control of the region. Small bands of Chechens carried out raids against the growing Russian infrastructure though, and the war transitioned to a counterinsurgency that Putin declared over in 2009. Russian forces committed numerous human rights violations, and Chechen guerillas carried out major terrorist attacks within Chechnya and in the Russian Federation at large. Sporadic violence continues.

Exact casualties are disputed. Estimates of separatist dead range from 1,100 to 10,000, and estimates of Russian dead range from 2,100 to 15,000. Civilian casualties could be as high as 45,000. Totals including the insurgency are much higher.

Jason Tasharski

See also: Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Maskhadov, Aslan (1951–2005); Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Cheka (Chrezvychaynayakomissiya)

Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, the first of a succession of Soviet secret police organizations. The Cheka was established on December 20, 1917, and abolished on February 6, 1922, when it was succeeded by the State Political Administration (*Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye*, or GPU).

Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, created the Cheka in 1917. The primary role of the Cheka was to combat internal threats to the Soviet regime, both in the military as well as in civil society; it had absolute authority over both. The Soviet government defined enemies to include former czarist officials and officers, including family members; the clergy; the wealthy; and any individual or group suspected of harboring anti-Soviet sentiments. Such individuals might be present anywhere, including within the ranks of Red Army. Thus, a primary mission of the Cheka was to root out subversion from within Red military formations.

Cheka teams were initially formed from existing Red Guard and ex-czarist military personnel, comprising an organization of less than 100 men. The Cheka expanded to 37,000 by 1919, growing ultimately to about 200,000 by 1921, largely because of the ongoing civil war in Russia (1918–1922). Cheka responsibilities also included administration and management of the Soviet penal labor camp system, commonly known as the “Gulag” (*Gosudarstvennoye lageri*).

The Cheka hierarchy, headed by Feliks Dzerzhinski, was organized at all levels of government, with detachments at the national, province, city, or town level. This widespread deployment allowed the Cheka to enforce control even in the more remote areas of the former Russian empire. Similarly, Chekist formations were present at all levels within the Red Army. Cheka responsibilities primarily were to root out anti-Soviet subversion and to ensure the maintenance of military and political discipline within the disparate Red Army formations.

In the summer of 1918, the Soviet government implemented War Communism, a drastic utopian policy eliminating money and private property. This policy was imposed to more effectively mobilize all economic and personnel resources to fight the civil war and defeat the anti-Soviet forces. The Bolsheviks also enacted conscription, which proved unpopular in many parts of the country where support for the communists was weak. The Cheka monitored the Red Army at all command levels for suspected disloyalty or defeatism through Special Punitive Brigades.

The Special Punitive Brigades apprehended about 1 million deserters during the period of 1918–1919. With few controls on their action, the Cheka imposed verdicts at will. Punishments ranged from forcibly returning deserters to their units

to executions. During the formation of the Red Army, ex-czarist specialists initially comprised up to 75 percent of the Red Army officer corps as there were not enough communists with the requisite technical skills, such as engineering and artillery. The Cheka forced these former czarist officers to put their skills at the disposal of the Red Army by holding the officers’ relatives as hostages. The Soviets continued to train more politically reliable personnel (usually ex-enlisted men and noncommissioned officers) to replace the ex-czarist officers, but by 1922, about 80 percent of the Red Army’s division and corps commanders still consisted of ex-czarist commissioned officers.

The Cheka also pioneered new techniques to control poorly performing Red Army formations. In August 1918, Commissar for War Leon Trotsky ordered the creation of Cheka “blocking detachments.” These units were deployed behind suspect battalions and regiments, with orders to fire on them if they retreated. Similar detachments would be used again during World War II. The Cheka remained active throughout Russia during the civil war, but those parts of the Cheka responsible for the armed forces continued to monitor the military hierarchy and enforce Soviet policies in areas under military occupation.

The Cheka was officially dissolved in February 1922 through reorganization into a new secret police organization. Renamed the Government Political Administration (GPU), the Cheka became part of the Peoples’ Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodny Kommisariat Vnutrikh Del’*, or NKVD) and continued its primary mission of identifying, arresting, imprisoning, and/or executing those identified as foes of the Soviet government.

Tim Wilson

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); Commissars Military (1917–1991); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Red Guards; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Chernaiev, Mikhail Grigorevich (1828–1898)

Mikhail Chernaiev was born on October 22, 1828, the son of a Russian civil servant and member of the minor nobility. At 19, he was a junior lieutenant entering the military academy. He joined the General Staff as a captain and saw action in the Crimean War (1853–1856). He showed coolness under fire but a lack of responsibility for his men. Despite this, he received the Saint Vladimir medal, a golden sword, and the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In 1859 Chernaiev went to Central Asia; within three years he led an invasion of Turkestan. After promotion, he seized the city of Chimkent by leading an attack through a drain pipe. In February 1865 he was appointed military commander and military governor of Turkestan. In June Chernaiev captured 30,000 Kokanese troops and the city of Tashkent. This egotistical adventurer was a poor administrator, fought with his superiors and, in 1866, was removed from his post by War Minister Dmitry Milyutin.

Until 1876, Major General Chernaiev held unimportant posts in the army and constantly

criticized the Milyutin Army Reforms and Russian policy in Central Asia. Chernaiev went to Serbia in 1876 to help in their impending war with Ottoman Turkey. He wanted to rehabilitate his career and save Orthodox Slavs. He was made commander of the Eastern Serbian Army, where he was an indecisive leader, but in Russia Chernaiev was a hero. Significant financial aid and 5,000 Russian volunteers flowed into Serbia. He was defeated repeatedly by the Turks, however, which ended his career in Serbia.

Chernaiev's actions in Serbia helped cause a Russo-Turkish war, but he did not play a major role in the conflict. In 1881, Chernaiev was made governor of Turkestan and tried to reverse the liberal reforms of his predecessor. He also annexed the Merv Oasis near Afghanistan, which heightened tensions with Britain. Soon he was removed again as governor of the region. After this, Chernaiev remained in retirement until his death in August 1898.

William T. Dean III

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Panjdeh Incident (1885); Russo-Turkish War

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Cherniakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich (1906–1945)

Soviet army general and the youngest Soviet front commander of World War II. Born in Uman in Ukraine on June 29, 1906, Ivan Cherniakhovsky joined the Red Army in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1928,

when he was commissioned. He held a variety of assignments before the war. He graduated from Kiev Artillery School in 1928 and the Mechanization and Motorization Academy in the late 1930s. By 1940, he was a colonel commanding the 28th Tank Division in the Baltic Special Military District.

Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Cherniakhovsky fought with his division as a part of XVIII Tank Corps on the Leningrad Front until July 1942. After being promoted to major general and then lieutenant general, he commanded Sixtieth Army and took part in the Kursk Offensive of 1943. He was promoted to colonel general in March 1944. Marshal Georgy Zhukov recommended him to command the Western Front, which he took over in April 1944 just before it was renamed the Third Belorussian Front.

In the Belorussian Offensive, Cherniakhovsky's command participated in the taking of Minsk; moved through Latvia and took Vilnius; and drove into East Prussia, eventually taking Königsberg (now Kalinin). Promoted to general of the army in June 1944 just days before his 38th birthday, Cherniakhovsky was one of the finest Soviet front commanders. Unusual for senior Soviet commanders of the war, he was a Jew and had joined the army after the civil war and never attended the Frunze Military Academy. Cherniakhovsky did not live to see the capture of Königsberg: he was mortally wounded by artillery fire at Melzak, Poland, and died on February 18, 1945.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Belorussia Offensive (June 23–August 29, 1944); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Chesme, Battle of (July 5–7, 1770)

Major Russian naval victory over the Ottoman Turks. In 1769, Count Aleksei Orlov proposed a Russian naval expedition into the Mediterranean to strike at the Ottoman Turks as part of a wider conflict with the Ottoman Empire that had begun the previous year. Given the Russians' inexperience with long-distance navigation and the length of the supply line from the Baltic, the venture was risky.

The first Russian ships arrived in the Mediterranean in spring 1770. Surprised at the bold Russian move, the Ottomans proved reluctant to engage. After preliminary skirmishing, the Ottomans anchored in a defensive position near the city of Chesme, between the island of Chios and Anatolia. The Ottomans had at least 20 major vessels, but suffered from poor leadership under Ibrahim Hosameddin, Hassan Pasha, and Djaffer Bey, while the Greek sailors in the fleet proved unenthusiastic.

The Russian command suffered from conflicts between admirals Grigory Spiridov and G. K. Elphinstone (on loan from the British Royal Navy), but Orlov took command, ending the difficulties. Orlov commanded 9 battleships, 3 frigates, 1 bomb craft, and 17 lighter vessels and, though outnumbered almost 2–1, took the offensive. Beginning at about 11:30 a.m. on July 5, 1770, Orlov's ships engaged the anchored Ottoman ships.

The chief action came between Spiridov's *Sv. Yevstafy* and Hassan's *Real Mustafa*. During the fight, the *Mustafa*'s burning mainmast crashed down onto the *Sv. Yevstafy*'s deck. The *Sv. Yevstafy* exploded

almost immediately, followed by the *Mustafa* moments later. Both senior commanders survived, though most of their crews did not. The Ottomans cut their anchor lines and retreated into Chesme harbor. Aside from the *Sv. Yevstafy*, the Russians suffered little damage due to the Ottomans' poor gunnery.

The Russians blockaded the Ottomans and carried out harassing bombardments while plotting their next move. Some of the British officers in Russian service had experience with fire ships, and the tactic seemed perfect for assaulting a numerically superior enemy fleet that was well supported with shore batteries. Four fire ships prepared for the assault on the night of July 6, while other Russian ships distracted the shore batteries, and the bomb ship kept up its fire.

In the early morning of July 7, the bombardment set one Ottoman ship afire. The fire spread quickly, causing two Ottoman ships to explode and further spreading the flames. Of the four fire ships in the attack, the Ottomans sunk one, one struck a ship already aflame, and a third carried out a successful attack. That was enough. Flames and exploding powder magazines sowed such chaos that the final fire ship aborted its mission; there was little left to destroy. The Russians succeeded in capturing and towing away one Ottoman battleship and five galleys in the confusion.

The victory was nearly complete. The Ottomans lost 11 battleships destroyed and 1 captured, plus 12 frigates and escort vessels destroyed, 8 galleys destroyed and 5 captured, and 32 small craft destroyed. Ottoman casualties are indeterminate, but they lost 8,000 men at a minimum, while the Russians lost about 500. The Russian fleet became the dominant naval force in the eastern Mediterranean and remained active, winning several small victories, but the Russians lacked the naval and military power to follow up

the victory with an advance on Constantinople (Istanbul). Nevertheless, the victory at Chesme made a significant contribution to Russia's gains in the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kinardji when the Russo-Turkish War ended in 1774.

Grant T. Weller

See also: Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Orlov, Count Aleksei Grigorevich (1737–1808); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

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Chichagov, Pavel Vasilievich (1767–1849)

Russian general and army commander.

Pavel Chichagov was the son of Admiral Vasily Chichagov and studied in the Russian Naval Corps before starting service as a sergeant in the Life Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment in 1779. In January 1782 he transferred to the 1st Marine Battalion and, in 1782–1784, he took part in the campaign in the Mediterranean Sea as an aide-de-camp to his father. Chichagov became a naval lieutenant on September 17, 1783, and captain lieutenant on April 25, 1787, before serving on the ship of the line *Iezekil* under Rear Admiral Timofei Kozlyaninov in Danish waters in 1788.

During the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790, he distinguished himself serving on the ship of the line *Rostislav* in the naval

engagements at Eland, Vyborg, and Revel. For his services he was promoted to captain second class and awarded the Order of St. George (4th class) on May 29, 1790, and a golden sword. He had the honor of delivering news of the victory at Vyborg to Czarina Catherine II, for which he was promoted to captain first class on July 8, 1790.

After the war, Chichagov studied in Britain from 1792 to 1793. He took command of the captured Swedish ship of the line *Sophia Magdalena* on July 19, 1793, and in 1794–1796 he commanded the *Retvizan* in the Baltic Sea. Chichagov rose to captain brigadier on November 24, 1796, and took part in the naval maneuvers at Krasny Gorky in June 1797, and received the Order of St. Anna (2nd class). However, he was discharged because of a disagreement with Czar Paul I in October 1797. Paul pardoned him two years later and promoted him to rear admiral on May 20, 1799. Yet Chichagov was soon thereafter falsely accused of treason and imprisoned in the Petropavlovsk Fortress on July 2, 1799. After investigating the case, Paul acquitted him and restored his rank on July 13. Late that year Chichagov participated in the expedition to Holland and fought at Den Helder and Texel. For his services he received the Order of St. Anna (1st class) and a golden sword with diamonds (a gift from King George III of Britain).

Returning to Russia, Chichagov became an adjutant general to Czar Alexander I on May 24, 1801, a member of the Committee on Navy Reorganization on September 5, 1802, vice admiral on November 25, and the deputy minister of the navy on December 12. Over the next five years, Chichagov introduced a series of reforms to modernize the Russian navy. He was appointed minister of the navy with the rank of admiral on August 1, 1807. He became a member of the

State Council on November 25, 1810, though he resigned because of poor health on December 10, 1811, and served as an adjutant general to Alexander. The following year Alexander appointed him the commander in chief of the Army of the Danube and of the Black Sea Fleet, and governor general of Moldavia and Wallachia on July 16, 1812. However, as the Treaty of Bucharest between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was concluded before Chichagov arrived at the army headquarters in the Danubian Principalities, he did not participate in military operations against the Turks.

On September 30, 1812, the Army of the Danube merged with the Third Reserve Army of Observation, and Chichagov took command of the newly created Third Western Army. He drove the Austrian troops to the Bug River and advanced to Kamenetz and Visoko-Litovsk. Chichagov attempted to cut Napoleon's line of retreat on the Berezina River on November 25–26, but he failed and was largely blamed for this fiasco, although generals Mikhail Kutuzov and Peter Wittgenstein should have shared the responsibility as well. He captured Smorgon on December 7 and pursued the French into Poland in January 1813. In that year he was relieved of command, ostensibly for poor health, but in reality he was harshly criticized and widely blamed for mishandling the operation on the Berezina. Chichagov was offended by such criticism and requested an indefinite furlough in March 1814, settling in France. He was relieved of all positions but remained a member of the State Council for the next 20 years.

In 1834 he disregarded Czar Nicholas I's decree limiting residence abroad to five years and was discharged from the Russian service on October 29, 1834. He was also dismissed from the State Council and his property was requisitioned. Chichagov died

on September 1, 1849 in Paris. His interesting memoirs were published posthumously in Paris.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Paul I (1754–1801); Russo-Swedish War (1788–1790); Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

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Chinese Civil War (1911–1949)

The Chinese Civil War spanned nearly half a century between the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the final victory of the Chinese Communists over Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists (*Kuomintang*) in 1949.

This war was a multifactional struggle that went through several phases. Chiang appeared close to victory when his troops encircled the main Communist base in Jiangxi Province in late 1934. This campaign nearly destroyed Mao Tse-tung’s forces and forced the survivors to make the famous “Long March” to Yenan, where they arrived toward the end of 1935.

The course of the war then was profoundly altered by Japanese intervention in China, beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and followed by the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. This became part of

the East Asia and Pacific theater of World War II. The Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945 seriously undermined Chiang’s regime and facilitated the Communist victory.

The Soviet Union and the United States played major roles in the conflict, but neither could control its outcome. As Soviet policy in China evolved under the stewardship of Josef Stalin, it was driven less by Communist ideology than by traditional concerns about the security of China’s long border with Siberia and the protection of Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway, as well as its maritime Pacific provinces. This meant preventing any other power from gaining ascendancy in North China and Manchuria.

From 1917 to 1928 the Soviets essentially forced the Chinese Communists to cooperate with Chiang’s nationalist movement. The USSR supplied the *Kuomintang* with arms, training, and advisors. This proved vital in the success of Chiang’s 1926–1928 Northern Expedition to bring the area under central control. Following the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist-Communist alliance in spring 1927, however, Stalin encouraged the Chinese Communists to resist through a series of urban armed uprisings. This resulted in a series of catastrophic defeats that discredited the pro-Moscow wing of the Chinese Communist Party and led to the ascendancy of Mao Tse-tung and his followers.

Stalin continually played the Nationalists, Communists, and local warlords against one another, providing arms and money to anybody willing to accept his help, thus keeping China weak and divided, and minimizing any threat to the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern interests. As Japan became more aggressive, however, Stalin urged the Communists and the Nationalists to form a “United Front” to fight the invaders, thus minimizing the threat of a Japanese attack against Siberia, and weakening both Japan and China. As part of

the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Agreement of April 1941, however, the Japanese agreed not to attack the Chinese Communist sanctuaries. Stalin in turn acquiesced in intensified Japanese operations against the Nationalist government.

The German invasion of Russia in 1941 and the need for stability in Northeast Asia led Stalin to urge Mao to keep the peace with Chiang and the Chinese Nationalists. After December 1941, the Soviets further sought to avoid provoking the United States, which was committed to supporting Chiang and the Nationalists against the Japanese.

The end of the war in Europe strengthened Stalin's position in China and Northeast Asia. The events of August 1945, in particular, changed Moscow's stance toward China's civil strife but not its ultimate aims. The Soviet Union broke its neutrality agreement with Japan and declared war on August 8. The Soviet Army commenced Operation AUGUST STORM on August 9 and rapidly overran Manchuria, parts of north China, and northern Korea before Japan formally surrendered on September 2, 1945. Soviet armies completely controlled Manchuria.

The Chinese Communists did not immediately benefit from the USSR's military presence. Stalin was skeptical about the Chinese Communists' chances to win a renewed civil war. Nor did he want a Nationalist victory, which would place a strong anti-Communist regime allied with the United States on Russia's eastern borders. The Soviets advised Mao to act with restraint and did nothing to undermine the efforts by the United States to broker a settlement.

When talks broke down in January 1947 and all-out civil war resumed, Moscow again used the war to keep China weak and divided. Stalin provided the Chinese Communists only with sufficient military and economic aid to hold rural Manchuria and

North China, and keep them dependent on Soviet support.

Events proved that Stalin and his cohorts seriously misjudged the balance of forces in post–World War II China. The string of spectacular victories by the Chinese Communists in Manchuria and North China in 1948, plus the collapse of Nationalist China's economy, led to complete Communist victory on the Chinese mainland by the end of 1949. Stalin was as shocked by this outcome as the United States and its allies. A strong China on Russia's Far Eastern border, even a Communist China, was the last thing Stalin wanted.

Walter F. Bell

See also: October (November) Revolution (1917); Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Trans-Siberian Railway; World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Chkheidze, Nikolai Semenovich (1864–1926)

Menshevik leader in Russia and in Georgia. Born on June 13, 1864, at Kutaisi on the eastern shore of the Black Sea into a well-to-do family, Nikolai Semenovich Chkheidze was expelled for revolutionary activities from two different universities. He then taught

school and went to Batumi, where he became the leader of a large and active Social Democratic Party organization. When the Russian Social Democrats split into two factions in 1903, Chkheidze sided with the Mensheviks (minority), opposing the Bolsheviks (majority). During the Russian Revolution of 1905, Chkheidze remained in Batumi.

Chkheidze was elected to the Third and Fourth Dumas (lower house of the Russian parliament) representing the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. In the Duma, Chkheidze headed the Social Democratic faction and worked, largely successfully, to reconcile the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. When World War I began, Chkheidze led the Social Democrats in voting against financing for the war.

During World War I, Chkheidze sought to find a middle ground to accommodate the defensist (prowar) and the internationalist (anti-war) wings within his party. Despite his considerable skills as a mediator, Chkheidze was unable to accomplish this. After the February 1917 revolution that overthrew Czar Nicholas II, Chkheidze became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which emerged as a parallel government to the Provisional Government. Chkheidze saw the danger of two governmental authorities and approved the entrance of Soviet representatives into the Provisional Government in the spring of 1917. That summer, Chkheidze supported the Socialist Peace Conference in Stockholm that unsuccessfully sought to end the war.

Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917, Chkheidze returned to his native Georgia. There he played a major role in the creation and maintenance of an independent Georgian Menshevik-led government. Chkheidze was in Paris seeking support from the allies when the Red Army

conquered Georgia in 1921. Depressed over the Bolshevik victory, Chkheidze committed suicide at Leuville-sur-Orge, France, on June 13, 1926.

Michael Share

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917)

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Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich (1900–1982)

Marshal of the Soviet Union who took the surrender of Germany's Berlin garrison in 1945. Born in the village of Serebrianye Prudy in the Moscow region on February 12, 1900, Vasily Chuikov left home and became a mechanic at age 14. He joined the Red Army four years later. By 1919, he had risen to command a regiment, and during the Russian Civil War, he fought in Siberia and in the western Ukraine. He also fought in the 1920 Russo-Polish War. Chuikov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1925 and was assigned to China two years later, fighting in the battle for the Chinese Eastern Railroad in 1929. He served in the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army until 1932 and managed to survive the purge of the officers in the Far East in the late 1930s.

Chuikov served in the Soviet invasions of Poland (1939) and Finland (1939–1940), commanding the Fourth and Ninth armies, respectively. He was promoted to lieutenant general in June 1940 and returned to China for a third tour, serving as a military attaché beginning in December 1940. But he was recalled in March 1942 to become deputy commander and then commander of the newly formed Sixty-Fourth Army (July 22, 1942). A protégé of Georgy Zhukov, Chuikov then took command of Sixty-Second Army on the west bank of the Volga River at Stalingrad, which he defended at tremendous cost. His determination was a major factor in enabling the Soviets to hold until they could mount a counteroffensive.

Assigned to the Southwestern Front in March 1943, the Sixty-Second Army was re-designated the Eighth Guards Army. Chuikov's troops spearheaded the liberation of Ukraine and Belorussia from German forces, and he was promoted to colonel general in October 1943. In mid-1944, Eighth Guards Army was transferred to Konstantin Rokossovsky's First Belorussian Front. The unit then distinguished itself in operations in eastern Poland, taking Lublin and Lodz. The Vistula–Oder Operation between January and February 1945 opened the way to Berlin, and Chuikov's tanks led the final assault on Berlin in a front-wide night attack; on May 2, 1945, Chuikov's headquarters took the surrender of the German Berlin garrison on behalf of the Red Army high command.

Chuikov was promoted to general of the army after Victory in Europe Day (May 8) and served as deputy commander and then commander of Soviet occupation forces in eastern Germany (1946–1953). Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955, he served as commander of the Kiev Military District (1953–1960) and as commander of

Soviet Ground Forces (1960–1964). He was chief of civil defense from 1961 to 1972, after which he served in the general inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense. Chuikov died in Moscow on March 18, 1982.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Frunze Academy; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Churchill-Stalin Meeting (Code-Name TOLSTOY; October 9–10, 1944)

Conference in Moscow that determined the postwar spheres of influence in eastern and central Europe. Concerned particularly about issues involving postwar Poland, Greece, and the Balkans, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill suggested the meeting, code-named TOLSTOY. Soviet leader Josef Stalin would not travel from the Soviet Union, so on September 27, 1944, Churchill asked him to receive a small British delegation to discuss these and related issues, including the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan.

Facing imminent national elections, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt could not

attend. Roosevelt saw the meeting as a preliminary for the forthcoming summit at Yalta and asked that U.S. ambassador W. Averell Harriman observe; however, Harriman was not present for some crucial two-man talks.

Churchill, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and chief of the imperial general staff General Alan Brooke flew to Moscow, where they stayed from October 9 to 18, 1944. British ambassador Clark Kerr joined the delegation.

Churchill's primary concern was to gain freedom of action in the difficult Greek political situation, which teetered on civil war. This he secured. During the dinner conversation with Stalin, he produced a half sheet of paper and wrote out proposed spheres of postwar influence: Romania, 90 percent Soviet; Greece, 90 percent British; Yugoslavia and Hungary, both to be evenly divided between the USSR and the Western Allies; and Bulgaria, 75 percent Soviet. Stalin checked and approved the page and returned it to Churchill. Although the numbers may seem somewhat arbitrary at first glance, with the exception of those for Greece, where the issue was in doubt, they reflected the reality of a surging Red Army and understated it in regard to Yugoslavia and Hungary. All parties concurred they were guidelines for discussion and nothing more.

Churchill and Stalin agreed to put off decisions about Poland until Roosevelt could be present. Still, there was considerable argument over the "London" versus "Lublin" Poles and how they might share power after the war. Extensive discussions of military plans also took place, and regular reports were sent to Roosevelt by Churchill and Harriman, and to the War Cabinet in London. The meeting laid some of the groundwork for the Yalta Conference, but it also cleared the way for firm British action in Athens in December 1944, designed to put down Greek Communist guerrillas. The

Soviets, true to the TOLSTOY discussions, did not intervene.

Christopher H. Sterling

See also: Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991)

As the world's leading communist power for most, if not all of the Cold War, the USSR was the main antagonist and opponent of the United States. Tensions between the two powers date back to the revolution and civil war that led to the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917–1918. Any chance of recognition from the West, much less good relations, essentially ended in 1924, with the German-Soviet rapprochement and the Zinoviev affair in Great Britain. It was not until 1933 that the American government recognized the Soviet Union diplomatically, and relations between the two nations remained chilly until 1941, when the United States and the USSR found themselves on the same side of the war against Germany and Japan. As the World War II drew to a close, however, the lingering mistrust between the two reappeared and, combined with fundamental ideological differences, led to the Cold War.

The main postwar goal of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Josef Stalin



A watchtower on the Spree River, part of the Berlin Wall system marking the divide between East (Soviet sector) and West (Allied sector) Berlin, 1976. (AFP/Getty Images)

was national security. Stalin wanted to acquire territorial “buffer zones” that would provide physical defense against first German and then any possible western European and American attack. The Soviet leadership believed that this, along with reparations with which to restore the shattered economy and society of the USSR, was the least they deserved for their role in defeating Germany. At the same time, the Soviet leaders hoped to secure and expand the future of communist ideology by surrounding the USSR with like-minded regimes. Though his policies appear to have been fundamentally motivated by practical concerns of national security, Stalin was also—at least at some level—a convinced socialist who saw the future in Marxian terms as a struggle between capitalism and communism.

In domestic politics, therefore, Stalin attempted to restore the party line in the years after the World War II. Prisoners of war

returning from the West who might have been “infected” with dangerous ideologies were sent to the Gulag. The leniency shown in Soviet culture during the war, when nationalism and Orthodoxy were allowed into the open in order to rally the populace, quickly disappeared. In 1946, the Soviet authorities launched a campaign known as the *Zhdanovshchina* intended to force artists, writers, and other cultural figures to follow strict Stalinist ideals in their works. Three years later, Stalin used the excuse of Andrei Zhdanov’s death to launch a purge of the Leningrad Party apparatus. Yet another purge was being prepared (on the same pretext) in 1953, indicating that Stalin remained intent on bending the nation and the Party to his will.

In the international arena though, it is clear now that the Soviets knew they were not dealing from strength at the outset of the Cold War. The USSR had lost some 22 million people in World War II and faced a



United States that possessed nuclear weapons. According to Ivan Maisky, once Soviet Ambassador to England, the USSR's direct losses from the war equaled at least one-third of America's national wealth. As a counter, the Soviet Red Army was in physical possession of much of eastern and central Europe when the war ended in Europe, and the United States desired Soviet assistance in Asia. It was a position that did not preclude concession, but also did not leave much room for negotiation.

Both at Yalta (February 1945) and at Potsdam (July–August 1945), the Soviets put forth their demands for reparations and territory. From earlier dealings with British prime minister Winston Churchill and because of excellent intelligence, Stalin was confident that the Western Allies would accede to his territorial demands and was willing to be moderate in other areas. Despite advice to seek more, Stalin initially demanded only \$10 billion in reparations

from Germany and its satellites at Yalta. Privately, the Soviets expected to get at least that much again unilaterally in the form of forced labor and the dismantlement of German industry. While the Western Allies recognized that the Soviet's leading role in the war in Europe entitled them to a preeminent role in eastern Europe after the war at Yalta, they refused to negotiate specific figures for reparations.

Stalin nevertheless won formal recognition of the Soviet-sponsored Polish government-in-exile at Lublin. The British and Americans also agreed to allow the USSR to annex the eastern portions of Poland and, in exchange for a Soviet commitment to enter the war against Japan, promised the Kurile Islands, lower Sakhalin Island, and the Liaodong Peninsula of China (which included Darien and Port Arthur) to the Soviet Union. In return, Stalin agreed to allow some members of the western Polish government-in-exile to hold positions in the Lublin regime, to hold free,

fair, democratic elections in Poland as soon as possible, and—with the caveat of requiring veto power in the Security Council—to join the United Nations (UN).

This pragmatic approach also led the Soviets to withdraw from Iran in 1946, to discourage a communist rebellion in Greece, and to try and rein in both the Korean and Chinese communist parties. The Soviet's inability to reach an acceptable agreement regarding the future of Germany, however, gradually drove Stalin to take a harder ideological line. Recent archival sources indicate that Stalin desired a unified Germany that would be friendly toward, if not completely within, the Soviet sphere of influence.

With this in mind, the Soviets exerted their influence within their zone of occupation after 1945 in support of a communist alternative. Led by Walter Ulbricht, a group of Soviet-trained German communists rebuilt the party, organized trade unions, and distributed food in the eastern zone. The Soviets then engineered a merger with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) within that zone, but they were unable to convince the western SPD to follow along.

Soviet actions that countered the unifying efforts of their German proxies were largely responsible for the increasing divide. The Red Army's behavior in Germany was somewhat less than circumspect, and Stalin's territorial acquisitions meant that the Soviet forces oversaw the forced movement of some 6 million persons from the former Polish and Prussian territories. Thousands of Germans were taken and shipped back to the Soviet Union as virtual slave laborers, and hundreds of German enterprises that fell within the Soviet zone were dismantled and shipped back to the USSR as well.

Stalin carefully avoided any blatant displays of disagreement over the management of eastern Germany, however, until the

spring of 1947, when the announcement of the Marshall Plan apparently convinced him that the United States was trying to build an industrial base in Western Europe for future attacks against communism. The Soviet response to these economic initiatives in the Western zones was to blockade Berlin, which lay deep within the Soviet zone. They hoped to win support by providing food and energy to the population, and to force the Allies from the city, which they could then use as a bargaining chip. British and American resolve, manifested in the Berlin Airlift, forced Stalin to admit defeat in May 1949.

Even before that, however, the Soviets had abandoned their policy of accommodation. In September 1947, Stalin orchestrated the creation of the Informational Bureau of Communist Parties (Cominform), a renewal of the Communist International that had been abandoned during World War II as a gesture of goodwill. Leaders of the French and Italian communist parties were urged to take a more militant line against their governments. The carefully balanced and democratic governments of states within the Soviet sphere were purged of any potential opposition to the communists in 1948 and 1949. In Poland, for example, the representatives of the London government-in-exile who had been allowed into the regime in 1945–1946 were now removed and jailed, along with the “wayward” communist leader Władysław Gomułka and thousands of lesser political opponents. The new, loyal regimes assented to the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet substitute for the Marshall Plan, in January 1949.

The Soviet zone of occupation in Germany quickly evolved into a separate state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), which the USSR recognized in October 1949. Yugoslavia, on the other

hand, led by the “renegade” communist Josip “Tito” Broz, was cast out of the Soviet bloc in 1948. In 1949, Hungary’s Internal Affairs Minister László Rajk and former Bulgarian deputy premier Traicho Kostov were arrested and eventually executed. Bloody purges swept through the governments of Eastern Europe as Stalin tightened Soviet control of the region.

Even as the “Iron Curtain” rang down decisively in Europe though, the Soviet Union faced a new challenge, this one in Asia. In early 1949, the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong emerged triumphant in the decades-long struggle for control of China. Though the USSR publicly welcomed the arrival of a second communist power and championed Mao’s regime in the UN, Stalin and his henchmen were far from delighted. Not only had they mismanaged and attempted to subjugate the Chinese Communist movement since its birth in the 1920s but Mao’s ideology challenged the hegemony of the Soviet communism in the international arena. When Mao visited Moscow in the winter of 1949–1950, Stalin refused initially to even meet with him, much less discuss the revisions to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements that Mao desired. The fear that China might emerge as the leader of Asian communism not only led Stalin to relent but in January 1950, it also drove him to support the national ambitions of Kim Il Sung, the communist leader of North Korea.

Kim had asked the Soviet leader to back the military reunification of Korea since at least March of 1949, but Stalin consistently demurred. Not even the Soviet Union’s development of its first atomic bomb in August 1949 persuaded him to risk a confrontation with the United States. Only the unfortunate combination of the Chinese threat to Soviet ideological leadership and statements by leading American officials including

Secretary of State Dean Acheson that implied South Korea lay outside the American sphere led Stalin to change his mind in April 1950.

Two months later, fully supplied with Soviet military materiel and the approval of Mao—to whom Stalin had delegated veto power over the enterprise—Kim launched the Korean War. When the Soviet’s absence from the UN General Assembly (in protest over the refusal to allow Mao’s regime to assume the Chinese seat) allowed the United States to marshal international support and reverse the fortunes of war at Inchon, Stalin neatly delegated the defense of North Korea to Mao as well.

While these maneuvers preserved at least the appearance of Soviet ideological leadership and communist solidarity, the costs were significant. Fearing monolithic communist power bent on world domination, the Western Allies rallied together. They opened negotiations to rearm West Germany and bring it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as part of the defense against any communist aggression in Europe. The United States signed a separate peace treaty with Japan, pairing it with a defense treaty that not only denied the Soviet Union de jure recognition of their territorial acquisitions there but also provided military bases to support the American strategy of containment. Though Stalin attempted to regain the initiative with a note proposing a united, neutral Germany in March 1952, there was little hope of it being accepted. When the Soviet dictator died in March 1953, the Cold War was at its peak, with a proxy war going on in Korea and both sides racing to build up their armaments in case a hot war should break out.

In the uncertainty that followed, however, Stalin’s heirs moved quickly to lessen tensions both domestically and internationally.

Though both Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin's notoriously hard-line foreign minister, and Lavrenty Beria, the even more infamous head of the Soviet secret police, were in the initial group that succeeded the dictator, it was Georgy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev who really directed policy. Both men favored pragmatic politics and better relations with the West. Food prices were lowered, and the focus of the Soviet economy shifted from industrial goods to consumer products. The purge already in progress, the so-called Doctors' Plot, was curtailed and the accused were released. Thousands of other inmates from Stalin's camps were given their freedom as well. Beria himself was arrested, tried in secret, and shot, purportedly for spying for the British.

The thaw in the ideological battle extended to foreign affairs as well. Soviet pressure brought the North Koreans to the negotiating table and effected a settlement in early 1954. One year later, Soviet concessions led to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, breaking a decade-long deadlock over the future of that state. Khrushchev, who had emerged as the dominant figure in the new Soviet leadership, reconciled with Tito and visited Belgrade. The nations of Eastern Europe signed the Warsaw Pact in 1955, pledging mutual defense. He met with the leaders of the Western Allies in Geneva in July 1955 in an attempt to mitigate tensions. To cap it all off, in February 1956 Khrushchev denounced the policies and methods of Stalin in ringing terms in his famed "secret speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Similar criticisms of Stalinist policy immediately after the dictator's death had led to a rising in East Germany on June 16–17, 1953. The new accusations caused rebellions elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Strikes and demonstrations in Poland forced the

government to release Gomulka, who then became first secretary of the Polish Communist Party with Khrushchev's grudging assent. Imre Nagy, a moderate Hungarian communist, likewise rose to power in the wake of Khrushchev's revelations. Popular protests against the Soviet occupation soon forced the Red Army to withdraw from Budapest. When protracted negotiations failed to produce a solution and Nagy announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, however, the Soviet Army moved in and suppressed the rebellion in bloody street fighting. The Soviet action and the inaction of the Western powers, who were distracted by the Suez Crisis, made it clear that the spheres of influence delineated after the war would not be challenged.

The rest of the world, however, was up for grabs; Khrushchev's adopted philosophy of "peaceful coexistence" held that war between the superpowers was neither inevitable nor desirable, but competition was allowed. He and other members of the Soviet leadership accordingly toured the world, offering friendship and Soviet aid. In 1955, Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, the president of the USSR, had visited India, Burma, and Afghanistan. When Fidel Castro's revolutionary movement gained power in Cuba in 1959, Khrushchev was quick to recognize the regime as an ally and proffer assistance. A new Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact extended technical and financial aid to China on a large scale in 1959 as well. His largest and best-known venture in this regard, however, was to subsidize the Aswan High Dam in Egypt in 1964, thus extending Soviet influence into the Middle East.

Khrushchev sincerely believed the Soviet economy could overtake the United States, proving the superiority of communist doctrine and providing an attractive model for third-world nations to emulate. He initiated

a series of reforms with this aim in mind, beginning in 1957 with the reorganization of the central economic ministries of the Soviet Union. The following year saw an adjustment in state investment priorities, and in 1959 the USSR adopted a new, aggressive Seven-Year Plan designed to increase agricultural output and production of consumer goods. The Soviet leader was so confident of success that he allowed an exhibit of the American way of life in Moscow in 1959, where he engaged U.S. vice president Richard Nixon in the famed “Kitchen Debate” on the merits of the two economic systems. In September of that year, Khrushchev became the first Soviet leader to visit the United States.

Although Khrushchev’s programs met with success initially—most notably with the launch of “Sputnik” in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s orbiting of the earth in 1960—the Soviet Union made little progress in the long run. Khrushchev’s highly touted “Virgin Lands” Program to vastly expand the cultivated areas of Soviet Central Asia dissipated in a chemical-induced dust storm. His *rapprochement* with the United States angered the Chinese, who accused the Soviets of revisionism, among other things. Mao argued in 1960 that even nuclear war would be preferable to peaceful dealings with the United States.

Soviet-American relations remained tense throughout the period though, thanks largely to Khrushchev’s habit of fomenting crisis as a matter of policy. The Soviets had produced their own hydrogen bomb in August 1953, for instance; four years later they successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering such weapons to the U.S. mainland. Khrushchev used the missile threat liberally, convincing many Western analysts that the Soviet Union had in fact surpassed the United States in that

area. Khrushchev also revisited the issue of Berlin in November 1958, threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR if the Allies did not sign a treaty recognizing the existence of two Germanys and “the free city of West Berlin.” It appears now that the Soviet leader intended to use the city as a lever to open talks with the United States that he believed would lead to a European settlement and perhaps even the end of the cold war. Though no progress was made even on smaller issues, a 1959 meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower was cordial enough and seemed to bode well for the future.

It did not help Khrushchev’s cause, however, when the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane in mid-1960 and paraded its captured pilot, Gary Francis Powers, in public as an example of American untrustworthiness. The event scuttled a second summit with Eisenhower, and when Khrushchev did meet with President John F. Kennedy in June 1961, progress was limited by the Soviet leader’s condescending attitude. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, in combination with renewed Soviet nuclear testing, also helped curtail any realistic chance for an understanding with the United States.

The final blow to Khrushchev’s aspirations, however, came with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Hoping to steal a march on the Americans and force them to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal in the game of global power politics, Khrushchev had arranged for the placement of Soviet missiles on Cuba, only 120 miles from the coast of Florida. American intelligence, however, discovered the installations before the missiles were in place and, in early October 1962, President Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent their arrival. After a period where the world held

its breath while Soviet ships approached the Caribbean and nuclear war seemed imminent, Khrushchev backed down and the Soviet ships bearing the weapons returned to the USSR. This humiliation, combined with the failure of several domestic economic reforms in the early 1960s, finally convinced the other members of the Soviet Presidium that Khrushchev had to go, and he was duly removed in October 1964.

As in 1953–1954, the change in leadership brought uncertainty and change to Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, in particular, loosened once again as pressure for reform mounted in Moscow. In Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, new economic systems emphasizing market mechanisms instead of centralized control came into effect by 1968. Alexander Dubcek, who became the leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968, boldly permitted political reforms as well.

By allowing independent pressure groups and relative freedom of the press, Dubcek and his allies hoped to create “socialism with a human face,” an aim not far off Khrushchev’s desire for communism led by economic success. Like Khrushchev though, Dubcek miscalculated the effect of his policy; the new Soviet leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev was not prepared to tolerate such developments. Soviet tanks rolled into Prague on the night of August 20–21, 1968, bringing an end to the so-called Prague Spring and to most hopes of reform in eastern and central Europe. Though the USSR allowed Poland to raise loans in the West to facilitate economic expansion in 1970, the “Brezhnev Doctrine” of 1968 emphatically restated the principle of 1956 that Soviet influence remained supreme in that sphere.

Although that statement of policy went unchallenged by the West, it stirred dissent

among other communist states. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia all condemned the Soviet action. Only 61 out of 75 nations attending a June 1969 meeting in Moscow agreed to sign the main protocol. China denounced the USSR in strident terms, and skirmishes along the Siberian border between the two powers raised the possibility of open warfare between the two communist powers later that year.

On all other fronts, however, Brezhnev and his cronies were more successful in pursuing Khrushchev’s foreign policy than Khrushchev had been. Soviet friendship with Cuba remained warm, and the USSR pursued close ties with India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. Relations with West Germany also improved, and a treaty recognizing both German states was signed in 1970. Salvador Allende, a Chilean Marxist friendly to Moscow, rose to power in that same year, extending Soviet influence in the region briefly. While Soviet-supported forces in North Vietnam wore down the American-supported forces in South Vietnam, Brezhnev repeatedly trumpeted the Soviet Union’s support for national liberation movements everywhere. The USSR and Cuba both sent aid to liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique.

Despite these Soviet adventures, relations with the United States were cordial enough to merit an upgrade from “peaceful coexistence” to “détente” in the eyes of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and started Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) in 1969. The resulting Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed in 1972. Visits between American and Soviet leaders became a fairly regular occurrence, with Nixon visiting Moscow in 1972 and 1974 while Brezhnev came to New York in 1973. In 1975, both states

signed the Helsinki Final Act, culminating several years of negotiations on questions of European boundaries and human rights.

Tensions did not, of course, disappear completely. In 1977 the USSR stationed new SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. The United States retaliated by introducing cruise missiles to bases in West Germany and the United Kingdom, and sent new Pershing missiles to West Germany as well. A second round of SALT not only prevented crisis but also reaffirmed the policy of *détente* by reaching a tentative agreement on missile placement in Europe in 1979.

Whatever goodwill existed between the two states in the 1970s, however, dissipated in the wake of the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. U.S. president Jimmy Carter ordered an immediate increase in defense spending, the arms race resumed, and *détente* collapsed. The ideological divide between the two superpowers deepened when Ronald Reagan won the presidency in November 1980 and again when the USSR approved the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Even Brezhnev's death in November 1982 and another transition period failed to halt the development of a new cold war.

As it had in 1953 and in 1964, Soviet policy moved toward reform and compromise during the period of transitional leadership. Brezhnev's successor, the former Soviet ambassador to Hungary and KGB chief Yuri Andropov, strove to revitalize the Soviet system by introducing new discipline. He implemented anticorruption and antidrinking programs, introduced new measures to ensure punctuality in the workplace and commissioned studies for sweeping economic restructuring. To gain the requisite fiscal breathing space, Andropov also attempted to resuscitate *détente*. He called for a summit with Reagan, proposed further

reductions in nuclear arms, suggested a nuclear test ban and, most startlingly, offered the possibility of a treaty forswearing attack in January 1983.

Reagan responded by announcing the funding of research on a Strategic Defense Initiative—the so-called Star Wars system for space defenses against any missile attack—in March 1983. Andropov refused to believe that any such system would be purely defensive, and suspicions mounted on both sides. It appeared things might reach crisis proportions when Soviet air defenses shot down a South Korean airliner, flight KAL-007, which strayed into Soviet air space on September 1, 1983. Diplomats on both sides acted quickly to diffuse the situation, but were unable to renew the thaw of the 1970s. Any chances of further progress were forestalled first by Andropov's serious kidney trouble, then by his death on February 9, 1984, and then by the illness and incompetence of his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, an octogenarian who suffered from emphysema and lived only until March 10, 1985.

The man who succeeded Chernenko, however, moved with speed great enough to make up for both Chernenko and Andropov. A protégé of Andropov and a relatively young man (he was 54 when Chernenko died), Mikhail Gorbachev was known as a reformer, a practical intellectual, and an ambitious man of action. He had traveled in Western Europe, and both he and his wife Raisa appeared at ease in Western society—a marked difference from all previous Soviet leaders since Lenin. Like most of those leaders, however, Gorbachev was a committed socialist; he believed that vigorous reforms would prove the viability of the system, and that Soviet communism and capitalism could coexist peacefully even as they competed economically.

His initial moves came, therefore, in domestic policy with attempts to revitalize Soviet agriculture and manufacturing through a program of “acceleration” (*uskorenie*) and “openness” (*glasnost*). This soon gave way to a general “restructuring” (*perestroika*) that included foreign affairs, and especially Eastern Europe. Like Andropov, Gorbachev sought on the one hand a respite from the arms race and from international distractions. On the other hand, he also believed that a reformed and reenergized Soviet socialist economy could deal with the challenges of the United States and world capitalism. If the United States would not negotiate, he would act unilaterally.

Gorbachev stated his intention to reverse the long-standing Soviet policy of controlling internal developments in the states of Eastern and Central Europe at a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in March 1985 and initiated plans to extricate the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in October. He had cordial meetings with President Reagan in Geneva in November 1985 and in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. At the second meeting, he briefly won Reagan’s agreement that all nuclear weapons on both sides should be destroyed within a decade before U.S. advisers effectively vetoed the accord. Negotiations continued, however, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty stipulating the destruction of all ground-based nuclear weapons was signed in December 1987. In April 1988, the Soviet Union said it would withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and Gorbachev later announced a 10 percent reduction in the size of the Red Army that would coincide with the recall of six Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe.

These measures did, indeed, lead to the end of the Cold War, but not in the way that Gorbachev imagined. The leaders of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe felt betrayed

by Gorbachev’s initiatives, while nationalities and dissidents within the Soviet Union used their new freedom to explore various means of escaping Russian domination. In November 1988, for example, the Estonian Supreme Soviet declared itself able to veto laws passed in Moscow. The Baltic states, citing the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 that Gorbachev had made public, clamored for independence. Large public demonstrations for independence took place in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine as well.

By the middle of 1989, the movement for independence and democracy had spread to Eastern Europe. Poland held free, if limited, elections in June 1989 that were won handily by the opposition. In September, the Hungarian government dismantled its fortified frontier with Austria and permitted free movement across the border. Thousands of East Germans exploited this loophole to escape to the West while thousands of others demonstrated in the streets of Leipzig and other East German cities. Erich Honecker, general secretary of East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party resigned in October 1989, and on November 9, the new East German regime permitted its citizens to visit the West without hindrance. The Berlin Wall, long a symbol of the divided world of the Cold War, came down within days. The communist leaders of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia stepped down, and Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown and executed.

The Soviet Union did nothing; within 18 months, it too would cease to exist, unable to either reform or sustain the communist system that had existed since 1918. And with that, the Cold War, the ideological divide that had held the world in thrall for nearly 50 years, came to a close.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984); Austrian State Treaty (May 15, 1955); Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949); Berlin Rising (June 16–17, 1953); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Hungarian Rebellion; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945); Prague Spring (1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); SALT I (November 1969–May 1972); SALT II (1972–1979); Suez Crisis (1956); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Commissars, Military (1917–1991)

Political officers assigned to the Soviet military to enforce the authority of the Communist Party. In the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sought to obtain the loyalty of the Russian military to secure its hold on power as well as confront the emerging White (monarchist) forces opposing them. To this end, the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars was established in April 1918. A principal function of the commissars was to supervise the activities of “military specialists”—former czarist

officers or noncommunists whose skills the Red Army required. All orders issued by military commanders therefore had to be countersigned by commissars as representatives of the CPSU. This led to a de facto dual command in many Red Army units.

The exact status and function of commissars following the Russian Civil War (1918–1924) were a focal point of the reforms of the Red Army initiated by Mikhail Frunze in the 1920s. The dual-command system was replaced by single command giving prominence of authority to the military commander. The military commissar was relegated to the secondary role of providing political education to Red Army units.

As Stalin consolidated his power over Soviet society in the 1930s, the powers of the military commissars (largely the “power of the pistol,” to carry out death sentences on the spot) were increased. This peaked during the Great (Military) Purge of 1937, which greatly affected the officer corps of the Red Army. After the poor performance of the Red Army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939, however, Stalin again curtailed the power of the commissars as part of the extensive efforts to rebuild the effectiveness of the Red Army.

On July 16, 1941, the powers of commissars were reintroduced as a desperate measure to strengthen discipline within the ranks of the Red Army in wake of the German invasion. The continued poor performance of the Red Army led to a return to the single-command structure in October of 1942 though, with the commissars relegated to secondary positions of authority behind battlefield commanders. Military commissars remained a vital part of the Soviet military structure throughout World War II, in spite of their decreased power and general unpopularity among front-line soldiers.

After World War II, the military commissars continued to operate, but their roles were largely relegated to political education

within the Soviet military as governed by the Main Political Administration. The reforms initiated by Gorbachev in the 1980s further curtailed the powers of the commissars. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the use of military commissars was discontinued within the Russian military.

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See also: Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Conscription. *See* Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918)

Constantinople Agreements, World War I

Series of five secret agreements made during 1915–1917 between Britain, France, Russia, and Italy to partition the Ottoman Empire and allot the territory to the Allies at the end of World War I. These were possibly the most important secret agreements of

the war. On March 12, 1915, an understanding between Britain, France, and Russia provided that on an Allied victory, Russia would secure Constantinople and the Bosphorus Straits commanding the entrance to the Black Sea.

The second agreement, the Treaty of London, concluded on April 26, 1915, added Italy as a party to the agreements and brought it into the war on the Allied side. Among territorial concessions to Italy were the Dodecanese Islands, Dalmatia, Trentino, and a part of Adalia that was proportional to territorial holdings granted the other powers in the Ottoman Empire.

The third treaty, concluded in talks during March–April 1916, was known as the Anglo-Franco-Russian Accord. These three powers divided up the Ottoman Empire. France was to receive Syria, Anatolia, and the Mosul Vilayet. Britain would get Mesopotamia, Baghdad, and Basra. Russia would receive Armenia, part of Kurdistan, and areas along the Black Sea to be agreed on at a later date.

The fourth treaty resulted from discussions during May 9–16, 1916, and settled all territorial disputes between Britain and France. This treaty also placed Palestine under international control.

The fifth treaty, known as the Treaty of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne was concluded during April 19–21, 1917. It satisfied Italy regarding its claims in Anatolia and gave it Smyrna (Izmir), in addition to what it had gained in the Treaty of London.

When the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in the fall of 1917, they made these treaties public and promptly denounced them as imperialist. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson also opposed secret treaties, and in fact made that opposition known in his famous Fourteen Points speech in January 1918. That opposition led to the revision of these agreements during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, although the League of

Nations mandates given to the French and British in the Middle East closely followed the Constantinople Agreements. Although these areas were not annexed outright by the mandate powers, France and Great Britain certainly exerted much influence there over the succeeding decades.

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See also: October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Construction Battalions (Soviet)

Soviet or Russian “Military Construction Troops” (*Stroitel’nye Batal’ony—Strojbat* in the vernacular), usually congruent to a battalion-sized formation. Shortly after the Munich Agreement of 1938, the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Defense formed conscript units with the explicit aim of fortifying the USSR’s western border. Intended for combat only as a last resort (as supplementary line infantry), construction battalions were equipped and trained less thoroughly than standard engineer units and, beyond building and maintaining defensive works, were available for constructing national economic projects.

During the “Great Patriotic War,” these units became more active (rather than reactive) in repulsing and counterattacking *Wehrmacht* offensives, more portable to support Soviet motorized and armored units, and more flexible in fortification of flanks and

junctions between large units. Their work was especially valuable in blunting the *Wehrmacht* offensives in the vicinities of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Kursk. Construction battalions also increasingly took on other engineering functions such as laying wire and setting up radio stations, improving roads and rail lines, mine clearing and emplacement, smoke generation, camouflage (to include erecting decoys), and bridging operations.

In 1945, the *Strojbaty* transitioned to rebuilding Soviet cities and strategic industries (e.g., railroads, metallurgy, and airfields), and were often employed for the more arduous tasks of postwar reconstruction. In the 1950s, construction battalion taskings were incorporated into the Five-Year Plans for the Soviet centrally planned economy; the defense ministry repeatedly altered and codified changes to the military hierarchy to define these units’ position. Between 1951 and 1957, construction battalions were placed under Main Administrations for construction, defense building, special building, and airport and special building. Since the 1960s, these units have completed projects as diverse as ICBM silos, the Moscow Olympic Stadium, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, and the Tbilisi subway system, while supporting Soviet contingents in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Afghanistan.

During the Cold War, these units held a total of 100,000–400,000 conscripts, often employed for nonmilitary tasks without adequate support from either responsible military or civilian authorities. Morale was consequently poor in construction battalions, and they developed a reputation for crime, desertion, and abuse of soldiers within the ranks. In 1990 the use of construction battalions by civilian ministries was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Soviet, which recommended abolition of this practice

within a year. The Soviet Union dissolved shortly thereafter, but the current Russian Federal Agency for Special Construction now employs similar units to perform tasks such as rebuilding military infrastructure in Chechnya, fortifying Russia's Arctic border, repairing fortifications along the Georgian border, and disposing of chemical weapons stockpiles.

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See also: Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944)

Renewal of warfare between Finland and the Soviet Union following the Winter War. The fighting occurred mainly northwest and northeast of the Soviet city of Leningrad.

Finland's rejection of Soviet demands for territory and bases to protect access to Leningrad—including the cession of Viipuri

(Vyborg), Finland's second largest city, and the surrounding Karelian Isthmus—led to the first Finnish-Soviet War, known as the Winter War. The war began in November 1939, and although the Finns fought well, the odds against them were hopeless. In March 1940, Finland was obliged to sue for peace, in which it had to cede even more territory that the Soviets had originally demanded.

Fearing additional Soviet demands and resenting Soviet interference in its policies, Finland aligned itself with Germany. In fall 1940, chief of the Finnish General Staff Lieutenant General Erik Heinrichs held talks in Berlin with German leaders, who requested Finnish assistance during Operation BARBAROSSA, the planned German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Finnish government welcomed this as an opportunity to recover territory lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War.

As planning progressed, the Germans and Finns agreed that German forces would secure the nickel-rich Petsamo region and attack Murmansk in the far north, while the Finns would be responsible for operations in the southeast toward Leningrad and Soviet Karelia, centered on Petrozavodsk, capital of Karelia. General Carl Mannerheim commanded the Finnish forces, as he had in the Winter War of 1939–1940. Mannerheim had 16 divisions: 11 along the frontiers, 1 opposite the Russian base at Hanko, and 4 in reserve.

On June 22, 1941, the Germans launched their massive invasion of the Soviet Union. Finland had already secretly mobilized its forces and declared war on June 25, but as a cobelligerent of Germany rather than as an ally. The German drive in the far north from Petsamo eastward fell short of both Murmansk and the large Soviet naval base at Polyarny. German forces also had little

luck driving east from the northern city of Rovaniemi, failing to cut the Soviet rail line running from Murmansk south along the White Sea coast. In the south, however, the Finns made much better progress. Preoccupied with the massive German onslaught, Red Army forces north of Leningrad were outnumbered.

Mannerheim divided his forces into two armies: one drove down the Karelian Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, and the other marched southeast between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega toward the Svir River to take Petrozavodsk. On June 29, the Finnish Karelian Army (II, IV, VI, and VII corps) attacked west and east of Lake Ladoga, crossing the Russo-Finnish border of 1940, recapturing Finnish Karelia, and driving on toward Leningrad. Aided by German contingents, Army Group Mannerheim attacked Soviet Karelia. Farther north, combined Finnish and German forces recaptured lost Finnish territory around Salla while the German mountain troops, coming from Norway, reached as far as the Litsa River on their drive toward Murmansk.

The Finns had originally planned to unite their troops with German Army Group North around Leningrad. On September 1, the Finns reached the old Russo-Finnish border. Despite heavy fighting, the Soviets were able to withdraw, but by late August the Finns had recovered all territory lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War. The Finnish attacks stalled north of Lake Ladoga in September.

Although the Finns were not eager to take non-Finnish land, they did advance somewhat beyond the pre–November 1939 borders for defensive purposes. Much to Germany's displeasure, however, they refused to cooperate with German troops against the city of Leningrad. Finnish and German commanders disliked each other, and the German air

force failed to provide as much air cover as had been promised. German troops did not perform well in the northern part of the front. In the dense forests and swamps that marked the terrain in the north, tanks, heavy artillery, and aircraft were often ineffective. Finnish casualties were not light, and Finland had a small population and insufficient resources for a long war. Given these points, the Finns only undertook those operations that suited them, and that did not include Leningrad. The Finns were nonetheless disappointed that the German army was unable to secure a rapid defeat of the Soviet Union.

After capturing Petrozavodsk and Medvezhegorsk on the western and northern shore of Lake Onega, in December the Finns established a defensive position somewhat inside Soviet territory and about 20 miles from Leningrad. Had the Finns advanced farther, Leningrad would probably have fallen to the Germans, with uncertain consequences for the fighting on the Eastern Front. The Finnish Front, however, remained largely static from early 1942. Despite some Soviet counterattacks toward Petsamo, the battle lines changed very little in the months to follow.

At this point, in August 1942, Moscow offered the Finns extensive territorial concessions in return for a separate peace, but the Finns, confident of an ultimate German victory, refused. In September 1941, London and Washington made it clear to Helsinki that any Finnish effort to advance beyond its prewar frontiers would mean war. Indeed, Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941.

As the war continued into 1942 and then 1943, the Finns lost enthusiasm for the struggle, especially when German military fortunes changed. In January 1944, a Soviet offensive south of Leningrad broke the blockade of that city. With the tide fast

turning against Germany, the Finns asked the Soviets for peace terms, but the response was so harsh that Finland rejected it. Not only would Finland have to surrender all its territorial gains, but it would have to pay a large indemnity.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin then decided to drive Finland from the war. The Soviets assembled some 45 divisions with about half a million men, more than 800 tanks, and some 2,000 aircraft. Using these assets, in June 1944 the Soviets began an advance into Finland on both flanks of Lake Ladoga on the relatively narrow Karelian and Leningrad fronts. While the Finns were well entrenched along three defensive lines, they could not withstand the Soviet onslaught. Viipuri fell on June 20 after less stubborn resistance than during the Winter War. Heavy fighting also occurred in eastern Karelia. Although they failed to achieve a breakthrough, Soviet forces caused the Finns to retreat and took the Murmansk Railway.

After the fall of Viipuri, the Finnish government requested German assistance. The Germans furnished dive-bombers, artillery, and then some troops, but they demanded in return that Finland ally itself firmly with Germany and promise not to conclude a separate peace. President Risto Ryti, who had been forced to provide a letter to that effect to German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (which bound him, but not his country, to such a policy), resigned on August 1 in favor of Marshal Gustaf Mannerheim.

On August 25, Helsinki asked for terms. Moscow agreed to a cease-fire to take effect on September 4, but Soviet forces actually fought on for another day after that. One of the cease-fire terms was that the Finns should break diplomatic relations with Berlin and order all German troops from Finnish soil by September 15. German leader Adolf Hitler refused the Finnish request for an orderly

departure of his forces and ordered German troops in northern Finland to resist expulsion and, if forced to retreat, to lay waste to the countryside. The German troops followed this order to the letter. Because there were 200,000 Germans in Finland, the damage to Lapland, where they were located, was considerable. During October, the Russian Fourteenth Army threw back German forces at Liza, supported by a large amphibious landing near Petsamo, and by the end of the month the Germans had withdrawn completely into Norway.

The war ended for Finland on October 15, 1944. The Continuation War cost Finland some 200,000 casualties (55,000 dead)—a catastrophic figure for a nation of fewer than 4 million people. Finland also had to absorb 200,000 refugees. Finland agreed to draw its forces back to the 1940 frontiers, placed its military on a peacetime footing within two and one-half months, granted a 50-year lease of the Porkkala District, allowed the Soviets access to ports and airfields in southern Finland, and provided the Soviet Union use of the Finnish merchant navy while the war continued in Europe. Finland also paid reparations of \$300 million in gold over a six-year period. Stalin did refrain from absorbing the entire country, but in the following decades Western-oriented democratic Finland was obliged to follow policies that would not alienate the Soviet Union.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Cossacks

The Cossacks are a Russian tribal group of horsemen from the west Asian steppes known for their warlike nature. The Cossacks probably originated from the serfs in the Moscow area during the 14th and 15th centuries. They fled their peasant lives under the yoke of the aristocratic boyars and established farming and stock-raising communities along the Dnieper, Don, Kuban, and Ural rivers and in Siberia. Toward the end of the 15th century, Ukrainian Cossacks formed the Zaporozhian Sich on a fortified island in the Dnieper—perhaps the first Cossack state. The name “Cossack” is probably from the Turkic *kazak*, which translates variously as “freeman” or “wanderer.” They first appeared as raiders and pirates in the 1500s and became both soldiers of the czar and pioneers almost by accident.

In 1581, the Cossacks were hired by a merchant family, the Stroganovs, to drive back Tatars (Mongols) who had been controlling Siberia and raiding into Muscovite

lands. Siberia was seen as a potential source of great wealth in furs that the Stroganovs, with royal support, could exploit. To benefit trade, the Stroganovs also hoped to turn the Cossacks, who had often raided their caravans, into allies or else to see them die at the hands of the Tatars.

Under the leadership of Yermak, their hetman (chief), 800 Don Cossacks entered Siberia in September 1581. Why they launched their campaign at the beginning of winter is a mystery, as they suffered in the open. In the spring of 1582, they pushed deeper into Siberia and met the forces of the main Tatar chieftain, Kutchum Khan. At first, the Cossacks fared well against superior forces because they had arquebuses and the Tatars had no experience with gunpowder. With those matchlocks, Yermak defeated Kutchum’s forces and captured Kutchum’s capital at Sibir. The Cossack chief had lost many of his men to disease, exposure, and guerrilla warfare by the Tatars though. Yermak died a year later but the power of the Tatars was broken, and the Russian Czar Ivan IV expanded his country eastward.



A Cossack cavalry unit charging with sabres drawn on the Crimean front, May 1942. (UIG/Getty Images)

The early Cossacks tended to move and raid by river, establishing villages and trading posts at river junctions and engaging in pillage and commerce much like the early founders of Russia, the Vikings (Rurikads). The Cossacks tamed the frontier for their own purposes, but at the same time, they acted as willing or tacit agents of the czar. By the 1630s, Cossacks had reached the Pacific Ocean, and a generation later, they had traversed the Aleutians into North America. Their wandering also took them southward toward the Caspian and Black seas, with Russian authority and settlement moving in behind them.

In 1650, the Russian merchant Khabarov led a Cossack force across the Amur River in search of sables. They encountered Manchu tax collectors and soon thereafter, Chinese troops. Russians sparred with the Manchus along the frontier for almost 40 years, and the Cossacks did most of the fighting. After signing a treaty in 1689 that ceded control of Central Asia to the Manchus, the Cossack tradesmen looked toward the Pacific. Cossack fur traders explored and trapped in Alaska, western Canada, and even the Rocky Mountains.

Cossack and Russian interests did not always coincide in the western lands, however. Although they served Czar Ivan IV in his campaigns in Astrakhan and the Crimea, relations with later czars ebbed and flowed. During the Time of Troubles—a conflict over the throne between Boris Godunov and the False Dmitry, a pretender claiming to be Ivan IV's grandson—the Cossacks seized the opportunity to establish a homeland for themselves along the Don River.

In 1648, a Cossack uprising began after the Poles attempted to acquire territory in the Ukraine that was populated by Zaporozhe Cossacks. The Poles attempted both to impose feudalism on the population and to

ban the Russian Orthodox Church. Under the leadership of hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a mixed Cossack and Muslim Tatar army from the Crimea routed a Polish army at Korsun. Believing that his people alone could not defeat the Poles, Khmelnytsky offered his homeland, the Ukraine, to Czar Alexis I. Under the Act (Treaty) of Pereyaslav, Russia took over the Ukraine in return for guaranteed local autonomy for the Cossacks.

The Russo-Polish War continued until 1667 with the occasional interference of Sweden and the shifting loyalties of various Cossack and Tatar forces. Russia gained most of the Ukraine. When Czar Alexis I proved tyrannical, Stepan Razin led an uprising that temporarily established an independent state around Astrakhan and Tsaritsyn (present-day Volgograd, previously Stalingrad).

The Cossacks once again fought for the czar when Peter I captured the Black Sea port of Azov in 1696, a battle in which the Don Cossacks played the major role. In 1705, Peter I created a new army by drafting a peasant out of every 20 households for lifetime military service, but he raised a separate force of 100,000 Cossacks. When Catherine II, known as Catherine the Great, became czarina, she too had mixed relations with the Cossacks.

Although she invited 54 Cossacks to be among the 564 representatives from across Russia to assist in drafting a new legal code, her reluctance to emancipate the serfs provoked a Cossack revolt. In 1772, Emelian Pugachev, a Don Cossack and veteran of service in the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish War and the wars against Prussia, claimed that he was Peter III (who had been murdered some years earlier) and stated he would overthrow the usurper Catherine II. With the aid of almost every contingent in southern Russia that had a grudge against

Catherine II, Pugachev raised 20,000 men and captured a number of cities, including Kazan and Saratov, before marching on Moscow. Catherine II looked to the nobility for aid, and disciplined imperial troops defeated the Pugachev Rebellion. The rebels surrendered their leader to Catherine II, cementing the fate of serfs as well as the relationship between the monarch and the aristocracy.

Another role in which the Cossacks gained notoriety was in pogroms, or attacks on Jews. During the War of the Polish Succession, Cossacks had instituted pogroms in the territory they occupied, and when Czar Alexis I joined with the Cossacks against Poland, his armies killed Jews as well. Again in Catherine II's time, they slaughtered Jews along the Polish frontier. In 1734, 1750, and 1768, Cossacks ravaged Jewish communities in Kiev and throughout the Ukraine. In the last instance, they claimed to have a document from Catherine II herself giving them authority "to exterminate the Poles and the Jews, the desecrators of our holy religion." By this time, the Cossacks had become master horsemen, and the image of the pogroms was equated with the Cossacks on horseback.

In the 19th century, the czars began to use the Cossacks not only as part of the army but also for suppressing political dissent. The reputation they had developed in the pogroms was reinforced by the appearance of Cossack cavalry breaking up meetings of whatever groups the government deemed dangerous. When the Russian Revolution of 1905 began, Cossack troops forced it into submission. Cossack horsemen fought for the czar during World War I, but when the Russian Revolution of 1917 began, the Cossacks had had enough and would not help Czar Nicholas II. They did fight against the Russian Red Army during the Russian Civil

War, although they were ultimately defeated and forced to submit to the communist system.

The Cossacks were forbidden after the Russian Revolution to serve in the military or even maintain their cavalry traditions, but in 1936 Josef Stalin relented and formed Cossack units that fought against the Germans. Some, however, emulated other Ukrainians who welcomed the Nazi Party as liberators from the communists, and some Cossack units served with the Germans. Whether fighting for or against the invaders, Cossacks went into battle on horseback, probably the last time any large mounted units will ever operate during large-scale, modern, industrial warfare.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cossack people have enjoyed something of a resurgence. In all their old territories, but mainly in Kazakhstan, various associations have formed to perpetuate their culture. Such organizations have spread as far northward as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Cossacks still seem to fight on both sides of the Russian government, however, by demanding local autonomy yet protesting Russian cession of territory like the Kuril Islands. In 1992, Boris Yeltsin gave the Cossacks the status of an ethnic group and called for the use of Cossack troops to protect Russia's borders.

Karen Mead

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); February (March) Revolution (1917); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Golitsyn (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich (1643–1714); Holy League, Wars of the (1686–1696); Ivan IV ("the Terrible"; 1530–1584); Khmelnytsky, Bohdan (1595–1657); Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Peter I (the Great) (1672–1725); Polish Succession, War of (1733–1735); Pugachev

(Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775); Revolution of 1905; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Crimea (Crimean Peninsula)

Peninsula extending into the Black Sea, presently part of Russia, but disputed by Ukraine; often referred to as *the Crimea*, it has an area of 26,000 square kilometers with a population of nearly 2 million. It has been controlled at various times by the Cimmerians, Scythians, Greeks, Goths, Huns, Bulgars, and Khazars, among others, and been part of Kievan Rus, Venice, the Khanate of the Golden Horde, and the Ottoman Empire. The name stems from the Tatar word *Quirim*, meaning “my hill.” The peninsula was a focal point of the Black Sea trade in ancient times, but now is famous as a seaside resort, and the site of many lovely palaces built by the Russian nobility, including the Livadia Palace that hosted the Yalta Conference (1945).

Crimea became part of the Russian Empire in 1783, during the reign of Catherine the Great. Though part of the Tauride Oblast and the site of many administrative reforms and experiments, Crimea remained very much a frontier province dominated by the Tatar people though with an ever-increasing number of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Greeks—along with some

Germans—coming to the area as its ports (Simferopol and Sevastopol) and trading opportunities developed. The Crimean War (1853–1856), however, devastated the infrastructure of the peninsula, as British, French, and Russian armies camped and fought on the land. Russia's military fortifications were destroyed, and it took years for the Black Sea Fleet to recover. Crimea remained an important port and naval base nonetheless, though behind the Baltic ports, and eventually Vladivostok, in military importance due to the Russians' inability to transit the Bosphorus at will.

Crimea thus existed on the periphery of the Russian Empire as the 20th century opened, and the Russian revolutions and subsequent civil war sent shock waves throughout the Crimean Peninsula and added fuel to the strained ethnic, religious, national, and political conflicts that plagued the region. Between December 1917 and October 1921 there were at least 14 attempts to establish a stable government in the region.

In March 1917, Ukrainian nationalists declared their independence from imperial Russia which resulted in a new Ukrainian National Republic. The Bolsheviks denounced this government, and the Red Army, along with Ukrainian Bolsheviks, seized Kiev and drove the nationalists from their capital. Several weeks later, the Ukrainian nationalists regained control of Kiev with the support of German troops. In April 1918, the Germans overthrew the Ukrainian National Republic and replaced it with a puppet regime under the former czarist general Pavlo Shoropady (Pavel Skoropadsky). These were minor skirmishes though, compared to the activities of the anti-Bolshevik White Army led by General Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel and the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine led by the anarchist Nestor Makhno.

Germany's defeat in November 1918 and the squabbling between various factions eventually allowed the Bolsheviks to consolidate their control over the peninsula, a feat they marked with the execution of some 50,000 White soldiers and sympathizers. On October 28, 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Republic was created.

Between 1921 and 1922, however, Crimea experienced a severe famine. An estimated 5 million people died. A second famine called the *Holodomor* or "death by hunger" occurred between 1932 and 1933. Estimates of 2–10 million died. Some believe it was deliberately created by the Soviet leadership as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. In 2008, during a dedication for Ukrainian Holodomor Remembrance Day, U.S. president Barack Obama called the famine a "man-made" catastrophe, the result of tyranny.

The Crimean Peninsula experienced some of the bloodiest battles of The Great Patriotic War (World War II) against Germany, including the Battle of Kerch and the Siege of Sevastopol (October 1941–July 1942). Both cities were awarded the title of Hero City for the general actions of Soviet soldiers and citizens, who continued to fight a guerilla (partisan) war after the Germans occupied the peninsula. Some actions, however, were less than honorable.

On May 18, 1944, following the triumphant return of Soviet troops to Crimea, Josef Stalin ordered the deportation of all Crimean Tatars on the grounds that they had collaborated with the Nazis. Tens of thousands died of starvation and disease during the journey. The ethnic Bulgarian, Greek, and Armenian populations of the peninsula soon followed them into exile. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland, but there are millions of Tatars living in Western Europe, North America, the Middle East, and around the world.

World War II left Crimea in ruins. The Soviet government rebuilt the area as a tourist destination, and, on February 19, 1954, transferred the administrative control of Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The naval base at Sevastopol was also rebuilt as a home for the modernized Soviet Black Sea Fleet. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, residents of the Crimea voted to remain part of now-independent Ukraine; an agreement on the division of the fleet was reached in June 1991. In early 2014 Russia, displeased by a revolution that forced out a pro-Russian government and threatened to align Ukraine more closely with the West, sponsored a separatist movement in Crimea. The separatists then voted to join Russia, which Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin accepted. The peninsula nonetheless remains a source of contention between Russia and Ukraine.

John G. Hall

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Crimean War (1853–1856); Hero Cities of the Soviet Union; Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich (1889–1935); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Crimea Campaign (April–May 1944)

Two-month campaign in April and May 1944 that resulted in the Soviet liberation of the Crimean Peninsula. As Soviet operations

around Kursk drew to an end, army generals Fyodor I. Tolbukhin and Rodion Malinovsky received instructions to prepare an offensive for mid-August 1943 to clear the Donets Basin region of German troops.


By the winter of 1943 though, German army groups South and A (together numbering 93 divisions) still held a line along the Dnieper River. The German Seventeenth Army held the Crimea, but had been isolated from other *Wehrmacht* units since October by Major General Nikolai I. Trufarov's Soviet Fifty-First Army of Tolbukhin's Fourth Ukrainian Front, which was at Perekop and along the Sivash, and General Andrei Yeremenko's Independent Coastal Army in Kerch. Malinovsky's Third Ukrainian Front recaptured Mykolaiv on March 28 and then drove toward Odessa, which it retook on April 10. The plight of German forces in the south was such that army groups South and A had to be reformed. On April 5, 1944, they were redesignated as army groups North Ukraine and South Ukraine, respectively. Hitler was determined to hold the Crimea,

however, for in Soviet hands it would serve as a base from which Soviet aircraft could attack the Romanian oil fields at Ploesti.

In March, Tolbukhin had been summoned to meet with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, to discuss the plan. The Crimean operation would involve the Fourth Ukrainian Front, the Independent Coastal Army, the Azov Flotilla, and the Black Sea Fleet. Tolbukhin's Fourth Ukrainian Front was assigned to destroy Colonel General Erwin Jänecke's Seventeenth Army, a mixed force of 11 German and Romanian divisions, totaling some 150,000 men. Tolbukhin would attack across the Perekop Isthmus and through the Sivash lagoon using Lieutenant General Georgy F. Zakharov's Second Guards Army and Lieutenant General Iakov G. Kreizer's Fifty-First Army. Follow-up attacks would target Simferopol and Sevastopol. Simultaneously, Yeremenko would establish a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula and block the German escape route, as well as German attempts to reinforce



Soviet troops in the fight for Sevastopol, May 1944. (Yevgeny Khaldei/Corbis)



against Tolbukhin. Colonel General T.T. Khryukin’s Eighth Air Army would support Tolbukhin, and Colonel General Konstantin A. Vershinin’s Fourth Air Army would back Yermenko. The operation involved some 450,000 Soviet personnel.

On April 8, Tolbukhin’s artillery opened the attack at Perekop, followed by an artillery barrage at Sivash. Soviet engineers constructed a pontoon bridge, working waist-deep in icy water. The next day, Yermenko attacked from Kerch. On April 11,

Soviet forces reached the railroad junction at Dzhankoy, behind the Perekop Isthmus.

Jänecke ordered his divisions to retreat toward Sevastopol from two prepared lines of defense stretching some 20 miles. This occurred without Hitler's approval. Jänecke's forces reached Sevastopol in surprisingly good order, and he hoped to hold there until his forces could be evacuated by sea. By April 13 though, Tolbukhin's troops had captured Simferopol, and Yeremenko had secured Feodosiya and Yalta.

From April 18, the Soviets built up their forces and artillery in preparation to storm the fortress defenses of Sevastopol, which stretched some 25 miles. These preparations were completed by May 5, the starting date of the battle to liberate the Crimea. Hitler had decided that Sevastopol had to be held, but its defenses were much weaker than they had been in 1941 when the Germans had attacked there. Also, Jänecke had only five weak divisions and little equipment. Because of Jänecke's repeated requests that his forces be evacuated, Hitler replaced him on May 2 with General Karl Allmendinger.

On May 5, the Soviet Second Guards Army attacked from north of Sevastopol via the Belbel Valley. This attack was diversionary; the main Soviet attack occurred on May 7, pitting the Fifty-First Army and the Independent Coastal Army against Sapun Ridge, which separates Sevastopol from the Inkerman Valley. Soviet forces broke through the German lines, forcing the defenders from the old English cemetery. The Germans then retreated to the Kherson sub-peninsula.

On May 9, with both the city and harbor in Soviet hands, Hitler authorized an evacuation. The remnants of the German-Romanian force attempted to hold a dock at Kherson, but any German hopes for evacuation by sea were dashed by Soviet air and naval operations. Consequently, on May 13,

the remaining Axis troops surrendered. Soviet authorities put total German losses in the Crimea Campaign at 50,000 killed (mostly Germans) and 61,000 taken prisoner. The Germans admitted to having lost 60,000 men.

Neville Panthaki

See also: Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967); Petrov, Ivan Yefimovich (1896–1958); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tolbukin, Fyodor I. (1894–1949); Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977); Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich (1892–1970)

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Crimean War (1853–1856)

Conflict that pitted Russia against a coalition of Great Britain, France, Sardinia, and the Turkish or Ottoman Empire over access rights to the waterways connecting the Black and Mediterranean seas.

In the middle of the 19th century, the Straits Question—who should control Constantinople, the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles—vexed the Great Powers. The Ottoman Empire had its capital at Constantinople but it was a weak and declining state. Russian foreign policy aimed to exploit this weakness to obtain for its navy and merchant marine year-round access to the seas of the world from its ports in the Black Sea—the only ports it had that were usable in the winter. Great Britain, considering Russian penetration of Central Asia

THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1853–1856



a threat to its control of India, was unwilling to see the Russian navy in the Mediterranean. France, a Mediterranean power, also wanted to keep the Russians out of that sea. A convention signed in 1840 banned foreign warships from the Straits when the Ottoman Empire was at peace.

Though this convention guaranteed for Russia the security of its Black Sea coasts, it also meant the Russian fleet was bottled up in that sea. A friendly visit to Britain in 1844 deluded Czar Nicholas I into believing that the British would not oppose his pressuring the Porte for concessions with regard to the Balkans and the Straits. The aid he gave

Austria by crushing the Hungarian Rebellion in 1848 convinced him that a grateful Austria would support such concessions.

At this point a “quarrel of monks” brought Russia into collision with Britain, France, and the Porte. Roman Catholic monks quarreling with Eastern Orthodox monks over control of the Holy Places in and around Jerusalem appealed to the French emperor, Napoleon III, for support. Anxious to court Catholics in his own country, he sent an ambassador in 1851 to demand recognition of France’s authority over all Christians in the Ottoman Empire. When the Porte declined such recognition on the grounds that treaties

already granted Russia that role, a combination of military threat and the promise of money persuaded Sultan Abdul Mejid I to sign a treaty giving France authority over Roman Catholics in the empire and control of the Holy Places. Enraged, the czar deployed troops along the Turkish frontier and sent Prince Aleksandr Menshikov to Constantinople in February 1853 to negotiate a treaty giving Russia a protectorate over Orthodox Christians. Menshikov's overbearing attitude and the suavity of the British diplomats resulted in the Porte defying the Russians demand.

In June, therefore, Russian troops invaded the Turkish satellite principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Britain and France sent warships and began diplomatic efforts to contain the crisis, but the sultan declared war on Russia on October 4. Fighting began on the Danube and in the Caucasus. On November 30, Russian warships destroyed Ottoman frigates anchored at Sinop, eliciting an Anglo-French ultimatum that the Russians withdraw from the Danubian Principalities, and prompting the arrival of British and French warships in the Black Sea. When Russia refused to comply and instead invaded Turkey's Bulgarian province, France declared war on March 27, 1854, and Britain the following day. As the Russians besieged Silestria to counter the landing of French and British troops in Varna, the Austrians moved an army into the Principalities with Turkish permission. The czar withdrew his troops from Bulgaria, Moldavia, and Wallachia but rejected peace terms.

With the Russian withdrawal, the original war aims of the allies had been achieved but they now resolved to destroy Russian power in the Black Sea by destroying Sevastopol, the Russian naval base on the Crimean Peninsula. Prior planning and reconnaissance there was not. On September 7, British

forces under the command of Lord Raglan, who had fought in the Napoleonic Wars and persistently referred to the enemy as "the French," and French forces under the command of Marshal St. Arnaud, who was dying of cholera, sailed from Varna, landing a week later on open beaches north of Sevastopol without opposition from Russian forces, now under the command of Prince Menshikov, who was no better a general than he was a diplomat.

Defeating the Russians at the Battle of the Alma on September 20, the allies marched around Sevastopol to the south and set up base camps, the French at Kamiesch and the British at Balaclava. By October 8 they had invested Sevastopol, though the Russian garrison maintained a supply route to the north throughout the siege. The Russian fleet based on Sevastopol had to be scuttled to block allied access to the harbor, its guns were taken ashore for fortress artillery. On October 25 the Russian field army failed to break through to Balaclava in a battle made famous by the futile charge of the Light Brigade, an unforgettable example of command stupidity and individual gallantry.

On November 5, the Russians tried again to cut allied troops off from their bases in the Battle of Inkerman, losing 12,000 men to the allies' 3,300. Winter then set in with a storm on November 14 wrecking allied transports and destroying tons of supplies. The British suffered more than the French, whose logistics were better handled and, as the British starved and died of cholera, the British public read of their suffering in newspapers and brought down the government, demanding proper medical treatment and better provision of food and clothing for the troops.

After a failed attack on Turkish troops at Eupatoria early in February, Czar Nicholas I relieved Menshikov of command and then died on February 16, worn out from coping

with the political and diplomatic problems the war had brought. With the Easter Bombardment of April 3–18, the allies renewed attempts to end the siege but muffed the opportunity. On May 12, French and British ships slipped through the Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov and, by the end of May, had destroyed the main Russian supply depot at the port city of Taganrog and captured all the shipping supplying the Russians in the Crimea. Later in May, another allied expedition landed at Kerch to cut Russian supply lines on the Crimean Peninsula but was unable to make any headway.

On June 17–18, the allies attacked the Russian strongpoints, the Malakoff and the Redan, hoping to take Sevastopol on the anniversary of Waterloo. When the attack failed with great loss of life, Lord Raglan died, perhaps of disappointment. After a Russian counterattack was repulsed on August 16 (the Battle of Terakhir), the allies mounted their only impressive military effort of the war, the storming of the Malakoff, a mass assault after three days of artillery preparation. The French having captured the strongpoint, the Russian position was untenable and on September 9 after holding out for 349 days, the Russian forces blew up the remainder of the fortifications and abandoned the city.

Even before the Turkish declaration of war on October 4, 1853, Russian and Turkish forces had clashed in the Caucasus. The Turks aimed to capture the city of Tiflis (Tbilisi). On 27–28 their Batum garrison attacked the Russian Fort St. Nicholas, cutting sea links between the Caucasus and the Crimea. But on December 1 the Russians routed the Turks at the Battle of Bashgediker and forced them to retreat into Kars. Through the winter and summer of 1854 little changed as the Turks were too weak to take the offensive, and the Russians seemed in no hurry to attack. Finally, General Nikolai Muraviev assaulted Kars on September 29 and, failing

to storm it, besieged it. The starving Turks capitulated November 26.

By this time, Ottoman general Omar Pasha had moved Turkish troops from Bulgaria and the Ukraine to Sukhum on the coast north of Batum. Moving southward, he attacked Prince Bagration's Russians on November 7. When Bagration retreated, Omar failed to pursue vigorously and the campaign ended inconclusively.

Although diplomatic and military efforts at the beginning of the war were directed at the Straits and the Danubian Principalities, by the end of February 1854 the British prepared a naval squadron to enter the Baltic, and the French followed suit. On March 20, an array of 44 vessels anchored off Copenhagen to prevent the Danes from aiding Russia. The commander, Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier, declared a blockade of the Russian coasts and began to reconnoiter their fortifications. From March to June, British forces bombarded several fortified places. Unfortunately, they disgraced themselves by ignoring instructions not to attack defenseless places and instead raided and burned coastal towns, shipyards, and warehouses. British goods in storage were destroyed, local populations were inflamed with anti-British sentiment, neutrals were offended; *The Times* of London condemned the navy's behavior.

The blockade was farcical because British heavy vessels could not enter shallow and uncharted waters to interdict the busy coastal trade. The only major action was carried out with the cooperation of a French fleet under Vice Admiral Perseval-Deschenes who brought 26 vessels and 2,500 men. The combined fleet sized up the Russian naval base at Kronstadt, decided it was too strong to be assaulted, and moved on to the Russian Åland Islands. On August 8, French troops disembarked and within a week had invested the fortress at Bomarsund. Naval bombardment forced the surrender of the

citadel, following which the allies destroyed all the fortifications and departed the Baltic Sea. The following year, the allies returned with 105 British ships, many of them were shallow-drafts, and a smaller complement of French ships.

The primary object of this fleet was enforcement of the blockade and the bombardment of either Reval or Sveaborg. The Russians had used the interval to swell the ranks of its army of the north, to strengthen fortifications, and to lay mines. The blockade was effectively maintained and Sveaborg was bombarded on August 9–11. By October 23 the allied squadrons had set out for home.

The war also played out in minor actions in the White and Barents seas in northern Europe and on the Kamchatka Peninsula on the Pacific Ocean. In 1854, a British squadron ineffectively blockading the coast around Archangelsk bombarded a monastery and destroyed a fishing village. The following summer an allied squadron had some success in raiding coastal commerce. British and French squadrons attacked Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula in an attempt to interfere with the Russians' efforts to take territory on the Amur River from the Chinese.

In December 1855, as the combatants were girding themselves for the campaigns of the year to come, Austria threatened to join the allies unless Russia pledged itself to four points the allies agreed on: all powers would regulate the Danubian Principalities; all states could navigate the Danube freely; the Straits Convention was to be revised; and Russia would abandon its claim to represent Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Bowing to necessity, Czar Alexander accepted the four points. The Treaty of Paris on March 30, 1856 embodied them.

Russia also consented to dismantle its Black Sea fleet and naval bases, to return

Turkish territory seized in the war and to cede southern Bessarabia to Moldavia. On April 15, Britain, France, and Austria agreed that they would treat any change in the neutralization of the Black Sea or any threat to the Porte as a cause for war. The Crimean War was a complete humiliation for Russia and led to a series of sweeping reforms under Czar Alexander II designed to modernize the economy and the military and enable Russia to compete with the West.

Joseph M. McCarthy

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Balaklava, Battle of (October 25, 1854); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); Inkerman, Battle of (November 5, 1854); Kronstadt (Kronshtadt); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Sevastopol; Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); Sinop, Battle of (November 30, 1853)

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Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)

International crisis and the closest the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, came to full-scale nuclear war.

In 1958 an indigenous revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba. Although Castro declared he was not



View from a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft of Mariel Bay, Cuba. In October 1962, Soviet missile equipment and transport ships were photographed by U.S. U-2 spy planes, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Library of Congress)

a communist, in the spring of 1959 he covertly sought Soviet aid and military protection. American economic pressure moved him openly into the Soviet camp. In response, the Central Intelligence Agency planned to assist Cuban exiles to attack the island and overthrow Castro. The April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion attempt proved a humiliating fiasco for the United States, which nevertheless continued to develop plans for a second invasion, and devised various schemes to overthrow or assassinate Castro, who not unnaturally sought further Soviet aid.

In mid-1961, military hard-liners in the Kremlin, frustrated for several years, succeeded in implementing a 34 percent increase

in spending on conventional forces. Despite U.S. Republicans' claims of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States that favored the Soviets, the strategic missile imbalance in fact greatly favored the United States, which had at least eight times as many nuclear warheads. The recent U.S. deployment of 15 intermediate-range missiles in Turkey, directly threatening Soviet territory, further angered Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Communist Party's general secretary, making him eager to redress the balance. He also hoped to pressure the United States into making concessions on Berlin while he rebutted communist Chinese charges that the Soviets were paper tigers, unwilling to act to advance the

international revolution. In addition, Khrushchev apparently felt a romantic sense of solidarity with the new Cuban state.

Early in 1962, Khrushchev offered Soviet nuclear missiles, under the control of Soviet technicians and troops, to Castro, who accepted and oversaw their secret installation. Khrushchev apparently believed that these would deter American plans to invade Cuba. Khrushchev's June 1961 summit with U.S. president John F. Kennedy at Vienna apparently convinced the Soviet leader that Kennedy would be easily intimidated, and he calculated that the Americans would find the prospect of nuclear war over the Cuban missiles so horrifying that they would accept their de facto presence in Cuba. So confident was Khrushchev that when warned in July and August 1962 that the United States would respond strongly should the Soviets deploy nuclear or other significant weaponry in Cuba, he implicitly denied any intention of doing so. By this time, of course, the missiles had already been secretly dispatched.

Khrushchev miscalculated. Instead of treating the Cuban missiles as deterrent weapons, the Kennedy administration regarded them as evidence of Soviet aggressiveness and refused to accept their presence. In October 1962, American U-2 reconnaissance planes provided photographic evidence that Soviet officials had installed intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Cuba. When the president learned on October 16, 1962, of the presence of the missiles, he summoned a secret executive committee of 18 top advisors to decide on the American response.

Whatever the logical justification for Khrushchev's behavior, politically it would have been almost impossible for any American president to accept the situation. The American military calculated that the missiles would increase Soviet nuclear striking force against the continental United States

by 50 percent. Since U.S. officials underestimated their numbers, in reality they would have doubled or even tripled Soviet striking capabilities, reducing the existing American advantage to 2-1 or 3-1. Kennedy, however, viewed the missiles less as a genuine military threat than as a test of his credibility and leadership. The U.S. military favored launching air strikes to destroy the missile installations, a course of action that would almost certainly have killed substantial numbers of Soviet troops, was unlikely to eliminate all the missiles, and might well have provoked full-scale nuclear war. Discussions continued for several days. Eventually, on October 22, Kennedy publicly announced the presence of the missiles in Cuba, demanded that the Soviet Union remove them, and announced the imposition of a naval blockade around the island.

Several tense days ensued as Soviet ships attempted to run the blockade, which Khrushchev claimed was illegally set in international waters. On October 27, Soviet anti-aircraft batteries on Cuba shot down—apparently without specific authorization from Kremlin leaders, whom this episode greatly alarmed—a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Seeking to avoid further escalation, Kennedy deliberately refrained from action. After some hesitation, Khrushchev acquiesced in the removal of the missiles, once his ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, secretly obtained a pledge that the United States would shortly remove the missiles in Turkey. Provided that the Soviet missiles were removed and not replaced, the United States also promised not to mount another invasion of Cuba.

Tapes of conversations among President Kennedy and his advisors reveal that he was prepared to make even greater concessions to the Soviets, including taking the issue to the United Nations and openly trading

Turkish missiles for those in Cuba. Newly opened Soviet documentary evidence, however, has demonstrated that the Cuban situation was even worse than most involved then realized. Forty-two thousand well-equipped Soviet troops were already on the island, far more than the 10,000 troops that American officials had estimated. Moreover, although Kennedy's advisors believed that some of the missiles might already be armed, they failed to realize that no less than 158 short- and intermediate-range warheads on the island, whose use Castro urged should the United States invade, were already operational and that 42 of these could have reached American territory. A bellicose Castro was also hoping to shoot down additional U-2 planes and provoke a major confrontation. The potential for a trigger-happy military officer to set off a full-scale nuclear war certainly existed.

The Cuban Missile Crisis had a sobering impact on its protagonists. From then on both superpowers exercised great caution in dealing with each other, and on no subsequent occasion did they come so close to outright nuclear war. The crisis exerted a salutary, maturing effect on Kennedy, making the once-brash young president a strong advocate of disarmament in the final months before his untimely death in November 1963. His stance compelled the Soviet leadership to establish a hotline between Moscow and Washington to facilitate communications and ease tensions during international crises. The two powers also finally reached agreement in 1963 on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which halted nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in space.

Humiliation at American hands, conversely, helped compel Soviet leaders to undertake an expensive major nuclear buildup to achieve parity with the United States, reaching this in 1970. Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964 was probably at least partly

due to the missile crisis. Soviet officials also felt that they had come dangerously close to losing control of the actual employment of nuclear weapons in Cuba, either to their own military commanders on the ground or even potentially to Castro's forces. Even though the settlement effectively ensured his regime's survival, Castro, meanwhile, felt humiliated that the Soviets and Americans had settled matters between them without regard for him. Before Khrushchev's fall from power, the two men were reconciled, and Soviet-Cuban relations remained close until the end of the Cold War.

Priscilla Roberts

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971)

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Curzon Line

Boundary between Poland and Russia drawn after World War I that figured in discussions during and after World War II over Poland's eastern frontier. The Curzon Line was a major factor in the tangled issue of Poland's post-World War II borders.

Leaders of the Big Four powers of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, meeting in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, were faced with a fluid situation in the East following World War I. They decided

therefore to leave the boundary between Poland and Russia to subsequent demarcation. In December 1919, a commission headed by British foreign secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon proposed a boundary line. Known as the Curzon Line, in the north it divided Suwałki Province between Poland and Lithuania, then extended southward toward Grodno before running west to the Bug River. The line followed the Bug past the great city of Brest-Litovsk to Sokoly, then ran west around Przemysl before heading south to the Carpathians and the border of the new state of Czechoslovakia.

Neither Poland nor Russia accepted the Curzon Line. Poland won the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1920 and, in the resultant Treaty of Riga of March 1921, Poland pushed its eastern border well to the east of the Curzon Line, near to what had been the Polish-Russian frontier of 1792. Recovering the territory to the Curzon Line became a major goal of post-World War I Soviet diplomacy.

In late August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact that made it possible for Germany to invade Poland. The treaty also included a territorial division of Poland and the Baltic states in which the Soviet Union received much of eastern Poland. Soviet troops invaded and seized this territory in mid-September 1939, but the Germans subsequently conquered it during their June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.

In subsequent discussions between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, Soviet leader Josef Stalin insisted that the Curzon Line be the western boundary for the Soviet Union. It was difficult for the Western powers not to agree with this, for they had drawn the line, but at the same time such an agreement would sanction Soviet incorporation of its 1939 gains made at the expense of Poland and in alliance with Nazi Germany.

At the Teheran Conference of November–December 1943, there was much discussion of Poland's borders. Stalin, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt all agreed on the Oder River as the future boundary of Poland with Germany. There was, however, no agreement among the Western leaders for a tributary of the Oder, the western Neisse River, as the southern demarcation line. Nor did the Western powers sanction Poland taking from Germany the important port of Stettin on the west bank of the Oder. The three did agree that Poland would receive most of East Prussia, although the Soviet Union claimed the Baltic port of Königsberg (later renamed Kaliningrad) and the land to the northeast. There was no major opposition from Western leaders to the Curzon Line as the eastern boundary of Poland, although the British did object to Soviet seizure of the predominantly Polish city of L'viv (Lvov, Lwów, or Lemberg).

Stalin insisted that the Soviet Union required security against a future German attack. Obviously, a Poland that would be compensated for the loss of its eastern territory to the Soviet Union by being given German territory in the west would necessarily have to look to the Soviet Union for security, and Churchill had the difficult task of having to sell all these arrangements to the Polish government-in-exile in London. Stalin refused normal diplomatic relations with the so-called London Poles, because no independent Polish government could ever concede changes that put the country at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

The Yalta Conference of February 1945 confirmed the decisions reached earlier at Teheran regarding Poland's eastern border, but with a slight modification. This meant the loss to Poland of some 52,000 square miles of eastern territory. The Allies were more

strenuous in objecting to the Oder-Neisse line as its western boundary, and there was no agreement on this matter at Yalta.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Breat-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Poland Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Czar Bomba (“King of Bombs”)

The Soviet Union built and tested the nuclear weapon named the *Czar Bomba*, officially classified as RDS-220, in 1961. The idea was developed at a meeting of Premier Nikita Khrushchev and top Soviet nuclear scientists in July 1961. It called for a nuclear bomb with a 100-megaton (MT) yield. The lead Soviet scientist, Andrei Sakharov, decided to pare down to 50 MT for safety reasons. Limiting the size of the explosion also limited the amount of fallout unleashed into the atmosphere. This “Big Bomb,” as Sakharov called it, was ready for deployment in October 1961. The *Czar Bomba* weighed 30 tons, had a length of 26 feet, and a diameter of approximately 7 feet.

The device successfully detonated on October 30, 1961. The bomb was dropped from a Tupolev TU-95 strategic bomber specially modified to carry the large weapon, from a height of 6.5 miles; it exploded approximately 2.5 miles above the target zone. The

bomb utilized a parachute to slow its descent and give the TU-95 time to escape the blast radius. The target for the *Czar Bomba* was the Mityushika Bay testing range on Novaya Zemlya, in the Arctic Ocean, which the Soviets believed was remote enough to minimize the danger of radioactive fallout spreading throughout the USSR.

Once the bomb exploded, the mushroom cloud reached a height of approximately 64 miles and the base of the cloud reached 25 miles. The blast destroyed most structures in a radius of approximately 35 miles. Effects could be felt as far away as Finland and Norway, where reports of broken windows occurred; there were seismic shocks felt around the world. The *Czar Bomba* remains the largest nuclear detonation to date.

Sakharov estimated that approximately 5,000 people around the world were affected by the radioactive fallout from the bomb’s detonation. He was convinced that further tests would only pollute the Earth, and he became a strong advocate for nuclear test bans and a world free of nuclear weapons as a result of the success of the *Czar Bomba*. The detonation of the device led to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibited testing of nuclear devices above ground, over water, and in space. Further testing of nuclear weapons was limited to underground tests.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989)

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Czar Pushka

An enormous bronze smoothbore cannon cast in 1586 by Andrei Chokhov at the Moscow Cannon Foundry. The cannon (*Pushka*) is 18 feet long with a bore diameter of 35 inches, an external diameter of 47.2 inches, and weight of 39 tons. The barrel contains an image of Czar Fyodor Ivanovich I riding on horseback.

Originally the cannon was located in Moscow's Red Square on a special metal frame, but it was moved in 1706 to the Kremlin Arsenal and mounted on a wooden carriage. During the French invasion of Russia, the wooden frame burned; the present ornate metal carriage was constructed in 1835.

In 1860, the Czar Pushka was moved to Ivanavskaya Square with a stacked pyramid of one-ton cast-iron cannon balls under the front of the cannon. During the cannon's last restoration, trace amounts of gunpowder residue were found, indicating the cannon had been fired at least once; however, it was never used in any military action. The Czar Pushka is considered the largest caliber bombard weapon in the world.

Steven A. Quillman

See also: Ivan IV ("the Terrible"; 1530–1584); Kremlin

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Czar Tank

The Czar Tank (Lebedenko Tank) was an experimental self-propelled armored vehicle developed by Nikolai Lebedenko (former head of the Experimental Laboratory of the War Ministry), Nikolai Zhukovsky, Boris Stechkin, and Alexander Mikulin in the summer of 1915. The tank had a tricycle design with two large front rod-spoked wheels 9 meters in diameter and a smaller triple-wheel set in the back of only 1.5 meters in diameter for maneuverability. Each wheel was powered by a 250-horsepower Sunbeam engine. The massive tank weighed around 40 tons. The upper turret consisted of one forward-firing 6-pound cannon and one rear-firing 7.62-millimeter machine gun. The upper turret reached nearly 8 meters in height. Two cannons were placed in the 12-meter hull sponsons. Additional weapons were planned for the undercarriage.

The tank received its nickname, *Netopýr* (derived from *Netopýr pipistrellus*—a genus of bat), from its profile (a hanging bat asleep) when transported by its rear wheel. The tank is considered the largest three-wheeled fighting vehicle ever built. An Achilles' heel was its vulnerability to artillery fire, due to its light armor. Another weakness exposed during trials was the tendency of its small rear wheels to get bogged down in soft ground, and its large narrow but underpowered front had difficulty pulling them out. The Czar Tank cost nearly 250,000 rubles, but the prototype was scrapped for steel in 1923, and the project abandoned.

Steven A. Quillman

See also: World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Czech Legion (August 1914–December 1919)

Military force that played a pivotal role in the Russian Civil War and in Allied support for an independent Czech state. At the outbreak of World War I, Czechs and Slovaks showed little enthusiasm for fighting in the Austro-Hungarian army against their Slavic brethren, the Russians and the Serbs. Members of the Czech community living in Russia approached the Russian government about forming a unit consisting of Czech and Slovak volunteers, including Austro-Hungarian army prisoners of war (POWs) held by the Russians. Tomáš Masaryk, head of the Czech National Council in Paris, and the members of the council immediately saw the powerful propaganda advantage of such an entity for an independent Czechoslovak state after the war.

Formed in August 1914, the *Česká Družina* (Czech Brigade) ultimately numbered about 40,000 men in two divisions. Approximately one-tenth of the 100,000 Czech citizens of czarist Russia joined the *Družina*. In the years that followed, tens of thousands of additional Czechs, widely influenced by Pan-Slavism, surrendered to the Russian forces and were interned in Russia. When Czar Nicholas II abdicated in 1917, the French government encouraged the provisional Russian government to combine the POWs and the *Družina* into a Czech army. As a result, the Russians created two Czech divisions and based them at Kiev.

The Czech divisions participated effectively in the Kerensky Offensive of July 1917, but when Kerensky's government approached collapse that fall, Tomáš Masaryk began negotiations to send the Czech Legion to the Western Front so that it could continue to fight for the Allies. As part of the

diplomatic maneuvering, France agreed to recognize the existence of a Czech state with the Czech Legion as its army.

In January 1918, the Czech soldiers in Russia came under threat when the Ukraine declared its independence and German army forces began to converge on Kiev. Masaryk declared war on the Central Powers, and the Czech Legion moved north and, in March, defeated a German force at Bakhmach. From there, the Czechs took the railway east to Moscow, destroying the tracks behind them.

The members of the Czech Legion intended to leave Russia via the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. They seized locomotives and rolling stock as they went. Russian commissar for war Leon Trotsky, however, ordered the legion disarmed, fearing it would become a counterrevolutionary force following an armed clash between the legion and procommunist Hungarian POWs at Chelyabinsk on May 14.

The members of the Czech Legion, now joined by increasing numbers of their countrymen freed as POWs, feared that they would be put in a labor detachment or incorporated into the Red Army. Refusing to be disarmed or divided (the British wanted some of the Czech Legion to move north to protect Allied supplies at Archangel and Murmansk), they clashed with Red Army units at Chelyabinsk on May 25. Following Trotsky's order of the same date that armed Czechs discovered on the Trans-Siberian Railway were to be shot, the Czechs began to seize areas adjacent to the Trans-Siberian Railway. General Jan Syrový had overall command of the anti-Red forces in the area, including the Czech Legion. The well-trained and well-armed Czechs, advised by French general Maurice Janin, often acting in concert with anti-Bolshevik White forces, then began to seize control of a series of Siberian towns from Penza, southeast

of Moscow, to Samara on the Volga River in south-central Russia. Indeed, the impending fall of Yekaterinburg to the Czech and White forces influenced Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin to order the execution of former Czar Nicholas II and his family there.

By August, Czech troops under Colonel R. Gadjia had broken through opposing Red Army troops in Trans-Baikal and cleared the railroad from the Volga to Vladivostok. The capture of Kazan by the Czechs and Whites on August 7, which also gave them the imperial gold reserves, greatly aided in the formation of a provisional White government. Tomsk was the only major Soviet town in Siberia taken by the Whites without Czech assistance.

Czech military successes helped encourage the Western Allies to aid the White forces in the Russian Civil War against the Reds. The Allies subsequently supported the White provisional government under Aleksandr Kolchak. The French insisted that the Czechs abandon their plan to leave Russia in favor of securing complete control of the vital Trans-Siberian Railway. Czech forces under Rudolf Gaidja also captured Trans-Baikal and took command of the Yekaterinburg Front.

The tide of battle soon turned in favor of the Reds, however. They retook Kazan on September 10, 1918, forcing exhausted Czech and White troops to withdraw. Lenin congratulated Trotsky on the “suppression of the Kazan Czechs and White Guards” as a “model of mercilessness.” Thereafter, the Czech Legion restricted itself to protecting the Trans-Siberian Railway between Omsk and Irkutsk. The Czechs fought their last major battle at

Ufa in November 1919. Their departure from the Civil War in December, in part because of disillusionment over Kolchak’s dictatorship and military weakness, greatly hurt the Whites’ cause.

After the Allies approved a Czech national state during the Paris Peace Conference, the Czech Legion made plans to depart Russia. Before leaving, however, it played a role in turning over Kolchak to Bolshevik authorities and also released the Russian imperial gold reserves. The Czech evacuation was completed at Vladivostok between May and December 1919. Ships chartered by the Red Cross and American Czechs transported them to the United States. From San Francisco, the Czech Legion crossed North America and then the Atlantic Ocean, returning home to form the nucleus of the new Czechoslovak army.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Trans-Siberian Railway; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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D

Danilov, Yuri Nikiforovich (1866–1937)

Russian army general. Born in Ukraine on August 13, 1866, Yuri Danilov graduated from the Mikhailovsky Artillery School. He then served as a line officer and in 1892 graduated with honors from the General Staff Academy. He spent most of his subsequent military career as a staff officer with the general staff in St. Petersburg. He also taught at the General Staff Academy and helped edit publications of the Russian military. In 1906 Danilov took command of the 166th Infantry Regiment. He returned to the general staff two years later as a colonel.

Nicknamed “The Black” to distinguish him from numerous other Danilovs in Russian military service, by 1909 Danilov was a general, holding the post of quartermaster general, or deputy chief of the general staff. He retained this position until August 1915. Danilov was the primary author of Plan 19, the 1910–1912 version of Russia’s war plan in support of its military treaty with France.

Danilov viewed Germany as Russia’s most dangerous threat and intended to focus most of his country’s military effort on East Prussia. This was the shortest route to Berlin, and a major attack here would fulfill Russia’s pledge to France. The plan called for 53 divisions, some coming from Siberia, Turkistan, and the Caucasus, formed into 7 armies to be allocated against Germany. Only 19 divisions were planned for action against Austria-Hungary, even though others in the Russian military wanted the major effort to be against the Dual Monarchy in

order to realize Russian war aims. The focus on East Prussia dissipated Russian forces and prevented them from producing sufficient mass against Austria-Hungary to drive that country from the war early on, but it was also true that Germany was by far the more dangerous military foe. Driving Austria-Hungary from the war would not bring the defeat of Germany. The reverse, however, was true. Danilov saw this and believed that by concentrating the bulk of its military assets against Germany and acting in concert with its ally France, Russia might defeat Germany and win the war.

Also in his prewar role as a war planner, General Danilov attempted to prevent the purchase of hundreds of new fortress guns for Russia’s fixed western fortresses. In fact, with the support of Defense Minister General Vladimir A. Sukhomlinov, he pressed to raze those fortresses and use their intended expenditures to modernize Russian weapons and equipment with motorized transports. Unfortunately for Russia’s military effort in the war, conservative officers of the general staff and members of the Duma, headed by the chiefs of the Kiev and Warsaw military districts, prevented Danilov’s modernization measures.

When Russian forces were mobilized in August 1914 and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the czar’s uncle, was appointed supreme commander in chief of the Russian armed forces, Danilov as quartermaster general nominally became third-in-command behind Nikolaevich and chief of the general staff General Nikolai N. Yanushkevich. By all accounts, Danilov was a hard worker and the brains of the general staff. He was

hampered by the location of the Russian High Command (*Stavka*) in the isolated Polish town of Baranovichi, a rail center between Warsaw and Vilna (Vilnius), and by the Russian army's chronically poor communications system. Once the subordinate fronts and armies were deployed, *Stavka* in fact had little control over strategy or the actions of those commanders.

When Czar Nicholas II took personal supreme command on August 23, 1915 and Nikolai Nikolaevich was dispatched to the Caucasian Front, General Mikhail Alekseev replaced Danilov, who was sent to Pskov as chief of staff to General Nikolai Ruzsky, commander of the Northern Front. Many in the army were relieved by his removal and that of chief of the general staff General Yanushkevich, blaming them for most of the Russian disasters to date. On the Northern Front, Danilov served first as a corps commander and eventually rose to command the Russian Fifth Army, and by March 1917 he was serving as chief of staff of the Northern Front.

After the Russian Revolution of March 1917, General Danilov resigned from the army. In 1918 he emigrated to France, where he wrote his memoirs. Danilov died in Paris on November 3, 1937.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Ruzsky, Nikolai Vladimirovich (1854–1918); Sukhominov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1848–1926); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Yanushkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1868–1918)

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Davydov, Denis Vasilievich (1784–1839)

Russian partisan leader, military theorist, and poet. Born into a military family on July 27, 1784, Denis Vasilievich Davydov grew up in Moscow, where he was homeschooled. An avid student of military history, his military career began in the cavalry in 1801 during the Napoleonic Wars. His satirical poetry led to his dismissal from the Horse Guards and transfer to the Hussars, but he returned to the Horse Guards in 1806 as aide de camp to Russian general Prince Pyotr Bagration.

Davydov distinguished himself in his first combat in January 1807 at Wolsdorf during the War of the Fourth Coalition (1806–1807). He also fought at Eylau and was awarded a golden saber for his performance in the Russian defeat of the Battle of Friedland. Following the conclusion of peace between France and Russia, Davydov fought in the Finnish War of 1808–1809 and in the war with the Ottoman Empire (1806–1812). When Napoléon I's *Grande Armée* invaded Russia in June 1812, Davydov was a lieutenant colonel commanding a Hussar battalion in Bagration's army.

Prior to the Battle of Borodino (September 7), Bagration granted Davydov's request to raid French lines of communication westward. He understood the need to have the support of the peasants and, for easy identification, had his men dress in peasant garb. Davydov enjoyed considerable success, and

in one raid captured some 2,000 French soldiers. He insisted on strict discipline and humane treatment of prisoners.

During the 1813 German War of Liberation, Davydov commanded a hussar regiment. His performance brought promotion to major general. He then took part in the Russian occupation of Paris in 1814.

Following the Napoleonic Wars, Davydov took command of a brigade, but he was tired of military service and retired in 1823. Davydov had already published several military works, including *Essay toward a Theory of Guerrilla Warfare* (1821). He returned to the army in 1825 to fight in the Russo-Persian War of 1825–1828, then again retired. He re-joined the army on the occasion of the Polish Revolt of 1830–1831. For his role in helping to crush the revolt, he received promotion to lieutenant general. Davydov retired for a final time and settled at his wife's estate of Vechnaya Maza in central Russia, where he continued to write and where he died on May 4, 1839.

In his poetry, Davydov celebrated the life of a cavalryman. In his *Essay toward a Theory of Guerrilla Warfare*, he stressed the need for strict discipline; securing the support of the peasantry; and surprise, speed, and mobility by the partisan force. His watchwords were “ubit-da-uiti” (kill and escape).

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Patriotic War of 1812; Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Russo-Iranian War (1826–1828); Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812)

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Dawan Cheng, Battle of (1934)

Military engagement between the Soviet army, in conjunction with White Russian forces, and the 36th Division of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army. The joint Soviet-White Russian force was called “The Altai Volunteers.”

The Battle of Dawan Cheng was one of a series of battles during the 1934 Soviet invasion of the Xinjiang region, in present-day northwest China. The Red Army originally invaded with two brigades of infantry, along with tanks, and aircraft and artillery armed with mustard gas to assist Chinese warlord (and communist sympathizer) Sheng Shicai gain control of the region.

While the 36th Division, led by General Ma Zhongying, was withdrawing from White Russian, Mongol, and collaborationist Chinese forces, it encountered a Red Army armored column. General Bekteev led the White Russian forces, while General Volgin led the Soviets. The 36th Division was a cavalry division consisting of Hui Muslim officers with Uighur conscripted soldiers, approximately 500 in strength. The Altai Volunteers had dozens of armored cars and hundreds of soldiers.

The 36th Division waged a fierce battle, eventually pushing the destroyed armored cars over the mountainside. Ma withdrew when White Russian forces arrived to assist. The Red Army suffered heavy, but undocumented, losses, while the losses of the 36th Division are unknown. The Chinese took the initiative from the Soviets at Dawan Cheng, hampering their movement for weeks. The Soviets, with the use of aerial-delivered mustard gas, eventually forced Ma

Zhongying to withdraw from Dawan Cheng to Turpan.

James D. Cote

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991)

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Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825)

Group of secret societies, active from 1816 to 1826, named after its unsuccessful military coup in St. Petersburg on December 26, 1825.

Russia's participation in the Napoleonic Wars (1805–1814) had a great impact on all sides of society and brought hopes for a better life, especially among the Russian serfs. Although Czar Alexander I had begun the war as a liberal, the events of the conflict—and particularly Napoleon's "Hundred Days"—had turned Czar Alexander I against reform. The first secret society with reformist ("liberal") aspirations therefore was formed in 1816 among the officers of the Russian Imperial Guard in St. Petersburg and was named the "Union of Salvation" (*Soyuz Spaseniya*). The "Union of Welfare" (*Soyuz Blagodenstviya*) followed in Moscow in 1818. Convinced that the Russian army had liberated European countries, many of these Enlightenment-minded and well-educated members of the Russian nobility had been disappointed when Czar

Alexander I's reforming plans to improve the peasants' lot were canceled. Having seen, in many cases, life in Western Europe during the campaign, many of those young men imagined the Russian peasantry as one unified nation and therefore proclaimed national and social "revival" as their major goals.

These two unions were not, however composed of permanent members; many of those officers who were members at the beginning left (due to promotions, new appointments, and family matters), thus leaving the place for a younger generation of conspirators. In January 1821, the Union of Welfare held its general meeting for three days in Moscow; because of disagreements among its members, the union then was dissolved. In its stead, two new secret societies were organized: the "Southern Society" of Moscow (led by Colonel Pavel Pestel), and the "Northern Society" of St. Petersburg (led by Nikita Muravev and Kondraty Ryleyev). Both societies advocated the abolition of serfdom and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, though many members favored a republican form of government. Land reform was also an issue.

The immediate cause for the societies to act was a succession crisis. Alexander I died in Moscow under mysterious circumstances on November 19, 1825. As he had no children, according to the law of the throne inheritance of 1797, his oldest brother, Grand Duke Konstantin (1779–1831), was his successor. In 1822, however, Konstantin had renounced his rights to the Russian throne in a private letter to the czar, which compelled Alexander to proclaim his younger brother, Nicholas, as his successor.

When news of Alexander's death reached St. Petersburg, Nicholas's advisors convinced him that the army would consider his accession to the throne as usurpation.

Nicholas and the Guard units, stationed in the capital (among which there were many members of the secret societies), therefore swore allegiance to Konstantin, who at the time was the viceroy of Poland. The latter was not willing to accept the authority, and yet he did not renounce it publicly at once. In the dangerous interregnum, Nicholas stepped in and set a new oath of allegiance, establishing him as czar on December 26, 1825.

Taking advantage of the confusion among their senior commanding officers, members of the Northern Society decided to act. They composed a manifesto to the Russian people, which—when approved by the Senate—would abolish the government. Next, according to their plan, troops should seize government buildings, arrest Nicholas, and declare a constitution. The leadership of the revolt—a “dictatorship”—was entrusted to Colonel Prince Sergei Trubetskoy, one of the leading members of the Northern Society. Although intended to bring good, the coup was poorly organized. Not all of the high-ranking officers and troops expected to participate in the uprising actually gathered; in all, the conspirators had at their disposal roughly 3,000 soldiers led by some 30 company-grade officers. Trubetskoy did not show up at all.

Leaderless, the Decembrists assembled their troops in battle squares on the Senate Square hoping more troops would join. The true plan was known only to a few senior and company-grade officers; however, the gathered soldiers were simply following orders. In the meantime, some 9,000 troops loyal to Nicholas surrounded the square. Attempts to persuade the soldiers to retire ended when the czar’s emissary—General Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich, a hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, was shot—probably by accident. Nicholas nonetheless gave the order to open fire; artillery quickly

drove the mutineers out onto the frozen Neva River. Many drowned there, as shells broke the ice open. Nearly 300 soldiers and officers were killed, along with nearly 1,000 innocent bystanders, including women and children. A special investigation committee led by the War Minister Alexander Tatishev condemned to death for high treason five leading Decembrists: Pavel Pestel, Peter Kakhovsky, Kondraty Ryleyev, Sergey Muravyov-Apostol, and Mikhail Bestuzhev-Ryumin (all hanged on July 13, 1826). Over 30 officers and 500 rank-and-file soldiers were sentenced to disciplinary battalions in the Caucasus, lifelong labor in Siberia, or general exile. Many Decembrists, particularly those of noble birth, took their families to Siberia, where they formed a society according to their own lights. The Decembrist Revolt was the first organized liberal political movement in Russia, and it led to prolonged royal and aristocratic reaction. Not until after the Crimean War (1853–1856) was there another breath of liberal reform in Russia.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Crimean War (1853–1856); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855)

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Declaration on Liberated Europe (February 1945)

Declaration issued by the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union during the February 4–11, 1945, Yalta

Conference. At Yalta, the bargaining position of the Western Allies was weak. They had recently suffered a major embarrassment in the December 16, 1944–January 16, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), while Soviet armies were poised to drive on Berlin. Soviet leader Josef Stalin seemed to hold all the cards, at least as far as eastern and central Europe were concerned. Soviet troops occupied most of that territory, including Poland. Stalin's goal was to secure a belt of East European satellite states to protect a severely wounded Soviet Union against the West and its influences.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill pointed out at Yalta that the United Kingdom had gone to war to defend Poland, and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt was not only influenced by the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations but also by a large Polish constituency at home. Roosevelt pressed Stalin to agree to apply the Atlantic Charter to “liberated Europe.” This excluded both the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

Stalin agreed to the resulting Declaration on Liberated Europe. It affirmed the right of all peoples “to choose the government under which they will live” and called for the “restoration of sovereign rights and self-government” to peoples who had been occupied by the “aggressor nations.” The Big Three pledged that in the liberated nations, they would work to restore internal peace, relieve distress, form governments that were “broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population,” and ensure that there would be “free elections” that were “broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population” as soon as possible.

No institutional arrangement was established to enforce the ideas embodied in the declaration. The Soviets chose to regard “democratic elements” as meaning all

communist and procommunist factions and “free elections” as excluding all they regarded to be fascists. The result was Soviet control over much of eastern and central Europe. The Soviet Union did pay a price for the declaration in the court of world opinion, as Stalin's promises to respect human rights were proven utterly false.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Dedovshchina

Dedovshchina is the culture of hazing within the Russian army wherein older soldiers bully younger recruits.

Dedovshchina was historically practiced in the Soviet army from the aftermath of World War I, when the educational and cultural level of new recruits began to decrease, making them easy targets for bullies. Additionally, disparate and conflicting perspectives and nationalities within the Soviet army played a strong role in who bullied whom. From the 1960s, military hazing increased substantially as there was less division, yet more interaction, between ranks, which incited envy and a penchant for defending one's perceived domain.

Dedovshchina also occurs in the slightly more democratic Russian military of the 21st

century. The hazing tradition is manifested in both psychological torture (including yelling, threatening, and severing communication between the young recruit and his distant family) as well as physical abuse (including fist-fighting, and the withholding of food as well as bathing facilities and medical attention). Economic pressure also results in hazing as the low pay scale of soldiers encourages older recruits to harass younger recruits into forfeiting money, clothing, and other items of worth. The prolonged practice of *dedovshchina* is a result of cultural acceptance within and without the military.

Jennifer Daley

See also: Army, Russian (1991–); Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991)

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Deep Battle

Deep battle was a Soviet military theory designed to address the perennial problem of breaking through the enemy's tactical defense. It was developed by the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s and predicated on the use of new weapons technologies—particularly the tank and airplane—then entering service.

Soviet military intellectuals of the time—notably Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Vladimir

Triandafillov, and Georgy Isserson—reasoned that these new technologies would make possible the simultaneous assault on the enemy throughout his defensive depth, with the goal of quickly isolating, surrounding, and destroying him. This emphasis on simultaneity and depth is what distinguishes deep battle from the tactical concepts that preceded it. Deep battle evolved as a direct response to Russian military failures in World War I, the Russian Civil War, and the 1919–1921 war against Poland. It was likely inspired by the works of British soldier and author J.F.C. Fuller.

The Soviet Field Service Regulations of 1936 (PU-1936) provide perhaps the fullest expression of the deep battle concept in the pre-purge era. The 1936 regulations divided deep battle into three elements: the encounter battle, the defensive engagement, and the offensive battle. Additionally, PU-1936 prescribed tactical organizations consisting of several rifle corps reinforced by additional armor, artillery, and aviation. These battle formations, referred to as either *shock groups* or *holding forces*, played important roles in all three types of the battle.

According to PU-1936, the holding force's primary task was to engage the enemy along secondary sectors and prevent him from concentrating his attack against the shock group's main effort. Meanwhile, the shock group's first echelon—mainly infantry and supporting armor—would attack along a broad front, fixing the enemy in place, while the second echelon, consisting primarily of tanks, created a breakthrough. The battle culminated with the third echelon—long-range tanks and mechanized infantry—exploiting the breach and striking deep into the enemy's position. Their task was to cut off withdrawal routes and create havoc in the enemy rear. As enemy forces wavered in the face of the main thrust, the holding force would join

with the shock group to complete the encirclement and destruction. Heavy and mobile artillery provided fire support during all phases of the battle. Aviation forces played a crucial role throughout the battlespace by conducting reconnaissance, downing enemy airplanes, and striking ground forces and rear echelon areas.

Deep battle was a purely tactical concept involving units no larger than the corps. As such it was but the first stage in the “deepening” idea espoused by Isserson, which ultimately led to “deep operations” theory and the application of many of its tenets at the operational level. Despite the 1937 purge of many of deep battle’s most fervent advocates, the theory took hold in Soviet tactical doctrine and would feature prominently in Soviet military operations of World War II. Deep battle would later influence several other maneuver theories, most notably the Air-Land Battle concept adopted by the U.S. Army in the early 1980s.

Rick Spyker

See also: Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Operational Art; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Triandafilov, Vladimir Kiriakovich (1894–1931); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947)

Lieutenant general and leader of the White Army during the Russian Civil War. Born near Warsaw (at the time part of the Russian Empire) on December 16, 1872, Anton Ivanovich Denikin joined the Russian army at age 15. Though of humble birth, he attended the General Staff Academy in Saint Petersburg. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Denikin requested transfer from his staff job to a combat command. He distinguished himself in battle and, in 1905, was promoted to colonel.

At the outbreak of World War I, Denikin was a major general and chief of staff of the Kiev Military District. After serving briefly as deputy chief of staff to General Aleksei Brusilov, in September 1914 he was given command of the 4th Rifle Brigade, the “Iron Riflemen,” where he again distinguished himself. In 1916 he was given command of VIII Corps, and in August 1917, having been promoted to lieutenant general and awarded a golden St. George’s sword decorated with diamonds, was appointed commander in chief of the Southwestern Army Group.

After supporting the purported revolt of General Lavr Kornilov against the Provisional Government in August 1917, Denikin was imprisoned; however, he escaped in October 1917 and joined Kornilov’s army opposing the new Bolshevik regime. In January 1919, during the Bolshevik invasion of the Caucasus, Denikin rallied the White (monarchist) counterrevolutionaries and drove out the Red Army. After General

Aleksei M. Kaledin committed suicide on February 13, and Kornilov was killed in action on April 13; Denikin assumed the general direction of the White armies.

Denikin launched a four-army offensive in May, recapturing Kiev on September 2. He continued to make progress through early October, when the Red Army's counteroffensive turned the tide. Denikin's army was defeated at Orel in late October, and Kiev was lost on December 17. The Whites were driven back to the Black Sea, where they evacuated on British ships on March 27, 1920. In April, Denikin resigned his command and escaped to Constantinople.

Denikin and his family lived in exile the rest of their lives. From 1921 to 1926 he lived in England, Belgium, and Hungary, relocating due to financial problems. During this time he wrote his best-known book, *The Russian Turmoil*, considered to be the seminal work on the White movement in southern Russia. From 1926 to 1945 Denikin lived in France, where he continued to write and lecture. During World War II he spoke out against Nazism and, though he was glad of Soviet victories against Germany, he kept hoping the communists would be overthrown.

In 1945 Denikin moved with his family to the United States. He died in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on August 8, 1947. In 2005 his remains were reinterred at the Donskoi Monastery in Moscow.

Kevin S. Bemel

See also: Kaledin, Aleksei Maksimovich (1861–1918); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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General Anton Denikin was a capable Russian army commander who turned against the Bolshevik regime in late 1917. He eventually became commander of the anti-Bolshevik (White) forces in the Russian Civil War (1917–1922). (Library of Congress)

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Deulino, Truce of (1618)

Suspension of hostilities between Sweden and Russia that allowed the new Romanov rulers time to establish themselves on the throne.

During the “Time of Troubles” (*Smutnoe Vremia*, 1584–1613), Russia experienced a severe economic downturn, marked by inflation and prolonged famines. As Ivan IV and his feeble-minded son, Fyodor (r. 1584–1591) left no clear line of successors, the

country fell into civil war. Pretenders to the throne arose one after another, backed by foreign powers; when their campaigns stalled, those powers entered the fray themselves. By 1612, Polish forces occupied the capital of Moscow, and their ruler, King Sigismund III, claimed the Russian throne. Swedish forces that had entered the fray in 1609 to help the Russians combat the Polish-backed pretenders now held northern territories including the key city of Novgorod, and claimed that their prince Charles Philip was the true czar. The Muscovite boyar Duma, which held power in abeyance, denied both foreign claims and sought from among its number a czar who could rescue the country.

While the Duma debated, a national uprising began at Nizhnii Novgorod; military forces led by Prince Dmitry M. Pozharsky and Kuzma Minin defeated a Polish relief column outside of Moscow and, in October 1612, forced the surrender of the Polish garrison in the Kremlin. A special *zemsky Sobor* (council of the lands) then was convened in January 1613, and proclaimed young Mikhail Romanov czar. The true power, however, lay with his uncle Filaret, whose own ambitions had been thwarted earlier.

Sweden and Poland refused to recognize the new czar or return the Muscovite territories they held. Only after two years, during which he eliminated a series of internal conflicts, was Mikhail I able to address these external threats. With the help of Englishman John Merrick, a compromise peace with Sweden was reached in February 1617, returning Novgorod and Staria Rossia to Muscovy.

Poland continued its conflict, however, and claimed the throne of Muscovy for Sigismund's son, Władysław. Only after another year of devastating, indecisive fighting did peace talks begin. The Truce of Deulino was signed in 1618; it allowed the Poles to

keep Smolensk and territories in western Russia, and both sides exchanged prisoners. The peace was to last 14 years. The Poles still did not recognize Mikhail as czar, however; and in 1632 hostilities resumed.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1632); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Minin, Kuzma (Late 1500s–1616); Pozharski, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich (1578–1642); Time of Troubles

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Diebitsch, Count Hans Friedrich Anton (Ivan Ivanovich Dibich Zabalkansky; 1785–1831)

Born to a German family in Lower Silesia on May 13, 1785, Hans Diebitsch was educated at the cadet school in Berlin, but joined the Russian army in 1801 at the behest of his father, who had also served the czars. Hans fought in the campaign against Napoleon in 1805; he was wounded at Austerlitz, but continued on and was promoted to captain following the action at Friedland.

During the four-year truce spawned by the Treaty of Tilsit, Diebitsch studied military science. He returned to active service during the Patriotic War of 1812, and was promoted to major general following distinguished service during the October 18–19 Battle of Potolsk. Diebitsch demonstrated considerable ability as a diplomat during this time as well, helping negotiate both the Convention of Taurroggen and the Secret Treaty of

Reichenbach. Valorous service in the battles of Leipzig and Dresden earned him promotion to lieutenant general in 1814.

Diebitsch was part of the Russian delegation to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and shortly after became adjutant to Czar Alexander I, who made Diebitsch chief of staff in 1820. When Alexander died in 1825, Diebitsch helped put down the Decembrist Revolt; Czar Nicholas I rewarded him by making him first a baron of the realm. Between 1826 and 1832, Diebitsch served on several secret committees that Alexander charged with investigating possible reforms.

Diebitsch also led Russian forces against the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829. His campaign against Adrianople, brilliantly conducted, decided the war and earned him promotion to field marshal and elevation to the status of count, with the honorific “Zabalkanski” (“across the Balkans”). As commander of Russian forces in Europe, he then led the army into Poland during 1830 to suppress the nationalist rising there. Diebitsch died of cholera while in Poland, on June 10, 1831.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825); Dresden, Battle of (August 26–27, 1813); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Patriotic War of 1812; Polish Rebellion (1830–1831); Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829); Tilsit, Treaty of; Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

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Dmitriev, Radko Ruskov (1859–1918)

Bulgarian general and diplomat, and Russian army general. Born on September 24, 1859, in Gradets, Bulgaria (then part of the Ottoman Empire), Radko Ruskov Dmitriev participated in the April 1876 Bulgarian national uprising against the Ottomans and served in the ensuing Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 as a volunteer with a Russian Cossack unit. After the war, he was among the first graduates of the Bulgarian Military Academy in Sofia, and he later attended the Nicholas General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg.

Dmitriev served in the Bulgarian-Serbian War of 1885 as a staff officer in the Western



Radko Dmitriev, a Bulgarian-born general in Russian service, led the Third Army at the start of the Great Retreat (1915). (National Archives)

Corps and rose in the ranks of the Bulgarian army; he was particularly distinguished by his pro-Russian perspective and charismatic personality. His short stature caused some observers to compare him to Napoleon. During the First Balkan War of 1912–1913, he commanded the Bulgarian Third Army in its descent upon eastern Thrace, achieving important victories against the Ottomans at Lozengrad (October 24, 1912) and Lyule Burgas-Buni Hisar (October 28–November 3). He directed the combined Bulgarian First and Third armies during the Bulgarian assault on the Chataldzha lines outside of Istanbul in November 1912 that failed to breach the Ottoman defensive positions. Dmitriev then commanded Bulgarian armies during the catastrophic Second Balkan War in 1913.

After the Second Balkan War, Dmitriev became Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg, but in August 1914 he resigned this post to accept a command in the Russian army. He led the Russian Third Army against the Austro-Hungarians into Galicia that autumn, but his forces suffered a serious defeat in the May 1915 German counterattack at Gorlice-Tarnów. The initial German artillery barrages decimated his soldiers, who had failed to prepare secure positions. His army also suffered heavy losses in the ensuing retreat from Galicia, to the extent that the Third Army ceased to be an effective force. After this disaster, Dmitriev was relieved of command of the Third Army. A major reason for his relief was his failure to prepare fortified positions, but he also squabbled constantly with his superiors at the Southwestern Front headquarters and at *Stavka*, insisting on the delivery of additional munitions for his troops and, after the initial German attack, demanding an immediate withdrawal of his forces.

Dmitriev later served on the Northern Front, commanding the II and VII Siberian

corps and afterward the Russian Twelfth Army. He retired after the February 1917 Revolution, but remained in Russia. During the Russian Civil War, Red forces commanded by I.L. Sorokin shot Dmitriev along with some hundred other officers as hostages at Rostov-on-Don on October 18, 1918. Dmitriev was an energetic and charismatic leader who commanded the loyalty of his subordinates and respect of his peers but whose victories in the Balkan Wars and World War I were overshadowed by his defeats.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Dmitry, False (1582?–1606)

Czar of Russia from July 21, 1605, to May 16, 1606, and possibly the son of Ivan IV (the Terrible) of Russia and his eighth (or sixth) wife, Maria Nagoi.

When Ivan IV died in 1584, he left behind two sons: Fyodor (b. 1573) and Dmitry (b. 1582). Though generally unhealthy and possibly mentally disabled, Fyodor and his wife Irina Godunova served as at least nominal rulers of Russia until 1598. Behind them stood a council of regents led by Irina's brother, Boris Godunov. To secure Fyodor's

succession and consolidate his own power, Boris forced Dmitry and his mother into exile in Uglich.

In May 1591, reports came from Uglich that Dmitry had perished. Rumors immediately spread that Boris Godunov had arranged the murder of the czarевич, but a commission headed by Vasily I. Shuisky determined Dmitry had cut his own throat when he suffered a seizure while playing with a sword. Godunov arrested several members of the Nagoi family who had accused him of murder, and the affair was generally forgotten.

In January 1598, however, Czar Fyodor I died leaving no heir. Irina, whom Fyodor had appointed as coruler, promptly retired and became the nun Alexandra. After a brief power struggle, Boris Godunov emerged as the “elected” czar of Russia.

Despite hard economic times and persistent boyar dissatisfaction, Godunov’s rule was largely unchallenged until 1603, when a young man claiming to be Dmitry Ivanovich surfaced in Poland. The true identity of this “false Dmitry” has been disputed ever since. Some claim he was a monk named Grigory Ostrepov, others that his real name was Yuri Bogdanovich, and still others that he was an illegitimate son of Stefan Bathory; many believe he may have been the real son of Ivan IV, protected by the Nagoi clan and hidden away until the time was ripe. Almost everyone agrees that he at least resembled the czarевич, and he knew many intimate details of court life in Moscow.

Whether he was the son of Ivan IV or not, people rallied to Dmitry. Some Polish nobles offered money and troops, which Dmitry wisely declined; instead he crossed into Russia in August 1604 and made contact with the Don Cossacks, who flocked to his cause. Backed by some 1,500 Cossacks, Dmitry then approached the fortified town

of Mozhaisk. Convinced Dmitry was “the true czar,” the garrison went over without a fight, taking their commanders (*voevodi*) prisoner when they refused to cooperate.

The majority of southern Russia quickly lined up behind Dmitry during 1604 and early 1605, and he established a “court” and “capital” at Putivl. Dmitry was noted for his generosity in dealing with opponents; he prevented looting by his forces, even when a town had resisted, and often appointed Godunov’s administrators to important positions once they had taken an oath of loyalty. These policies, along with promises of lower taxes and guaranteed freedom for Cossacks, won most of the population to his cause.

Dmitry’s military campaign was less successful. After a drawn battle against Godunov’s forces at Briansk in December 1604, Dmitry was defeated and nearly captured at Dobrynichi in January 1605. His forces were driven from Rylsk in February, and the rebels’ siege of Kromy dragged on until April.

None of this affected Dmitry’s popularity, and when Godunov died on April 13, 1605, the path to Moscow opened. Nearly half of the commanders at Kromy now declared for Dmitry, and when he approached on May 7 the garrison threw open the gates. Less than a week later Prince Ivan V. Golitsyn, commander of Godunov’s main army, surrendered his forces to Dmitry at Putivl. A small force of *streltsy* loyal to Godunov’s son, Fyodor, briefly halted Dmitry’s advance at the Oka River, but even within Moscow support for the czarевич was growing. When messengers read a proclamation from the czarевич in Red Square on June 1, the crowd stormed into the Kremlin, arresting Czar Fyodor II, and proclaiming their support for Dmitry, who arrived in triumph on June 20. He was crowned on July 21, 1605.

Boyars led by Prince Vasily Shuisky were soon plotting to overthrow Czar Dmitry,

however; not only did they question his legitimacy but they were also troubled by many of his actions. Dmitry did not act like a traditional Russian czar. He dressed informally, attended mass irregularly, and even tolerated the establishment of a Jesuit church in Moscow. Dmitry further pursued an alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which roused suspicions that foreigners had been behind his rise from the beginning, and agreed to wed the daughter of a Catholic Polish magnate. It was at Dmitry's wedding, on May 17, 1606, that Shuisky and his confederates assassinated the czar.

Shuisky seized the throne for himself, but he could not dispel the myth of Dmitry. Rumors that the czar had miraculously escaped, again, fueled a popular rebellion in southern Russia, and a second pretender soon appeared, this one claiming to be Pyotr, the "hidden son" of Czar Fyodor. At least two, and possibly as many as a dozen other pretenders to the throne appeared during the struggle for power, known as the "Time of Troubles" (*smutnoe vremnia*), including a second Dmitry and his son. Rebels thereafter frequently claimed to be "hidden heirs" to the throne—including, most famously Emelian Pugachev.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608); Cossacks; Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1632) Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Ivan IV ("the Terrible"; 1530–1584); Peter, False (?–1608); Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles

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Dogger Bank Incident (October 21, 1904)

Russian attack carried out in error against a group of British fishing boats misidentified as Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea near the Dogger Bank fishing grounds.

Following the Japanese surprise torpedo attack on its naval forces in the Yellow Sea harbor of Port Arthur (modern Lüshunkou, China) on the night of February 8–9, 1904, the government of Czar Nicholas II prepared and dispatched Russian naval reinforcements from the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific. The squadron left the port of Libau (modern Liepā, or Latvia) on the Baltic Sea on October 15, 1904.

The audacious Japanese attack at Port Arthur caused the naval officers of the relief squadron to fear that they might be attacked en route. Their concern was heightened by their awareness of the anti-Russian Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and by the need to pass near the British Isles as they crossed the North Sea to reach the North Atlantic.

The Dogger Bank is a shallow sand bank and rich fishing area located about 60 nautical miles due east of Flamborough Head in Yorkshire in the United Kingdom. Steaming across the bank in a light haze just before midnight during October 21–22, Russian lookouts misidentified a group of British trawlers as torpedo boats. The Russian ships opened fire, sinking one boat and damaging others. Two fishermen were killed and a half-dozen others wounded. British protests quickly followed.

War appeared imminent, but the two governments took advantage of the international legal framework established by the Hague Convention of 1899 for peaceful arbitration of disputes. A month after the incident, the two nations agreed to the appointment of an international commission to investigate the incident.

The commission report, released on February 26, 1905, while recognizing that confusion prevented the Russians from stopping to render aid, nevertheless faulted the Russian commander, Vice Admiral Zinovy P. Rozhdestvensky, for failing “to inform the authorities of the neighboring maritime powers that, as he had been led to open fire near a group of trawlers, these boats, of unknown nationality, stood in need of assistance.”

Still commissioners did not “cast any discredit upon the military qualities or the humanity of Admiral Rojdestvensky (sic), or of the personnel of his squadron.” The British fishermen were afterward compensated by the Russian government, and the squadron went on to defeat at the hands of the Japanese navy at the Battle of Tsushima Strait on May 27, 1905.

Larry A. Grant

See also: Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Rozhdestvensky (Rozhdestvensky), Zinovy Petrovich (1848–1909); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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Dolgorukov, Prince Vasily Vladimirovich (ca. 1667–1746)

Born to a boyar (noble) family, Vasily Dolgorukov entered court service at a young age, perhaps around 1685. In 1700, he enrolled in the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment and took part in the Great Northern War. Dolgorukov transferred to frontier service in Ukraine in 1706, and played a key role in squelching Bulavin’s Rebellion. He commanded a cavalry force during the Battle of Poltava in 1709, and then joined Peter I’s retinue on his travels of 1717–1718.

Dolgorukov openly disapproved of Peter’s Westernizing reforms, however, and soon found himself on trial for treason as a result of court intrigues. In 1719, Dolgorukov was demoted and exiled to Siberia. He returned to Russia after the death of Peter I, and was restored to the rank of general. In 1726, he was appointed commander of Caucasus forces, and in 1728 he was promoted to field marshal. Dolgorukov returned to St. Petersburg as a senator in 1730, but once again fell victim to court intrigue and was sentenced to death in 1731. His sentence was then reduced to life in prison. Dolgorukov served eight years and then was exiled to Solovetsky Monastery, in the Russian far north, in 1739.

He was pardoned and rehabilitated by Czarina Elizabeth in 1741, and returned to St. Petersburg, where he served as president of the war college. He died in the capital on February 11, 1746.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bulavin, Kondraty Afansievich (1660–1708); Elizabeth I, Czarina (1709–1761); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)

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Dolgoruky, Yuri (1099?–1157)

Yuri Vladimirovich Dolgoruky, the Rurikid prince of Suzdal and grand prince (*veliky kniaz*) of Kiev, is one of the most contradictory and turbulent figures in Russian history. The son of Vladimir Monomakh, the grand prince of Kiev from 1113 to 1125, Yuri was given the nickname Dolgoruky (the long-armed) because of his constant invasions of other lands, particularly southern Kievan Rus', where he captured numerous towns along the Volga River and conquered the state of Volga Bulgaria (Bulgar). Dolgoruky's name is also traditionally associated with the founding of Moscow in 1147.

Appointed by his father Monomakh, then the ruling prince of Periaslav, Prince Dolgoruky began his political and military life as the ruler of the Rostov-Suzdal region, where he founded the town of Vladimir on the bank of the Kliazma River. With a fortified outpost downstream, Dolgoruky established an effective defense against the Bulgars and held authority over major segments of the river systems traversing the Rostov-Suzdal lands. In 1125, Dolgoruky moved his capital from Rostov to Suzdal (also referred to as Vladimir-Suzdal), and became the first independent prince of northeastern Rus. With the death of his father, the grand prince of Kiev, also in 1125, Kievan Rus' gradually splintered into several principalities and regional centers: Chernigov, Galich, Novgorod, Periaslav, and Suzdal. The Suzdal region, which Dolgoruky formed and enforced, gradually occupied a vast territory in the northeast of Kievan Rus'.

When his older brother Mstislav, the grand prince of Kiev, died in 1132, Dolgoruky

began conquering the lands to the south of his domain; Periaslav and Novgorod were two major principalities Dolgoruky seized. While widening his territory, Dolgoruky built fortresses and founded towns throughout Kievan Rus'; he is credited with fortifying the walls of Moscow and making it into a permanent settlement in 1156. Dolgoruky had a particular interest, however, in seizing the throne of Kiev and becoming the grand prince.

Dolgoruky's reason for invading Kiev was his claim of genealogical seniority to the throne. He twice succeeded in seizing Kiev (1149 and 1151), only to be ousted each time by his nephew Iziaslav. It was only after Iziaslav's death that Dolgoruky entered Kiev and became the grand prince; he reigned for three years (1155–1157) until his mysterious death in 1157. Even though his father and older brother had reigned in Kiev, Dolgoruky was considered an outsider and was not popular among the Kievan citizens.

Dolgoruky nonetheless skillfully combined political negotiations with military campaigns to seize vast territories and attain his ultimate goal, the grand prince of Kiev. Even though his reign as the grand prince was not successful, Dolgoruky's Vladimir-Suzdal became an important political region in Russian history. It succeeded Kievan Rus' as the most powerful Russian state in the late 12th century and lasted until the late 14th century, was the cradle of Russian language and nationality, and formed the core of modern Russia.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Bogolyubsky, Andrei (1111–1174); Novgorod, Siege of (1169)

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Donskoi, Dmitry (October 12, 1350–May 19, 1389)

Grand prince of Vladimir, credited as the founder of Muscovy and the ruler who first demonstrated the ability of Rus' to resist the Mongols.

The son of Prince Ivan II (“the Meek”) of Moscow, Dmitry was only nine when his father died. Though Dmitry was Ivan II’s eldest son, the Mongol (Tatar) overlord Izbeg awarded the patent of Vladimir to Dmitry’s uncle, Dmitry Konstantinovich of Nizhny-Novgorod. Guided by the crown regent Metropolitan Aleksei, Dmitry’s forces deposed Konstantinovich in 1363 and regained the crown of Vladimir. Dmitry married Konstantinovich’s daughter, Eudoxia, and consolidated the thrones of Moscow and Vladimir in 1367.

Among Dmitry’s first and most important acts was to order the wooden *kreml* (fortress) at the heart of Moscow reconstructed in white stone. This paid great dividends in November 1368, when a Lithuanian army approached the city; Dmitry burned the suburbs as a defense, and the Lithuanians could not breach his new stone citadel. A second successful defense in 1370 led Dmitry to fortify Periaslavl in similar fashion.

After signing a treaty with Lithuania in 1373, Dmitry turned his attention to the struggle with Tver. Mikhail II, grand prince of Tver and brother-in-law of Prince Algirdas of Lithuania, had secured the patent as grand prince of Vladimir from the Mongol khan in 1371, promising to pay a higher tribute. Dmitry defeated a small Tver force in 1371, however, and made a successful defensive stand on the Oka River against a larger

Mongol force in 1373. The Mongols subsequently withdrew their support for Mikhail, but it was not until Dmitry defeated his rival directly in 1375 that he was once again the undisputed grand prince of Vladimir.

Dmitry thus held more power than any leader of northern Russia to date. He could draw on the resources not only of Moscow and Vladimir but also those of Nizhny-Novgorod, Tver, Briansk, Periaslavl, Rostov, Starodub, Suzdal, and many other towns he had annexed. Many, particularly Russian historians, have also argued that Dmitry’s stand against the Mongols from 1371–1375 established him as the popular champion of Russian liberty, who thus could rely on the support of the people.

Regardless of the truth of that assertion, Dmitry soon enough proved his ability to withstand a serious challenge from the Mongols. In 1378, Mamai, a Mongol general who aspired to lead the Golden Horde, led a large force north to exact tribute from Moscow and punish Dmitry. The Mongols sacked Nizhny-Novgorod in August and moved through the province of Riazan, plundering and burning the countryside.

Dmitry resolved to strike Mamai’s forces before they could enter Muscovite territory. He therefore led his forces to the Vozha River and established a defensive position. Dmitry positioned his main force on a small rise with his wing regiments pulled back to force the Mongols into a frontal attack with the river behind them. When the enemy assault began to peter out, Dmitry gave a signal and the Russian wings and reserves mounted a furious counterattack, driving the Mongols into the river, where many of them drowned. The survivors fled.

Mamai returned the following year, however, with an even larger army (c. 300,000) now allied both to Lithuania, which sent a force to strike Dmitry’s western flank, and

with the prince of Riazan, who, however, did not contribute any forces. Dmitry once again resolved to meet the enemy on terms and ground of his choosing. Marching around the principality of Riazan so as not to tip the prince into direct opposition, Dmitry led his forces across the Don River on September 7 and set up a defensive position in a horse-shoe bend (“Snipes’ Field”) near the village of Kulikovo.

The Russian position once again forced the Mongols into a traditional battle featuring a frontal assault, rather than the free-wheeling flanking maneuvers they preferred. This time, however, Dmitry bent his left wing forward, inviting attack, and placed an elite reserve force behind it. Twice the Mongols nearly broke the Russian line, and twice Dmitry led counterattacks to restore it. When Mamai threw his last reserves into the fray against the weakening Russian left wing, Dmitry finally launched his reserve and drove the Mongols from the field.

The Battle of Kulikovo ended with some 160,000 casualties for the Russians and perhaps twice that on the Mongol side. The 10,000 Russian soldiers who died in the struggle are commemorated by a monument over their mass grave in the village. According to Russian historical mythology they were the martyrs who, under the leadership of Dmitry Donskoi (“of the Don River”), “threw off the Mongol yoke” and liberated Russia.

There is little truth in this. A Mongol army under Khan Tokhtamysh laid siege to Moscow in 1382, taking the city on August 27 and plundering it. Tokhtamysh’s forces proceeded to pillage Vladimir, Iuriev, Svergorod, and Periaslavl before returning home. The princes of Moscow, like the other Russian princes, paid tribute to the Mongols for several decades more.

Dmitry Donskoi had, however, laid the foundations for the success of Moscow. In addition to the Kremlin, he established a series of stone, fortified monasteries around Moscow and created stone and brick fortifications in Serpukhov, Kolomna, and other strategic towns. Through his marriage to Eudoxia, he consolidated the principalities of Moscow and Vladimir-Suzdal; the marriages of his 12 children, along with his campaigns, brought other principalities into the fold and established some degree of unity among the princes of northern Russia.

Dmitry also led a successful expedition to force Novgorod to pay tribute to Muscovy in 1386, a significant addition to the wealth and strength of the principality. Dmitry fell ill in February 1389, however; he died in Moscow on May 19. In addition to being credited as the founder of Muscovy and the first to build stone defensive works in Russia, Dmitry Donskoi introduced artillery and gunpowder weapons into the Russian military and was, after Alexander Nevsky, perhaps the greatest military commander in early modern Russia.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Ivan I (“Kalita”; ca. 1288–1340); Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505); Kremlin; Kulikovo, Battle of (1380); Nevsky, Alexander (1220–1263); Vozha River, Battle of the (August 11, 1378)

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Dragomirov, Mikhail Ivanovich (1830–1905)

Nineteenth century army general, military instructor, and writer who helped shape the reforms in the Russian Imperial Army after the Crimean War. Dragomirov left an indelible mark on the army, espousing new ideas about training and incorporating new tactical ideas into the army regulations.

Mikhail I. Dragomirov was born in 1830 in Konotop, Ukraine, to a noble, military family. His father was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Dragomirov was in the Noble Cadet Corps in 1846, the Semenovskiy Guards Regiment in 1849, and at the Nicholas Military Academy in 1854. He registered perfect scores on his final exams. Following his studies at the Nicholas Military Academy, he briefly studied at the *Ecole Militaire* at St. Cyr. Dragomirov then served as a military observer with various European armies. He became an adjunct professor of tactics at the Nicholas Academy in 1860 and a member of War Minister Dmitri A. Miliutin's Special Committee on Structure and Training Troops. He later held the chair of tactics at the Nicholas Academy.

Defeat in the Crimean War was a turning point in the development of the Russian Imperial Army. Many felt the army and its training had become inflexible and impractical. The introduction of rifles demanded versatile soldiers who were trained to survive a new level of brutality on the battlefield. Dragomirov presented new ideas. He rejected the pettiness and pomp of the drill field as training, and espoused a doctrine based on developing essential combat skills.

Dragomirov proposed two types of military education: indoctrination and training.

Indoctrination dealt with the different ideals and principles he saw as keys to being a dependable, capable soldier, including loyalty and courage. Training dealt with more physical aspects of being a soldier in the late 19th century: marksmanship, bayonet skills, and others.

Dragomirov's greatest contribution to the development of Russian Imperial Army tactics was simply the departure from the established ideals. He found that many of the casualties in recent battles came from failed offensives. Rifles had greater range and accuracy, which made offensives using closed formations easy targets. Contemporary Western reformers called for dispersed formations and skirmish lines and all but abandoning the columns of the Napoleonic Era. Dragomirov, however, only chose to include the concept of dispersed formations alongside the more traditional columns. He proposed using the new firepower, which he clearly did not appreciate, to soften the enemy for the eventual bayonet charge. Dragomirov saw marksmanship as a dangerous distraction. He endorsed Suvorov's notion: "The bullet's a fool, the bayonet a fine lad."

William Eger

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856), Miliutin, Dmitry (1816–1912); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Dragunov Sniper Rifle

A semiautomatic sniper rifle used by Soviet and, later, by Russian forces starting in 1963. This weapon is also commonly referred to as the *SVD*, which is short for its Russian name *snayperskaya vintovka Dragunova*. The rifle fires a 7.62-millimeter round, usually in a 10-round magazine. The effective range is disputed. Most reports have the weapon accurate up to 1,000 meters. Other sources document an effective range of 1,200 or 1,300 meters with an optical sight. It weighs less than 10 pounds and has a rate of fire of 30 rounds a minute at a speed of 830 meters per second.

The Dragunov is similar to the Kalashnikov assault rifle. The Dragunov uses a short-stroke piston instead of the long-stroke design of the Kalashnikov to reduce the weight shift during firing for enhanced accuracy. The weapon is issued by the Russian military with a PSO-1 telescope sight, a NSPU-3 night sight, and a bayonet. Many Dragunov rifles are now made in Romania, Iran, Iraq, and China by various companies.

The Dragunov is named for Evgeniy Fedorovich Dragunov, leader of the design team that created the weapon. The design team began their work in 1958. Designing a light sniper rifle was a challenge. The engineers on the team were originally planning on a heavier weapon that was more accurate, but soldiers in the field wanted it as light as possible. The designers' other main goal was to make the weapon resilient in poor weather. The prototype was completed in 1962. Production began in 1963.

William Eger

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Dresden, Battle of (August 26–27, 1813)

In the fall of 1813, Napoleon resumed his campaign in Germany against the Sixth Coalition, which consisted of all the great powers of Europe: Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden. The Allies formulated a strategy agreed to by a convention signed at Trachenberg during the summer armistice. The strategy specified that no one army would fight the forces led by Napoleon in person; only a combination of armies would confront him. The plan thus relied mainly on avoiding forces commanded by Napoleon while aggressively attacking his lieutenants and his lines of communications.

At the outset of the campaign, three large armies were poised around Napoleon's defensive salient in Saxony. In the north was former French marshal Bernadotte's army protecting Berlin. In the east was General Gebhard von Blücher's Army of Silesia. The largest army of all was in the south in Bohemia, under the command of Karl Philipp, Prince Schwarzenberg, who also served as the nominal commander in chief, but really was only responsible for coordinating the movements of the other armies. On the French side, Napoléon was in overall command of the central reserves in Saxony with subordinate armies under Marshal Nicolas Oudinot in the north facing Bernadotte, and Marshal Jacques Macdonald in the east facing Blücher.

Unity of command was the key French advantage in the forthcoming battle. From

the beginning, Czar Alexander I had been unhappy about an Austrian exercising overall command. Alexander now felt he had sufficient resources of military talent—the turncoat French generals Jean Moreau and Antoine Jomini—to reassert his claim to supreme command in the field. Alexander’s failure to recognize the distaste an Austrian would have for a partnership with Moreau and Jomini developed into a dispute over strategy. Napoleon’s apparent inaction since the end of the armistice caused the Allies to reconsider the wisdom of the Trachenberg Plan. Trachenberg had not allowed for an inert French defense but, rather, had anticipated a move on Napoleon’s part. The Allies therefore reacted to Napoleon’s supposed lack of movement.

A “general offensive,” contrary to the desires of Schwarzenberg and *Feldmarschall-leutnant* Johann Joseph Graf Radetzky von Radetz, was agreed to at a council of war shortly after the campaign began. Schwarzenberg had organized the logistics for the Austrian army to support an eventual advance on Leipzig, and now that an offensive was to be conducted, he naturally recommended Leipzig as the objective. Orders were sent, and the huge Army of Bohemia (over 200,000 men) began to advance.

Once again the czar, advised by Moreau, interfered. Alexander and Moreau felt that a move closer to Blücher in Silesia was warranted; indeed, that was where Napoleon had gone in response to an advance by the Prussian commander in chief. The czar’s view prevailed, despite Schwarzenberg’s opposition, and Dresden was chosen as the new objective. Schwarzenberg had considered moving on Dresden as well but wanted to take advantage of his logistical preparations and to wheel east toward the city after advancing through the Bohemian mountains.

The crisis of command translated to the tactical level. Logistical support, established for a move on Leipzig, soon broke down during the advance to Dresden. The effects of countermarching and the wet, rainy weather further fatigued and slowed the advance of the Allies. The lead elements of the Army of Bohemia arrived cold, tired, wet, and hungry south of Dresden on August 25. Napoleon was not yet there. Another council of war was held instead of attacking while Napoleon was still absent. Schwarzenberg and Jomini supported the czar’s desire for an immediate assault, but Moreau and General Karl *Freiherr* (Baron) Toll (a Prussian in Russian service) advised against it. The attack was eventually postponed until the next day (August 26), when discussion resumed while the troops formed up for battle.

Marshal Laurent Gouvion St. Cyr’s corps opposed the Allies at Dresden. He had earned his marshal’s baton in Russia at Polotsk fighting, just the type of battle the Allies now contemplated—a battle in urban terrain naturally suited to fortification and defense. The Allied skirmishers had already found Dresden’s walled houses and gardens well-fortified in response to their threatened assault.

It was at this point that, at about 9:00 a.m. on the morning of August 26, Napoléon dramatically arrived. Once Napoleon’s presence became known, the mood at Allied headquarters changed, and Alexander now favored a withdrawal. The Prussian king, Frederick William III, for the first time asserted himself and called for the attack to continue—in contravention of the Trachenberg Plan. The Allies had not consolidated major formations of their army to include both the Russian Imperial Guard and the corps of General Prince Eugen of Württemberg. They had about 150,000 men initially on hand. St. Cyr had only about 30,000

troops. While the Allied supreme command bickered, the assault began on the basis of the orders already issued. This decided the issue, and the battle now commenced in earnest.

The critical action on the battlefield took place south of the Elbe River in the old city of Dresden and was characterized by desperate house-to-house fighting. Walls held up many of the Austrian columns because they had not brought assault ladders. Meanwhile, more French troops arrived by the hour—many after forced marches. Napoleon rapidly reinforced St. Cyr's excellent defenses with portions of the Young Guard. By the end of the day, Napoleon had stabilized his position, repulsed the Allied attacks all along the line, and assembled more than 70,000 men.

On the same day, General Dominique Vandamme, commanding the French I Corps, engaged Eugen's corps, thus effectively preventing it from reinforcing the Allies. Napoleon continued to reinforce and would have almost 120,000 troops for the second day of battle. With Vandamme threatening the Allied line of communication, the Allies diverted another corps to help contain him near Pirna further up the Elbe.

On the second day, August 27, Napoleon once again displayed his tactical genius for terrain and weather (as he had at Austerlitz in 1805), while his troops exhibited their former élan in executing their emperor's plans. During a furious rainstorm and using a rain-swollen stream that bifurcated the Allied line, Napoleon launched Marshal Joachim Murat and the cavalry against the Allied left, which annihilated *Feldmarschalleutnant* Frederick *Freiherr* Bianchi's Austrian Korps. On the far right, Marshal Adolphe Mortier had roughly handled the Russian corps under General Count Peter Wittgenstein. In the center, the Allies had massed what they hoped

was overwhelming strength, but as news of trouble on the flanks became known, a spirit of defeat settled in. Allied headquarters also nearly suffered a serious loss when a round shot (cannonball) narrowly missed the czar, killing Moreau instead. The Allies had had enough, and late in the day ordered a retreat. Napoleon had already retired from the field convinced he would need a third day of battle to complete the victory.

Half-beaten once they learned of Napoleon's presence, the Allies had compounded their initial mistakes in deviating from the Trachenberg Plan and accepting battle against a strong defensive position. Their losses were heavy even by Napoleonic standards: some 38,000 Austrians, Prussians, and Russians were casualties, including many prisoners. French losses were approximately 10,000. Dresden was the exception that proved the rule: The Trachenberg Plan had never intended that an offensive battle be fought against Napoleon and his main army by a single Allied army—even the huge Army of Bohemia. The fact that Napoleon occupied such a strong defensive position as Dresden had only made things worse.

For Napoleon this battle could have been a harbinger of one of his most successful campaigns. Dresden seemed to justify the improvements Napoleon had made during the summer armistice. His Young Guard had resolutely defended the city on the first day of action, and his cavalry and horse artillery had been critical in the counteroffensive that forced the Allied withdrawal the following day. Marshal Auguste Marmont expressed to Napoleon his concern about fighting on such a widely extended front, however.

Marmont's concerns literally came true. At Kulm, Vandamme was fortuitously cut off from the main French army while leading the pursuit of the dispirited Army of Bohemia. He was captured, and his 30,000-man corps

was reduced to fewer than 10,000 effective troops. Not long after that, Napoleon learned that General Friedrich von Bülow's Prussian Corps had repulsed Marshal Michel Ney's drive on Berlin at Dennewitz. Worse still, at about the same time as the fighting was going on at Dresden, Macdonald had been badly defeated by Blücher along the Katzbach in Silesia and was in headlong retreat.

Thus the fruits of the Battle of Dresden were temporary, and circumstances relegated it to the status of a mere tactical victory. Despite this unfortunate confluence of events, the battle highlights the high degree of skill and leadership of which Napoleon was capable. The Allies, despite their defeat, had made considerable gains, and the initiative remained with them until Napoleon's ultimate and catastrophic defeat at Leipzig that October.

John T. Kuehn

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

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Dudayev, Dzhokhar M. (1944–1996)

Until his death in April 1996, Dzhokhar Dudayev was the leader of the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim territory situated in southern Russia near the North Caucasus mountain range.



Until his death in April 1996, Dzhokhar Dudayev was the leader of the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim community situated in the southern territory near the North Caucasus mountain range. (AP Photo)

Dudayev was born in 1944, the year his family was deported from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic to Kazakhstan on the orders of Soviet leader Josef Stalin. Of the 800,000 Chechens sent away, because of Stalin's fears that the historically defiant people would collaborate with invading Nazi forces during World War II, almost a quarter of a million died in transit. Dudayev spent his childhood in northern Kazakhstan and attended Soviet military schools in his teens, took a Russian wife, and graduated from the Yuri Gagarin Air Force Academy in 1974. From 1987 to 1990, he commanded a division of Soviet bombers based in Estonia as a major general, the first Chechen in history to attain such a rank in the Soviet military. He earned a reputation as a commander tolerant of Estonian nationalist desires and

refused to carry out central Soviet orders to close down the country's parliament and television stations.

In 1990, his division withdrawn from Estonia, Dudayev retired from the Soviet Air Force and settled in Grozny, the Chechen capital, where he became the leader of the National Congress of the Chechen People, a nationalist opposition party. Following the abortive Moscow coup in August 1991 against Mikhail Gorbachev, Dudayev overthrew the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and unilaterally declared Chechnya independent from Russia. Russian troops sent by President Boris Yeltsin to put down the revolt were called back by a parliamentary order.

Modeling himself on past Chechen warrior sheikhs such as Imam Shamil, who fought a long war against czarist rule that was put down in 1864, Dudayev consistently flouted central Moscow control, survived many assassination attempts, and dodged a covert Russian effort to topple him. From 1991 he ran Chechnya as his outpost of organized crime, delving into arms and drug smuggling that spawned a class of rich Mercedes-driving hustlers and thugs who lived in "air houses" because the money that built them seemed to come from the air.

A full-scale Russian invasion force, which entered the republic on December 11, 1994, met with unexpectedly fierce resistance from Dudayev's fighters and Chechen volunteers, threatening to turn the conflict into a long and costly war on a scale with the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Dudayev was never popular with the citizens of Chechnya but since the heavy-handed Russian assault on the republic and the verified atrocities committed by Russian soldiers, many of the survivors voiced support for him. Dudayev, who had sworn to fight the Russians to the death, was killed by a Russian rocket

around April 21, 1996, during a period of intensified air strikes against Chechen strongholds.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Chechen War, Second (War in the Northern Caucasus; October 1999–February 2000); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Grozny, Battle of (December 1994–January 1995); Maskhadov, Aslan (1951–2005); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Dukhonin, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1876–1917)

Russian army general and chief of staff under Alexander Kerensky. Born on December 13, 1876, in Smolensk Province, Nikolai Dukhonin was of noble descent. He graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1902 and then served as an intelligence officer in the Kiev Military District. The Kiev District served as a hub for numerous reform-minded officers, including future army commanders Mikhail Alekseev and Aleksei Brusilov.

A regimental commander at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the talented and energetic Dukhonin became one of the youngest generals in the Russian army. He served as deputy quartermaster general of the Southwestern Front from December 1915 to July 1916. Promoted to general, he was made quartermaster general. Dukhonin's career continued to advance after the

collapse of the monarchy in March 1917, and he was appointed chief of staff of the Southwestern Front in August 1917.

Following the arrest of army commander in chief General Lavr Kornilov in September 1917, Alexander Kerensky declared himself supreme commander of the army and appointed Dukhonin chief of staff. Kerensky's preoccupation with trying to prevent his government from collapsing meant that Dukhonin exercised broad operational command, and he showed a willingness to work with the socialist commissars to restructure the army and prevent its collapse. Ultimately, Dukhonin's plans for reform, which included reducing the size of the army and making it a largely voluntary force organized into units based on nationality, were dashed by the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.

There was considerable confusion in the week following the fall of Kerensky's government. Dukhonin attempted to organize military support for Kerensky, but his efforts failed to stir his officers and men, who preferred to remain neutral amid the chaos. By November 3, Kerensky gave up his bid to regain power and fled, but not before appointing Dukhonin supreme commander. In that role, Dukhonin endeavored to maintain control of the army by ordering his troops to remain at their posts while also attempting to avoid becoming embroiled in the general political upheaval.

By mid-November, 1917, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had gained control of the government, and the rulers of the new regime ordered Dukhonin to contact the Germans

immediately to open truce negotiations. Dukhonin refused to carry out the order, however, partly out of a sense of patriotism and partly because of protests by Allied representatives at his headquarters. As a result, he was relieved of command on November 12, replaced by General Nikolai Vasilievich Krylenko. In his final hours of authority and while awaiting the arrival of his successor, Dukhonin released from custody five prominent generals, including Kornilov, who had been held since September. Enraged at this news, on November 23, a mob of revolutionary soldiers dragged Dukhonin from his train at Mogilev and murdered him, reportedly with Krylenko looking on but unable to dissuade the angry mob.

John M. Jennings

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Eberhardt, Andrei Augustovich (1856–1919)

Russian navy admiral. Born November 21, 1856, in Patras, Greece, the son of the Russian consul there, Andrei Augustovich Eberhardt (occasionally transliterated as Ebergard) graduated from the St. Petersburg Naval Institute as a midshipman in 1878. He served in the Baltic and Far East and took part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900–1901). By 1902, he was a captain first rank.

Immediately before the Russo-Japanese War, Eberhardt served as flag captain on the staff of the commander of the Pacific Squadron (1903–1904), and then was flag captain of the naval field staff of Admiral Evgeny I. Alekseev (1904). After brief stints commanding battleships (the *Imperator Aleksandr II* and the *Panteleimon*), Eberhardt was appointed deputy to the chief of the naval General Staff in 1906 and was promoted to rear admiral in 1907. In 1908, he was appointed chief of the naval General Staff. He was promoted to vice admiral in 1909.

Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovich, who became naval minister in April 1911, considered Eberhardt unsatisfactory as chief of the naval general staff, and on October 24, 1911, he convinced Czar Nicholas II to appoint Eberhardt commander of Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. It was a decision Grigorovich came to regret. In his memoirs, Grigorovich repeatedly states that Eberhardt lacked the drive and dash of Admiral Nikolai von Essen in the Baltic.

Early in his tenure with the Black Sea Fleet, Eberhardt faced a serious threat when reports from the secret police indicated that a mass mutiny was being planned for the summer of 1912. The suspected ringleaders were arrested; 142 men were tried by courts-martial, and 11 were executed. Eberhardt was promoted to admiral on April 27, 1913.

After the outbreak of the war, Eberhardt faced a difficult situation. On August 11, 1914, the German battlecruiser *Goeben* and light cruiser *Breslau*, fleeing Allied warships in the Mediterranean, arrived at Istanbul (Constantinople) and almost immediately were transferred (in name only) to the Ottoman navy. The *Goeben* was faster and more powerful than any of the Russian pre-dreadnoughts in the Black Sea and thus presented Eberhardt with a formidable threat; yet the Russian government hoped to avoid war with the Ottoman Empire and ordered Eberhardt to take no provocative action.

This policy exploded on October 29, 1914, when German and Ottoman warships attacked Odessa, Novorossiisk, Feodosia, and the Black Sea Fleet's main base of Sevastopol. Although no serious damage was done, the slowness of the Black Sea Fleet in responding to the attacks and the beginning of war with the Ottoman Empire led to accusations that Eberhardt and his staff had failed to take necessary precautions.

Eberhardt's wartime performance was checkered. He enjoyed some success in skirmishes with the *Goeben* on November 18,

1914, off Cape Sarych, and on May 10, 1915, off the Bosphorus, fending off the powerful German ship by keeping his pre-dreadnoughts together. His destroyers undertook sweeps along the Anatolian coast that gradually reduced Istanbul's coal supplies, and in 1916, the fleet carried out a series of amphibious landings that drove the Ottomans to the west of Trebizond.

On the other hand, Eberhardt repeatedly failed to bring the *Goeben* to decisive action, and the appearance of U-boats in the Black Sea beginning in mid-1915 led to a sharp reduction in the fleet's activities. Moreover, there was growing frustration at *Stavka* and in the naval general staff, which favored a close blockade of the Bosphorus, a strategy Eberhardt rejected. Also, Eberhardt and his staff appeared to be resisting preparations for an amphibious landing at the Bosphorus.

Matters came to a head in July 1916, after the failure of yet another attempt to trap the *Goeben*. On July 10, Admiral Aleksandr I. Rusin, chief of the naval staff at *Stavka*, submitted a report to Czar Nicholas II enumerating all the faults, real and imaginary, attributed to Eberhardt and his staff. The czar reluctantly accepted Rusin's indictment and, on July 16, 1916, Eberhardt was replaced by Vice Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak.

Eberhardt was then appointed to the State Council, a largely honorary position, and in June 1917, became a member of the Admiralty Council. He was retired in December 1917, and died in Petrograd on May 2, 1919.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: Cape Sarych, Battle of (November 17, 1914); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Navy, Russian (1991–); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918)

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Elizabeth I, Czarina (1709–1761)

Elizabeth Petrovna Romanov was the second daughter of Czar Peter I and his second wife, Catherine (later Czarina Catherine I). Born in St. Petersburg on December 18, 1709, she came to the throne through a palace coup on November 25, 1741. Until that point, Elizabeth had displayed little interest in politics. Described as tall, beautiful, willful, romantic, and vain, she had at one time been groomed to marry the future Louis XV of France, then betrothed to Prince Karl Augustus of Holstein-Gottorp. When Karl Augustus died in 1725 and her sister Anna then came to the throne in 1730, Elizabeth retired to the countryside, where she led a “robust life” of riding and hunting.

As czarina, Elizabeth was something of an enigma. She loved clothes, and at one time owned over 15,000 dresses; she reveled in society, and took a series of lovers. At the same time, she often made extended pilgrimages to the monasteries around Moscow and frowned on the affairs of others, particularly her daughter-in-law, Catherine II. She was dedicated to the legacy of her father, Peter I, but often too intellectually lazy to pursue his reforms. Elizabeth devoted considerable energies, however, to ensuring the continuation of the Romanov line,

bringing her sister Anna's son by the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Charles Peter, back to St. Petersburg to be raised as the heir to the throne—the future Peter III—and choosing for him Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst—the future Catherine II.

Elizabeth's only major foreign policy venture, however, was to involve Russia in the Seven Years' War. Following Russia's traditional interest, she and her chancellor, Count Aleksei Bestuzhev-Ryumin, aligned the country with Austria against Prussia and France. Though they had managed to avoid involvement in the War of Austrian Succession, Elizabeth certainly had to be concerned with Prussia's seizure of Silesia on grounds that Maria Theresa, as a female, was not the legitimate empress of Austria. Thus when Prussia suddenly allied with Great Britain in 1756, Elizabeth feared Frederick II (the Great), king of Prussia, might have his eye on the Baltic littoral of Russia. She renewed her pledge of support for Austria, and ordered Admiral-General Stepan Apraksin to prepare her forces for war.

It was more than a year before Russia was ready to intervene in the European conflict, but she did so in spectacular fashion. In June 1757, Apraksin's forces captured the Baltic port of Memel and then drove into East Prussia. They met Prussian forces under Frederick II at Gross Jaegersdorf on August 17 and defeated them soundly. In an even greater surprise, however, Apraksin then led his forces on a speedy retreat to Memel, scorching the earth as he went. Recalled to St. Petersburg and placed under arrest, Apraksin pleaded inadequate supply.

Elizabeth replaced him with William Fermor, and sent her armies back into Prussia the following year. They met Frederick II this time at Zorndorf, in August, and fought



Elizabeth I of Russia (1709–1761). (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

to a draw. Shocked by the losses her army incurred—estimated at 10,000 dead and perhaps twice as many wounded—Elizabeth removed Fermor from command, but determined to fight on. Under Peter Saltykov, the Russian forces fought smaller engagements with mixed results during 1759–1761, though they did advance to and occupy the Prussian capital of Berlin briefly during the summer of 1760. In December 1761 though, Elizabeth took ill; she died on Christmas Day.

Her nephew, now Peter III, immediately switched sides and withdrew Russia's forces, advising his former allies to do the same. After signing a treaty of mutual assistance with Frederick, he further ceded all territories the Russians had won during Elizabeth's reign. This move, highly unpopular,

contributed to his overthrow in favor of Catherine II in 1762. Elizabeth's only lasting achievement would be to have brought Catherine to Russia.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Apraksin, Stepan F. (1702–1758); Bestuzhev-Ryumin, Count Aleksei Petrovich (1693–1766); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Fermor, William (ca. 1702–1771); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Seven Years’ War (1754–1763)

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Erzincan, Battle of (July 25–26, 1916)

Important battle on the Caucasus Front. The city of Erzincan is located in Turkish Armenia about a mile from the Euphrates River. Erzincan was not only a center for the production of civilian goods but served as the headquarters for an Ottoman army corps. Its facilities, which included barracks and factories geared to military production, made it a lucrative target for the Russian army, which in the summer of 1916 appeared to have the momentum following several earlier successes. The battle for Erzincan pitted the Russian Caucasus Army commanded by General Nikolai Yudenich against the recently reinforced Ottoman Third Army led by Abdul Kerim and was the last major action on the Caucasus Front.

Erzincan was a key objective of the Russian offensive that began on July 12, 1916, with the capture of Mama Khatun. In this operation, Russian forces gained control of the heights of Naglika and took an Ottoman position near the Durum Darasi River. Also, their cavalry pierced the Boz-Tapa-Mertekli line.

The Russians reached Erzincan on July 25, 1916, and took the largely evacuated city in only two days. Erzincan was relatively untouched by battle and yielded a considerable amount of supplies and equipment. Ottoman forces then retreated to the southeast to Mosul and Sivas. With their victory at Erzincan, Russian forces had advanced 80 miles and were well placed to strike at Sivas, Angora, and Istanbul (Constantinople). They could also threaten the Mediterranean port of Adana and were even in position to sever communications and trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The capture of Erzincan also provided proof positive of the execution there of Armenians by the Ottomans.

Yudenich pursued the withdrawing Ottomans until the end of August. The siphoning off of his forces because of Russian reversals on the Eastern Front precluded further offensives on this front, however.

Anthony J. Schmaus

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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Erzurum Offensive (January 10–March 25, 1916)

Russian offensive on the Caucasus Front. Compared with the towering Pontic Alps to the north and the forbidding highlands to the east, the Erzurum area (in modern-day eastern Turkey) is comparatively accessible geographically. In 1916, the Kars–Erzurum road was the only important land communication between Anatolia and Caucasia. After its abortive advance on Sarikamiş in the winter of 1914–1915, the battered Ottoman Third Army had withdrawn to a fortified line on the hills east of Köprüköy, about 60 miles from Erzurum.

Following the Ottoman victory over the Allied Expeditionary Force at Gallipoli,

General Nikolai Yudenich, commander of the Russian Caucasus Army, rightly assumed that the Ottomans would reinforce the Caucasus Front with divisions from Thrace. He calculated that reinforcements could arrive from the early spring of 1916. Accordingly, Yudenich decided to preempt the expected Ottoman strike with a winter offensive, which he hoped would destroy the Ottoman Third Army. The attack would focus on breaking the Ottoman lines east of Köprüköy and advancing on the fortress city of Erzurum.

While Yudenich selected favorable terrain for his offensive, ground that could be negotiated by troops even in the middle of the terrible Caucasian winter, he also chose the point where the Ottoman lines were strongest. Abdul Kerim Pasha, commander of the Ottoman Third Army who was charged with defending the entire 300-mile-long Caucasus Front, had all his divisions but one



Russian forces display the captured flags at Erzurum, the capital of Ottoman Armenia, on February 16, 1916. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

concentrated in the defense of the Erzurum area. Still, the length of the front meant that his 65,000 men and 100 guns were insufficient for anything but a thin screen along the entire front. Yudenich had only 80,000 infantry himself, but he concentrated vastly superior numbers at the point of attack (35,000 men against 13,000). With more than 230 guns, he also had a decisive advantage in artillery.

During the last months of 1915, the Russian Caucasus Army carefully and secretly prepared for the offensive. Its assault on the KöprükÖy lines on January 10, 1916, took the Ottoman defenders by surprise, although a diversionary attack by the II Turkistan Corps over the heavily broken ground of the Karadag mountain range on the Russian right was checked by the Ottomans, who enjoyed the protection of deep trenches and well-placed machine guns.

On January 12, the I Caucasian Corps of the Ottoman army attacked over the plains in the center but was also repelled with serious loss. Yet the Ottoman lines were too weak to resist for long. On January 14, Yudenich launched a general attack, and the superior Russian numbers overran the Ottoman forces.

On January 16, a Russian drive around the northern flank of Cilligül Hill threatened to cut off the Ottoman defenders in the Aras Plain. That night, Abdul Kerim ordered a general retreat to the Erzurum fortified area. The Russians failed to pursue vigorously, and the Third Army reached its fallback position in comparatively good order. It had sustained some 20,000 casualties, almost one-third of its strength, and lost about 30 guns. Russian casualties totaled some 12,000.

The next obstacle facing the Russians was the Erzurum fortified area proper. Nature rendered Erzurum an impressive stronghold. All

approaches from the north, east, and south ran over or cut through mountain ranges considered impassable, especially in winter.

This natural protection had been improved since the 1880s with a series of 15 independent forts arrayed in two lines, extending in a semicircle from the Tortum road in the north to the Takepen mountain path in the south. These forts were of modern construction, on the technical level of Liège or Antwerp. They could withstand everything save the newest heavy siege guns of German or Austrian manufacture that had defeated the forts at Liège in 1914; the Russian Caucasus Army had no such guns, however.

Bristling with more than 300 artillery pieces and connected with carefully prepared fieldworks, the Erzurum forts constituted a formidable obstacle. Fully manned, however, they required about 75,000 men, and the Third Army's effective strength did not exceed 50,000 after KöprükÖy. Still, the Ottoman General Staff considered Erzurum an impregnable stronghold and believed it would hold out for months, as it had in fighting against the Russians during 1877–1878. That may have been one reason the Ottomans did not quickly reinforce Erzurum; another was the primitive state of communications in Anatolia.

Yudenich was not a man to be discouraged by the formidable but undermanned fortifications his army faced. He enjoyed a significant numerical advantage, and he knew Ottoman morale was low. Yudenich also chose the weakest spot in the defensive perimeter for his attack.

Due north from Erzurum, the Gürcü-bogaz defile opened on to the plains of the Karasu River. It was enclosed by mountain ranges considered impassable in winter and defended by only two unsupported forts.

Yudenich concentrated three rifle divisions in this sector. The assignment was to scale the slopes of Kargapazar Mountain and Dumlu Mountain and encircle the forts, then break through to the plains beyond. The remainder of the army would attack frontally the main fortified lines on the Deve-boyun Ridge and Palandöken Mountain in order to pin the Ottomans and force them to commit their few reserves.

On the afternoon of February 11, the Russians launched their offensive. In spite of tough Ottoman resistance, the attack progressed favorably. The defenders at Fort Dalangöz on Deve-boyun were surprised and fell to the Russians at dawn on the February 12. Furious Ottoman counterattacks failed to retake it. The defenders at forts Çoban-dede, Kaburga, Ortayuk, and Gez repelled the attackers, but the main Russian attack in the Gürcü-bogaz defile succeeded.

The Ottoman X Corps was under incompetent leadership, and its three divisions fought widely separated. The Russians encircled and captured Fort Kara-göbek, the northernmost of the Erzurum strongholds, on the February 12. The next day, the flanking columns, passing over the impassable mountains, converged on Fort Tafet, which fell on February 14. The way to the Karasu Plain was now open.

On February 15, the Ottomans began to withdraw from Erzurum. Russian aircraft detected their rearward movement, but the II Turkestan Corps failed to cut their retreat. What remained of the Ottoman Third Army escaped the trap in some semblance of order. It had lost 10,000 killed and wounded, 5,000 captured, and perhaps another 10,000 as stragglers during the retreat. The Russians captured 327 guns in Erzurum; their own casualties in the battle totaled about 9,000 men.

Erzurum had held out for only four days. Its loss had a disastrous effect on the Third Army's logistics and morale. Yet the Russians failed to follow up their spectacular success with a vigorous pursuit. Following the defeat, the Ottomans were able to recover and stiffen their resistance. By the end of March 1916, the Russian offensive was over.

Dierk Walter

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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Essen, Nikolai Ottovich von (1860–1915)

Russian admiral. Born December 23, 1860, in St. Petersburg, Russia, Nikolai von Essen graduated from the St. Petersburg Naval Institute in 1881 as a midshipman, at which time he entered the Imperial Navy. Upon his graduation from the Nikolaevsky Naval Academy in 1886, he was commissioned a lieutenant. Essen subsequently specialized in gunnery and engineering. His first command was a torpedo boat in 1897.

Essen achieved fame as commanding officer of the cruiser *Novik* in the early months of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Promoted to captain first rank, Essen distinguished himself during the initial Battle of Port Arthur in February 1904. He

subsequently commanded the battleship *Sevastopol* and served briefly as chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet. As an advocate of more aggressive operations, Essen soon fell out with commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Wilhelm K. Vitgift who relieved him of his post. During the final Japanese attack on Port Arthur in late December 1904, Essen was the only commanding officer to take his ship into the outer roadstead, where he fought off several Japanese torpedo boat attacks before scuttling his ship in deep water on January 2, 1905. Essen was awarded the Order of St. George for his wartime performance.

Upon his return to Russia, Essen served briefly in the Strategic Planning Department on the Naval Staff. He then became commander of a destroyer squadron in the Baltic Sea, where he reformed its training program. Essen was promoted to rear admiral in 1908, took the new post of commander of the Baltic Fleet in December 1909, and was promoted to vice admiral in 1910. By 1914, his rigorous training regime had brought his command to an unprecedented level of readiness, in spite of its largely outdated equipment. Meanwhile, on April 27, 1913, he was advanced to full admiral.

In August 1914, Essen immediately initiated a comprehensive mine-laying campaign in the Baltic Sea. As in the Russo-Japanese War, Essen chafed under orders that confined him to low-risk defensive operations. On August 9, 1914, Essen's surreptitious attempt to force the neutral Swedish fleet into internment was prevented by a last-minute wireless instruction from Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, supreme commander of the Russian armed forces. In defiance of his orders, Essen continued to increase the pressure on the Germans by extending his mining and raiding

operations well into the central Baltic Sea until heavy ice reduced general naval activities in February 1915.

Essen, who was unquestionably the most able Russian naval commander of his time, died unexpectedly of pneumonia in Reval (Tallinn) on May 20, 1915. He was succeeded by Vice Admiral Vasily A. Kanin.

Dirk Steffen

See also: Grigorovich, Ivan Konstantinovich (1853–1930); Kanin, Vasily Aleksandrovich (1862–1927); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilevich (1874–1920); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929)

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Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?)

Russian army general. Born February 20, 1857, Aleksei Evert graduated from the Aleksandrovsy Military College in 1876 and served in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). In 1882, he graduated from the General Staff Academy. Evert held several command positions and served competently in staff positions during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. He then received a corps command, and in 1912, he became the commander of the Irkutsk Military District with the rank of general of infantry.

After several setbacks at the beginning of World War I in Galicia, the Russian High

Command (*Stavka*) appointed Evert to take over Fourth Army. He soon restored order to his forces and contributed to the successful counterattack that drove the Austro-Hungarians back to the Carpathian Mountains. The Fourth Army also assisted in repulsing the Austro-Hungarian Carpathian Campaign during January–March 1915. With the successful Central Powers’ offensive at Gorlice-Tarnów (May–December 1915) threatening to encircle the Fourth Army, Evert extracted it during a three-month fighting withdrawal of almost 300 miles that finally halted near Baranovichi.

In September 1915, Czar Nicholas II took over command of Russian forces from his uncle Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. At this time, Evert may have been considered for the post of chief of staff to the czar, but the position went to General Mikhail Alekseev. In any event, Evert received command of the Western Front, the largest of the three Russian fronts facing the Central Powers.

Evert proved unequal to front command. He was reluctant to undertake offensive operations, but in March 1916, *Stavka* ordered him to attack so as to relieve some of the German pressure on the French during the Battle of Verdun (February 21–December 15). Although Evert enjoyed a significant advantage in numbers and guns, his offensive at Lake Naroch was a disaster. He had selected swampy terrain for the offensive and failed to coordinate the artillery barrage with the infantry advance.

Several months later, Evert repeatedly delayed launching an attack that was to coincide with the Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1) to the south. Finally, Evert launched two half-hearted efforts at Baranovichi on July 2 and Kowel (Kovel) on July 27, both of which were failures.

Evert managed to keep his command, but his last major act in the war was more political than military. In March 1917, when Alekseev canvassed the front commanders for opinions on the possible abdication of the czar, Evert urged Nicholas II to give up the crown. Although staunchly conservative, Evert was disillusioned with Nicholas’s leadership. Whatever his aims, Evert did not long retain his command; the new provisional government relieved him in the spring of 1917.

Little is known of Evert’s activities for the next year. It is believed that he died in 1918, but there is no definitive account of the circumstances of his death. Some accounts list his death date as May 10, 1926.

Curtis S. King

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Carpathian Campaign (January 23–March 1915); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929)

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Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807)

Indecisive battle between Napoléon’s *Grande Armée* and a Russian army under General

Leonty Bennigsen near modern-day Bagrationovsk, Russia.

In the early stage of the First Polish Campaign, 1806–1807, Napoléon followed the retreating Russian army, which numbered nearly 70,000 men and 400 cannon and intended to defend Königsberg (modern-day Kaliningrad, Russia), toward the small Prussian town of Preussisch-Eylau. The French emperor had at his immediate disposal his Guard, two infantry corps under marshals Pierre Augereau and Jean-de-Dieu Soult, and a reserve cavalry under Marshal Joachim Murat (50,000 men and 200 cannon); additionally, marshals Michel Ney and Louis-Nicolas Davout (32,000 men) were within marching distance of the field. Prussian General Anton Wilhelm von Lestocq (9,000 men) was moving to join the Russian army half-march ahead of Ney.

After the bitter fight with the Russian rearguard on February 7, the French took Eylau and pushed the Russian army into the open field. On the next morning, while not having news from either Davout or Ney, Napoléon decided on the frontal assault against the Russian position. At 8:00 a.m., he launched Soult's force in a probing attack; at the same time, Russian cavalry engaged with the advance guard of Marshal Davout's force moving up from the south. Trying to break the Russian line in the center, Napoléon ordered troops under Marshal Augereau to launch a full attack. The French set off into a blizzard—straight toward the Russian artillery positions. After heavy bombardment, the French marching columns were practically destroyed as a cohesive formation, and the reserve line under General Dmitry Doctorov pursued the retreating French. For a time, the Russians took the initiative and one of their separate columns (no more than a battalion) even

reached Napoléon's headquarters at Eylau's cemetery.

Around noon, trying to save his center, Napoléon sent Marshal Murat's cavalry reserve (nearly 10,000 men) forward. His squadrons charged in two massive columns through the nearest Russian cavalry formation, which was still pursuing Augereau's retreating corps. The French overran the Russian battery but finally were stopped by the Russian infantry. Napoléon then sent in squadrons of his Guard under Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières, which finally broke the Russian line and managed to return, but lost many men.

After a few hours of recess, the battle continued. With Ney still not in sight to the north, Napoléon pressed the opponent with Davout's corps from the south, which made the Russian line bend back into a hairpin formation. Finally, the Prussians under Lestocq reached the battlefield, and his troops reinforced the exhausted Bennigsen's army. The battle was finished by 9:00 p.m., and at that time, Marshal Ney's corps finally arrived and took part in the short night battle. Bennigsen gave an order to retreat after midnight.

Both sides sustained heavy losses. The Russian army lost 26,000 men (including 8,000 killed); the *Grande Armée*—nearly 20,000 (including 8 generals and 2,100 men killed; 350 men were taken prisoner). Although Bennigsen claimed victory, it resulted, nonetheless, in his retreat. The French were also in no position to pursue the Russian forces, and both armies retired to their main quarters until the spring.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Bennigsen, Leonty Levin (1745–1826);

Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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F

FAUSTSCHLAG, Operation (February 18–March 3, 1917)

Code name for the German army offensive in early 1918 that forced the Bolshevik government of Russia to conclude the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ending Russian participation in World War I. The Bolsheviks had seized power in early November 1917, and party leader Vladimir Lenin immediately announced that Russia would withdraw from the war. On December 3, 1917, the two sides opened talks behind the German lines at the Polish city of Brest-Litovsk, and on December 17, an armistice went into effect on the Eastern Front. Peace talks began at Brest-Litovsk on December 22, although meaningful discussions did not commence until January 9, 1918.

Commissar for foreign affairs Leon Trotsky headed the Russian delegation. He hoped to delay until an anticipated revolution drove Germany from the war. The Russian leaders also naively expected to be able to negotiate peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities and were thus shocked on the presentation of the harsh German peace demands.

During a brief Christmas recess, Trotsky returned to Petrograd to urge the government to pursue a policy of “no war, no peace.” Such a stance was unacceptable to the Germans, who were already transferring large numbers of troops to the West for an anticipated massive spring offensive on that front. The Russians did manage to agree to extend the armistice until February 12. Two days before its expiration, Trotsky simply announced

that the Russians considered the war at an end. Astounded German chief of staff in the East Major General Carl Adolf Maximilian “Max” Hoffmann, who headed the German side in the peace talks, responded by signing a separate peace with Ukraine and informing the Russians on February 16 that the German Army would resume offensive military operations in two days’ time.

Operation FAUSTSCHLAG (“Punch”) commenced on schedule on February 18 along the length of the Eastern Front. German troops crossed the Dvina River and took the city of Pskov. More than 50 German divisions took part against little to no Russian resistance; at no point did the Russian army make a stand. Intermittent bad weather and the poor state of communications were the only real problems. Within a week, the German army had advanced more than 150 miles. The northern force of 16 divisions ultimately secured Narva by February 26; the central force of the Tenth Army and XLI Reserve Corps headed for Smolensk, and a southern force occupied Ukraine, securing Kiev on March 1. At the same time, Ottoman forces drove into the Caucasus region, reaching as far as Baku.

Meanwhile, Trotsky returned to Petrograd. Most of the Russian leadership preferred continuing the war, but as the Bolsheviks had effectively destroyed the army in their rise to power, Russia was in no position to do so. In a close vote, the leadership decided to conclude peace, Lenin telling them that the most important thing was to preserve Bolshevik control of Russia and that the treaty with Germany would not last.

The German advance continued even after the Russians had returned to the negotiating table, with the Germans reaching Narva, within 100 miles of Petrograd, and forcing transfer of the capital to Moscow. On March 3, 1918, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, bringing Operation FAUSTSCHLAG to an effective close. German military operations continued after that date, however, in the Caucasus and Crimea. German amphibious forces took Helsinki on April 13, and German forces secured all of Finland by the end of that month.

David A. Smith and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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February (March) Revolution (1917)

The first of two internal Russian uprisings in 1917. The February 1917 Revolution is often referred to as the *March Revolution*, because when it occurred, Russia followed the Julian calendar, which was 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar used in the West.

After a dozen years of experimenting with a constitutional monarchy, popular support for the Russian political system had waned; in this environment, the influence of radical intellectuals grew. Adding to the burden on the population was the enormous cost of two and a half years of war, replete with military

disasters, incompetent leadership, inefficient bureaucracy, arms and ammunition shortages, rampant inflation, and tremendous sacrifices in casualties. By 1917, the Russian masses had suffered enough.

Czar Nicholas II, out of touch with his people and government and strongly influenced by his wife Alexandra, focused more on preserving the autocracy than on saving Russia. Attempts to pressure him to do otherwise only stiffened his stubborn resolve. In December 1916, conservative members of the nobility and Duma assassinated Grigori Rasputin, who held considerable influence over the royal couple. The czar, who had been nominally commanding the army at the front, secluded himself with his family at Tsarskoye Selo, 15 miles from Petrograd, isolating himself from people and events and leaving no one at army headquarters with authority to act. Nicholas did not return to army headquarters in Mogilev until March 5, 1917.

Throughout January and February, conditions deteriorated nationwide and especially in Petrograd. Worker dissatisfaction led to periodic strikes in war industries. Inflation and food shortages because of mismanagement and an inadequate transportation network brought food riots. On January 9, 1917, some 150,000 workers in Petrograd took to the streets to commemorate the 12th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in 1905. Across Russia, other workers did likewise. This marked only the beginning of the wave of strikes across Russia in the following weeks. As conditions continued to deteriorate, the masses, especially in the capital, became more embittered.

On February 23, workers—primarily women frustrated by long hours and inadequate wages that bought little food for their families while their husbands were at the front—poured into the streets of Petrograd

demanding “Bread!” As more workers joined the strikers, soon totaling 90,000, those cries were joined with shouts of “Down with the war!” and then “Down with the czar!” By nightfall, the police had restored apparent calm, but strike fever simmered through the night in the workers’ quarters. The next morning, 40,000 people filled the streets. They were met initially by 500 mounted Cossacks ordered to restore calm. Facing demonstrators led by women, the Cossacks hesitated and then gave way as the strikers marched into the city center. Others joined, and by nightfall, a reputed 160,000 workers had gathered in the city’s center. Not since the 1905 revolution had so many strikers converged in central Petrograd.

The police were unable to control the situation, and after three days, the government ordered in regular army units to augment them. By February 25, the city had become an armed camp, with periodic gunfire erupted as police and strikers clashed. On the evening of February 25, upon returning to their barracks, soldiers of a Guards regiment mutinied and vowed not to fire on crowds again. The next morning, they refused to obey their officers’ orders and joined the demonstrators in the street. Soon the entire Petrograd garrison joined the revolution.

On the afternoon of February 25, members of the Duma, which the czar had that day ordered dissolved, elected a temporary committee to restore public order. That day in the same building, the Petrograd Soviet, comprised of delegates from factories, workshops, rebelling military units, and representatives from socialist parties, established itself to take hold of the revolution and restore order. Technically, neither body possessed governmental authority, although the central administration had ceased to function since the czar was back at army headquarters where he still controlled most of the army.

Removed from the scene, the czar and his advisors misread the situation in the capital and underestimated its seriousness. Nicholas II first ignored pleas from his advisors to appoint a government the people could trust and instead directed military commanders to suppress the rebellion. That task force simply melted away when the soldiers came in contact with revolutionaries. On February 28, the czar left Mogilev by train for Petrograd to take personal control, but his train was diverted to Pskov where the army leadership, including his uncle Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, convinced him that his only option was abdication.

On March 2, the Duma Temporary Committee dissolved itself and established the Provisional Government under Prince Georgy Lvov, a nonparty-affiliated liberal, as prime minister. Pavel Miliukov, a Duma deputy and leader of the Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party, became foreign minister, and Aleksandr Guchkov, an Octobrist Party leader, was made minister of war. Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist Revolutionary member of the Duma, became minister of justice. Kerensky was simultaneously vice chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and, given his role in both, acted as liaison between the two.

The Provisional Government’s position was weak from the start because it inherited all of the problems of its predecessor, while its authority came from the Duma from which Russian workers and peasants had been disenfranchised. It was weakened further by sharing power with the Petrograd Soviet, which had the support of the vast majority of the capital’s populace and persistently second-guessed and undercut the Provisional Government’s decisions.

Ominously, the leaders of the Provisional Government, responding to Allied pressure in the form of war loans, decided to continue Russia’s involvement in the war,

a course taken despite war-weariness and the disintegration of discipline in the army. The latter was intensified by Order Number One, issued by the Petrograd Soviet, a decree that destroyed the authority of military officers over their troops. Kerensky's dream of a great successful military offensive that would win the people's support for the government ended in military defeat, the collapse of the Russian Army, and another revolution, actually a coup d'état, carried out by the Bolsheviks.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Guchkov, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1862–1936); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); October (November) Revolution (1917); Revolution of 1905

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Fedorenko, Yakov Nikolaevich (1896–1947)

Soviet army marshal who created the first Soviet tank armies. Born in the village of Tzarborisovo, Kharkov Oblast, on October 22,

1896, Yakov Fedorenko was drafted into the navy in 1915 during World War I. He took part in the October 1917 revolt at Odessa and joined both the Red Guard and the Bolshevik (Communist) Party that year.

During the Russian Civil War, Fedorenko had charge of Red armored trains. He then graduated from the Kharkov Higher Artillery School and the Frunze Military Academy, and commanded a tank regiment in 1934. He next commanded the 15th Mechanized Brigade. Fedorenko had charge of armor formations in the Kiev Military District from 1937 to 1940 before becoming chief of the Main Armored Directorate in Moscow in June 1940. During that period, production of the new T-34 medium tank and the KV-1 heavy tank increased.

Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Fedorenko took charge of Soviet armored and mechanized troops, and was deputy commissar of defense. He showed great understanding of armored warfare and in 1942, created the first Soviet tank armies for deep penetration operations. In August 1944, he and Pavel Rotmistrov became the only Soviet marshals of armored troops. Fedorenko held his posts until his death in Moscow on March 26, 1947.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Deep Battle; KV-1 Tank; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); T-34 Tank; Tanks, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Fermor, William (ca. 1702–1771)

Little is known of William Fermor's early life. He was born in or around 1702 to a family of Baltic German heritage, and joined the Russian army in 1720. Fermor distinguished himself during the 1734 Siege of Danzig, and also served in conflicts with Finland and the Ottoman Empire. During 1757, he commanded the force that captured Memel, in East Prussia, and served at the Battle of Gross Jaegersdorf. The next year, he replaced General Stepan Apraksin in command of Russian forces in East Prussia, and led the Russian army against Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia at Zorndorf. Although Fermor proclaimed victory, his forces retreated after the battle, and he was relieved of command. Fermor did command Russian forces again in 1760, during a raid on Berlin. In 1762, he was appointed governor of Smolensk. He died there in 1771.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Apraksin, Stepan F. (1702–1758); Gross-Jaegersdorf, Battle of (August 30, 1757); Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

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Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1632)

Patriarch of Russia, and father of the first Romanov czar.

Fyodor Romanov was born to a boyar (noble) family in Muscovy in the early 1550s. Little is known of his youth, but he enjoyed successful careers as a soldier and diplomat before becoming involved in royal politics. When Boris Godunov rose to power following the death of Ivan IV, Fyodor Romanov rose with him and played a central role in building a boyar alliance in support of the new czar. Fyodor, as the eldest brother of the Romanov clan, was also part of the new boyar council established by Godunov.

During the later portion of Godunov's reign, however, Muscovy was struck by economic crisis and the boyars, including the Romanovs, increasingly turned against him. In retaliation for a supposed Romanov plot to supplant him during an illness in 1600, Godunov forced Fyodor to take monastic vows and had him tonsured as the monk Filaret.

Filaret was released from his monastery by the False Dmitry, who was likely a creature of a Romanov-led conspiracy against Godunov, when Dmitry became czar in 1605. Filaret then became metropolitan of Rostov. Vasily Shuisky, who wanted the throne for himself, had Dmitry assassinated in May 1606, however, throwing Russia into turmoil once again. Filaret supported Fyodor Mstislavski against Shuisky in the contest for czar, but failed to carry the day. The boyar council did force Shuisky to accept Filaret as the patriarch of Moscow though, perhaps in an attempt to create a balance.

In 1608, the Romanov family threw in their lot with a second "false Dmitry," along with many other noble families dismayed at Shuisky's inability to end the rebellion. Filaret was "captured" by the rebels in October, and was appointed as the patriarch of Russia by the pretender. Despite several boyar plots to unseat him, Czar Vasily IV retained power and began to find military success; in September 1609, Filaret and the rest of the rebel

court fled to Kaluga, and then sought refuge with the forces of the Polish king Sigismund, who had invaded Russia to seek the throne for himself.

While Filaret remained a captive in Poland, Russian nationalist forces led by Kuzma Minin and Prince Dmitry Pozharski finally drove all invaders from Moscow. The remaining boyars convened a *zemsky Sobor* that elected Filaret's 16-year-old son, Mikhail, as czar on February 7, 1613. When Filaret returned to Russia in 1619, as part of the Truce of Deulino, he immediately assumed the post of patriarch again, and became the true power behind the throne.

Under Filaret's influence, Mikhail modernized the Russian army, importing pistols, carbines, and armor. He established Russia's first casting foundry and, in 1631, created the foreign formations (*inozemski stroi*) to teach Russian soldiers Western tactics. It was also Filaret who launched the war against Poland in 1632, and his death in October 1633 essentially brought an end to the conflict. The Romanov Dynasty he had founded, however, would last until 1917.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Deulino, Truce of (1618); Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Minin, Kuzma (Late 1500s–1616); Time of Troubles

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Franco-Russian Alliance (1894)

The Franco-Russian military convention of 1894 marked a diplomatic revolution in Europe and the cornerstone of the Triple Entente before World War I. Since the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck had kept France diplomatically isolated in Europe; but Bismarck left office in 1890 and it did not take German Kaiser Wilhelm II long to undo most of his work. That same year, the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia came up for renewal. New Chancellor Leopold von Caprivi and Baron Friedrich von Holstein, the leading career officer in the Foreign Ministry (and an enemy of Bismarck) convinced the Kaiser, who did not need much urging, to let the treaty lapse. The Kaiser and the Foreign Office apparently believed that an alliance between autocratic Russia and republican France was impossible on ideological grounds.

The Russians, in the midst of extensive industrialization and railroad construction, needed foreign investment, however. Bismarck had already largely closed off German financial markets, and France now stepped into the void. The French government actively encouraged substantial private investment in Russia that helped overcome the resistance of Czar Alexander III.

In the spring of 1891, the Russian government invited the French to send a naval squadron, and in June, French warships anchored at Kronstadt, near St. Petersburg, on the Baltic. Alexander III even visited one of the French ships. In August 1891, Russian

foreign minister Nikolai Giers and French foreign minister Alexandre Ribot exchanged notes that established an entente. Both governments agreed to consult in order to maintain the peace in Europe and to take joint action should either be attacked.

The French wanted a more binding agreement, and the czar acceded. In October 1893, a Russian naval squadron visited Toulon amidst widespread demonstrations throughout France of friendship for Russia. An exchange of letters between the two governments in late December 1893 and early January 1894 led to formal acceptance of the agreement already arranged in August 1892. Although the agreement was really political, it was classed as a military convention to avoid having to submit it to the French Chamber of Deputies for approval.

The convention was to remain in force as long as the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. It provided that if France were attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would act with all available forces against Germany. If Russia were to be attacked by Germany, or by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, France was to employ all its available forces against Germany. The treaty also provided that in case forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the three powers mobilized, France and Russia would both immediately mobilize. Other articles specified numbers of troops involved and provided for rapid mobilization to compel Germany to fight a two-front war. Although for a number of years, neither side used the word “alliance,” in effect one now existed.

In 1899, French foreign minister Théophile Delcassé traveled to St. Petersburg and negotiated an additional understanding. It committed the two states to collaborate in maintaining not only the peace but also

the balance of power in Europe. It clearly implied French support for Russia in the Balkans and Russian support for France to recover Alsace-Lorraine, lost to the Prussians in 1871. It also provided for joint action if either party were attacked by Britain.

The Franco-Russian alliance was of immense importance to both states, and it remained the only military leg of the Triple Entente.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Schedule 19 (Plan 19); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807)

Decisive victory of Napoleon I over the Russian army that took place near modern Pravdinsk, Russian Federation.

After several minor engagements (at Spanden and Lomitten, June 5; at Heilsberg, June 10, 1807), the Russian army under General Leonty Bennigsen (around 62,000 men and 120 cannon) continued its withdrawal to the Alle River, trying to protect Königsberg (modern Kaliningrad, Russia). On the eve of June 13, Napoleon, with 80,000 men and 118 cannon, while pursuing the Russian rearguard from three sides, received intelligence that their forces were amassing near

the town of Friedland. The French emperor properly realized that Bennigsen was taking up a disadvantageous position, with his army holding five miles of line and the Alle River at their back.

The Russian commander deployed his six divisions in a double line, two to the south and four others to the north of the river. Napoleon decided, while holding his center (corps of marshals Michel Ney and Jean Lannes) against the troops under generals Pyotr Bagration and Andrei Kologrovov, to advance northward and crush the Russian forces back against the Alle. Masses of the French cavalry formed the extreme left wing; Napoleon's Imperial Guard and corps under Marshal Casimir Mortier were placed in the central reserve. By 4:00 p.m. on June 14, the French *Grande Armée* was prepared to attack.

After 5:00 p.m., the troops of Marshal Ney advanced in full attack, being supported by cavalry under Marie Victor

Latour-Maubourg. The French light infantry pushed the Russian *Jägers* from the Sortlach Woods and repulsed the Russian cavalry. The Russian artillery concentrated its fire from the further bank of the Alle. Napoleon sent from his reserve part of General Claude Victor-Perrin's corps to support Ney, whose troops were suffering under a counterattack by the Russian cavalry. Thus reinforced, Ney's troops soon established control over the Sortlach Woods.

In the second phase of the battle, Marshal Victor formed a 36-cannon battery under General Alexandre Senarmont that opened a fire against a mass formation of the Russian front at a range of no more than 150 yards. In the meantime, the Russian Horse Guard engaged the French cuirassiers under Latour-Maubourg, but was repulsed with heavy losses. The situation quickly became critical for the Russians, and Bennigsen ordered General Peter Gorchakov's divisions against the corps of Lannes and Mortier, but



The Russian defeat in the Battle of Friedland, June 14, 1807, led Czar Alexander I to conclude a treaty with French emperor Napoleon I at Tilsit the following month. (Painting by Edward Detaille from *Life of Napoleon Bonaparte* by William M. Sloane. New York: Century Co., 1906.)

this attack was held by the French troops assisted by the cavalry and infantry of the Imperial Guard.

Ney was now again moving northward, sweeping the Russian counterattacks into the waters of the Alle. Bennigsen sent dragoon squadrons against Ney's flank as the French began to penetrate into the outskirts of Friedland near the western gates. By 8:00 p.m. Ney was the master of Friedland, to which the retreating Russians set fire along with, accidentally, the nearby bridges, thus cutting off the general retreat just as Bennigsen was trying to extricate his remaining troops on the far flank over the Alle. General Gorchakov attempted to retake Friedland, but to no avail. The Russian cavalry sacrificed itself, letting the infantry retreat more or less in good order; surprisingly, the French cavalry under General Emmanuel Grouchy let the opportunity slip. As a result, the remnants of the Russian army had the good fortune to find a ford north of Friedland, and although only one bridge out of four remained intact, a majority of the troops managed to cross the Alle covered by large batteries of guns along the river bank. By 11:00 p.m. the battle was over.

The Russian army lost 15,000–20,000 men (numbers still vary) but only 13 cannon. Napoleon's *Grande Armée* lost 12,000 men (including 1,400 killed). The result was the long-sought armistice with Russia, the Peace of Tilsit. This practically divided Europe into two spheres of influence with Napoleon getting *carte blanche* for his Spanish invasion, while Czar Alexander I took care of his northern provinces and dealt with the Ottoman Porte.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Bennigsen, Leonty Levin (1745–1826); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Frunze, Mikhail (1885–1925)

Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze was a successful leader of the Russian Civil War and one of the founders of the Russian Red Army. As a military theorist, he opposed the views of Leon Trotsky and pressed for professionalization and modernization of the armed forces.

Frunze was born in the Central Asian city of Pishpek on February 2, 1885, the son of an army medical assistant. An excellent student, he graduated from the local school with honors and went on to study at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. While in attendance, he joined the communist Bolshevik Party in 1905 and embarked on the career of a professional revolutionary.

Frunze was sent as an agitator to Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where he was arrested and sentenced to internal exile. In 1909, he was condemned to death for the murder of a policeman, but his sentence was commuted to exile in Siberia for life. Frunze assumed several false names, however, and continued his political activities throughout Irkutsk and Chita during 1914–1916. During World War I, he escaped from exile, returned to Moscow, and gained appointment as head of the Bolshevik underground in Minsk just as the Russian Revolution erupted.

In May 1917, Frunze met Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin at the famous First

Congress of the Soviet of Peasant Deputies in St. Petersburg and impressed him with his knowledge of military affairs. Frunze then assumed political responsibilities in the city of Shuya, where he also commanded a military formation, the Shuya Guards. During the October Revolution, it was Frunze's command in Moscow that stormed the Metropole Hotel and the Kremlin, putting the Bolsheviks in firm control of the city.

In consequence of his service to the Communist Party, Frunze became military commissar of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where he crushed an anti-Bolshevik (or White) uprising in August 1918. As the Russian Civil War expanded across the country, he rose through promotion to command of the Fourth Army that December, and assumed command of the Southern Group the following spring. In this capacity, Frunze enjoyed several successes against White forces under Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak.

He then transferred to the Eastern Front, winning several important victories for the Communists in the Ural Mountains. From August 1919 to September 1920, Frunze was actively employed against White forces operating in the southern Urals and Central Asia. After capturing Bukhara in 1920, he next operated against General Pyotr Wrangel's White Army in the Crimea, defeating it decisively and concluding the civil war in a complete triumph for the Communists. In recognition of his contributions, Frunze was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1921.

After the war, Frunze continued his close association with military affairs and engaged in a long-running dispute with Trotsky, the defense minister. Soviet military doctrine was then in a state of flux and very much caught up in the revolutionary overhaul of society. Trotsky, in essence, realized the present weakness of the Soviet state and

called for the creation of mass peasant armies, acting as guerrillas and led by so-called specialists who were former military officers of the Russian Imperial Army.

Frunze hotly disputed this approach, and in a series of planning papers, he outlined his strategy for a "unified doctrine." This maintained that for the Soviet state to survive, military science had to be integrated into all aspects of society so that it could defend itself against the inevitable invasion from the capitalist West. Frunze therefore called for the creation of national military academies and the introduction of realistic training and education for peasants and workers alike. In contrast to Trotsky's adherence to guerrilla warfare, Frunze preached the predominance of offensive tactics. Because this kind of fighting was predicated upon strategic and tactical maneuvering, army organization had to be smaller, less centralized, and less bureaucratic than prevailing political models. Finally, he emphasized that former Imperial officers constituted a threat to the Russian Revolution. The Red Army needed its own professionally trained military officers.

Trotsky, predictably, ridiculed Frunze's suggestion of a standing Red Army, but then Trotsky himself fell into disfavor. In January 1924, Frunze succeeded him as commissar for military and naval affairs and introduced universal military service for all men aged 18–40 years. Frunze's tenure proved brief, as in October 1925, he underwent surgery for stomach ulcers, dying in consequence on October 31, 1925. It has been speculated that the procedure had been forced upon him by Soviet leader Josef Stalin, who feared Frunze as a possible political rival and wanted him dead. Nonetheless, Frunze's reforms were ultimately implemented. From the chaos of civil war, they brought stability and structure to the Red Army and paved the way for its full-scale modernization and mechanization.

In many respects, he was the “Father of the Red Army,” and the Frunze Military Academy was so named in his honor.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

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Frunze Academy

The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, brought an end to Russia’s involvement in World War I. A Civil War followed immediately. The Soviet Officer Corps was formed from the Imperial Russian Officer Corps on July 29, 1918, under the leadership of Leon Trotsky, Commissar for War. Officers held over from the Russian Imperial Army were known as “military specialists.” They were kept on because the Red Army lacked technical expertise and experienced military leadership. These officers, however, were regarded with suspicion because few of them came from the proletariat that was supposed to be the driving force of the new Soviet Russia. An

All-Russian Supreme Staff was formed in April 1918, and the Red Army General Staff Academy for training a new generation of class-conscious Soviet military leaders was formally opened on December 8, 1918, by Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov.

Within the Soviet Union, in the mid-1920s, a deep-seated debate on military reforms between Leon Trotsky and Mikhail Vailievich Frunze took place. Trotsky was commander and chief of the Red Army; he wanted to establish a small Red Army led by the former czarist officers and noncommissioned officers and supported by a large militia. Frunze, an early party member and successful Civil War organizer and commander in the field, advocated for military reforms. He argued for a “Unified Military Doctrine of the Red Army,” which called for a new Marxist doctrine of war. Frunze believed that there was a proletarian method of war, and that this method had to reflect the society and its relationship to the means of production. In Frunze’s view, a Soviet military would serve as a vehicle for world revolution, and thus offensive, maneuver, and *aktivnost* (dynamism) were essential operational practices. As Trotsky’s position within the Soviet Union faded, Frunze was elevated. On March 11, 1924, Frunze effectively became head of the Soviet military establishment and issued Order No. 446/96, which began his reforms. He defined the Red Army Staff, with Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Boris Shaposhnikov as his assistants; together they developed the thesis of “communizing” the military, and insisted on a Red Army, not a Russian Army. Their insistence on offensive and maneuver became doctrine, as did Frunze’s idea of one-man command (*edinonachal’stvo*), which is taught to this day. Frunze died on October 31, 1925, by chloroform poisoning during an operation that many speculated was not needed.

The Red Army General Staff Academy was renamed the Frunze Academy in the mid-1920s, after being transformed into the RKKA (Workers and Peasants' Red Army; *Raboche Krest'yanskaya Krasnaya Armiya*). Officers of the rank of captain or major, up to 32 years old, would be accepted once they passed a rigorous competitive entry examination.

In the 1930s, the Frunze Academy began teaching combined arms operations and tactics. Politically, Frunze's concept of a red army, not a Russian army, was implemented. With the outbreak of the German invasion on June 21, 1941, however, all prewar concepts were discarded. The concepts of "strategic defense" were used until the conditions were ideal for "Pursuit of Deep Battle," which came about in the later part of the war, and well into the post-World War II period.

With the death of Stalin (March 5, 1953), the new leader of the Soviet Union emerged: Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. He implemented a military doctrine that took into consideration a nuclear battlefield. Teachings were influenced by Marshal Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky and his 1962 work *Military Strategy*, which called for smaller offensive units deployed in immediate response after the use of nuclear weapons on the forward battlefield. A strategic defense was to be situated in the rear to oppose any enemy nuclear offense. Both strategies used a combined arms structure.

By 1985, the concept of nuclear war faded (though was not ruled out in total) and military theory was once again taught on combined arms and conventional war tactics, with an emphasis on defense. This change developed from the Western use of air-land battle and follow-on forces attack, with the use of high-tech weapon systems.

The Frunze Academy is equivalent to the U.S. Command and General Staff College at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1998, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the Frunze Academy was merged with the Malinovsky Armed Forces Academy and renamed the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Up to the fall of the Soviet Union, each graduate received a diploma and a silver diamond-shaped badge worn on his uniform or suit jacket, placed on the right side of the chest above all other awards.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich (1882–1945); Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937)

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Fuchs, Klaus Emil Julius (December 29, 1911–January 28, 1988)

German theoretical physicist and nuclear scientist; born into a Lutheran family in Rüsselsheim, Germany, in 1911. Fuchs's father was a professor of theology at Leipzig University and an active Quaker. Klaus became active in politics while at university, and joined the German Communist Party. He fled Nazi Germany as a political refugee to England in 1937. Having attended both Kiel University and Leipzig University, he finished his studies with doctorates in physics,

from the University of Bristol in 1939, and in mathematics, from the University of Edinburgh in 1939. Fuchs was a shy young man who excelled as a researcher at Bristol.

After the war broke out, he was temporarily interned in a British camp in Canada. He gained a security clearance and returned to work as a research assistant at Edinburgh in 1941, and he was eventually integrated into the British atomic bomb project there. In the same year, he received British citizenship.

In 1943, Fuchs came to the United States as a member of the British contingent of scientists for the secret joint atomic bomb research program known as the Manhattan Project. He was assigned to a team at Columbia University in New York before being transferred to the weapons laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. There he worked in the theoretical division under his former British mentor, Dr. Hans Bethe, from 1944 to 1946.

Fuchs was a quiet, hard-working scientist. He remained aloof from political discussions, and never raised suspicion of having tried to elicit confidential information or of being a communist. After the successful American deployment of the atomic bomb, he put his expertise as a theoretical physics to work on the H-bomb project. In 1946, he received an appointment to the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell-Oxford, and returned to England. In December 1948, his work was terminated when British Secret Service unmasked him as Soviet spy.

In 1949, Fuchs confided to British intelligence officers that he had passed detailed information to the Soviet Union on the atomic bomb project in 1945, as well as on the hydrogen bomb project in 1946 and 1947. He also admitted to having spied on the British atomic project. British authorities formally arrested Fuchs and charged him with violation of the British Official Secrets Act in

February 1950. He was put on trial in London, convicted on March 1, 1950, and sentenced to 14 years in prison.

Fuchs cooperated with the continuing investigation, giving the names of his contacts in the United States to British officials of the Atomic Energy Program, who relayed the information to the Americans. His revelations exposed the communist spy ring around the more famous Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, two American citizens, husband and wife, who were the first Americans given a death sentence for espionage by a U.S. civil court. They were executed in 1953.

After serving nine years, Fuchs was granted amnesty and left his prison cell at Wakefield, England, on June 23, 1959. He emigrated to the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and was appointed to the new Research Center for Nuclear Research of the Academy of Sciences in 1959.

There he resumed his career as a scientist of considerable influence in the field of neutron physics and was appointed to the Central Committee of the ruling Socialist Unity Party in 1967. From 1972, he was a council member of the Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic. He died in East Berlin on January 28, 1988.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet

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G

Galicia, Battle of (1914)

One of the opening battles of World War I on the Eastern Front. It was a decisive defeat for the Austrians and forced the Germans to take a more active role in protecting their ally from Russian attacks. The Austro-Hungarian Empire never really recovered from the losses in the Battle of Galicia.

All sides had multiple plans for prosecuting the war. The Austrian chief of staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf was regarded as an able strategist, but he was faced with a two-front war against Serbia and Russia. He left one army to invade Serbia and attacked Russia in the border province of Galicia with three armies. His indecision resulted in another army not being available in either theater, as it was traveling on the rails when fighting broke out. Conrad misjudged Russian intentions and made his main attack toward the Polish salient with the hope of cutting it off. The Russian armies opposing Austria were under General Nikolai Ivanov. Ivanov planned to invade Galicia and make his main effort south of Conrad's. When the armies began moving on August 10, they spent some time trying to find each other.

On August 23–24, the Austrians defeated the Russian Fourth Army at the Battle of Krasnik. Two days later, the Austrians also defeated the Russian Fifth Army at Zamosc-Komarow and pushed it back. Those initial successes caused Conrad to order his armies north and leave his flank exposed.

On August 26, Ivanov opened his own offensive. Exploiting a three-to-one advantage

in manpower, he quickly defeated the Austrian Third Army. By September 3, Ivanov captured Lemberg (L'viv). When the Austrian Second Army finally arrived, it too was routed. The Austrian front in Galicia collapsed. All four armies began a general retreat that did not end until September 26, when they took up positions on the Carpathian Mountains 100 miles away.

Conrad's losses totaled 350,000 men, including 120,000 men captured. Whole Habsburg units, composed of Slavs, surrendered to the Russians and offered to fight against the Austrians. Most of the prewar veterans and officers of the Austrian Army were lost. Over 100,000 men were shut up in the fortress of Przemysl, which was besieged by the Russian Eighth Army. Although the fortress was relieved on October 11, it was besieged again on November 6 and was forced to surrender on March 22, 1915. Russian losses were also heavy, but not as severe as the Austrian losses.

The Russians prepared for further attacks into Silesia, a major industrial region for both Germany and Austria. General Paul von Hindenburg, German commander in the east, formed Ninth Army using local units. He used the superior German railroads to mass his troops to block the Russians. When the Russians launched their next attack in November 1914, Hindenburg struck their flank and drove them back. The Austrians played a minor role. Fighting continued in Galicia until December, when winter weather forced an end.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Komarów, Battle of (August 26–September 2, 1914); Kravnik, Battle of; Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Galicia Campaigns (1914–1917)

The Galician Front was also referred to as the *Southwestern* or the *Carpathian Front* by the Russians. Galicia constituted the southwest portion of the Eastern Front, with the Carpathian Mountains its most prominent geographical feature. The Carpathians were not a definitive barrier but served much as a wall with numerous gates by which invaders in past centuries had been able to move into Hungary. The numerous rivers of the region were generally small and posed no serious problems for an invader. The railway lines of Galicia, while not nearly as extensive as those of East Prussia or Silesia, extended radially from Lemberg (L'viv, Lvov, or Lwow), the major city of eastern Galicia.

Unlike campaigns in East Prussia and Poland, where the issue was decided by 1915, Galicia saw heavy fighting each year of the war through 1917, the collapse of the Russian army, and beyond. In contrast to the 1914 fighting in the northern portion of the Eastern Front in East Prussia, where Russian forces were defeated in the Battle of Tannenberg

(August 26–31) and the First Battle of Masurian Lakes (September 8–15), the Russians enjoyed some success in Galicia.

In August 1914, both Austria-Hungary and Russia had in place strategic plans to secure victory in Galicia. Chief of the Austrian general staff General of Infantry Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf concentrated resources in eastern Galicia for an offensive that would drive north into Russian-controlled southeast Poland, between the Vistula and Bug rivers, for what he hoped would be an envelopment of Russian forces east of Warsaw in conjunction with the German Eighth Army. *Stavka*, the Russian High Command, divided Russia's resources on the Eastern Front for an attack in the north against East Prussia by the First and Second armies, with the main blow to fall in the southeast in Galicia by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth armies.

The fighting in Galicia began as a large, general engagement along the frontier of about 150 miles. The Austrians had about 1 million men under the command of Colonel General and soon-to-be-promoted Field Marshal Archduke Friedrich, while the Russians had some 1.2 million men under Russian Southwestern Front commander General Nikolai Yudovich Ivanov. Expecting the Austrians to attack due east from their fortress of Lemberg (L'viv), Ivanov had positioned General Nikolai Ruzsky's Third Army and Aleksei Brusilov's Eighth Army to defend in-depth between Dubno and Proskurov. Meanwhile, Baron Salza von Lichtenau's Fourth Army and Pavel Pleve's Fifth Army would strike south from Poland, cutting the Austrians off from Cracow and taking the Austro-Hungarian fortresses of Lemberg and Przemysl. Ivanov then expected that his reunited forces would then clear the Carpathian passes for an advance on Budapest and Vienna. Unfortunately for



Russian troops on the march in eastern Galicia, January 1916. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

Ivanov's plans, the Austrians did not follow the expected scenario.

Conrad ordered General of Cavalry Viktor Dankl von Krasnik's First Army to advance to Lublin to cut the Warsaw-Kiev railroad, secure control of the road to Brest-Litovsk, and threaten Russian positions east of Warsaw. General of Infantry Moritz Auffenberg's Fourth Army was to the right of the First Army; to its right was General of Cavalry Adolf Ritter von Brudermann's Third Army. Left flank security was provided by General of Cavalry Baron Heinrich Kummer von Falkenfeld's Army Group. General of Infantry Baron Hermann Kövess von Kövessháza's XII Corps provided right flank security.

The Austro-Hungarian attack, launched on August 23, collided at once with the advancing Russian Fourth and Fifth armies. Neither side did what the other expected. As the fighting evolved, the Austrians made limited gains to the northeast while the Russians

advanced to the south. Full battle was finally joined in the vicinity of Lemberg. The August 23–24 Battle of Kravnik, as well as the August 26–September 1 Battle of Zamoszcz-Komarów, was an Austrian victory. In the former, Dankl's Austrian First Army rebuffed Salza's Russian Fourth Army; in the latter, Auffenberg's Austrian Fourth Army accomplished the same with Pleve's Russian Fifth Army.

On the southern part of the front, however, things went differently. On August 26, Ivanov advanced his left wing, precipitating the Battle of Gnila Lipa. By August 30, Ruzsky's Russian Third Army and Aleksei Brusilov's Russian Eighth Army had defeated the Austro-Hungarian Kövess Group and Third Army so thoroughly that the Austrians were unable to regroup.

Ivanov now committed Pleve's Russian Fifth Army north of Lemberg. The Austrians, who assumed that Pleve had been defeated, were caught shifting forces to the south and

were forced to retreat. Austro-Hungarian forces in the north were defeated yet again at Rava-Ruska during September 3–11. The Austro-Hungarian Second Army, transferred from Serbia, also went into action, but it too was forced back.

The entire Austrian Front now collapsed. Suffering the loss of some 130,000 men, the Austro-Hungarian Army abandoned Lemberg. The Russians pushed the Austrians back more than 100 miles to the Carpathian Mountain passes. By the end of September, Austro-Hungarian forces had withdrawn to Cracow, the capital of West Galicia. In late September, the Russians trapped more than 100,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the great fortress of Przemyśl, although it held out until March 22, 1915.

The extent of the Austrian defeat was staggering. Of the 1 million men with whom the Austrians had begun the offensive, at least 300,000 were lost, including 100,000 prisoners; 300 guns were also lost. The Austro-Hungarian Army never recovered from the blow. The Russians now held virtually all of Galicia and Bukovina as well as the north-eastern part of Slovakia and Carpathian Rus' in Hungary.

The Russians appeared poised for further strikes into Silesia and Hungary. Had their pursuit been more determined, they might have secured the crucial passes to the interior of Austria and Hungary. But Russia had also suffered heavily in the fighting, losing some 255,000 men (45,000 of them prisoners of war) and 182 guns.

The Russian government was pleased with the acquisition of Galicia, which it considered a Russian territory, and it immediately established a new administration of that province for what it expected to be a permanent territorial acquisition. Unfortunately for the Russians, this state of affairs did not last long.

Under these desperate circumstances, Vienna called for help from Berlin. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, German commander in the East, created a new army, the Ninth, to buttress Austrian Poland and protect Silesia. It soon went on the offensive, driving almost to Warsaw and forcing the Russian High Command to divert troops from Galicia.

The situation changed in 1915 with a combined Austro-Hungarian and German Eastern Front offensive. It began first in East Prussia, where the Germans were victorious in the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes during February 7–22, 1915. In the south, Austro-Hungarian forces were not as successful, although they did take Chernivtsi on February 17. When substantial German forces under Colonel General (soon to be Field Marshal) August von Mackensen joined the Austro-Hungarians, they defeated the Russians at Gorlice (May 2) and the San River (May 15–23). The Russians were also forced to yield Przemyśl (June 3) and then Lemberg (June 22). By the end of June, the Russians had been forced to relinquish all of Bukovina and Galicia, with the exception of a small bit of territory east of Tarnów (Tarnopol). The Central Powers also advanced into Russian Poland, and by the end of 1915, they had taken Russian Courland (Latvia), Lithuania, Poland, and western Ukraine.

During 1916, the Russians made a dramatic effort to help relieve Central Powers' pressure on France at Verdun and against Italy. General Aleksei Brusilov proposed an offensive in Galicia to draw off Central Powers' resources that would then allow General Aleksei Evert, with the bulk of Russian military assets, to launch the major offensive to the north toward Vilna (Vilnius). This plan failed, however, because of the inability of the Russians to coordinate it and the timidity of Evert.

The Brusilov Offensive began on June 4 and lasted until September 1. The Russians caught Austro-Hungarian forces by surprise. Attacking north of the Dniester River, they broke through the Austrian lines at several points and advanced into Volhynia, Galicia, and Bukovina. On June 8, Lutsk fell. The Russians then took Baranovichi (July 2–9) and Kovel (July 18–August 17). Russian forces regained Austrian Bukovina and a strip of eastern Galicia and western Volhynia.

Russia almost drove Austria-Hungary from the war, but Russian forces lacked the reserves and resources to take full advantage of the situation. Evert, with 1 million men and two-thirds of all Russian artillery, was slow to move against a far weaker German force in the north, which allowed the Germans to rush reinforcements to the Austro-Hungarians. The Brusilov Offensive was halted.

The Brusilov campaign produced more than 1 million Russian casualties. Russia's greatest military achievement of the war, it inflicted more than 1.5 million casualties on the Central Powers and probably finished Austria-Hungary as a major military power. It also helped relieve German pressure on Verdun; drew Austro-Hungarian forces from the Italian Front, preventing a possible Central Powers victory there; and induced Romania to enter the war on the Allied side. The offensive also helped bring the replacement of General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn with Hindenburg as chief of staff of the German army.

In March 1917, Russia was wracked by revolution, and Czar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate. In a fateful decision, the new provisional government continued Russian participation in the war and staked all on a great summer offensive, known as the Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19). The plan called for local attacks to hold German

forces while the main blow again fell in Galicia. Brusilov's attacking force consisted of 45 divisions in three armies: General I. G. Erdeli's Eleventh Army in the north, General Leonid N. Belkovich's Seventh Army in the center of the front, and General Lavr Kornilov's Eighth Army south of the Dniester River. Brusilov's immediate objective was the oil fields near Drohobycz, but his ultimate goal was Lemberg.

The Kerensky Offensive opened along a 100-mile front. Initially, the poorly equipped Russian forces made significant headway. Many Austro-Hungarian troops simply threw down their weapons and fled. Kornilov's Eighth Army made especially good progress, driving back the Austrian Third Army, reaching Kalusz, and threatening the oil field at Drohobycz. On the northern flank, the Russian Eleventh Army forced the Austrian Second Army back to Zlochow, and the Seventh Army pushed German general of infantry Count Felix von Bothmer's mixed Habsburg-German *Südarmer* (South Army) back nearly 30 miles.

But Brusilov lacked reserves. The Russians rapidly outran their supply lines, and their drive petered out. Russian discipline also broke down as German reinforcements, profiting from the advantage of interior lines and a developed railroad net, stiffened the resistance. When the Germans began a counteroffensive on July 19 east of Lemberg, the Russian army simply disintegrated.

Tarnopol fell on July 25, triggering withdrawals along the entire front. Czernowitz fell on August 3; by early August, the Russians had evacuated both Galicia and the Bukovina. The entire Southwestern Front simply collapsed. Discipline broke down as Russian soldiers shot their officers and refused to fight. The gains of 1916 were wiped out, and there was no Russian army south of the Pripet Marshes. The German offensive

halted on the border of Galicia because of insufficient resources.

Political events now interceded. In November, the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia and at once asked the Central Powers for an armistice, which was concluded at Brest-Litovsk in December.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Kovel Offensive (July 28–October 1916); Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); Masurian Lakes, Second Battle of (February 7–22, 1915); Plevé (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916); Ruzky, Nikolai Vladimirovich (1854–1918); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Gentry Cavalry

Mounted force that formed the core of the armies of Muscovy from the late 15th to the late 17th century.

The roots of the gentry cavalry lay in the practice of *pomestie* introduced by Czar Ivan III (the Great). This made landholding conditional upon military service and made the lower propertied classes lifelong military servitors of the czar (*sluzheboepootechstvo*). At least one historian has denoted the gentry cavalry as “the bottom rung of the hereditary military service ladder,” although the term can also include the *dvoranie* (courtiers), provincial elites who often served as commanders in the gentry cavalry. Service began at 15 years of age, and by the late 16th century, a *pomeshchik* could pass his lands to his son if the son served.

Members of the gentry cavalry, often referred to as *pomeshchiki* or *detiboyarski* (sons of nobles), were to provide one armed cavalryman in return for the rights to the revenues of a certain area of land, which varied from time to time and region to region, and a small government stipend. During the reign of Czar Ivan IV (the Terrible), landholders were to provide one cavalry man for every 100 *chetverti* of land (roughly 250 acres). The vast majority of the gentry cavalry were small landholders, with less than 200 *chetverti*, and many lived on and worked in their own land.

Each cavalryman was to be provided with at least one horse—two, if the campaign was to be lengthy—and usually served two four-month terms during an active season. Light cavalry were armed with sabers and bows, and wore leather caps and dense quilted jackets as armor. Heavy cavalry carried lances in addition, and often had matchlock pistols in their saddlebags in later years. Very few cavalrymen could afford real chain metal or

plated armor, though most heavy cavalrymen wore a distinctive round helmet.

Ivan IV's introduction of the *oprichnina* temporarily displaced the gentry cavalry as Russia's main military force from 1565–1572. Economic difficulties in the second half of Ivan IV's reign made it difficult for many *pomeshchiki* to meet the requirements, and most found the duties tedious and onerous. Absenteeism, though punishable by fine, was a persistent problem. The “military revolution” of the 17th century led to an increasing emphasis on infantry with gunpowder weapons—harbusquiers and musketeers—known in Russian as *streltsy* (“shooters” or “musketeers”). Where in the mid-1500s, cavalry (including Cossack formations) comprised nearly 90 percent of the army, by the time of Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) the *streltsy* and infantry formations provided well over half of the army.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); *Pomestie* (*Pomeste*)

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Geok-Tepe, Battles of (1879, 1881)

The battles of Geok-Tepe demonstrated the determination and resiliency of Russian expansion in Central Asia. It was one of the

last major Russian campaigns there, and it highlighted the career of Lieutenant General Mikhail Skobelev. By 1879, after conquering the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, the Russians would annex Trans-Caspia.

General Nikolai Lomakin's force of 3,500 soldiers advanced to Geok-Tepe in September 1879 to begin the Russian conquest of the Turkmen. Twenty thousand civilians and soldiers took refuge behind the earthen walls of the fortress. As the Russians began shelling the position, thousands of civilians fled, but Lomakin drove them back with artillery. The Russians could have taken the fortress with constant shelling and a siege, but the general thought he would win a more spectacular victory with an infantry assault. Fighting hand to hand though, the Turkmen were able to drive the Russians back, inflicting 450 casualties. They then launched a counterattack, which was repelled by Russian artillery. This was the worst defeat the Russians experienced in Central Asia. Lomakin had no choice but to retreat, and soon he was relieved of command.

In May 1880, Skobelev, a hero of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), known as the White General (or Pasha), returned to Central Asia and led 7,100 men and 20,000 camels in a campaign of revenge against the Turkmen of Geok-Tepe. By December 1880, the Russians began besieging the fortress, which now contained 25,000 soldiers and civilians. Only 8,000 defenders had firearms, however, and there was no artillery. Learning from his predecessor's mistakes, Skobelev decided against an infantry assault. The Turkmen made several sorties, but were easily repelled. Russian sappers placed mines under the fortress walls and exploded them on January 12, 1881.

Several hundred defenders were killed in the explosion, and the rest of the garrison was dazed. Russian soldiers rushed into the

fortress and slaughtered most of the Turkmen soldiers and civilians. Thousands of civilians fled Geok-Tepe, and many were cut down by Russian cavalry. Over 14,500 Turkmen were killed by Skobelev's men. Russian casualties were paltry in comparison, with only 59 killed and 254 wounded. More Russians died in this campaign from disease (645) than combat.

Taking Geok-Tepe broke Turkmen resistance and decided the fate of Trans-Caspia. A few months later, in May 1881, it became an oblast (administrative region) of the Russian Empire. This campaign settled the boundary between Russia and Iran, but created tension with the British. The Russian government was embarrassed by the slaughter of civilians at Geok-Tepe—it was the bloodiest Russian campaign in Central Asia—and recalled General Skobelev. He died the next year. In 1884, General Mikhail Cherniaev would complete the conquest with the capture of the Merv Oasis.

William T. Dean III

See also: Bukhara and Khiva, Conquest of; Cherniaev, Mikhail Grigorevich (1828–1898); Skobelev, Mikhail (1843–1882)

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Georgia, Anti-Bolshevik Uprising in (1924)

Failed uprising against the Bolshevik authorities in Georgia. In February 1921, the

Red Army ended three years of Georgian independence but struggled to establish its authority, as a guerilla war sprang up in various regions. In the summer of 1921, a rebellion in Svaneti was harshly suppressed but instigated further anti-Bolshevik outbreaks. In 1922, Georgian officers Kakutsa Cholokashvili and Mikhail Lashkarashvili organized guerilla detachments to fight Soviet authorities, while other guerrilla units operated in Kartli, Guria, and Mingrelia. The same year, Georgian political parties united to form the Independence Committee, Military Center, and a host of regional organizations. Some former Menshevik leaders returned to Georgia to prepare an uprising.

In late 1922, rebellions began in Khevsureti, Kakheti, and Guria. The underground organization had been penetrated by the secret police, however, and in February 1923, K. Mesabishvili helped the police arrest members of the Military Center and shut down the underground press. On May 19, 1923, generals Kote Abkhazi, Kote Andronikashvili, Varden Tsulukidze, and 12 other members of the Military Center were executed. In subsequent reprisals, hundreds of Georgians, including Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ambrosi, were arrested and exiled; numerous churches and monasteries were closed, and some villages were burned down.

Preparations for the uprising continued under the leadership of Noe Khomeriki and Mikhail Javakhishvili of the newly established Military Commission of the Independence Committee. In late 1923, several leaders (Noe Khomeriki, Gogita Paghava, and G. Tsinamdgvrishvili) were arrested, but the return of some Georgian immigrants (including Paghava, Valiko Jugheli, B. Chikhvishvili, and V. Tsenderadze) from Europe helped the conspirators to continue their work. The Military Commission appointed General Spiridon Chavchavadze to

lead the uprising to be launched simultaneously throughout Transcaucasia.

The initial date of February 1924 was changed after the arrest of many members of the Military Commission. In June 1924, the conspirators set a new date, August 17, but the Soviet secret police detained key members of the Military Commission, and the subsequent arrests (including that of Valiko Jugheli, one of the leaders of the uprising) demoralized the conspirators, who moved the date to August 29. The lack of effective cooperation between rebel groups precipitated their defeat in bloody clashes with the Soviet authorities, who were helped by the Georgian Bolshevik detachments.

The uprising began around 4:00 a.m. on August 28, in Chiatura and spread to Shorapani, Zugdidi, and Guria, while Cholokashvili's detachment attacked authorities in Kakheti. Abkhazia and Adjara remained largely quiet, as did Tbilisi and Batumi. The Soviet authorities, led by Sergo Ordzhonikidze, quickly responded to these events and dispatched the Red Army units; in certain regions, the peasantry supported the Bolsheviks and attacked the insurgents. Yet in Guria, as Sergo Ordzhonikidze later admitted, there was a general peasant uprising in support of the insurrection. In a major coup, on September 4, the secret police captured generals Kote Andronikashvili and Jason Javakhishvili, who were forced to appeal to the insurgents to lay down their weapons.

The uprising was ruthlessly crushed during the remainder of the year; in Metekhi Prison alone, some 146 prisoners, who had not been involved in the rebellion, were summarily executed. Hundreds were slaughtered in railway wagons at Shorapani, or shot on the outskirts of Tbilisi and Rustavi. Depending on the sources used, the total number varies between 3,000 and 6,000. The Bolsheviks seized the opportunity to exterminate potential threats and arrested, exiled,

or executed hundreds. The August Uprising remained a taboo subject throughout the Soviet era, and much of it was unknown to the public until the 1990s.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Georgia, Soviet Invasion of (1921)

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Georgia, Soviet Invasion of (1921)

In May 1918, the National Council of Georgia adopted the Declaration of Independence and established the first Georgian republic. Over the next three years, the Menshevik government of Georgia introduced economic, social, and educational reforms that stabilized the country. By 1921, however, Soviet Russia actively sought to extend its hegemony to south Caucasia, and Georgia proved one of the main obstacles. In April 1920, the Eleventh Red Army had occupied Azerbaijan and established Soviet authority in Baku. In May, the Bolsheviks crossed the Georgian state border but were halted in their advance; diplomatic negotiations soon led to Russia's recognition of Georgian independence in May 1920. In November of the same year, the Red Army occupied Armenia, where another Soviet government was proclaimed.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, head of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (*Kavbyuro*), coordinated the Bolshevik policies in the region and was a fervent exponent of Sovietization of Georgia. He and his supporters in the *Kavbyuro* played an important role in pushing through the plan for the Bolshevik occupation of Georgia, often disregarding or acting contrary to the directives of the Bolshevik leadership, which preferred to leave Georgia alone, expecting that the Menshevik government would collapse under the weight of its own unpopularity. This would give the Bolsheviks the advantage of winning power through popular choice rather than armed conquest. The Bolsheviks failed to attract a large following in Georgia, however, and the Menshevik reforms were largely successful. This caused a growing rift in the Bolshevik leadership, where Vladimir Lenin and his supporters called for a peaceful approach while Josef Stalin and Leon Trotsky advocated the use of force.

Ordzhonikidze belonged to the latter group, but in late 1920, the politburo barred Ordzhonikidze from “self-determining [the fate of] Georgia.” In two directives in November–December, it confirmed its peaceful policy toward Tbilisi. Nevertheless, the *Kavbyuro* continued planning a coup in Georgia, prompting the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to chastise it in January 1921. Simultaneously, relations between Tbilisi and Moscow quickly deteriorated over the alleged violations of the peace treaty, persecutions of the Bolsheviks in Georgia, and suspicions that Georgia aided rebels in the North Caucasus. The *Kavbyuro* took advantage to organize an uprising in southeastern Georgia that was then used as an excuse for invasion. With the offensive underway, the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow had no choice but to approve the *Kavbyuro*'s actions.

The uprising started in the Lore District of Georgia on February 11, 1921; it was portrayed as a workers' insurrection. The insurgents seized the Borchalo District the following day; simultaneously, the Bolsheviks, led by N. Zhvania, began preparations for an uprising in Abkhazia. On February 15, Philipe Makharadze organized the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia at Shulaveri and formally appealed for help to the Russian Bolsheviks. The same day, Lenin ordered Red Army forces in the Caucasus to assist the insurgents in Georgia. The Eleventh Army of General Anatoly Gekker was the main attacking force, crossing the Georgian state border from Armenia and Azerbaijan toward Tbilisi. The Terek forces served as a diversion, advancing from Vladikavkaz into Kvemo Kartli. Finally, the Ninth Red Army of Arkadi Chernyshev invaded Abkhazia to seize Sukhumi and prevent any reinforcements from foreign powers. On February 17, the *Kavbyuro* established the Revolutionary Committee of Abkhazia, which included Nestor Lakoba, N. Akirtava and Eshba among others.

The Eleventh Army made a double-pronged attack with Mikhail D. Velikanov proceeding along the Baku-Tbilisi railway and Pyotr V. Kuryshko marching from the Sartichala district. By February 17, these forces occupied Ekateirienfeld, Marneuli, Keshalo, Kody, and Elisavethal. The following day, the Georgian forces under General Giorgi Kvinitadze successfully engaged Kuryshko near Tsiteli Tskaro; Kuryshko was killed in the battle. Despite the destruction of the strategic bridge over the Algeti River, Velikanov continued his advance and seized the strategic Kojori and Yagulji heights some 12 miles from Tbilisi. Later that day, the Georgian forces, among them military cadets, counterattacked and recaptured these heights. The Bolshevik invasion was also

dealt a serious setback when the Armenian Dashnaksutiuns took advantage of the Bolshevik preoccupation in Georgia and seized Yerevan on February 18, forcing Gekker to divert some of his forces. The fighting between Georgian and Bolshevik forces in Kojori and Manglisi continued for three days; by February 22, the Bolsheviks had restored the bridge over the Algeti River, which allowed them to bring in reinforcements and armored trains. Gekker then reorganized his forces to launch a double enveloping offensive on February 23.

On February 24, after failing to halt the Bolshevik advance, the Georgian forces under Kvinitadze left Tbilisi for a last stand in Batumi; the Bolsheviks occupied the Georgian capital the following day, and the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia was reorganized into the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia. At the same time, Red Army forces achieved success in Abkhazia where, aided by the insurgents, they seized Gagra, Lykhny, and Gudauta by February 26. As Ninth Army advanced to Oni though, Georgian forces supported by the French fleet recaptured Gagra, which remained in their possession until March 1. Yet by March 4, the Bolsheviks had seized all major centers in Abkhazia and proclaimed the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic. Georgian forces were also on the defensive in Ossetia, where Tskhivali was lost on March 5, and the Eleventh Army crossed the Surami Gorge on its advance to Surami and Bakuriani.

The situation was further complicated by Turkey's involvement in the war; Turkish troops attempted to capture Akhaltsikhe and the strategic port of Batumi, which they occupied on March 11. Fighting against the Turks and the Russian Eleventh Army, General Giorgi Mazniashvili was still able to route the Turks in Adjara on March 15. The Menshevik government could not turn the

tide of the war, however, as Kutaisi was lost on March 10, Akhaltsikhe on March 10 and Poti on March 14. On March 17, a Bolshevik uprising began in Batumi, and the Menshevik government of Georgia decided to immigrate to Europe the following day. With the strategic centers in Georgia under the Bolshevik control, the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia dissolved the Constituent Assembly of the Menshevik republic on March 24 and created a new Bolshevik government of people's commissariats in mid-April.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Russian Civil War (1918–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Georgian Rebellion (1956)

Bloody crackdown on Georgian demonstrations on March 9, 1956. The death of Josef Stalin ushered in a period now known as "the Thaw," when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev began the de-Stalinization process. In February 1956, he made his famous speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party and denounced Stalin's policies and the "cult of personality." The speech was supposed to be secret

but rumors about its content leaked out. To the majority of Soviet citizens, such revelations came as a great surprise and it was particularly true in Georgia, where attacks on Stalin were perceived as a slur against the Georgian nation.

On March 3, Georgian students organized protest rallies in Tbilisi. Two days later, a large demonstration gathered near the Stalin monument on the Kura River to mark the third anniversary of Stalin's death. The protesters rapidly grew in numbers, with their slogans becoming increasingly radical. Protests were also staged in Gori, Telavi, Kutaisi, and Batumi. The students played an important role in mobilizing demonstrators (by March 7–8, some 70,000 people demonstrated in Tbilisi alone) and pushing nationalist demands; in some parts of the town, demonstrators sang the long-suppressed anthem and waved flags of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918–1921). The demonstrations paralyzed Tbilisi, and the Georgian Communist leadership turned to the Soviet military for help.

On March 9, 1956, the Soviet armed forces, including heavy armor, entered the city and launched a bloody crackdown against the protesters. The precise number of casualties remains unclear, but estimates indicate that between 150 and 800 were killed, while hundreds more were wounded or arrested. The event was quickly covered up without the rest of Soviet Union learning about it, and information concerning the incident was restricted for years to come. The ruthless but effective measures used against the demonstrators ensured that the Soviet authorities would face no repetition of such events in Georgia for the next two decades. Nevertheless, the events of March 1956 left a deep imprint on the Georgian populace and contributed to the rise of the Georgian underground groups calling for secession from the Soviet Union.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Georgia, Soviet Invasion of (1921); Georgian Rebellion (1956); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971)

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Georgian War (2008)

Armed conflict in August 2008 between Georgia, and Russia and the separatist forces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia's resurgence as a world power became clear in the summer of 2008 when the Georgian government's bid to restore its sovereignty over a pro-Russian breakaway region of Georgia developed into a war.

After declaring its independence from Soviet Union in 1990, Georgia was beset with difficulties. A savage civil war and conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russia actively supported separatist forces, left much of the country in ruins and contributed to ubiquitous corruption, government inefficiency, an unstable economy, and widespread poverty. In November 2003, the government of President Eduard Shevardnadze collapsed in the wake of mass demonstrations condemning fraudulent parliamentary elections. The new Georgian government, led by U.S.-educated Mikhail Saakashvili, embarked on a rapid modernization program, thoroughly reforming police and army. Saakashvili vowed to reassert control over breakaway regions and, after restoring control over the southwestern region of Adjara in the spring



Russian soldiers in armored troop carriers move toward the Georgian border, August 9, 2008. (AP Photo/Musa Sadulayev)

of 2004, focused on the separatist region of South Ossetia, which led to brief clashes between the two sides.

South Ossetia—a term the Georgian government rejects—refers to the former South Ossetian autonomous region within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. After Georgia's secession from the USSR, South Ossetia experienced a military conflict between Georgians and Russia-backed Ossetian separatists that resulted in the establishment of a de facto South Ossetian government in 1992. The conflict remained "frozen" throughout the next 11 years as Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian peacekeeping forces maintained a fragile peace.

The situation changed when Saakashvili came to power in 2003. The new government pursued a strongly pro-Western, and particularly pro-U.S., foreign policy, and sought membership in NATO and the

European Union (EU). After the start of American war in Iraq, Georgia joined the coalition forces and remained one of the major contributors to the coalition in terms of per capita troop deployment. In 2004, the NATO's North Atlantic Council approved the Individual Partnership Action Plan of Georgia. In May 2005, Georgia was visited by U.S. president George W. Bush, who was greeted by tens of thousands of Georgians at Freedom Square in Tbilisi. With U.S. backing, Georgia achieved a historic agreement on the complete withdrawal from Russian military bases by 2008.

Russia was genuinely concerned by the overtly pro-Western course of Georgia, which many in the Russian government still considered within Russia's sphere of influence and vital to its geostrategic interests. Russo-Georgian relations deteriorated over 2004–2008 as the two sides bickered over a

multitude of issues. Georgia accused Russia of virtual annexation of its internationally recognized territory and condemned the decision to grant Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia; as of 2009, more than two-thirds had acquired Russian citizenship. Georgian offers of broad autonomy to South Ossetia within a federal Georgian state were repeatedly rejected.

Throughout the first half of 2008, Georgia and Russia accused each other of preparing for war. Although Russia denied any such activities, according to a 2012 statement by Russian president Vladimir Putin, Russia had a contingency plan as early as 2006–2007 and had been training South Ossetian militias. In addition, in July, Russia conducted a large-scale military exercise called “Caucasian Frontier 2008,” in the North Caucasus and, once exercises were over, kept troops in the border region. The Georgians had also conducted large-scale maneuvers called “Immediate Response 2008,” as part of the joint U.S.-Georgian military cooperation program.

The first clashes between Georgian and the Ossetian separatist forces occurred in mid-June and escalated throughout next month and half, with both sides suffering losses. In July, the Russian Air Force deployed jets to prevent the Georgian Air Force from operating unmanned aerial vehicles. By early August, as the fighting intensified, each side accused the other of firing first and warned of potential escalation. On August 6–7, the Georgian peacekeeping checkpoints, as well the villages of Avnevi, Tamarasheni, and Prisi were attacked. In response, Georgia began concentrating forces near the administrative border with South Ossetia, and President Saakashvili announced his readiness to “re-store constitutional order” in South Ossetia.

Late on August 7, Georgian heavy artillery opened a bombardment of Tskhinvali (the

administrative center of South Ossetia) and nearby villages. As Human Rights Watch investigators later concluded, South Ossetian forces endangered civilian population by setting up defensive positions in close vicinity of civilian structures, while the Georgian army used indiscriminate weapons to target densely populated areas.

Early on August 8, the Georgian military launched Operation CLEAR FIELD, aimed at capturing Tskhinvali. The operation involved some 10,000 men from the Georgian 2nd, 3rd and 4th brigades, supported with armor, heavy artillery, and air forces. During the fighting, Georgian forces targeted the southern base of the Russian peacekeepers, where several Russian soldiers had been killed and wounded. By noon, Georgian infantry and tanks had entered Tskhinvali, where they became involved in fierce urban fighting with Ossetian militiamen.

At the same time, the Russian Fifty-Eighth Army, stationed in North Caucasus, crossed the Caucasus gorge and moved into South Ossetia in support of the separatist forces. Their arrival turned the tide of battle and created a rout; the Georgian forces lost a large part of their artillery and armor. In the largest operation since the collapse of the USSR, the Russians then launched major land, naval, and aerial operations throughout Georgia. Many Georgian military facilities and industries were targeted, and strategic locations, including the Black Sea port of Poti and the city of Gori, were occupied. In a dramatic reversal of its earlier policies, Moscow also recognized the independence of Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and established formal relations with them.

Officially, the war ended on August 12 when Tbilisi and Moscow agreed to a EU cease-fire negotiated by the EU rotational president, French president Nicholas

Sarkozy. Practically, however, the war continued with a lesser intensity at least for another week; Georgia and Russia accused each other of violating the cease-fire. Occasional clashes took place as late as March 2009. Following a new round of negotiations, Russia withdrew most of its forces from the Georgian territory proper by October 9 but retained its heavy military presence in the breakaway regions.

The Russo-Georgian War had a significant effect on regional politics and Russia's relations with the Western countries. It sent a clear signal that Russia was resurgent and would use force to protect its interests. The conflict also undermined the already tense Russian-Western relations and revived fears of another Cold War. Georgia's close relationship with the United States was a cause of great alarm for Russia. Russia accused the United States of instigating the war to secure influence in former Soviet republics and encircle Russia. The Russian leaders also condemned NATO's eastward expansion. Russia's intervention in Georgia prompted angry reactions from the U.S. government and NATO, which both described the Russian reaction as an act of aggression. The Georgian War of 2008 was the first major conflict that the Russian army participated since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian general staff performed well and implemented a comprehensive and systematic plan that achieved strategic goals.

Yet with its global navigational system still in development, Russia was unable to use precision-guided munitions. Russian C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) performed poorly, demonstrating an inability to coordinate units and utilizing obsolete equipment; it was reported that the commander of the Fifty-Eighth Army had to borrow a satellite phone from a journalist to communicate with his forces.

The Russian Air Force also performed poorly and struggled to establish air superiority, losing several planes, including a Tupolev Tu-22M3 long-range bomber.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Georgia, Soviet Invasion of (1921); Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–2014)

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German Colonies in Russia (1763–1993)

Many German colonies existed in Russia between 1702 and 1945. The biggest settlements could be found along the Volga River, in Crimea, and in southern Russia along the Black Sea shores of what is now the Ukraine and northern Romania.

Origin

In the 18th century, Europe's monarchs funded many marvelous engineering projects and the further development of craftsmanship as a means of competing in a truly enlightened manner. In Russia, the most prominent rulers of this era were Czar Peter I, "Emperor of all Russia" from 1682 through 1725, and Czarina Catherine II (r. 1762–1796). These monarchs embraced German immigration to the Russian Empire with decrees promising free land, political and cultural autonomy, freedom of religion,

exemption from military services and taxes to lure skilled people, and new technologies to all corners of their vast empire.

Peter I issued a decree on immigration on April 17, 1702, and started the process of “Europeanization” in Russia. Important positions in public administration, diplomacy, and military soon were filled with Germans. A district of Moscow was called the “German suburb” (*nemetskaya Sloboda*).

Catherine II initiated a second wave to create ethnic bulwarks against foreign intruders at the crossroads of Western Christianity and Eastern religions from the 1760s on. Settlements with toilsome, proud, and determined people were to thwart frequent Tatar and Turkish invasions in the southern areas of Russia’s huge empire. The monarch’s immigration policies thus were not crafted out of admiration for German peoples; she wanted to bring Western craftsmanship and seasoned agricultural expertise to Russia to develop infrastructure and settlements as basis of stable regional economies in further international trade with Russia in her most remote regions. Still, facing the devastation of the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) sometimes whole communities from the present-day areas of Baden, Hesse, Württemberg, and the Netherlands followed Catherine’s call.

The first group immigrated by the end of the 1700s. They became known as the Volga Germans, because they lived along the banks of the Volga River, where they were allowed to establish an autonomous republic. The first German colony was established there in 1764. Russia had acquired coastal land along the Black Sea, including the Crimea—called New Russia—after two wars with the Ottoman Empire (1774–1776 and 1788–1792). The first German Mennonite settled along the Dnieper River in 1789. In the fall of 1800, Czar Paul I even granted

special privileges and autonomy to these and the Mennonites to come.

Czar Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) continued the tradition and issued a manifesto calling on foreigners to settle in the steppe of the Volga and Black Sea regions on February 20, 1804. The third big wave of German immigrants thus came to settle in southern Russia, along the Black Sea. The German colonists also reclaimed the steppe in southern Ukraine, which became the northern Black Sea colonies.

The final wave of German immigrants settled in Russia during and after the Napoleonic Wars, lasting through the first three decades of the 19th century. More Germans immigrated from war-torn Württemberg and Prussia to Bessarabia, along the west coast of the Black Sea, around 1812. By 1824, numerous colonies had been established on the Black Sea and in Bessarabia. Their autonomous villages were established according to religion—Catholic, Lutheran, or Mennonite—and possessed thriving agricultural production and trade in manufactured merchandise. Neighboring ethnic groups were welcome partners, and many Ukrainians, Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, and Romanians prospered alongside the German communities.

Eventually, the largest and most flourishing German settlements in Eastern Europe were the Mennonite colonies, and the Russian provinces of Bessarabia, Kherson, Tauria, Ekaterinoslav, and those along the Volga and Don rivers, which bordered the coastal regions around the Black Sea.

Persecution, Deportation, and Expulsion

The colonists’ experience went from being invited and welcomed in the 18th and 19th centuries to an end of ethnic cleansing, political persecution, and mass expulsion in

the 20th century. In June 1871, Russia abolished self-government and special status for all “foreign colonies” within the empire. In 1874, compulsory military service was introduced, forcing the first Mennonite groups to emigrate to Canada. The Russification policies of Czar Alexander III (r. 1881–1894) drove more Russian Germans overseas. Laws deprived Germans of business, trade, and agricultural subsistence. A law forbidding the acquisition of land was enacted in 1892, and between 1914 and 1918, the 1.8 million Germans living in Russia were declared “internal enemies.” In 1915, all German-owned land was confiscated under the “Liquidation Laws,” and the forced deportation of 50,000 Volhynian Germans was carried out by the military. The homes and shops of ethnic Germans were looted and burnt down, and several Germans killed during the Moscow Pogrom of May 27, 1915. Brutal acts of persecution during the last years of the reign of Czar Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) cost the lives of 60,000 ethnic Germans in Russia.

Conditions did not improve after the Bolshevik Revolution. There was cooperation with Germany in military affairs and in trade through 1933, but this did not particularly benefit Germans living in Russia. Most of the German-inhabited areas of Russia, with the notable exception of the Baltics, came under Bolshevik control by 1924, just as anti-foreign sentiment began to rise once again. Under the leadership of Josef Stalin, German crops were confiscated. German communities suffered from forced collectivization, politically imposed famines, and the purges of any dissenters to Bolshevik rule. Whole villages perished, and eventually, 600,000 ethnic German civilians lost their lives between 1918 and 1938.

In September 1939, Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler, which contained

provisions for the repatriation of Germans living in Russia. The Germans and Soviets then divided Eastern Europe, with the Baltics coming again under Soviet control; the first groups of ethnic Germans were repatriated before the area was annexed to the Soviet Union. In late 1940, Germans from Bessarabia were resettled in Austria, Poland, and Germany in Operation *HEIM INS REICH* (Back to the Homeland), before Bessarabia and the Romanian Black Sea colonies were annexed. German men who had not moved were conscripted into the so-called Labor Army in 1942.

Between the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and 1949, all remaining Germans were deported to Soviet Siberia and Central Asia, often to work in slave labor camps under miserable conditions. During these forced settlements, another 350,000 Germans died. By 1949, international relief agencies estimated that approximately 1 million Russian German civilians (neither “settlers” from the Reich nor German soldiers) had perished under the Stalinist rule.

Post-1945

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, tens of thousands of ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe resettled as “Displaced Persons” in Western-occupied Germany or emigrated to the United States, Canada, Australia, and other countries. In 1955, West German chancellor Adenauer visited Moscow and reestablished diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This allowed more ethnic Germans to leave the Soviet Union, though not most; however, all ethnic Germans were considered eligible for citizenship in West Germany throughout the Cold War. Only in January 1993, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany were German immigration laws

amended with regard to ethnic German immigrants from Russia. These changes established that descendants of former colonists born after December 31, 1992 could no longer claim the “privilege of being German” (*Russlanddeutsche*) as under the previous rules for immigration to Germany.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); NKVD; Paul I (1754–1801); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II (1945–1948)

The victorious Allied powers in the Second World War—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and, belatedly,

France—began working out guidelines and structures for the eventual occupation of Germany as early as 1944. Unable to agree on a uniform policy, they resorted to vague compromises in the final declaration at Potsdam on August 2, 1945, some three months after the German surrender.

The Allies established four supposedly temporary zones of occupation. While these largely followed old German state borders, Prussia was dissolved because of its association with militarism. U.S. forces occupied southern Germany, including Bavaria, northern Baden, northern Württemberg, and Hesse. The Americans also controlled the North Sea port city of Bremen to facilitate supply. The British zone, in northern Germany, included Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and the city of Hamburg. France governed the southwestern German region that abutted it: Rhine-Palatine and southern Baden. The Soviet zone of occupation comprised Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Saxony-Anhalt. American troops had liberated and occupied significant portions of Mecklenburg and Thuringia at the conclusion of hostilities but, despite the urgings of British prime minister Winston Churchill to remain in place, they withdrew according to the agreements and in exchange for the Soviet handover of portions of Berlin.

The German capitol was also divided into four zones of occupation and administration. The city center and the larger eastern portion of the city fell to the Soviet Union, while the three Western Allies divided the remainder. This arrangement left the Soviets in control of 31 percent of the German territory and about half of its resources. U.S. lieutenant general Lucius Clay, the first administrative head of the American zone, noted that the Soviets had gotten the agriculture while the British received the industry,

and the Americans controlled the scenery of Germany.

In theory, Germany was to be administered as a single economic unit according to the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam. Though the Allied military commander in each zone enjoyed virtual autonomy, there was also a four-power Allied Control Commission (ACC) responsible for the administration of all of Germany, and a corresponding *Kommandantura* for Berlin. The Allies agreed in principle on four primary objectives: the decentralization, the decartelization, demilitarization, and de-Nazification (the “4Ds”) of the German society. The most significant and efficacious joint enterprise in this regard was the International Military Tribunal established in Nuremberg to conduct trials of Nazi leaders and high-ranking military officers for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Even this undertaking saw disagreements among the Allies, and the implementation of the “4Ds” program varied widely across the zones of occupation. The Americans adopted a strategy of establishing “administrative beacons” at the state level, while the British attempted to create a single administration for their entire zone and even nationalized some industries. They tended to focus on reeducation, with an eye to creating a democratic German society in the near future. Both the French and the Soviets created strict military regimes that focused on extracting reparations and left Germans little room for initiative.

The Soviets were bent on creating an entirely new social and political order in Germany and carried out a program of radical reform without consulting the ACC. German banks were dispossessed in July 1945, all estates over 245 acres were seized without compensation in September, and between October 1945 and November 1946, the

Soviet military authorities confiscated all industrial enterprises in their zone. The Soviets disassembled almost 1,500 factories and shipped them back to the USSR as “reparations,” and took the lion’s share of remaining industrial and agricultural production as well.

Though the British and Americans had agreed at Potsdam that each power might take reparations from its own zone and allowed that the Soviets might claim another 10 percent of Germany’s industrial production from their zones without payment, Clay felt that this went beyond the spirit of the agreement. On May 4, 1946, he suspended economic exchanges with the French and Soviet zones on the grounds that they were not treating Germany as a single economic unit. Clay also suspected that the new Socialist Unity Party—a forced fusion of the German Social Democrats in the Soviet zone and the German Communists—was intended as an instrument for controlling German politics as a whole.

American policy shifted to counter these moves and to sidestep the continuous French objections to reestablishing German administration. In July 1946, U.S. secretary of state James Byrnes announced that the United States was prepared to join forces and zones with any other power in order to ease the burden of occupation. The British Cabinet accepted the offer on July 25. By January 1, 1947, the British and Americans had established a unified economic administration for “Bizonia,” which included half of all German territory and almost two-thirds of the German population. A German Economic Council was given day-to-day authority over the region’s economy, though the Allies retained all practical political power.

The separation of economy and politics quickly became impractical when the United States announced its intention to

aid in the reconstruction of Europe through the European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan. This necessitated currency reform in Germany, as the *Reichsmark* had become useless and the German economy survived largely via black market activity. The Soviets, however, refused to participate in either the currency reform or the ERP. When a final attempt at compromise collapsed at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, U.S. secretary of state George Marshall informed the Soviets that the Americans and British intended to forge ahead even if it meant the creation of a separate West German state.

The Soviets responded in January 1948 by claiming all of Berlin as part of their zone, since the Western powers had violated the occupation agreements. To counter the West German Economic Council, the Soviets granted their own East German Economic Council (created in June 1947) the right to exercise governmental authority in the Soviet zone on February 12, 1948. A month later, they oversaw the creation of a preliminary German parliament in Berlin. The Soviet representative Marshal Sokolovski left the ACC on March 20, 1948, declaring that it held no authority over the Soviet zone. On June 16, the Soviets abandoned the inter-Allied administration of Berlin as well, and began to restrict the exchange of goods between West Berlin and the Soviet zone of occupation. They implemented a full blockade on June 24, 1948, four days after the Western powers went ahead with the currency reform.

Germany was now divided into two virtual states, the French having agreed to join their zone to a federal West Germany at the London Six-Power Conference held from February 23 to March 6, 1948. Both sides moved quickly to formalize the arrangement.

On July 1, 1948, the Western powers instructed the minister-presidents of the West German states to convene a national constituent assembly. Instead of a constitution (which they felt would preclude unification), the resulting German Parliamentary Council drafted the so-called Basic Law in September 1948. It was approved on May 10, 1949, and promulgated on May 23, 1949, with the first elections for a West German parliament following in August 1949. Allied high commissioners replaced the Allied Military Government, which was suspended. An occupation statute limiting the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in matters of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and currency exchange remained in effect until May 9, 1955.

In the Soviet Zone, a parallel People's Parliament passed a draft constitution in November 1948. This was confirmed on May 30, 1949, and put into effect on October 7, 1949, officially creating the German Democratic Republic (GDR, DDR, or East Germany). The Soviets, like the Western allies, remained in Germany as an occupying power until the "Two Plus Four" Treaty of September 12, 1990, officially brought World War II to a close. The burden of occupation was, however, gradually lessened over the years. The Soviets renounced further reparations from Germany in 1953, and declared hostilities at an end in 1955, the same year, the GDR joined the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Soviets dissolved their *Kommandantura* in Berlin in 1962 and, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, refused to intervene when antigovernment protests broke out in the autumn of 1989.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949); Berlin Rising (June 16–17, 1953); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Potsdam

Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945); Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Godunov, Boris (1552–1605)

Boris Godunov rose from an ancient but untitled family to become the czar of Russia from 1598 to 1605, during the Time of Troubles.

Boris Feodorovich Godunov was born in 1552 into a family of nontitled Russian landowners, reputedly of Tatar descent. When he was about eight, his father died and Godunov and his sister went to live with their uncle, Dmitry Ivanovich, a boyar (landed noble) adviser to Czar Ivan IV. Ivan, increasingly suspicious of his courtiers and nobles, invited Dmitry Ivanovich and his family to live inside the walls of the Kremlin. Boris became a member of the palace guard and, later, an *oprichnik*, or member of Ivan's private army.

In 1570, Godunov married Maria Skuratova-Belskaya, the daughter of the man who led the *oprichniki*, and was promoted to the position of *kravchi*, the royal food taster. Godunov became a relative of the czar in 1580, when his sister Irina Godunova married Ivan's second son, Fyodor. Godunov

was thus present in 1581, as a close advisor, when during a fit of rage Ivan killed his first-born son, leaving the dim-witted Fyodor heir to the throne. When Ivan died suddenly in 1584, Fyodor I was crowned, but actual control was shared between Godunov and Nikita Romanov, Ivan's brother-in-law, as leaders of the boyar council appointed by Ivan IV on his deathbed. Godunov was named the master of the stable, privy grand boyar, and governor of Kazan and Astrakhan, and he received vast estates that ensured him continuing wealth.

Romanov died in 1586, and Godunov took control of national affairs, contacting foreign leaders from his own separate court. Godunov's power rested on the fact that his sister was married to the czar and, in 1590, had been appointed coruler. Irina had failed to produce an heir, however; this left Dmitry, Ivan's son by his sixth marriage,



Boris Godunov rose from an ancient but untitled family to become czar of Russia from 1598 to 1605. (Archivo Iconografico, S.A./Corbis)

which was not recognized by the Orthodox Church, as the only possible dynastic successor and jeopardized Godunov's position. Many boyars tried to convince Fyodor to divorce Irina in order to continue the dynasty legitimately.

Godunov's regency was by and large successful, though he could not arrest the decline of the Muscovite economy that had begun with the *oprichnina*. His skillful negotiation of an agreement to make Moscow the seat of an independent patriarchy within the Orthodox Church made him a national hero. He built fortresses to protect Russia against attacks by Tatars, Turks, and Persians, and went on a building spree, establishing towns in the east and south and building new churches, including the Great Belfry, the tallest building in Moscow. He fought a war with Sweden in 1595 to recover territories lost under Ivan IV, but his policies were generally pacifist. Godunov encouraged trade with Western Europe, particularly England, and established trading and military outposts in Siberia. He lacked the legitimate authority to press for much-needed economic and social reforms, however; in fact, to placate the nobles, he decreed an end to the peasants' right to move, effectively enserfing them. Godunov also maintained a large political police to guard against conspiracies seeking his overthrow.

When Fyodor died in 1598, the succession of the Russian throne was thrown into confusion. Dmitry had died under mysterious circumstances in 1591, and while Fyodor had given the scepter to his wife on his deathbed, she did not wish to reign. Several princes held claims to the throne as descendants of the royal family. Godunov was by far the most popular, but said (rather disingenuously) he would not take the throne unless it was granted by a national council (*zemski sobor*). After much argument and threats

of excommunication against any who voted against Godunov, the council finally offered Godunov the throne. Godunov then falsified documents stating that Fyodor had designated him as his heir, and hastily convened a "national council" that rubber-stamped his election. He was finally crowned on September 1, 1598.

As Czar Boris I, Godunov continued many of the policies he had implemented as regent. Most scholars recognize him as a good administrator and diplomat, but he was unable to prevent the economic crisis. After two prosperous years, heavy rains caused famine in 1601 and 1602. Godunov made great efforts to feed the people, but these proved inadequate and as many as 100,000 died of starvation in Moscow alone. Many of the landed gentry were driven to sell themselves into slavery, and banditry increased in the countryside as peasants fought to survive. Amid the crisis, Godunov suffered a stroke and his health began to fail. Then in 1604, a man claiming to be the Czarevich Dmitry (history is still uncertain about who he really was) appeared on the scene. He made a pact with the Polish government and invaded Russia. Thousands of hungry Russians joined Dmitry's army. Godunov's forces initially repulsed the invasion, but Dmitry regrouped and returned even stronger.

Godunov died on April 23, 1605. His son, Fyodor was crowned as czar the following day, but several powerful princes betrayed him in favor of Dmitry, whom they viewed as the "God-given" and therefore the legitimate czar. Fyodor was arrested on June 10 and murdered, along with his mother and cousins. Dmitry marched into Russia and took the throne. Within a year, he too had been murdered, however, and Russia descended into full-fledged civil war.

Katherine Gould

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1633); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); *Oprichniki*; Time of Troubles

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Golikov, Filip Ivanovich (1900–1980)

Soviet army marshal. Born in Borisovo (Kurgan Oblast), east of the Ural Mountains on July 29, 1900, Filip Golikov joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik (Communist) Party in 1918. Golikov underwent political indoctrination in Petrograd in 1919, and that August, he became a political officer in the 51st Infantry Division and continued till the end of the Russian Civil War. By 1919, he had completed advanced leadership training. He was involved primarily in political work until 1931, when he undertook command of an infantry regiment. Golikov graduated by correspondence from the Frunze Military Academy, with a specialty in armor, in 1933. He had charge of the 8th Mechanized Brigade during 1936 and 1937 and of the Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Military District during 1937 and 1938.

Golikov held commands in the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 and perhaps in that of Finland as well. He was promoted to major general in May 1940 and

assigned as deputy chief of the General Staff and chief of military intelligence. Reporting only to Josef Stalin, he passed along information from Russian spy Richard Sorge that Japan would strike south in 1941 rather than drive north into the Soviet Union. Shortly after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Golikov led missions to London and Washington to negotiate aid.

Golikov took command of the Tenth Army in October 1941 in the defense of the city of Moscow, participating in the desperate fighting there in December. He headed the Fourth Assault Army in the winter counteroffensive of February and March 1942 and then headed the Bryansk Front opposing German Army Group South's summer offensive in June 1942. During the August 1942–January 1943 Battle of Stalingrad, Golikov commanded first the Voronezh Front and then the First Guards Army. He was also deputy commander of the Southeast and Stalingrad fronts. He headed the Voronezh Front from October 1942 to March 1943 and took part in the Soviet push through Kursk and Kharkov.

Promoted to colonel general in January 1943, Golikov was deputy commissar of defense for cadres and chief of the personnel directorate of the Red Army from 1943 to 1950. In 1945, he was promoted to general of the army. Golikov was then commander of the Special Mechanized Army from 1950 to 1956 and commandant of the Military Academy of Armored Troops in 1956. From 1957 to 1962, he was chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces. In 1961, he was promoted to marshal.

Following his disagreement with Nikita Khrushchev over the latter's handling of the Cuban missile crisis, Golikov was quietly relieved of his posts and shunned by his fellow officers. He served out his remaining active service in a succession of administrative

positions until 1966. Golikov died in Moscow on August 8, 1980.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Frunze Academy; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

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Golitsyn (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich (1643–1714)

Born to a noble family in 1643, Vasily Golitsyn attained the rank of boyar (nobleman) in the court of Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich. In 1676, he commanded an army sent to establish peace in Ukraine; Golitsyn also commanded troops during the Chygyrn Campaigns. With the ascendance of Sophia as regent, along with her brother Peter, Golitsyn became head of foreign affairs, to which he added the duties as the czarina’s favorite and principal minister during 1682–1689. He had some diplomatic success, fixing the border with the Chinese above the Amur River and concluding peace with Poland, but his abject failure in two military campaigns against the Crimean Tatars ultimately led to his demise. When Peter came to the throne, he stripped Golitsyn of his titles and his estates. Golitsyn was banished from the capital; he died in Kholmogory, near Archangelsk, on April 21, 1714.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Crimea Campaign (April–May 1944); Golitsyn (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich, (1643–1714); Holy League, Wars of the (1686–1696); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); *Streltsy* Rising (May–August 1682)

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Golitsyn, Dmitry Vladimirovich (1771–1844)

Born into a noble military family on October 29, 1771, Dmitry Golitsyn enrolled in the Preobrazhensky Guard Regiment at age three, and was commissioned as a sergeant at six. He was educated thereafter in Germany and France, where he studied military science. He returned to Russia in 1785 and entered the cavalry. Golitsyn fought under General Aleksandr Suvorov during the Polish Rebellion of 1794, and earned the Order of St. George for his actions at the Battle of Praga. He was promoted to colonel in 1797, to major general in 1798, and to lieutenant general in 1800.

Golitsyn fought with General Count Leonty Benningsen during the War of the Third Coalition, seeing action at Eylau and Friedland. He was decorated five times for bravery, and fought briefly against the Finns during 1808–1809 before resigning his commission to travel in Germany. Having returned to Russia, he entered military service again in 1812, leading the cavalry of Second Army under General Mikhail Kutuzov at Borodino and Vyazma. Golitsyn was promoted to general in 1814, and appointed

military governor of Moscow. Elevated to prince in 1841, Golitsyn died in Paris, where he was receiving medical treatment, on March 27, 1844.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bennigsen, Leonty Levin (1745–1826); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812; Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800); Third Coalition, War of the (1805)

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Golovin, Nikolai (1875–1944)

Nikolai Golovin's early life was obscure, and his military career was undistinguished; however, he has some significance as a military historian. Born in Moscow on November 22, 1875, Golovin graduated from the Corps of Pages in 1894 and from the Academy of the General Staff in 1900. He served as a professor of tactics at the General Staff Academy from 1908 to 1914. With the onset of World War I, he was given command of a Hussar regiment on the Northwestern Front. He then served as quartermaster general for Ninth Army and, in 1916, as chief of staff for Seventh Army. Golovin also served as chief of staff on the Romanian Front during 1917.

With the October Revolution, Golovin first retired to Odessa and then fled to Paris. During 1919, he traveled back to Vladivostok to join the White forces under Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, but found those forces already disintegrating upon his arrival.

Returning immediately to Paris, Golovin set about writing on military history and military theory. His 1931 history of the Russian army during World War I still commands attention. Golovin collaborated with the Germans during the occupation of France, earning him a death sentence from the Resistance; however, he died in Paris in 1944.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: October (November) Revolution (1917); Romanian Campaign of 1916

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Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–)

Communist reformer and last leader of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms forever changed the character of the Soviet political system, and led to the end of the Cold War and the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev was born on March 2, 1931, in the southern Russian village of Privolnoe in Stavropol province, to a peasant family. Both of his grandfathers were arrested during the purges of the 1930s; his father served on several fronts in the Great Patriotic War and was wounded twice. At 14, Mikhail drove combines in the fields, and at 18 he received the "Red Banner of Labour Group" decoration for helping with a record harvest. In 1950, Gorbachev went to study law at the Lomonosov Moscow State University. He also became a candidate member in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, rising to full member in 1952. Gorbachev



Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the reform policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the USSR. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

graduated in 1955, having married Raisa Maksimovna Titorenks in 1953, and returned to Stravropol, where he rose quickly through the regional party hierarchy.

In 1978, Gorbachev was appointed secretary of the Central Committee responsible for agriculture. In March 1985, he became the party leader following the death of Konstantin Chernenko. Following the lead of his mentor, Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev initiated

the policies of *perestroika* (reconstruction) and *demokratizatsiya* (democratization) while also pursuing campaigns against corruption and alcoholism. Gorbachev further ended the war in Afghanistan, and worked to improve East-West relations, which he considered an essential first step to economic reform. He replaced long-time Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze, a reformer from Soviet Georgia, and proposed deep cuts in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals.

The first of many summit meetings between Gorbachev and U.S. president Ronald Reagan took place in Geneva on November 19, 1985. No major breakthroughs resulted, but the two established a good relationship, and at an October 11, 1986 meeting in Reykjavik, brought sweeping agreements on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In 1987, Gorbachev visited the United States to further discuss arms reductions, and he and Reagan signed a treaty to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles. The following year saw the end of the war in Afghanistan and a fourth meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Moscow. Gorbachev spoke at the United Nations twice in 1988 and spoke out in favor of the self-determination of nations.

Until then, under the Brezhnev Doctrine, it was given that the Soviet Union would intervene to prevent the creation of any noncommunist regime in any Warsaw Pact countries. While Gorbachev wished leaders of a similar disposition would be chosen in these countries, he believed nuclear missiles had rendered Stalin's "*Cordon Sanitaire*" irrelevant. Already in 1987, during a speech in Berlin, he urged reform upon the leaders of East Germany and warned them the USSR would not intervene against domestic disturbances. Gorbachev's public support for such views, along with his charm and comfort

with Western ways, launched a wave of “Gorby-mania” that swept over Europe and spilled into the United States.

In October 1988, Gorbachev was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, an indication of continued domestic support for his policies. In December, he met with Reagan for a fifth time in New York. The Soviet leader sought far-reaching agreements but Reagan was not prepared to go so far. In October 1989, the Soviets publicly accepted the principle that states could leave the Warsaw Pact—an action that had led to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. As one state after another cautiously followed Poland in initiating reforms, holding elections, and moving out of the Soviet orbit, Gorbachev remained true to his word. When the Berlin Wall came down during the night of November 9–10, 1989, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was at an end.

Gorbachev was not so liberal or forgiving in what he regarded as the proper sphere of Soviet influence. Soviet troops violently suppressed protests in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic States during 1986–1991. Gorbachev nonetheless was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, and won election as the first president of the Soviet Union. Protests and demonstrations for independence continued in many Soviet republics, however, and the economic situation declined alarmingly.

In January 1991, Gorbachev pressured Lithuania to confirm its legal status as a Soviet republic; before the Lithuanians could respond, Soviet special troops (*Spetznatz*) attacked and occupied the television tower in the capital of Vilnius that had been broadcasting programs advocating Lithuanian independence. The attack left 14 dead and 110 wounded. Protesters numbering almost 100,000 marched in Moscow on January 20,

demanding Gorbachev’s resignation. Gorbachev vacillated and, while he was on vacation in August 1991, hard-liners attempted a coup. Gorbachev was arrested and a Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR was set up. On August 19, the committee announced that Gorbachev was unable to carry out his presidential duties “for health reasons.” Two days later, however, the coup collapsed in the face of popular resistance led by Boris Yeltsin.

Gorbachev returned to Moscow, but he no longer had the support of the people. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev transferred his authority as the president of the USSR and commander in chief of the armed forces to Yeltsin. The next day, the USSR Supreme Soviet abolished itself, declaring “the Soviet Union no longer exists.”

Inside Russia, Gorbachev is often reviled as the man who gave away what so many millions of Soviet citizens had died to obtain during the Great Patriotic War. In the West, however, Gorbachev is revered as the man who ended the Cold War. He currently heads a foundation based in Atlanta, Georgia, that works to promote international peace.

Brian Tannehill

See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984); August Coup (1991); Baltic Rebellions (1991); Brezhnev Doctrine; Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Prague Spring (1968); SALT II (1972–1979); Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–2014); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Gorchakov, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich (1793–1861)

The son of a noted writer, Mikhail Gorchakov was born on January 28, 1793. He joined the Russian army at age 14, serving as a cadet in the Guards Artillery Battalion. Promoted to lieutenant, Gorchakov served in Persia during 1809, and then in the campaigns against Napoleon. He was decorated for his service at the battles of Borodino and Bautzen, and promoted to captain. By 1824, he had risen to major general.

Gorchakov again served with distinction during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, and served as temporary commander of Russian artillery during the suppression of the Polish Rising of 1830–1831. Promoted to lieutenant general, he was appointed military governor of Warsaw in 1846, and commanded the Russian artillery in the 1849 campaign to suppress revolution in Hungary.

Gorchakov served as adjutant general to Czar Nicholas I during 1852–1853, but when the war with the Ottomans started again in 1853, he was sent to command Russian troops in Moldavia and Wallachia. Gorchakov initiated the siege of Silestria in 1854, but politics dictated a withdrawal before the siege was completed. In 1855, he took command of Russian forces in Crimea; his performance there was lackluster, though the city held out to the end. When the war ended, he was appointed viceroy to the Kingdom of Poland. He died in Warsaw on May 30, 1861.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bautzen, Battle of (May 20–21, 1813); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Crimean War (1853–1856); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Polish Rising (1863); Revolutions of 1848

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Gordon, Patrick (1635–1699)

Scottish mercenary and Russian general. Patrick Leopold Gordon was born May 31, 1635, to a Scottish Catholic family. His ancestors were ennobled for supporting King James II of Scotland in 1449, but during the English Civil War (1642–1649) the family fell out of favor. Patrick Gordon therefore left for Danzig in 1650. He lived briefly in Braunsberg before studying at the Jesuit College at Frauenberg. Gordon left school in 1654, and enlisted as a cavalryman in the Swedish army.

Gordon served briefly under Field Marshal Arvid Wittenberg before joining the infantry regiment of Count Pontus de la Garie. Gordon was captured by the Poles at Rimanova in 1655, but released when he promised to enlist as a dragoon under Polish commander Constantine Lubomirski. During the siege of Warsaw in July 1656, however, Gordon was taken prisoner by Brandenburgers. They brought him to their Swedish commander, General Field Marshal Lieutenant Douglas, who freed him on condition that he serve again in the Swedish army. Douglas had formed a company of Scots as a sort of officers' school, and Gordon remained an instructor there, seeing occasional action around Danzig, until January 1657.

Gordon then was taken prisoner again by the Poles but released as part of a prisoner exchange. Gordon thus returned to Douglas's

unit and served near Strasbourg, where he was captured by a Habsburg unit. Gordon escaped and was released from Swedish service on January 1, 1658. Gordon then joined another Swedish unit but was captured by the Poles during an action near Thorn (Torun). The Poles refused to release him, and Gordon refused to switch sides until Lubomirski offered him a post as regimental quartermaster.

Here Gordon was noted for his industry and decisiveness; he was promoted to captain lieutenant and returned to the field in 1660. Avoiding capture, he fought against Russians and Cossacks on the Hungarian border and in Volhynia. Gordon was decorated several times for actions in battles at Lubar, Slobodischtsche, and Czudno. He then sought his release from service, intending to return to Scotland. When the Russian ambassador to Poland offered him a post as a major with the promise of promotion to colonel within two years, however, Gordon entered the czar's service. He departed for Moscow on September 2, 1661, as part of a regiment of foreign mercenaries.

In January 1665, only days after his marriage to the 17-year-old daughter of Colonel Philipp Albrecht von Brockhoven, Gordon was promoted to colonel. From June 1666 to February 1667, he served as the czar's representative in London. Gordon then served in regiments in Sloboda, Briansk, Trubestchov, Sevsk, Kanev, and Periaslav until 1677, defending against Tatar incursions and suppressing the occasional Cossack rebellion. In August 1678, Gordon supervised the fortification of Chigirin against the Turks. Even though the city had to be abandoned after four weeks, Gordon was promoted to major general and posted to Kiev. He advanced to lieutenant general in 1683, but remained generally unhappy in Russian service. The czar did allow Gordon to visit England in

January 1686; however, Gordon's family was to remain in Russia as a sign of good faith.

In August 1686, Gordon presented the Regent Sophia with letters from King James II of England naming Gordon his representative to Russia and therefore requesting Gordon's release. Threatened with demotion and a remote posting, Gordon recanted and accepted a command at his former rank. He led a regiment in two campaigns against the Turks (1687 and 1689); in both cases, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, the commander in chief, marched his armies to the Dnieper River, declared the campaign impossible, and returned home. Gordon nonetheless was rewarded richly and allowed to settle in Moscow, where he took command of one of the foreign regiments established as a training ground for officers.

Here Gordon befriended the future Peter I and, along with several other foreign officers, sided with Peter against his co-czar Sophia. Gordon accompanied Czar Peter on a journey to Archangelsk in 1694, and served as his representative to the Holy Roman Empire in early 1695; he planned and participated in the Azov campaigns of 1695–1696. During Peter's "Great Embassy" of 1697–1698, Gordon served as second in command of military administration and supervised the fortification of Taganrog. Gordon also played a pivotal role in suppressing the revolt of the *streltsy*, an elite unit that rose in support of Sophia and against Peter in June 1698. He became ill shortly thereafter, however, and died in Moscow on November 29, 1699. Peter I provided him with a lavish funeral, which included an oration from the grateful czar.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Golitsyn, (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich

(1643–1714); Holy League, Wars of the; Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); *Streltsy*

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Goremykin, Ivan Logginovich (1839–1917)

Russian bureaucrat and prime minister (1906, 1914–1916). Born on November 8, 1839, in Novgorod, to a wealthy landowning family,



Ivan Logginovich Goremykin was Russia’s prime minister under Tsar Nicholas II from 1914 until 1916. (Library of Congress)

Ivan Logginovich Goremykin entered the civil service in 1860 after graduating from law school and rose rapidly through the bureaucracy, where he was considered something of an expert on peasant affairs. In 1895, Goremykin was appointed minister of the interior. He already had the reputation for being extremely conservative and completely loyal to Czar Nicholas II. His term in office was largely undistinguished, and after failing in his attempt to implement organizational reform and enlarge the zemstvo program (the system of limited local government introduced by Czar Alexander II), he retired in 1899.

In May 1906, Czar Nicholas II made the surprising decision to appoint Goremykin prime minister just before the first session of the newly established Duma. Nicholas believed that Goremykin would faithfully defend the authority of the monarchy against the new representative body. Indeed, Goremykin had already publicly stated his complete fealty to the throne, asserting that the czar was “the anointed one, the rightful and lone sovereign.”

Nicholas was not disappointed in his appointment, as Goremykin obstinately resisted the Duma’s attempts to exercise power at the czar’s expense and to implement political reforms. Nevertheless, on July 21, 1906, Nicholas forced Goremykin into retirement and replaced him with the younger and more energetic Pyotr Stolypin. By that time, Goremykin’s open contempt for the Duma, which he expressed by pretending to nap during its sessions, had earned him a reputation as one of the most reactionary and unyielding of the czar’s officials.

After nearly a decade in what had seemed like permanent retirement, Goremykin was again appointed prime minister by the czar in February 1914. The elderly prime minister accomplished little in the months leading up to World War I. During the July Crisis, he was virtually invisible. As wartime prime

minister, he devoted most of his energy to resisting the Duma's calls for reform, and his unquestioning devotion to the monarchy led him to support the czar's disastrous decision to take personal command of the army in 1915. In early 1916, however, Nicholas was forced to send the by now senile Goremykin into permanent retirement.

Goremykin's replacement, the corrupt and incompetent Boris Stürmer, proved to be even more objectionable to the Russian political elites and the general public. Goremykin's extreme conservatism and unwillingness to work with the Duma and even other Cabinet officials had virtually doomed his chances of political success. But those same qualities had endeared themselves to the czar, and even Empress Alexandra had reportedly liked Goremykin.

After the March 1917 Russian Revolution, Goremykin was arrested and detained, although he was soon released on orders of Alexander F. Kerensky, the erstwhile socialist prime minister. Goremykin died near his estate at Sochi in the Caucasus, according to some accounts, murdered by a Bolshevik mob, on December 24, 1917, only weeks after the November 1917 Revolution.

John M. Jennings

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917)

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Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915)

Important military offensive by the Central Powers against the Russians in 1915. After the campaigns of 1914 and early 1915, the German and Austro-Hungarian high commands argued over strategy. German chief of staff General Erich von Falkenhayn wanted to place the main effort on the Western Front, while in the East, the German command team of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his chief of staff, General Erich Ludendorff, argued for an offensive in East Prussia. Colonel General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, desired a major offensive in the center of the Eastern Front to help his beleaguered forces in the Carpathians. Falkenhayn, hoping to keep the offensive in the East limited, ultimately supported Conrad and, with the Kaiser's support, approved a plan for an attack in western Galicia in early May.

The German High Command transferred forces, including eight newly raised divisions, to Galicia, and formed a new army, the Eleventh, under General August von Mackensen, to spearhead the offensive. After some wrangling, a complicated command arrangement gave Mackensen control of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army as well as his Eleventh, while technically subordinating him to the Austro-Hungarian High Command. Mackensen's brilliant chief of staff, General Hans von Seeckt, communicated directly with the German High Command, thus establishing a dual-command system.

The Russians were ill-prepared to receive the attack. Russian commander in chief Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich wanted to renew the Russian offensive in the Carpathians, but he did not press for the transfer of forces to the Southern Front (Army Group). Chief of staff of the Russian Northern Front General Mikhail Alekseev obstructed

and delayed the transfer of troops to the south. Southern Front commander General Nikolai Ivanov, receiving few outside reinforcements, shifted the bulk of his troops to the Eighth and Eleventh armies in the Carpathians. This left General Radko Dmitriev Third Army with few troops to cover a much larger section of front than Ivanov's other armies. Dmitriev compounded the error by failing to prepare defensive positions in depth.

One of the keys to Mackensen's offensive plan was a concentrated and heavy artillery bombardment to pave the way for his infantry advance. On May 1, 1915, Mackensen's forces registered their artillery, and the next morning, they began an intensive four-hour bombardment. Compared to later barrages on the Western Front, Mackensen's artillery fire was not unique; however, the German bombardment was one of the most intense of the war on the Eastern Front. Russian forces in the first line of trenches were shattered. Some Russian units in the second and third trench positions held and even launched counterattacks, but by May 4, the Germans had penetrated all of the Russian defensive lines, and the Russian Third Army had been virtually annihilated.

Initially, the Grand Duke ordered Dmitriev and the neighboring armies to hold their positions in the hope of buying time to bring up reinforcements. Unlike the dense rail lines on the Western Front though, the limited railways behind the Russian positions made it difficult to move reserves, and the Russians were forced into a major retreat. German and Austro-Hungarian forces threatened to isolate the Russian armies in the Carpathians, but hard-fighting rearguards and timely withdrawals by the Eighth and Eleventh armies enabled the Russians to avoid encirclement. At the end of May, the Russians paused on the San and Dniester

rivers long enough to remove supplies from Przemyśl, which fell on June 3.

The success against the Russian Third Army, which included the capture of 120,000 Russian prisoners, prompted another strategic debate among Central Powers' leadership in June. Hindenburg and Ludendorff wanted to conduct a deep encirclement of Russian forces with a new offensive north of Warsaw that would join with Mackensen's advance. Conrad could not offer much assistance, however, and he had to transfer the Austrian Third Army to combat a new enemy offensive in Italy. Falkenhayn still opposed additional offensives that would require transferring more German troops to the east.

In the meantime, Mackensen's forces took L'viv on June 22, thus prompting another meeting on strategy held at Posen on July 1. Kaiser Wilhelm II sided with Falkenhayn's limited concept for the offensive, and the Germans shifted Mackensen's advance to a more narrow thrust north between the Bug and Vistula rivers. Hindenburg and Ludendorff received sufficient reinforcements to form a new German army, the Twelfth, under General Max von Gallwitz, which was to advance from the north of Warsaw and join Mackensen in a limited encirclement near Brest Litovsk. Gallwitz began his attack on July 13 with a crossing of the Narew River. Nikolai Nikolaevich had already planned his withdrawal, however, and removed munitions and supplies from the Warsaw region.

Although the grand duke had anticipated the new offensive by the Central Powers, the Russians still suffered extensive losses. To cover his withdrawal, Nikolai Nikolaevich left a large garrison in the fortress of Novogeorgievsk (today Modlin). This force covered the Russian field forces, which abandoned Warsaw on August 5 as they retreated to the east. The fortress surrendered

with 90,000 men on August 20. By the end of the month, the Central Powers' main offensive halted. In September, it achieved some additional, but limited, gains on the flanks of the front.

Gorlice-Tarnów was one of the great tactical offensives of the war, and it certainly strained the Russian war effort. The weakened czarist army on the Eastern Front showed remarkable resilience though. The setbacks did prompt Czar Nicholas II to remove the grand duke and make himself commander in chief on the Eastern Front. Perhaps more than troop and territorial losses, the czar's assumption of military command was the most significant impact of the offensive. The czar proved to be inept as a commander, and his presence at the front left the government in the capital in disarray.

Curtis S. King

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich (1910–1988)

Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union. Born in Kemenets-Podolsky, Ukraine, on February 16, 1910, Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov

entered the Russian navy in 1927 and graduated from the Frunze Naval Academy in 1931. His early service was with the Black Sea Fleet. In 1939, Gorshkov took command of a cruiser squadron in the Pacific Fleet.

Gorshkov benefitted in his rise in the service from the purges of the Soviet military in 1937 and 1938. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Gorshkov, only 31 years old, was a rear admiral in command of the Sea of Azov Flotilla. He then became deputy commander of the Novorossiysk Defense Area, where he was placed in the unusual circumstance of commanding the Forty-Seventh Army in defense of the Caucasus. Gorshkov then resumed command of naval forces in the Sea of Azov, assisting in the liberation of the Taman Peninsula and Crimea. Gorshkov next commanded the Danube Flotilla and played an active role in the liberation of Ukraine and the Soviet invasion of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria. Gorshkov ended World War II in command of the Black Sea Fleet.

Following the war, Gorshkov became chief of staff and then commander of the Black Sea Fleet until 1955, when he was appointed deputy commander of the Soviet navy. Gorshkov was a close associate of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who appointed him commander in chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, a post he held until his death. Khrushchev initially charged Gorshkov with carrying out reductions in defense expenditures, but this policy ended following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, one of the great lessons of which for the Soviet leadership was the inadequacy of Soviet naval power.

Khrushchev and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, embarked on a considerable increase in defense expenditures, especially in the naval sphere, allowing Gorshkov to transform the Soviet navy from essentially a

coast defense and submarine-centered force into one capable of projecting naval power around the globe. In 1967, Gorshkov was promoted to admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union, the naval equivalent of marshal of the Soviet Union.

Gorshkov oversaw construction of the Soviet navy's first aircraft carriers and of new nuclear submarines and battle cruisers comparable to Western designs. His theories of naval tactics and strategy were embodied in his major book, *The Sea Power of the State* (1976). Gorshkov died in Moscow on May 13, 1988.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Crimea Campaign (April–May 1944); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Navy, Soviet (1917–1991)

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Govorov, Leonid Aleksandrovich (1897–1955)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Butyrki, Kirov Oblast, on February 22, 1897, Leonid Govorov was drafted into the Russian army in 1916 during World War I. Commissioned from the Konstantin Artillery School in 1917, Govorov was then drafted into anti-Bolshevik forces commanded by Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, but he deserted and joined the Red Army in 1920. During the Russian Civil War, Govorov commanded an

artillery battalion, but because he had served in Kolchak's forces, he was denied membership in the Communist Party until 1942.

Govorov attended staff schools, the Frunze Military Academy, and the General Staff Academy. He commanded an artillery corps in 1936 and, during the 1939–1940 Finnish-Soviet War, he served as chief of Seventh Army artillery. Here he initiated the technique of using heavy guns for direct fire against fortifications. Govorov then commanded the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy. Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, he commanded the Fifth Army in October 1941 in the defense of Moscow and was promoted to lieutenant general of artillery in November. He played an important role in the counterattack around Moscow in December 1941. Govorov then commanded the Leningrad Front from June 1942 to July 1945.

Promoted to general of the army in November 1943 and to marshal of the Soviet Union in June 1944, Govorov broke the German siege of Leningrad, pursuing the Germans through the Baltic states. In February 1945, he took command of the Second Baltic Front. After the war, he headed the Leningrad Military District, and he was chief inspector of the Soviet army from 1946 to 1947. Govorov later commanded the Air Defense Forces and became deputy minister of defense in 1954. He died in Moscow on March 19, 1955.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze Academy; Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Grachev, Pavel (1948–2012)

General Pavel Grachev was the defense minister of Russia and commander of the army from 1992 until his ouster in July 1996. A somewhat unpopular figure, Grachev has been accused of corruption and castigated in the press for the army's disastrous war in separatist Chechnya.

Born on January 1, 1948, in the Tula region of Russia, Grachev attended a military school for paratroopers and then joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and became a battalion commander in Lithuania from 1968 to 1981. He went on to command a parachute landing regiment in Afghanistan from 1981 to 1983 and was made the head of staff of the Seventh Army in Lithuania from 1983 to 1985. From 1985 to 1988, he was commander of the 103rd Airborne Division in Afghanistan. During 1990–1991 he was the first deputy commander and then the commander of the USSR Air Landing Forces. He was the first deputy defense minister from 1991, and was finally appointed defense minister in May 1992.

During the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Grachev opposed the use of the army to put down interethnic fighting in Lithuania and later, in support of Boris Yeltsin, refused to fire on protesters at the Russian White House during the abortive Moscow coup that August. In gratitude, when Yeltsin rose to power, he appointed the young deputy commander to the top leadership post in the army, incurring the resentment of more senior members of the General Staff. During the armed uprising of defiant legislators at the White House in 1993, Grachev hesitated

to storm the building but eventually was persuaded to do so by the chief of Yeltsin's bodyguard, General Aleksandr Korzhakov.

As defense minister, however, Grachev was instrumental in developing a policy of using force to quash breakaway republics. He made rash claims that a squad of his paratroopers could squelch the independence fighters of Chechnya in days, leading to the ill-prepared and protracted army invasion of the secessionist republic of Chechnya on December 11, 1994. Grachev consistently underplayed the casualty figures of the war as part of a deliberate propaganda campaign and lobbied the government for more money to keep the creaking Soviet-era military running. Grachev was sacked after the reelection of Yeltsin in July 1996, after which criminal investigations for graft against him and his allies were launched in the State Duma. Known for his taste for Mercedes limousines, Grachev defended army colleagues against allegations of corruption stemming from the illegal sale of army matériel during the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany. He became a top executive at a Russian arms firm after leaving government service, but was fired in 2007. Grachev died in Krasnogorsk on September 23, 2012.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); August Coup (1991); Baltic Rebellions (1991); Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Great (Large) Program (1910)

Part of a series of initiatives intended to modernize the Russian army in the aftermath of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905. The czarist government initiated the program in 1914. The program's goals were to modernize military equipment and infrastructure in order to keep up with similar programs in Germany. The Great Program was to be completed by 1917, but was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I. Some historians have argued that the Great Program influenced Germany's decision to initiate hostilities in August 1914, as the German General Staff feared the potential strength of the Russian army if it were allowed to complete the program unhindered.

The Great Program was one in a succession of pre-1914 initiatives. Between 1907 and 1914, the czarist government had spent about 700 million rubles on the modernization efforts for the army and navy in what it called the “Small Program.” The 1914 “Great Program” called for continuing annual expenditures of 143 million rubles for the army from 1914 to 1917. These funds were intended for various types of military equipment and matériel, to include rifles, artillery, ammunition, and other supplies. These expenditures greatly concerned the German General Staff, as they calculated that the Russians were actually spending more on their army than Germany was.

Russian General Staff planners allocated 800 million rubles for fortress modernization

as part of the 1914 Great Program. Much of the fortress system was obsolete or badly sited to resist the damage likely to be inflicted by modern, high-trajectory artillery. Despite the misgivings of some senior Russian officers, fortress modernization expenditures came at the expense of the army's field artillery arm, to include heavy artillery and requisite munitions.

Russian planners also allocated program funds to modernize and expand the railways. The Russian General Staff knew that rapid mobilization and deployment of troops was critical, but key portions of the Russian rail net lacked both the capacity and quality to move significant troops and supplies. Thus, the czarist government spent 150 million rubles on the creation of new railway lines and upgrading existing rolling stock and infrastructure. Additionally, the French government offered a loan guarantee of 500 million francs per year in support of Russian railway modernization.

Ultimately, the Russian government spent more than 1.5 billion rubles as part of the Great Program. Russian efforts prompted German General Staff planners to fear the impact that the completion of the program might have on any future conflict, where the Russians would potentially outnumber the German army 3–1. When war began in August 1914, however, the Russian program was incomplete and there remained significant problems with organization, armaments, supply, and the mobilization process that would manifest themselves quickly.

Tim Wilson

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (1500–1918); *Stavka*; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Great Game, The (Russia in Central Asia)

Popular name for the 19th-century rivalry between Russia and Britain for control of Central Asia.

The Anglo-Russian race to conquer Central Asia, that is, the lands east of the Caspian

Sea and west of Tibet, reached a climax in the 19th century; by the beginning of the 20th century, the entire region had been reduced to colonies or vassal states aligned with St. Petersburg or London. Russian ambitions in Central Asia grew following the failure to expand westward into Europe and south into Ottoman territories in the early- to mid-18th century. This in turn elicited fears in London that the Russian military would one day use bases in Central Asia to challenge British hegemony in India, and so Britain launched its own expeditions to Central Asia, including three wars with Afghanistan.

Russian encroachment into Central Asia began in the mid-18th century when Kazakh



tribes of the steppe region east of the Caspian Sea agreed to become nominal vassals of the czar. During the Napoleonic Wars, St. Petersburg schemed to attack British India by sending the Russian military south through Central Asia, but the plan never came to fruition. In the 1820s, Kazakh territories were administratively reorganized, reducing Kazakh autonomy, and St. Petersburg instituted policies favoring Cossack settlers. This resulted in two decades of revolts by the Kazakhs.

Russian envoys sent to Bukhara and Kabul in the 1830s again stirred British fears of Russian encroachment on India and, in 1839, the First Anglo-Afghan War commenced. In the first year of the war, British Indian forces occupied much of southern Afghanistan, but British fortunes turned disastrously in 1842 when an entire British army was wiped out during a retreat from Kabul to Jalabad.

After Russia's Balkan ambitions were thwarted in the Crimean War (1854–1856), St. Petersburg turned toward Kokand, Khiva, and Bukhara. One goal of the Russian conquest of Central Asia was to end the regional trade in slaves, including thousands of Russian Christians. In the early 1860s, the Russian military absorbed most of the urban centers controlled by Kokand into a new Turkestan Province. Kokand was finally reduced to a Russian vassal state in 1865, and the city of Tashkent became the capital of Russian Turkestan.

In 1868, Russia conquered Bukhara, and the fabled city of Samarkand was attached to Russian Turkestan. In 1873, the khan of Khiva was overthrown, and in 1876, an unsuccessful rebellion in Kokand resulted in that state being abolished, with its territory absorbed into Russian Turkestan. By the end of the decade, the Russian military had subdued the Turkmen tribes east of the Caspian

Sea and the Kirghiz tribes on the border with Chinese Turkestan, leaving St. Petersburg in control of Central Asia north of Afghanistan and west of Chinese Turkestan.

Russia's rapid advance was aided by the 1873 agreement between London and St. Petersburg to recognize their respective spheres of influence in Central Asia. London acknowledged Russian control of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, and in exchange, St. Petersburg agreed that Afghanistan was a British protectorate. The agreement defined the Amu Darya River as the northern boundary of Afghanistan, with land on the right bank of this waterway designated as Russian territory.

Despite this accord, Russia continued to try and establish better relations with the emirs of Afghanistan, and in 1878, a Russian diplomatic mission arrived in Kabul. This triggered the Second Anglo-Afghan War, which ended in 1880 with the installation of a new Afghan emir who agreed to hand control of his foreign policy to British officials. In the 1880s, Russia and Afghanistan engaged in a series of border incidents, including in 1885, when Afghanistan was forced to cede the district of Panjeh to Russian control. In 1888, the Afghan emir's exiled cousin received backing from Russia in a failed attempt to take power.

The last significant division of territory during the Great Game was in the Upper Amu Darya River Basin and Pamir Mountains during the 1890s. In 1895, a joint Anglo-Russian commission mapped out the eastern extremity of the Afghan-Russian border, granting Russia control of land on the right bank of the tributaries of the Amu Darya and most of the Pamirs. To ensure that Russia and British colonial possessions did not share any borders, Afghanistan was given possession of the Little Pamir and

most of the Great Pamir. Thus the Wakhan Corridor, a strip of land dividing the Russian Pamirs from the British protectorate of Kashmir, was created.

Central Asia remained quiet for the next two decades until rebellion broke out in the late 1910s. The Bolshevik occupation of Russian Central Asia in 1918 ignited an anti-Russian rebellion among the local Muslim population known as the Basmachi insurrection. The Basmachi rebellion was not extinguished until the early 1930s.

Meanwhile, a Third Anglo-Afghan War started in 1919. The brief border war ended with an agreement that London recognize Afghanistan's independence to negotiate its own foreign affairs. This permitted Kabul to align itself with Moscow in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 20th century, one of the most active outposts for British and Russian espionage was in the city of Kashgar, located in southern Xinjiang Province in Chinese Turkestan. Here Russian and British agents gathered intelligence and courted Chinese officials for the purpose of granting better trade relations.

In the 1930s, Soviet agents were instrumental in fomenting rebellion among the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, and during the 1940s, the Soviet Union held a dominant position in the province. The rivalry between London and Moscow in Central Asia finally came to a conclusion in the late 1940s, when Britain withdrew from the Indian subcontinent, and India and Pakistan emerged from the ashes of the British Raj.

David P. Straub

See also: Basmachi Insurgency (1918–1933); Bukhara and Khiva, Conquest of; Crimean War (1853–1856); Ili Rebellion (1944–1946); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Panjdeh Incident (1885); Xianjiang, Battle of (1937)

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Great Northern War (1700–1721)

Opening conflict in the north during the nearly continuous warfare of 18th-century Europe. Lasting from 1700 to 1721, the Great Northern War marked the decline of Sweden's power in the Baltics and the rise of Russia as a European power.

In the second half of the 17th century, Sweden controlled much of northern Europe, including the Baltics and Poland. Upon the accession of 16-year-old Charles XII to the Swedish throne in 1697, Peter I of Russia, Frederick IV of Denmark, and Augustus II of Poland entered into an alliance to try to take advantage of the inexperienced king and strike at the heart of Sweden's growing territorial power. Charles XII, against the advice of his councillors, chose to take the offensive and invaded first Denmark and then Poland and enjoyed success. In January 1708, however, Charles invaded Russia, and his campaign became complicated by the Russian winter. One of the war's great turning points was the Battle of Poltava in June 1709, when Peter's forces routed those Swedish troops who had survived the previous winter. Charles fled to Moldavia in the Ottoman Empire.

Peter's army then occupied Poland but had to regroup in 1710 when Charles persuaded



the Ottoman sultan to declare war on Russia. The Russian army, under an overconfident Peter, would have been slaughtered had the Turkish commander, Baltaji Mehmet, not agreed to negotiations resulting in the 1711 Treaty of Pruth, which led to the 1713 Peace of Adrianople between Russia and the Ottomans.

Now Russia moved to take control of the Baltic Sea with a new fleet, and Charles returned to Sweden to revitalize the Swedish army, which enjoyed victories during 1714–1715. Charles was killed in a battle with Denmark in December 1718. The Russian fleet stepped up its depredations of Swedish territory, and the Swedes finally sued for peace. The Treaty of Nystad, signed on

August 30, 1721, established which ruler would rule which territory and made Russia the dominant power in the Baltic region.

Steven Strom

See also: Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)

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Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938)

Ostensibly an internal “cleansing” of the Soviet hierarchy in the middle to late 1930s, the Great Purges were in fact repressive measures taken to remove any and all potential threats to the continuance of the Communist Party and to control by Josef Stalin.

Periodic purges were not unheard of in Soviet Russia after the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917. Most were directed at subordinate officials and low-ranking party members, who bore the brunt of policy failures. Others, like the Shakhmaty Trial of 1922, prosecuted foreigners who were supposedly spying and “wrecking” the Soviet economy. The Great Purges (*Yezovshchina* in Russian, named for Nikolai Yezhov, head of the NKVD during 1936–1938) were characterized by their focus on party and state elites, mass terror, and dramatic public “show trials” and “confessions” by the accused.

The Great Purges began in earnest with the assassination on December 1, 1934, of Sergei M. Kirov, Stalin’s chief lieutenant in Leningrad. Kirov, it is alleged, received more votes than Stalin in the Central Committee elections during the 17th Party Congress of 1934, and many party members desired Stalin’s removal from his post as general secretary. Kirov’s assassin, Leonid V. Nikolaev, and 13 so-called accomplices were arrested, given a sham trial, and executed on December 30. Eventually, 49 people were directly implicated in the plot and shot. Supposedly these individuals implicated others, who implicated still others. Although never proven, it has been suggested that Stalin arranged Kirov’s murder and then had those who carried out the deed executed to cover his tracks. In any case, Kirov’s assassination now became the justification for the Great Purges.

Beginning in 1936, in a series of show trials held in Moscow, numerous leading Communists and old Bolsheviks—members of the former left and right oppositions—were tried, convicted, and sentenced either to execution or to hard labor in the Gulags. The spillover effect on the general population was horrendous. The purge soon extended to the Red Army.

In June 1937, the secret summary arrest and trial of several Red Army leaders took place. Charged with Trotskyism, and with conspiring with Germany and Japan, three of the five marshals of the Soviet Union—Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, chief of the Soviet General Staff; Aleksandr I. Yegorov; and Vasily K. Bluecher—were summarily tried and executed. Immediately thereafter, the purges descended to the lower echelons of the Soviet armed forces. Before ending, they claimed, in addition to the marshals, 14 of 16 army commanders, all 8 admirals, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 division commanders, and 221 of 397 brigade commanders. All 11 vice-commissars of defense and 75 of 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, all military district commanders, and all air force commanders also were murdered.

This devastating decapitation of the Soviet armed forces eliminated more than 50 percent of the senior officer corps. Those lost included the most aggressive, outspoken, and capable. Some observers consider the purge of the officer corps the chief cause of the near-disastrous performance of the Red Army early in the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Not all were executed or died in the Gulags, however. Many survived to be rehabilitated in the wartime emergency. Some, such as Konstantin Rokossovsky, later a marshal of the Soviet Union, became national heroes. For others, the path to prominence previously

closed was opened. A little-known regional commander, Georgy K. Zhukov, rose to become chief of the Soviet General Staff in three years; during the same period, Nikolai G. Kuznetsov rose from cruiser commander to chief of the Soviet navy.

At the same time that the great show trials were going forward, millions of ordinary Soviet citizens simply disappeared without benefit of trial in what became known as the “Deep Comb-Out.” Approximately 8 million people were arrested; 1 million were executed, and the rest were sent to the Gulags.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: NKVD; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); Yegerov, Aleksandr Ilyich (1883–1939); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Great Reforms. *See* Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918)

Grechko, Andrei (1903–1976)

Soviet marshal and minister of defense. Born on October 17, 1903, in the village of Golodaevka in the Rostov Oblast, Andrei Antonovich Grechko joined the Red Army in 1919 and served as a cavalryman during the Civil War. Selected for Taganrog Cavalry

School in 1925, Grechko became an officer in 1926 and served in a succession of junior commands. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1928.

After graduation from the Frunze Military Academy in 1936, Grechko served as a regimental commander and staff officer before attending the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff. Graduating in 1941, he served successively as a division, corps, and army commander during World War II. His most notable service was as commander of the First Guards Army on the First Ukrainian Front, during which time he worked closely with political commissars and future Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. A colonel general at war’s end, Grechko served as commander of the Kiev Military District from 1945 to 1953.

Following Stalin’s death in 1953, Grechko was promoted to general of the army and appointed commander of Soviet forces in Germany, where he oversaw suppression of the East Berlin Uprising in June 1953. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955, he was named first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of Soviet Land Forces in November 1957. In April 1960, he was appointed commander in chief of Warsaw Pact Forces. He became minister of defense in April 1967. In that post, he directed the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and presided over a significant expansion of Soviet military capabilities. He served on the CPSU Central Committee as a candidate member from 1952 to 1961, and as a full member during 1961–1976. He was elected a full member of the politburo in April 1973. Grechko died of a heart attack in Moscow on April 26, 1976, and was succeeded as defense minister by Dmitry Ustinov.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also: Berlin Rising (June 16–17, 1953); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Brezhnev Doctrine; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Prague Spring (1968); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Ustinov, Dmitry Fyodorovich (1908–1984); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Greek Civil War (1946–1949)

Greece entered a state of political instability after the death of dictator Ioannis Metaxas in 1941. Initially a leftist alliance, the National Liberation Front (EAM) quickly came under control of the Greek communists. The democratic opposition, the National Republican Greek League (EDES), was supported by the United States and the United Kingdom.

The driving force behind the EAM was the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which had been suppressed during the Metaxas regime. Following the German occupation of Greece in May 1941, however, some of the members escaped to the underground, where they made significant contributions to the fight against fascism. Many noncommunist patriots subsequently supported them because of this, and the communists became the leading elements in the People's Liberation

Army (ELAS), the People's Liberation Navy (ELAN), and the United Panhellenic Youth Organization (EPON). ELAS soon gained control of the northern, mountainous regions of Greece, and established a new government, the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), which they sought to dominate.

The conservative, nationalist, and Western-oriented elements naturally resisted these efforts and, when the Germans evacuated in September 1944, called on the Western Allies for support. The British, whose forces arrived in Greece in October, suggested ELAS should disarm. The communists, who could have taken control of the country earlier but refrained on advice from the USSR, firmly rejected the proposal.

In early December, EDES leaders issued an ultimatum for the disbanding of ELAS. The EAM ministers resigned and called for a general strike. A demonstration on December 3 quickly turned into a pitched battle in the center of Athens, with British tanks and police opposing the EAM supporters. Over a month of full-scale civil war followed.

EAM and ELAS, with popular support, held the early advantage; however, the communists were reluctant to engage British forces, fearing they might cause inter-Allied strife while the war against Germany continued. Britain flew in reinforcements, and by January, EAM had lost the battle. Under a January 15, 1945 cease-fire, ELAS partially demobilized; a full agreement in February called for full demobilization of all paramilitary forces, and for a general election to be held as soon as possible.

In the intervening year, right-wing gangs carried out a campaign of terror against former ELAS members and their supporters while the government stood by idly. The KKE boycotted the elections of 1946,

claiming (rightly) the voting process was unfair, and the right easily won a majority.

Former ELAS fighters saw the flawed elections and Western approval of them as proof that armed resistance was their only choice. The KKE, in line with the hardening positions of the Cold War, now called for an armed struggle against “monarcho-fascism.” EAM was supported by communist Albania and Yugoslavia; Stalin disapproved of this aid, and offered none himself. As part of his infamous “spheres of influence” agreement with Churchill, the Soviet dictator had consigned Greece to the Western powers in return for the acceptance of communist dominance in Yugoslavia. Britain therefore supplied troops and financial aid to the so-called democratic faction in Greece until March 31, 1947, with no sign of protest from Stalin. Thereafter the United States provided aid against the communists under the Truman Doctrine.

Once again, the communists held the upper hand early on as government forces were unable to check their campaign of guerrilla warfare. As successes mounted through 1947, the KKE decided to mount a full-scale conventional campaign to seize control of the country. By March 1948, KKE forces were within 20 kilometers of Athens. Stalin’s refusal to provide assistance left the Greek communists’ new “Democratic Army of Greece” (DSE) at a distinct disadvantage, however, as the clear, increased threat from the communists spurred ever-greater U.S. support.

Ironically, however, it was the July 1948 split between Stalin and Tito that doomed the Greek communist effort. Forced to choose, the KKE followed Stalin; support from Yugoslavia dried up almost immediately. Now lacking ammunition and bases, the DSE suffered a series of major defeats and was pushed back into the mountains. The last strongholds

of the DSE fell in September 1949. Several thousand communist fighters took refuge in Albania, and the DSE maintained a headquarters in Tashkent, inside the USSR, until 1952. The USSR, however, had never truly supported the Greek communists.

Abubakar Eby Hara

See also: Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Greek War of Independence (1821–1829)

The Greek War of Independence freed Greece from the Ottoman rule and generated sympathy for nationalism in Europe. It was one of the first tests of the Congress System and marked the beginning of the serious Western European conflicts over the territories of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Turks had occupied Macedonia in 1393, and soon afterward the rest of mainland Greece lost its independence. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, however, a weakening of Ottoman central control and the emergence of a mercantile community caused a social and intellectual ferment in Greece. Many Greeks believed their fellow Orthodox Christians in Russia were the most likely to support their cause, since Russia had traditionally opposed the Ottomans in the Balkans. Czar Alexander I, however, was a staunch advocate of stability and the divine right of monarchs.

In 1814, a clandestine organization of Greek exiles called *Filiki Eteria* (“Friendly Society”) was established in Odessa, Russia. The society promoted Greek independence and claimed to have the support of the Russian government. Its leader, Alexander Ypsilantis, was in fact a Russian general and an adjutant to the czar. In February 1821, Ypsilantis and a small band of conspirators crossed into Moldavia and raised the banner of independence, claiming they had the support of “a Great Power.”

Alexander I quickly disavowed Ypsilantis though, and the Ottomans crushed the rebellion in the Danubian Provinces. A revolt in the Peloponnese and rebellions in central Greece met with greater success; however, revolutionary activity remained fragmented, and the Ottomans, with assistance from their vassal state of Egypt, soon threatened to drown the revolt in blood. The Russian foreign minister, Iannos Kapodistrias, now demanded that Alexander intervene to liberate Greece. The czar, who considered himself protector of the Orthodox Church, sent an ultimatum to the Porte on July 27, 1821, but stood down when the Ottomans agreed to make concessions.

The continuing fight for Greek independence soon became a cause célèbre in Europe, and to a degree in Russia. Russian intellectuals greatly admired classical Byzantine, and felt they shared not only a religious but also a cultural bond with the Greeks. Moreover, Russia did not want to lag behind Britain and France in the Greek war of independence; Russia was interested in expanding its influence in the Balkans and on the Black Sea. When Alexander I died in 1825, his successor, Nicholas I, adopted a more aggressive policy and delivered a new ultimatum to the Ottoman sultan. In the Akkerman Convention of October 1826,

the Ottomans agreed to evacuate the Danubian Principalities and grant autonomy to Serbia.

In April 1826, however, Nicholas had signed the St. Petersburg Convention with Great Britain, in which both powers agreed to pursue autonomy for Greece. The Treaty of London signed in July formalized this agreement, provided for military measures should the Porte refuse mediation, and brought France in as an ally. When the sultan duly rejected the Western powers’ interference, the three allies sent their forces into the Black Sea to interdict Ottoman shipping. On October 20, 1827, the allied fleet destroyed a combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in the Battle of Navarino. Furious at what they perceived as Russian treachery, the Ottomans now repudiated the Akkerman Convention.

In the ensuing Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829), a combat force of some 100,000 men under the command of Nicholas I invaded Bulgaria, the Caucasus, and northeastern Anatolia. A second force under Prince Peter Wittgenstein occupied the Danubian Principalities. After a successful siege at Varna, however, winter and the Ottomans’ interdiction of supply forced a retreat. Nicholas returned to St. Petersburg and replaced Wittgenstein with General Hans Karl von Diebitsch. Diebitsch repulsed an Ottoman relief effort at Varna in May, and the following month, took the key fortress of Silistra. In July, he launched an offensive that brought Russian troops within sight of Constantinople and forced the Ottomans to sue for peace.

The Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) consolidated the Russian position in Eastern Europe. It was master of eastern shore of the Black Sea, and the Sultan conceded Russian sovereignty over Georgia. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus were opened to Russian ships, and on condition of

paying tribute, the sultan recognized the independence of Greece in 1830. Kapodistrias served as the first head of the new Greek state, but was assassinated in 1831. Thereafter, Greece became a monarchy at the insistence of European powers.

*Patit Paban Mishra and
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See also: Adrianople (Edirne), Treaty of (1829); Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Holy Alliance (1815); Navarino Bay, Battle of (October 20, 1827); Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856); Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815); Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

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Grigorovich, Ivan Konstantinovich (1853–1930)

Russian navy admiral. Born in St. Petersburg on February 7, 1853, Ivan Konstantinovich Grigorovich graduated from the Russian Naval School as a midshipman in 1875. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1879 and to captain second rank in 1890. He served as a naval attaché in Britain in 1896–1898. In 1899, as a captain first rank, he was appointed to command the battleship *Tsesarevich*, then under construction in Toulon, France, and upon its completion, brought it to Port Arthur, two months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). When Japanese torpedo

boats launched a surprise attack on the ships anchored outside Port Arthur on the night of February 8–9, 1904, the *Tsesarevich* was damaged and had to be grounded to prevent its sinking.

While his ship was under repair, Grigorovich was appointed commander of the port of Port Arthur with a promotion to rear admiral. There he proved his administrative abilities, and after the war, he rapidly ascended through a series of increasingly responsible positions: chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet (1905–1906), commander of the port of Libau (1906–1908), and commander of the port of Kronstadt (1908–1909). Promoted to vice admiral in 1909, he was appointed deputy naval minister, responsible for the economic and technical departments of the ministry. This post gave Grigorovich opportunity to evaluate many aspects of the navy's shipbuilding and armaments plants. It also introduced him to the treacherous world of ministerial politics, where factions vied for influence and high-ranking officers sought to use their connections with the czar to advance their own agendas.

Grigorovich's experience as deputy naval minister proved invaluable, and he was appointed naval minister on April 1, 1911. Thanks to his administrative and political skills, he managed to avoid the worst of the bureaucratic infighting while completely re-vamping the Naval Ministry's hierarchy and replacing ineffective managers. He was promoted to admiral on October 10, 1911.

In addition to revitalizing the ministry's administration, Grigorovich set about winning the support of the elected legislature, the State Duma, for increased naval spending. In particular, he made use of the energetic young officers of the Naval General Staff both in developing construction programs and in lobbying the Duma's representatives. In June 1912, the Duma approved



Ivan Konstantinovich Grigorovich was minister of the Russian Navy from 1911 until the revolution in 1917. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

an enormous program of naval construction (the so-called Large Naval Program) that would add 4 battlecruisers, 6 light cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 18 submarines, complete with the shore facilities necessary to support them.

Unfortunately, events overtook this program; by the outbreak of war, none of the ships had been completed. At the same time, Grigorovich's position was fundamentally altered. In peacetime, the naval minister was the operational head of the navy, but in August 1914, the Black Sea Fleet was placed under the direct command of *Stavka* (the Russian Army High Command), while the Baltic Fleet was under the authority of the Sixth Army. These changes turned the Naval Ministry into a purely administrative institution. Nevertheless, Grigorovich worked energetically to support the fighting fleets.

Throughout his tenure, Grigorovich had managed to retain the czar's support while gaining the respect of many of the

opposition's political leaders. He was considered for the post of prime minister in the autumn of 1916 but did not get the position.

After the March 1917 Revolution, the Provisional Government retired Grigorovich on April 4, 1917, and Aleksandr I. Guchkov became minister of war and the navy. After the war, Grigorovich found himself a member of the historical commission studying the lessons of the naval war. In poor health, in 1924, he was allowed to leave Soviet Russia to seek medical treatment in France, where he supported himself by selling paintings, a longtime hobby. He died in Menton, France, on March 3, 1930.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: Guchkov, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1862–1936); Navy, Russian (1991–); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918)

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Grizhodubova, Valentina (1910–1993)

Valentina Grizhodubova was an aviation pioneer and a celebrated Soviet pilot during World War II. She was born in Kharkiv (Kharkov), Ukraine (then part of the Russian Empire), in 1910. As a child, she received a liberal education and was trained as a pianist

and linguist. She was exposed to flying from a young age, as her father was an inventor and developed flying machines. At the age of 19, she completed the course of study for flying at the Penza Flying Club, after which she gained admittance to more prestigious flight schools, including Tula Advanced Flying School, where upon graduation in 1933 she became an instructor. She gained additional flying experience through employment with the Maxim Gorky Escadrille.

She flew courageously in pursuit of aviation records for altitude, speed, and distance. In recognition of her world-record-setting 1938 flight from Moscow to the Far East, Grizhodbova was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union honor, along with copilot Polina Osipenko and navigator Marina Raskova (the first female Soviet navigator and navigational instructor). During the landmark 1938 flight, the groundbreaking female trio ran into foul weather and experienced faulty instrumentation. Raskova parachuted out over Siberia and, remarkably, nonetheless returned home safely to a hero's welcome, along with Grizhodbova and Osipenko. The three women received honors from the Soviet state and were feted by Stalin at the Kremlin. The Soviet public embraced Grizhodbova, saluting her courage. She was a respected leader within Soviet aviation and significantly raised the profile of women in the military.

During World War II, she was the commander of the 101st Long-Range Air Regiment, an otherwise all-male aviation wing. In November 1942, Grizhodbova was appointed as the only woman to a commission of 10 members whose mission was to investigate Nazi war crimes in the Soviet Union. In 1944, she became chief of flight testing within the Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation. She died in Moscow in 1993.

Jennifer Daley

See also: Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991), Women in; Litviak, Lidiia (Lilia or Liliia) Vladimirovna (1921–1943)

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Gross-Jaegersdorf, Battle of (August 30, 1757)

The Battle of Gross-Jaegersdorf was the result of Russia's first major offensive into East Prussia during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), and changed the perceptions that Prussian King Frederick II (the Great) had of the Russian army.

The Battle of Gross-Jaegersdorf was a daylong fight between the Russian army of 55,000 commanded by Field Marshal Stepan F. Apraksin and the Prussian army of 24,000 commanded by Field Marshall Hans Lehwaldt on August 30, 1757. The Russian army began its slow and unorganized advance toward East Prussia intending to march on the capital of Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Plagued with supply problems and poor discipline, the foraging of Field Marshal Apraksin's army soon turned into

looting and vandalism. King Frederick II viewed the Russian army as nothing but a heap of barbarians and was confident that any well-disciplined troops would make short work of them.

Under orders from Frederick to seize the initiative, attack, and defeat the Russian army at first opportunity, Field Marshal Lehwaldt's experienced Prussian army engaged the unprepared Russians just east of the Prussian village of Gross-Jaegersdorf. Outnumbered 2–1, the Prussians attacked the Russian northern and southern flanks with cavalry, while the Prussian infantry tried to take advantage of the confusion and attacked the Russian center. Field Marshal Apraksin and his inexperienced commanders struggled to form the scattered Russian army into a coherent defense.

The Prussian threat to break through the thin Russian center was defeated when General Pyotr A. Rumiantsev, who would become one of Russia's best commanders under Catherine the Great, rallied the Russian regiments in the center and cleared away the Prussian infantry. The weight of the Russian numbers and the firepower of the reformed Russian artillery forced the Prussians into retreat; the small Prussian army, responsible for defending all of East Prussia, could not afford more losses. Both sides ended the day bloodied; the Prussian army lost 4,500 men and the Russians lost 6,000 men.

Even though the Russian victory was costly, the opportunity to take Königsberg was also lost. The retreat of the Prussian army left the road to the East Prussian capital clear, but shocked by the battle, Field Marshal Apraksin halted the Russian advance and withdrew to winter quarters. The Prussians, however, gained a new respect for the Russian capacity to withstand assaults and

for the deadly effectiveness of their artillery. That respect was reinforced in the battles at Zorndorf and Kunersdorf.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Apraksin, Stepan F. (1702–1758); Kunersdorf, Battle of (August 12, 1759); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Seven Years' War (1754–1763); Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

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Grozny, Battle of (December 1994–January 1995)

Major engagement in the First Chechen War, during the Russian invasion of Chechnya.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev led a movement to establish an independent Chechen state. To prevent this, Russian president Boris Yeltsin ordered troops into Chechnya on December 11, 1994, following a failed attack by Russian-supported opponents of the separatist movement in Grozny, the Chechen capital. About 38,000 Russian soldiers commanded by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev surrounded the city from three sides, carrying out diversionary maneuvers and taking high ground around the city to ensure steady communications. About 12,000 well-armed Chechen fighters defended the city.



Chechen fighters move through the rubble near the presidential palace in Grozny, January 1995. (AP Photo/David Brauchli)

Attempting to replicate the Soviet success in Hungary during 1956, Grachev planned a quick strike to capture the Presidential Palace, the heart of Chechen resistance, on January 1. According to this plan, Russian troops would clear Chechen fighters from the city by January 6.

The operation began on New Year's Eve, 1994; it was a disaster. Russian troops were poorly trained and grossly unprepared for urban combat, and Russian commanders dramatically underestimated the scale and spirit of the Chechen resistance. Hastily assembled units were poorly coordinated, and the strikes from the east and west did not enter the city. Some commanders refused orders to advance due to a lack of support, and bad weather prevented Russian air support from influencing the battle for days.

The main attack, from the north, entered the city but was surrounded by Chechen fighters and took heavy casualties. Isolated,

unsupported, and unprotected by infantry, the armored column was easy pickings for Chechen fighters firing antitank rockets from basements and the upper stories of buildings. Chechen fighters trapped the leading elements of the column (the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade [MRB] and 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment) at the central railway station. By January 3, these units had taken heavy losses, the bulk of the Russian casualties. The 131st MRB alone lost nearly 80 percent of its men and 122 of its 146 armored vehicles.

Russian forces then withdrew from the city and commenced a long, building-by-building battle to clear the city, making extensive use of rocket-launched flamethrowers to flush out Chechen fighters. Artillery bombardment destroyed much of the city. Both sides ignored a Russian-announced two-day cease-fire and accused each other of human rights violations.

By January 15, Russian troops had finally encircled the city, preventing escape and re-supply of the remaining Chechen fighters holding out in the city center. Russian troops captured the Presidential Palace on January 19 and handed control of the city to the Ministry of the Interior on January 26. Paramilitary police units rooted out the last separatist fighters by February 26. Separatist forces retreated to the mountains and carried out a guerrilla war. They retook the city in August 1996.

Jason Tasharski

See also: Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Dudayev, Dzhokhar M. (1944–1996); Grachev, Pavel (1948–2012); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Guards Units. *See* Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918)

Guchkov, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1862–1936)

Russian soldier, businessman, and politician. Born on October 14, 1862, in Moscow, to a prominent family, Aleksandr Ivanovich Guchkov graduated from Moscow University and also attended Berlin University. He thereafter took over and improved an already lucrative family business and also traveled extensively. Guchkov had a lifelong interest in military adventure, and he fought as a volunteer on the Boer side during the 1899–1902 South African (Second Boer) War, where he was wounded and captured. After his release, he returned to Moscow via Beijing, where he participated in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (Uprising) of 1899–1901. During the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Guchkov organized the Russian Red Cross, which ran the Russian Army’s medical service. He was again captured, this time by the Japanese.

During the Russian Revolution of 1905, Guchkov led the conservative opposition to Czar Nicholas II. Guchkov was the founder and leader of the conservative party called Union of October 17, known as the Octobrists (*Oktyabristy*), which favored a strong central government and strong defenses. Solidly pro-Russian nationalist in outlook, it also favored industrialization along 19th-century classical liberal lines. In 1906, Guchkov formed an alliance with Prime Minister Pyotr A. Stolypin to try to modernize Russia.

Guchkov supported Nicholas II’s harsh repression of revolutionaries and peasant rebellions. Elected to the Third Duma (1907–1912), of which he became president in 1910, Guchkov helped secure passage of Stolypin’s agrarian reform measures. He also chaired the National Defense Committee of the Duma, which urged the

modernization of the Russian military. In 1909, he resigned from the Duma. He failed to win election to the Fourth Duma, but was elected to the State Council (upper house of Parliament).

Prior to World War I, Guchkov broke with the czar regarding the influence of Grigori Rasputin, the royal family's close advisor. A lifelong monarchist, Guchkov gradually came to the conclusion that the czar was the worst obstacle to the continuation of monarchical rule in Russia. When World War I began in August 1914, Guchkov first headed Russia's Red Cross and then the Central War Industries Committee to increase production and improve the distribution of war goods. He eventually became convinced that only a palace coup could save the war effort and the monarchy.

Guchkov was involved in planning such an event when the February 1917 revolution occurred. After the revolution's success, Guchkov was one of two delegates sent to Pskov to secure the czar's abdication.

Guchkov became the first minister of war in the new Provisional Government, but he resigned following antiwar demonstrations that spring. After the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Guchkov went abroad, first to Berlin and then to Paris, where he became involved in various anti-Soviet activities, including sabotage and assassinations. Guchkov died in Paris on February 14, 1936.

Michael Share

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Revolution of 1905; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Gulf of Riga, Battle of the

Naval battle in the Baltic Sea between the German and Russian navies. The Germans sought to defeat the Russian fleet, lay mines, and gain control of the Gulf of Riga. The operation was ultimately unsuccessful.

The naval base of Riga's importance as a port and supply center made it critical to the Russian war effort during World War I, and it was therefore an early German objective. Seaborne access to the Gulf of Riga was limited; ships could enter only via Moon Sound and the Strait of Irben. The Russians heavily mined both approaches.

The German attack force consisted of eight modern battleships, three battle cruisers, and supporting destroyers and minesweepers. The Russian defenses centered around the pre-dreadnought battleship *Slava*, supported by 20–30 destroyers, gunboats, and a minelayer, as well as Russian naval aviation based in Riga.

The Germans began their offensive on August 8, 1915, sending minesweepers to clear the Irben Strait. The *Slava* opened fire on the German battleships supporting the attack, but the results were inconclusive, with neither side doing much damage. The dense minefields, however, delayed the German effort. Additionally, mines sunk two minesweepers and a destroyer, and damaged a German cruiser.

On August 16, the Germans again attempted to force the Irben Strait, with two battleships

in support of a minesweeping flotilla. Although another minesweeper hit a mine and sank, the German battleships' heavy guns neutralized the *Slava's* fire. That night, two German destroyers slipped through the minefield and attempted to torpedo the *Slava*. The attack failed to do significant damage, and a German destroyer was sunk. The next day, the Germans widened the cleared passage through the mines and attacked the *Slava* with two battleships, scoring several hits with their main guns. The *Slava* withdrew north, toward Moon Sound.

The Germans pressed their advantage, sending more light ships into the Gulf of Riga to attack Russian shipping. Russian mines continued to claim victims, however, and another German minesweeper was lost. Royal Navy submarines operating in the Baltic in support of the Russians torpedoed the German battle cruiser *Moltke*, but the damage was slight. The German High Command subsequently ordered its forces to withdraw, considering the operation too costly. Riga remained in Russian hands until September 1917.

Tim Wilson

See also: Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Riga, Battle of (September 1–3, 1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Guliai-gorod (gulyaygorod, gulay-gorod, or gulai-gorod)

Defensive construction used by Russian forces from the 15th to the 18th century.

The term *guliai-gorod* translates roughly as “wandering city.” Though the phrase is often used to denote any mobile fortification, a proper *guliai-gorod* generally consisted of a series of walls constructed with logs 1 to 2 meters in height and mounted on wheels, carts, or sleds. The walls, each about 2 meters wide, were linked with ropes or chains, leaving enough space between the walls for archers or (later) musketeers to fire through them. Often firing slits would be cut in the walls themselves.

Smaller versions were created later that resembled a turtle and provided cover for a company or squad. While most often deployed as a defensive structure, the flexibility and mobility of the smaller versions of the *guliai-gorod* also allowed soldiers to use it to approach fortresses during a siege, or as a wedge to break through enemy formations during battle.

The *guliai-gorod* thus shared some characteristics of the “Wagenburg,” or “wagon fort” formation (roughly equivalent to “circling the wagons” for defense) and the Cossack “*tabor*” (a formation of sleds used as a temporary shield) but was cheaper, more flexible, and more mobile than either. A *guliai-gorod* could consist of two simple walls or, as at the Serpukhov Gate during the siege of Moscow in 1607–1608, form an entire defensive line. The advent of field artillery rendered the *guliai-gorod* obsolete.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Gentry Cavalry; *Streltsy*

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Gumbinnen, Battle of (August 20, 1914)

Early World War I battle between the Russians and Germans in East Prussia. The German war plan called for the main German military effort to occur in the West against France, while the Eighth Army held East Prussia against the Russians. Eighth Army commander Colonel General Maximilian von Prittwitz und Gaffron had at his disposal only 13 divisions, mostly reservists and garrison troops, but many of these were assigned to the defense of East Prussia's fortress cities. Prittwitz's orders called for him to defend in place in the unlikely event of a Russian attack. If necessary, he was empowered to withdraw his army all the way behind the Vistula River.

Prittwitz was cautious to a fault. Fortunately for the Germans, the leaders of the two Russian armies now invading East Prussia were as well. Slow to move and bitter rivals, they failed to coordinate their movements. General Pavel Rennenkampf commanded the Russian First Army of some 11.5 divisions, while General Aleksandr Samsonov commanded the Russian Second Army that had 12 divisions. In their drive west, the two Russian armies were separated by the geographical barrier of the Masurian Lakes, Rennenkampf to the north and Samsonov to the south.

At dawn on August 17, Rennenkampf's northern force crossed the border, its objective being the fortified city of Königsberg (Kaliningrad) to the west. General of Infantry Hermann von François's I Army Corps

blocked the Russian advance. In defiance of Prittwitz's orders to fall back on Gumbinnen where the Germans had set up defensive positions, François rashly attacked three Russian corps at Stallupönen. The battle was a draw, and Prittwitz reluctantly decided to commit the rest of the Eighth Army to another effort east of the Angerapp River at Gumbinnen.

The battle began with François shifting the 2nd Division to his left (northern) flank and pushing back the Russian XX Corps. Eventually, the Russian 28th Division shattered under German pressure, but not before fighting stoutly for the entire morning. François's other units also ran into stubborn Russian resistance that took advantage of local village buildings for their defense. By noon, the Germans had severely tested the Russian northern flank, but they had also run out of steam.

The German success on their left was counterbalanced by setbacks suffered by the rest of the Eighth Army's attacks. General of Cavalry August von Mackensen's XVII Army Corps was to support François's assault, but had to conduct a 15-mile march to get into position. Mackensen ordered his corps into battle with little knowledge of the Russian positions.

Russian lieutenant general Yepanchin's III Corps had skillfully established its positions and planned its artillery fire prior to the German assault. The German 35th and 36th Divisions were hard-hit by the Russian fire, and both German divisions fell back with heavy casualties. On Mackensen's right, General Otto von Below's German I Reserve Corps later advanced in its own attack. Although less costly than that by XVII Army Corps, the I Reserve Corps assault was also brought to a standstill. The battle ended with slight tactical advantages for the Germans in the north and similar success for the Russians in the center and south. In the battle,

the Russians sustained some 16,500 total casualties, the Germans nearly as many: 8,800 killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners.

Although the Battle of Gumbinnen lacked a decisive result, it had a major effect on the rest of the fall 1914 campaign in East Prussia. *Rennenkampf* now paused to regroup, while *Prittwitz* overreacted. He had no idea where *Samsonov's* army was and believed that *Rennenkampf* would press home the advantage. Against the advice of his staff, *Prittwitz* ordered a withdrawal to the Vistula River. When so informed, chief of the German General Staff Colonel General *Helmuth von Moltke* flew into a rage, ordered the withdrawal stopped, and replaced *Prittwitz* and his chief of staff Major General *Ernst Grünert* (who, however, had disagreed with *Prittwitz*), replacing them with a new command team of Colonel General *Paul von Hindenburg* and Major General *Erich Ludendorff*. The new commanders in the east promptly endorsed a plan, previously drawn up by *Prittwitz's* operations officer Lieutenant Colonel *Maximilian Hoffmann* to shift the main effort toward the Russian Second Army to the south, resulting in the catastrophic Russian defeat in the Battle of Tannenberg.

Curtis S. King

See also: *Rennenkampf*, *Pavel Karlovich* (1854–1918); *Samsonov*, *Aleksandr Vasilievich* (1859–1914); *Stallupönen*, Battle of (August 17, 1914); *Tannenberg*, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Gurko, Iosif Vladimirovich (1829–1901)

Iosif Gurko was born in *Veliky Novgorod* on July 16, 1828, and was educated in the Imperial Corps of Pages. He joined the hussars of the Imperial Guard in 1846, and was promoted to captain in 1857. Gurko served as an adjutant to Czar *Alexander II* during 1860, and was promoted to colonel in 1861. Gurko participated in the suppression of the Polish Rising of 1863 and was appointed to command a hussar regiment in 1866. He joined the imperial suite as a major general in 1867, and commanded various units of the Imperial Guard during 1868–1873.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, he held a field command and distinguished himself by leading the successful captures of *Tarnovo*, *Ufani*, and *Shipka*. After only two weeks, his Russian advance force had secured passage through the Balkan Mountains and was threatening Constantinople.

In October 1877, Gurko was given command of the allied cavalry force in the Balkans; he captured several towns, cut communications to *Plevna*, and successfully sieged that city before defeating the Ottomans at *Philippopolis* and occupying *Sofia*. Gurko's success played a large role in bringing the war to a successful conclusion for Russia. Gurko was made a count and, in 1879, appointed governor of *St. Petersburg*. During 1883–1894, he served as the governor general of Poland and carried out Czar *Alexander III's* strict policies of Russification. Gurko died in *Tver* on January 15, 1901.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: *Alexander II*, Czar (1818–1881); *Alexander III*, Czar (1845–1894); *Gurko*, *Vasily Iosifovich* (1864–1937); *Plevna*, Siege of (July 20–December 10, 1877); Polish Rising (1863); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)

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Gurko, Vasily Iosifovich (1864–1937)

Russian army general. Born on May 8, 1864, Vasily Iosifovich Gurko was the son of Field Marshal Iosif Gurko, a hero of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. The younger Gurko graduated from the Corps of Pages in 1885 and the General Staff Academy in 1892. Gurko was a Russian observer during the South African War (Second Boer War) of 1899–1902, and he served in several headquarters positions and also commanded a Cossack brigade in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Beginning in 1906, he chaired the commission studying the lessons of that conflict. In 1911, he took command of the 1st Cavalry Division, which position he held at the outbreak of World War I in August 1914.

Gurko's rise during the war was swift. He led the 1st Cavalry Division as part of General Pavel Rennenkampf's First Army during the Battle of Tannenberg (August 26–31, 1914) and in the Battle of Lodz (November 11–December 6, 1914). His aggressive leadership led to command of the VI Corps under the Russian Second Army. After the unsuccessful German attack at Bolimów (January 31, 1915) that saw the first use of poison gas on the Eastern Front, Gurko led a counterattack that regained some ground but at heavy cost. In the autumn of 1916, Gurko

received command of the elite Guards Army, which had been decimated in the Kovel Offensive of July–October 1916. He worked hard to restore its capabilities before being elevated temporarily to chief of staff to the commander in chief, Czar Nicholas II, in November 1916, replacing the ailing General Mikhail V. Alekseev.

Soon after the Russian Revolution of March 1917, Gurko left the chief of staff position and became commander of the Western Front. He disagreed with plans for the Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917), however, and was demoted in May 1917. He went into exile that September, on the cusp of the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Gurko went to Italy, where he died on November 11, 1937.

Curtis S. King

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Gurko, Iosif Vladimirovich (1829–1901); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kovel Offensive (July 28–October 1916); Lodz, Battle of (November 11–December 6, 1914); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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H

Hero Cities of the Soviet Union

On May 8, 1967, the Grave of the Unknown Soldier was unveiled in Alexandrovsky Garden, near the Kremlin, in Moscow, Russia. The inscription read: “Your name is unknown, your deeds immortal.”

Along the Kremlin wall, not far from the Grave of the Unknown Soldier, are 13 memorials that contain the “sacred earth” from the Hero Cities of the Soviet Union. These are the cities where men, women, and children, military and civilians, professors, and factory workers sacrificed their lives during World War II, known in the Soviet Union as The Great Patriotic War. Citizens and soldiers of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, Kiev, Moscow, Kerch, Novorossiysk, Minsk, Tula, Murmansk, Smolensk, and the fortress at Brest fought and ultimately defeated the invading German army after intense battles and great suffering. While the German invasion affected virtually the entire population of the USSR and left some 26 million soldiers dead (with perhaps an equal or greater number of civilian casualties), the struggles and deeds of the populations of these dozen cities stand out even amid the horror and devastation of World War II. For that reason, these cities were designated as “Hero Cities.”

The Presidium of the Soviet Union awarded each city a gold star medallion, the Order of Lenin, and a certificate denoting the heroic deeds carried out there. In addition to the honorary title, each city received a memorial obelisk to its fallen heroes. Though the term was in use within the

Soviet Union as early as 1942, the first official mention of “Hero Cities” came in 1945; on May 1 of that year, Josef Stalin issued Supreme Commander Order No. 20, calling for salutes to be fired in honor of the “Hero Cities” of Leningrad (St. Petersburg), Stalingrad, Odessa, and Sevastopol. The term was applied to Kiev on June 22, 1961; Kerch and Novorossiysk were honored in 1973, with Minsk (1974), Tula (1976), and Murmansk and Smolensk (1985) following. The award was officially discontinued in 1988, but in 2005, the Russian Federation introduced the title of “City of Military Glory” to continue the tradition, and nominated several cities where particularly fierce battles took place during World War II, including Orel, Voronezh, and Viazma.

The *Defense of Brest* was a triumph for 7,000 Soviet soldiers who defended the Brest Fortress from June 1941 to August 1941 even though they were heavily outnumbered by German forces. Located on the border established between Germany and the USSR in 1939, the city and fortress were among the earliest points attacked in the German invasion. Despite having little warning or preparation, the defenders fought valiantly long after the German Blitzkrieg had left them isolated behind the front lines.

The *Battle of Kerch* commenced in November 1941. German and Romanian forces captured the city on December 30, 1941. Soviet partisans hid in the cliffs above the city and carried out guerrilla actions for almost three years. Kerch changed hands several times before it was liberated on April 11,

1944, and the city was destroyed almost completely.

The *Battle of Kiev* was a devastating defeat for the Soviets. The city was encircled from August 23 to September 26, 1941. Ordered to stand fast, the Red Army suffered over 700,000 casualties; thousands of civilians volunteered to help in the city's defense. The Germans held Kiev until May 1943; during the occupation, they executed thousands of citizens and deported thousands more to concentration camps.

The *Siege of Leningrad (St. Petersburg)*, lasted from September 8, 1941, to January 27, 1944. Over 1 million civilians and 300,000 soldiers died. There was hardly any food; people ate tree bark, animals, and, in some cases, the bodies of the dead. After weeks and months of hunger and exposure, many people simply stayed in their beds and froze to death.

Others, however, endured and survived. One survivor remembers that after a sugar warehouse was bombed and burned to the ground, people went there to dig up the earth because it was sweet. Despite these desperate times, many survivors remember that "These were years of great hope and faith. We wished first and foremost to defend our city and our country."

The *Battle of Minsk* was a resounding defeat for the Red Army. They had over 300,000 soldiers taken prisoner. During the occupation, German troops killed an estimated 400,000 civilians.

The *Battle of Moscow* took place between October 1941 and January 1942. The Germans desperately wanted to capture the Russian capital, but the Red Army prevented their advance during a fierce winter. This was a much-needed boost for Soviet morale.

The *Battle of Murmansk* began on June 29, 1941, and ended with Germany's defeat in October. By successfully defending this

northern port, the Soviets kept open a key supply line.

During the *Battle of Novorossiysk* in August 1942, Germany was unable to capture the entire city due to sustained resistance by Soviet troops. By clinging to the eastern portions of this Black Sea port, the Soviets prevented the Germans from using it to supply their forces inland.

The *Battle of Odessa* lasted from August 8, 1941, to October 16, 1941, before the city was finally occupied by Romanian (Axis) forces. The occupation lasted until April 10, 1944, when Odessa was recaptured by the Soviet army. During the years of occupation, thousands of Jewish citizens of Odessa were murdered or deported. Between October 22 and October 24, 1943 alone, some 20,000 Jews were executed.

The *Battle of Sevastopol* began on October 30, 1941. The city was under constant bombardment for nearly 250 days. Soldiers from the Red Army and sailors from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet fought valiantly. The Axis prevailed on July 4, 1942, and held the city until May 1944.

The *Battle of Smolensk* was a major defeat for the Red Army. Over 300,000 soldiers were killed or taken prisoner when this key city on the path to Moscow surrendered after holding out from July 10, 1941, until early August.

The *Battle of Stalingrad (Volgograd)* is considered one of the bloodiest battles in human history. Fighting went from street to street and house to house. From August 21, 1942, to February 21, 1943, over 1.5 million lives were lost. Although the Soviets suffered massive losses, they emerged victorious, destroying the German Sixth Army. The Germans were forced to retreat while the Soviet Red Army advanced into Berlin where they became a major influence in Eastern Europe from the end of the Cold War until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The *Battle of Tula* began on October 24, 1941 and lasted until December 5. Tula would have been an important victory for Germany because of its close proximity to Moscow. The Red Army held its ground, however, and secured Moscow's southern flank in its desperate battle against the Germans that winter.

John G. Hall

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Holocaust in the Soviet Union

The systematic massacre of over 3.5 million Soviet Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II on the Eastern Front. Most of the killings were carried out by SS *Einsatzgruppen* by shooting or use of carbon monoxide gas vans, between the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the end of 1942.

The mass murder of Soviet Jews and other inhabitants of the occupied areas of

the USSR grew out of basic Nazi ideology concerning the racial superiority of the German people, and the obsessive racialist anti-Semitism of the National Socialist leader, Adolf Hitler. Hitler and his lieutenants, particularly *Reichsführer SS* Heinrich Himmler, saw Communist rule in the Soviet Union and the power of international Jewry as inextricably linked. In addition, the Nazis blamed "the Jews" for the domestic collapse that hastened Germany's defeat in World War I. Hitler's worldview centered on history as a struggle between the races in which the Jews, as Germany's mortal enemies, would destroy the German people unless Germany eliminated them first. Reinforcing Hitler's paranoid image of an international Jewish conspiracy seeking to destroy the German "Volk," was his fixation on the German people's need for *Lebensraum* ("living space") in the east—space that could only be attained if Communist Russia and the Jews were destroyed.

The development of the European war between 1939 and 1941 also strengthened Hitler's urge toward war with the Soviet Union. Germany had scored spectacular victories in Poland in September 1939, and over France and the Low Countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) in the spring of 1940. Great Britain, however, continued to resist despite being forced off the continent and facing Germany virtually alone. Despite Germany's dominance over Europe and the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, which assured Soviet neutrality and material support, Hitler feared that Britain, backed by increasing financial and military aid from the United States would only get stronger. In addition, Germany would become more dependent on Soviet food and raw materials and would have to face a more formidable Red Army. Behind this threat of encirclement lay the sinister hand of the Jews, who



Prisoners in one of the first concentration camps established by the Germans in Soviet territory, July 1941. (Mondadori/Getty Images)

Hitler saw as controlling Britain, the United States, and the USSR.

It was in this strategic and ideological context that Hitler decided in July 1940 to invade the Soviet Union the following spring. Hitler believed a lightning campaign in which the German *Wehrmacht* would overrun the key industrial and resource areas of the western USSR and seize Moscow and Leningrad would cause the Communist system to collapse, leaving a victorious Germany in control of the entire Eurasian landmass. With Russia eliminated, Britain would be forced to make peace, Germany would have its “living space” in the east; Hitler then would be in a position to challenge the United States for global supremacy. For Hitler, war with the Soviet Union would also be a genocidal, racial, and ideological fight to the death. Mass killings of Jews and communists would be a natural outgrowth of this war. The extermination of the Soviet Jews

and the destruction of Soviet power were inseparable.

Although the decision for mass extermination of all of European Jews had not yet been taken, German planners integrated the mass murder of Jews in the occupied Soviet territories into the invasion of the USSR (Operation BARBAROSSA) from the start. They initially justified these steps as part of the overall campaign to destroy Soviet resistance and further hasten the collapse of the Soviet system. The security of the rear areas, particularly, countering the threat from partisans, would be the primary reason for the killings. A memo from OKW (*Oberkommando Wehrmacht*, the High Command of the *Wehrmacht*) issued in March 1941 empowered Heinrich Himmler, *Reichsführer SS* and chief of the German police, to carry out “special tasks” in the German rear areas without interference from the German army or German civilian authorities. To

implement this directive, SS General Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler's chief deputy and head of the German Main Security Office (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*) and representatives of the German army negotiated an agreement spelling out responsibilities for the occupied Soviet lands. This agreement, signed on April 28, 1941, left rear area security entirely with the SS and permitted "special detachments" (*Einsatzgruppen*) to carry out Himmler's orders.

The *Einsatzgruppen* consisted of four main detachments, with one assigned to each of the invading army groups and the fourth "sweeping" the southern flank: Group "A," attached to Army Group North covered the region around Leningrad and the Baltic States; Group "B" was attached to Army Group Center and was responsible for Belorussia and the Smolensk/Moscow region; Group "C" was assigned to Army Group South and had jurisdiction over the Ukraine; and Group "D" covered extreme Southern Russia, the Crimea, and the Caucasus and followed the Eleventh Army. They totaled close to 3,000 men at the outset of the campaign. Each group was subdivided into two or more *Kommandos*, which operated independently so they could move over larger areas faster. Heydrich handpicked the members of these groups, and their commanders from the German Security Service (the *Sicherheitsdienst*, or SD), Gestapo, concentration camp staff, and other Nazi security organizations. Numerous battalions of the Order Police, Reserve Police, and German Army Field Police were also available.

The security measures for the *Einsatzgruppen* were spelled out in a series of special orders issued shortly before and during the early stages of BARBAROSSA. The "Commissar Decree" issued on June 6, 1941, ordered the immediate identification, separation, and execution of all captured

Red Army political officers (commissars). On June 16, Heydrich signed an order instructing his *Einsatzgruppe* commanders to encourage local anti-Semites in German-occupied areas to undertake *pogroms* (mass lynchings), and to separate and kill any Jews they found. In addition, he ordered that all Jewish prisoners of war be executed. At first, the mandate for mass shootings applied only to military-age Jewish men. As the war continued into the autumn of 1941, however, and it became clear that BARBAROSSA would not succeed in crushing the Soviet Union as quickly as hoped, the demands on German resources and heightened security concerns in rear areas led the Nazi authorities to extend the killing orders to cover Jewish women and children as well.

Demographics facilitated German plans and heightened the danger in which the Soviet Jews found themselves. The vast majority of the 5 million Jews living in the USSR at the war's onset resided in the westernmost Soviet areas—those likeliest to be overrun and occupied by the invading Germans. Almost 2.4 million Jews lived in the Western Ukraine in cities such as Zhitomir, Kiev, and Kharkov, where Jewish communities had been fixtures for centuries. Some 850,000 either evacuated before the Germans arrived or were able to escape the Germans afterward. Of the remaining 1.5 million, most perished. Hundreds of locations witnessed large-scale mass executions numbering in the tens of thousands carried out by *Einsatzgruppe* "C" and "D" in the summer and fall of 1941. The largest of these occurred at Babi Yar outside of Kiev on September 29–30, 1941. The Germans (including units from *Einsatzgruppe* "B," the Waffen SS, and the German Army Field Police) and their Ukrainian accomplices shot some 33,000 Jewish men, women, and children. Likewise in Belorussia, *Einsatzgruppe* "B" systematically

murdered over 800,000 Belorussian and Polish Jews, mostly during 1941 and 1942.

The German army cooperated fully with the SS and also carried out wholesale killings of Jews in their combat areas, usually citing the threat of partisans as cause. In October 1941, the *Wehrmacht* shot over 8,000 Jews in the Minsk area. In Kharkov, during November and December 1941, the German Sixth Army, purportedly in reprisal for partisan attacks, rounded up every Jew they could find and shot or gassed all of them. At the end of 1941, the *Einsatzgruppen* commanders reported to Heydrich that nearly 500,000 Jews had been killed in territory the German army controlled.

News of these atrocities, along with the generally harsh treatment of Soviet civilians under German occupation, quickly reached the Kremlin. The Soviet regime's response was inconsistent and ineffective. Stalin and his henchmen were willing to use the killings to mobilize popular support at home and to appeal to Jews in the United States and Britain, as well as in the Soviet Union, to support the "Great Patriotic War." They did not, however, recognize the singularity of the Nazi campaign against the Jews; they viewed it simply as a part of the Nazi campaign against communism and increasingly portrayed communists as the main victims. The reports that emphasized Jewish suffering came almost exclusively during the war's first two years. By 1944 and 1945, as the Red Army retook German-occupied areas and overran Eastern Europe including many concentration camps, Soviet reports rarely singled out Jews as victims of the Nazis.

Nor did Moscow aid those millions of Jews trapped in the German rear. In 1941, thousands of Jews fled the advancing Germans and formed partisan bands (the best known and most active of these was formed by the

brothers Zus and Tuvia Bielski in Western Belorussia) in the forests and marshes of Belorussia, the Baltic states, and the Ukraine. Under-armed and often facing starvation, they endured considerable hardship and received no support from Soviet-controlled guerillas. Stalin, himself deeply anti-Semitic and suspicious of any independent partisan groups, forbade the providing of any material aid to Jewish partisans unless they submitted to Moscow's control. Those Jews in Soviet-controlled partisan units were often subject to attacks from their non-Jewish comrades. Non-Soviet, nationalist partisans in the Ukraine and the Baltic areas frequently attacked and murdered Jews. After the war, both Soviet and Western sources estimated that 90 percent of the prewar Soviet Jewish community had been destroyed.

By the commencement of BARBAROSSA, Hitler, leading SS and Nazi Party officials, the Army High Command, and top government figures all had accepted the notion that deliberate mass murder in the Soviet Union was necessary. As the war in the east continued, Nazi policies therefore became even more radical. The scale and brutality of the fighting radicalized Nazi Germany's genocidal intentions not only toward Soviet Jews but also toward the wider European Jewish community. In the context of the time and space of 1941 and 1942, the Soviet Union became ground zero for Hitler's "final solution"—the mass extermination of Europe's entire Jewish population.

Walter F. Bell

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); NKVD; Partisans (*Partizans*, Guerrillas), World War II; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes Soviet, World War II; World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Holy Alliance (1815)

Treaty signed by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in September 1815 to contain both liberalism and revolution in Europe.

After more than 25 years of war and revolution in France, Napoleon was defeated decisively at Waterloo in June 1815. The leaders of the powers allied against him—Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire—had already been meeting in Vienna to discuss the postwar settlement. Led by Prince Klemens von Metternich of Austria, the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe to create a balance of power that would be regulated by the Great Powers meeting at regular intervals.

Czar Alexander I of Russia, among others, found little comfort in this agreement, particularly after the events of the “100 Days,” when France welcomed back the defeated dictator. Before ascending to the throne in 1801, Alexander had a reputation as a liberal in Russia and he undertook several reforms in the early part of his reign. The events of the French Revolution, however, and

particularly his encounters with Napoleon Bonaparte and his works, soon revised that view. Already given to mysticism, Alexander became a political and social conservative in his later years, and sought to impose his views on Europe. He met with little direct success at the Congress of Vienna, but because Russia had entered the conflict late, and its armies occupying Paris were still fresh, suffering little in comparison to the other nations’ armed forces, he was not without influence.

The Holy Alliance was the resultant brainchild of Czar Alexander I. It was strategically formed in Paris on September 26, 1815 by Alexander I, Emperor Francis I of Austria, and King Frederick William III of Prussia. Alexander’s goal was to foster a coalition with the absolutist monarchies of Austria and Prussia that would counter and contain the forces of liberalism and revolution.

Alexander held a review of his Imperial Russian Army on September 10, 1815, to celebrate the final allied victory over Napoleonic France. On September 11, the feast day of St. Alexander Nevsky, 150,000 Russian soldiers celebrated mass with the czar outside Paris. Inspired, 15 days later, Alexander brought the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia together to sign the Holy Alliance. In the following months, most of the European states subscribed.

In the Holy Alliance, Alexander revived an idea for a European league of nations that he first outlined in 1804. He combined this with a vision of revived Christendom to form the Holy Alliance. The text itself was the work of Alexander. The treaty was comprised of three articles. The first was a pledge to govern in accordance with the tenets of the Christian faith; the second covered the pursuance of sovereign relations among one another in a spirit of Christian love; and

the third laid out an imperative to promote Christian teachings among their peoples.

The Holy Alliance was not so much Russia's attempt to form a world league as it was an effort to construct a solid basis of mutual understanding on a single continent. There was no concrete apparatus in place to enforce the document, and the treaty was scorned by diplomats, who perceived it as a utopian initiative that would have little lasting effect. Alexander's critics argued that the document served more as a representation of the emperor's retreat from liberalism and his withdrawal into mysticism than a diplomatic initiative. There were no apparent benefits for Russia to the alliance.

The treaty also reflected the return of conservative politics in Europe after the long struggle against revolutionary and imperial France. Liberals and nationalists despised the Holy Alliance as a symbol of the reactionary restoration. The King of Great Britain declined to sign it on constitutional grounds, as well as Pope Pius VII because he refused to treat with Protestant monarchs. The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire also declined signature.

The Holy Alliance nevertheless was a substantial addition to the sense of international responsibility that arose at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The treaty did have a direct bearing on the so-called Congress System that began in 1815, as its signatories usually agreed within that system. The Holy Alliance lasted until the end of Alexander's reign 10 years later.

Dustin Garlitz

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Nevsky, Alexander (1220–1263); Quadruple Alliance (November 20, 1815); Second Coalition, War of the (1798–1802); Third Coalition, War of the (1805); Tilsit, Treaty of; Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

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Holy League, Wars of the (1686–1696)

As a result of the Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1683, the Russian regent Sophia and her chief advisor, Prince Vasily V. Golitsyn reached an understanding with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In exchange for acknowledgement that Kiev and the Left-Bank Ukraine were Muscovite territory, Sophia agreed under the terms of the April 2, 1686, "Holy League" treaty to campaign against the Crimean Tatars and prevent them from aiding the Ottomans against the Commonwealth.

Golitsyn carried out two campaigns against Perekop. In 1687, he led five corps (some 113,000 men with another 20,000 support personnel), drawn from the military districts of Belogorod, Sevsk, Kazan, Novgorod, and Riazan, against the Tatars. Foreign formations (i.e., mercenaries or mercenary-trained and -led troops) comprised almost two-thirds of the force, though the corps commanders (A. S. Shein, V. D. Dolgoruky, M. G. Romodanovsky, L. R. Neplyev, and Golitsyn) were all Russians.

The Muscovite force departed Akhtyrka on May 2; on May 30, a force of 50,000 Cossack allies joined Golitsyn when he reached the Samara River. This joint force then proceeded south along the Dnieper River with seven infantry regiments as a vanguard and a supply train almost five kilometers long trailing. In mid-June, as the Muscovite army approached Konski Vody, the Tatars set fire to the dry steppe grasses. After pushing forward for three days, Golitsyn determined the venture was useless; his men were thirsty, his horses were dying, and his goal was over 200 kilometers away. He declared the campaign a success and returned to Moscow.

After ordering the construction of two fortress outposts on the Samara in 1688, Sophia and Golitsyn staged another attempt in 1689. Determined to get to the steppe before the grasses dried out, Golitsyn gathered 117,000 men and 350 guns in early February and began the march south. His force reached Konski Vody in early May, and thereafter marched in battle formation, with six columns following an advance guard. The Tatars launched attacks against the Muscovites in mid-May, sending mobile forces against the flanks of the formation persistently. Golitsyn's forces maintained good discipline, however, and reached the Perekop Isthmus on May 20.

To his dismay, Golitsyn found the Tatars had dug a huge trench across the isthmus. With his men once again thirsty, and the grass on the steppe drying out, Golitsyn again declared his campaign a success and turned for home. Many of Golitsyn's officers knew the truth, however, and on returning to Moscow they shifted their support to Sophia's co-regent, Peter; several important boyars (nobles) followed suit.

With the Holy League still in force through 1694, Peter decided to undertake a campaign directly against the Ottomans. Preparations took more than a year, however, as Peter sent

120,000 men under Boris P. Sheremetev to establish outposts on the Dnieper. After seizing Kazy in late July 1695, Sheremetev sent a flotilla downriver to bombard the smaller Ottoman forts; however, none proved large enough to be useful to the Muscovites. The planned offensive against Okachev was cancelled, but Sheremetev kept his force in the field as a deterrent.

Meanwhile a second, smaller force of 31,000 men with 201 guns under the command of Patrick Gordon marched against the Ottoman garrison at Azov. After establishing a forward base at the Koisuga River, Gordon attempted to take Trautsyn on July 6 but failed. He also failed to prevent the Ottomans from resupplying and reinforcing Azov, as his forces were too small to encircle the city and his naval forces proved no match for 20 Ottoman galleons. Gordon's attempts to mine the walls of the fort likewise came to naught, as Ottoman sorties inflicted serious casualties before the Muscovites retired in late September.

Gordon's second attempt to take Azov, in 1696, involved more foreign formations and fewer *streltsy* ("musketeers"), whom he believed had no stomach for fighting away from Moscow. With 50,000 men and an allied Cossack force of 20,000, Gordon this time established a supply post on the Don River that, although further from Azov, provided more direct and secure supply. Using some 20,000 laborers, Gordon constructed a small sea-going fleet, along with some 1,000 longboats, 100 barges, 23 galleys, and 4 fire-ships. Additional naval forces were built at Voronezh, Kozlov, Sokolsk, and Dobryr. On May 20, the longboats attacked the Ottoman fleet at Azov and drove it off, establishing a blockade of the fort.

The Muscovite forces, now commanded by A. S. Shein, reached Azov during May 28–June 3, 1696, and established a siege, digging

trenches around the fort, raising earthen forts in forward positions, and constructing a rolling rampart for assaults. These allowed the Muscovites to withstand Ottoman attempts to break out or resupply on June 28 and July 13, and the fort surrendered on July 19.

The victory allowed Peter to establish a base at Taganrog and begin the construction of a serious Black Sea Fleet at Voronezh. Within a few years, this nascent naval force had some 80 ships of the line, with another 60 brigantines and 6 galleys. Negotiating thus from a position of strength, Peter got control of Azov and a two-year armistice with the Ottomans and their Tatar allies in the January 1699 Treaty of Constantinople. The Russians also stopped paying tribute to the Crimean Tatar khans, and thereafter would increasingly gain control of the northern coast of the Black Sea.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Golitsyn, (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich (1643–1714); Gordon, Patrick (1635–1699); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Tatars (Mongols)

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Home Front, 1904–1905. *See*

Revolution of 1905

Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917)

The impact of Russia’s involvement in the Great War on the home front life was

discernible almost immediately, and by 1917, it affected almost every area of everyday life. Although the October (Bolshevik) Revolution of 1917 may have resulted in truncating Russia’s direct involvement in the war in terms of military affairs, the effects of the war lingered long after Russia had ceased to be a military player.

As historians of home front history during wartime have demonstrated, particularly, in employing microhistory methodologies, there are surprising similarities and commonalities among the experiences of each country in World War I. At the same time, each country’s specific political, social, cultural, and geographical contexts inform the home front experience, thereby differentiating the experience of citizens in one country versus citizens of another.

At the beginning of the war, the Russian Empire had some of the largest reserves of both manpower and food sources amongst the belligerent nations, and this fact caused many civil and military leaders to be overly optimistic when estimating Russia’s resources that could be depended upon during wartime. Even though most contemporary observers thought (and a majority of historians concur) that at the outset there was a general expectation among the populations that the war would be a short, decisive war, leaders calculated that in event the war lasted longer than anticipated, Russia would face no difficulties supplying its wartime needs.

The impact of the war could be felt in nearly every aspect of daily life by the war’s end, but one of the primary areas was that of agriculture and food supply. Agriculture was foundational to the Russian economy, and the means by which most Russians made their livelihoods. At the outset of the war, Russia’s estimated population was 169 million; most were peasants who farmed 90 percent of the arable land throughout Russia’s vast territories.



Russian refugees at a railway station during World War I. (Edgar Allen Forbes, *Leslie's Photographic Review of the Great War*, 1919)

It is ironic that a country that produced just over 40 percent of the world's exported grain on the eve of the war could still suffer food shortages as early as 1915, despite bountiful harvests in the first years of the war. These shortages are largely attributed to government purchases of large quantities of grain to feed the army, which caused grain agents to stockpile grain, concerned that there might be a shortage and speculating on future price increases. Within a year, the price of grain in urban areas had doubled; while by law, the army could buy grain for its soldiers at a fixed low price and had priority over civilian needs, the government also allowed other grain transactions to go unregulated. These factors contributed to the decisions of peasants, who tilled farmland, to actually reduce the amount of land they planted the following spring. Uninterested in being forced to sell their grain at government prices, many peasants and farmers expanded their produce, which allowed them to retreat

to self-sufficiency; they often fed their excess grain to their livestock or secretly saved it for themselves.

Grains were not the only foodstuffs in short supply; as early as October 1915, 75 percent of cities surveyed reported general shortages of food, and the situation only worsened, particularly, in urban centers. Government observers noted that two-thirds of the butcher shops had no meat to sell, and one-third of the bakeries had closed, as bakers were unable to obtain the flour and sugar needed. By 1916, moreover, coal cost four times as much as it had in 1914 and a cheap meal at a café had increased sevenfold. Yet 1917 only saw prices continue to climb with inflation, even as workers' salaries failed to keep pace. In Petrograd, the price of bread rose by 2 percent, milk by 5 percent, and sugar by 10 percent each week. Landlords charged excessive rents, coal and firewood were scarce, and medicine cost 50 times more than it had in 1913. Those products

that could be found in urban markets were unaffordable but to the very wealthy. The harsh winter of 1916–1917, with constant snowstorms and subzero temperatures, made things even more miserable for urban dwellers; and trains were only able to deliver minimal provisions.

It is impossible to discuss the food supply crisis without explicating its relation to the transportation crisis. Russia had a large railway system of some 71,000 kilometers of rail at the beginning of the war; over half of the country's transportation was conducted via rail. The remaining transportation systems were mostly made up of rivers and lakes; but these bodies of water were not passable all year, due to harsh winters. Additionally, despite the existence of major sea ports that allowed the Russian government to import supplies, the railways connecting these ports to the interior were inferior, and many ports closed during the winter. Clearly, the transportation network was not conducive to shipping grain and other products efficiently to the country's interior, and what railways existed along these routes were frequently commandeered by the army for its own needs. Thus, at the outset of the war, Russia was already heavily dependent on the railway system which, while adequate for peacetime, quickly proved itself unable to withstand the rigors of war.

Railcars and locomotives were already old in 1914. As these broke down over the next three years, the government had problems obtaining replacements, as by this time, most factories had been converted to munitions factories or lacked the capacity to produce the needed locomotives, railroad lines, and signaling equipment. The government was forced to import railroad stock, which was more costly and difficult to deliver by water routes; and delivered products were frequently either substandard or incompatible

with existing stock, as the Russian railroad gauge was broader than that of most other systems. Eventually, a 1,000-mile rail line from Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was called after 1914) to a port in Kola was built, using steel imported from the United States. Additionally, as Russia lost territory to its enemies, valuable industrial areas, farmland, and transportation systems were also lost—including 10 percent of its rail tracks.

Under peacetime conditions, Russia imported large quantities of raw materials for its factories. On the eve of the war, the major exporter of goods and raw materials to Russia was Germany, which became an enemy, thereby instantly denying Russian commercial and industrial sectors a major source of supplies as well as financial investment. Among the many items Russia imported were coal (which eventually had to be rationed), precious metals, and nongrain foodstuffs. With the cessation of interactions with German businesses, Russian manufacturers and government agents were forced to find alternative sources, turning to Allied countries (such as France and England) or neutral countries (which included the United States until 1917).

Implementing these business relationships was often a lengthy process, at times hindered by language barriers, currency and credit negotiations, and perhaps most importantly, the necessity of finding alternate transportation routes, which further complicated matters and caused more delays. By the time all negotiations and trade contracts and payments had been agreed upon by both parties and their respective governments, what contracts were fulfilled and delivered to Russia was far less than required and months behind the most pressing needs. Additionally, once these goods were obtained, the hazards of the transportation system were such that foodstuffs and materials were often fated to rot on the side of the tracks, as there were no means

to move them and warehouses had not been constructed to house them. In addition to being cut off from foreign suppliers, Russian factories and industries were slow to convert their factories to produce war matériel, instead they preferred to continue producing merchandise for the public consumers. Eventually, war shortages forced the government to offer contracts to factories that would convert their production to shells and weaponry, but these factories' output frequently fell far behind government demands, hampered both by a shortage of raw materials and fuel, and by a lack of skilled laborers. Manufacturers that persisted in producing consumer goods fared even worse, often turning out products of inferior quality due to the lack of suitable raw materials, which in turn led to a further decline in their profits. The lack of skilled laborers to work in factories and in other areas of industry was largely the result of the mass mobilization of millions of men at the beginning of the war. The czarist government, often concerned with the appearance of interfering too much in the civil affairs or afraid that their involvement might signal a lack of strength on the part of the Russian government or a failing war effort, did not fully involve itself in the problem of skilled workers being pulled away from the workforce until 1916 and 1917. By early 1917, some 1.86 million men, including not quite half a million men involved in weapons productions, were subject to exemptions, but by this time, untold numbers of educated schoolteachers and skilled laborers had already perished as Russian soldiers in largely unsuccessful campaigns across the Russian front.

The lack of skilled laborers in factories was mirrored in the Russian countryside, where the enlistment of men took them away from their farms and deprived large estates of their hired labor force. This shortage of labor was another factor in the decreased

harvests in subsequent years. By 1916, flour mills were producing one-third less than in prewar years. Women, children, and prisoners of war had to work in the fields, factories, and even coal mines. The mass mobilization of men also caused at least a temporary shift in workforce composition as, by necessity, women were forced to take on the roles traditionally assumed by men. Another aspect of home front life was the hunt for traitors and spies. Rumors were rampant that German sympathizers and German spies were undermining the war effort both on the home front and on the battlefields; some believed this was widespread, from the czarina (who had been born in Germany) and her Germanic courtiers in the imperial court to university professors, to waiters and janitors. Correspondence from Russian soldiers at the front supported this view, and many took these reports of treason as the primary reason for the catastrophic Russian military failures and casualties. At the height of this spy mania, the Russian branches of the American-owned Singer Sewing Machine company were (temporarily) shut down, with managers arrested and some 6,000 thrown out of work; in Moscow, a riot led to mass looting, arson, and violence.

This propaganda campaign and hysterical fear of spies within Russia's borders both heightened the popular support of nationalism and "Russian-ness," but other groups (who often identified themselves as Russian) faced prejudice and discrimination as a result of the increased patriotic sentiment: Jews and Russian Germans—especially those in the Baltic regions—were the two primary targets though other ethnicities also suffered. This rabid sentiment against enemies within Russia also led the government to confiscate the land and properties of the enemy, where it could, and even "enemy" settlers—the latter being families that had

owned land in Russia long before the war began, in some case, for centuries. By 1917, the government had seized and liquidated hundreds of enemy-owned firms and factories, and planned to seize 16 million acres of land belonging to ethnic Germans, though the February Revolution halted many of these plans. Although the mobilization of soldiers and their subsequent return resulted in population shifts in all countries, one aspect of the home front wartime experience that was much more unique to Russia was the civilian population displacements. Many of these displacements happened as Russia lost significant territories to the enemy armies, but others were a result of the Russian Army and government forcing the relocation of groups, particularly the Jews of Galicia, who were suspected of aiding the enemy. Ironically, the German forces suspected the Jews they encountered in Galicia were saboteurs, and also evacuated them forcibly. Conservative estimates suggest that by April 1916, refugees in Russia numbered around 3.8 million; most flocked to urban areas, further burdening the strained resources of urban centers. These waves of refugees overwhelmed the transportation networks, competing with a retreating army, crowding the muddy roads with their carts and animals, seeking passage on railroad cars and shelter from the elements. Although there were many other factors that led to the revolutions of 1917, historians argue convincingly that the intense food and transportation crises and the czarist government's seeming inability to adequately respond to or resolve these issues were significant factors that fed the anger and discontent of the ordinary Russian civilian who joined in calls for change and revolution.

Jenna L. Kubly

See also: World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Home Front (Soviet Union), World War II (1941–1945)

In 1941, the Soviet Union numbered some 193 million people inhabiting an area of more than 8 million square miles extending over 11 time zones. The Soviet Union covered an area as great as the two next largest countries—China and Canada—combined. Although Russians living around Moscow comprised a majority of the population, the country was composed of many different nationalities who spoke nearly 170 different languages. The largest republic by far in the USSR was the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic, which had more than 100 million people.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin refused to believe warnings that Germany intended to invade in 1941. He continued to believe that any war between the Germany and the Soviet Union lay years in the future. Stalin's refusal to prepare adequately for a German attack was made worse by his orders that Red Army units stand fast rather than retreat, leading to the cutting off and surrender of vast numbers of Russian soldiers. Stalin's



Leningrad residents, under the leadership of a munitions worker, use shovels and picks to help construct antitank ditches to defend their city against the Germans during World War II. (Library of Congress)

orders were largely responsible for the disastrous Red Army encirclements at Kiev and Vyazma in 1941 and at Kharkov in 1942.

Decisions such as these almost drove the Soviet Union from the war. But while Hitler unlearned the art of war, Stalin proved he was capable of learning it by absorbing specialist knowledge and technical information and paying attention to knowledgeable subordinates. Though he had vanished during the early days of the war, Stalin recovered quickly. He continued to make the major decisions, shifting units and commanders about. Front commanders reported to him at the end of each day and received their instructions directly from him.

To gain the support of the Russian people—some of whom had reportedly welcomed the invader with open arms—Stalin deliberately downplayed communism, choosing to emphasize Russian patriotism. He even

enlisted the services of the Russian Orthodox Church. Indeed, World War II is known in Russian history as the “Great Patriotic War.” The Soviet populace was more used to deprivation and suffering than most peoples, but the war took a huge toll on the population as German and Soviet forces fought back and forth across the Russian heartland and practiced scorched-earth policies.

During the first months of the war, the government exercised total control over the media and withheld any information as to the real losses suffered by the Red Army. There was no hint in the press of hunger or starvation, which was widespread. Even news of the suffering in besieged Leningrad was suppressed. Those spreading rumors were subject to severe punishment under Article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code. Strict censorship often delayed evacuation of populations westward ahead of German army advances.

On June 22, 1941, the Supreme Soviet declared martial law in all front regions, and two days later, it extended martial law to the entire European part of the Soviet Union. Millions of civilians were conscripted to build bunkers, barricades, and tank traps. During July and August 1941, at Leningrad alone, nearly 1 million citizens helped build defensive works. A decree of December 26, 1941, announced that unauthorized leave would be punished by five to eight years' imprisonment. Even more draconian was a decree of July 28, 1942, that stated that all workers who left their jobs without permission would be treated as deserters and would be handed over to military tribunals. All facets of ordinary Soviet life were militarized, with civilian activities directed by the Commissariat of Defense and the secret police. War put a severe strain on the state budget, and the Soviet government therefore imposed a "war tax" on all adult citizens, which further tightened the already draconian conditions for most of the population.

The Soviet government pursued a scorched-earth policy. As the Red Army withdrew, it destroyed absolutely everything in its path with no regard to the civilian population left behind. Hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and agricultural products were burned to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Germans. This suffering was repeated several times over with the ebb and flow of the war.

At the time of the German invasion, some 11 million Soviet citizens had undergone some military training during the previous 15 years, and a like number had received some military instruction. Even at the end of the war, after its horrendous casualties, the Red Army had 6 million men under arms, twice the German total.

Increasing industrial production would be vital if the Soviet Union was to have any

chance of victory, and it registered great success in this area. In the Third Five-Year Plan (1938–1942), increasing attention had been given to armaments production; to developing new industry in the east; and to relocation of existing production east of the Ural Mountains, where it would be safe from air strikes.

After the German invasion, whole factories were disassembled, loaded on flatcars, and then shipped east, where they were reassembled and resumed the production of tanks, planes, and guns. Unfortunately, much of the industrial effort was inefficient, the product of confusion and an inept bureaucracy. On the plus side, much of the conversion from peacetime to wartime production was carried out by local initiative, without central intervention.

Not even a majority of production could be relocated so quickly, and in the second half of 1941, the Soviet Union lost 68 percent of its iron production, 63 percent of its coal, 58 percent of its steel, and 40 percent of its farmland. The loss of Ukraine to the Germans was a particularly heavy blow, for it boasted the USSR's most fertile farmland. Despite this, the Soviet Union registered solid gains in arms production during the war. It emphasized simple yet durable weapons. The Russian *Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik* ground-attack aircraft and the T-34 tank were also easy to manufacture and maintain. Between 1940 and 1945, the Soviet Union far outproduced Germany; in that period, it manufactured 146,929 aircraft, 102,301 tanks, and more than 14.6 million rifles and carbines.

During the war, the Soviet civilian population endured hunger, cold, malnutrition, and disease. The German invasion had far-reaching consequences for the food supply, as a large part of Soviet agricultural production was soon in German hands. Also, in the

first months of the war, Soviet authorities were far more intent on relocating industry than on saving agricultural production. The relocation of factories east of the Urals had priority over the shipment of food supplies. The Red Army also requisitioned tractors and horses from agricultural work. Soldiers and workers in armaments industries received priority in food and medical supplies at the expense of peasants, the old, and children. The cities were hard hit, and many people sought refuge in the countryside, where they worked as day laborers to secure bread. Given the lack of machinery, it is not surprising that harvests were poor. Agricultural production fell sharply, resulting in sharp increases in the price of food.

The vast casualties sustained by the Red Army in fighting the Germans, the manpower requirements of the armed forces, and the demands of war industries all led to a severe labor shortage. This shortage was taken up in part by women (who had long been in the industrial workforce in the Soviet Union), by men who were too old for the army, and by teenage boys. Women were the major labor source in the agricultural sector, and by the end of the war, they comprised a majority of the workers in the industrial sector as well. The percentage of female labor in agriculture rose from 40 percent in 1940 to 70 percent in 1943, 82 percent in 1944, and 92 percent in 1945. The loss of their husbands to the army placed an additional burden on married women, who now had to support both children and aged relatives. Workdays were extended to 16 hours and longer.

The war exacted a frightful human toll on the Soviet Union. Immediate postwar calculations set the toll at 22 million people dead, an estimate raised later to 50 million or more. This death toll swelled in part because of Stalin's own policies. During the war, the

Soviet authorities executed an astonishing 157,000 of their own soldiers. Stalin wrote off Soviet prisoners of war held by the Germans, for surrender was regarded as treason. Even Soviet prisoners who managed to escape from the Germans were severely punished. Many were executed out of hand; others were shipped off to the Gulags.

The war was the seminal experience for generations of Soviet citizens. Its legacy of burned villages and hatred came to be reflected in the brutal Soviet treatment of its zone of Germany at the end of the war.

*Eva-Maria Stolberg and
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See also: Casualties, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945); Holocaust in the Soviet Union; Lend-Lease (March 1941–August 1945); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); NKVD; Order No. 270 (June 1941); Sorge, Richard (1895–1944); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II

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Hungarian Rebellion (1956)

Revolt against Soviet authority that began on October 23, 1956, and ended with the Red Army crushing Hungarian resistance three weeks later.

The rebellion's genesis came during the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 24, 1956, when Soviet First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev, gave a four-hour speech. Khrushchev denounced former leader Josef Stalin's violent crimes and the personality cult associated with his rule. He called for a restoration of core communist ideals to repair the damage done by Stalin, who had left Russia, according to Khrushchev, with a legacy of iron-fisted tyranny. It spread throughout Europe and reverberated in the minds of many Eastern Bloc communists, who were angered by the realities of Stalin's cruelty. Many wondered why the Soviets had done nothing to stop Stalin's oppression. These feelings of betrayal were most apparent in Hungary and Poland.

By April 1956, anti-Soviet grumblings in Budapest aroused the fears of Soviet ambassador Yuri V. Andropov. Hungarian communists criticized Soviet policies and a nationalist, revolutionary youth stirred throughout the country. An anxious Andropov cabled Moscow. Andropov warned them that de-Stalinization had awoken Hungarian solidarity; as the weeks progressed, his cables became more worrisome. On June 28 in the city of Poznań, Poland, workers began demonstrations for better pay and working conditions. Although the Polish army (influenced and commanded by many Soviet officers) silenced the Poznań strike, Polish actions further inspired Hungarians.

The Hungarian communist politician Imre Nagy and his followers called for Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization) and the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The two issues intertwined because the Warsaw Pact (signed May 14, 1955) gave the Red Army the legal right to remain in Hungary forever. In July, Moscow gave orders to Lieutenant General Pyotr N. Lashchenko in Hungary to prepare

for Operation VOLNA (WAVE). This classified military plan would protect pro-Soviet leadership and maintain communist order if open revolt began. In the meantime, on July 18, Moscow forced the hard-line (Stalinist) general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, Mátyás Rákosi, to stand down, replacing him with Ernő Gerő. This did not assuage Nagy's supporters or the populace, and tensions actually increased with the concession. Groups such as the Petőfi Circle, a nationalist organization of young professionals and intellectuals, intensified anti-Soviet rhetoric. In September, Andropov notified Moscow of growing anticommunist movements and a crumbling Hungarian Communist Party.

On October 23, the Hungarian Rebellion began. While the conflict arose in Debrecen, and other cities witnessed combat, the nexus of the revolution was Budapest. In a symbolic gesture, at the edge of City Park in the capital, a crowd toppled, dragged, and dismembered a 26-foot bronze statue of Stalin; the former dictator's metal head remained on the street with a traffic sign jammed into his face for days. At the Hungarian Radio building, after the rebels exchanged fire with the ÁVH (*Államvédelmi Hatóság* [Hungarian secret police]), the Hungarian Army's 8th Tank Regiment joined the opposition.

As word spread of the ÁVH's attack on civilians, Budapest erupted into open rebellion, whose icon became the Hungarian flag with a hole in its center (due to the removal of the Communist coat of arms). A frantic Gerő pleaded for Soviet support. Red Army commanders stationed in Budapest argued against military intervention for fear of stiffening Hungarian resolve. Moscow disregarded their doubts and on October 24, with limited support of the Hungarian army, Soviet armor, including T-34 tanks, rolled into Budapest.

The Hungarian revolutionaries, however, caught the Soviets by surprise and unprepared

to conduct a counterinsurgency. The typical insurgent was a worker or tradesman, young, nationalist, anti-Soviet, and anti-Russian. These men and women used the urban environment to their advantage. Nitroglycerin bombs (effective against tanks), Molotov cocktails (makeshift liquid firebombs), small arms fire, and strategic barricades defeated Soviet mechanized units, which lacked efficient infantry support. By the end of the day, while the Red Army held several key buildings, insurgents controlled the majority of the city and over 20 Soviet soldiers lay dead. The following morning in Budapest, October 25, Soviet troops reacting to gunfire, shot demonstrators in Kossuth Square, killing 75 and injuring 284. The incident emboldened the rebels and thousands joined the insurrection. That same day, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division (a Soviet unit stationed in Romania) and the 128th Guards Rifle Division from Ukraine arrived to strengthen the Red Army in Budapest. The Soviets now had a force of 20,000 troops to combat the insurgents.

For the next five days, insurgents withstood hesitant Red and Hungarian army maneuvers throughout the country, as well as heavy fighting within Budapest. Some of the most intense combat revolved around Corvin Cinema, at the intersection of two of the city's main traffic arteries. On October 28, the Red Army lost five tanks attempting to conquer the Corvin battleground. The Soviet counterinsurgency became more difficult as many Hungarian troops joined the rebellion or refused to fire on their brethren and remained neutral.

With each passing day, the revolution gained support and shifted from an anti-Stalinist movement to one of national independence. Hoping to regain control, Gerő and the Hungarian Communist Party appointed Nagy prime minister. The idea failed. Moscow sacked Gerő; Nagy's initial political

operations amounted to little, and the rebellion continued.

Wooed by the insurgency or eager to solidify his power, Nagy then decided to side with the rebellion and echoed the demands of the people: withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, removal of Soviet forces, free elections, and an independent, but neutral nation. Soviet leadership, indecisive since October 29, contemplated negotiation rather than intervention. Soviet World War II hero and Defense Minister Georgy K. Zhukov even suggested compromise was the better option.

Nonetheless, Nagy's bold announcement for Hungary's future proved too audacious for Moscow. Khrushchev did not want to remove Soviet forces from Hungary, fearing it would display weakness to and bring reprisals from the United States, Britain, and France. He ordered the insurgency annihilated.

The second Soviet offensive, Operation VIKHR (WHIRLWIND) began on November 4. This time, the Red Army unleashed its full fury, and its operations were organized and decisive. The Soviets secured all strategic locations across the country, such as airbases, barracks, bridges, and highways. Three divisions then swept into Budapest and split it in thirds. Once again, the Corvin Cinema provided the sternest defense—until Soviet artillery pounded the insurgents into submission. The euphoria of their early victories vanished. Although the rebellion received almost universal popular support, the Soviet Union only faced around 25,000 armed insurgents from a population close to 10 million.

Effective resistance ended on November 11, but sporadic guerrilla activity continued until the end of the month. The Soviet invasion displaced around 182,000 Hungarians, the majority into Austria; many later migrated to the United States. Hungarian casualty figures vary, but totaled around 2,700

insurgents and 3,000 civilians killed (1,569 in Budapest), with over 19,000 wounded. Soviet casualty figures also differ; the most commonly accepted numbers are 737 dead, circa 1,500 wounded, and 67 missing. Testament to the conflict's ferocity, the Red Army awarded 26 men the Hero of the Soviet Union medal and 10,000 troops received combat medals.

The Hungarian Rebellion was the first major armed attack against the Soviet Union after World War II. For Hungary, it was a revolution—for Russia, an uprising. After the fighting ended, the Soviets arrested 3,773 insurgents, confiscated 90,000 firearms, and solidified their control over János Kádár, Hungary's new leader. In the following months, Kádár's government arrested thousands, including Nagy, who was hanged as a traitor on June 16, 1958. The government prohibited complete repair of several structures peppered with bullet holes. They represented symbols of caution, but became mementos of audacity that remain today amongst the buildings of Budapest.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); T-34 Tank

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Ice, Battle on the (April 5, 1242)

Battle between the Teutonic Brethren knights (Livonian Order branch) and their Estonian allies, and the Republic of Novgorod, presumably fought on the frozen portion of the Chudskoe Lake (Lake Peipus in English; today's location is near Teploe Lake and Ostrov village in the Pskov area).

In early 1241, the Teutonic knights, in order to strengthen their position in the neighboring Duchy of Estonia, organized, with the blessing of Pope Gregory IX, a new campaign against the Baltic tribes. Such an expedition was considered as a threat by the Russians, because it touched the sphere of interest of the Republic of Novgorod. While advancing, the knights soon captured the cities of Izborsk and Pskov. The rulers of Novgorod asked Prince Alexander (sobriquet "Nevsky" for his victory in July 1240 over the Swedes at the Neva Battle), a ruler of Pereslavl-Zalessky, to lead the resistance. In March 1242, Alexander sent out a reconnaissance party but it was defeated by the knights and their Estonian auxiliaries (*Chudes*). Led by Bishop Hermann of Dorpat (modern-day Tartu, Estonia), the knights and their allies then met Alexander's forces by the narrow strait that connects the northern and southern parts of Lake Peipus on the night of April 5, 1242. Alexander, intending to fight in a place of his own choosing, retreated in an attempt to draw the often overconfident knights onto the frozen lake.

The number of belligerents is difficult to estimate; the Russian forces might have up to 15,000–17,000 troops, including the

Novgorod militia and separately paid detachments in the service of the Republic of Novgorod, as well as Alexander and his brother Andrei's own heavily armored bodyguard (*druzhina*). Alexander "Nevsky" was in command. The Teutonic Brethren fielded only a small number of heavy armored knights, along with numerous German and Dutch infantry mercenaries, and a large number of the Estonian light-armored auxiliaries. The total was perhaps no more than 10,000–12,000 men (including squires, pages, and various servants). The Brethren further lacked a centralized command, as detachments had fought separately under their own banner.

The details of the battle are practically unknown. According to contemporary Russian chronicles, after hours of hand-to-hand fighting, Alexander ordered the left and right wings of his mounted archers to enter the battle. By that time, the armored knights were exhausted from the constant struggle on the slippery surface of the frozen lake. According to the historic reconstruction, the knights started to retreat to the lake's shore in disarray. The appearance of a reserve—the fresh Russian cavalry led by Alexander himself—made the knights run for their lives. According to the myth in circulation since the 16th century, the ice began to give way under the weight of their heavy armor and weapons, and many knights drowned. Of course, the Russian mounted part of the *druzhina* had similar heavy defensive armor; furthermore, both the knights and the Russians warriors had experience fighting on forest-lake landscapes.

The Russian casualties are not listed, but they definitely were numerous. According to the *Novgorod First Chronicle* (1016–1471), the Teutonic Brethren lost “many knights killed and drowned; 400 German mercenaries and countless number of *Chudes* were also killed. Fifty knights were taken prisoner and brought in chains to Novgorod.” The *Livonian Rhymed Chronicle* (composed around the 1280s) lists only 20 knights killed and 6 taken prisoner, however; the *Teutonic Chronicle*, composed sometime around 1540, tells of 70 knights (*teuentich Ordens Herennan*).

Regardless of casualties, the Teutonic knights’ defeat in the battle marked the end of their attempts to subjugate Novgorod and other Russian and Baltic territories. In 1243, a treaty was concluded between Novgorod and the Teutonic Order, wherein the knights abandoned all claims to Russian territories. The Battle on the Ice was glorified in Sergei Eisenstein’s propagandistic Soviet Socialist Realism historical drama film *Alexander Nevsky* (1938), which created a popular image of the battle often mistaken for the real events.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Nevsky, Alexander (1220–1263)

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Ili Rebellion (1944–1946)

Uprising from 1944 to 1946 against the Chinese Guomintang government in Xinjiang

Province in western China. The rebellion was led by a coalition of Turkic Muslims, mostly Uighurs and Kazakhs, and resulted in the formation of the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) on the border with the Soviet Union. Soviet agents were instrumental in arming and backing the rebels, as well as forging a peace agreement that ended the rebellion.

Known locally as East Turkestan, Xinjiang was prone to Soviet penetration due to its proximity to the Soviet Central Asian republics, which shared economic and nationality ties with Xinjiang. Soviet agents played a key role in a number of uprisings that shook Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. From 1931 to 1935, the province was engulfed in Uighur rebellion that received Soviet aid and arms. In 1933, Provincial Governor Sheng Shicai instituted a pro-Soviet policy, signing a trade agreement and opening the region’s mineral resource to Soviet exploitation. During Sheng’s reign, thousands of Soviet advisors and military personnel trained Guomintang security and military units and, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Soviet aid poured into China via Xinjiang.

Following Soviet setbacks at the outset of World War II, Sheng turned a cold shoulder to Moscow, and in 1943, Soviet advisors and military personnel were withdrawn. Sheng fell from power in 1944, and shortly thereafter, Xinjiang erupted into rebellion. At the outset, Muslim forces ousted Guomintang units from key urban centers in western Xinjiang. In November 1944, Uighur nationalists announced the formation of the ETR in three districts in the west of the province, with its capital at Ili (Ghulja). In 1945, the rebellion spread to Kazakh and Uighur insurgents in the northern districts of Altai and Tarbagatai, as well as the southern districts of Kashgar and Yarkand; the rebellion even threatened Guomintang control of the provincial capital Urumqi.

The Soviets, seeking a friendly regime in Xinjiang, provided aid to the rebels, but by the summer of 1945, greater strategic concerns caused the Soviets to curtail support. In August 1945, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty that reaffirmed China's sovereignty over Xinjiang and Manchuria. In the fall of 1945, the Soviets orchestrated negotiations between the officials of the East Turkestan Republic and Guomindang, but local ETR commanders continued to fight Chinese forces. As a result, the Soviets withdrew much of the military assistance provided to ETR forces.

Months of negotiations gave way to a final agreement in June 1946 to integrate ETR forces into Chinese military units and form a coalition government. The fighting ended, but the new government failed to produce a governing coalition, and by mid-1947, the agreement had collapsed; ETR officials returned to Ili. Soviet aid to the ETR resumed, and in the summer of 1947, Soviet troops clashed with Kazakh rebels allied with the Guomindang. In 1949, the Chinese communists swept into Xinjiang, which resulted in the defection or defeat of the remaining ETR holdouts.

David P. Straub

See also: Great Game, The (Russia in Central Asia); Kashgar, Battle of (1934); Xinjiang, Battle of (1937)

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Ilyushin, Sergei Vladimirovich (1894–1977)

Soviet general and aeronautical engineer. Born in the village of Dilialevo in the lower Vologda region of Russia on March 30, 1894, Ilyushin served in the Russian army during World War I as an aircraft mechanic and learned to fly. He joined the Red Army in 1919 and commanded an aircraft maintenance unit during the Russian Civil War.

Ilyushin graduated from the Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy in 1926 and became an aircraft designer. In 1931, he was chief of the Central Design Office and a colonel general. Ilyushin's two-engine bomber, the DB-3F, entered service in 1937. Redesignated the Il-4, it was the mainstay of the Soviet Union's medium bomber fleet in the early years of World War II. The first Soviet bomber to reach Berlin, it was employed as both a torpedo bomber and a strategic bomber.

Ilyushin is also credited with designing the superb *Il-2 Shturmovik*. Appearing in March 1941, it was a highly effective, well-armored (about 15% of empty weight) ground-attack aircraft known to the Germans as "the black death." Armed with two 30-millimeter (mm) cannon (and later, a 37-mm gun), the *Il-2* was the most successful tank killer. The Soviets manufactured some 36,000 *Il-2s* through 1955, more than any other wartime aircraft. Josef Stalin described the *Shturmovik* as being "as essential to the Red Army as bread and water," and Ilyushin received the Hero of Soviet Labor award for design of *Il-2 Shturmovik*. In 1943, Ilyushin developed the *Il-10*, a smaller but faster and more aerodynamic bomber based on the *Il-2*. It saw service well past the war, including in many Soviet satellite states. He also developed a four-engine bomber, the *Il-20*.

Ilyushin continued to design aircraft after the war, when he also taught at the Zhukovsky Academy. He developed the jet ground-attack *Il-40* aircraft and, in 1948, the twin-engine *Il-28* attack bomber, the Soviet Union's first jet bomber. He also designed the *Il-38*, the Soviet Union's first long-range antisubmarine aircraft. Among his civilian aircraft designs were the four-engine *Il-12* in 1946 and the *Il-14* in 1954. In 1957, Ilyushin developed the large turboprop *Il-18*. He also designed the intercontinental passenger jet known as the *Il-62* and the larger transport aircraft *Il-76* and *Il-86* that have served in both the Soviet Air Force and Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline. Ilyushin died in Moscow on February 9, 1977.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Ingrian War (1610–1617). *See* Time of Troubles

Inkerman, Battle of (November 5, 1854)

The Battle of Inkerman, fought on November 5, 1854, was the third and final major field battle fought during the Crimean War

(1853–1856). It was a tactical victory for the allied forces of England and France, who repulsed a major Russian attack. Because fog prevalent during much of the combat resulted in troops being cut-off, surrounded, and fighting small-unit actions, the battle is often known as "The Soldier's Battle." The hard fighting and losses suffered by England and France kept them from quickly seizing Sebastopol (Sevastopol), their primary objective. Instead, the Siege of Sebastopol lasted more than a year, forcing the allied forces to spend two winters on the heights above the city.

Following the Battle of Balaclava, Czar Nicholas I determined that his numerically superior forces in Sebastopol should attack before additional French troops arrived in the region. A major reconnaissance in force by the Russians on October 26 established the weakness of British defenses on the heights above Sebastopol, particularly on Mount Inkerman, an area of many gullies and ravines. The Russian commander General Aleksandr Menshikov decided to mount a coordinated attack from two directions on the British positions, while a third force distracted the nearby French troops and prevented them from reinforcing the British. The Russian forces totaled over 57,000 men, vastly outnumbering the defending British and French units, which totaled approximately 16,000 men.

Unfortunately, the two-pronged Russian attack never properly developed. Instead, the two Russian forces, which numbered approximately 35,000 men in total, attacked piecemeal, rather than in a single, coordinated assault. After a night of heavy rain, thick fog and mist enveloped Mount Inkerman. While the weather conditions prevented the Russian advance from being noticed for some time, it also thwarted adequate coordination between the assaulting

units. Moreover, the commander of the force that was to prevent the nearby French troops from assisting the British failed to follow his orders and thereby allowed the French to assist in fending off the Russian attacks.

The first Russian forces, supported by heavy artillery, engaged British troops beginning at about 7:30 a.m. In the heavy fog, the various battalions of British infantry often were unable to see or hear the orders of their senior leaders, and so relied on their company commanders or even smaller unit officers. Supported by their own cannon, British battalions drove back enemy infantry as they appeared from the various gullies and ravines.

By 8:30 a.m., the fighting renewed as the second prong of the Russian attack finally arrived. Again, battalion- or smaller-sized units of British infantry, at times reinforced by the French forces, repulsed determined Russian attacks, often in bitter close-quarters fighting. Some positions changed hands several times. Cannons frequently fired barely over the heads of their own troops. The fighting was so close and intense that the commander of one of the two Russian assaulting units, General F.I. Soimonov, was killed in action, followed quickly by his next two subordinates. The fighting devolved into small-unit combat throughout the Mount Inkerman area. When the British forces were almost forced to retreat, the nearby French troops appeared to reinforce them. Ordered to withdraw and regroup, the Russian troops began a headlong dash off Mount Inkerman, which their officers were unable to stop. British and French artillery fire chased them on their way. By noon, the fighting was over.

In about four hours of fighting, the Russians lost approximately 12,000 men. The British and French combined lost nearly 4,500. Dead and wounded soldiers littered the battlefield. It took the Western allies

days to find and bury all their dead. The defeat was a bitter pill for the Russians, whose attacking units greatly outnumbered the defenders throughout the day. While they had defeated the largest Russian attack yet to try to remove them from the heights around Sebastopol, British and French casualties, which amounted to over 25 percent of their total forces in action, were at an intolerable level. The British and French instead settled in for their first winter besieging Sebastopol.

Alan M. Anderson

See also: Alma River, Battle of (September 20, 1854); Balaclava, Battle of (October 25, 1854); Crimean War (1853–1856); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Ivan I (“Kalita”; ca. 1288–1340)

Ivan Danilovich was the son of Grand Duke Daniel Aleksandrovich and brother of Georgy Danilovich of Moscow, a relatively minor principality in the territory of Rus. At the time of his birth, all of the local principalities paid tribute to the Mongol Empire, and struggled with one another for primacy within the region. Ivan's father and brother spent much of their reigns conquering smaller cities near Moscow. By the time Ivan assumed the throne in 1325, the city

controlled almost the entire Moskva River Basin. Its primary rival in the period, Tver, also owed allegiance to the Mongols, whose Golden Horde could bestow the coveted title of Grand Prince of Vladimir, a position that included the right to collect tribute on behalf of the Golden Horde.

Ivan pursued a sound economic policy to bolster the strength of his city. He encouraged immigration to the region, offering incentives to future taxpayers and purchasing Russians who had been enslaved in Mongol raids. While he struggled with his Russian rivals, he cultivated favor with his Mongol overlords to garner future wealth as their local representative. This likely reduced the number of raids upon his region, as he offered substantial bribes for the protection of his realm. Ivan also extended credit to nearby cities, gradually gaining influence over them until they could be annexed. In 1328, he became the consolidator of tribute from Russia to the Golden Horde, making him indispensable to the Mongols as long as he remained loyal. His wealth and his tendency to use economic resources for diplomatic purposes earned Ivan the sobriquet “Kalita,” which loosely translates to “moneybag.”

When money could not achieve his goals, Ivan was not afraid to use force. A number of small towns that refused to join his principality were sacked and annexed. Those who joined without resistance often retained a certain degree of autonomy; those who fought and lost were ruthlessly destroyed. Ivan also massively improved Moscow’s fortifications, making it safe from all but the most determined invader. As long as Ivan retained Mongol backing, his city was a haven for citizens eager to escape the uncertainty and violence of other areas. One of the most important immigrants to Moscow, Metropolitan Peter, essentially made Moscow the capital of the Russian Orthodox

Church when his successors remained in the city. Ivan underwrote the construction of a series of churches to cement the loyalty of the metropolitans.

In 1338, Ivan received Mongol backing to lead an invasion and conquest of Tver, whose leader had refused to pay further tribute. Ivan’s attack virtually destroyed his foremost rival, solidifying Moscow’s primacy in the region. Before his death, Ivan convinced the Golden Horde to transfer his title as Grand Prince of Vladimir to his son, Simeon, making it essentially a hereditary title for the ruler of Moscow. Although the principality remained subservient to the Mongols for decades after Ivan’s death, during his reign, he had transformed Moscow from an insignificant province to the largest power in Russia.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Tatars (Mongols)

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Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505)

Russian czar.

When Ivan III was born as Ivan Vasilievich in Moscow on January 22, 1440, the Moscow princes still were paying tribute to their Mongol, or Tatar, overlords. Expansion across the Volga River to the east and across the treeless steppes to the southeast was already underway, however, and would soon lead to Slavic domination in those areas. As

they invaded the frontier, farmers tackled the often inhospitable land by developing communal agriculture based on collective ownership of the fields.

Ivan’s youth remains shrouded in mystery, but a few facts are known. His father, Grand Prince Vasily II, faced a rebellion in Muscovy led by an uncle, Yuri, while Ivan was still young. In 1446, the rebels captured Vasily and blinded him (thus his appellation, Vasily the Dark, or Vasily the Blind). Vasily’s supporters then hid Ivan in a monastery. Some of those he trusted, however, betrayed him and turned him over to his father’s enemies. The following year, discontent within Moscow forced the rebels to release both Vasily and Ivan. In a political arrangement, Ivan, age six, was promised to the daughter of the grand prince of Tver, a shrewd move that boosted the boy’s political strength. In 1452, he married the princess of Tver, and six years later, his first son was born. In 1458, he led an army against a Tatar horde and prevented it from crossing the Oka River. The victory won him considerable renown.

Meanwhile, Vasily continued to expand Moscow’s power, and the city became the greatest in Russia. By the time of his death in 1462, he had gained control of the Upper Volga and Oka rivers. The rich trading principality of Novgorod, although independent, was forced to pay tribute to Moscow.

After Vasily died in 1462, Ivan expanded his father’s policies. He ruled autocratically and at times brutally. After his brothers and nephews conspired against him, he put them to death. He kept the upper class, or boyars, in line by torturing some of them; rebellious Poles, and even princes, were ordered whipped or burned alive. Yet he did not like going into battle and usually avoided leading his men in assaults. Most of his early territorial acquisitions, such as Yaroslavl in 1463



The reign of Ivan III marked the emergence of a Russian state free from foreign control and, as historians have claimed, “the beginning of her national consciousness.” (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath’s History of the World*, 1901)

and Rostov in 1474, were the result of purchase or marriage contracts.

In 1470, however, the princes of Novgorod challenged Ivan, pledging their allegiance to the Polish ruler and deny the ecclesiastical supremacy of Moscow. (It was not a unanimous decision, as many in Novgorod preferred becoming part of Muscovy.) The rulers of Muscovy had for decades considered it their right to name Novgorod’s leaders. Ivan reacted by sending an army in 1471 to crush the rebellion. His men soundly defeated the Novgorodians. The Muscovites destroyed farms and burned towns, but in all, Ivan’s settlement with Novgorod was lenient. The city ceded some of its northern territories, and paid a war indemnity.

Ivan pressed for greater control over the city though, and in 1477, the simmering

conflict once again sparked into rebellion. Ivan’s forces soon surrounded the city and forced it to recognize his sovereignty. Novgorod lost its independence to Moscow, which consequently gained an outlet to the Baltic Sea and dominated the lucrative trade in the northwest. Ivan retained a large portion of Novgorod’s lands as his personal property. He punished subsequent revolts between 1479 and 1488 with further expropriations.

In 1480, Ivan broke with the Tatars, whose power had been deteriorating. After arranging a series of alliances with neighboring khans, Ivan refused to exhibit homage to the Tatars—at one point, taking a portrait of Khan Akhmed presented to him by Tatar emissaries and throwing it to the ground. More significantly, he refused to pay his customary tribute, which led to the famous confrontation on the Ugra. As the opposing armies faced each other, the river froze over. Ivan believed the Tatars would attack, so he ordered a hasty retreat—whether it was from trepidation or a strategic ploy is not known with certainty. In any event, the sound of the Muscovites breaking camp confused the Tatars, and they also retreated. Thus, a non-battle ended the Tatar yoke.

Historians generally consider that event as marking the emergence of Russia as a nation. In the 1480s and into the early 1500s, Ivan chipped away at Lithuania by gaining the allegiance of several princes in that land and obtaining territory through attacks. Muscovite forces soundly defeated the Lithuanians at Vedosha in 1500, and by 1503, Ivan controlled most of Lithuania’s territory. He also expanded Russia’s frontiers toward the Arctic and the Urals, part of the larger process known as “the gathering of the Russian lands” that took place during Ivan III’s reign. Ivan is generally considered the first ruler of Russia, rather than Muscovy, and the first czar.

After Ivan’s first wife died in 1467, he married Sophia Palaeologue (Zoe), the niece of a former Byzantine emperor. Historians disagree as to whether she influenced Ivan and shaped state policy. After marrying, Ivan signed his letters “czar” (from the Roman “caesar”), and considered himself “czar of all Rus”—both extensions of Byzantine claim to the throne of the Roman Empire. He further claimed Moscow to be the “third Rome,” and czar to be the true leader of Orthodox Christians.

His domestic policies became increasingly imperial as well. Ivan III and Zoe moved into a sumptuous palace designed by Italian architects, and Ivan invited numerous Westerner artists and doctors to Russia. Many of the buildings in Moscow’s Kremlin bear the hallmarks of this era, including the Bell Tower of Ivan the Great. Ivan also established a code of law written by Russian and Greek experts that sanctioned torture to obtain evidence and established the beginnings of serfdom. The boyars found themselves excluded from policy making, and Ivan expanded tax collections to finance the growing services of the state.

Ivan died on October 27, 1505, in Moscow. Under Ivan, the Russian state was consolidated, Russian territory tripled in size, trade expanded, and Western contacts shaped society. Perhaps above all else, he ended Tatar rule and elevated Moscow from a principality to a sovereign nation, earning the title “Ivan the Great.”

Neil A. Hamilton

See also: Kremlin; Tatars (Mongols)

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Ivan IV (“the Terrible”); 1530–1584)

Ivan IV was the son of Vasily III, Grand Duke of Muscovy, by his second wife, Elena Glinska. Born August 25, 1530, Ivan was proclaimed Grand Duke of Muscovy on the death of his father on December 3, 1533. His mother died, possibly poisoned, when Ivan was seven. During Ivan’s minority, the Russian nobles (boyars) treated him with contempt as they vied for power. Their rule was marked by chaos, cruelty, and exploitation. Seizing control, Ivan IV literally threw to the dogs the boyars who had maltreated him. Claiming to be descended from the Byzantine emperors, on January 16, 1547, Ivan had himself crowned “Czar of All the Russias.” The word “czar” derived from “caesar,” and the claim to rule “all the Russias” asserted dominion over both Kievan Rus’ and Muscovy.

At first a conscientious ruler, Ivan IV set out to reform the government. He revised the law code, convened a national assembly (*zemsky Sobor*) and established a Chosen Council of nobles as an advisory body. He also confirmed the official position of the Orthodox Church. Ivan introduced limited self-government in many rural areas of Russia and established the first printing press in the land. During this period, he surrounded himself with men of lesser rank who shared his vision of a modern government.

One of Ivan’s first steps was to overhaul the military. He created a standing army, the *streltsy* (“shooters” or musketeers), and organized it into five corps, each commanded by a noble of proven loyalty advised by a military professional. Ivan was especially interested in artillery, to counter and outrange



Ivan IV, nicknamed “the Terrible,” was the first czar of a consolidated Russia. He also wrought havoc that led to the end of his dynasty. (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath’s History of the World*, 1901)

the arrows of the Mongols who controlled the fertile lands south of Muscovy. The Russians also developed the *guliai-gorod* (literally “wandering city”), a sort of fortified wagon modeled on those the Hussites had employed in the early 15th century, for fighting on the steppes.

Ivan’s first campaigns against the Khanate of Khazan (1547–1548 and 1549–1550) were unsuccessful, and he had the generals involved executed. In 1551, though, the leaders of a dissident faction in Khazan offered him rule of the khanate. Ivan commanded in person a force of 150,000 men and 50 pieces of artillery in a successful six-week siege of the city. The capture of Khazan (October 2, 1552) marked the first time Muscovy had taken Mongol territory. Ivan then pushed south and east, capturing Astrakhan (1554)

and moving into the Crimea as far as Per-ekop (1555). Later in his reign, Ivan also expanded his realm to the east, into Siberia.

Ivan’s principal aim, however, was to open trade and communication to the west to enable him to modernize his realm. He tried to encourage the immigration of skilled workers from the West, but the rulers of the neighboring realms conspired to prevent this. In 1555, Ivan opened the port of Arkhangelsk on the White Sea to the Muscovy Company of England. In 1558, Ivan attempted to take advantage of a quarrel among Sweden, Denmark, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and seize Livonia (modern Estonia and Latvia). His forces quickly captured Narva and Dorpat, but the Livonians placed themselves under the protection of the Polish king Sigismund II (1560), and Ivan’s fortunes turned.

The death of Ivan’s wife and the desertion of his advisor and close friend Prince Kurbsky to the Livonian side, both in 1560, took a terrible toll on Ivan. He vented his wrath on his subjects, with particular horrors reserved for nobles he believed had conspired against him. After suffering several reverses in the continuing Livonian War (1558–1583), Ivan withdrew from Moscow (December 1564) and announced his intention to abdicate. His subjects, fearing the return of chaos, begged him to return and offered him unlimited power. Ivan agreed, exploiting the situation by taking personal possession of vast tracts of land and wealthy towns.

Although the organs of government established earlier continued to function, Ivan and his courtiers stood above the law. Ivan even created a private army, the *oprichniki*, to enforce his will and punish his enemies, principally the boyars. Dressed in long black robes and riding black horses, the *oprichniki* terrorized the country. When the Metropolitan of Moscow condemned the *oprichnina*

(“private court”) in 1569, Ivan had him strangled. Ivan unleashed his army on the city of Novgorod, the leaders of which he suspected of treason. The *oprichniki* systematically destroyed the city and massacred some 3,000 residents (1570).

The last decades of Ivan’s life were marked by a string of failures. His second wife died in 1567 and, though he married six more times, he had only one son, Dmitry Ivanovich. The khan of Crimea raided Moscow and burned it (1571), while Ivan was busy in Livonia. The Poles, now allied with the Ottoman Empire, retook Polotsk (1579) and captured Velikie Luki (1580). In 1581, Ivan IV struck and killed his eldest son, Ivan, in a fit of rage. Crushed by remorse, Ivan again offered to abdicate, but the boyars, fearing a trick, refused to obey anyone else. Two years later, Ivan admitted defeat in the West, surrendering all of Livonia to the Poles and Ingria to the Swedes. Ivan died on March 28, 1584.

Despite his tumultuous reign, Ivan IV was a capable and influential ruler. He opened the Russian connection with Europe, expanded the territory of Muscovy by more than 1.5 million square miles, and made Russia a regional power. He created representational government bodies and codified Russian laws, although those laws bound the peasants to the land and cemented the bases of serfdom. He established a personalized, centralized form of government that persisted in some ways through the time of Josef Stalin. His economic legacy, on the other hand, was a disaster for Muscovy, and his madder actions led directly to the end of the Rurikid Dynasty and the Time of Troubles (1589–1613). Some scholars nonetheless consider Ivan the founder of modern Russia, while Russians often refer to him as a great patriot. His Western nickname, “Ivan the Terrible,” comes from the Russian: “Ivan *Grozny*.” *Grozny* may be translated as

“terrible,” but it can also mean “fearsome,” “formidable,” or even “awesome.” Ivan was certainly all of these.

*Timothy C. Dowling and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: *Gulai-gorod* (*gulyaygorod*, *gulaygorod*, or *gulai-gorod*); Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505); Livonian War (1558–1583); *Oprichniki*; Smolensk War (1632–1634); *Streltsy*; Time of Troubles

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Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919)

Russian army general. Born August 3, 1851, possibly to a peasant family, Nikolai Ivanov graduated from the Mikhailovsky Artillery College. Ivanov saw action in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, when he commanded a corps. In 1906, as military governor of Kronstadt near St. Petersburg, he helped put down an army mutiny there. Promoted to general of artillery in 1908, Ivanov took command of the Kiev Military District that same year.

As Russia mobilized in July 1914, Ivanov commanded the Southwestern Front of four armies (the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth), arrayed along a 300-mile front facing Austria-Hungary. In August, Ivanov’s armies made substantial advances into Austrian Galicia. Ivanov, however, was slow to

react to changing battlefield conditions, and he failed to take full advantage of Russian military superiority.

Following the Austro-Hungarian First Army’s defeat of the Russian Fourth Army in late August at Kraśnik, Ivanov panicked and ordered a retreat to Brest-Litovsk. He also ordered his Fifth Army to carry out an unsupported advance against the Austro-Hungarian right flank, but Fifth Army commander General Pavel Pleve disobeyed orders and withdrew from his advanced position. In September, again on the advance, Ivanov failed to take advantage of his superior numbers and moved against the Austro-Hungarians at glacial speed, halting his troops after each Austro-Hungarian defeat. The Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow in December 1914 ended Ivanov’s plans to invade Germany through Austria-Hungary.

In March 1915, the Russian High Command (*Stavka*) ordered Ivanov to attack Hungary via the Carpathians. This time Vienna requested German assistance, and as Ivanov requested German assistance, and as Ivanov employed his Third Army against Hungary, it left the remainder of his forces stretched out in defensive positions. In May, German general August von Mackensen took advantage of this, striking with his Austro-Hungarian/German Eleventh Army in what became known as the Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów. Ivanov failed to heed warnings that a Central Powers’ attack was imminent, and was caught unprepared.

The Third Army suffered heavy casualties, but the Russians managed to avoid a total disaster by a four-month-long withdrawal of their forces all the way to near Luck. The Central Powers now held Poland and Galicia. Ordered to advance in eastern Galicia in the hope of relieving pressure on beleaguered Serbia, Ivanov again demonstrated command ineptitude. He was relieved of his

position in March 1916 and was replaced by General Aleksei A. Brusilov.

Ivanov's political connections helped secure an appointment as military advisor to Czar Nicholas II. During the Russian Revolution of March 1917, the czar ordered Ivanov to lead a force of 800 men to suppress the revolutionary forces in Petrograd. Promised reinforcements failed to arrive, and Ivanov was soon forced to abort his mission. Ivanov officially retired later that year. At the end of 1918, Ivanov took nominal command of an anti-Bolshevik White Southern Army in the Don Valley. This force soon dissolved. Ivanov died from typhus in south Russia on January 27, 1919.

Harold Wise and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Kronstadt (Kronshtadt); Pleva (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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J

Jabotinsky, Vladimir Yevgenievich (Ze'ev Yina; 1880–1940)

Zionist leader, author, soldier, and founder of the Jewish Legion in World War I. Vladimir Yevgenievich (Ze'ev Yina) Jabotinsky was born into a middle-class Jewish family at Odessa in Ukraine, Russian Empire, on October 18, 1880. He left Russia in 1898 to study law in Italy and Switzerland, then became a highly acclaimed foreign correspondent whose articles appeared under the nom de plume of “Altalena” in several well-known Russian newspapers.

In 1903, when a pogrom seemed imminent in Odessa, Jabotinsky helped form the first Zionist self-defense group. As a consequence of a pogrom in Kishinev that same year, he became active in Zionist work, helping to organize self-defense units within the Jewish communities of Russia, and becoming an outspoken advocate of full civil rights for Russian Jews. Elected a delegate to the Sixth Zionist Congress in Basle in 1903, he opposed the scheme to establish a Jewish homeland in East Africa. Soon the most important Zionist speaker and journalist in Russia, Jabotinsky worked to promote Jewish culture in Russia, launching an effort in 1910 to make Hebrew the language in all Jewish schools. He also helped establish the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

With the beginning of World War I, Jabotinsky became a war correspondent. In Alexandria, Egypt, he met Joseph Trumpeldor. The two men then worked to establish Jewish military units within the British Army. Jabotinsky believed that the Ottoman Empire

was doomed and that Jewish participation in the war on the Allied side would help secure creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Their efforts began with the Zion Mule Corps of several hundred Jewish men, which served with distinction in the Gallipoli Campaign. From the beginning, Jabotinsky wanted the Jewish units to be frontline forces rather than auxiliaries. Later, Jewish Battalions (which also came to be known as the Jewish Legion) served with distinction in other campaigns against the Ottomans. Enlisting in the 38th Battalion of Royal Fusiliers as a private, Jabotinsky was soon promoted to lieutenant and participated in the Palestine Campaign, being both decorated for bravery and mentioned in dispatches.

After the war, Jabotinsky joined the Zionist Committee and for a while, headed its Political Department. British authorities in Palestine denied requests that he be allowed to arm a small number of Jews for self-defense. Nonetheless, Jabotinsky was able to arm perhaps 600 men in secret self-defense groups. In 1920, Jabotinsky was arrested following the April Arab riots in Jerusalem and charged with arms possession and served several months in prison.

In March 1921, Jabotinsky joined the executive council of World Zionist Organization. Disagreeing sharply with British policies in Palestine and with what he considered the lack of Jewish resistance to them, Jabotinsky resigned in January 1923. That same year, he helped found, and headed, the youth movement Betar (a Hebrew acronym for *B'rit Trumpeldor*, the League of Joseph Trumpeldor).



Vladimir Jabotinsky (Ze'ev Yina), Zionist leader, author, soldier, and founder of the Jewish Legion of World War I. (Library of Congress)

In 1925, Jabotinsky founded in Paris the Union of Zionist Revisionists (*B'rit Herut-Hatzohar*), and became its president. It called for the immediate establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state that would occupy both sides of the Jordan River, continued immigration until Jews were a majority there, and the establishment of a military organization to defend it. An admirer of the British form of government, he wanted the future Jewish state to be a liberal democracy.

From 1925, Jabotinsky made his home in Paris, except during 1928–1929, when he lived in Jerusalem and was director of

the Judea Insurance Company and edited the Hebrew daily newspaper *Doar Hayom*. In 1929, he left Palestine to attend the Sixteenth Zionist Congress, after which the British administration in Palestine denied him reentry. For the rest of his life, Jabotinsky lived abroad.

When the Seventeenth Zionist Congress in 1931 rejected his demand that it announce that the aim of Zionism was the creation of a Jewish state, Jabotinsky resigned from the World Zionist Organization and founded his own New Zionist Organization (NZO) at a congress held in Vienna in 1935. It demanded free immigration of Jews into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. Supplementing the NZO were its military arm, the *Irgun Zevai Leumi*, established in 1937 and which Jabotinsky commanded, and the Betar youth movement. Both organizations abetted illegal immigration to Palestine.

Fluent in a number of languages, Jabotinsky continued to write poetry, short stories, novels, and articles. Deeply concerned in the 1930s about the plight of Jews in Poland, Jabotinsky called for the evacuation of the entire Jewish population of Poland and its relocation to Palestine. During 1939–1940, Jabotinsky traveled in Britain and the United States. He especially sought the establishment of a Jewish army to fight on the Allied side against Nazi Germany. Jabotinsky suffered a massive heart attack while visiting the Betar camp near Hunter, New York, and died on August 4, 1940. In 1964, his remains and those of his wife were reinterred in Israel. The State of Israel also established a medal in his honor, which it awards for distinguished accomplishment.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Jewish Battalions (Jewish Legion); Trumpeldor, Joseph (1880–1920)

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Japan, Border Incidents with (1938–1939)

Refers principally to the two most significant border clashes that took place between the USSR and Japan in the 1930s, first in July–August 1938, and later on the Manchukuo–Outer Mongolian frontier, May–September 1939.

Many minor incidents and anticipation of a more serious collision formed a backdrop to the 1938 incidents. The presence of Soviet advisors with Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Chinese Army complicated Japanese designs in Manchuria, which they had acquired indirectly following the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and then directly after invading China in 1937, following the Mukden Incident. The Soviets viewed Japanese troop movements in Manchuria as a threat to Vladivostok, the USSR's major naval base on the Pacific Ocean. They were also concerned about the intelligence consequences of the recent desertion of Soviet general G. S. Lyushkov to the Japanese side.

The first major clash began in July 1938 about 140 kilometers southwest of Vladivostok, at Lake Khasan, near the mouth of the Tumen River, where a sliver of territory belonging to the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo was squeezed between the northern border of Japanese-controlled Korea and the southern Soviet frontier. The exact location of the borders, the subject of the 1886 Sino-Russian treaty, had become unclear as

boundary markers subsequently were lost or moved.

Red Army troops occupied Zaozernaya Hill (Changkufeng, in Chinese) on the western side of Lake Khasan on July 11, 1938. According to the 1886 treaty, the hill marked the frontier; nevertheless, the Japanese, using Korean and Kwantung Army troops, attacked the Soviets and drove them from the hill.

Failing to deflect the Japanese quickly, the Soviets moved additional infantry, artillery, tank, and air forces into position and counterattacked on August 6, driving the Japanese from the hill and inflicting heavy casualties. The two sides deployed about 40,000 troops altogether, but the Red Army employed many more airplanes and tanks. On August 11, both sides agreed to a cease-fire.

The second incident occurred on the border between Japanese-controlled Manchukuo (as they now called Manchuria) and Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia as a dispute over a strip of territory that stretched about 70 kilometers along the Khalkin Gol, or Halha River. The eastern edge of the disputed territory lay 20 kilometers east of the river on a line passing through a place named Nomonhan.

Each side claimed illegal incursions by the other and soon employed military force to drive the other side out. In early May, Japanese soldiers claimed that Mongolian cavalry troopers violated the disputed border area. On May 28, the Soviets alleged Japanese violations of the border. Reinforcements were called up, beginning a series of escalations that soon included tank and air operations.

On June 2, Soviet General Georgy K. Zhukov was ordered to Mongolia to direct Red Army operations. Small-scale fighting continued while Zhukov built up the Soviet

forces. Zhukov launched an offensive on August 19–20, that resembled Hannibal’s classic encirclement of the Romans at Cannae in 216 BC, using his armor and mechanized forces to surround the Japanese force and, by August 28, crush it. The last Japanese survivors escaped on August 31.

In early September, the Japanese acknowledged their defeat by seeking and, on September 15, signed a cease-fire. The Soviets placed Japanese losses at more than 60,000, though the Japanese admitted to fewer than 20,000, about the same number claimed by the Soviets for their side.

The signing of the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression on August 23, 1939, by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop may have contributed to the Japanese decision to settle rather than escalate. This treaty, which cleared the way for the German invasion of Poland, eviscerated the Anti-Comintern Pact and ended Japanese hope of German aid in a war against the Soviet Union.

The USSR and Japan concluded an agreement in June 1940 that settled the border issues linked to Lake Khasan and Khalkin Gol. On April 13, 1941, the two nations signed a neutrality treaty that secured the Soviet eastern frontier and allowed Japan to turn its attention to other areas that soon brought it into conflict with the United States. The neutrality treaty lasted until 1945, when the Soviets denounced it and attacked Japan as part of an agreement with European and American allies.

Larry A. Grant

See also: Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Lake Khasan, Battle of; Manchuria Campaign (August 9–September 5, 1945); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Japan, War versus (1945).

See Manchuria Campaign
(August 9–September 5, 1945)

Japanese Intervention in Siberia (1918–1922)

The Siberian Intervention was part of an Allied effort after World War I to secure Allied military stockpiles sent to the previous Russian regimes and to topple the Bolsheviks from power. The Japanese government, moreover, saw the intervention as an opportunity to further its imperialist ambitions in the region.

By early 1918, the Bolsheviks had taken Russia out of World War I. In response, the Allies sent troops to a number of places in Russia, including the Russian Far East. The intervening Allied governments publicly announced that they would respect Russian territorial integrity, would not interfere in Russian internal affairs, and would withdraw their forces as soon as the limited objectives of the intervention had been secured. Japanese leaders in Tokyo, however, saw the intervention as a golden opportunity

to expand their territorial reach in East Asia. Japan already controlled Korea and had been seeking an opportunity to push northward into Manchuria and Siberia.

The United States, Britain, France, Canada, several European countries, and Japan all sent troops to Vladivostok. The largest contingents were the United States and Japanese. Each government had agreed to send 7,500 men, and while the United States did deploy that number, Japan dispatched many more. Exact figures on the Japanese forces are uncertain. The number could have been as few as 30,000 but it was probably closer to 90,000 men.

While Allied troops guarded military stockpiles at Vladivostok and sought to secure the vast Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Japanese embarked on a grander plan. Japanese troops penetrated deep into Siberia. One force moved north from Vladivostok into the Maritime Province of eastern Siberia, while another formation headed westward from Vladivostok via the Chinese Eastern Railroad through northern Manchuria to Irkutsk, west of Lake Baikal.

In 1919, Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, head of the Russian provisional government at Omsk, commanded the major anti-Bolshevik (White) Russian forces. In addition to Kolchak, other strong anti-Bolshevik forces were led by Grigory Semenov at Chita in the Trans-Baikal region and Ivan Klmykov in the area around Khabarovsk in the Maritime Province. These and other anti-Bolshevik groups operated largely independently of one another. Instead of encouraging these forces to cooperate in fighting the Bolsheviks, the Japanese seemed bent on encouraging strife between the White factions. Thus they permitted Semenov's men to interfere with railway operations and hijack quantities of arms, munitions, and other supplies intended for the Omsk government.

Meanwhile, Kolchak's government at Omsk alienated many Russians by its policy of attempting to cooperate with the Japanese. Increasingly, Russian partisans carried out military operations against the Japanese occupiers, who were despised for their repressive policies. In one incident at Yufta in February 1919, partisans almost completely wiped out a unit of 300 Japanese. Perhaps in retaliation, on March 22, Japanese troops destroyed the village of Ivanovka, killing 232 inhabitants. There were other similar actions.

Following the near complete collapse of White forces at the end of 1919, the United States announced its intention to withdraw its forces from Siberia, an action that put great pressure on Tokyo. On February 27, 1920, the Japanese government announced a partial withdrawal from part of Siberia.

During February–May 1920, in the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident, Russian partisans executed some 700 Japanese as well as a larger number of Russians at the town of Nikolaevsk on the Amur River. On April 1, the remaining Allied forces were evacuated from Vladivostok, leaving only the Japanese as occupiers in Siberia. The Japanese military quickly established control of the Maritime Province and set up a provisional government of the Far Eastern Republic that declared its independence, which the Soviets recognized on May 14 in a bid to secure time. By the end of 1920, the Russian Civil War had come to an end, with the remaining White armies driven off Russian soil.

To pressure the Japanese to withdraw from Siberia, on May 31, 1921, the United States announced a policy whereby it would refuse to recognize the Japanese-supported political arrangement there. Finally, on June 10, 1922, Tokyo announced its intention to withdraw its troops. The last Japanese forces in Siberia departed Vladivostok on October 25,

1922, abandoning there some 50,000 Japanese settlers. On January 20, 1925, Tokyo signed a treaty with Moscow, whereupon its troops also left north Sakhalin Island.

Andrew Jackson Waskey

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act (April 13, 1941)

Important treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan, signed on April 13, 1941. When the Soviet Union and Germany concluded their nonaggression pact on August 23, 1939, the Japanese were caught by surprise; when Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka Yōsuke visited Berlin in March 1941, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered that he not be informed about Operation BARBAROSSA, Germany's plan to invade the Soviet Union.

On his way back to Tokyo, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow, where he concluded the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact. This guaranteed territorial inviolability, as well as neutrality, in case either power became involved in hostilities with a third nation. The treaty was to be valid for five years, with an

automatic extension for an additional five years.

Since 1939, Tokyo had sought an agreement with the Soviet Union to remove a threat from the north as it attempted to conquer China. The Japanese first raised the idea of a nonaggression pact in May and June 1940, when the fall of France allowed Tokyo to contemplate a move against the European colonies in Southeast Asia.

Negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow began in August 1940. The Soviets pursued a cautious approach, suggesting a neutrality agreement instead of a nonaggression pact to avoid straining its relationship with the Western powers. The Japanese urged a more binding treaty, with the undisguised goal of Japanese expansion southward. The Japanese memorandum resembled the content of the secret protocol of the 1939 German-Soviet pact, calling on the Soviet Union to recognize the traditional interests of Japan in Outer Mongolia and the three provinces of northern China (Manchuria), and to agree that French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies lay within the Japanese sphere of influence. In return, Japan agreed to look favorably on a Soviet advance into Afghanistan and Persia (Iran).

The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact greatly facilitated Japanese expansion in the southeastern Pacific and its attack on the United States. Soviet leader Josef Stalin's policy toward Japan in the summer and fall of 1941 resembled his attitude toward Germany before June 1941. He ordered his generals in the Soviet Far East to avoid any hostilities with Japan along their common border in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Despite this treaty, Japan contemplated attacking the Soviet Union in the fall of 1941. Leaders of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria especially supported such a move, but Tokyo decided on a move south. Tokyo reached its decision based on

earlier fighting with the Soviets, the difficult weather in Siberia, and the absence from that region of natural resources Japan needed.

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 was of immense assistance to the Soviet Union in its war with Germany. Had Germany and Japan cooperated, the Axis powers might have won World War II. Thanks to Japan's neutrality, the Soviet Far East provided the Soviet Western Front with 250,000 men between 1941 and 1944. The pact also allowed the Soviet Union to benefit from substantial and vital U.S. Lend-Lease aid.

Simultaneously, Japan gained immensely from the pact. During its war with the United States, it received from the Soviet Union 40 million tons of coal, 140 million tons of wood, 50 million tons of iron, 10 million tons of fish, and substantial quantities of gold from Siberia and the Soviet Far East.

The Soviet Union ultimately broke the pact in 1945. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the Soviets promised to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the end of the war in Europe, in return for territorial concessions in the Far East. Three months to the day, on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan.

Eva-Maria Stolberg

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Manchuria Campaign (August 9–September 5, 1945); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Jewish Battalions (Jewish Legion)

Formations of Jewish volunteers raised by Great Britain, sometimes called the Jewish Legion, who fought in World War I. Expelled by the Ottoman Empire, Palestinian Jews who retained citizenship with Entente countries gathered in Egypt in December 1914. Many of them, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor, petitioned to join the British Army. London initially rejected their offer, but later formed the 650-man Zion Mule Corps under Colonel John H. Patterson with Trumpeldor as his second in command. The Mule Corps served with distinction in the Gallipoli Campaign carrying supplies to the front lines until disbanded at the campaign's conclusion.

Jabotinsky and others continued to lobby for the establishment of Jewish combat units, believing that these would further the Zionist cause. In August 1917, shortly after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, British prime minister David Lloyd George and foreign secretary Arthur Balfour approved the formation of a Jewish regiment. Patterson, assisted by Jabotinsky, who became his aide-de-camp, recruited a battalion from Jewish refugees and Mule Corps' veterans. This battalion, the 38th Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment), completed training in February 1918 and arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, in March.

In April, Britain formed the 39th Battalion, primarily from U.S. and Canadian Jewish volunteers, and in June, it recruited the 40th Battalion from Jews who had remained in Palestine. Grouped together and attached to the Australian and New Zealand Mounted

Division, the Jewish battalions forced a crossing of the Jordan River, paving the way for British lieutenant general Sir Edmund Allenby's successful autumn offensive and the capture of Damascus.

Britain also formed the 41st and 42nd Reserve Battalions from Jewish volunteers. These remained in Britain and supplied replacements for the three combat battalions. In all, some 6,500 Jews served in these five battalions, including David Ben-Gurion, Israel's future first prime minister. Most of these veterans settled in Palestine after the war.

Stephen K. Stein

See also: Jabotinsky, Vladimir Yevgenievich (*Ze'ev Yina*) (1880–1940); Trumpeldor, Joseph (1880–1920)

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July Days. See Kornilov Rebellion (1917)

K

Kagul (Cahul), Battle of, 1770

Russian military victory in the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774). In May 1770, Russian forces under General Pyotr Rumiantsev left Khotin, a fortress on the Dniestr River, advancing along the Prut River into Moldavia (present-day Romania), which was then a province of the Ottoman Empire. In June, Rumiantsev defeated the Ottomans at Riabaia Moglia and then at the Large River. In July, the Russians encountered the main Ottoman forces at Kagul.

Rumiantsev led approximately 40,000 men, while the Ottoman grand vizier Halil Bey brought 150,000 to the field. On August 1, Rumiantsev took the offensive. His troops advanced during the night in a dispersed formation of five divisional squares interspersed with artillery and cavalry, but were detected. Halil Bey launched a cavalry attack at dawn, which the Russians repulsed with artillery and infantry fire.

The Russians resumed their frontal attack on the Ottoman camp, falling most heavily on the Ottoman left, which fell back. A counterattack by the Ottoman Janissaries, however, broke open a large gap in the Russian center. Rumiantsev personally led the infantry and artillery reserves that plugged the hole, and Russian firepower quickly broke the Janissaries. Rumiantsev followed up this success with a cavalry change, then an all-out assault by all five squares.

With the Janissaries defeated, the Russians turning both Ottoman flanks, and Russian artillery beginning to harass their rear, the remainder of the Ottoman forces broke

and fled. The Russian pursuit caught the Ottomans before they could cross the Danube. Overall, the Ottomans suffered over 20,000 killed and wounded, and over 2,000 captured. Russian casualties totaled around 400.

Kagul was Rumiantsev's greatest battlefield success, and secured his reputation as Russia's foremost general of the day. The defeat forced the Ottoman Empire onto the defensive for the remainder of the war.

Grant T. Weller

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Larga, Battle of the (July 7, 1770); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

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Kalashnikov, Mikhail Timofeevich (1919–2013)

Small arms designer most famous for the creation of the AK-47 assault rifle, as well as the AKM and the AK-74 rifles. All of these rifles have been manufactured, copied, and used prolifically since their introduction.

Mikhail Kalashnikov was born on November 10, 1919 in Kurya, Altai Krai, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. He was one of 19 children in his family. Kalashnikov was drafted into the Red Army in 1938. By 1941, Kalashnikov had achieved the rank of senior sergeant tank commander in Styri, with the 24th Tank Regiment of the 12th Tank Division. He was with the division in June 1941, when they retreated following the Battle of Brody. Kalashnikov was wounded at Bryansk in October and sent back to hospital to recuperate. There Kalashnikov reportedly heard soldiers complaining about the Soviet infantry rifle of the time, the 1891 Mosin-Nagant.

Kalashnikov also had difficulties with the weapon, and thus sought to create a rifle that would be easily employed by basic infantryman and still be able to deliver a significant weight of fire in battle. Kalashnikov's first design did not gain acceptance by the Soviet military, though they recognized his talent as a designer. By 1942, he was transferred to the Central Scientific-developmental Firing Range for Rifle Firearms of the Chief Artillery Directorate of RKKA (*Raboche-Krest'yanskaya Krasnaya Armiya*; the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army). By 1947, Kalashnikov had the AK-47 (*Avtomat Kalashnikova* model 1947) prototype finished. The weapon, with its simplicity and ease of use, became the standard infantry weapon off the RKKA by 1956.

Kalashnikov created numerous weapons in the AK series and held a high place in Soviet society as the creator of a weapon used in "liberation struggles" around the world. Kalashnikov also wrote six books, and he enjoyed some status as a poet. Kalashnikov received the "Hero of the Russian Federation" award on November 10, 2009, from former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. He died in Izhevsk, Russia, on December 23, 2013.

Nicholas Efstathiou

See also: AK-47; World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Kaledin, Aleksei Maksimovich (1861–1918)

Born the son of a Don Cossack officer on October 24, 1861, Aleksei Kaledin graduated from the Vornezh Military School in 1880, the Artillery School in St. Petersburg in 1882, and the General Staff Academy in 1889. During 1903–1906, he was head of the Novochoerkassk Military Academy; he then served as assistant chief of staff for the Don Army, a Cossack cavalry force.

During World War I, he commanded a cavalry division in Eighth Army under General Aleksei Brusilov on the Southwestern Front. Brusilov praised Kaledin as one of his best commanders, particularly, after his performance in the Battle of Lutsk in June 1916. Unlike Brusilov though, Kaledin refused to accept the orders of the Provisional Government following the February Revolution; Kaledin was therefore relieved of his command.

He returned to Voronezh, and was elected ataman (hetman) of the Don Cossack Army and head of a putative Cossack government. During August 1917, Kaledin traveled to Moscow to discuss a military coup with conservative army leaders, perhaps at the behest of former army chief of staff Mikhail Alekseev. Local authorities attempted to arrest Kaledin upon his return to Voronezh, having been informed by the leader of the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky,

that Kaledin had been removed as leader of the Cossacks. Other Cossack leaders protected him, however, and Kaledin continued to work against the Provisional Government and, after the October Revolution, the Bolshevik regime.

During October–December 1917, Kaledin led a fierce and often brutal anti-Bolshevik rebellion in the Don region. His forces inflicted severe casualties, but never managed to defeat the Reds; when the Cossacks lost control of Rostov-on-Don and were forced to retreat in horrible weather conditions, Kaledin lost hope; he committed suicide on February 11, 1918.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Cossacks; February (March) Revolution (1917); Lutsk, Battle of (June 4–6, 1916); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Kalinin, Recapture of (December 15, 1941)

Major battle during the Soviet counteroffensive to reverse the German army's drive to Moscow. Kalinin (Tver), situated some 100 miles northwest of Moscow, served as the northern linchpin in the defense of the Soviet capital. Retreating to within 40 miles of Moscow, the Soviets brought up 100 fresh divisions, including 34 from Siberia specially trained for winter warfare. From mid-November to December 4, German

casualties reached some 85,000 in the Moscow area alone. The unusually early and harsh winter, with temperatures as low as -31°F , had brought most motorized transport to a halt. The German army, unlike its Soviet counterpart, was ill-prepared to fight in such conditions.

Complicating the situation, German chancellor Adolf Hitler issued orders on December 1 that threw the German high command into disarray. He relieved Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt as commander of Fifth Panzer Army and personally took command of this crucial sector of the front. That same day, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, commanding Army Group Center, relayed the message that German troops were completely exhausted. The German drive against Moscow had ground to a halt.

On November 30, Soviet leader Josef Stalin had agreed to plans drawn up by the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, and the next day, the General Staff made final preparations for the offensive. On December 5, Soviet commander on the Moscow front General Georgy Zhukov began the first great Soviet counteroffensive in the Kalinin sector. Siberian troops, who were extremely effective in cold weather operations, were used for these actions.

The next day, Zhukov ordered a general offensive against German forces west of Moscow. Some 88 Soviet divisions with 1,700 tanks and 1,500 aircraft attacked 67 German divisions (many of them understrength) on a 500-mile front between Kalinin and Jelez. They pushed back the exhausted Germans, encircling them where possible and forcing a general retreat.

Hitler, however, forbade anything but the shortest withdrawals. On December 8, with the Red Army achieving many breakthroughs, he ordered his troops to go over to purely defensive operations and hold their positions at

all costs. This decision condemned thousands of Germans to death. On December 13, Soviet forces moved to relieve Leningrad, extending the counteroffensive to the northwest. On December 14, German troops departed Kalinin, which the Soviets entered the next day. Hitler assumed command of the German army on December 19, and German forces managed to establish a stable front some 55 miles west of Moscow one day later. The Red Army's winter counteroffensive continued into February 1942, although its greatest gains were registered at its beginning.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Kaluga, Battle of (December 26–30, 1941); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich (1882–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg)

Founded as a fortress of the Teutonic Knights in 1255, the Baltic port of Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) became part of the Hanseatic League in 1340. It was ruled by the dukes of Prussia between 1525 and 1618. Disputed by Sweden and Prussia during the Thirty Years' War, it returned to Prussia and became the site of coronation for kings of Prussia in 1701. It remained part of Prussia,

and thus part of Germany, until 1945, when the Potsdam Conference ceded the territory to the Soviet Union. It was renamed in honor of Mikhail Kalinin, the first president of the Soviet Union, in 1946.

The port itself sits at the mouth of the Pregolya River, which empties into the Vistula Lagoon. In 1901, a new canal allowed ships with a draught up to 21 feet to access Koenigsberg directly. The Strait of Baltiysk (Pillau) provides access to the Bay of Danzig from the Vistula Lagoon.

When the port passed to Soviet control, the surviving German population was expelled. The city was rebuilt, having suffered massive destruction during the war, repopulated, and turned into a Russian-speaking military enclave. As the only warmwater port on the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad became home to the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and the headquarters of the Baltic Military District. The port and the surrounding area were closed to foreign visitors, as well as to the average Soviet citizen, as the area was heavily militarized during the Cold War. At least 100,000 troops were based in Kaliningrad, and nuclear weapons were housed in the region. In addition to naval and submarine bases, the Kaliningrad Oblast is home to two air bases.

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 disconnected Kaliningrad from the territory of the Russian Federation, the Kaliningrad Oblast remains Russian territory, and an important military and manufacturing base. It was designated as a special economic zone in 1996, and is more, though not completely, open to visitors.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Navy, Soviet (1917–1991)

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Kalisz, Battle of (October 29, 1706)

Part of the Great Northern War.

The Battle of Kalisz was almost certainly unnecessary, and made no difference in the overall conflict. It resulted from a lack of communication, when August of Saxony failed to inform his Russian allies that he had signed a treaty with the Poles abdicating his claim to the throne. The Russian commander, Aleksandr Menshikov, was providing the funds for August's troops, so the Saxon commander did not wish to alienate his ally. He did try to inform the Swedes of developments, but their commander suspected a trick, and held his ground.

The Swedish army numbered only about 4,000 though allied Polish and Lithuanian cavalry brought the total manpower close to 14,000. Against them, Menshikov fielded a force of 20,000 while August's army numbered 6,000 and another 10,000 Polish mercenaries and rebels stood on the Russian side. The odds were not in Sweden's favor, but large Russian forces had often been defeated by smaller, disciplined forces earlier in the war.

When the Russian force advanced, however, the Polish and Lithuanian cavalry simply fled, leaving the Swedish infantry exposed. Even though the Saxons held back, the Russians proceeded to crush the Swedes over the course of three hours. The Swedes suffered 700 killed and 1,800 captured before they yielded the field of battle to the Russians. Menshikov's forces lost more than 750 men in the battle. The Russian victory was rendered meaningless when the

agreement between Saxony and Poland was publicized two weeks later.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Danilovich (1673–1729)

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Kaluga, Battle of (December 26–30, 1941)

The culmination of the Soviet winter offensive in December 1941 that halted the Soviets' drive on Moscow. Kaluga is situated some 90 miles southwest of Moscow; the Germans had taken it on October 12, 1941.

Reinforced by 100 fresh divisions, the Soviets launched a massive counteroffensive to save Moscow on December 5–6, 1941. The action took place in subzero temperatures and with German forces exhausted and strung out along a front of 560 miles, from Kalinin in the north to Yelets in the south. During the first days of their offensive, the Soviets registered significant progress. Where possible, Red Army troops avoided frontal assaults, endeavoring to flank and get behind the German positions and cut them off. Partisans also struck the overextended German communication and supply lines.

Fearful of encirclement, the Germans destroyed what they could and withdrew. On December 13, the Soviet government issued a communiqué announcing that the German effort to take Moscow had failed. On December 14, Soviet general Ivan Zakharin's Forty-Ninth Army went on the offensive

north of Tula against Army Group Center (*Heeresgruppe Mitte*). Despite Adolf Hitler's order of December 16 calling for "fanatical resistance," the right wing of the German Fourth Army on the east bank of the Oka River collapsed, and on December 17, Aleksin fell. The offensive continued in the direction of Tarusa, which was taken the next day.

A special mobile group under Lieutenant General V.S. Popov, including cavalry, infantry, and tank units, then moved in deep snow on the southern bank of the Oka. The offensive to recapture Kaluga began on December 17. In three days, Popov's troops covered nearly 60 miles, and by the evening of December 20, they had Kaluga in sight. The Germans there were taken completely by surprise. During the morning of the next day, the 154th Rifle Division, supported by the 31st Cavalry Division and tanks, attacked the railway station.

On December 26, German resistance in the Nara-Fominsk area broke and the city was retaken. Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets soon fell. On December 28, Hitler issued a new order calling for every hamlet and farm to be turned into defensive positions and held at all costs. Counterattacks could not be realized, however. German tanks were no longer capable of offensive operations but could only cover retreating infantry units.

Much more adept at fighting in winter conditions, the Soviets threw back every German attempt to stop their advance. Unable to cover and plug the ever-increasing number of holes appearing in their front line, the Germans had to withdraw even farther west. On December 30, Soviet forces completely secured Kaluga. The Soviet offensive ended on January 5, 1942. The Soviet army had established a line between Uhnov, Kirov, and Ludinovo and completed the encirclement

of Army Group Center. The German army had lost 25 percent of its original strength and been handed its first strategic defeat.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Kalinin, Recapture of (December 15, 1941)

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Kanin, Vasily Aleksandrovich (1862–1927)

Russian navy admiral. Born on December 23, 1862, Vasily Aleksandrovich Kanin graduated from the Russian Navy School in 1882 as a midshipman. He attended the Mine Officers' Class in 1891 and became a specialist in that field. He served in the Baltic Fleet and in the Pacific, participating in the suppression of the Boxer Uprising (Boxer Rebellion) in 1900–1901. He then served in the Black Sea Fleet, reaching the rank of captain first rank in 1908.

Kanin returned to the Baltic Fleet in 1911 as chief of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. He was promoted to rear admiral on December 19, 1913, and appointed to command the minelaying detachment. Kanin's force laid the first of the defensive minefields at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland on July 31, 1914. In early 1915, he was appointed chief of the mine defenses, a post which brought together the minelayers and the light forces

intended for the direct defense of the minefields. He also led a minelaying operation into German waters on January 12–14, 1915, when his force carried out the operation even though radio intelligence indicated that German vessels were nearby. Kanin was awarded the Order of St. George for this operation; in fact reportedly he had wanted to break off the operation but was dissuaded from doing so by Captain First Rank Aleksandr V. Kolchak.

On February 22, 1915, Kanin was promoted to vice admiral. When Admiral Nikolai von Essen, commander of the Baltic Fleet, died on May 20, Kanin was appointed his successor. Kanin retained this post for 16 months and was promoted to admiral on April 23, 1916. He did not prove to be an outstanding fleet commander. Although several successful operations were carried out during his tenure—most notably, the defense of the Gulf of Riga in August 1915—Admiral Aleksandr I. Rusin, chief of the Naval Field Staff at *Stavka*, felt that he was not active enough, and that under his leadership, discipline had grown lax.

In September 1916, Rusin and naval minister Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovich strongly pressed Czar Nicholas II to replace Kanin. Nicholas reluctantly agreed, appointing Vice Admiral Adrian I. Nepenin as the new Baltic Fleet commander. Kanin was appointed to the State Council, and in January 1917, he was made a member of the Admiralty Council and served as an assistant to the naval minister for shipbuilding affairs. He retired in December 1917.

By this time, the Bolsheviks had seized power, and Kanin joined the White forces in south Russia during the ensuing Russian Civil War. In November 1918, General Anton I. Denikin appointed him commander of the Volunteer Army's largely nonexistent Black Sea naval forces, but he was replaced

by Admiral M.P. Sablin in early 1919. In November 1920, Kanin left Russia, settling in France. He died at Marseilles on June 17, 1927.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: Essen, Nikolai Ottovich von (1860–1915); Grigorovich, Ivan Konstantinovich (1853–1930); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Nepenin, Adrian Ivanovich (1871–1917)

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Kapustin Yar

Cradle of the Soviet rocketry, Soviet military proving ground, and space port; situated east of Volgograd, in the steppe near the Volga River, north of the Caspian Sea, and named after the nearby village Kapustin Yar.

At the end of World War II, Soviet intelligence teams were racing with American army intelligence teams for remnants of the Nazi A-4 missiles program (Aggregate 4/A-4, aka *Vengeance* weapon). The Soviets created construction bureaus and research institutes at former Nazi science centers in the Russian zone of occupation to scour abandoned A-4 sites for parts, documents, and scientists to evaluate its military use in a Soviet missiles program. Promising prospects moved Stalin to decree the transfer

of all rocket development engineering and industry from the army to the government ministries. He assigned top-priority status and trusted deputy ministers to the program on May 16, 1946.

These research centers were shipped in toto to the USSR and continued work at an institute near Moscow headed by Sergei Pavlovich Korolov. In October 1946, the German scientists apprehended in the Russian zone were brought to a secluded place in the USSR to consult on the Soviet missile program. In June 1947, Kapustin Yar became a test range after Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrikh Del*, NKVD') chief Lavrenti Beria proposed an area near the small town to Stalin as the proving ground for the missiles. A highway and railroad tracks were built within weeks to connect the remote range in the Astrakhan steppe with Stalin-grad (now Volgograd).

On October 18, 1947, the first missile was successfully launched. The A-4 was renamed R-1, first in the R-series of missiles in the USSR. The enhanced version of the world famous "Scud" (SS-20 RSD-10) was the last of the series. Later missiles were equipped with scientific devices, leading to specialized geophysical rockets (B-series), and other high-altitude research rockets, which were all exclusively tested from this range.

Innumerable Soviet intermediate- and short-range missiles were tested in Kapustin Yar during the 1950s. The site grew into a military complex of bunkers, launch and observation pads, and special launching sites for transcontinental long-range missiles and space carrier devices, making it the most important ballistic missile and rocket testing site of the Soviet military program.

At a new cosmodrome, engineering of rockets for space travel and satellite programs extended the military program. The

first Soviet military satellite, *Cosmos-1*, was launched in March 1962. The range was opened to international use with the launch of French and Indian satellites in 1969.

The proving ground was instrumental in the testing and development of interceptor rockets, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, submarine missiles, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; and for sending the first Sputnik, first dog, first man, and first woman in space; and for conducting the first space walk. The USA-USSR arms reduction treaty of 1988 forced the Soviets to discontinue the nuclear warhead programs and sent the site into 10 years of decay.

With the collapse of the Soviet-sponsored space program in 1992 came the end of the space program at this site. The city dissociated itself from the former military area, and Kapustin Yar was renamed Snamensk. In 1998, however, the launch of the French satellite *Abrixas* resumed the work at the Kapustin Yar Cosmodrome, from which commercial, telecommunication, and meteorological satellites are still launched into orbit. It also became a military test range again for the entire armed forces of Russia in 1999.

Christiane Grieb

See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); OSOAVIAKHIM Operation; SALT II (1972–1979); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO)

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Kashgar, Battle of (1934)

Kashgar is located in the Xinjiang Province of western China, an area dominated by Turkic Uighur and Kirghiz people who are overwhelmingly Muslim. Thus it has little in common with the majority of Chinese citizens, especially the ruling class. The Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek essentially abandoned any efforts at controlling the region, as it attempted to slow the Japanese advance in Manchuria and combat the native communist insurgency. For all intents, local warlords controlled the city and the region, which was economically dependent upon trade with the Soviet Union. The Soviets supplied manufactured goods and purchased raw materials in the region, and saw the territory as a potentially easy conquest given the distractions faced by the Chinese government. Soviet premier Josef Stalin feared the Japanese intended to drive westward, creating a buffer between China and the Soviet Union that would halt trade and create a staging area for an invasion of the Soviet heartland.

Uighur and Kirghiz nationalists had proclaimed the area the East Turkestan Republic (ETR), headed by President Khoja Niyaz, in 1933. The new republic's capital, Kashgar, nonetheless remained occupied by elements of the Chinese 36th Division commanded by General Ma Zhancang. In January 1934, Emir Abdullah Bughra attacked the city's defenses, attempting to drive out the Nationalists. He was soon reinforced by Niyaz and thousands of poorly equipped, undisciplined troops. Despite having no access to resupply and being heavily outnumbered, the Nationalists managed to retain control over the

Chinese portion of the city. Although they could not hold the entire urban area, they inflicted heavy casualties upon the attackers.

While Niyaz struggled to establish control over the region, Stalin decided that a small Soviet intervention might provide enough assistance to complete the capture of Kashgar and the surrounding area. He dispatched two brigades of Soviet troops to intervene in northern Xinjiang, hoping to tip the balance. These troops used heavy concentrations of airpower and chemical weapons to drive the Chinese defenders out of the northern half of the province. Ironically, as the Chinese Nationalists retreated, they moved toward Kashgar, leading to an attack in February that drove Niyaz and his supporters away. Once the area around Kashgar was recaptured, the 36th Division instigated a counterattack that included a massacre of Uighur civilians, killing thousands in an orgy of retaliatory fury. Although Soviet intervention failed to guarantee the survival of the ETR, it sapped the forces available in the region for the Nationalists, thus strengthening the ongoing communist insurrection.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Sino-Soviet Border Conflict; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Xianjiang, Battle of (1937)

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
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Katyn Forest Massacre (1940)

World War II Soviet atrocity in Poland. On April 13, 1990, the Soviet news agency

TASS (*Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuz*) announced that a joint commission of Polish and Soviet historians had found documents proving the involvement of personnel from the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrikh Del'*, or NKVD) in the deaths of some 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland in 1940. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev handed over a list of the victims to Polish president Wojciech Jaruzelski. In October 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin produced more documents to help determine the burial sites of missing officers not found near Katyn.

Until 1990, the USSR had denied murdering captured Polish army officers after its occupation of eastern Poland ever since Radio Berlin announced, on April 13, 1943, that



Largest of the mass graves during exhumation at the Katyn Forest massacre site in 1943. (AP Photo)

German troops had discovered mass graves near Smolensk. In June 1943, the German Field Police reported that 4,143 bodies had been found in the Katyn Forest, all clothed in Polish army uniforms. Some 2,815 corpses were later identified by personal documents in their pockets. Without exception, the officers had been killed by shots in the back of the head. Medical examination later showed that a few bodies had jaws smashed by blows or bayonet wounds in their backs or stomachs, probably sustained when the individuals tried to resist.

General Władysław Sikorski's London-based Polish government-in-exile and General Władysław Anders, commander of the Polish forces in the USSR and the Middle East, had been worrying for a considerable time over the fate of the missing officers. Following the Soviet-Polish agreement in the summer of 1941, a small but steady trickle of Poles arrived at the reopened Polish embassy in Kuibyshev. These individuals, from prison camps scattered over the western USSR, agreed that their fellow servicemen had been transferred to unknown destinations when the NKVD liquidated the camps in April 1940. The arrivals at Kuibyshev turned out to be the few survivors of the Katyn Forest Massacre. The massacre was apparently a Soviet effort to deprive the Poles of their natural leaders, who would undoubtedly oppose a Soviet takeover.

After numerous fruitless discussions with Soviet authorities, the Polish government-in-exile came to believe the German announcement of April 1943 and demanded an independent investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This led the Kremlin to accuse the Polish government-in-exile of siding with the "fascist aggressors" and to break off diplomatic relations. The ICRC, pursuing its policy of

neutrality, could take no action without Soviet consent. London, although embarrassed by this development, was unwilling to risk an end to the alliance with the Soviet Union over such an investigation. The United States took a similar stance.

When the Red Army finally drove the German armies westward, Moscow carried out own investigation in 1944. A Soviet “special commission” pointed out that the bullets found on the crime scene were manufactured in Germany and concluded that the Germans had killed the Polish officers. The Soviet prosecution raised the Katyn affair at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, but was unable to prove the German guilt, and the tribunal dropped the case. Throughout the Cold War, the issue of the Katyn Forest Massacre resurfaced time and again; however, it remained unresolved until the dissolution of the USSR.

Pascal Trees

See also: NKVD; Nuremberg Trial (and Others); Poland Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II

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Katyusha Multiple-Rocket Launcher

The Soviet Union’s Katyusha multiple-rocket launcher was developed by a design team

headed by Georgy E. Langemak at the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory beginning in 1938 in direct response to the German development in 1936 of the six-barrel “Nebelwerfer” (“Fog Thrower”) rocket launcher. The Soviet rocket was at first intended for aircraft use and was approved on June 21, 1941, on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. It was first employed in combat in a truck-mounted mode by the Red Army against the Germans in July 1941. The rockets were unofficially named for the title of a popular Russian wartime song; *Katyusha* is a diminutive for Ekaterina (Catherine). The Germans knew the weapon as the *Stalinorgan* (Stalin Organ) because of its distinctive sound.

The unguided *Katyusha* rocket appeared in a variety of sizes. The first was the BM-8 (BM for *boevaya mashina*, or combat vehicle) 82-millimeter (mm) rocket, but by the end of the war, the Soviets were using BM-13 132-mm rockets. The BM-13 was nearly 6 feet in length, weighed 92 pounds, and had a range of about 3 miles. Such rockets could be armed with high-explosive, incendiary, or chemical warheads. Although not an accurate weapon, the Katyusha could be extremely effective in saturation bombardments when large numbers of launch trucks were deployed side by side.

The launch system consisted of a series of parallel rails with a folding frame that was raised to bring the rockets into firing position. Katyushas were mounted on a variety of truck beds to fire forward over the cab. Each truck mounted between 14 and 48 launchers. Trucks included the Soviet ZiS-6, and the Lend-Lease-supplied and U.S.-manufactured Studebaker US6 2.5-ton. Katyushas were also mounted on T-40 and T-60 tanks and on aircraft for use against German tanks. They also appeared on ships



A group of Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, also known as “Stalin’s Organ,” during the Battle of Kursk. (Getty Images)

and riparian vessels in a ground-support role. Artillerists were not fond of the multiple-rocket launch system, because it took up to 50 minutes to load and fired only 24 rounds, whereas a conventional howitzer could fire four to six times as many rounds in a comparable period.

Katyushas continued to undergo refinement. During the Cold War, Soviet forces were equipped with the BM-24 240-mm Katyusha, which had a range of about six miles. Each truck mounted 12 rockets. Two racks, one on top of the other, contained six rockets each. In 1963, the Soviets introduced the 122-mm BM-21. It was exported to more than 50 countries. Larger 220-mm and 300-mm Katyushas were also developed.

The name *Katyusha* has, however, become a generic term applied to all small artillery rockets, even those developed by Israel based on Soviet Katyushas, captured during the 1967 Six-Day War. The Israeli Light Artillery Rocket has a range of some

27 miles and can be loaded with a variety of different munitions. It was employed in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Katyushas have also been employed by Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad against Israel and by Iraqi insurgents. In March 2006, a BM-21 122-mm Katyusha was fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip, the first time a Katyusha had been sent into Israel from Palestinian-controlled territory. The 9’2” BM-21 has a range of nearly 13 miles and a warhead of nearly 35 pounds. Katyushas are much more a worry to Israel than the short-range, homemade Qassam rocket, fired by Hamas into Israel from the Gaza Strip. The United States developed the Tactical High Energy Laser system specifically to defeat the Katyusha during flight.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Six-Day War (June 5–10, 1967); Tanks, Soviet World War II (1939–1945)

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Kaufman, Konstantin Petrovich von (1818–1882)

Konstantin Kaufman's family had emigrated to Russia in the late 17th century, entered the service of the czar, and converted to Orthodoxy. Konstantin, born in 1818, graduated from the Nikolaev Engineering Institute in 1838 and became a military engineer. He served initially in the Caucasus, and commanded a battalion of sappers as a colonel in the 1855 Siege of Kars during the Crimean War. He then joined the war office, where he worked on the reorganization of the army as part of the Great Reforms. In 1864, Kaufman was promoted to adjutant general and military governor of Vilnius.

In 1867, Kaufman was appointed governor general of Turkestan. Over the next decade, he led a sweeping campaign that expanded the Russian Empire well into central Asia. His forces took Samarkand in 1868, and forced the Emirate of Bukhara to recognize Russian authority. During 1872–1873, he campaigned against the Khanate of Khiva, making it into a Russian protectorate. His 1875 intervention in a civil war in Kokand ended that state's independence and brought it into the Russian sphere as well in 1876. Kaufman subsequently sent emissaries toward Afghanistan, but British protests put an end to his plans for expansion.

Kaufman was recalled to Moscow in 1882; he died there on July 7 of that year.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bukhara and Khiva, Conquest of; Crimean War (1853–1856); Skobelev, Mikhail (1843–1882)

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Kaulbars, Baron Aleksandr Vasilievich (1844–1929)

Russian army commander during the Russo-Japanese War.

Aleksander Kaulbars was born on May 14, 1844, into an aristocratic family of Baltic German ancestry. He joined the Russian army at age 17 and served with several expeditions in central Asia, notably fighting in the conquest of Khiva in 1873. Kaulbars also saw action in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 before being appointed to the Serbian Boundary Commission, and then served in the Bulgarian army. He was appointed Bulgarian minister of war in 1882, but returned to Russia the following year, and once again served in Central Asia. A noted diarist, Kaulbars was appointed to command the Odessa garrison in 1903. In October 1904, the Russian commander of land forces in Manchuria, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, requested Kaulbars to take the post of commander of the Third Manchurian Army.

His forces first saw significant action in the Battle of San-de-pu (January 25–29, 1905); Kaulbars performed without distinction, but nevertheless succeeded General Oskar

Grippenburg as commander of the Second Manchurian Army on February 12, when the latter was removed for incompetence. Kaulbars proved equally inept during the Battle of Mukden (February 23–March 10, 1905); he questioned some orders, ignored others, and was generally slow to act. His army soon found itself flanked by Japanese forces, panicked, and broke. In the chaotic retreat, Kaulbars was injured falling off his horse, but he retained his command for the remainder of the war. He then returned to his post in Odessa, where he played a central role in a pogrom during November 1905. From 1906 to 1909, Kaulbars served as governor general of the Odessa region. He was posted to Paris in 1913, and did not return to Russia after the revolutions of 1917. He died in Paris on January 25, 1925.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); San-de-pu (Sandepu), Battle of (January 25–29, 1905)

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Kazakh Riots (1986)

Uprising against Soviet rule in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) from December 17 to December 19, 1986. The riots are known as the *Zheltoqsan* or “December” protests in Kazakh; they started in Alma-Ata

(today Almaty) and spread to other cities in Kazakhstan.

On December 16, 1986, as part of a general campaign against corruption, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Dinmuhammaet Kunaev, the leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) since 1964 and an ethnic Kazakh, with Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Chuvash. After the announcement of Kolbin’s appointment, a number of college students, including Nuratai Sabilyanov, organized a protest march for December 17 to Brezhnev Square (later renamed Republic Square), site of the CPK Central Committee building. Eventually, thousands of protesters gathered with banners calling for the appointment of a Kazakh to the top of the CPK. By the end of the day, the military garrison in Almaty had been put on high alert. Police units failed to deny entry to the square, though they did use a water cannon in an unsuccessful bid to end the protests. When the KSSR authorities sought military assistance, General Vladimir Lobov, commander of the Central Asian Military District of the Soviet Army, refused on legal grounds; interior threats were the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. Following a reconnaissance by senior Soviet and KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*) officials, including Mikhail Gorbachev, on the night of December 17–18, units of the *Spetsnaz* (special forces) loyal to the Ministry of the Interior arrived from Sverdlosk, Leningrad, and Moscow.

In the early evening of December 18, with some 15,000 protesters on the streets of Almaty, Operation SNOWSTORM began; *Spetsnaz* units reinforced local police and used batons, police dogs, and trenching tools in an attempt to suppress the protests. Groups of *rabochie druzhiny* (literally “friendly workers” or volunteers) also backed the police operation in a conflict that had clear ethnic

overtones. Most of the protesters were ethnic Kazakhs, while most of those involved in Operation SNOWSTORM were of Slavic origin. The groups clashed through the night, and the next day saw smaller clashes as police units raided various university campuses and other locations in Alma-Ata before order was restored. Small-scale protests also took place in other Kazakh cities, including Pavlodar, Shymkent, Karaganda, and Taldykorgan.

Official statistics suggest two individuals were killed in the clashes: one protester and one volunteer. Additionally, some 200 individuals suffered serious injuries and more than 8,000 arrests were made. Some Kazakh sources claim that closer to 200 were killed, if those summarily executed after December 19 are included.

While Kolbin and other Soviet leaders viewed the events as ethnic nationalism, local communist leaders like Kunaev and Nursultan Nazarbayev, then prime minister of the KSSR, disagreed; they suggested the riots were merely a reaction to arbitrary events. Between 1936 and 1986, only 2 of the 10 heads of the CPK had been Kazakhs. Nazarbayev eventually maneuvered to become the head of CPK in 1989, and he was elected president of Kazakhstan (a position he still holds today) after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The events of 1986 were the bloodiest uprising within the Soviet Union in three decades and foreshadowed similar events in Georgia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic States.

Joseph Hammond

See also: Baltic Rebellions (1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Tbilisi Riots (1989)

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Kazakov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1889–1919)

Imperial Russian Air Force aviator and top-scoring Russian ace of World War I. Born in Kherson Province on January 15, 1889, Kozakov attended Russian military schools before joining the army as a cavalry officer in 1908. He transferred to aviation in 1913 and was assigned to the IV Corps Flight Detachment in Poland, where he flew reconnaissance and bombing missions in a Morane “G” monoplane. Kozakov brought down his first enemy aircraft in March 1915 when he rammed it with an anchor trailed behind his aircraft to damage the enemy’s control surfaces.

In 1916, Kozakov assumed command of the XIX Corps Flight Detachment and participated in air operations supporting the Brusilov Offensive that June. Flying French-designed *Nieuport-11* and 17 fighters, Kozakov shot down five enemy aircraft between June and December 1916. In August 1916, Kozakov took command of the 1st Combat Air Group, an elite formation. He continued to serve primarily in the southern part of the Russian lines near Tarnow (modern southeast Poland). Kozakov shot down one more enemy aircraft in December 1916, despite increasingly poor weather.

Romania entered the war on the Entente side in August 1916, and Russia deployed

troops and aircraft to support Romanian operations. The 1st Combat Air Group went to Romania in February, 1917, where Kozakov scored eight more victories. That March, Czar Nicholas II abdicated, succeeded by the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky. Russia remained in the war, however, and 1st Combat Air Group continued operations. Kozakov was wounded in action in June 1917 but returned to service in July, running his victory total to 17 by August 1917. Between August and October, he scored his final three victories. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power and subsequently withdrew from the war.

Despite Kozakov's prominence as an imperial officer, the Bolsheviks requested he command the 7th Air Division on the condition that it could not fly combat missions. Kozakov, dispirited and exhausted, resigned his commission in January 1918. Kozakov then joined the anti-Bolshevik forces serving with the British at Murmansk. He commanded the Slavo-British air detachment until wounded in January 1919. As the British prepared to leave Russia, they offered to take Kozakov with them. Kozakov declined, and was killed in a crash on August 1, 1919, while performing low-level acrobatics. One observer, Royal Air Force ace Ira "Taffy" Jones, speculated that the crash was intentional; Kozakov had been increasingly depressed by flagging anti-Bolshevik fortunes and the impending withdrawal of British support.

Kozakov's tally of German and Austrian aircraft stood at 20 confirmed kills at the time of his death, although it may have been as high as 32, as he claimed additional unconfirmed victories.

Tim Wilson

See also: Air Forces, Russia (to 1917, and since 1991); *Stavka*; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Kazan, Siege of (August–October 1552)

Russian Czar Ivan IV's successful siege of the Tatar city of Kazan (sometimes spelled Khazan or Kazhan).

An important Tatar (Mongol) trading center at the confluence of the Volga and Kazanka rivers, Kazan is about 450 miles east of Moscow and represented a threat to Russian hegemony in the region during the 16th century. The first attempt by Czar Ivan IV ("the Terrible") to take Kazan over the winter of 1547–1548 failed due to heavy rains and an early ice thaw. This inclement weather cost the Russian army their artillery, making a successful siege almost impossible. Ivan's army reached the gates of Kazan, but after a week's encampment around the city, without artillery, the Russians retreated.

Two years later, during the winter of 1549–1550, Ivan attempted his second siege of Kazan. Although the Russians maintained their artillery this time, immense storms nullified the effect of the Russian cannon. After 11 days, Ivan ordered a withdrawal. During his march back to Moscow, Ivan, claiming divine inspiration, realized a fortress at the convergence of the Volga and Sviyaga rivers would aid in the future conquest of Kazan. In the spring of 1551,



The people of Kazan submitting to Ivan IV. (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

therefore, the Russians began building the fortress—named Sviyazhsk—18 miles west of Kazan. It would serve as a critical outpost and military depot for Ivan during his successful third siege in 1552.

Ivan tried to negotiate for control of Kazan during late 1551 and early 1552. When these attempts failed, the resolute czar left Moscow in July 1552 and reached Sviyazhsk on August 13 with an army of perhaps 150,000 men. Ivan offered terms of surrender to Kazan, but the Tatars refused. Ten days later, on August 23, the Russians began their attack. Besides an initial storm, good weather prevailed, yet two other important factors enabled Ivan to take Kazan: local support and superior logistics. The year before, Ivan had established alliances with the subject

peoples of the Tatars, which allowed Ivan to concentrate his forces against Kazan and encircle the city. Before the construction of Sviyazhsk, moreover, the Russian supply line had extended back 200 miles to Nizhny Novgorod during Ivan's first two sieges. Now, aided by Sviyazhsk, the Russian received a steady flow of supplies and matériel.

The Tatars defended Kazan with 30,000 men and, during the initial phase of the siege, used their cavalry to maintain constant pressure against Ivan's lines. Despite vicious mounted troop raids, Russian cavalry served a crucial role by protecting artillery and, on August 29, with well-dug earthworks, the Russians established artillery batteries with 150 cannon. After capturing a detachment of

Tatar cavalry, Ivan again asked for Kazan's capitulation and presented the captured men in front of the walled city. The defiant Tatars shot their own men dead.

Besides artillery, Ivan, for the first time in Russian history, employed thousands of sappers to mine toward and destroy a fortification. Led by the Lithuanian engineer Nemchin Razmysl, the sappers, perhaps by chance, encountered the city's water source. After the discovery, engineers ignited a massive explosion on September 4 that cut off the water supply. With only a small water spring feeding Kazan, the Tatars nevertheless continued the fight.

As the city's defenses weakened, the Russians mobilized a massive three-tiered siege tower built by Ivan Vyrodkov, who armed the tower with 10 heavy and 50 light cannon. Taller than parts of the damaged city wall, the tower rained down direct artillery fire on the civilian population. Razmysl and his sappers, however, provided the coup de grâce. Right before dawn on October 2, engineers detonated mines that brought down two sections of Kazan's walls.

Russian troops swarmed toward the breach. After several hours of intense combat, the Tatar defense crumbled and Kazan belonged to Ivan. Although Ivan rode amongst his troops during the battle, he left command to his princes and spent the majority of his time at prayer in a private chapel tent. On the last day of the siege, Ivan appeared atop the ramparts amidst fluttering Christian banners—a move that invigorated his men as they took the city.

Ivan's victory marked the first time Orthodox Christians had defeated Muslims since the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and the czar commissioned the construction of St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow (completed in 1561) to glorify his victory. Kazan had symbolized a powerful khanate

to the Tatars, as well as to the sedentary and nomadic tribes in the surrounding lands. Ivan now controlled a lucrative trade route along the Volga River, but it took decades to establish lasting Muscovite political control and for the diverse ethnic region to adapt Russia's sociocultural ways. Nonetheless, the siege of Kazan enabled Russia to obtain and expand a massive trade network with the Middle East and Asia, a key factor in Russia's rise toward world power status.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); *Oprichniki*; Tatars (Mongols)

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Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970)

Russian socialist and political leader.

Born in Simbirsk, Russia, on May 2, 1881, Alexander Kerensky studied law at the University of St. Petersburg and quickly established a radical reputation by representing defendants accused of political crimes. He was considered by some to be a moderate socialist, having joined the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party and becoming the successor to the defunct revolutionary populist movement *Narodnia Volia* (People's Will). In 1912, Kerensky was elected to the Russian National Parliament (Duma).

A powerful orator, he developed a strong following among industrial workers.

When World War I began, Kerensky was one of the relatively few in the Duma who opposed Russia's entry. He became a critic of the czarist government's prosecution of the war and an opponent of the regime. In late 1915, serious illness forced him to reduce his political activity; however, on his return to Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was then called) in the summer of 1916, his vocal attacks directed at the czar increased in fervor. By then Kerensky was committed to the war as an opponent of German militarism, but he also believed that the czar's personal command of the army had weakened the Russian effort.

Toward the end of 1916, Kerensky became a prominent voice calling for the abdication of the czar and the dissolution of autocracy. When conditions sparked strikes and food riots in Petrograd, inducing the czar's abdication and the revolution of March 1917, Kerensky obtained two significant appointments. He became vice chairman of the influential Petrograd Soviet (a "council," patterned after the Soviets of the revolution of 1905 and mirroring the national government), and he was appointed minister of justice in the provisional government headed by Prince Georgy Lvov. Because of his position in both bodies, Kerensky acted as liaison between the two, boosting public awareness of him.

Appointed minister of war in May 1917, Kerensky was determined that Russia should continue in the war to victory so that it could realize its war aims. He staked all on a great 1917 summer offensive, the so-called Kerensky Offensive, and he visited major army units to promote it. The offensive soon ground to a halt, however. It was in fact the final straw for the Russian army, bringing about its collapse as well as that of

the provisional government under Lvov in July. As Lvov's successor as prime minister that same month, Kerensky's policies vacillated between the left and the right and led to his increased isolation.

Although he increased socialist representation on his cabinet in August 1917, the fall of Riga to the Germans brought unrest in the capital, and Kerensky ordered Russian army commander General Lavr Kornilov to Petrograd to restore order. Upon learning of Kornilov's intent to seize control by military coup, Kerensky issued a recall and dismissed Kornilov. When Kornilov continued to march on the capital, Kerensky sought the help of the Bolsheviks, issuing them arms. The Bolsheviks then organized a defense of Petrograd.

Kerensky declared Russia to be a socialist republic on September 14, 1917 and assigned a majority of seats to the socialists in his new cabinet, announced on October 8. His government collapsed, however, when Kerensky ordered the arrest of the leaders of the Bolshevik revolutionary committee on November 5, 1917. This action incited an uprising that forced him to flee from Petrograd. Gathering a core of loyal troops, Kerensky tried to march on Petrograd to reverse the Bolshevik Revolution, but he was forced to retreat when confronted by armed revolutionaries on November 12.

Fleeing Russia shortly thereafter, Kerensky went into exile and spent most of the remainder of his life in the United States, where he taught at the university level and wrote numerous articles and books. He died in New York City on June 11, 1970.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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
Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917)

Russian offensive on the Eastern Front during the summer of 1917 that led to the near total collapse of the Russian army.


After the March 1917 revolution brought about the fall of the autocracy and replaced it with the provisional government appointed by the State Duma, the shadow government of the Petrograd Soviet, bent on gaining the support of the army rank and file, unilaterally issued instructions to soldiers that became known as Order No. 1. This order essentially removed control of the armed forces from its officers.

The Bolshevik Party had gone on record as favoring an immediate end to Russian participation in the war, and its leaders were active in stirring up unrest among the troops.

Exhausted by three years of war, often without sufficient means to sustain the fight and suffering horrific casualties, Russian



Alexander Kerensky, head of the Provisional Government, honors the victims of the Petrograd riots of March 1917. (*The Great War in Gravure: The New York Times Portfolio of the War*, The New York Times Co., 1917)



soldiers began to vote for peace with their feet by fleeing the trenches. Commander of the Russian armed forces General Mikhail Alekseev and his senior commanders petitioned representatives of the provisional government, telling them that Russia's survival was threatened and asking them to take action to reinstate discipline and order.

By the end of April 1917, a commission established by the Petrograd Soviet had drafted a declaration of soldiers' rights that mirrored the provisions of Order No. 1. When the new regulation was presented to War and Navy Minister Aleksandr Guchkov, he resigned on May 1, 1917, rather than sign. Alexander Kerensky, the Provisional Government's minister of justice, then replaced Guchkov and issued the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights" 10 days later. It provided that only elected organizations, committees, and

courts, rather than officers, could discipline soldiers, save for cases of direct insubordination in combat.

At the time, Russia's Western Allies were hard-pressed and requested that Russia undertake offensive action. Kerensky responded by planning a major offensive for the summer of 1917 in Galicia, where Russia faced weaker Austro-Hungarian forces. A brilliant orator, Kerensky had gone to the front to speak to the troops and to rally them to fight for the defense of the motherland. He believed the war was a means for Russia to realize its historical territorial ambitions. The soldiers enthusiastically cheered Kerensky's pleas and promised fidelity. In fact, they continued to reject the war, abetted in this by Bolshevik "truth squads" that followed Kerensky and told the soldiers to refuse to fight. Based on his tour of the front,

however, Kerensky thought the soldiers supported the war effort as well.

To further that support, Kerensky made a number of command changes. He replaced Alekseev with General Aleksei Brusilov, previously commander of the Southwestern Front, and more accepting of the revolution. Only three weeks before the planned offensive, however, Kerensky also replaced the commanders of both the Southwestern and Western fronts—those that would make the main military effort. He also replaced several army commanders only five days prior to the planned attack. All this produced considerable confusion.

The offensive began early in the morning of July 1, 1917. Brusilov sent two armies, the Eleventh and Seventh, consisting of 31 divisions, to strike the combined South Army of eight divisions (three Austrian, four German, and one Turkish) and push toward Lemberg (Lvov or L'viv). Kerensky, following the offensive's progress from Seventh Army headquarters, was confident. Initial reports from the front reinforced that confidence.

On July 5, the 13 divisions of the Russian Eighth Army attacked farther to the south along the Dniester and the Carpathian foothills in the direction of Halicz and Dolina against the Austro-Hungarian Third Army, which was considerably weaker than the South Army. The Russian forces outnumbered the defending Central Powers' forces in Galicia 3–1 and, thanks to arms shipments from the Allies and increased Russian domestic production, the Russians had adequate artillery and shells to support the attack. Russian artillery pieces reportedly stood less than 30 yards apart along a 60-mile stretch of the front. Russian heavy guns outnumbered those of the defenders by more than 5–1. The Austro-Hungarians and Germans had been forewarned by defectors of the broad outlines of the Russian plan and its timing, but the assaulting Russians

nonetheless opened a breach in the enemy lines some 20 miles deep, threatening the oil wells of Drohobycz. At the same time, Brusilov ordered supporting attacks on the Northern Front.

Russia's commanders and ministers were elated by what appeared to be a major victory. Outside observers, however, detected disturbing signs in the Russian ranks that portended ill. Unit committees had held meetings to discuss the attack orders, and some refused to obey. Large numbers of soldiers deserted and returned only when they were hungry or thought the fighting had stopped. Other units moved to attack across three lines of trenches as if on parade and then withdrew to their own trenches. Many of the early gains, it seemed, had been either temporary or simply false.

The Germans shifted resources south, and when the Austrians and Germans counterattacked on July 19, Russian units voluntarily evacuated their positions without waiting for the enemy to approach. Some even killed officers who tried to persuade them to return to duty. Even the commissars assigned by the soviet to invigorate the soldiers in defense of revolutionary gains could not hold back the tide of fleeing soldiers. From the Baltic to Romania, the collapse of the Russian army was total. All that stayed the Central Powers' advance on the Eastern Front was a greater interest in events in France. Their counter-offensive stalled temporarily just east of the prewar Russian frontier.

Meanwhile in mid-July, some units of the Petrograd garrison, fearing that they would be sent to the front, rose in revolt. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the rioting and attempted to seize power in the capital. Battles took place during July 16–18 between the rioters, joined by sailors from the nearby Kronstadt navy base, and units loyal to the government. Eventually, the uprising was quelled, but not before several hundred

people were killed. The government ordered the arrest of Bolshevik leaders, but Vladimir Lenin escaped to Finland.

Recriminations followed the failed July offensive, creating even greater tension between the civilian government and military leadership. Brusilov was made the scapegoat and relieved of command. Prime Minister Prince Georgy Lvov resigned, allowing Kerensky to assume the post. Kerensky replaced Brusilov with General Lavr Kornilov, who was until then commander of the Southwestern Front. Kornilov was a national hero, and Kerensky believed Kornilov could rally the soldiers. Instead, a confrontation between the two led to the final collapse of the provisional government and the Bolshevik seizure of power in November (October in Old Style calendar) 1917.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Kornilov Rebellion (1917); Order No. 1 (March 1, 1917)

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KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State Security)

The main Soviet security and intelligence agency from March 13, 1954, to November 6,

1991. During this period, the KGB operated as an agency and even a ministry. Its tasks included external espionage, counter-espionage, and the liquidation of anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary forces within the Soviet Union. The KGB also guarded the borders and investigated and prosecuted those who committed political or economic crimes.

Soviet security forces have a long history, dating back to the pre-1917 czarist period. Communist predecessors of the KGB were the All-Russian Extraordinary Commissary against the Counterrevolution and Sabotage (also known by its Russian acronym, *Cheka*), the Main Political Department (GPU), and the Joint Main Political Department (OGPU), headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, the “Knight of the Revolution,” during 1917–1926. The name *Cheka* suggested that it was to be only a temporary body, but the agency became one of the principal pillars of the Soviet system. In 1934, the OGPU merged into the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (*Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrikh Del’*; NKVD), with Genrikh Yagoda (1934–1936), Nikolai Yezhov (1936–1938), and Lavrenty Beria (1938–1945) as its chiefs. Under Yezhov and Beria, the NKVD carried out brutal purges within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). NKVD officers, for example, murdered Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940.

During the rule of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, the security apparatus had achieved almost unrestricted powers to harass, arrest, and detain those who were perceived as class enemies. The Soviet Union thus became a police state in which millions of innocent victims suffered arbitrary and brutal terror. Official figures suggest that between January 1935 and June 1941, some 19.8 million people were arrested by the NKVD and an estimated 7 million were subsequently executed.

Following World War II, in 1946, the NKVD was raised to a state ministry (*Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti* [MGB] or Ministry for State Security) under Beria, who became a member of the politburo. After the deaths of Stalin (March 1953) and Beria (December 1953), the security services were again reorganized, and on March 13, 1954, the secret police was renamed the KGB. There were half a dozen principal directorates.

The First Directorate was responsible for foreign operations and intelligence-gathering activities. The Second Directorate carried out internal political control of citizens and had responsibility for the internal security of the Soviet Union. The Third Directorate was occupied with military counterintelligence and political control of the armed forces. The Fifth Directorate also dealt with internal security, especially with religious bodies, the artistic community, and censorship. The Ninth Directorate, which employed 40,000 persons, provided (among other things) uniformed guards for principal CPSU leaders and their families. The Border Guards Directorate was a 245,000-person force that oversaw border control. Total KGB manpower estimates range from 490,000 in 1973 to 700,000 in 1986.

The KGB helped and trained the security and intelligence agencies in other communist countries. It was also heavily involved in supporting wars of national liberation in the developing world, especially in Africa. The Soviet Union also maintained a close alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization, providing it with arms, funds, and paramilitary training. The KGB mostly avoided direct involvement with terrorist operations, but it played an important role in directing aid to these groups and producing intelligence reports on their activities. Scandals concerning defectors and moles

plagued the KGB throughout its existence, but the agency also scored notable successes such as, for example, the recruitment of the Cambridge Five in Great Britain, atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, and Aldrich Ames, a KGB mole within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Under Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, the terror lessened considerably. Both the security police and the regular police were subjected to a new legal code, and the KGB was made subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, it was allowed to circumvent the law when combating political dissent. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB waged a campaign against dissidents such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who became worldwide symbolic figures of communist repression. In July 1978, the head of the KGB received a seat on the Council of Ministers.

The KGB had a considerable impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policy making. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, became CPSU leader in 1982. Under Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies during 1985–1990, Soviet citizens' fears of the KGB diminished, which signaled the erosion of the Soviet system. The KGB was dissolved in November 1991 following the August coup attempt against Gorbachev, which was engineered by KGB chief Colonel General Vladimir Kryuchkov. Its successor organization, the *Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti* (Federal Security Service), bears great resemblance to the old security apparatus. Vladimir Putin, once president (2000–2008) and twice (1999–2000 and 2008–present) prime minister of Russia, served 16 years as a KGB officer before retiring in 1991.

Beatrice A. de Graaf

See also: August Coup (1991); Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); *Cheka* (*Chrezvychaynayakomissiya*); Fuchs, Klaus Emil Julius

(December 29, 1911–January 28, 1988); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Hungarian Rebellion; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); NKVD; Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–); SMERSH; Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes Soviet, World War II

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Khalkhin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939)

Clash between Soviet and Japanese forces along the Manchurian (Manchukuo)/Outer Mongolian frontier between May and September, 1939. Called the Nomonhan Incident by the Japanese, it was the largest in a series of border clashes.

The incident grew out of a dispute over a strip of land approximately 16 miles wide between the Khalkhin Gol River and a line running through the village of Nomonhan, and eventually resulted in a battle that resulted in more than 50,000 casualties on both sides. Both countries pursued aggressive expansionist policies in North-east Asia. Both also claimed the territory between the river and Nomonhan—the Japanese as part of their puppet state of Manchukuo, the Soviet Union as part of

their client Mongolian Peoples' Republic. It juttied toward central Manchuria, and a Soviet presence there roused Japanese fears of an incursion. Likewise the Soviets feared a Japanese attack from Manchuria into Mongolia or Siberia.

Extremist officers in the Japanese Kwangtung Army, backed by militarist allies in Tokyo, sought to expand Manchukuo's borders at Soviet expense, both to preempt possible attacks into Japanese-occupied territory and to discourage Soviet aid to Nationalist China, which Japanese forces had invaded in 1937. Previous clashes had erupted along the Amur River in June 1937, and in August 1938, near Lake Khasan and Changkufeng Hill in extreme Eastern Manchukuo, near the Soviet Maritime Province Japanese incursions in this area threatened the Soviet Far Eastern port of Vladivostok and prompted a strong Soviet response. Moscow ordered a highly regarded officer, Georgy Zhukov, to the Far East to assess the situation and take whatever steps he deemed necessary to restore the Soviet-claimed boundary.

It was in the context of this mounting regional tension that the Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan dispute erupted into a border war. The fighting began on May 11–12, 1939, when Soviet and Japanese surrogate Mongolian and Manchukuoan units clashed within the disputed area just east of the Khalkhin Gol River. Initially, Manchukuoan cavalry pushed the Mongolians back across the Khalkhin Gol, but the latter counterattacked and reestablished themselves on the eastern bank. At that point, both the Soviets and the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the area. Soviet forces came from the LVII Corps based in the Trans-Baikal area. Japanese troops came from the Kwangtung Army, and from the newly arrived 23rd infantry division.

Initially, only small forces probed each other. Then, on May 28, Soviet and Mongolian forces encircled and destroyed a Japanese reconnaissance battalion just east of the Khalkhin Gol. This prompted the Kwangtung Army command (without authorization from Tokyo) to launch a larger attack one month later. Alerted that a Japanese offensive in the disputed area was imminent, Zhukov reinforced Soviet units east of the Khalkhin Gol River. On July 1, the Japanese attacked with 15,000 men. At first, the Japanese made progress and actually crossed the river. On July 3, the Soviets counterattacked with 150 tanks and 1,200 infantry. The Japanese held their ground for 24 hours, but the Soviets forced them back across the river. The Japanese offensive had gained little ground.

The next five weeks saw only sporadic fighting as both sides strengthened their forces. The Soviets, however, were building up troops in their bridgehead on the east side of the Khalkhin Gol and preparing an offensive designed to encircle the Japanese forces in the salient. On August 20, Zhukov launched a powerful combined-arms attack on both the northern and southern Japanese flanks, and on their center. The Japanese, plagued by poor intelligence work, were taken by surprise. By August 26, the Soviets had enveloped Japanese forces in the Khalkhin/Nomonhan salient in three pockets and, by August 31, destroyed them all, clearing Japanese troops from the area west of Nomonhan.

The Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol marked the end of the frontier battles in northeast Asia that had unsettled Soviet-Japanese relations. International developments also favored the USSR. The Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact stabilized the USSR's strategic position on its western borders, ending the hopes of Japanese Army extremists for a two-front German-Japanese attack on the

Soviet Union. At the same time, the loss at Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan strengthened those military and civilian elements in Tokyo who wanted to abandon expansion into the Soviet Far East, pursue the war in China, and advance into Southeast Asia. The Imperial Army General Staff in Tokyo relieved those Kwangtung Army officers responsible for initiating the battle. The Japanese reversal thus helped to confirm a "strike south" strategy that started Japan on a collision course with the Western powers and the United States that would result in the Pacific War two years later.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Japan, Border Incidents with (1938–1939); Lake Khasan, Battle of; Russo-Japanese War, (1904–1905); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Khanaqin, Battle of (June 3, 1916)

Ottoman army victory that halted the Russian army's drive into Mesopotamia. The offensive that ended at Khanaqin marked the only Russian attempt at a coordinated effort with its British ally in the Middle East.

Before World War I, the Russian and British governments had agreed to divide Persia into two spheres of influence, separated by a neutral zone. When war began in 1914, the Persian government declared

its neutrality. Although many Persians were sympathetic toward the Ottoman Empire on religious grounds, the Persian government had neither the forces nor the will to fight. German agents took advantage of Persia's neutrality to wage a vigorous propaganda campaign, resulting in a number of public demonstrations.

The Ottomans took advantage of Persia's neutrality to occupy the city of Kotur in December 1914. Meanwhile, the Russian government had sent troops to occupy Oiyadin in northern Persia in November 1914. These moves easily pushed the lightly armed Ottoman forces out of Kotur and back into Ottoman territory. In November 1915, Russian troops under General Nikolai Nikolaevich Baratov marched on and secured control of the Persian capital of Tehran in response to reports of a possible German coup.

The situation along the Persian border with Mesopotamia remained stable through much of 1915. In September, British troops under Major General Charles Townshend moved up the Tigris River toward Baghdad. Defeated during November 22–25 at Ctesiphon, only 20 miles south of Baghdad, Townshend retreated to Kut-al-Amara, where his force was promptly besieged by the Ottomans. British relief efforts in December 1915 and January 1916 failed, and in desperation, the British appealed to their Russian allies in Persia for assistance.

In response, Baratov moved into western Persia to threaten Baghdad. On February 26, 1916, he secured Kermanshah. The Russians moved next to Kharind, only 125 miles from Baghdad. The British hoped that Baratov would then push on to Baghdad, forcing the Ottomans to raise the siege at Kut. The Ottoman Army had few resources available to prevent his advance, but unfortunately Baratov remained at Kharind for three months. The Russians were at the end of a long supply

line, and Baratov was anxious to resupply and consolidate before advancing farther.

After the fall of Kut on April 29, 1916, Ottoman forces there were available for other assignments. Other seasoned Ottoman divisions were also available, thanks to the Allied evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in January 1916, and these slowly made their way to Mesopotamia. Ottoman Sixth Army commander Halil Pasha agreed to send his XIII Corps to attack Baratov at Kharind.

Ali Insan Pasha commanded XIII Corps, which centered on three fresh divisions. Insan massed his forces near the border with Persia and then advanced toward Baratov's positions. When the Russians learned of the Ottoman move, Baratov undertook a preemptive strike, crossing the border and, on June 3, attacking the Ottoman 6th Infantry Division of XIII Corps at the border town of Khanaqin.

In the Battle of Khanaqin, Baratov employed his infantry to pin the Ottomans in place, while his cavalry tried to encircle them. Insan's corps outnumbered the Russians, however, and the confident Insan fended off the infantry assault and used his reserves to crush the Russian cavalry. Ottoman losses were only around 400 men. Russian casualties were much greater.

Following his victory, Insan pushed into Persia. Baratov conducted a skillful fighting retreat, but Insan's forces defeated the Russians in a series of small-scale actions and eventually reached Hamadan, while Baratov withdrew to the north and awaited reinforcements.

Insan was disappointed that few Persians joined his army. As no Ottoman reinforcements were forthcoming and his extended supply line left his force short of virtually everything, Insan had no choice but to withdraw back into Ottoman territory. Insan had succeeded, however, in preventing a major Russian invasion of Mesopotamia.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Kharkov, Battle for (March 1–14, 1943)

The Soviets claimed to have inflicted 1 million German casualties in the period between November 1942 and March 1943, and despite some replacements, the Germans estimated a shortfall of 470,000 men on the Eastern Front. Following their victory at Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943), the Soviets drove to the Donets River in February 1943, and recaptured Kursk, Rostov, and Kharkov, leading Adolf Hitler to order a counterattack during his visit to the front between February 17 and 19, 1943. In the resulting action on February 20, Field Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein's Southern Army Command struck the Soviet flank with a Panzer attack from the south in a running battle from Krasnoarmeiskaya to the northern Donets River; Fourth Panzer Army's XL Corps encircled and destroyed what was left of Group Popov, consisting of four understrength Soviet tank corps.

The German thrust, assisted by First Panzer Army after February 23, continued to the northeast. On February 22, SS Panzer Corps and LVIII Panzer Corps attacked the

flank of Colonel General Nikolai Vatutin's Southwest Front, the lead elements of which (XXV Tank Corps) were within 12 miles of Zaporozhe. Having run out of fuel, the latter units abandoned their equipment and escaped to the north; the Germans took 9,000 prisoners, but Manstein claimed to have killed 23,000 Soviet soldiers and destroyed or captured 615 tanks, 354 artillery pieces, and 69 anti-aircraft guns.

On March 1, Manstein began an advance on Kharkov, attempting to get behind the Soviets west of that city who were pushing against Army Detachment Kempf, commanded by General Werner Kempf. A five-day battle for the city raged, with Fourth Panzer Army facing Russian lieutenant general Pavel Rybalko's Third Tank Army. By March 5, the Germans had mauled units of Third Tank Army on the Berestovaya River southwest of the city, capturing 61 tanks, 225 guns, and 600 motor vehicles in a small pocket at Krasnograd.

Manstein wanted to proceed west to attack the rear of the Soviet Voronezh Front, forcing it to fight simultaneously in two directions near Poltava, but because of the rain and mud, the Germans tried to strike the Soviet flank. They attacked north on March 7 and made steady progress, driving a wedge between the Third Tank and Sixty-Ninth Soviet armies, with pressure eventually coming from the west as Army Detachment Kempf was freed for action. The Soviets then brought up II Guards Tank Corps from the east.

The Germans recovered Kharkov on March 14, 1943. At the same time, to the north of Army Detachment Kempf, the *Gross Deutschland* Division moved rapidly on Belgorod. At Gaivoron, the Germans wiped out Soviet armored forces that sought to defend Belgorod. The capture of Kharkov and Belgorod marked the end of the German

counterblow, and reestablished the Donets-Mius Line.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Popov, Markian Mikhailovich (1902–1969); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Vatutin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1901–1944)

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Khmelnysky, Bohdan (1595–1657)

Bohdan Khmelnysky was the most important leader of the Cossacks in the Ukraine during the middle of the 17th century. He led the Cossack uprising against the Polish government that claimed authority over the Ukraine and threatened to establish an independent state. Khmelnysky's failure against the Poles caused him to ask for Russian aid, which led eventually to Russia's occupation and annexation of the Ukraine.

Khmelnysky was born in 1595 in Peoriaslavl, in Polish-controlled Ukraine. His father was a registered Cossack, and owned a farm and a flour mill at Czehrin near the Dnieper River. Khmelnysky was well educated; he studied in both a school run by an Orthodox Catholic brotherhood and the Jesuit school in Yaroslav. After his father died, Khmelnysky inherited the estate.

By the 16th century, the Zaporozhian Cossacks had established a relationship with the Polish government. The Polish king claimed

authority over the Ukraine, and to control the Cossacks, he enrolled them into Polish service and paid them an annual sum. A leader called the "hetman" was appointed over the registered Cossacks.

In 1646, a local Polish noble claimed ownership of Khmelnysky's property. Khmelnysky was forced to come before a tribunal that dispossessed him. When the Poles came to take the farm, Khmelnysky's son was killed, and Khmelnysky was forced to flee. He headed south, and presented other registered Cossacks with a document he claimed was from the king of Poland, authorizing Khmelnysky to raise a Cossack army to attack the Crimean Tatars. When the registered Cossacks proved reluctant to join him, Khmelnysky encouraged the Zaporozhe Cossacks to revolt. He also met with the khan of the Crimean Tatars, Islam Girei III, and showed him the document. Girei agreed to join Khmelnysky in an attack on the Poles and provide 4,000 men.

Khmelnysky's agents, disguised as monks, moved through the areas of the Ukraine inhabited by Cossacks and stirred up revolt. By March 1648, Khmelnysky had an army of 5,000 men. In April, Khmelnysky was selected as hetman over 8,000 Cossacks and 4,000 Tatars. Serfs and peasants by the thousands left their masters to join Khmelnysky. Negotiations for a settlement were opened in 1649 and the Poles signed the Treaty of Zborow in August. The treaty granted much more autonomy to the Ukraine. Khmelnysky was formally recognized as the hetman of the registered Cossacks, whose numbers were increased to 40,000.

Khmelnysky tried to form a confederacy with Moldova, Wallachia, and Transylvania in 1650. The Poles feared he would become too independent and powerful, so war broke out again. On July 1, 1651, a Polish army

of 34,000 men under King Jan II Kazimierz decisively defeated 200,000 Cossacks and Tatars under Khmelnytsky at the Battle of Beresteczko. The Tatars abandoned their alliance, and Khmelnytsky was forced to make a less favorable peace with the Poles. The number of registered Cossacks was reduced to 20,000.

The new peace was unpopular, and Khmelnytsky turned to the other power in the region, Russia, for assistance. In October 1653, Russia recognized the Ukrainian Cossacks as free people. In January 1654, the Russians and Cossacks signed the Treaty of Periaslavl, in which the Cossacks pledged their loyalty to the Russian czar, Aleksei I. In return, Aleksei registered 60,000 Cossacks and confirmed their ownership of lands and towns. He also reserved the right to approve the hetman chosen by the Cossacks. Russian soldiers soon poured into eastern Ukraine, provoking a war with the Poles. As time went by, the Ukraine lost more and more autonomy. In 1667, the Poles and the Russians divided the Ukraine in the Treaty of Andrusovo. The Cossacks were eventually forced to submit to Russian control.

Khmelnytsky did not see the ultimate failure of his revolt. He died in Chigirin, Ukraine, on August 16, 1657, believing that the Russians would ensure Cossack independence.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Cossacks

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Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657)

The Khmelnytsky Uprising of 1648–1657, sometimes referred to as the *Chmielnicki Pogrom*, was a key episode in the rise of Russia as the major power of Eastern Europe. Russia, sometimes referred to then as *Muscovy* or the *Grand Duchy of Moscow*, was a relatively small state centered on Moscow. It faced serious, existential threats from Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to its north and west, as well as challenges from Cossack and Muslim states to the south and east. Moscow had emerged from its “Time of Troubles,” a civil war, in 1613, with Mikhail Romanov becoming czar and beginning a dynasty that lasted until 1917. A weak leader, he was succeeded in 1645 by his more able son, Aleksei I, who ruled through this period.

The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth ruled the lower Dnieper River area, in what is now the Ukraine. This was a rich agricultural region, and the rising demand for its products in central and western Europe made control attractive. Local royalty benefited, but much land came under control of absentee landowners in Poland. While the owners remained in Poland, they managed their estates through arendators, often called “tax farmers,” on site. Many of these were Jewish. Increasing demands from the owners for more revenue to support lavish lifestyles forced the managers to decrease the amount of produce remaining in the hands of the peasants, most of whom were Orthodox and resented being squeezed by Jewish arendators to remit more to Catholic absentee landowners.

Further complicating matters was the presence of local boyars, landowners with minor nobility status, who passed their lands to their sons. There were also Cossacks,

loosely organized groups of people, including some boyars, who sought their fortunes in those parts of the region with little central government. To protect their interests, they organized under local warlords with militias for enforcement and often plunder. One of these was the Zaporozhian Cossack group.

The leader of the Khmelnytsky Uprising was Hetman (Chief) Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who came from a family of modest nobility with property near Subotiv. He received a good education in Poland in a Jesuit school, but remained faithful to his Orthodox religion. Returning home in 1617, he entered Cossack service supporting a Polish-Lithuanian war against the Ottoman Empire. His father died in the campaign, and Bohdan was captured. He managed to return in 1622 and manage his family's estate while continuing service with the Cossacks. The turning point came in 1645, when the family estate was targeted for confiscation by Polish-Lithuanian authorities. His protests were ignored, and in 1648, Khmelnytsky began the uprising against the government he and his family had thus far supported.

The target was Polish-Lithuanian landlords, only some living near at their holdings. The wrath of the Cossacks fell on the Jewish tax farmers. Over the next few years, up to 100,000 Jews died, often by cruel means. This is why this episode in history is often referred to as a pogrom against the Jews of this part of the Ukraine.

The uprising lasted nine years and was not consistently successful. The result was likely different from that envisioned by Khmelnytsky. There were several battles, most in modern Ukraine with some action as far north as Belarus. The first were the battles of Zhovti Vody and Korsun in the spring of 1648 and another in September at Pyliavtsi, all victories for the uprising. Khmelnytsky triumphantly entered Kiev in December

1648, hailed as the liberator of the people of Rus' (the older Russian state centered on Kiev) from Polish-Lithuanian rule. In February 1649, he declared that he was "the sole autocrat of Rus'."

This was far from the end of the Uprising though. Khmelnytsky had the Crimean Tatars on his side in 1648. In 1649, the Tatars were less eager as supporters, and their unenthusiastic support led to an inconclusive battle at Zboriv in August. Following this were a successful resistance by Commonwealth forces defending a siege of Zbarazhs the same year and the defeat of Cossack forces at Loyew in the summer. Both sides had overextended their lines, resulting in the Cossack defeat, but also the inability of the Polish-Lithuanian forces to follow. Support from the Crimean Tatars was by now only lukewarm. To preserve independence, they felt that a conclusive victory by either Khmelnytsky or the Commonwealth was not to their benefit.

The next, and largest, battle of the uprising, was a three-day fight at Berestechko in June 1651. The result was a decisive victory for the Polish-Lithuanian forces. After an inconclusive battle at Bila Tserkva in September 1651, the last battle of the Uprising was a decisive Cossack victory at Batih in early June 1652. This ended Polish-Lithuanian rule over a large part of the Ukraine.

Although the Commonwealth had been defeated, the question was whether Khmelnytsky would be able to establish an independent or autonomous state. In an era of monarchy, it was essential for a new state to be backed by a major monarchy. It was no longer feasible to look to the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy. Khmelnytsky therefore looked to the Ottoman Empire, and there was an offer of a vassalship. Submission to a Muslim sovereign was not attractive to his Orthodox subjects, however. Protestant

Sweden was a possibility, and Khmelnytsky put out feelers. There was, however, no common border. Russia was the most practical choice, but the ruler in Moscow was hesitant. The possibility of union with the Ottomans forced his hand.

The result was the Treaty of Periaslavl of January 1654. The Ukraine was now under the protection of Moscow, while the Crimean Tatars tied their hopes to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and proceeded to raid the Ukraine. On the other hand, the Cossacks were able to drive the Commonwealth from more of the area. Sweden now entered the scene and, while not attacking Russia directly, occupied parts of Lithuania on the Baltic. Russia responded by attacking Sweden in July 1656.

As Khmelnytsky had negotiated with Sweden in the past, Russia was uncertain of his loyalty. Suspicions escalated with differences over Russian control of finances in the Cossack realm and Belarus. Khmelnytsky's declaration that the Swedes were more honorable than the Russians did not help. At the same time, Khmelnytsky faced dissension in the Cossack ranks and raids from the Crimea. His health also deteriorated rapidly, and he died in July 1657. His son succeeded him, but was unable to prevent the Ukraine from becoming part of Romanov Russia.

Daniel E. Spector

See also: Cossacks; Khmelnytsky, Bohdan (1595–1657); Periaslavl, Treaty of (1654); Tatars (Mongols); Time of Troubles

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Khozin, Mikhail Semenovich (1896–1979)

Soviet army general and commander of the Leningrad Front in 1941. Born in the village of Skachikha, Russia, on October 22, 1896, Mikhail Khozin served as a junior officer in the Russian Army during World War I before joining the Red army and the Bolshevik (Communist) Party in 1918. He held a variety of assignments, and by the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Khozin, as a lieutenant general, headed the Frunze Military Academy.

In October 1941, Khozin took command of the Leningrad Front (Army Group). Stalin demoted him after he promised but failed to save General Andrei Vlasov's Second Shock Army. Between June and October 1942, Khozin headed Thirty-Third Army. He briefly commanded Twentieth Army (from December 1942 to January 1943). Khozin died in Moscow on February 27, 1979.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze Academy; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Vlasov, Andrei Andreevich (1901–1946); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971)

Soviet politician, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during 1953–1954, and premier of the Soviet Union during 1958–1964. Born on April 17, 1894,

in Kalinovka, Kursk Province, to a peasant family, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev worked beginning at age 15 as a pipe fitter in various mines near his home. His factory work exempted him from wartime service. In 1918, he joined the Russian Bolshevik (Communist) Party.

In 1919, Khrushchev became a political commissar in the Red Army, accompanying troops fighting both the Poles and Lithuanians. In 1922, he returned to school and completed his education. In 1925, he became Communist Party secretary of the Petrovsko-Mariinsk District. Recognizing the importance of Communist Party secretary Josef Stalin earlier, Khrushchev nurtured a friendship with Stalin's associate, Party secretary in Ukraine Lars Kaganovich, who helped him secure a post in the Moscow city party apparatus in 1931.

By 1935, Khrushchev was secretary general of the Moscow Communist Party, and in effect, mayor of the capital. In 1938, he became a candidate member of the politburo, and in 1939, a full member. He was one of few senior party officials to survive Stalin's purges. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Khrushchev was made a lieutenant general and placed in charge of resistance in Ukraine and relocating heavy industry eastward.

With the Red Army's liberation of Ukraine, Khrushchev took charge of that region, but by 1949, he was back in his previous post in Moscow. In 1952, at the 19th Party Congress, Khrushchev received the assignment of drawing up a new party structure, which replaced the old politburo with the Presidium of the Central Committee. Following Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, a brief power struggle ensued. Khrushchev did not appear to be a likely choice for supreme power, but on March 14, when Georgy Malenkov suddenly resigned as secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev succeeded him. Shortly



Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Josef Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union and attempted to steer the country in a new direction. (Library of Congress)

thereafter, another rival, Lavrenty Beria, was removed from authority and executed.

Over the next four years, Malenkov and Khrushchev struggled over who would dominate the Soviet state. Khrushchev had taken responsibility for Soviet agriculture, and by 1953, he registered considerable successes. His Virgin Lands program the next year opened new agricultural lands in Kazakhstan and western Siberia. Malenkov advocated increases in consumer goods. Hard-liners in the party leadership and military opposed this and sought continued concentration in heavy industry and increases in defense spending. Khrushchev took the tactical decision to side with the hard-liners, and in February 1955, Malenkov was defeated and resigned as party chairman.

Malenkov continued to intrigue against Khrushchev, however. In June 1957, Khrushchev

took full authority when an attempt by Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Vyacheslav Molotov to unseat Khrushchev miscarried and they were purged. It speaks volumes about the change in the Soviet state under Khrushchev though that they were not executed. Indeed, Khrushchev's greatest achievement as leader of the Soviet Union was the unmasking of Stalin's legacy and his attempt to de-Stalinize Soviet society. The most powerful blow came during his famous "Secret Speech" on February 25, 1956, in which Khrushchev documented some of the crimes of the Stalinist period.

The Soviet Union became gradually more liberal under Khrushchev, but the overall thrust of his policies was ambivalent, overshadowed by inconsistencies and poorly conceptualized initiatives. Success during the 1950s in economic policy, industrial production, and the space program compelled Khrushchev to proclaim that by 1970, the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in per capita production. In 1980, he predicted that America would embrace communism. In reality, severe economic problems persisted in the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to agriculture.

In foreign policy, Khrushchev generally attempted to ease tensions with the West. He rejected Stalin's thesis that wars between capitalist and socialist countries were inevitable, and sought peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States was a remarkable success. His talks with President Dwight D. Eisenhower produced what came to be called "The Spirit of Camp David." Another highlight was the July 25, 1963 signing of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

But Khrushchev also engaged in some dubious and dangerous foreign policy initiatives. He initiated the 1958 Berlin Crisis, authorized the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and used the U-2 Crisis to torpedo the May 1960 Paris Conference. Most

disturbing of all, in 1962, Khrushchev decided to install intermediate-range ballistic missiles in communist Cuba. After a brief but extremely tense confrontation in October 1962, during which the superpowers were poised on the abyss of thermonuclear war, Khrushchev decided to remove the weapons. The crisis was clearly a humiliating loss of face; it became an important factor in his fall from power less than two years later.

Khrushchev's policy toward other socialist states was equally ambivalent. He restored Soviet relations with Yugoslavia in 1955, after the Tito-Stalin break of 1948. He promoted de-Stalinization programs in Eastern bloc states and allowed limited autonomy for communist parties abroad. When his secret 1956 speech on Stalin led to revolts in Poland and Hungary, however, he intervened. He ordered the 1956 Hungarian Revolution crushed by brute force. He was also unable to head off crises when Albanian and Chinese officials criticized his de-Stalinization policies; both led to permanent schisms. Particularly noteworthy was the Sino-Soviet split, for which Khrushchev was largely blamed.

Khrushchev was ousted by the party's Central Committee on October 14, 1964, and relieved of all his positions. He then wrote his memoirs, which were published in the West beginning in 1970. Khrushchev died in Moscow on September 11, 1971, following a massive heart attack.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

See also: Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Hungarian Rebellion; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Kiev Pocket, Battle of the (August 21–September 26, 1941)

Significant German encirclement of Soviet forces on the Eastern Front in 1941. Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began on June 22. A month later, sharp disagreements developed between Adolf Hitler and his senior generals as to strategy. The generals—led by the army chief of staff, Colonel General Franz Halder, and the army commander, Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch—pointed out that not all German army groups would be able to accomplish their assigned tasks. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center was advancing faster than the weaker army groups North and South. At the same time, Hitler was preoccupied with securing the industrial and agricultural heartland of Ukraine and the Crimea and linking up with the Finns at Leningrad.

As a result, Hitler decided on July 19, in *Führer* Directive 33, to divert substantial panzer units from Army Group Center, thereby postponing the drive on Moscow. He sent Colonel General Hermann Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group north to assist in the drive to Leningrad and Colonel General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group south to deal with the bulge created by Soviet Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos's Southwestern Front with its mechanized corps. The German generals argued against this decision, pointing out that Moscow was the more important objective. Not only was Moscow the

political capital of the Soviet Union but it was also a major industrial area and transportation nexus. Attempts to convince Hitler that the advance on Moscow was more important failed, and he issued a final directive on August 21 that ordered a major encirclement operation, with the goal of destroying Soviet forces in northern Ukraine.

On July 10, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had appointed the barely competent marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Mikhailovich Budenny to command the Southern and Southwestern fronts (army groups). German forces advanced under the capable leadership of Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South. Stalin poured troops into the new command, amounting ultimately to almost 1 million men, insisting that the Dnieper River Line be held at all costs.

In Uman, the Germans encircled Budenny's forces of the Sixth, Twelfth, and Eighteenth armies. He remained stationary as Colonel General Ewald von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group drove around his flank to the southeast. Kleist's Panzers advanced north even as Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group attacked south through the weakly held northern flank of the Southwestern Front, aiming for a linkup east of Kiev. When Soviet army chief of staff General Georgy Zhukov tried to point out the dangers of encirclement to Stalin on August 5, the latter sent him to Leningrad's defense and appointed marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov in his stead.

By early September, Kiev was a salient endangered by advancing German troops to the north and the south. An attempt by Lieutenant General Andrei Ivanovich Yermenko's newly formed Bryansk Front to halt Guderian's push south failed on September 2, and by September 11, the German pincers were closing on Kiev. Budenny

requested authority to retreat, but Stalin preferred to replace him with Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko. On September 12, Kleist's Panzers broke through the Soviet Thirty-Eighth Army, attacking north from bridgeheads at Cherkassy and Kremenchug.

Despite the onset of the rainy season, the 1st and 2nd Panzer groups linked up at Lokhvitsa, 125 miles east of Kiev, on September 16. Timoshenko and Nikita Khrushchev, representing the War Council of the Southwestern Direction, authorized a Soviet withdrawal, but Kirponos feared Stalin's reaction and refused to move until Moscow confirmed the orders near midnight the next day.

The encirclement was still sufficiently porous to allow some Soviet forces to escape, including Timoshenko, Khrushchev, and Thirty-Seventh Army commander Andrei Vlasov (whose forces had defended Kiev skillfully), but Kirponos was among the dead. The Soviet Fifth and Twenty-First armies were destroyed, along with major portions of the Thirty-Seventh and Fortieth armies. Army Group South also claimed 665,000 Soviet prisoners taken, along with 3,500 guns and 900 tanks. For all practical purposes, the Soviet Southwestern Front ceased to exist. It had to be entirely reconstructed from the nucleus of the 15,000 men who escaped the disaster.

This major German success was one of the greatest tactical victories of the war. Yet despite opening a 200-mile gap in Soviet defenses and permitting the investment of the eastern Ukraine, it had long-range negative strategic consequences for Germany. Senior German commanders, including Halder and Guderian, concluded that it had been a major blunder, ultimately dooming the German attempt to take the Soviet capital in 1941.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970); Vlasov, Andrei Andreevich (1901–1946); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Kinburn, Battle of (October 17, 1855)

Battle fought between the Russian army and an Anglo-French amphibious force for control of the Russian fortifications guarding access to several Russian rivers from the northern Black Sea. Armored warships took part in combat operations for the first time at Kinburn.

The Crimean War (1853–1856) saw the first modern use of joint or combined tactics (i.e., army-navy, multinational) and the large-scale employment of new military and naval technologies. It was widely anticipated, before the middle of the 19th century, that new naval weapons had rendered wooden warships dangerously vulnerable, and once modern naval guns firing explosive-filled projectiles became widely available, the fate of the wooden ship was sealed.

Serious efforts to solve this naval problem waited until the Crimean War, when two events led to the adoption of armor plating on warships. The first occurred on November 30, 1853. Russian ships carrying a few improved shell guns based on French General Henri Paixhans's design, among their other ordnance, destroyed every (wooden) Ottoman ship at Sinop (Sinope) except one. The event demonstrated the weakness of wooden ships, and subsequent events brought British and French intervention in the war.

After Sinop, French emperor Napoleon III ordered the construction of floating batteries protected by iron plate armor. French naval experts began planning the new ships in the spring of 1854. In July, the French ordered construction to begin and offered the plans to the British. The British soon began their own construction program.

On the second occasion, long before the new ships were ready, an allied naval attack on Russian harbor fortifications on October 17, 1854, during the Siege of Sevastopol (Sebastopol) failed and left several warships seriously damaged. Afterward, the British and French awaited the arrival of their new ironclad batteries to lower the risk of attacking fortifications to acceptable levels.

The first three French armored batteries, *Lave*, *Tonnante*, and *Dévastation*, displaced nearly 1,600 tons, were 164-feet long, about 42 feet in beam, and of shallow draft. Their wooden frames and oak planking, 17-inch thick, were overlaid with another 4 inches of iron sheathing. Each ship mounted sixteen 50-pounder guns and two 12-pounders and, though fitted with a 225-horsepower engine, they required towing to travel any significant distance.

After their arrival from France, the attack at Kinburn provided the first opportunity to try the new batteries. The Russians had built three stone forts and two sand emplacements mounting about 80 guns and mortars

on a sandspit extending into the Black Sea to guard the gulf into which flowed the Dnieper and Bug rivers, and to control access to the Russian naval port of Nikolaev.

Following a feint toward the port of Odessa, admirals Sir Edmund Lyons (Britain) and Emile-Marius Bruat (France) led about 40 warships in the naval attack. Generals Sir Augustus Spencer (Britain) and Achille Bazaine (France) commanded a landing force of 10,000 soldiers. General Ivan Vasilievich Kokhanovich, commandant of Kinburn, directed the Russian defense.

On October 14, an amphibious landing force isolated the forts from the mainland to prevent reinforcement, and early on October 17, the naval bombardment began in earnest when the French armored batteries anchored about 1,000 yards from the forts and reduced them to rubble after three hours and more than 3,000 rounds fired. Though hit repeatedly by Russian return fire, the ironclads were undamaged and suffered only two killed and two dozen wounded. Line-of-battle ships continued the bombardment another 90 minutes until the Russians surrendered.

The capture of Kinburn marked the end of the Crimean War in the Black Sea. Soon after the war, the former allies returned to their naval competition with renewed interests and new possibilities to explore. Wooden ships did not immediately disappear from use, but within a decade, their place on the battle line was gone.

Larry A. Grant

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); Sinop, Battle of (November 30, 1853)

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Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920)

Russian army general and leader of the White forces in the Russian Civil War. Born November 16, 1874, at St. Petersburg, Aleksandr Kolchak served 28 years in the Imperial Russian Navy. His father had been a major general in the marine artillery, and Aleksandr was educated for a naval career. He completed the Naval College in 1894 and commanded a destroyer in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. He also participated in two polar expeditions.

On the outbreak of World War I, Kolchak was chief of operations of the Baltic Fleet. Aggressive and capable, he also commanded a destroyer flotilla in the November 1915 Windau operation that drove German picket lines away from Russian bases. Promoted to rear admiral in April 1916, Kolchak took command of the Destroyer Division of the Baltic Fleet. That June, he participated in an operation in the Gulf of Norrköping against a German convoy from Sweden. His destroyers sank a German auxiliary cruiser and a number of ships in the convoy, but Kolchak's poor tactics allowed most of the convoy to escape. Despite this, Kolchak was advanced to vice admiral and took command of the Black Sea Fleet in July 1916.

Kolchak proved a capable fleet commander. His aggressive tactics soon secured Russian dominance of the Black Sea. His ships conducted mining operations and coastal sweeps, and they shelled Turkish coastal installations. Following the March 1917 abdication of Czar Nicholas II,

however, revolutionary sailors of the Black Sea Fleet forced Kolchak to resign in June 1917. The Russian provisional government then sent Kolchak on a mission to Washington; he returned from that in the midst of the Bolshevik seizure of power.

Kolchak was determined that Russia should remain in the war against Germany. Supported by the British, he formed an anti-Bolshevik government in Siberia that was recognized by the Allies as the legitimate government of Russia. Unfortunately, Kolchak had little interest in politics and lacked revolutionary leadership qualities. His initial military offensive began well, thanks in large part to the well-organized Czech Legion, but Kolchak was unable to link his forces with those of General Anton Denikin, leading White forces in South Russia and Ukraine.

Kolchak never won the popular support necessary for victory, in part because he never articulated a reform platform. His call for a more representative government did not come until the end of 1919, when his armies had already been defeated. Kolchak himself ascribed his failure to a number of causes, including constant battle, inadequate supply, poor officer leadership, and effective enemy propaganda. Although Kolchak was an honorable man, many of his subordinates were not, and his failure to curb their excesses and harsh treatment of their own soldiers drove many Siberians into Red hands.

By January 1920, with Russia having lost an estimated 1 million people to disease, famine, and fighting, on the retreat to Irkutsk, Kolchak was forced to step aside as leader of White forces in favor of the more successful Denikin. Shortly thereafter, Kolchak was arrested by the Irkutsk government. Tried by a tribunal dominated by Bolsheviks, Kolchak was executed by firing squad outside Irkutsk on February 7, 1920.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Kolomenskoe, Battle of (December 2, 1606)

Turning point in the Bolotnikov Rebellion, a central episode in Muscovy’s “Time of Troubles.”

In May 1606, agents of boyar leader Vasily Shuisky murdered Czar Dmitry (aka “the False Dmitry”) at his wedding. Although Shuisky proclaimed himself czar, he had few supporters, and the rebellion that had placed Dmitry on the throne flared up once again under the military leadership of Ivan Bolotnikov, a former Cossack. With support from Poland, Bolotnikov raised an army at Putivl, which had been Dmitry’s capital before he became czar, during June–July 1606.

Areas that had supported Dmitry quickly joined the new rebellion against Shuisky, and Bolotnikov’s forces soon numbered about 12,000–15,000. Despite an initial defeat outside Kromy, a fortress that had declared for Dmitry and been besieged by

Shuisky’s forces, Bolotnikov’s smaller army persistently regrouped and pushed north. Shuisky’s forces managed to defeat the rebels at the confluence of the Ugra and Oka rivers on September 23, 1606, however, and Bolotnikov and his supporters were forced to adopt a strategy of siege for the winter.

Rebel armies held Viazma, Mozhaisk, and Serpukhov, with an outpost entrenched on the Pakhva River, only 18 kilometers south of Moscow. At the end of October, they defeated Shuisky’s forces in the Battle of Troitskoe and advanced to Kolomenskoe, a key position 13 kilometers from Moscow that controlled the northern roads from the capital. With this victory, only a narrow corridor to the northeast remained open to Shuisky’s forces.

Bolotnikov, who arrived in early November, commanded a motley force of some 30,000 at Kolomenskoe. Peasants, townsmen, and small landholders comprised more than half of Bolotnikov’s force, leading some scholars to see his rebellion as a social movement.

Bolotnikov’s forces launched several sorties against Moscow during November 1606, but none managed to penetrate the outer walls of the city. As Shuisky’s forces held, and Dmitry failed to appear as Bolotnikov had promised he would, the rebel force slowly diminished. Istoma Pashkov, a rival commander, even agreed to betray Bolotnikov.

After holding a martial parade in the center of Moscow with a force of some 15,000, Shuisky launched his attack on December 2, 1606. Guarding his main force with a large *gulai-gorod* (mobile fortification), Shuisky advanced to the Danilov Monastery on the Serpukhov Road. As Bolotnikov lead his forces from Kolomenskoe to meet Shuisky, Pashkov suddenly turned his army and struck Bolotnikov’s flank. Shocked, the rebels fled back to Kolomenskoe to mount a defense.

In the battle that followed, some 2,000 rebels died, while another 6,000–10,000 were taken prisoner. Most of the prisoners were executed in the following days. Unable to hold Kolomenskoe, Bolotnikov ordered a retreat to Serpukhov. The rebellion lasted another year, but never again came as close to success. Bolotnikov was captured and executed in October 1607, and other pretenders arose who extended the “Time of Troubles.”

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608); Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles; Tula, Siege of (June–October 1607)

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Komarów, Battle of (August 26–September 2, 1914)

Important early World War I battle involving Austro-Hungarian and Russian forces in Russian-held Poland. Following chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff General of Infantry Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf's daring plan for a double envelopment of Poland, General of Cavalry Viktor Dankl von Krasnik's First Army and General of Infantry Moritz Auffenberg's Fourth Army opened the 1914 campaign, starting north over the San River border toward Siedlce and Brest-Litovsk. The First Army moved east of the Vistula River toward Lublin with its right flank covered by the Fourth Army, marching on Cholm, with its right on the Bug River.

The two armies advanced on a front of about 50 miles on sandy tracks through pine barrens, marshland, and small farms.

The result was that the advancing Austro-Hungarian forces ran into Russians, who had also taken the offensive. The preliminary engagement occurred at Kravnik between the Austro-Hungarian First Army and the Russian Fourth Army on August 23–25. The Russian Fifth Army under General Pavel Pleve then blindly moved west in an effort to take the Austrian First Army in the flank. Instead, Pleve encountered Auffenberg's Fourth Army.

The two sides were evenly matched in the resulting Battle of Komarów of August 26–September 2. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army had 124 battalions against the Russian Fifth Army of 128 battalions. With aerial reconnaissance in its infancy, the entire campaign was typified by weak scouting on both sides.

The advanced Austro-Hungarian II Corps (Czech and German divisions, and the Vienna Honor Garrison) on Dankl von Krasnik's flank had reached the important railway town of Cholm. Pleve struck the IX Corps (Czech and German divisions) in echelon behind the II Corps. In hard fighting, IX Corps halted the Russian Fifth Army's advance.

Auffenberg now saw an opportunity for a “Cannae” double envelopment. He ordered the II Corps to move southeast behind the Russians. An old friend of General Conrad, Auffenberg was able to borrow the crack XIV Corps (Tiroleans) from the Third Army on his right at Lemberg (L'vov, Lwow, or L'viv) and send it north behind Pleve's left to attempt an encirclement.

Pleve, however, broke off the battle and ordered a retreat eastward over the Bug. The key to Auffenberg closing his trap on the north side was the prestigious 25th Division, the Vienna Garrison, commanded by Archduke Peter Ferdinand of the Habsburg royal

family. Stymied by poor reconnaissance and communications, however, Peter Ferdinand lost his nerve and ordered a retreat west from his advanced position. His forward unit, Bosniaks of the Imperial Guard, could see Pleve's troops fleeing to the east. But a Bosniak colonel could not or would not dispute with a general of the royal family. Pleve took 40 percent casualties, but made good his escape east to the Bug, where he quickly re-fitted. Auffenberg's Fourth Army had taken 20,000 Russian prisoners, the best success of any opening 1914 battle save Tannenberg (August 26–31).

Days later, the Fourth Army was drawn south to support the Third Army at Lemberg. This move opened a gap with Dankl's First Army, still facing north at Lublin, although the Germans had not delivered the crucial Siedlce attack. Regrouped, Pleve's Russian Fifth Army then moved into this widening gap between the Habsburg First and Fourth armies, which forced them to fall back into Austrian Galicia.

In retreat, Auffenberg publicly blamed Archduke Peter Ferdinand for failing to deliver the blow that would have destroyed Pleve and secured a major victory. In any event, Auffenberg became the scapegoat. He was sacked as commander of the Fourth Army and replaced by Peter Ferdinand's brother, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

R. D. Zehnder

See also: Pleve (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Lladeino, near Viatka (today Kirov), on December 28, 1897, and schooled to age 12, Ivan Konev became a lumberjack. Conscripted into the Russian army in 1916, he served in the artillery on the Galician Front, rose to officer rank, and was demobilized in November 1917. He joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik (Communist) Party in 1918, serving as military commissar on an armored train on the Eastern Front. He rose to divisional commissar by 1920.

Konev played a notable role in crushing the Kronstadt Rebellion of March 1921. He



Ivan Konev was one of the Soviet Union's outstanding commanders of World War II. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1927 and then switched to the command side. He rose to divisional command and attended special courses at the Frunze during 1934–1935. He then served in turn as commander of the Special Red Banner Army in the Far East and head of the Trans-Baikal Military District (1938–1941). His presence in the Far East and his political acumen helped him survive the Great Purge of the Soviet Army officer corps. In the course of fighting against the Japanese in 1939, Konev developed a bitter rivalry with Georgy Zhukov.

Promoted to lieutenant general, Konev assumed command of the North Caucasus Military District in January 1941. In June, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, he received command of the Nineteenth Army. In September 1941, he was promoted to colonel general and succeeded Semen Timoshenko as commander of the Western Front. Terrible Soviet defeats followed, with five Soviet armies encircled and a half million men taken prisoner. Responsibility for the defeat lay with Konev and Josef Stalin, as the large encirclement could have been prevented.

Zhukov now replaced Konev, but Zhukov saved Konev by appealing to Stalin. Konev thus became Zhukov's deputy. Konev did not repay the favor. As colonel general, he then commanded the Kalinin Front, formed in October. Here he successfully defended the northern approaches to Moscow, and in mid-December, drove the German Army from Kalinin.

In August 1942, Konev again secured command of the Western Front when Zhukov returned to duty with the *Stavka*. Konev halted the last German drive toward Moscow and was shifted to command the Northwestern Front (February–June 1943). During the critical July 1943 battle for Kursk, Konev

commanded the strategic reserve Steppe Front, the powerful armor forces that blunted the German Panzers at Prokhorovka.

Konev secured promotion to general of the army in August 1943. In October, his front, now known as the Second Ukrainian Front, played a key role in the encirclement of German forces at Korsun-Shevchenko, earning him promotion to marshal of the Soviet Union in February 1944. Taking command of the First Ukrainian Front in May 1944, he swept through southern Poland and captured the Silesian industrial region. Zhukov was initially assigned the honor of taking Berlin, while Konev moved south of the German capital to the Elbe. Heavy German resistance allowed Konev to propose that his armor be diverted north to the city, and Stalin agreed. On April 25, 1945, Konev's tanks linked up with Zhukov's tanks, isolating Berlin. That same day, Konev's patrols made contact with the U.S. First Army on the Elbe at Torgau, in effect splitting Germany. Konev then commanded Soviet occupation forces in Austria.

By July 1946, Konev had succeeded Zhukov as commander of occupation and ground forces in Germany, having provided "evidence" against Zhukov during Stalin's inquiry of the latter's "improper behavior." Konev served as chief inspector of Soviet Forces (1950–1952), commander of the Trans-Carpathian Military District (1952–1955), and commander in chief of Soviet Ground Forces (1955–1956).

On formation of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev named Konev commander of Soviet forces (1956–1960) in time to crush the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Konev again turned upon Zhukov when Khrushchev removed him in 1957. Ironically, Konev's Zhukov-like objections to the move from conventional forces to missiles resulted in his "voluntary" retirement to the Inspectorate.

During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, Konev was called upon to head Soviet forces in Germany again through April 1962. He went into active retirement again in 1963 as a Ministry of Defense inspector. Konev died in Moscow on May 21, 1973.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Frunze Academy; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Hungarian Rebellion (1956); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Konotop, Battle of (June 29, 1659)

Disastrous Russian defeat at the hands of the Tatars in the Thirteen Years' War.

In 1657, Ivan Vyhovsky became khan of the Crimean Tatars and, reversing the policy of his predecessors, aligned with the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania against Muscovy. Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich, who had been at war with Sweden since 1656, now sent an army to Periaslavl, increased his garrisons at Korsun, Chernigov, Mirvgorod,

Nezhin, and Bela Tserkva, and sent some 6,000 troops to his most important outpost, Kiev. Unfortunately, the czar had neither the money nor the time to properly supply these forces, and they soon found themselves under siege by Vyhovsky's army and his Cossack allies.

Aleksei therefore sent Grigory Romodanovsky into Ukraine with a relief force of 20,000 in November 1658. After wintering in Lohvitsa, Romodanovsky was joined by an additional force under A. N. Trubetskoi in March 1659, and together they moved to Konotop during April 16–20. The fortress was defended by only about 4,000 Cossacks, but early attempts to storm the defenses failed. Romodanovsky sent four infantry regiments, nine *prikazi* of musketeers, and eight regiments of dragoons—almost 22,000 men all told—against the fort on April 29; after a five-hour battle, the Muscovites had lost 514 dead and another 2,980 wounded without making any progress.

Romodanovsky continued the siege, but on June 24, Vyhovsky approached with a large relief force of some 70,000 Tatars. After annihilating a Muscovite reconnaissance detachment, Vyhovsky set his main force behind a screen of trees and, on June 27, sent two small columns forward with instructions to engage the Muscovites and then flee, luring them into the trap.

Vyhovsky's plan worked perfectly. Romodanovsky sent 4,000 cavalry in pursuit of the "retreating" Tatars, chasing them across the Sonoska River and even camping there that night to allow the main pursuit force to catch up. Vyhovsky waited until the entire force had crossed the river the next day, and then his Cossack allies swept out of the woods, destroyed the bridge over the river, and swept around the Muscovite's right flank.

As the garrison sortied from Konotop to rescue the beleaguered force, Vyhovsky sent

his main army forward from the woods, pinning the Muscovites against the river and destroying Romodanovsky's army. Official figures record losses of 4,769 dead, including 259 officers. Only a small remnant of Romodanovsky's original force managed to escape to Putivl; for all intents and purposes, Russia was driven from Ukraine, and the Tatars proceeded to raid freely for the rest of the summer.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Cossacks; Periaslavl, Treaty of (1654); Romodanovsky, Grigory Grigorevich (mid-1630s–1682); Tatars (Mongols); Thirteen Years' War (Russo-Polish War, First Northern War, War for Ukraine; 1654–1667)

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Konstantin Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1827–1892)

Admiral of the Russian fleet.

The second son of Czar Nicholas I, Konstantin Nikolaevich was born in St. Petersburg on September 9, 1827. His father intended from the start that he would be an admiral, and chose for him a tutor who trained him in naval science, languages, mathematics, and navigation from a young age. In 1835, Konstantin was given a small yacht, which most days he sailed from the imperial residence at Peterhof to the naval base at Kronstadt and back. The following year, he embarked on a lengthy sailing expedition with his tutor; upon his return,

Konstantin was given command of the frigate *Hercules*.

Despite his titles, Konstantin served a fairly normal cadet tour until 1843, when he was promoted to captain and given command of the frigate *Ulyses* for a tour of the Gulf of Finland and the Mediterranean.

During 1849, he took part in three naval battles as part of the campaign to suppress the liberal rebellions in Austria and Hungary. In 1850, Konstantin became a member of the State Council, and in 1853, he was appointed General Admiral of the Imperial Navy, and head of the naval department.

He thus had the misfortune to oversee the disaster that was Russia's naval performance in the Crimean War, where British and French steamships far outclassed the antiquated Russian fleet. As soon as the war was over, he visited England and France to study modern naval techniques, and to purchase modern technology, including artillery.

Under his guidance, the Russian navy was completely overhauled. The Baltic fleet received 18 new battleships, 12 new frigates, and hundreds of smaller vessels. The Pacific fleet got 12 armored battleships and four frigates. Treaty restrictions prevented the full modernization of the Black Sea Fleet; nonetheless, at the end of Konstantin's program, the Russian navy was the third largest in the world, with modern, armored steamships and modern guns. He also reformed the naval colleges and the naval bureaucracy.

In 1861, after helping prepare the ground for the emancipation of the serfs, Konstantin became viceroy of Russian Poland. Despite an assassination attempt on his second day in office, Konstantin proved a sympathetic governor; he ended martial law, reopened the universities, and reinstated Polish as the official language of the land. When, following the directive of Alexander II, he ordered the conscription of young nationalists in 1863,

however, the Poles rebelled. Konstantin was forced to declare martial law once again, and crush the rising. He then resigned as vice-roy, returning to St. Petersburg as minister of navy once again.

From 1864 to 1871, he implemented a series of reforms, mostly concerned with the training of recruits and attempts to improve conditions for the sailors. Corporal punishment was abolished. Konstantin also served as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and president of the Council of State. When Alexander III, an archconservative who bore a grudge against Konstantin, acceded to the throne in 1881 though, he removed Konstantin from all of these posts.

Konstantin retired to Pavlovsk. In 1889, he suffered a severe stroke that left him partially paralyzed and mute. He died at Pavlovsk on January 13, 1892.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); Crimean War (1853–1856); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918); Polish Rebellion (1830–1831)

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Korean War (1950–1954)

Significant turning point in the Cold War, the first major conflict of the nuclear age, and the Cold War's first "hot war."

The Korean War had its origins in the immediate post–World War II period. At the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, the Soviets and Americans agreed to a temporary division of Korea along the 38th Parallel. The Soviets occupied the northern part of the peninsula, while the Americans controlled Korea south of the 38th Parallel. The two halves were to be reunited once elections were held; however, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could agree on the conditions necessary for a unified Korea. Both sides nevertheless withdrew their military forces in early 1948, leaving only military advisors behind to support their clients.

The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) was founded on August 15, 1948, with Syngman Rhee as president. On September 9, 1948, Kim Il Sung formed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Korea was now permanently divided between two hostile governments, one communist and one anticommunist.

Rhee and Kim each believed he was the rightful ruler of all of Korea. Kim was



A U.S. M-4 tank of the 5th Regimental Combat Team moves past a Russian-manufactured T-34 tank near the Kum Chun front lines in Korea on June 10, 1950. (National Archives)

especially eager to unite Korea and introduce Soviet-style communism there. While Kim received support from the Soviets in the form of tanks, artillery, and ammunition, the Americans were reluctant to extend significant aid to Rhee. They feared that would embolden him to attack North Korea and start a civil war. The result was that Kim, who had been planning to attack South Korea since the spring of 1949, was in a much stronger position than Rhee by 1950.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin was reluctant to support an attack, however, fearing it might lead to war with the United States. Badgered by Kim during 1949–1950, he eventually delegated the decision to Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse Dong, telling Kim that if Mao agreed to support North Korea, he would relent. Mao, then planning his final attack on the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan, did not believe the United States would invade, and acceded to Kim's plan. He also sent some 65,000 ethnic Koreans who had been serving in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to bolster Kim's forces. Soviet advisors accordingly helped train North Korean troops and assisted in planning an invasion.

Kim launched a massive attack against South Korea on June 25, 1950. South Korean forces were badly outnumbered and outgunned, and embarked on a hasty retreat to the south and southeast. At their low ebb, the South Koreans found themselves pinned in a small area around Pusan, the so-called Pusan Perimeter. In this initial stage, the war was basically a civil war between Koreans. U.S. president Harry S. Truman immediately pledged to come to South Korea's defense.

Meanwhile, the United Nation (UN) requested a cease-fire, which was ignored by North Korea. On June 27, the UN asked its members to assist South Korea; the Soviet ambassador to the UN was absent, having

withdrawn in protest at the nonrecognition of the Communist Chinese regime. On June 30, Truman committed U.S. ground forces to the fight. One week later, the UN called for the formation of a multinational military coalition, led by the United States, to defend South Korea. The Korean War was now an international conflict.

The first phase of the war saw UN forces wage a series of bloody defensive battles. On September 15, 1950, UN forces staged the daring Inchon Landing. This took the North Koreans by surprise and placed UN forces deep inside enemy territory. It also turned the tide of war. In the second phase of the war, the Truman administration and the UN called for the complete defeat of North Korean forces and the unification of Korea under a democratic government. By mid-October, UN forces had the North Koreans retreating far to the north, almost to the Chinese border.

The People's Republic of China intervened in the war in a limited fashion on October 25, 1950. But Chinese forces retreated quickly, and the commander of the United Nations Command, General Douglas MacArthur, ignored the warning. Stalin and Mao had discussed and planned for exactly this scenario though, and both were ready. In exchange for PLA ground forces to defend North Korea, the Soviet Union would send MiG-15 jets and pilots, along with radar systems and antiaircraft guns to provide air cover along the Yalu River. Painted with Chinese markings and stationed in northwest China, the MiGs were part of the Soviet LXIV Air Defense Corps stationed at Vladivostok and under the command of Lieutenant General G. A. Lobov.

On November 25, 1950, 260,000 Chinese troops intervened in the war. They clashed violently with UN forces, pushing them into one of the longest retreats in modern military history. By spring 1951, the battle lines

stabilized close to the 38th Parallel. For the next two and a half years, the war dragged on, bringing heavy casualties and destruction to both sides.

Though the Soviet Union never sent ground troops into combat, MiG fighters battled U.S. and UN pilots in the northeastern corner of Korea known as “MiG Alley” throughout the rest of the war. At peak strength, the Soviet air forces numbered about 26,000; more than 70,000 Soviet pilots and ground crew served in China during the conflict. They proved remarkably effective in the early going, forcing the United States to send F-86 Sabres to gain at least parity. Official Soviet figures claimed 1,300 kills for a loss of only 200 pilots, but these are almost certainly distorted. U.S. and UN estimates, for example, show at least 400 Soviet pilots killed or captured.

Cease-fire negotiations bogged down over the status and repatriation of prisoners of war. A final armistice was not signed until July 27, 1953, after the death of Stalin. Nikita Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, believed he needed détente with the West in order to focus on domestic reforms. No peace treaty was ever negotiated, however, and the two Koreas remain technically in a state of war to this very day.

The war turned China into the pre-eminent regional power in Asia, put Chinese-American relations on ice for 20 years, and temporarily drew the Chinese and Soviets closer together. Yet the war also set the stage for the eventual Sino-Soviet Split in the late 1950s, as the Chinese concluded that the Soviets had not done enough to aid them during the war. Falsely believing that the Korean War was a precursor to a Soviet offensive against the West, U.S. policy makers sent large troop deployments to Western Europe to shore up North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defenses.

The conflict saw the application of new technologies, such as the widespread use of helicopters in evacuation and combat support roles. The first jet battle in history took place in November 1950 between an American F-80 and a Soviet MiG-15. The advent of mobile army surgical hospitals revolutionized medical treatment for wounded soldiers and cut the number of military deaths significantly. The war also served as a reminder that air power alone does not win wars, while command of the sea was shown to be a decisive factor in modern warfare.

The most horrific result of the Korean War was its grim cost. Almost every city and town in North Korea was partly or wholly destroyed, while industry and infrastructure were leveled. In South Korea, the destruction was less intense but still catastrophic; the capital city of Seoul saw its population cut by 60 percent during 1950–1952. The United States suffered 142,091 casualties (33,686 killed in action). South Korea suffered 300,000 casualties (70,000 killed in action). North Korea and China sustained a staggering 1.5 to 2 million killed in action. Perhaps as many as 3 million Korean civilians were killed, while several million more became refugees.

*Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. and
Timothy C. Dowling*

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Mi-G (Mikoyan-Gurevich) Aircraft; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918)

Russian army general and commander of the Army under the provisional government. Born on August 30, 1870, in Ust-Kamengorsk, in western Siberia, Lavr Kornilov was a retired officer's son and thus had the right to a free education in a Siberian Cadet Corps school, a kind of secondary school with military discipline. After graduating with distinction, he attended the Mikhailovski Artillery Training Corps for Officers. Commissioned in 1892,



Russian general Lavr Kornilov was a commander and war hero during World War I. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Kornilov joined the Turkistan Artillery Brigade. In 1895, he attended the General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg, and following graduation and a short period of service in the Warsaw Military District, he returned to duty in Turkestan.

Assigned to intelligence duties in connection with expeditions into eastern Persia, Kornilov became fluent in several Central Asian languages and published articles on eastern Persia, India, and Baluchistan. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, he was chief of staff of the 1st Fusilier Brigade and earned the Cross of St. George. At war's end, he was assigned to the central offices of the General Staff and served in Turkistan, the Caucasus, and western Russia. From 1907 to 1911, he was the military attaché to China and undertook some horseback treks through China and Mongolia.

Kornilov rose rapidly through the officer ranks. Already a general when World War I erupted, he first commanded the 49th Infantry Division and then the 48th Infantry Division on the Southwestern Front. In April 1915, his division spearheaded the Russian offensive thrusting through the Carpathians into the Austrian plains. When the army suddenly found itself short of arms and ammunition, particularly artillery, Kornilov's unit was forced to retreat. He was wounded and taken prisoner at Przemyśl by the Austrians.

In 1916, Kornilov escaped from captivity and crossed through Romania to rejoin the Russian Army. News of his escape and repatriation made headlines and made him a hero. He was given command of the XXV Corps, again on the Southwestern Front then commanded by General Aleksei Brusilov. When the imperial government fell and was replaced by the provisional government in March 1917, Kornilov became commander of the Petrograd garrison. Instructed to restore order and discipline but frustrated by

the lack of government support, Kornilov was allowed to resign the post and return to the front lines as commander of the Eighth Army. Here he had some success in the opening assaults of the so-called Kerensky Offensive before the German counteroffensive drove the Russians back in disarray. His attempts to restore order and discipline among his troops were also frustrated.

In August 1917, new prime minister Alexander Kerensky appointed Kornilov commander of the Russian Army. When the fall of Riga to the Germans brought unrest in the capital, Kerensky ordered Kornilov to Petrograd to restore order. When Kornilov called for the government to resign and pass control to him as commander in chief of the army, Kerensky dismissed Kornilov and ordered his return to the capital.

Defying Kerensky, Kornilov ordered forces under General Aleksandr Krymov, consisting of the elite III Cavalry Corps and the renowned Savage Division of north Caucasian mountain warriors, to march on Petrograd. Kerensky called on Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin for assistance, and massed railroad workers—along with some soldiers and sailors—blocked Kornilov’s path. Discussions between Kornilov’s troops and the radical workers convinced his forces to disperse, and the threat to Kerensky’s government subsided.

Kornilov was arrested on September 1, 1917, at army headquarters and imprisoned at Bykhov. He later escaped and joined anti-Bolshevik White forces in the Don region. Kornilov was killed by a shell explosion during an engagement with Bolshevik forces at Ekaterinodar on April 13, 1918.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917);

Kornilov Rebellion (1917); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Russo-Japanese War, (1904–1905); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Kornilov Rebellion (1917)

Putative rising by troops under General Lavr Kornilov to install him as dictator of Russia.

The Provisional Government established upon the abdication of Czar Nicholas II in February (March) 1917 was plagued by weakness. Originally comprised of members of the Third Duma, it had limited popular support and thus from the outset had to share power with the Petrograd Soviet, a much more radical body. The Provisional Government also favored a continuing role for Russia in World War I, arguing the state was obliged to fight by treaty. When it tried to stage an offensive in June 1917, however, the soldiers simply refused to fight. The more radical elements in St. Petersburg, including the Bolshevik Party led by Vladimir Lenin and the First Machine Gun Regiment, took advantage of the protests and chaos the so-called Kerensky Offensive stirred up to stage a coup, the “July Days”. The government, led by Alexander Kerensky, barely managed to suppress the poorly organized rising. Many military officers, including General Lavr Kornilov, whose Eighth Army had fought well in the recent offensive, now

became more strident in their call for a return to traditional discipline—including corporal punishment and the death penalty—in the military. Kerensky, seeing an opportunity to stabilize his government, appointed Kornilov as commander in chief on July 12, 1917.

There is some evidence that Kornilov viewed his role as tantamount to dictator from the beginning. This tendency certainly was reinforced by the August 24 visit of Vladimir Lvov, former procurator of the Holy Synod, to Kornilov's headquarters at Mogilev. Claiming, probably falsely, he had been sent by Kerensky, Lvov asked Kornilov whether he saw a dictatorship under Kerensky, an authoritarian government in which he and Kerensky shared power, or a military dictatorship with Kornilov at its head as the best solution to Russia's dilemma. Kornilov replied that he favored the last option, which Lvov reported to Kerensky the following day.

Kerensky, either alarmed by Kornilov's intentions or having manipulated Kornilov into revealing his intentions (it is unclear whether Lvov and Kerensky were cooperating), confronted Kornilov indirectly, using a Hughes teleprinter. Without revealing his identity, Kerensky asked Kornilov to confirm that he aimed at a military dictatorship, which Kornilov essentially did. Though the entire exchange was vague, Kerensky took the opportunity to accuse Kornilov of plotting against him, and removed him as commander in chief. When he could not find a replacement, however, Kerensky reinstated Kornilov only hours later.

Kornilov assumed this back-and-forth indicated Kerensky was hostage, at least politically, to the radical factions within the Petrograd Soviet and wanted his assistance against them, possibly with an eye to establishing the military dictatorship they had

discussed. He ordered his III Cavalry Corps to march against St. Petersburg to suppress the radicals and restore order. Panicked, Kerensky called on the Soviet to defend the government; he released the political prisoners from the July Days and gave the Bolshevik Red Guards arms to aid in the effort. Before Kornilov's troops reached St. Petersburg, however, they were sidetracked and dissuaded by Bolshevik railway workers. The coup, if there ever was one, fizzled; Kerensky again removed Kornilov as commander in chief and jailed him, along with 30 other officers. The Provisional Government was saved, but Kerensky had armed a more dangerous opponent in the Bolsheviks.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); February (March) Revolution (1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Order No. 1 (March 1, 1917)

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Kornilov, Vladimir Alekseevich (1806–1854)

The son of landed gentry in the Tver District, Vladimir Kornilov was born on February 13, 1806, and joined the Russian navy at age 17. He was a midshipman aboard the

Russian flagship, the 74-gun *Azov*, during the 1827 Battle of Navarino. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1829. By 1841, Kornilov had risen to captain and commanded the battleship *Twelve Apostles*. In 1849, he was appointed chief of staff for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. When another Russo-Turkish conflict erupted in 1853, Kornilov took command of the frigate *Vladmir* and engaged the Ottoman ship *Pervaz-Bahri* off Pendrakli. After a three-hour battle, the Russians captured the ship, which they towed to Sevastapol and recommissioned as the *Kornilov*. Promoted to rear admiral, Kornilov was given responsibility for the defense of Sevastopol in the ensuing Crimean War. He was mortally wounded in the Battle of Malakoff, however, and died on October 17, 1854.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Navarino Bay, Battle of (October 20, 1827); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich (1906–1966)

Founder and director of the Soviet space program. Sergei Korolev was born in Zhitomir, Ukraine, on December 30, 1906. His parents divorced when he was young, and his mother then married an electrical engineer who encouraged young Sergei's interest in mathematics. At age 11, Korolev moved with his family to Odessa.

In 1924, Korolev enrolled at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute in its aviation branch. He also became a glider enthusiast. In 1926,

he transferred to the Bauman High Technical School in Moscow, the top engineering college in the Soviet Union. In 1928, he designed a glider, which he flew in competition. Graduating in 1929, Korolev joined the Central Aero and Hydraulic Institute, working under the brilliant Soviet aircraft designer Andrei Tupolev. The next year, Korolev became interested in the development of liquid-fuel rocket engines. In July 1932, he was appointed head of its Jet Propulsion Group, which the next year became the Jet Propulsion Research Institute with Korolev as its deputy chief. Korolev headed research into cruise missiles and a manned rocket-powered glider.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's Great Purges of the late 1930s included many scientists among the innocent victims, and in June 1938, Korolev was arrested and accused of subversion, apparently because he advocated the development of liquid fuel over solid fuel systems. Sentenced to 10 years in prison, he was sent to the Siberian Gulag. Korolev nearly died in the brutal conditions there, but in March 1940, he was returned to Moscow and placed in Butyrskaya Prison. That September, he was transferred to a *sharashka*, in effect a slave-labor camp for those held to be useful to the state. This *sharashka* was an aviation design bureau prison. There he worked with other aviation engineers, including Tupolev. Released in July 1944 on parole, in September 1945, Korolev traveled to Germany to study and evaluate that nation's V-2 rocket program. The next year, Korolev was appointed head of a new agency charged with developing long-range ballistic missiles based on the German World War II advances. In this research, the Soviets utilized some 5,000 captive Germans who had worked on the wartime V-1 and V-2 programs.

Over the next two decades, Korolev—the Soviet counterpart to Wernher von Braun in

the United States—headed the Soviet development of ballistic missiles, satellite launch vehicles, satellites, manned spacecraft, and interplanetary probes. Korolev's R-1 missile doubled the range of the German V-2 and was the first ballistic missile to have a separate warhead. His R-5, which flew successfully in 1953, had a range of 720 miles. The R-7 of 1957, with a range of 4,200 miles, was the first true intercontinental ballistic missile. In 1952, Korolev joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although he was not completely rehabilitated politically until 1957.

Korolev was especially interested in the space program and proposed the R-7 rocket to lift satellites into orbit. Aware of the U.S. space program through press reports, Korolev secured the support of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev against the opposition of military and other political leaders for the attempt by the USSR to be the first nation to launch an object into space orbit. He achieved this feat in October 1957 with *Sputnik I*. Beginning the next year, Korolev planned a manned mission achieved with the Vostok spacecraft in April 1961.

Korolev advocated an effort to land a spacecraft on the moon, and for this, his team designed the immense N1 rocket and the *Soyuz* spacecraft as well as *Luna* vehicles to land on Mars. He also sought to send unmanned missions to Mars and Venus. He did not live to see his plans come to fruition. Korolev had already suffered a heart attack in 1960. His weakened heart contributed to his death on January 14, 1966, following a botched routine surgical procedure. Korolev's pivotal role in the Soviet space program was kept secret from the Soviet people and the world and was not widely known until well after his death.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Kapustin Yar; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971)

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Kovel Offensive (July 28–October 1916)

Part of the massive June 4–September 1, 1916, Russian Brusilov Offensive on the Eastern Front. General Aleksei Brusilov conceived the offensive against Austro-Hungarian forces in the southern part of the Eastern Front as a supporting attack for a strike against the Germans by the bulk of Russian forces under General Aleksei Evert to the north. Evert, however, delayed his attacks, and the offensive went forward only on the Russian Southwestern Front.

By mid-July, Brusilov's forces had advanced to the Stokhod River, at which point two German divisions moved forward and managed to hold the line. The Russians then turned back a German counterattack, taking most of Bukovina and Galicia. The Russians also turned back the southern flank of the mixed *Südarmee* (South Army) on the Dniester River. German Army chief of staff General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn then rushed up four German divisions as reinforcements to the Dniester Front. Meanwhile, the Russians took the Styr salient and advanced up to the Stokhod River.

Brusilov was hamstrung by Evert's refusal to move in the north. He claimed inadequate resources, among other things, and

continued to build up stockpiles of ammunition and guns. Despite Brusilov's pleas, Evert did not begin his advance until early July, and even then it was half-hearted. After an early advance, Evert halted. His failure to capitalize on Brusilov's successes meant that the Russians lost their chance to force Austria-Hungary from the war.

Brusilov now decided on a thrust toward Kovel in Ukraine, to the northeast of the Stokhod line. Kovel was a key railhead for the Central Powers. If he could take it, Brusilov could turn the German lines to the north, allowing Evert's troops to advance.

Guaranteed reinforcements, Brusilov decided on a direct, battering ram attack. He had received control of the southernmost of Evert's armies, the Third. Brusilov also had his Eighth Army, and between the two, he would insert the Guards Army. But while the Central Powers—especially the Austro-Hungarians—had paid a heavy price in men and equipment, Brusilov had sustained 65,000 men killed, 370,000 wounded, and 60,000 missing.

Losses in officers and trained troops had been especially heavy, but Brusilov counted on the fresh 60,000-man Guards Army. Its men were fit and supposedly had been well-trained in the rear area during the previous several months. In reality, their training had been indifferent at best. Russian attacks in mid-July failed, and when the Guards Army arrived at the Stokhod, Brusilov assigned it the task of breaking through to Kovel, supported by his Third and Eighth armies.

German general of cavalry Georg von der Marwitz commanded the Central Powers' defense of Kovel with some 115,000 men; the Russians had 250,000. With more than 100 heavy guns, the Guards Army enjoyed an even greater advantage in heavy artillery, but the Germans controlled the air;

their aircraft made low passes over the lines, strafing the Russian infantry.

The Guards Army attack began on July 28. The slow-moving and shallow Stokhod River was not a significant obstacle, but the marshes on both sides made for slow going. Paths through the marshes allowed movement only by single file. On July 28, one corps of the Guards Army took high ground at Trysten, allowing the other corps to drive a wedge in the line. The Russians captured 45 guns and took some 11,000 prisoners, but the Guards Army lost 30,000 men in this combined effort, taking the steam out of subsequent Russian attacks. Although the Russians mounted some 18 different attacks through October, these were unsuccessful and extraordinarily costly in lives. The drive toward Kovel failed, with the Russians unable to get beyond the Stokhod bridges. Only in front of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army did the Russians register significant gains. Russian Eighth Army successes there led Marwitz to bring in German units and mix them with the Austro-Hungarian forces even to the company level.

The net effect of the offensive was to bring about a German takeover of command of the entire Eastern Front and to weaken the Russians to the point that they were unable to lend support to Romanian troops when that country entered the war.

Aaron W. Childers

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?)

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Kozhedub, Ivan Nikitovich (1920–1991)

Soviet Air Force officer, leading Soviet ace of the war, and later a marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Obrzheevka, Russia, on June 8, 1920, Ivan Kozhedub completed chemical engineering school in 1940 and immediately joined the Red Army. After graduating from the Aviation School for Pilots in 1941, he was a pilot instructor until the end of 1942, when he requested a transfer to the front lines.

Kozhedub saw combat on the Eastern Front during World War II, assigned to the Voronezh, Steppe, Second Ukrainian, and First Belorussian fronts (army groups) between March 1943 and May 1945. During this period, piloting *Lavochkin* LA-5s and LA-7s, Kozhedub flew 330 combat missions and claimed 64 air-to-air kills in 120 dog-fights, making him the leading Soviet ace of the war. His confirmed total of 62 also makes him the leading Allied ace of the war. He was given a Hero of the Soviet Union award three times. He commanded a squadron and then was deputy commander of a fighter wing.

Kozhedub remained in the service after the war, graduating from the air force academy in 1949. He led the 324th Fighter Air Division during the 1950–1953 Korean War and graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1956. He was then inspector of flight training between 1956 and 1966. As a colonel general, he was first deputy commander of aviation for the Moscow Military District in 1964. Promoted to

marshal of aviation, he was a member of the Group of Military Inspectors from 1978 to 1985. Kozhedub died at his dacha in Mnino, outside Moscow, on August 8, 1991.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991); Korean War (1950–1954); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Kozludzha (Kuludzha), Battle of (June 20, 1774)

Russian military victory in the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774). In spring 1774, the Russian army under General Pyotr Rumyantsev advanced against the forces of the Ottoman Empire along the Danube River in the direction of Shumla, in present-day Romania. While the Turks had had little success in the war to date, the outbreak of Pugachev's Rebellion inside Russia gave the Ottomans hope of at least winning concessions when peace was negotiated, if they hung on a bit longer. The Ottomans assembled a new army, 100,000 strong, but undertrained and lacking in veterans.

On June 20, part of the Russian army, about 8,000 men under General Aleksandr Suvorov, discovered a concentration of approximately 40,000 Ottomans under Abder-Rezak Pasha at Kozludzha. Without waiting for reinforcements, Suvorov ordered an attack in divisional squares, supported by

artillery. When fully engaged, Suvorov ordered his cavalry to sweep around the Ottoman rear, where the Russians captured the entirety of the Ottoman artillery. The Ottomans, overwhelmed, retreated to Shumla, losing 3,000 men to Russian losses of 209.

Kozludzha marked the first independent success of Suvorov, who went on to succeed Rumiantsev as Russia's most capable military leader. The battle proved the final straw for the Ottomans, who signed the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774) shortly thereafter.

Grant T. Weller

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775); Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich. (1729–1800)

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Kravnik, Battle of (August 23–25, 1914)

Early World War I encounter battle between the Austro-Hungarian First Army and the Russian Fourth Army in Galicia, east of the Vistula River. Each side had misjudged the intentions of the other. The Russians were planning an offensive around Lemberg (L'viv or Lvov) to the east, where they believed the Austrians were concentrating, while the Austrians expected a Russian concentration more to the west.

Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Colonel General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf ordered General Viktor Dankl's Austro-Hungarian First Army of 144 infantry battalions and 71 cavalry squadrons (some 10.5 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) with 354 guns to advance north toward Lublin and Brest-Litovsk in Russian Poland to disrupt any Russian concentration there. As it moved north, First Army's left flank would be on the Vistula. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army was on First Army's eastern flank and would encounter the Russians at Komarów.

At the same time, General Baron Anton Salza's Russian Fourth Army of 104 infantry battalions and 100 cavalry squadrons (some 6.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) and 350 guns was moving south into the area west of Przemyśl to prevent any Austrian withdrawal. Salza's army had not yet completed its concentration, but *Stavka*, the Russian High Command, expected no major encounter with the Austrians.

The two armies met south of Kravnik on August 23 when the Russian right ran into the Austrian left. The Austrians had the advantage of superior numbers and the Russians were driven back. During the battle, both sides employed significant numbers of cavalry. The next day, the fighting became general along the entire line. On August 25, Dankl concentrated on an attack by his left, which again drove back the Russian right, exposing the Russian left to enfilading fire and also forcing it to fall back. By the end of the day, the Russians had withdrawn up to seven miles.

That evening, convinced that the Russians had faced only scattered Austrian units, *Stavka* replaced Salza with General Aleksei Evert. At the same time, *Stavka* detached units to deal with Dankl's army, ordering the entire Russian Fifth Army to turn to its right

and take the Austrians in the flank and rear. This decision led to near disaster when it ran into the Austrian Fourth Army in the Battle of Komarów (August 26–September 2, 1914). In the Battle of Kravnik, the Austrians sustained 15,000 casualties; the Russians suffered 20,000, including 6,000 prisoners. They also lost 28 guns.

Dankl's army continued its movement northward, but *Stavka* reinforced its crippled Fourth Army with the new Ninth Army, the so-called Berlin Army, still forming in Warsaw. This weakened the planned Russian Steamroller (a mass attack planned to relieve German pressure on the French) and uncovered the flank of General Aleksandr Samsonov's Russian Second Army en route to Tannenberg in the north. Later, Russian victories east of Dankl's First Army at Gnila Lipa (August 26–30) and at Rava Ruska (September 3–11) forced the entire Austro-Hungarian Army to withdraw to the south and west beyond the San River, abandoning the gains won at Kravnik.

R. D. Zehnder and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); Samsonov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1859–1914); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Kremlin

Fortress at the center of the most old Russian towns and cities containing churches and

government buildings. *Kreml* in Russian means fortress. *The Kremlin* usually refers to the complex of buildings in the center of Moscow, traditionally the seat of Russian government, and thus to the government of Russia and the former Soviet Union.

Moscow started as a small outpost in 1156. It developed as a trading center, and became the capital of the Muscovite state in the 14th century. The first stone walls of the Kremlin were set in 1367. These gave way to larger stone walls built from 1485 to 1499.

The Kremlin grew within Moscow as the city gained prominence. The Kremlin is 6.5 acres along the Moskva River enclosed by 1.5 miles of brick and stone. The walls range from 14- to 20 feet thick. The exterior wall includes 19 towers and 5 gates.

The Kremlin is built upon a vast network of tunnels. Construction of the interior buildings continued for centuries. Many of the early structures, including several churches, were demolished and rebuilt or replaced. Other buildings were renovated. The most far-reaching reconstruction of the Kremlin occurred under Ivan III, who invited architects from Italy to redesign the walls and create the interior buildings, including the imperial palace and the Bell Tower of Ivan the Great (1505–1508). The Kremlin acquired most of its main features by 1533, though many have been rebuilt or refurbished. Catherine II added the Senate buildings in the late 18th century, and Nicholas I commissioned the Grand Kremlin Palace, completed in 1849.

Moscow and the Kremlin have extensive military histories. The Tatars laid siege to Moscow three times: in 1238, in 1382, and in 1513. The Kremlin survived the last two sieges largely intact. Polish forces invaded and occupied the Kremlin in the early 1600s in a dispute over claims to the Russian



The Kremlin in Moscow as it appeared in 1842. (Library of Congress)

throne. The Russians laid siege to their own Kremlin for two years before driving out the Poles in 1612. It remained the seat of government until 1712, when Peter I shifted the capital to his new city, St. Petersburg.

One hundred years later, Napoleon invaded Russia and advanced as far as Moscow. Czar Alexander I ordered Russian troops to evacuate the city. Though they fired the city as they left, the Kremlin was unharmed. Napoleon remained in the Kremlin for five weeks and ordered it destroyed upon withdrawal. French forces inflicted only minimal damage, however, and the Russians repaired it easily.

After the October Revolution in 1917, the Soviets moved the capital back to Moscow and the Kremlin again became the center of government. The Kremlin was in good condition, but the Soviets made several changes, including replacing the traditional Russian

eagles atop the spires with red stars. Josef Stalin had several churches pulled down to make room for the Palace of Congresses and a military school, and Nikita Khrushchev transformed the Armory into a museum, which currently displays the Russian crown jewels. The Soviets also began a tradition of burying deceased prominent communists and Soviet leaders along the Kremlin wall. Lenin's Tomb, the most notable architectural addition from the Soviet times, technically lies outside the Kremlin in Red Square, as does St. Basil's Cathedral—perhaps the most recognizable of all Russian buildings.

William Eger

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); October (November) Revolution (1917); Patriotic War of 1812; Tatars (Mongols)

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Krivoshein, Alexander Vasilievich (1857–1921)

Russian political figure. Born in Warsaw on July 31, 1857, Alexander Krivoshein graduated from St. Petersburg University in 1884 with a degree in law, and for the next 12 years, worked for the Justice and Interior ministries. In 1896, he became the assistant head of the Interior Ministry's Department of Peasant Colonization, and by 1904, he was its director. A year later, he was assistant head of the Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture.

In 1905, Krivoshein became well known for his efforts to secure land reform. Between 1906 and 1908, he was a member of the State Council and an assistant to the minister of finance. During this time, he was an active supporter of Premier Pyotr Arkadevich Stolypin's land reforms. In 1908, Krivoshein headed the newly created Ministry of Agriculture. Under Krivoshein, 2.5 million peasants were resettled on lands in Siberia.

Known as a moderate who wanted to introduce democratic reforms in Russia, Krivoshein called on the Russian Duma (parliament) to become involved in Russia's internal affairs. On August 6, 1915, Czar Nicholas II announced his plan to take personal command of the Russian military. Krivoshein and other ministers opposed this, and on August 21, 1915, they expressed their opposition in a written letter. Ignoring their appeal, the czar assumed the supreme command and departed for the front in early September.

Krivoshein was removed from his post that October. He then served with the Red Cross at the front until Russia left the war.

Following the March 1917 revolution, Krivoshein became the leader of the State Unity Council, a major part of the centrist provisional government. The council also served as the administrative body of the Volunteer Army. After the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Krivoshein joined the anti-Bolshevik White forces.

Beginning in the middle of 1920, Krivoshein was the premier of General Baron Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel's government in the Crimea. As head of its Ministry of the Interior, he oversaw the secret police, the department that prosecuted suspected Bolsheviks and their sympathizers. With the collapse of Wrangel's efforts in November 1920, Krivoshein became one of more than 146,000 Russian soldiers and civilians who sought French protection. Krivoshein immigrated to France and later moved to Germany. He died in Berlin on October 28, 1921.

Vadim K. Simakhov

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front, World War I (1914–1917); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1918–1922); Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadevich (1861–1911); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

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Kronstadt (Kronshtadt)

Russian naval base located on an island 20 miles west of St Petersburg, Russia, in the

Gulf of Finland. It was the base of the Russian Baltic Fleet and the site of a well-known revolt against the Bolshevik government in 1921.

Kronstadt is a fortified Russian city and naval base located on Kotlin Island. Originally built by Peter I (the Great) in the 18th century, Kronstadt was designed to protect the new Russian capital from the open sea. In 1921, it served as the main base for the Baltic Fleet with a total population of around 50,000—half of whom were military. The fortifications have been rebuilt several times since 1704, most notably between 1856 and 1871 when a new fort was constructed following the designs of Eduard Totleben. Today the fortifications and city—which is home to St. Andrew’s Cathedral, made famous by Saint John of Kronstadt—are part of a World Heritage site.

The French fleet visited the fortress in 1894, but during the 20th century, the base became famous as a stronghold of leftist political sentiment. Kronstadt was the site of revolts by disgruntled sailors in 1901–1903, 1905, 1906, 1917, and, most famously 1921. The base was an important training center for the Soviet navy during the 1930s, as well as home to the repair plant for the Baltic Fleet. Kronstadt was subjected to repeated German bombing attacks during World War II, and suffered extensive damage. The work of the repair plant continued, however, and Kronstadt again became the main base for the Baltic Fleet when the Soviets were forced to evacuate Tallin in August 1941. For its central role in supplying and maintaining the Baltic Fleet, as well as supplying Leningrad during the prolonged German siege, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev awarded Kronstadt the title “City of Military Glory” in 2009.

Many of the 22 smaller forts of Kronstadt have been demolished, but the Naval

Cathedral, British Seamen’s Home, and other historical sites remain popular tourist destinations.

Brian Tannehill

See also: Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Totleben, Eduard (1818–1884)

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Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921)

An uprising primarily by Baltic Fleet sailors in sympathy with striking workers and peasants against the repressive Bolshevik (Communist) rule following the Russian Civil War.

Kronstadt is the name of the principal fortress city and naval base located on the eastern end of Kotlin Island, where the Bay of the Neva River meets the Gulf of Finland. The fortress, dating from the founding of Saint Petersburg in the early 18th century, lies about 20 miles west of Saint Petersburg as part of a system of forts that guard the access to the city from the Baltic Sea. In 1921, it was the principal base of the Soviet Russian Baltic Fleet.

Sailors from Kronstadt were early and enthusiastic supporters of revolution in the 20th century. Their revolutionary history included an uprising in October 1905, near the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Rampaging sailors demanded better food, clothing, and pay; easier discipline; and shorter tours of

duty—though the rising ended without success. Baltic Fleet sailors joined in revolutionary events early in 1917 and, in November, gave crucial support to the Bolsheviks by helping storm the Winter Palace and by manning the guns of the cruiser *Aurora*.

By February 1921 though, low wages, a lack of food and fuel in the middle of winter, and unfair distribution of resources in favor of those in power led to riots, demonstrations, and strikes against Bolshevik rule in several large cities. Repression of political opposition and a failure to achieve the idealist goals of the revolution added to the impression that the Bolshevik rulers were out of touch.

Hearing rumors of strikes and demonstrations in Saint Petersburg, sailors at Kronstadt sent a fact-finding delegation to the mainland. Their report, named for the battleship where they met, led to the adoption of the *Petropavlovsk* Resolution on February 28, 1921. The resolution called for new national elections to be conducted by secret ballot; freedom of speech, assembly, and the press; the release of all political prisoners; an end to forced labor; and increased freedom for the peasants, among other demands. Bolshevik condemnation of their actions prompted the sailors to establish a five-man Provisional Revolutionary Committee under the chairmanship of Stepan M. Petrichenko.

The Bolsheviks labeled the rebellion as the work of non-Russian counterrevolutionaries allied with Western imperialists and with the forces recently defeated during the Civil War. Government talks with the sailors to defuse the rebellion, soon spearheaded by Leon Trotsky, took such an unbending position that the sailors refused to back down.

On March 5, 1921, General Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky therefore took command of a Red Army force that initially numbered about 20,000 soldiers to dislodge some 15,000

defenders armed not only with cannon and machine guns but also with the weapons mounted on two modern dreadnoughts, *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol*. Each of these ships mounted twelve 12-inch guns and sixteen 120-mm guns. Eight other warships in the harbor added to the defensive firepower, but all these ships were held in the winter ice or in dock, and thus were unable to bring all their weapons to bear effectively.

The first attack by the Red Army began with an artillery duel on the evening of March 7. The following morning, Red Army soldiers, led by picked assault troops, advanced in a fully exposed attack across the frozen surface of the Gulf of Finland and were decimated by the defender's guns. Reinforcements were rushed to the area and attacks continued, with pauses for aerial and artillery bombardment. The final assault began with a barrage on the afternoon of March 16, 1921, followed by the final assault across the ice at 3 o'clock the following morning. By the middle of the day on March 18, the sailors were defeated.

No official casualty figures exist. Some estimates indicate that only a few hundred were killed and a few thousand wounded, but much higher figures have been suggested, and any estimate must include those hundreds of sailors executed after the rebellion.

The rebellion shocked the Bolshevik government, which responded by liberalizing economic conditions—for a time—to help ease the suffering. While approving a measure of free trade and similar liberties in a program known as the New Economic Policy, the Bolsheviks clamped down even more on political dissent, to include the banning of factions within the party.

Larry A. Grant

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922); Bloody Sunday; October (November)

Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937)

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Krylenko, Nikolai Vasilievich (1885–1938)

Born on May 2, 1885, near Smolensk, Nikolai Krylenko was the son of a populist revolutionary—a heritage he followed faithfully. Nikolai joined the Social Democratic Labor Party as a university student in St. Petersburg during 1904, and served as a member of the Petersburg Soviet during the Revolution of 1905. He fled Russia in the aftermath of the revolution, and was arrested almost immediately upon his return in 1907 and forced into exile in Poland.

Krylenko returned to St. Petersburg to finish his degree in 1909, and was drafted in 1912. He was discharged in 1913 as a second lieutenant, and went to work as an editor for the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*. Krylenko was arrested again in 1913 and sent into exile at Kharkov, where he earned a law degree. Fearing further punishment, he fled to Austria in 1914 and, when World War I erupted that August, he continued on to Switzerland.

In 1915, Krylenko returned to Russia as an emissary of Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin; his mission was to rebuild the Bolshevik underground, but he was arrested in Moscow in November and sent to the Southwestern Front just in time to participate in the Brusilov Offensive of June 1916.

Krylenko survived the massive casualties of that offensive and, following the February Revolution, was elected chairman of his regimental, divisional, and army soviets. He had to resign these posts in May 1917, however, as few soldiers supported the Bolshevik position of complete opposition to the Provisional Government that Krylenko advocated.

In June 1917, Krylenko became a member of the Bolshevik Military Organization and a representative to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets. He was arrested by the Provisional Government in the aftermath of the Bolsheviks' abortive "July Days" rising, but released to help defend Petrograd against the putative coup of General Lavr Kornilov in August. During the October Revolution, Krylenko helped secure the support of the Petrograd garrison and played a leading role in the Bolshevik takeover in that city.

Following the revolution, Krylenko became part of a triumvirate responsible for military affairs in the nascent Bolshevik regime. When army chief of staff General Nikolai Dukhonin refused to obey Lenin's directive to open peace negotiations with the Germans in early November, Lenin announced that he had appointed Krylenko as the last head of the Russian army.

Krylenko was also the first head of the Red Army, which was established in January 1918. He implemented radical Bolshevik policies, such as the election of all officers, but was unable to prevent the German army's crushing victories in February 1918. Lenin and Trotsky therefore established a Supreme Military Council, to be headed by Mikhail Bonch-Bruевич, which led Krylenko to resign in early March 1918. He was reassigned to the People's Commissariat for Justice, where he became chair of the Revolutionary Tribunal.

Krylenko proved an enthusiastic advocate of revolutionary justice, and advocated terror

as an instrument of the revolution. In 1922, he was appointed deputy commissar of justice and assistant prosecutor general. He led the show trial of the Russian Roman Catholic leadership in 1923, and in 1931, he became commissar of justice and prosecutor general. Krylenko retired as a prosecutor in 1932, however, and became head of the Soviet chess, checkers, and mountain climbing associations.

Krylenko was removed as commissar for justice in January, 1938, and arrested by the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrikh Del'* or NKVD; secret police). He was tried on July 29, having confessed in prison to "wrecking" and opposing Lenin at every turn. At his trial, which lasted 20 minutes, Krylenko recanted; he was found guilty nevertheless and shot that day.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bonch-Bruевич, Mikhail Dmitrievich (1870–1956); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Dukhonin, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1876–1917); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); NKVD; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774)

Peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774. The treaty, signed at the village of Kuchuk-Kainardji (Bulgaria) on July 21, 1774, proved to be rather consequential for

the Ottoman Empire and had long-term effects on the history of the Middle East.

The agreement consisted of 28 articles (plus two secret provisions). Under Russian pressure, Sultan Abdulhamid I recognized the independence of the Crimean Khanate, which was annexed by Russia just nine years later, but maintained, as a caliph, his religious authority there. This was the first time a separation into secular and spiritual authority was established in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the first time an Ottoman ruler surrendered a territory largely populated by Muslims.

According to other provisions, the Porteceded major fortress of Kilburnu, Kerc, Yenikale and Azak, and the territories of the Greater and Lesser Kabarda, allowing Russia to establish strong presence in north Caucasus and the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire retained Moldavia and Wallachia but recognized Russia's special position in the region. Russia agreed to withdraw from parts of North Caucasus and the islands in the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman authorities also conceded capitulations which gave Russian merchants commercial privileges throughout the empire. The sultan also agreed to pay a heavy war indemnity of 15,000 purses (4.5 million rubles).

The most consequential articles of the treaty dealt with Russia's role inside the Ottoman Empire. Russia received the right to open consulates in any place, and the sultan agreed to let Russia establish a Russian Orthodox Church for local Russians in Constantinople (Istanbul). Article 7 granted Russia the right to represent (and protect) the church and its personnel. These provisions were highly controversial, and disagreements quickly emerged. Russia interpreted them as granting it the status of the protector of Ottoman Orthodox Christians, which allowed it to actively interfere in the Ottoman domestic affairs. The treaty thus was crucial

in the “Eastern Question” and contributed to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1853–1856)

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Kulikovo, Battle of (1380)

Battle traditionally taken as founding an independent Muscovy.

The Battle of Kulikovo occurred in 1380 and marked the beginning of the end of Mongol (Tatar) dominance over Russia, although it would be another century before the Mongols were completely eliminated. It also marked the beginning of Russian consolidation, and some historians consider the battle one of the most important events in medieval Russia.

During the 14th century, Moscow had steadily increased in importance among Russian principalities. Located further north in the poorer forest regions, Moscow was of less interest to the Mongols; it stood outside the Mongol Empire proper and thus provided a base for opposition. Its growth in power eventually led Moscow’s leaders to decide not to pay tribute to their Mongol overlords at a time when the empire was in turmoil. In turn, Mongol general Mamai led his army to Russia to force Moscow back into submission.

Mamai’s forces crossed the Volga River in the fall of 1380 and marched north toward

Moscow. They allied with forces from the principality of Riazan and the Kingdom of Lithuania, and planned to catch the Russians in a huge pincer movement. The Russian forces marched in three columns along the Oka River and assembled near Kolomna under the leadership of Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow, then grand prince of Vladimir and known as Dmitry Donskoi (“Dmitry of the Don”). Probably close to 50,000 strong, they formed the largest army seen in Russia in 300 years, but would still be outnumbered almost 2–1.

The Russians marched to the Don River and crossed it on the night of September 7. On the morning of September 8, they moved into battle formation to face the Mongol army. Donskoi set his flanks against either side of a horseshoe bend in the river, and placed his elite guard behind his left wing, where he expected the main Mongol attack to fall. This deprived the Mongols of their greatest asset, mobility, and forced them into a frontal assault.

The Russians and Mongols fought on the Kulikovo Plain near the Don River, close to the village now known as Kurkino, southeast of Tula. In keeping with tradition, the champions of the two armies took to the field of combat first. Both were killed in the first joust. Once the full battle began, the Mongols gained the upper hand by using infantry and cavalry to drive a wedge into the Russian center. A Russian counter restored the line, but the Mongols moved around the Russian left wing and came close to breaking through to the Russian rear. At that point, Donskoi launched the attack by his guard, which caught the advancing Mongols in the flank. The rest of the Russian army then took the offensive and managed to turn the tide of battle. The Mongols fled the battlefield by nightfall, making no attempt to regroup.

The Battle of Kulikovo was the largest battle ever fought during the Middle Ages

in Europe; modern estimates put the number of soldiers as high as 180,000. Donskoi's forces suffered some 10,000–12,000 killed and as many wounded, while the Mongol casualties were perhaps twice as high.

The Russian soldiers who died on the battlefield were honored as heroes, and a monument still stands on the mass grave where they were buried. The battle played an important role in the formation of the Russian state and the Russian national consciousness. The Russian victory was short-lived, however; in 1382, after taking control of the Golden Horde, Mongol khan Tokhtamysh defeated the Russians, and the Mongols exerted dominance over the region once again.

Amy Hackney Blackwell

See also: Donskoi, Dmitry (October 12, 1350–May 19, 1389); Tatars (Mongols)



A lifelong socialist revolutionary, Béla Kun reached his greatest fame for his key leadership role in the short-lived Communist government in Hungary in 1919. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

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Kun, Béla (1886–1938)

Hungarian revolutionary and head of the communist government in Hungary following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Born into a Jewish family in Szilágycsehi, Transylvania, on February 20, 1886, Béla Kun studied at Calvinist College in Zalu, but dropped out of law school and became first a journalist and then a trade union official. Kun joined the Austro-Hungarian army at the start of the Great War in August 1914 and served until he was taken prisoner by the Russians during the Brusilov Offensive of June 4–September 1, 1916. While in Russia he came under the influence of Bolshevism, joined the party, and became a revolutionary. Kun returned to Hungary on November 17, 1918, as a propagandist and ally of the Bolshevik government in Russia with the goal of introducing communism in his native country.

Kun founded the Hungarian Communist Party on December 20, 1918. In February 1919, Prime Minister Mihály Károlyi ordered Kun's arrest and imprisonment in an attempt to halt the spread of communism in Hungary, but Kun continued his propaganda activities from prison. He continued to manage the party as well as direct an ongoing campaign of agitation. Kun sought to convince Károlyi to include him in the government, promising that, in return, Hungary would receive Russian military support against the Romanians and Czechs, who were threatening the territorial integrity of the country.

On March 21, 1919, after Prime Minister Károlyi and his government resigned and Kun was released from prison, he formed an alliance with the Social Democrats. Unlike Károlyi, Kun was prepared to fight Hungary's neighbors. The Communists quickly came to dominate this coalition government, in which Kun was responsible for foreign and military affairs.

Kun tried to bring about immediate change in Hungary. The popularity of the new government soon began to fade, however, with its nationalization of industry, agriculture, banks, large businesses, estates, and all private property above a certain minimum. These policies produced economic chaos and disorganization of agriculture that brought widespread hunger throughout the country.

Kun set up a dictatorship of the proletariat, removed the Social Democrats from the government, and suppressed the opposition. He managed to maintain his hold on power primarily through the ruthless use of the armed forces.

In the spring of 1919, Kun raised a Red Army and overran Slovakia with the aim of liberating this historically Hungarian territory in the north. Pressure in the form of two notes from French premier Georges Clemenceau in June threatening military intervention led Hungarian forces to evacuate Slovakia.

Kun's Communist government was also faced with a counterrevolution, which broke out in southern Hungary. At first, his forces were victorious over the French-sponsored counterrevolutionaries led by Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya. But with Romanian forces also advancing into Hungary from the east, Kun was driven from power. On August 1, 1919, Kun resigned the presidency and fled by plane to Vienna. Kun's "Red Terror" of 133 days was followed by a "White Terror" that established Horthy in power.

In 1920, Kun fled to Russia, where he took a leading role in the Russian Civil War. He is said to have been responsible for the murder of numerous White prisoners in the Crimea. Remaining active in the international Communist movement, Kun attempted to stage a revolution in Saxony in March 1921. He ended his career as a mid-level bureaucrat in the Soviet government.

Kun was arrested in June 1937 during the Communist Party purges. Tortured, he was either executed or died in prison in Moscow, probably on August 29, 1938 (some sources claim he died on November 30, 1939). In the 1960s, Kun's reputation was rehabilitated in the Soviet Union.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also: Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1918–1922)

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Kunersdorf, Battle of (August 12, 1759)

Battle near modern-day Kunowice (western Poland), where united Russian and Austrian forces under Count Pyotr Saltykov nearly destroyed the Prussian army of King Frederick II during the Seven Years' War.

After success at the Battle of Paltzig (or Kay) on July 23, 1759, the Russian army (46,000 men, including irregular Kalmyk cavalry, and 260 cannon) marched along the Oder River to Frankfurt to meet their Austrian allies with the intent to threaten Berlin. On August 3, the Russian army occupied the heights on the right bank of the Oder near the village of Kunersdorf, just 50 miles from Berlin. King Frederick II rushed from Saxony and moved across the Oder, hoping to force a decisive battle.

In the meantime, the Austrian corps under General Ernst Gideon von Laudon (18,500 men) joined the Russian army. Saltykov formed his forces in two lines, but arranged for a strong reserve on the right flank, placing there his cavalry and the Austrian corps. Frederick II (48,000 men and 200 cannon) began his march on the eastern part of the Russian battle order. He deployed his army at a right angle to the Allied front and, after heavy artillery bombardment, began his advance.

The battle started with a successful Prussian oblique-order attack on the left flank of the Russian position. To support his advance, Frederick II brought in artillery and cemented his initial success. The Russian infantry bravely withstood the pressure, and only with additional reserves, which made the front line longer, did their situation stabilize. The Russian field artillery that included *licornes* (part of the Shuvalov's Secret Howitzer Corps) were quickly relocated and skillfully fired over the heads of their own troops into the Prussian line.

In the early evening hours, Frederick II ordered his left flank cavalry under General Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz to charge the Russian center and artillery positions. The Prussian cavalry, while trying to cross between ponds south of Kunersdorf, suffered

heavy losses and retreated in complete disorder. Prussian dragoons under the prince of Württemberg managed to occupy the central Russian position but soon were routed by heavy Russian artillery fire. The Russian infantry counterattacked the Prussians with bayonets and compelled them to retreat. The allied irregular cavalry, including Croats and Kalmyks, also counterattacked and scattered what was left of the Prussian army, which rushed to the bridges over the Oder in panic.

The Russian forces, however, lacked initiative to pursue the retreating Prussians. King Frederick II barely escaped capture, and was wounded by gunfire. Close to nightfall, the remnants of the Prussian army finally crossed the Oder; only a small number of the king's troops reached Berlin next morning. The victors, however, passed on the opportunity to take Berlin and retired to Saxony instead.

Frederick II lost 25,600 men (including 6,270 killed) and almost all of his artillery. The Allies lost 28,500 men (including 7,100 killed). The Russians also captured Frederick II's hat, which is now on display at the State Suvorov Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Kurchatov, Igor (1903–1960)

As head of the Soviet Union's atomic program, Igor Kurchatov oversaw the development of the Soviet's first atomic and nuclear bombs. More than just a manager, he was a great scientist whose discoveries advanced the field of physics. Kurchatov's work played a large role in establishing the Soviet Union as a major force in nuclear technology, which then heightened the arms race of the Cold War with the United States.

Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov was born on January 12, 1903, in a city called Sim in Cheliabinsk Oblast. He attended the University of Crimea, graduating from the physics and mathematics department in 1923. Soon afterward, he secured a job as a physics assistant at the Azerbaijan Polytechnic Institute in Baku, where he studied electrical conduction. In 1925, Kurchatov was hired at the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute.

At first, Kurchatov studied the electrical properties of salt. His investigations into the electrical properties of crystals made possible an area of science known as ferroelectricity. Kurchatov did not go into nuclear physics until 1933. His specialty was the physics of the nuclei of atoms. In only two years after entering the discipline, he had discovered several important nuclear phenomena, including the nuclear isomerism of artificially radioactive isotopes. His discoveries were so significant that he was put in charge of the institute's nuclear physics laboratory in 1938.

During World War II, Kurchatov was relocated to Moscow to head the Soviet Union's military and industrial atomic research laboratory. His group discovered the spontaneous fission of uranium in 1940. Starting in 1943, he was put in charge of research relating to

the challenge of harnessing atomic power. Kurchatov supervised the construction of the first cyclotron in 1944 and the first atomic reactor in Europe in 1946. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb under the direction of Kurchatov. He was also responsible for supervising the development of the world's first thermonuclear bomb in 1953—one year ahead of the United States. The world's first nuclear power station followed in 1954.

In 1943, Kurchatov founded and took over the leadership of Lab No. 2 of the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences. (In 1956, the lab became the Institute of Atomic Energy; in 1960, it was renamed the I. V. Kurchatov



As head of the Soviet Union's atomic program, physicist Igor Kurchatov oversaw the development of the Soviet's first atomic and nuclear bombs. (Library of Congress)

Institute of Atomic Energy; and in 1991, it became the Russian Research Center's Kurchatov Institute. Some 6,116 people conduct research there.) During 1946–1960, Kurchatov served as a member of the Soviet Union Academy of Sciences.

Kurchatov joined the Communist Party in 1948, and the scientist proved to be a deft politician as well. He served as a deputy to the third through the fifth meetings of the Supreme Soviet. The government awarded him the Lenin Prize in 1957. He also won many other honors, including the Stalin Prize and the State Prize of the Soviet Union. Kurchatov authored or coauthored several physics books during his career.

Kurchatov died on February 7, 1960. His remains were interred in Moscow's Red Square at the Kremlin wall. The Academy of Sciences instituted the Kurchatov Medal, given to scientists who have done outstanding work in the field of nuclear physics. By some accounts (the names of elements above number 103 are still under debate), the 104th element of the periodic table, kurchatovium, was named after Kurchatov.

Kellie Searle

See also: Atomic Weapons Program Soviet; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953)

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Kurile Islands

Archipelago of 30 large and small islands, the sovereignty of which has long been contested

by the Russians and Japanese. The Kurile Islands are located between the Japanese territory of Hokkaido and the Russian territory of Kamchatka. Between the Kurile Islands and Hokkaido are islands the Japanese call the Northern Territories (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and Habomai islands). Japan first laid claim to portions of the islands in the 17th century, while Russia began sending research and hunting expeditions to the archipelago in the early 18th century. The first mention of the islands in Russian documents comes in 1697. Both the Russians and Japanese subsequently laid claim to the Kuriles, and after prolonged negotiations, reached a settlement that divided the territories between them in 1855.

In the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg, Japan gave up Sakhalin Island. In return, Russia agreed to withdraw from the Kuriles. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and Japan's Siberian intervention (1918–1925), Japan used the Kuriles to launch invasions of Kamchatka. The islands served as naval bases during World War II and were subject to repeated American air strikes.

The Soviets entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945. One of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's key objectives upon entering the war against Japan was to control the Kuriles, which blocked Soviet exits to the open sea. Soviet control of the Kuriles had, in fact, already been arranged at the February 1945 Yalta Conference. There the Allied leaders had approved a plan in which South Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands were to go to the Soviet Union. It was codified by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty that Japan abandon the islands, but the exact terms of the transfer of the islands were not prescribed in the treaty. Soviet forces invaded the islands between August 18 and 31, 1945, and in 1946, the Soviets expelled the entire Japanese population of the archipelago.

Japanese prime minister Yoshida Shigeru argued at the San Francisco Conference that the Northern Territories were Japanese lands and were not to be part of the larger agreement concerning the Kuriles. The Soviets refused to sign the treaty. The United States supported the Japanese position in September 1956, and a formal diplomatic memorandum stating as such was sent to the Soviet Union in May 1957.

The deployment of Soviet forces in the Northern Territories and Kurile Islands waxed and waned over time, but their numbers increased dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s. The island of Hokkaido remained the main focus of Japanese defensive preparations throughout the Cold War in spite of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1956. The sovereignty issue concerning the Kuriles continues and is still an obstacle in Russo-Japanese relations, even well after the end of the Cold War. In 2011, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for troops to reinforce the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division occupying the island during a particularly heated period in the debate.

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See also: Japanese intervention in Siberia (1918–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Kurland (Courland) Offensive (April 26–September 26, 1915)

German offensive in the far north of the Eastern Front, part of a multi-faceted Central Powers' offensive in 1915, coupled with operations in Galicia and at the Narev. In mid-April 1915, German army chief of staff General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn ordered commander in the East, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg to draw off Russian forces from Galicia prior to the Central Powers' Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive. Hindenburg and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Erich Ludendorff decided to mount an offensive on the left flank in Kurland (Courland).

Kurland was a barren, thinly populated stretch of land where movement and communications were problematic because of a lack of infrastructure. The front line here was about 90 miles west of the city of Riga (in present-day Latvia), the nearest strategic prize. The area was only lightly held, with Russian strongpoints scattered about 10 miles apart. The chief obstacle to German offensive operations in Kurland was the Russian fortress of Kovno (Kaunas, Lithuania).

Ludendorff put together a cavalry-heavy force of seven cavalry and five infantry divisions under the command of Lieutenant General Otto von Lauenstein. This force was first known as Army Group Lauenstein and later as the Neiman Army. The German offensive began on April 26.

Russian blunders converted this German diversion into a major strategic threat. Russian commander in chief of the Northwestern Front General Mikhail Alekseev dismissed defense of the region as a waste of manpower. He believed that even if the attack were to succeed, Lauenstein would only have conquered a wasteland. Still, Alekseev was forced to commit more and

more resources to the region as the Germans advanced and threatened Riga to the north. Also, Russian patriotism demanded that large areas not simply be yielded. Leaders of the Russian Baltic Fleet did not share the army's view that Kurland and its ports were dispensable. An effort by fleet units to occupy the coastal fortress of Libau was outpaced by the German advance, however.

Soon, 18 Russian divisions, 9 each of cavalry and infantry, faced Lauenstein's 12 divisions. A Russian counterattack at Szawli (Schaulen, Lithuania), south of Riga, on June 9 proved ineffective, however. Cavalry and infantry failed to collaborate. German forces were now poised to attack either Riga or Kovno, and the Russians had to dispatch additional forces to the area. By mid-June, the situation along the entire front was perilous when the Germans launched their summer triple offensive. When Falkenhayn decided on the two-pronged attack on Poland, he included an additional offensive in Kurland to maintain the pressure there.

The renewed Kurland Offensive began on July 13 and soon threatened Riga. The Germans captured Mitau, and their cavalry reached Kovno. They easily pushed through the defending Russian Fifth Army toward Riga. The Russian withdrawal from Poland, begun on July 22, freed up the Twelfth Army to protect Riga, however. Simultaneously, the Russians reinforced their Tenth Army at Kovno. Because both armies remained close to their supply bases, the Germans moved into the gap between them. Russian reserves were not available to fill this area because of the Central Powers' offensive in Galicia. Still, Russian forces in the area outnumbered those of the Germans by 20 divisions to 13. In late July, *Stavka*, the Russian High Command, insisted that Alekseev send additional reinforcements to the area.

Ludendorff had wanted a full-scale offensive in Kurland, but in early August, Falkenhayn, uncertain of supply and lines of communication, decided simply to follow the Russians in their withdrawal from Poland. A strenuous push into Russia might have prompted the Russians to resist more fiercely. Falkenhayn's more cautious approach proved correct. The Kurland Offensive had only progressed as far as it had because the Russians had the bulk of their resources in Poland.

Stavka feared a German amphibious landing on the Baltic Coast or even an attack on Petrograd. This prompted it, on August 17, to set up the new Northwestern Front of three armies commanded by General Nikolai Ruzsky to defend the approaches to Riga and Dvinsk. By this time, Russian strength in Kurland had grown to 28 divisions. This reinforcement came too late, however, to prevent the fall of Kovno on August 17. The Tenth Army then retreated east toward Vilnius, while the Fifth Army fell back on Riga. Ruzsky redeployed his forces, convinced that the Germans were about to drive on Petrograd, and in the process, he opened a 50-mile gap between the Russian armies. Alekseev, who was appointed chief of staff of the entire Russian Army in early September, refused to further reinforcements as this would have meant weakening Russian lines elsewhere.

In early September, Ludendorff, still convinced that a great victory might be obtained in the northern part of the front, launched a new attack, against Falkenhayn's orders, this time in the southern part of the sector. German lines of communication were now stretched, while those serving the Russians were considerably shorter, enabling the Russians to resupply their forces more effectively. The Germans therefore achieved only local successes in this Vilnius Offensive.

A German frontal attack on Vilnius failed, although a subsequent flanking operation on September 8 succeeded, and the Germans captured the Vilnius-Riga railway junction at Sventsiany. On September 18, they took Vilnius.

These operations had their price, as the Germans sustained 50,000 casualties in only two weeks. Further German advances met stiff Russian resistance, and on September 26, Ludendorff ended the offensive and ordered construction of a permanent trench line.

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See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Ruzsky, Nikolai Vladimirovich (1854–1918)

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Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925)

Russian army general. Born in Pskov Province on March 17, 1848, Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin graduated from the Pavlovskoe Military Academy in 1866 and from the General Staff Academy in 1874. He spent much of his early military career in Central Asia, where he gained distinction for personal bravery in combat and for his administrative abilities as a staff officer. On August 8, 1866, he was commissioned as a

first lieutenant; in August 1870, he was promoted to major. From 1872 to 1874, he studied at the Nicholas General Staff Academy, after which he became a military attaché to Berlin and Paris, completing his military studies.

Kuropatkin subsequently accompanied French troops to Algiers and the Sahara. Returning to Russia in late 1875, he was assigned to the Turkestan Military District. He was later awarded the Order of St. George (4th class) for his role in the Russian conquest of Kokand. Kuropatkin served on the General Staff during 1883–1890, after being promoted to major general on January 22, 1882.

Kuropatkin was promoted to lieutenant general in 1890 and appointed commander



Aleksei Kuropatkin served as war minister and commanded Russia's field armies during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). His indecisiveness there, and as a front commander in World War I, proved disastrous. (Library of Congress)

of the Transcaspian Military District. In 1898, he was recalled from Central Asia to become minister of war. In that capacity, he cautioned against further expansion into Manchuria and Korea on the grounds that it would unnecessarily antagonize Japan and thus would force the diversion of finite military resources to Asia at the expense of Russia's defense posture in Europe.

When hostilities with Japan commenced in February 1904, Kuropatkin took over supreme command of the army in Manchuria, but he proved to be overly cautious and unable to carry out a coherent strategy. After suffering a series of defeats at the hands of the Japanese that culminated in the great Battle of Mukden (February 20–March 10, 1905), Kuropatkin was relieved of command. He subsequently retired to write his memoirs.

After spending a decade in near obscurity, Kuropatkin was recalled from retirement during World War I and given command of the Grenadier Corps in October 1915, despite his advanced age and record of failure in the Russo-Japanese War.

This appointment occurred chiefly at the behest of Czar Nicholas II, who had recently taken personal charge of the Russian war effort. Although he did nothing in particular to merit it, Kuropatkin took command of the Fifth Army shortly thereafter, followed by promotion to command the Northern Front sector in February 1916. This last appointment in particular proved to be disastrous for the Russian Army.

The increasingly timid, indecisive, and pessimistic Kuropatkin opposed any offensive action, but General Aleksei Brusilov's plan for an offensive against Austria-Hungary in 1916 in particular. He then failed to provide more than half-hearted support for the Russian spring offensive once it began, despite the fact that his sector had the bulk of the artillery and manpower. Without adequate

support from Kuropatkin's armies in the north, the Brusilov Offensive eventually petered out without achieving its objective of driving Austria-Hungary from the war. In July 1916, Kuropatkin stepped down and became governor general of Turkestan, where he suppressed a rebellion by tribesmen against conscription.

Following the March 1917 revolution, Kuropatkin was relieved of his post in Turkestan and sent to Petrograd under arrest. Freed in May 1917, he retired to his estate in Pskov Province. Rejecting a French offer to immigrate and refusing offers of command in both the Red and White armies during the Russian Civil War, Kuropatkin spent his remaining years teaching at an agricultural school that he had founded. He died in Pskov Province on January 16, 1925.

John M. Jennings

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Kursk (Submarine)

Russian submarine that sank on August 12, 2000, in the Barents Sea due to a faulty torpedo.

Commissioned by the Russian Navy in 1995, the K-141 *Kursk* was a Project 949A (*Antei*) NATO-designated Oscar-II class nuclear submarine. Two nuclear reactors powered the colossal and well-armed *Kursk*. It measured 506 feet long and 60 feet at the beam (width), with a displacement reaching 24,000 tons submerged. On August 10, off the Murmansk coast, the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy began a large exercise that involved 22 warships and submarines, including the *Kursk*.

Two days later, unbeknownst to the crew, a 65–76A practice torpedo loaded into tube number 4 contained a cracked casing. The fissure resulted from old age or from workers dropping the weapon while loading it (or perhaps a combination of both). The crack enabled volatile high-test hydrogen peroxide fuel to mix with kerosene, causing the chemical reaction needed for launch, but within the torpedo tube. The explosion devastated the submarine's bow (front) and created an uncontrollable fire. As water poured into the *Kursk*, it began to sink. Around 135 seconds later, either as it hit the sea floor 354 feet below or shortly after, a second, massive explosion of overheated munitions annihilated the bow. All 118 men on board perished.

As the tragedy unfolded, the navy and President Vladimir Putin initially responded with indecision. The navy even refused support offers, but then accepted when their rescue attempts failed—inaction that might have saved some of the crew. All the while, the government obstructed the media from their attempts to disclose the truth, making false accusations and publishing illogical theories such as a possible submarine attack or collision. Eventually, both Russian and foreign investigations confirmed that the *Kursk* sank due to a faulty torpedo and negligence. The *Kursk* disaster exhibited

flaws within the Russian military, decayed and tainted by the weaknesses of the Soviet system.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–); Navy, Russian (1991–); Navy, Soviet (1917–1991)

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
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Kursk, Battle of (July 1943)

Massive battle fought between German and Soviet forces near the city of Kursk, southwest of Moscow, July 5–13, 1943. It centered around a German attack on a large salient jutting into their lines. Students of World War II consider this battle one of the pivotal engagements of the entire conflict.

The German Kursk offensive (Operation CITADEL) followed a winter and spring of seesaw fighting after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The Soviet command launched a series of ambitious winter offensives in southern Russia that left them badly overextended. The Germans counterattacked and recaptured the city of Kharkhov in March 1943. This successful German counteroffensive created the Kursk bulge's southern flank.

In the spring of 1943, the Kursk bulge reached 75 miles into German territory at its deepest point, with the northern shoulder stretching south of the Briansk/Orel



area and the southern shoulder fixed north of Kharkov. Its curving configuration drew the attention of both the German and the Soviet high commands, and both saw danger and opportunity. For Adolf Hitler and his

generals, the Kursk salient represented an opportunity to encircle a large number of Soviet troops—their preferred mode of operation in the war—and inflict a massive defeat on the Red Army.

German plans called for pincer attacks toward Kursk on both the northern and southern shoulders. The northern force, concentrated around Orel, was controlled by Army Group Center under Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge. It consisted of the Second Panzer Army (three army corps) commanded by General Erich Cloessner; and Ninth Army (four army corps and one Panzer corps) under General Walther Model, along with an army group reserve of two Panzer divisions. The southern group was controlled by Army Group South under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. It consisted of the Fourth Panzer Army (two Panzer corps and an army corps) under General Hermann Hoth, and Army Group Kempf (two army corps and two Panzer corps). The main element was the II SS Panzer Corps, in the Fourth Panzer Army, comprised of three Waffen SS Panzer Divisions. It was to deploy near the southern corner of the bulge near Belgorod and drive north to link up with Model's force thus closing off the salient and trapping two Soviet army groups ("fronts" in Soviet usage). Both German forces, particularly the Waffen SS divisions, had large numbers of tanks and self-propelled guns led by the powerful new Panther and Tiger tanks.

The Soviet Command, however, had anticipated German intentions and strengthened their defenses accordingly. They too saw dangers and opportunities in the Kursk bulge. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin pushed for an offensive, but his generals, led by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, persuaded him that the best course would be to build up their forces within the salient and let the Germans wear themselves out attacking it.

Soviet forces in and around the bulge were split between the Central Front to the north commanded by General Konstantin Rokossovsky and the Voronezh Front to the south under General Nikolai Vatutin.

Rokossovsky's forces numbered five armies (Thirteenth, Forty-Eighth, Sixtieth, Sixty-Fifth, and Seventieth), the Second Tank Army (two tank corps) and two additional tank corps. Vatutin controlled two regular armies (Fortieth and Sixty-Ninth), two Guards armies (Sixth and Seventh), the First Guards Tank Army, the XXXV Guards Rifle Corps, and two additional tank corps. Overall command rested with Zhukov. The Soviets built defenses strong enough to shatter the German attacks. Red Army counterattacks would then envelop and destroy the attacking Germans. The Soviets also planned follow-up offensives north of the salient toward Orel, and south toward Kharkov.

Originally, the Germans planned to launch their offensive in early May. Delays in the production of the new tanks, chronic shortcoming in their logistics, and concerns about keeping sufficient forces in reserve to counter possible Anglo-American operations in the west forced postponement until July. A number of German officers, particularly Model, von Manstein, and General Heinz Guderian, expressed doubts about the operation, arguing that Soviet defenses were too strong and it was wiser to preserve German armored forces to meet expected Soviet offensives later in the summer. Hitler, however, insisted that *CITADEL* (*Zitadelle* in German) go ahead and ordered the attacks to begin on July 5.

Both northern and southern thrusts quickly ran into trouble. Vatutin and Rokossovsky correctly gauged the timing of the German offensives and fired massive spoiling artillery barrages into German assembly areas, disrupting the enemy timetable. Once the German attacks began, Germans stumbled on the formidable Red Army defenses. In the north, Model's Ninth Army penetrated six miles into the defensive zone between July 5 and 9 but at terrible cost. Rokossovsky

guessed the direction of the German attack and, by July 9, had halted it near the village of Olkovatka, still far north of Kursk.

The Germans did better in the south. Hoth deployed his main SS armored elements toward the town of Prokharova—a direction the Soviets did not expect because it lay further southeast of Kursk. Soviet intelligence also underestimated the size and strength of the German attack. By the end of July 5, the Germans had advanced 11 miles into the Soviet defenses. By July 11, the Germans seemed on the verge of a breakthrough that would put them on a clear path to Kursk.

Vatutin and the Soviet command reacted by rushing almost all of their armored reserves toward Prokhorovka. The result was the largest tank battle of the war involving nearly 900 German tanks and an equal number on the Soviet side. The Germans could not follow through on their initial progress because Red Army attacks on both German flanks pinned down the forces the Germans needed to reinforce their armored spearheads. By July 13, the Germans' southern thrust had lost its momentum. More than 700 tanks and thousands of dead and wounded soldiers from both sides littered the battlefield. Although their losses had been much greater, the Soviets had foiled CITADEL.

It was clear to the Germans that they had failed. Reflecting their growing confidence, the Soviets launched an offensive against Orel threatening to cut off Model's forces. Moreover, the Western Allies had invaded Sicily on July 10, forcing the Germans to send reinforcements to the Mediterranean. For these reasons, Hitler called off the operation.

After their failure at Kursk, the Germans no longer had the resources to launch a major attack in the east. Lacking the strength to hold a front deep in the USSR and with an Anglo-American invasion looming in northwest Europe, the Germans were forced to

shorten their lines. The Red Army began a long advance west toward the heart of Germany and eastern Europe.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Vatutin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1901–1944); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813)

One-eyed Mikhail Ilarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov was Russia's most famous commander of the Napoleonic Wars. Although the famous strategy of forcing the French to retreat in 1812 did not originate with him, he oversaw a masterful campaign leading to the destruction of French armies. Many consider him the leading Russian hero of 1812 and a major factor in the downfall of French emperor Napoleon.

Kutuzov was born in St. Petersburg on September 16, 1745, as the son of a noted general. He studied at an artillery and engineering school in 1757 and commissioned in the army four years later. After good service against the Poles during 1764–1769, Kutuzov transferred to the Turkish front at Crimea, where he was wounded and lost an eye in 1773. While in the Crimea, however, he came to the attention of General

Aleksandr Suvorov, who employed him throughout the Second Turkish War.

Kutuzov distinguished himself during the Siege of Ochakov in December 1788, sustained serious head wounds, and gained promotion to lieutenant general. After recovering, he fought well at the capture of Izmail in December 1790, and subsequently held several administrative positions, serving as ambassador to Istanbul, governor of Finland, ambassador to Berlin, governor of Lithuania, and military governor of St. Petersburg. Kutuzov had an excellent military reputation, but his refusal to participate in the 1801 plot to assassinate Czar Paul I placed him at variance with Paul's successor, Czar Alexander I. The two men remained on uneasy terms for the rest of Kutuzov's life.

In 1805, Kutuzov was selected to lead a Russian expeditionary force as part of one of the conflicts of the Napoleonic Wars. He had reached the Danube region by the fall, only to learn of the capture of Austrian general Karl von Mack's army, Russia's ally, at Ulm. Outnumbered and hotly pursued by French forces, Kutuzov fought a skillful withdrawal, assisted by Russian general Pyotr Bagration, and escaped with his army intact. At one point, when a division under French Marshal Edouard Mortier became isolated on the north bank of the Danube at Durrenstein, Kutuzov suddenly turned and attacked, inflicting heavy casualties.

Once reinforced by Austrian forces, the Russians were ordered to make a stand at Austerlitz by Czar Alexander I. This decision was made against Kutuzov's wishes, and in the ensuing Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon completely crushed the armies arrayed against him. Stung by the defeat, Alexander blamed Kutuzov, who went into retirement and later held a series of minor military posts. By 1811, friction with the Turks had erupted into open hostilities, and



General Mikhail Kutuzov held senior command over Russian forces during the French invasion of 1812 at the height of the Napoleonic Wars. He is remembered as the hero of the Battle of Borodino. (George Dawe (1781–1929)/Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia)

the czar directed Kutuzov to lead armies in the field again. With his accustomed skill, the Russian general defeated his adversaries in several hard-fought actions, and in May 1812, the Turks ceded Bessarabia to Russia under the Treaty of Bucharest. The following month, Napoleon invaded Russia at the head of 600,000 men.

The war proceeded badly for the Russians as the two leading generals, Bagration and Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, despised each other and cooperated poorly. After the fall of Smolensk in August, Czar Alexander relented in the face of public opposition and appointed Kutuzov as supreme commander. The general was under extreme pressure to make a stand before Moscow.

On September 7, 1812, the contending armies clashed at the Battle of Borodino, one of the bloodiest battles of the Napoleonic Wars, with a combined casualty list of more than 70,000 men. Bloodied but unbowed, the Russians withdrew in good order to the east and south, while Napoleon pressed on to Moscow. Kutuzov decided to abandon the city, concentrate on rebuilding his forces, and conduct a guerrilla war against Napoleon's supply lines.

By October, the French were ready to withdraw, but a drawn battle with the Russians at Maloyaroslavets forced them to retrace their steps over the same route they came, which had been picked clean of supplies. Kutuzov followed them carefully, intending to let nature destroy the enemy and spare the lives of many Russian soldiers. The onset of winter greatly increased French hardships, as they were forced to fight several costly battles to avoid being captured. In October, Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal. The following month, he tried but failed to trap Napoleon while crossing the Berezina River. Nonetheless, the *Grande Armée* crumbled under the combined effects of cold weather and relentless Russian attacks—only 10,000 French soldiers ever made it back to Poland.

Once Russia was cleared of the French, Kutuzov pursued them into Prussia, where exhaustion necessitated his replacement by General Peter Wittgenstein. The exertions of the recent campaign proved too much for the “sly old fox of the North,” and he died at Bunzlau, Silesia, on April 28, 1813.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Maloyaroslavets, Battle of (October 24, 1812); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812; Paul I

(1754–1801); Russo-Turkish War, (1787–1791); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800); Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

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Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich (1904–1974)

Soviet navy admiral, minister of the navy, deputy minister of Soviet armed forces, and commander of Soviet naval forces. Born in the Arkhangelsk Oblast of northern Russia on July 24, 1904, Nikolai Kuznetsov joined the Red Navy in 1919. After service in the Russian Civil War, he graduated from Leningrad Naval College in 1926 and from the Voroshilov Naval Academy in 1932. In 1936 and 1937, he served as the Soviet adviser to the Republican navy during the Spanish Civil War. The Great Purges exacted a frightful toll on the Soviet navy leadership, and as a consequence, Kuznetsov was named people's commissar of the navy (minister of the navy) in 1939 at just 37 years of age.

In August 1939, Kuznetsov submitted an ambitious naval construction plan designed to produce 2 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 48 cruisers, 198 flotilla leaders and destroyers, and 433 submarines. The demands and costs of overseeing widely dispersed Soviet naval actions during World War II prevented any meaningful result from this initiative

though. Promoted to admiral in 1940 and admiral of the fleet in May 1944, Kuznetsov commanded the Soviet Pacific Fleet that supported the Red Army's operations against the Japanese at the end of the war.

Kuznetsov's postwar shipbuilding plan was far beyond the means of the Soviet Union's war-ravaged industries and did not reflect Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's expectations. Kuznetsov was named deputy minister of the USSR's armed forces and commander in chief of naval forces in 1946, minister of the navy in 1951, and first deputy minister of defense of the USSR and commander in chief of naval forces in 1953.

Stripped of these titles in December 1955 as part of the de-Stalinization program then underway, Kuznetsov was demoted to vice admiral in February 1956 and forcibly retired, apparently because of the October 1955 explosion and sinking of the battleship *Novorossysk* (formerly the Italian *Giulio Cesare*) while it was moored at Sevastopol. His immediate subordinate, the more progressive Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, assumed his post and led the Soviet navy to unprecedented prominence over the next three decades. Kuznetsov was posthumously restored to his rank of admiral of the fleet by the Supreme Soviet in 1988, nearly 14 years after his death in Moscow on December 6, 1974.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also: Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich (1910–1988); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)

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KV-I Tank

Heavy tank deployed by the Soviet Union during World War II.

The KV-1's inception came during the interwar years via Lieutenant General Vladimir K. Triandafillov's doctrine of deep battle (*gluboki boi*), which envisioned massive armored units smashing through enemy lines. In September 1939, engineers completed the KV-1 prototype, and the project's lead designer, Nikolay L. Dukhov, named the tank in honor of People's Commissar Kliment Y. Voroshilov. The original KV-1 featured a 76.2-millimeter (mm) cannon with up to 110-mm armor, and a weight of 52.4 tons. Each one cost 635,000 rubles (about \$33,500 today). Over the course of the war, engineers developed 15 different variants or prototypes of the KV-1. The two most successful were the KV-2, armed with a 152-mm cannon and the KV-1S, built with less armor to increase speed.

In December 1939, KVs experienced combat during the Winter War against Finland. While the tank's armor appeared impervious, other sections contained numerous flaws. KVs suffered from poor vision devices and powertrains (especially transmissions and clutches), as well as terrible steering and a wide turning radius. Even though an average KV crew (five or six men) could fire four to eight rounds a minute, they received limited training, which aggrandized KVs' weaknesses. The tank was also too heavy. It sank in soft terrain and could only manage off-road speeds around 10 miles per hour.

Even so, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the KVs proved

a nightmare for German troops. During initial encounters, KV armor stunned Germans as they pounded the tanks with shells yet caused minimal damage. KVs absorbed scores of hits. Withstanding shots from 155-mm howitzers, the monstrous tanks would lumber forward over vehicles and wounded men, grinding them into the earth. At the Battle of Raseiniai, a lone KV blocked a road for two days until it succumbed to German attack.

The KVs' advantage did not last. In 1942, Germany developed high-explosive antitank rounds in addition to superior antitank guns and tanks. Although they kept experimenting, Soviet developers could not overcome the KVs' flaws, and by July 1942, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin doubted the KVs' effectiveness. In 1941, KVs sustained 24 percent of their losses from combat, but this number rose to over 50 percent in 1942, and the following year, improved German antitank weapons and defense tactics further diminished KV's battlefield value. After the battles of Kursk and Orel in July and August 1943, the KV's role vanished when German Panther and Tiger tanks decimated KVs with their superior combination of firepower and armor.

Factories stopped manufacturing KVs in 1943, with a total production of 4,749 tanks. After scrapping the KV, Russia focused on producing the T-34 and the IS-2 heavy tank, although the latter proved no better against

the Germans. The KV provided strong success at the tactical level in 1941, but due to its shortcomings, it never played a decisive role, and the Red Army lost 3,400 KVs during the first three years of the war—most due to mechanical malfunction. Even Germany's formidable 88-mm gun did not guarantee a knockout blow against a KV. Dukhov's heavy tank provides an example that Soviet weapons competed well against their German counterparts on the Eastern Front.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Tanks, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945); T-26 Tank; T-34 Tank; Triandafillov, Vladimir Kiria-kovich (1894–1931); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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L

Lacy, Count Peter (1678–1751)

Irish soldier, Russian field marshal.

Born Pierce Edmond de Lacy on September 26, 1678, in Kileedy, Ireland, Peter Lacy claimed a long and noble Norman heritage. His military experience began at age 13, when he was commissioned a lieutenant in the defense of Limerick against the Williamites. Peter fled to France with his father and brother after the battle, and all joined the Irish Brigade there and fought in Italy for French king Louis XIV. Only Peter survived the campaign, and he now became a soldier of fortune.

Lacy served two years in the Habsburg armies, and then followed his commander to Russia. He commanded a regiment of *streltsy* (musketeers) in the 1700 Battle of Narva, and was wounded twice during the campaigns of the Great Northern War. Promoted to colonel in 1706, he led a brigade at the Battle of Poltava in 1709, and distinguished himself at the Siege of Riga the following year. He led a force of nearly 6,000 men and horses that was landed in Sweden in 1719, and earned promotion to general by 1720. Czar Peter I appointed him to the Military Collegium in 1723, and in 1726, Lacy was appointed commander of Russian forces in Livland (Latvia). He became the governor of Riga in 1729.

During the War of Polish Succession, Lacy again held a field command. His forces drove the Poles from Warsaw and besieged Danzig in 1734. He then advanced into Germany, intending to join up with forces commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy, which

he accomplished in August. His troops then entered winter quarters in Moravia before returning to Russia, where Lacy was promoted to field marshal.

He thus took to the field again in 1735 against the Ottoman Empire, leading the Don Army against Azov, which he took in 1736. The following year, he routed the Crimean Tatars in a series of battles in mid-June, and in 1738, he again landed a corps in Crimea and seized a key fortress near the capital. Upon the conclusion of peace, Lacy returned to serve as governor of Livland, having earned the title of count of the Holy Roman Empire.

In 1741, Lacy returned to the field, however, this time as commander in chief of all Russian forces in the 1741–1743 war against Sweden. His corps captured several key towns in Finland during 1741–1742, and he brought an end to hostilities by encircling a Swedish army near Helsinki and forcing a surrender. Lacy then returned to his post in Riga, where he served until his death on May 11, 1751.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Narva, Battle of the, (November 20, 1700); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709); Russo-Swedish War, 1741–1743

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Lake Khasan, or Zhanggufeng (Chang-ku-feng), Battle of (July 29–August 11, 1938)

Armed clash along the border between the Soviet Maritime Province and Japanese colonial Korea.

The border dispute between the two sides led to fighting, beginning on July 29, 1938, on a small hill known as Zhanggufeng (Chang-ku-feng) and the adjacent Lake Khasan. Soviet troops had occupied the hill early in the month, and the Japanese demanded their evacuation. When Moscow refused, Japanese forces attempted to drive the Soviets from their positions. A night sortie by the Japanese 19th infantry division on July 31 turned the trick.

Kliment Voroshilov, the Soviet people's commissar for defense, immediately mobilized additional forces. On August 6, Soviet lieutenant general V.N. Sergeev's Thirty-Ninth Army of 23,000 infantry troops, with tanks and armored vehicles and supported by heavy artillery and air cover, attacked units of Lieutenant General Suetaka Kamezō's 14th Division of 7,000 infantry troops defending Zhanggufeng. By August 9, lacking heavy artillery and armor, the Japanese were driven from the hill. The Soviet forces then broke off contact save for reconnaissance.

The Japanese refrained from a counterattack, as they planned to open their Wuhan operation in China soon. A truce was arranged between the two sides on August 11, 1938. The Japanese sustained 1,440 casualties (526 killed). The victorious Soviets paid a higher price, with 792 killed or missing and 3,279 wounded.

As a consequence of the battle, the Soviets gained confidence in their combat effectiveness. The battle revealed glaring Japanese weaknesses in firepower and tanks, but the army did nothing to rectify these shortcomings, continuing to believe in the superiority of fighting spirit over firepower. This mistaken doctrine eventually led to an overwhelming victory for the Soviets and defeat for the Japanese in their border dispute in the renewed fighting at Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol the following year.

Haruo Tohmatsu

See also: Kalkhin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963)

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Lake Naroch (Narotch), Battle of (March–April 1916)

Russian offensive launched from March 18–21, 1916, intended to relieve pressure on the Western Front.

Under the terms of the 1915 Chantilly Conference, the Entente powers were pledged to launch concerted attacks against the Central Powers in 1916. The offensive was launched as a response to a French request for help to divert German attacks on the fortress of Verdun that commenced in February 1916. Czar Nicholas II and the Russian General Staff (*Stavka*) also hoped the attack would garner

additional assistance from the British and French in the form of supplies and munitions.

The Russian army chief of staff, General Mikhail Alekseev, decided to attack in north, where the Russians had a large numerical advantage against the defending Germans. The offensive was to be launched by General Aleksei Kuropatkin's Northern Front (i.e., army group) and part of General Aleksei Evert's Western Front.

The plan called for Evert to conduct the main offensive while Kuropatkin launched diversionary attacks toward the Latvian city of Vilnius to draw off German reserves. The main thrust of the attack would fall to Evert's Second Army, consisting of about 350,000 men and 1,000 artillery pieces under General Ivan Smirnov. The defending German Tenth Army of General Herman von Eichhorn had only 75,000 men and 300 guns, but was well dug-in and occupied multiple lines of trenches.

Evert's staff planned the offensive, which relied on massed artillery to break up and disorganize the German defenses, followed by mass infantry assaults along a narrow front. The operation was characterized by poor planning, lack of detailed reconnaissance, ill-positioned reserves, and a poorly organized supply system. Though not short of ammunition, Russian commanders had a difficult time moving supplies forward, particularly as March was a wet and muddy time of the year. Furthermore, Russian commanders coordinated poorly with one another—a problem that plagued the Russian army throughout the war. The replacement of several key officers prior to the offensive further exacerbated coordination problems. They included General Smirnov, replaced by General Aleksandr Ragoza—an officer unfamiliar with Second Army.

The Russian preparatory bombardment lasted for two days, but was inaccurate. Consequently, when the infantry assaults began,

the German defenses were still largely intact, and the two-day bombardment had only served to warn the Germans that a major offensive was imminent. The infantry attacks began on March 18, but quickly stalled. The assaults were poorly coordinated, and the massed Russians made ideal targets for German machine guns and artillery. The first wave lost 15,000 men in a matter of hours. Although weight of numbers allowed the Russians to occupy the first line of German trenches, the foothold was unsupported. Poor handling of Russian reserves precluded them from reinforcing the lodgment in the German positions, and soon the Germans counterattacked on both flanks. The attacks eventually forced the Russians back to their start line.

Evert continued to attack through March 21, but incurred heavy losses and made no appreciable gain, though the Russians achieved some success when several infantry divisions penetrated the German defenses along the banks of Lake Naroch in a dense fog, capturing around 1,000 prisoners. The muddy springtime conditions continued to hamper Russian movement of both supplies and reserves.

To the north, Kuropatkin's offensive did not begin until March 21 and was no more successful than Evert's. The Germans halted the diversionary attacks with machine gun and artillery fire, inflicting a further 15,000 casualties on the Russians. Despite the failures, *Stavka* ordered the attacks to continue for several days to fulfill Russia's obligations to France.

Subsequent German counterattacks soon recaptured the small gains made by the Russians, and the fighting stopped in early April. The Russians lost over 110,000 casualties and the Germans about 20,000. The Lake Naroch offensive failed to either capture significant territory or force the Germans

to divert troops from the Western Front as originally intended.

Tim Wilson

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Casualties, Russian, World War I (1914–1917); Chantilly Conference (1915); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); *Stavka*; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Lamsdorf, Count Vladimir Nikolaevich (1845–1907)

Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamsdorf was a Russian diplomat and statesman who served as foreign minister from 1900 to 1906. His tenure as foreign minister included the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the Revolution of 1905. Lamsdorf was born in January 1845 of Baltic-German descent in St. Petersburg, Russia. He attended the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum outside St. Petersburg and thereafter joined the Russian Foreign Ministry. Lamsdorf's acquaintances considered him well-mannered, sociable, and genial—character traits essential for a good diplomat. He never married, and his political enemies often used innuendos regarding his sexual orientation to undermine his authority at court throughout his career.

Lamsdorf attended the Congress of Berlin in 1878 as part of the entourage of Russian chancellor Prince Alexander Gorchakov.

Gorchakov's successor, Mikhail Muravyov, soon identified Lamsdorf as a protégé and possible successor. Lamsdorf strongly supported the Three Emperors' League between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia in the 1880s, but altered his opinions after Kaiser Wilhelm II forced his chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, to resign in 1890. Appointed deputy foreign minister in 1897, Lamsdorf played an important role in advising Russia and its representatives at the first Peace Conference called by Czar Nicholas II and held at The Hague in 1899. He succeeded Muravyov as foreign minister in 1900.

Initially, Lamsdorf's main concern as foreign minister was the reform of the Ottoman Empire in order to strengthen Russia's position in the Balkans. He personally visited, and accompanied Nicholas II on visits to, Vienna, Belgrade, and Sofia in 1902 and 1903, working to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The most significant chapter in Lamsdorf's tenure as foreign minister, however, was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the consequent Revolution of 1905.

Lamsdorf wanted Russia to end its aspirations in Korea and protect its established interests in Manchuria. Though Finance Minister and Prime Minister Count Sergei Iu. Witte agreed with Lamsdorf, various members of the military opposed him, especially Admiral Evgeny Ivanovich Alekseev, who exerted far greater influence on the czar than either Lamsdorf or Witte. As a result, Russia defaulted on its agreement to leave Manchuria by 1902 following the Boxer Rebellion, and events descended into a disastrous war for Russia.

During and after the war, Witte eclipsed Lamsdorf to a great extent. They jointly negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth on Russia's behalf, ending the war, though usually only Witte is remembered for this. When they returned to St. Petersburg, however,

they learned that the czar had secretly signed the Treaty of Björkö with Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German emperor. As a result of their efforts, that treaty never came into effect. The German government and press focused their displeasure on Lamsdorf. Regardless, Lamsdorf took pride in having steered Russia to a diplomatic position between England and Germany. Nicholas II nevertheless replaced him as foreign minister in 1906.

Appointed to the State Council of Imperial Russia following his dismissal, Lamsdorf spent the remaining months of his life on the Italian Riviera. He died in San Remo, Italy, in March 1907 at the age of 62.

Alan M. Anderson

See also: Dogger Bank Incident (October 21, 1904); Gorchakov, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich (1793–1861); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); *Potemkin Mutiny* (June–July 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

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Larga, Battle of the (July 7, 1770)

Russian military victory in the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774). In May 1770, Russian forces under General Pyotr Rumiantsev left

Khotin, a fortress on the Dniester River, advancing along the Prut River in Wallachia (present-day Romania), then a province of the Ottoman Empire. In June, Rumiantsev defeated the Ottomans at Riabaia Moglia, but the Ottomans retreated so precipitously that the Russians lost contact. Thus, Rumiantsev faced a superior force that might turn and attack without warning, on ground of its own choosing.

Rumiantsev sent out scouting detachments, which discovered a concentration of Ottoman troops on the Larga River, a tributary of the Prut. Having found his enemy, Rumiantsev planned an attack. On July 7, Rumiantsev led his approximately 34,000 men against the Ottomans (15,000) and Tatars (65,000) under Abdy Pasha and Abaza Pasha. Rumiantsev led the majority of his forces around the Ottomans’ right flank, while a divisional square kept the Ottomans’ attention by attacking the enemy center. Meanwhile, Cossacks harassed the enemy rear. Maneuvering in regimental and divisional squares, the Russians repulsed Ottoman and Tatar cavalry attacks and, ably supported by field artillery, broke both the Ottoman center and right. The Ottomans fled, leaving behind approximately 3,000 dead and wounded, while the Russians had lost only about 100.

The Russian success allowed a further advance along the Prut, but the Russians won the battle so quickly and thoroughly that they had little time to inflict heavy casualties on the Ottomans. The Ottoman and Tatar survivors were able to re-form quickly further downriver, and the two forces met again at Kagul in August. The Russian victory can be attributed in large part to the careful training of the soldiers in aimed infantry and artillery fire, and in the highly maneuverable infantry and field artillery formations. The Russian heavy cavalry, however, had little utility against the Ottoman and Tatar light cavalry.

Grant T. Weller

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Cossacks; Kagul (Cahul), Battle of 1770; Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

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Lebed, Aleksandr (1950–2002)

Russian general and politician Aleksandr Lebed was one of the most popular men in Russia before his untimely death in 2002.



Russian general Aleksandr Lebed, May 1995. (AP Photo/Alexander Zmlianichenko)

Born April 20, 1950, in the southern Russian town of Novocherkassk, Lebed entered the army as a cadet at the Riazan Institute for Airborne Troops and was decorated for bravery in the Afghanistan war during 1981–1982. He helped quell civilian protests in Azerbaijan and Georgia during the waning years of the Soviet Union. As the commander of a tank battalion in August 1991, he rejected orders to send tanks against the reformers and sided with Boris Yeltsin during the attempted communist coup in Moscow, which won him the early favor of liberal reformist politicians.

In 1990, Lebed's troops entered Moldova as a "protection" force to end fighting between Moldovan nationalists and the secessionists, Russian-speaking minority concentrated in the northeastern periphery of Moldova, or Trans-Dniester. An outspoken nationalist, Lebed resisted attempts to downgrade and withdraw the 8,000-member Fourteenth Army and at one point appealed directly to President Yeltsin not to be reassigned to a border post in Tajikistan. After Lebed repeatedly threatened to resign his command, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev called his bluff in June 1995 and accepted Lebed's resignation. Yeltsin also approved the resignation after consultations with his Security Council on the tactical consequences of cutting the populist general loose.

A former boxer, Lebed was a stocky and trim disciplinarian favored by at least two-thirds of the army corps for his blunt attacks on corruption and incompetence in the army. A critic of the unpopular Grachev, he had been compared to Napoleon and the former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet. In early 1995, Lebed joined the ruling board of a moderate nationalist party, the Congress of Russian Communities, founded by Yuri Skokov, a former Yeltsin ally. Lebed campaigned independently for president in the

summer of 1996, maintaining an ambiguous ideological position between the political far right and the left. He garnered almost 15 percent of the popular vote in the first round of voting, leaving him in third place and out of the final election.

Yeltsin appointed Lebed as his national security advisor and secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation two days later. Long a shrewd opponent of Russia's invasion of separatist Chechnya, Lebed forged a controversial peace agreement with rebels there calling for a delayed referendum on the status of the Caucasian republic and ending the First Chechen War. Yeltsin fired Lebed in October 1996, however, when the former general came into conflict with Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov.

In 1998, Lebed won election as governor of the region of Krasnoyarsk. Lebed was killed on April 28, 2002, when his helicopter hit a power line near the town of Abakan.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Georgian Rebellion (1956); Grachev, Pavel (1948–2012); Transdnestrria; Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Leer, Genrikh Antonovich (1829–1904)

Born on April 4, 1829, in Nizhni Novgorod, Genrikh Leer became a prominent military

theorist and historian in Russia. He graduated from the Chief Engineering College in 1850, and from the Military Academy in 1854. Leer served as a lecturer on tactics at the General Staff Academy from 1858, and taught courses in military history at the Engineering Academy. In 1865, he began offering courses on strategy as well. During the 1870s, he assisted with the reorganization of the Serbian army, and he served as chief of the General Staff Academy from 1889 to 1898.

Leer's seminal work on strategy, *Essay on a Critical and Historical Investigation of the Laws of the Art of Warfare* (1869), was published in six editions and in several languages. He advanced a streamlined "strategy of annihilation" derived from the historical evidence of several 19th-century wars, and was one of the first military theorists in Russia to recognize the indivisibility of politics and strategy. His work had a significant influence on the military reforms carried out in the 1860s and 1870s. Made a general in 1896, Leer died in St. Petersburg on April 16, 1904.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918)

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Lefort, Franz Jacob (1656–1699)

Franz Lefort was born to a merchant family in Geneva, Switzerland, on January 2, 1656. He began his military career serving with

the French and then with the Dutch during the wars of Louis XIV. In 1675, he sought employment in Russia but his services were rejected. He settled in Moscow nonetheless, and reapplied for service in 1678; this time he was accepted and commissioned as a captain. In 1679, he was ordered to Kiev, where he fought the Ottomans under the command of Prince Vasily V. Golitsyn and General Patrick Gordon. Upon conclusion of the war, in 1683, Lefort returned to Geneva and then carried out a series of diplomatic assignments, returning to Russia in late 1685.

Lefort participated in Golitsyn's Crimea Campaigns in 1687 and 1689, but he was clearly drawn to the side of Peter I, then coregent with his sister Sophia. Peter frequently visited Lefort's home in Moscow, and Lefort organized military exercises for Peter. Lefort was promoted to major general in 1690, lieutenant general in 1691, and general in 1693. The training ground for the foreign formations he headed was called "the Lefort Quarter"—it still exists as Lefortovo, in Moscow.

Lefort commanded the new Russian naval forces during Peter's Azov campaigns of 1695–1696, and subsequently was appointed governor of Novgorod. He headed Peter's Grand Embassy to Europe during 1696–1698, but returned with Peter to suppress the *Streltsy* Rising. Lefort died in Moscow on March 2, 1699; he was given a state funeral, and later memorialized with the 84-gun ship of the line, *Lefort*, launched in 1835.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Crimea Campaign (April–May 1694); Golitsyn (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich (1643–1714); Gordon, Patrick (1635–1699); Peter I ("the Great"; 1672–1725); *Streltsy* Rising (May–August 1682)

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Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813)

The Battle of Leipzig is also known as the "Battle of the Nations" for the large number of national armies participating. Approximately 410,000 Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and Swedish troops under Prince Karl Philip zu Schwarzenberg faced 195,000 French under the personal command of Napoleon. It was the largest single battle of the Napoleonic Wars, as well as the most important battle of the War of German Liberation of 1813 and one of the most important battles of the Napoleonic Wars overall. The French defeat here forced Napoleon to quit Germany permanently.

Following the defeat of Napoleon's army in Russia in 1813, the anti-Napoleonic forces at last coalesced. That March, under heavy Russian pressure, Prussian king Frederick William III declared war on France, initiating what became known as the War of German Liberation. There was keen determination in Prussia to exact revenge for the humiliation visited by Napoleon earlier, but enthusiasm for armed struggle that would bring the eviction of the French found enthusiastic response throughout the German states.

Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, headed the allied forces. General Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, then 70 years old, commanded the Prussian forces. Britain remained at war with



Francis I of Austria, Frederick William III, and Alexander I of Russia on the battlefield after the Battle of Leipzig in 1813. (Archivo Iconografico, S.A./Corbis)

Napoleon, so the coalition included Russia, Britain, and Prussia. Sweden, heavily influenced by heir apparent Crown Prince Karl Johan (Charles John, former French marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte), also joined. Sweden received a subsidy from Britain as well as a pledge of support for a union of Norway and Sweden. For the time being, Austria, nominally allied with France, remained neutral.

With substantial resources tied down in Spain, Napoleon was at a disadvantage. He arrived in the German theater of war at the end of April. Although the emperor could replace the men lost in Russia (many of the replacements came from the new class of 17-year-old conscripts, known to the veterans as the “Marie Louises”), he was short of equipment and artillery. Many of the new recruits did not receive muskets for the first

time until they got to Germany. Above all, Napoleon lacked replacements for the trained noncommissioned officers, officers, and cavalry horses lost in the Russian campaign. To minimize his army’s exposure and purchase time to rebuild, Napoleon might have stood on the defensive, but he followed his standard strategy of trying to decide the campaign with a bold advance to achieve decisive victory in one stroke.

The natural meeting point of the opposing armies was in Saxony, and the important battles of the campaign all occurred there. On May 2 at Lützen and on May 20–21 at Bautzen, Napoleon won important victories over the Russian and Prussian forces, but he was slow to concentrate his forces, and his enemies were able to withdraw in good order. Also, Napoleon’s casualties of 40,000 men were as great as those of his adversaries.

After Lützen, however, the Kingdom of Saxony openly allied with the French.

On June 2, the Allies asked for a suspension of hostilities to talk, and two days later, an armistice was signed at Poischwitz, putting off hostilities to July 20 (and later to August 16). Both sides saw this as an opportunity to rest, reorganize, and resupply their forces, and as a chance to woo Austria. Austrian foreign minister Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich had suggested the armistice as a first step to a general European peace conference.

On June 26, he met with Napoleon in the Marcolini Palace in Dresden. Metternich proposed a settlement that would include the restoration of Prussia's 1806 boundaries, the return of Illyria to Austria, the dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and an end to the French protectorate over the Confederation of the Rhine. In return, France could have the so-called natural frontiers of the Rhine River and the Alps along with Holland, Westphalia in Germany, and Italy. Napoleon rejected these terms. The furthest he was prepared to go was to return Illyria to Austria, and this only to keep it neutral. If Napoleon had been capable of concession, he might have unhinged the coalition against him and kept Austria neutral, but he claimed that Austria would never go to war against him. A peace congress held at Prague during July 5–August 11 was also a failure, and the struggle was renewed.

This time, however, the odds against Napoleon were greater, for Austria declared war against France on August 12, adding 150,000 men to the allied side. This put their strength at some 515,000 men against only 370,000 for Napoleon. Supreme command of the allied armies went to Prince Karl Philip zu Schwarzenberg, with Kutuzov having died in April. Napoleon, though outnumbered, attacked, turned the allied left

flank, and won a brilliant victory—his last on German soil—near Dresden during August 26–27. The French sustained 10,000 casualties, while the allies suffered 38,000 casualties.

By October 15, Napoleon's forces were being driven toward Leipzig, where during October 16–19, the battle would take place. On October 16, Napoleon commanded some 177,000 men and 700 guns; the allies had more than 200,000 men under Schwarzenberg in the south and 54,000 under Blücher in the northwest. On October 18, Napoleon had increased his numbers to 195,000 men and 734 guns, but the allies had added Swedish troops under Bernadotte and Russians under Bennigsen for a total of 410,000 men and 1,335 guns. These numbers heavily influenced the battle's outcome. In terms of sheer numbers, the battle was probably the largest in history until the 20th century.

The first day of battle went to Napoleon, but the tide shifted with the arrival of 70,000 Russians on the night of October 17 and 85,000 Swedes early the next morning. Napoleon made a tentative attempt, without result, to negotiate with the allies on October 17. The decisive point came on the third day, October 18. Napoleon drew his army into a tight circle around Leipzig and secured his escape routes over the Elster and Luppe rivers. In "a miles-wide pant of pain," the allies opened a general attack on the length of the French lines. The French held, although a contingent of Saxon troops defected to the allies. Napoleon was nonetheless forced to withdraw, beginning after dark.

The retreat continued into the next day, when the allied forces stormed Leipzig. The French rearguards held, and all seemed to be going well until a French corporal prematurely blew the bridge over the Luppe River, trapping four corps commanded by marshals Jacques Macdonald and Józef Antoni Prince

Poniatowski and generals Jacques Lauriston and Jean Louis Ebenezer Reynier. Their men fought desperately but were driven into the river. Macdonald swam to safety, but Poniatowski, wounded several times, drowned. Lauriston and Reynier were taken prisoner. Napoleon sustained some 68,000 casualties (30,000 were taken prisoner). He also lost 325 guns and 500 wagons. The allies lost about 54,000 men.

The Battle of Leipzig finished Napoleon in Germany. He now withdrew his forces behind the Rhine. The liberation of Germany was complete, and the allies were in position to invade France from the northeast as the Duke of Wellington and British forces invaded in the southwest from Spain. Napoleon still refused to make concessions, but diminished allied peace offers led to his military defeat and abdication in April 1814.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Bautzen, Battle of (May 20–21, 1813); Beningsen, Leonty Levin, (1745–1826); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Kutuzov, Mikhail, (1745–1813); Lutzen, Battle of (May 2, 1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815)

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Lend-Lease (March 1941–August 1945)

Mutual aid program among the Allied powers during World War II, dominated by U.S.

material assistance to 38 members of the wartime alliance.

When World War II began in September 1939, the U.S. Neutrality Acts forbade the sale of American war matériel on anything other than a cash-and-carry basis. By autumn of 1940, with France out of the fight and the United Kingdom in dire straits and running short of supplies and assets, President Franklin Roosevelt realized the need to provide Britain with immediate assistance. Isolationist sentiment in the United States, however, dictated that Roosevelt not strike too munificent a deal. This led to Roosevelt's brilliant (and consciously misleading) analogy, first aired at a press conference on December 17, 1940, that the United States should temporarily loan Britain war goods in the same way that a person might loan a garden hose to a neighbor whose home was on fire.

The Lend-Lease bill became law on March 11, 1941. It remained in effect until August 1945, when President Harry Truman canceled the bulk of the program after the Japanese surrender, a decision that vexed the British and angered the Soviets, who had relied heavily upon Lend-Lease aid during the conflict and hoped to receive more for reconstructing their shattered society. The cancellation of Lend-Lease aid is often cited as one of the causes of the Cold War, as Josef Stalin and other Soviet leaders perceived this as an attempt by the United States to dominate the postwar landscape and keep the USSR weak.

Any firm dollar amount of the value of Lend-Lease aid is speculative, but the program is thought to have provided at least \$50 billion in aid. About half of this amount was in the form of munitions, 22 percent in industrial goods, 13 percent in agricultural products, 5 percent in oil, and the remainder in services rendered (for example, the rental, maintenance, and repair of shipping).

Lend-Lease aid reached its peak in 1944, when the United States delivered \$15.1 billion in goods and services, or about 17 percent of the nation's entire war expenditures for that year. More than \$30 billion in Lend-Lease aid went to the United Kingdom, with the Soviet Union receiving \$11 billion, France \$2.3 billion, and China \$1.3 billion. Much of the aid to the Soviets came in the form of transport vehicles and maintenance supplies, though large quantities of foodstuffs were also shipped to the USSR.

The terms of Lend-Lease repayment were left to the discretion of the president, and Roosevelt had spoken only of a vague "gentlemen's agreement," with no firm conditions laid down. Britain paid off its final Lend-Lease debt on December 29, 2006. Several billion dollars were supposed to be repaid by the Soviets at the end of hostilities, but the onset of the Cold War halted negotiations, and it was only in June 1990, under much different circumstances, that the United States and the USSR finally negotiated a settlement.

Alan Allport

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov; 1870–1924)

Russian revolutionary and political leader, author of the political doctrine known as

Bolshevism, and founder of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) that seized control of Russia via the November 1917 revolution. Born in Simbirsk, Russia, on April 22, 1870, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was the third of six children. The pseudonym "Nikolai Lenin" probably came from his paternal grandfather's first name and the Lena River of Siberia where he was later exiled for revolutionary activity. His paternal grandfather probably rose from the peasantry to lower-middle-class town-dweller. His maternal grandfather, a physician of either German or Jewish descent, practiced medicine in St. Petersburg and became a serf-owning member of the landed nobility—a fact often suppressed in official Soviet histories. A year after Lenin's birth, his father was appointed inspector of public schools for the Simbirsk District.

The Ulyanovs encouraged discipline, hard work, and diligence in school; all their children were excellent students, including Vladimir, who was an energetic and active youth. As a young man he had no interest in politics or economics, instead favoring Russian literature, Latin, Greek, history, and geography. Lenin started down the revolutionary path only after his older brother Alexander's execution in 1877 for participating in a plot to assassinate Czar Alexander III as a member of the terrorist wing of the revolutionary populist movement *Narodnaia Volia* (People's Will).

Lenin idolized his older brother, and, attempting to comprehend his motivations, Lenin abandoned the works of Russian novelist Ivan Turgenev for those of Nikolai Chernyshevsky, the leading radical Russian publicist of his time. He also read Marx's *Das Kapital* for the first time in 1889. By then he had been expelled from Kazan University, arrested, and exiled, for participation in radical organizations and in a student

demonstration. In 1891, he was permitted to take the law exams at St. Petersburg University as an external student; he passed the exam, earning his law degree with honors, and was admitted to the bar.

Steeped in the Jacobin traditions of the *Narodnaia Volia* movement, in 1892, Lenin began to seriously contemplate Marxism and the feasibility of social democracy in Russia. Introduced to the writings of Georgy Plekhanov, considered the father of Russian Marxism, Lenin made his final separation from populism. He absorbed all he could from Plekhanov's writings and applied to go abroad—telling the authorities this was for health reasons—to study with the master (who was in exile in Switzerland), but his request was denied.

In 1893, Lenin moved to St. Petersburg and immersed himself in the debate between the two rival varieties of socialism, Marxism and populism, through involvement in workingmen's literacy groups and Marxist study circles. He entered the debate on the correct path for Russia to enter socialist society by writing handprinted pamphlets and leaflets, circulating them among workers, and by writing reviews of other Marxists' writings. This intellectual activity helped him forge his own concept of socialism in Russia and gained him local attention as a gifted Marxist theoretician.

After a severe bout with pneumonia in 1895, Lenin received permission to travel abroad for his health. He spent four months during the spring and summer in Western Europe traveling to Germany, France, and Switzerland. He learned much about German social democracy and read a great deal of its literature. In Switzerland, he met and conversed with exiled Russian Marxists including Plekhanov, and leaders of the Group for the Emancipation of Labor. Returning to Russia, he visited Moscow, Vilnius, and



Vladimir Lenin led the Bolshevik Party to power during the Great October (November) Revolution of 1917. (Library of Congress)

other towns, making contacts for the exiled group and establishing the organization Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. He even arranged to publish an underground newspaper, *The Workers Cause*.

Ready to go to press in December, the paper died at birth, seized by the police who arrested Lenin along with nearly all of his contacts in the new-found Petersburg League. Lenin was sent to prison for a year and then into Siberian exile for three more years, where the state allowed his continued scholarly pursuits. He wrote and published a major theoretical work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, during that time.

In exile, Lenin began developing his theory that the proletariat would not achieve

revolutionary consciousness naturally, as Marx had believed. Lenin concluded that workers, particularly Russians, would not go beyond unionizing but would require a core of dedicated revolutionary intellectuals to guide them to socialism. For Lenin, the model social democratic party was the German Social Democrats of the 1890s, rigidly disciplined and centrally hierarchical. In 1900, Lenin began working to unify Russian social democracy under one banner, waging a war of words against those who sought to moderate the movement. In doing so, in 1902, he published his most famous political treatise, *What Is to Be Done? (Chto Delat?)*, which not only served as a critique of evolutionary socialism but also provided the blueprint for the party organization that would provide the political structure of Soviet Russia.

When words failed to unite the party under his direction, in 1903, at the RSDLP's Second Congress, Lenin split the party into two factions. Having managed to get his followers elected as the majority of the party central committee, he took the title Bolshevik (majority). In reality, the Menshevik (minority) had the majority of followers, but Lenin had controlled the voting.

Lenin spent the years between 1903 and 1917 as an émigré in Western Europe and patiently built up a Bolshevik following in Russia. Ever the pragmatist, he briefly returned to Russia after the 1905 revolution to find Bolsheviks unprepared, but even he failed to develop a coherent program to take advantage of the revolutionary ferment. It was the Menshevik faction that made the running, with Leon Trotsky as its most prominent representative. Over the next 12 years, he focused on preventing the reunification of the RSDLP and preparing for a revolution that he never expected to see.

Living abroad in Switzerland, Lenin was again surprised in March 1917 when

spontaneous strikes over food and rising inflation touched off revolution in Russia. Growing apprehensive over his ability to influence events, he gained German approval to transit Germany, Sweden, and Finland to Russia, arriving on April 16, 1917. In two speeches later known as the April Theses, he rejected cooperation with the provisional government, urged an end to the “predatory war,” and surprised his own followers by calling for “all power to the soviets”—which had been the Mensheviks’ rallying cry in 1905. At the same time, however, the Bolsheviks benefitted from considerable sums of money secretly dispensed by the German government to foment revolution in Russia and bring an end to the war.

After a failed Bolshevik coup attempt in July 1917 (the July Days), Lenin went into hiding in Finland, from where he tried to direct Bolshevik affairs, urging the Central Committee to act. When the growing disintegration of the empire under the increasingly feeble provisional government reached a critical point, the Bolsheviks, practically prepared by Lenin’s surprising new collaborator Leon Trotsky, simply occupied the most strategic points in the capital and seized power on November 7, 1917. Lenin had only returned to Russia the night before. His role in the revolutionary takeover was to order it.

Once in power, Lenin promised peace to the war-weary, land to the peasants, and control of production to workers. Initially, the Bolsheviks refused to negotiate with Germany for an end to the war, following Trotsky’s slogan of “no peace, no war,” but Russian soldiers voted against the war by abandoning their positions when facing German advances. In March 1918, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Trotsky negotiated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which deprived the Bolsheviks of vast stretches of land and

populations, including some of the most fertile regions of the former empire.

Lenin's regime survived the tumult of revolution in the midst of war, War Communism, a civil war during 1918–1922, and foreign intervention through little more than his personal stature and reliance on the Bolshevik Party. As chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he eclipsed all other Bolshevik leaders, save perhaps Trotsky. And in fulfillment of Trotsky's earlier prophesy, "the organization of the party [took] the place of the party itself; the central committee [took] the place of the party organization; and finally the dictator [took] the place of the central committee."

Economic chaos forced him to order a retreat from pure communism (War Communism) in his 1921 "New Economic Policy," although he also initiated all the instruments of Bolshevik (Red) terror and had a hand in ordering the execution of former Czar Nicholas II and his family. Lenin kept control of the new Soviet state until a series of debilitating strokes in 1922 and an incapacitating stroke in 1923 wrested it from his grasp. He died in Moscow on January 21, 1924.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism

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Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944)

Longest and most devastating siege of a major urban center in the history of modern warfare. The nightmare that engulfed the population of the Soviet Union's second largest city, which lasted from July 10, 1941, to January 27, 1944. The once vibrant city had been built by Peter the Great and was considered Russia's window to the West. But by March 1943, Leningrad and its 3.2 million people had been reduced to a militarized fortress of some 700,000 inhabitants.

The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The capture of Leningrad—a city described by Adolf Hitler as the "hotbed of Communism"—was one of the major strategic goals of Operation BARBAROSSA. Germany's Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb commanded Army Group North, advancing northeast toward the city. He believed that his troops would soon take the city in cooperation with the Finns, who had reentered the war. Finnish forces, meanwhile, drove south, both to the east and the west of Lake Ladoga, toward the Svir River and Leningrad.

On July 8, the German Fourth Panzer Army reached the old fortress of Shlisselburg east of Leningrad, guarding the point at which the Neva River flows out of nearby Lake Ladoga. Taking it cut off Leningrad from the Soviet interior. The siege, which was actually a blockade, officially began on July 10. Leeb's hopes for a quick victory were dashed, however, when the Finns merely reoccupied the territory taken by the Soviets in consequence of the 1939–1940 Finnish-Soviet War (also known as the



German soldiers salvaging belongings left behind by withdrawing Russians, in a village on the outskirts of Leningrad, November 28, 1941. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Winter War), thus halting some 26 miles north of Leningrad. The refusal of the Finns to push beyond the Svir or their pre-1940 borders was a major factor in the city's survival. Leeb also lost much of his Fourth Panzer Army, which Hitler diverted to the drive on Moscow.


Hitler ordered Leningrad obliterated through artillery fire, air attack, and blockade; moreover, he prohibited any acceptance of a surrender, were one to be offered. In mid-October, he ordered Leeb to make a wide sweep of some 150 miles around Lake Ladoga to link up with the Finns on the Svir River. On November 8, the Germans took the vital rail center of Tikhvin, about halfway to the Svir. Josef Stalin then shifted major reinforcements north, and in mid-December, Hitler authorized Leeb to withdraw. Soviet troops reoccupied Tikhvin on December 18.

Authorities in Leningrad had done little to prepare the city for a possible blockade. Although the city was believed to be a major

German military objective, efforts to evacuate part of the population suffered from bureaucratic delays. The party boss in Leningrad, Andrei Zhdanov, second only to Stalin in the party hierarchy, and Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov, appointed by Stalin to defend the city, were reluctant to order any measures that might be branded defeatist.

On July 11, the Leningrad Party Committee ordered the civilian population to take part in the construction of tank traps and other defensive positions in front of the city. Between July and August, nearly half of the population between the ages of 16 and 55 engaged in this effort, which proceeded under constant German artillery and air attacks. The city government also ordered the establishment of some civilian combat units made up of workers, men and women alike, but they were poorly trained and had virtually no weapons.

In normal circumstances, Leningrad was entirely dependent on outside sources for its



food and fuel and for the raw materials used in its factories. Now it had to find food for some 2.5 million civilians as well as the forces of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Fleet in the Baltic. By November, rations had been cut to the starvation level. The soldiers and sailors received priority in the allocation of food, and rationing authorities literally held the power of life and death.

Rations were cut again and again, beyond the starvation level. People tried to survive any way they could, whether on stray animals and on the glue from wallpaper. Hunger even led to instances of cannibalism. The hardships were not, however, evenly shared, for Communist officials ate well throughout the siege.

Lake Ladoga was the only means of accessing the rest of the Soviet Union. In winter, trucks were able to travel on a “road” across the ice, and in summer, some boats got through. But this route was insufficient to overcome the fuel shortage. The Soviets

rebuilt the rail line from Tikhvin, but the Germans bombed and shelled it, as well as the Lake Ladoga route.

In January 1942, Stalin ordered General Kirill A. Meretskov’s Volkhov Front to strike the German lines from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen, but after punching a narrow gap in them, the Soviet offensive faltered. When Stalin refused to allow a withdrawal, the Germans cut off the Soviet forces in June and restored their own lines. Soviet authorities, meanwhile, managed to evacuate 850,000 people from Leningrad, including a large number of children, between January and July 1942.

Hitler’s plans for the summer 1942 campaign called for the destruction of Leningrad and the occupation of the area between Lake Ladoga and the Baltic in order to free up the Finns for operations against Murmansk. In August, Meretskov carried out another attack against the eastern part of the German lines. Field Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein, sent

to Leningrad by Hitler, replied with a counterattack in September.

That summer, the Soviets managed to lay both pipelines and electric cables under Lake Ladoga. The Germans brought in E-boats, and the Italians also operated some midget submarines in the lake. In January 1943, in Operation SPARK (ISKRA), Red Army troops in Leningrad (which the Soviets had managed to reinforce and which were now commanded by General Leonid A. Govorov) and Meretskov's forces to the east struck the Germans from the north and east. The offensive was successful, with the two Soviet armies meeting at Shlusselburg on January 19, thus breaking the siege and opening a 10-mile corridor. On February 7, a Soviet train reached Leningrad through the corridor and across the Neva on tracks over the ice. Although this line came under constant German attack and had to be repaired daily, it operated continuously thereafter.

On January 14, 1944, Govorov and Meretskov struck German positions, with their forces outnumbering the Germans by a ratio of 2–1 in men, and 4–1 in tanks and aircraft. Yet Hitler refused to authorize a withdrawal, and bitter fighting ensued. Ultimately, the Soviets were successful, driving the Germans back. On January 27, 1944, with the Leningrad-Moscow railroad line reopened, Stalin declared the “900-day” blockade at an end.

During the blockade, perhaps 1 million people in Leningrad—40 percent of the prewar population—died of hunger, the majority of them in the 1941–1942 winter. The entire city was within range of German artillery fire, and the bombing and shelling claimed many of the city's buildings and architectural and art treasures, including works from the Hermitage Museum. The travails of Leningrad became the chief subject of the Soviet war literature. Like the bombings of

Dresden and Hiroshima, the siege of Leningrad became a national and even a worldwide symbol of the horror of war.

Eva-Maria Stolberg and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Govorov, Leonid Aleksandrovich (1897–1955); Meretskov, Kirill Afanasievich (1897–1968); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Lesnaya, Battle of (October 9, 1708)

In 1703, Czar Peter I reentered the Great Northern War with a victory over the Swedish forces of King Charles XII in Livonia. Stung, Charles launched an assault on Moscow, deploying forces from his base in Poland in 1707. In the summer of 1708, needing resupply, Charles ordered his best general, Adam Lewenhaupt, to march south with a force of 20,000 protecting a wagon train of ammunition and stores for Charles's army of 25,000. It took Lewenhaupt until nearly August to complete preparations, however, and Charles, ever-impatient, abandoned his camp in Mogilev and invaded Ukraine only days before Lewenhaupt would have reached him in late September. Charles sent

orders for Lewenhaupt to meet him now at Starodub.

With both Swedish forces moving south and maintaining a distance between them, Peter decided to strike before they could concentrate. He sent an army under Boris Sheremetev in pursuit of Charles, and led a smaller force himself to attack Lewenhaupt. Peter's force, at almost 30,000 men, outnumbered the Swedes by almost 3–1. Lewenhaupt, however, was weighed down with the supply train, and the Russian lead elements caught up to the Swedes on October 6. They skirmished and raided the Swedish convoy for two days, forcing Lewenhaupt to march in formation and slowing the Swedes even further. Nonetheless, after a brief stand-off at Belitsa on October 8, Lewenhaupt was in position to cross the Sozh River, which would afford him some cushion.

Peter was determined to prevent that. Splitting his 13,000 regulars into two columns, he set upon the Swedes as they were crossing a stream near the village of Lesnaya. The Russian western column, commanded by Mikhail Golitsyn, moved through a forest to attack the Swedes from the north, while the eastern column commanded by Aleksandr Menshikov proceeded along the road to catch the Swedish forces on the southern side of the stream. When the Russians appeared on the horizon, the Swedish army was also almost equally divided by the stream.

Lewenhaupt immediately detached one-third of his force (roughly 3,000 men) to protect the baggage train, however, and another 750 men were sent to establish an outpost on the northern side and forestall the full weight of the Russian attack. As Menshikov's force advanced, the Swedes surprised him by attacking, throwing the Russian column into confusion.

Golitsyn's western column now appeared on the Swedish left, and Lewenhaupt's five

battalions found themselves vastly outnumbered. They fought valiantly, however, and almost broke the Russian line. Had Peter not sent his Guards forward and deployed his artillery, the Russians might have lost. As it was, their line barely held, and they lost four of their guns to the Swedes, who used them to blockade the nearby Krivi Bridge. Menshikov's force now widened to outflank the Swedes to their right, however, and forced a retreat. Lewenhaupt's attempt at a counterstroke failed, although his dragoons did drive the Russian cavalry from the field.

The Swedes then retreated to Lesnaya, with the Russians following about 200 yards behind. For about an hour, neither side engaged, however; they watched each other across the field as they refreshed and reorganized their troops. Just after 4:00 p.m. though, the Swedes, noting the arrival of Russian reinforcements, opened an artillery barrage. The Russian dragoons responded with a spontaneous charge, which the infantry units soon supported. The Swedes were well prepared; sending the infantry forward to pin the Russians, Lewenhaupt's cavalry then swept around and struck both Russian flanks. The weight of the Russian onslaught began to tell, however, and the Swedes were pushed back into the village. A sudden counterstroke by the Swedish dragoons drove the Russians back as night fell, however, leaving the contest undecided.

Swedish casualties numbered about 1,000 dead and twice that wounded or captured, while the Russians had lost nearly 10,000 men all told—although official figures merely matched those of the Swedish losses. Lewenhaupt nonetheless withdrew under cover of night, abandoning any supplies that could not be carried. Large numbers of Swedish soldiers chose to drink the supplies, however, and were either captured the following day, or simply disappeared. Only

about half of Lewenhaupt's original force made it to Starodub, and virtually none of the supplies.

While the Russians did not win the Battle of Lesnaya, their capture of the Swedish supply train certainly weakened Charles's armies and forced his hand, thus presaging the Russian triumph at Poltava.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Danilovich (1673–1729); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)

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Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904)

First land battle of the Russo-Japanese War fought on a grand scale.

When the conflict between Russia and Japan flared into war in February 1904, the Russians disposed of relatively few forces in Manchuria and the Far East, most of them reserves or security personnel rather. General Aleksei Kuropatkin, appointed as commander of land forces in Manchuria by Czar Nicholas II, therefore resolved to fight a series of delaying actions from the Yalu River to the central Manchurian city of Liaoyang, where he would make a stand. The ancient imperial city lay astride the rail line leading to Port Arthur, Russia's newly acquired naval base in Manchuria and the main issue of contention with Japan. Liaoyang was also well situated for defense, possessing

fortified walls and sitting slightly above the plain it dominated. So obvious was its strategic importance that the Japanese commander in chief, Marshal Iwao Oyama, had planned for his three armies to converge on it for the decisive battle as well.

Time was essential to both sides. Oyama hoped for a speedy advance and a rapid victory, for Japan's resources could not match Russia's. Kuropatkin, on the other hand, wanted to stretch the conflict out until trained troops could arrive from Europe and, he hoped, overwhelm the Japanese. Although the Russian retreat was faster than Kuropatkin might have wished, by the end of August 1904, he still had some 14 divisions at Liaoyang—roughly 130,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry—with over 600 guns. These forces were deployed in three groups: I, II, and IV Siberian corps formed the Southern Group commanded by Lieutenant General Nikolai Zarubaev; III and X Siberian corps comprised the Eastern Group under General Aleksandr Bilderling; and Kuropatkin commanded the reserve, made up of V and XVII Siberian corps along with some elements of IV Siberian Corps. Poor intelligence gathering led Kuropatkin to believe he was outnumbered, and he therefore made defensive dispositions in front of the city.

With better intelligence, Oyama knew his troops were in fact at a numerical disadvantage. His Third Army was still tied down at Port Arthur, so he had only about 115,000 men supported by 10,000 cavalry and 170 pieces of artillery. Like Kuropatkin, Oyama deployed three distinct forces: First Army, under General Tametomo Kuroki; Second Army, commanded by General Yasukata Oku; and General Michitsura Nozu's Fourth Army. Unlike Kuropatkin, Oyama was determined to attack and end the war victoriously.

The Japanese commander initiated the action on August 25, sending his First Army through the mountain passes east

of Liaoyang. Bilderling, whose Eastern Group was to hold the passes, failed to react promptly. Russian artillery nevertheless inflicted severe casualties on the Japanese and slowed their advance considerably. Not until the night of August 26 did the Japanese take the last pass, at which point, the Russians carried out an orderly retreat to prepared defenses in front of the city.

At this point, the Russians held a significant advantage; not only did they outnumber the Japanese but also the advance of Oyama's First Army had left that force in an exposed position, with units isolated and without ready defensive positions in the mountains. Kuropatkin convinced himself that Oyama would not have made such a thrust without numbers to back it up; however, and hurried to defend the city, which he assumed the Japanese intended to capture. Therefore, despite Zurabaev's successful defense thus far, Kuropatkin ordered a general retreat to the second line of positions in front of Liaoyang.

Oyama, however, aimed not to capture the city, but to destroy the Russian forces in place. Kuroki therefore directed his forces north of Liaoyang to cut the rail line into the city, while Oku and Nozu prepared a general assault against the Russian troops massed to the south. On August 30, Oyama launched a frontal attack, hoping to overrun the Russians before they could settle into their positions. The Russian defenses held firm for two days, however, even as Kuropatkin held back his sizeable reserve. Had he carried out his declared intention to counterattack, these 70,000 men might well have driven the Japanese back and decided the battle—and perhaps the war. Instead, fearing Oyama had launched a sizeable force to his rear and his line of withdrawal might be cut, Kuropatkin ordered another retreat.

Oyama's forces pursued the Russians closely and even managed to seize a key position, Manjuyama Hill, which allowed them

to shell the center of Liaoyang, including the railway station, directly. At that point, on September 2, Kuropatkin decided to abandon the city and relocate to Mukden, 40 miles north. So well had the Russians fought though, that Oyama's forces could neither prevent the retreat nor pursue. Japanese casualties totaled some 5,500 dead and 18,000 wounded, while the Russians casualties were 3,611 men dead and 14,301 wounded.

Kuropatkin reported the clash as a Russian victory, but the Russian minister of war Viktor Sakharov rejected the notion, since the Russians had failed to either destroy Oyama's forces or hold Liaoyang. Neither side, in fact, had achieved its objective at Liaoyang, and both sides now looked for a decision at Mukden.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Litviak, Lidiia (Lilia or Liliia) Vladimirovna (1921–1943)

Soviet Air Force officer and first woman fighter pilot to shoot down an enemy aircraft in daytime. Born in Moscow on August 18, 1921, Lidiia Vladimirovna Litviak became a flying instructor after graduating from the

Kherson Flying School. By mid-1941, she had trained 45 pilots. That fall, she joined Major Marina Raskova's 122th Group. Litviak's 586th Fighter Regiment, which flew Yak-1 fighters, became operational in April 1942 and was assigned the defense of military and civilian installations in Saratov.

In September 1942, Litviak was sent with her squadron to Stalingrad. With fighter pilots Raisa Beliaeva, Ekaterina Budanova, and Mariia Kuznetsova, she joined the 437th Fighter Regiment and scored her first two victories on September 13, 1942. As her new wing did not fly Yaks, she soon transferred with Budanova to the 9th Guards Fighter Regiment.

In January 1943, when this wing began acquiring American Bell P-39 Cobras, Litviak and Budanova transferred to the 296th Fighter Regiment (renamed the 73rd Stalingrad-Vienna Guards Fighter Regiment) of 6th Fighter Division, Eighth Air Army, to continue flying Yaks. Both women were commissioned as junior lieutenants on February 23, 1943. Litviak and Budanova both became "free hunters," searching for targets of opportunity. Litviak's final score stood at 12 autonomous and 3 group victories.

Guards Senior Lieutenant Litviak was killed in a dogfight on August 1, 1943. Because her Yak was missing, rumors persisted that she had gone over to the Germans. Her loyalty to the Soviet regime was suspect, as her father, the former deputy minister of transportation, had been executed in 1937. After her remains were found in 1979, Litviak was rehabilitated in March 1986. She was posthumously awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union award by Mikhail Gorbachev on May 5, 1990.

Kazimiera J. Cottam

See also: Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna (1912–1943); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

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Litvinov, Aleksander (1853–1932)

Russian army general. Aleksander Litvinov was born on August 11, 1853. Educated at the First Moscow Military School, he joined the army on August 5, 1870. On his graduation from the artillery school in 1873, Litvinov was commissioned a lieutenant on August 10, 1873. Assigned to the 1st Horse Artillery Brigade, he then joined the 2nd Cavalry Artillery.

Litvinov served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and was promoted to captain in December 1880. In 1882, he graduated from the General Staff Academy and was assigned to the 4th Cavalry Division in the Vilensky Military District. In March 1885, he was promoted to colonel. The next year, he became chief of staff of the Vilna (Vilnius) Military District, and in 1890, he held the same position in the 2nd Cavalry Division. In June 1896, he took command of the 4th Pskov Dragoon Regiment.

Promoted to major general on June 23, 1889, Litvinov was assigned with the Don Cossacks. In September 1890, he assumed command of the Warsaw Military District. In November 1896, he was again chief of staff of the Vilna Military District. Promoted to lieutenant general on December 6, 1905, he took command of the 1st Cavalry Division in October 1906. In March 1911, he assumed command of V Corps. He was promoted to general of cavalry on December 6, 1911.

At the beginning of World War I in August 1914, Litvinov commanded the 7th and 10th infantry divisions in Fifth Army; however, on November 17, 1914, he was named to replace General Pavel Rennenkampf in command of First Army in the wake of the disastrous Russian defeat at Tannenberg.

Following the March 1917 Russian revolution, Litvinov was dismissed from the army on April 2, 1917. From 1918, he was a member of the Red Army. Litvinov died in 1932.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich (1876–1951)

Soviet foreign minister and diplomat. Maxim Maximovich Litvinov was born Meer Genokh Moisevich Vallakh on July 17, 1876, in Bialystok, in the Jewish “Pale of Settlement” in what is now Poland. Litvinov joined the Russian army in 1893 and was there exposed to Marxism. In 1898, he refused to fire on strikers at a factory in Baku and, while this insubordination was covered up, he was soon dismissed for other violations of army regulations. That same year, Litvinov joined the Russian Social Democratic Party.

Litvinov eventually settled in Kiev, where he managed a sugar factory by day and worked for the underground Social Democratic Party at night. Arrested in 1901, he was sentenced to two years in prison, but escaped and fled to Berlin and then to Britain. In 1903, when the Social Democratic Party split into the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, Litvinov sided with the Bolsheviks and worked to promote revolution in Russia.

In November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, and Litvinov, who had been living in Britain for a decade, became the Russian diplomatic representative in London. Expelled from Britain in 1919, he returned to Russia and began working in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. During the Russian Civil War, Litvinov was the Russian government’s only official diplomat. He became commissar for foreign affairs in July 1930, and in February 1932, led the Russian delegation to the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where he proposed general and complete disarmament.

When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, Litvinov championed ties with Western Europe and collective security. Diplomatic relations were also established with the United States in November 1933. In 1935, Litvinov signed mutual assistance pacts with both France and Czechoslovakia directed against Germany.

Following the appeasement of Germany over Czechoslovakia by Britain and France at the September 1938 Munich Conference, Josef Stalin began to reverse Russian foreign policy in an effort to secure time to rearm. Litvinov was dropped as foreign minister in May 1939, replaced by hardliner Vyacheslav Molotov. Hitler said that this step of dropping an internationalist and a Jew helped convince him that Stalin was serious about a rapprochement. On August 23,

in Moscow, the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a nonaggression pact that also secretly partitioned much of eastern Europe between them.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA on June 22, 1941, Stalin appointed Litvinov Soviet ambassador to the United States. He held this post from November 1941 to August 1943 and greatly assisted in the inclusion of the Soviet Union in Lend-Lease assistance.

Litvinov then returned to the Soviet Union to serve as deputy commissar for foreign affairs until he retired in August 1946. He died in Moscow on December 31, 1951.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Lend-Lease (March 1941–August 1945); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Livonian War (1558–1583)

A long, protracted war that started when Ivan IV “the Terrible” (1530–1584) invaded Livonia in an attempt to gain access to the major seaports along the eastern Baltic Sea, the Livonian War brought Russia into conflict with Poland-Lithuania, Denmark, and Sweden. Russia sought to acquire the lands west of Pskov, territories that provided control over the Livonian ports and towns for trade with Europe. Control of Livonia also gave Russia

possession of the trade route connecting the Baltic Sea with the Caspian Sea. Ivan IV initiated the war in January 1558; after Russian victories early in the war, it came to an unsuccessful conclusion in 1583.

Despite arguments from several advisors that the Crimea was a better choice for invasion, Ivan IV was convinced that Livonia was ripe for conquest. Russia was increasingly drawn into western and central Europe’s trade networks. Though prosperous, Livonia was politically and militarily weak, and Ivan IV saw an opportunity for easy gain. The danger he overlooked was that Poland-Lithuania, Denmark, and Sweden—all formidable opponents—were just as eager to seize Livonia’s lucrative ports and would not let Moscow have them without a fight. Almost as soon as Russia demonstrated their intentions by launching twin campaigns in January 1558, seizing both Dorpat (Tartu) and Narva, other Baltic powers intervened to block Russia’s expansion and obtain portions of Livonia for themselves. The war quickly transformed from a frontier campaign into a regional war in which Russia, Poland-Lithuania, Denmark, and Sweden all participated. The Crimean Tatars, disappointed with the Ottoman Turks’ reluctance to assist them in liberating Kazan, supported Poland-Lithuania. Moscow thus not only provoked its European neighbors but also had to face the vengeful Crimean Tatars on its southern borders.

After initial victories, Ivan IV concluded a six-month truce with its Livonian opponents. During that period, Poland became involved by offering protection to the Livonian Order and the Bishop of Riga, and Denmark seized a major island off the Livonian coast. When Moscow launched another offensive in 1560, defeated the Livonian army, and established control over central Livonia, the northern towns of Livonia placed themselves under Swedish rule.

As Livonia was carved up among the Baltic powers, Ivan broadened the conflict. Forming an alliance with Denmark and reaching a truce with Sweden, Moscow concentrated on Poland-Lithuania and in 1563, captured Polotsk. Poland proposed peace, which Ivan rejected. To affirm his position, Ivan IV summoned an assembly of the boyars, nobility, and church hierarchy to consult on whether to make peace or continue the war; all pledged themselves to war. The Livonian War, however, dragged on without any significant gains and continued to drain men and money.

As frustrations mounted, Ivan's paranoia and frustrations exploded into horrific violence. This *oprichnina*, a period of political chaos and terror, put Ivan IV at war with his own people and devastated Moscow's ability to carry on the Livonian War and protect itself. The Crimean Tatars invaded Moscow in 1571 and burned it; however, Moscow was able to repel a second Crimean invasion in 1572. The damage the *oprichnina* inflicted could not be easily repaired though, and Moscow never again achieved the victories it had won early.

In 1569, Poland and Lithuania entered the Union of Lublin. The new monarchy, drawing upon the resources of its enlarged realm, was able to repulse Russia's offensive efforts and expand its own possessions in Livonia. In 1570, Sweden ended its war with Denmark, freeing it to concentrate on Russia. To complete the events that ensured Russia's demise in the Livonian War, the death of Polish King Sigismund Augustus II in 1572 led to the election of the talented and energetic Stefan Batory as Polish king in 1576.

Ivan continued his efforts to conquer Livonia, personally leading an army into northern Livonia against Swedish-controlled territory in late 1572. He captured Pernau in 1575 and, by 1577, took most of Livonia,

which kept thoughts of victory alive even as costs mounted.

Meanwhile, Stefan Batory began a series of counteroffensives against Russia and, in 1578, the war decisively turned against Moscow. Polish and Swedish armies took Livonian towns one after the other. In August 1579, Batory led a Polish army to retake Polotsk, which Russia had captured 15 years earlier. The next year, Batory captured the Russian town of Velikii Luki, and in 1581, Polish and Lithuanian armies devastated the southern portion of the Novgorod lands and besieged Pskov. Losing Pskov would sever the connection between Moscow and Livonia, leaving Ivan defeated. Swedish forces took advantage of Russia's desperate condition; they seized Russian outposts along the Gulf of Finland and captured Narva and Ivangorod in 1581. The Swedes advance inland toward Novgorod, however, was halted at the southern end of Lake Ladoga in 1582.

On the verge of disaster, Ivan IV accepted negotiations with Batory. In 1582, Moscow agreed to cede southern Livonia to Poland and to accept a 10-year truce. This enabled Ivan IV to continue against the Swedes to try and regain in northern Livonia what he lost in southern Livonia. With a depleted army and little desire to continue, in 1583, Ivan agreed to a three-year truce with Sweden and gave up all the coastal territories with the exception of the mouth of the Neva River, ending the Livonian War. For Ivan and Russia, the Livonian War proved disastrous. In return for the costs of the war, the devastation inflicted on Livonia, and the tens of thousands of Russian lives lost, Ivan gained nothing. The damage to Moscow's political and social system, moreover, had deadly consequences long after Ivan's death in 1584 and brought Russia to the brink of destruction.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Narva, Battle of (1581)

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Lodz, Battle of (November 11–December 6, 1914)

Eastern Front engagement between the German and Russian forces in modern-day Poland. The Battle of Lodz was one of the most fluid battles of World War I; at various times, substantial forces on both sides were faced with encirclement. After the German success in East Prussia and the Russian victories against Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia, both sides planned for new offensives in the center of the Eastern Front (modern-day Poland).

Overall, Russian commander Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich massed four armies (from north to south, the Second, Fifth, Fourth, and Ninth armies) for a direct thrust into German Silesia. The Russian leadership split responsibility for the offensive between two commands—the Northern Front (Army Group) under General Nikolai Ruzsky and the Southwestern Front under General Nikolai Ivanov. This division of effort led to delays in the offensive.

The German command team on the Eastern Front of Colonel General Paul von Hindenburg and Major General Erich Ludendorff wanted to conduct an offensive of their own. They asked chief of the general staff

General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn for reinforcements from the Western Front, but setbacks in the First Battle of Ypres (October 19–November 22) delayed transfer of these troops. Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided to attack anyway. Their plan called for the newly formed Ninth Army, led by General of Cavalry August von Mackensen, to attack from the north and cut in behind the Russian Second Army, commanded by General Philipp Scheidemann, and destroy it.

The Russians were still completing their dispositions when the Germans struck on November 11. The Ninth Army’s left flank units achieved considerable success against Scheidemann’s right flank, and his Second Army pulled back. From November 14 to 16, the Germans pounded the Russians at Kutno and forced them into another retreat. Russian leaders, particularly Ruzsky, contributed to this defeat by focusing on their own offensive to the west and ignoring the threat to the Second Army’s northern flank.

By November 18, the Germans seemed to have Lodz and the Russian Second Army within their grasp. The Russians reacted with surprising flexibility and remarkable effort, however. Although General Pavel Rennenkampf’s First Army dallied on the Second Army’s northern flank, General Pavel Pleve’s Fifth Army conducted strenuous forced marches to save its Russian comrades on November 18 and 19. These exhausted forces shored up Scheidemann’s Second Army on both flanks.

On November 20, Scheidemann and Pleve’s troops repulsed nearly all the attacks by the German Ninth Army. The one exception was a German group under General of Infantry Reinhard Scheffer-Boyadel consisting of his own XXV Reserve Corps and attached guard and cavalry divisions, which penetrated an opening on the Russian eastern flank and advanced as far as Rzgów. Although this advance appeared to threaten

the Russian flank and rear, it was in fact the Germans who were in a difficult position. Russian reinforcements were arriving (even the lethargic *Rennenkampf* sent assistance in several divisions known as the Lodz Force), and by November 22, it was Scheffer who was virtually surrounded.

One of the great fighting withdrawals of the war now ensued. Scheffer decided to reverse his direction and fight his way out of the Russian trap by advancing to the northeast. During November 22–25, his forces battled every day against the pursuing Russians on three sides while trying to force an opening against other Russian units blocking his path. The Russians were so confident of trapping Scheffer's force that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich's chief of staff, General Nikolai Yanushkevich, ordered up empty train cars from Warsaw to transport the expected German prisoners.

Russian optimism proved misplaced, however. On November 24, Scheffer won a crucial victory at Brzeziny, smashing the 6th Siberian Division and opening an escape passage to the north. The next day, Scheffer's exhausted men reestablished contact with the main German lines. Scheffer's forces had suffered nearly 50 percent casualties, but they had escaped destruction and brought 2,000 of their own wounded out with them, along with 16,000 Russian prisoners and 64 captured guns.

After the dramatic maneuvers of November, the final fate of Lodz seemed anticlimactic. At the beginning of December, Hindenburg, now a field marshal, received the much-awaited reinforcements from the Western Front, and on December 6, the Ninth Army began a new offensive. The Russians then decided to abandon Lodz, and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich pulled his forces back in good order to new positions that covered Warsaw. Despite several opportunities, neither side had gained a decisive

victory at Lodz, and both the Germans and Russians shifted their main efforts to different regions in 1915.

Curtis S. King

See also: Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Plevé (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916); *Rennenkampf*, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Ruzski, Nikolai Vladimirovich (1854–1918); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Yanushkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1868–1918)

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Loris-Melikov, Count Mikhail Taryelovich (1826–1888)

Descended from an ancient noble Georgian family, Mikhail Loris-Melikov was born in Tiflis (Tbilisi) on December 20, 1825. He was educated at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in St. Petersburg, and then graduated from the Guards Cadet Institute. After serving four years in a hussar regiment in St. Petersburg, Loris-Melikov was sent to the Caucasus in 1847. During 20 years there, he earned a reputation as an able administrator who worked diligently to educate the local population.

His military exploits were less inspiring. In command of a corps on the Ottoman frontier during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Loris-Melikov suffered an initial defeat at Zevin, but recovered to take

Kars. He was laying siege to Ezerum when the conflict ended, and Czar Alexander II elevated him to count for his services.

Loris-Melikov next served as governor general of the Lower Volga region, and proved so effective, he was transferred to central Russia, where terrorism was a growing problem. His success in implementing reforms in education and administration that seemed to temper the problem led to his appointment in February as chief of the Supreme Administrative Commission, created to deal with terrorism throughout Russia. Loris-Melikov proposed an extensive series of reforms designed to ameliorate the causes of popular discontent, again focusing on education and economic stimulus. He also suggested various forms of representative government at the local level, and the creation of a responsible cabinet at the national level. Czar Alexander II seemed amenable, and appointed Loris-Melikov as minister of interior in August 1880.

Unfortunately, on the day Alexander II signed a decree to prepare commissions to implement these reforms, he was assassinated by terrorists. His successor, Alexander III, immediately began to roll back the reforms. Loris-Melikov therefore resigned his post; he remained in retirement until his death in Nice on December 22, 1888.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Russo-Turkish War, (1877–1878)

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Lutsk, Battle of (June 4–6, 1916)

Important Eastern Front battle opening the Brusilov Offensive during June 4–September 1, 1916. At Lutsk, located in the Bukovina region (modern-day northwestern Ukraine), 150,000 men of the Russian Eighth Army under General Aleksei Kaledin faced the numerically superior Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army of 200,000 men commanded by Colonel General Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

Lutsk had been the scene of heavy fighting in 1915, and since the autumn of 1915, Austro-Hungarian forces had heavily fortified it with impressive in-depth earthworks. The attack saw the Russians carefully coordinate their artillery fire and infantry assaults. They secretly brought forward reserves and at the point of attack, heavily outnumbered the defenders.

The Russian preliminary bombardment began at dawn on June 4 and created more than 50 gaps in the barbed wire defenses. The attack began shortly thereafter, and by that evening, the Russians had smashed through the three lines of Austro-Hungarian trenches and created a hole 20 miles wide and 5 miles deep. Within two days, the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army had suffered 130,000 casualties; the Russians suffered 90,000 casualties in and around Lutsk. This Austro-Hungarian defeat led to the dismissal of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. The Brusilov Offensive almost drove Austria-Hungary out of the war before it lost momentum. In any case, the Austro-Hungarian army never recovered from the loss.

Matthew W. Speers

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–

September 1, 1916); Kaledin, Aleksei Maksimovich (1861–1918); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Lutzen, Battle of (May 2, 1813)

Battle that took place 12.5 miles southwest of Leipzig where Napoleon I defeated the combined Russian and Prussian forces of the Sixth Coalition.

Soon after the disastrous Russian Campaign of 1812, a combined Russo-Prussian army, followed by Swedes, was marching into Germany, and the War of the German Liberation began. After the death of Russian field marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, on April 28, 1813, the Allied army was led by Russian general Prince Peter Wittgenstein. Following Czar Alexander I's orders, he moved the army (54,000 Russians, 28,000 Prussians, and 418 cannon) across the Elbe River south to Leipzig. Napoleon, after assembling some 120,000 fresh troops and 370 cannon, also crossed the Elbe on April 30 and advanced on Leipzig, which was occupied by the French advance guard on May 2. Further, Marshal Michel Ney's corps took the town of Lutzen (Grossgörschen) to protect the movement of Napoleon's main forces, which marched en echelon extended over 40 miles. The allies, hoping to increase national sentiment among the German people, were eager to engage the French.

Early on May 2, a French corps under General Alexandre Lauriston engaged Prussian

forces under General Heinrich von Kleist engaging Ney at the Leipzig's environs. Napoleon rushed to the city at the head of the Guard. Ney set about occupying a number of villages south of Lutzen, thus covering the right flank of the French army, when he was attacked near the village of Kaja by the Prussians under General Gebhard von Blücher. Soon a fierce struggle was raging around the village.

Napoleon ordered reserves, including his Guard, to Ney's aid; soon, the French strength rose to 110,000 men. Around 5:00 p.m., Wittgenstein also received reserves—the Russian troops under General Aleksandr Tormasov—which he sent to assist Blücher. All was in vain, however, for the French Young Guard pushed off the Prussian battalions and held Kaja. In this struggle, Blücher was wounded; the Russian troops were also repulsed, and the French were finally joined by Prince Eugene Beauharnais at the head of 35,000 fresh troops, making his long march from the Vistula to join the main French army. Napoleon ordered General Antoine Drouot to mass 80 cannon, including the Guards' artillery, near Kaja and then launched the Middle and Old Guard, formed in four big squares, with the support of the entire Guards cavalry, in a telling attack against the Allied center. By 7:00 p.m., the Russo-Prussian army was in full retreat, but Napoleon's lack of experienced cavalry precluded an effective pursuit.

The French lost in the battle nearly 20,000 men (including 3,000 killed); the allies suffered nearly 12,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Wittgenstein called a military council that evening, which decided to evacuate Leipzig and retreat across the Elster River. The allies separated their troops: the Prussian army marched toward Berlin, while the Russian army retreated toward Dresden, protected by the rearguard under General Miloradovich. After Napoleon reoccupied Dresden,

on May 8, 1813, the entire Kingdom of Saxony was, once again, under his rule.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Lvov, Prince Georgy Yevgenievich (1861–1925)

Russian political leader and head of the Provisional Government in Russia in 1917. Born in Dresden, Saxony, on November 2, 1861, Georgy Yevgenievich returned to Russia with his family soon after his birth. The family owned large estates in Tula Province. After graduation from Moscow University in 1885, Lvov worked to make his land profitable. Drawn into politics by the ineptitude of the czarist government, Lvov was elected to the local zemstvo (district assembly). During the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, he was active in organizing a union of zemstvos and towns to aid sick and wounded soldiers. Lvov became a reluctant member of the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party and as such was elected to the Russian Dumas (parliament) in 1906 and 1907.

With the beginning of World War I, Lvov resumed his relief work, and Czar Nicholas II authorized the creation of an All-Russian

Zemstvo Union for Aid to Sick and Wounded Soldiers under Lvov's leadership. This organization proved far superior in supplying aid to the soldiers than the government's own General Headquarters Medical Division. Lvov also became a leader in the Union of Towns and in the Central War Industry Committee. In 1917, the Zemstvo Union and the Union of Towns combined into the so-called *Zemgor*.

Lvov was a reluctant politician, drawn by the increasing importance of the Zemstvo Union and its involvement in munitions manufacture and the provisioning of troops, at which it was more successful than the government agencies. Lvov's constant criticism of the government's war efforts was taken by progressives within the Duma to mean that he shared their political goals.

Following the abdication of Nicholas II, on March 15, 1917, Lvov became both head of the Provisional Government and minister of the interior. He headed a state that now lapsed into near-anarchy as the grievances of centuries broke to the surface. Revolutionary elements controlled large areas of the country; the peasants began seizing land from the nobles; workers in the cities struck for better conditions; and discipline broke down in the army.

Under pressure from the Allies and to realize Russia's war aims for which so much had already been sacrificed, the Provisional Government took the fatal step of continuing Russia in the war. The government also deferred the tough decisions on reform, especially in land ownership. Lvov's appeal to the peasants to wait until a future constituent assembly could decide this issue fell on deaf ears.

Lvov's commitment to a defensive war without territorial annexations and indemnities saved him following riots in May 1917 resulting from revelations that the

government sought to acquire the Turkish straits and other areas. Lvov accepted Foreign Minister Pavel Miliukov's resignation and reshuffled the cabinet to include Alexander Kerensky and four socialists.

Following failure of Kerensky's great July military offensive, riots occurred in Petrograd, and on July 21, 1917, Lvov resigned, succeeded by Kerensky. Lvov had been unwilling to crack down on the shadow government of the Soviet or accept socialist demands for a radical agrarian solution and a republic. Lvov remarked, "To save the situation it was necessary to dissolve the soviets and fire at the people. I could not do it. But Kerensky can."

Arrested by the Bolsheviks after their seizure of power in November, Lvov escaped and made his way to Paris where he sat on

a Russian Political Conference organized to support Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak during the Russian Civil War. He died in Paris on March 6, 1925.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917)

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M

Makarov, Stepan Ossipovich (1848–1904)

Russian admiral, naval theorist and reformer, ship designer, oceanographic explorer, and author.

Stepan Makarov was born at Nikolaev, on the shores of the Black Sea, into a naval family on December 27, 1848. The Makarovs moved to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, a frontier town near the Amur River's mouth in the Russian Far East in the late 1850s. Makarov joined the navy in 1864 after training at the city's National Maritime Academy.

As a torpedo boat commander during Russia's 1877–1878 war with Turkey, Makarov built a reputation as a daring officer and tactical innovator. His commendable performance earned him promotion to captain and selection as an aide to the czar.

In 1886, he commanded the corvette *Vitiaz* on a four-year, round-the-world voyage of oceanographic and hydrographic research; Makarov published the collected data in *Vitiaz and the Pacific Ocean* (1894).

Made the youngest admiral in Russian history in 1890, Makarov earned a worldwide reputation among naval professionals during the decade that followed. In 1897, he published the renowned *Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics*. His tactical understanding of modern naval warfare challenged the views of naval strategists like Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett.

Given command of the Baltic Fleet in 1897, Makarov's criticism of Russia's inadequate state of readiness did not make him

popular. When Japan attacked the Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur in 1904, however, the lack of an effective force to protect Russian interests in the Pacific proved the accuracy of his observations.

The Russian losses at Port Arthur induced St. Petersburg to appoint Makarov commander of the Pacific Squadron in March 1904. Makarov took an aggressive stance to try and regain the initiative. His self-confidence and his exertions to improve readiness encouraged the despondent Russian forces and resurrected their morale.

Unfortunately for Russia, he did not survive long enough to affect the outcome. Japanese destroyers laid mines in the approaches to Port Arthur, and Makarov neglected to sweep the channel before using it. He died on April 13, 1904, when his flagship, *Petropavlovsk*, struck a mine with heavy loss of life. His death depressed morale, and his less-aggressive replacement commander, Rear Admiral Villem K. Vitgeft, did little to continue Makarov's program.

Larry A. Grant

See also: Alekseev, Evgeny I. (1843–1917); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Vitgeft, Villem (Vilgelm) Karlovich (1847–1904)

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Makarov Pistol

Currently the standard sidearm of many of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union, including Russia.

The *Makarov Pistolet*, or *Makarov PM*, replaced the Soviet Tokarev pistol in the 1951. The weapon was designed by Nikolai Fyodorovich Makarov, a second-generation machinist from a small town outside of Moscow. He worked his way through the Soviet bureaucracy to the position of head designer at a defense plant during World War II. Following the war, he worked at the weapons design bureau. He retired in 1974.

The Makarov pistol is modeled after the German Walther PP. The Makarov was meant to be easier to master and control, but has some shortcomings of its own. The Makarov is not as powerful as the Tokarev and is harder to handle. It has a difficult double-action trigger pull. The pistol fires a specially designed 9 × 18-millimeter (mm) round. This round will not chamber correctly in comparable Western weapons like the 0.380 Browning or the 9-mm NATO pistol.

The Makarov is still in wide use. Older models in circulation are likely to have come from East Germany. The weapon is still being produced in Russia, Bulgaria, and China. The Chinese company Norinco produces two different versions of the Makarov pistol. The first, referred to as *Type 59*, chambers the 9 × 18-mm round originally designed for the pistol. The second model, *59A*, uses a conventional 0.380 round.

William Eger

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Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich (1889–1935)

Ukrainian anarchist and guerilla leader.

Nestor Makhno was born to a peasant family in Ukraine on October 27, 1889. He worked as a farm laborer for most of his youth, but joined an anarchist group at age 17 following the abortive Revolution of 1905. He was arrested for terrorism in 1908 and sentenced to death; the sentence was later commuted, although Makhno was kept in solitary confinement for some time. He was released in the aftermath of the February Revolution.

Makhno immediately returned to Ukraine and resumed his political activities. In August 1917, he was elected as chairman of the local soviet, which busied itself with seizing the property of local landowners. Many of his ideas, rooted in the Russian anarchism of Mikhail Bakunin and Prince Pyotr Kropotkin, approached the Bolshevik political program, and he occasionally coordinated with Red Army units; however, Makhno was not affiliated with the Bolsheviks.

When German army forces entered Ukraine following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, however, Makhno first attempted to resist and fight for an independent Ukraine. His forces could not match German strength though, and Makhno fled to Moscow, where he met Lenin, but found no support.

Returning to Ukraine, Makhno organized a guerilla war against the German puppet regime headed by Pavel (Pavlo) Skoropadsky. His forces carried the black flag of anarchism prominently during their raids, and Makhno became something of a legend; in September 1918, he led Ukrainian guerillas to a stunning victory over a large Habsburg occupation force at Di-brivki. When German and Austrian troops departed at the end of that year, Makhno's forces, with the aid of the Red Army, overthrew the remaining government and established an independent, anarcho-communist Ukraine.

Makhno then signed an agreement with the Bolshevik regime for joint action against the regional White forces commanded by Anton Denikin. The Bolsheviks double-crossed Makhno, however, sending assassins after him and ordering troops into Ukraine to dissolve the communes he had established. Caught between Red and White forces, Makhno fought gamely through 1919 and most of 1920. The Bolsheviks briefly made a truce with Makhno when it appeared White forces might take Ukraine, but once the danger had passed, they again turned on the anarchists.

In 1921, Red Army units wiped out most of Makhno's forces. Wounded, Makhno fled into Romania, where he was immediately arrested. He soon escaped to Poland, only to be arrested again. He was eventually released, and settled in Paris. Makhno continued to work for an independent Ukraine and published several anarchist tracts before his death on July 6, 1935.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Skoropadsky, Pavel (Pavlo) Petrovich (1873–1945); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Maklakov, Nikolai Alekseevich (1871–1918)

Russian political figure. Born on September 21, 1871, Nikolai Alekseevich Maklakov graduated from Moscow University in 1892 and joined the bureaucracy of the state treasury. From 1894 until 1900, he was a clerk in the Moscow branch of the Treasury and a tax inspector. He also headed a section of the Tambov branch of the Treasury, and by 1906, he was the head of the Poltava branch. An influential friend helped him secure appointment in 1909 as the governor of Chernigov.

In December 1912, Maklakov was appointed minister of the interior, in part because Czar Nicholas II liked Maklakov's autocratic views. Maklakov formally took control of the ministry in early 1913. Considered a staunch monarchist, Maklakov pandered to the czar and rightist groups, and failed to initiate any major reforms that might address Russia's staggering internal problems. Indeed, he opposed concessions to the Duma.

Hostile to universal suffrage, Maklakov sought to exploit Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism to roll back democratic reforms. In the July Crisis of 1914, Maklakov believed that Russia must support Serbia. He remained confident of victory against both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

As the war progressed badly for Russia, Nicholas II came under mounting pressure

from the Duma to remove his most reactionary ministers, and Maklakov resigned under pressure on June 6, 1915. He continued to exercise influence as a member of the State Council, however. In January 1917 Maklakov had charge of gerrymandering districts to manipulate the elections to the Fifth Duma.

Maklakov lost his posts after the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. He was executed in Petrograd, along with more than 500 other political prisoners, during August 31–September 1, 1918.

Vadim K. Simakhov

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born to a poor peasant family near Odessa on November 23, 1898, Rodion Malinovsky enlisted in the Russian army at the outbreak of World War I. Badly wounded in 1915, he spent several months recuperating before reassignment as a machine gunner with the Russian Expeditionary Corps in France in April 1916. He was decorated for bravery and again wounded. His unit mutinied in the

spring of 1917, however, and Malinovsky was transferred to North Africa.

Malinovsky returned to Russia via Vladivostok in August 1919. He made his way along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Omsk, where he joined the Red Army and fought against the White forces. He then served as chief of staff of III Cavalry Corps. In 1926, he joined the Communist Party and a year later entered the Frunze Military Academy for a three-year officers' training program. He next served as a military advisor to the Republican forces during 1937–1938 in the Spanish Civil War. Returning to the Soviet Union, he became a senior instructor on the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy.

In March 1941, Major General Malinovsky assumed command of the new XLVIII Rifle Corps on the Romanian border. In August, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he had charge of the Sixth Army in the Ukraine, where he had no choice but to withdraw before the advancing Germans. Promoted to lieutenant general that November, the next month he took command of the Southern Front. Following the ill-fated Kharkov Offensive in June 1942 for which he shared blame, he was reassigned to rear echelon duty.

During July and August 1942, Malinovsky headed the Don Operational Forces Group before being named in August to command the Sixty-Sixth Army. He also developed a long association with Nikita Khrushchev, then a political officer reportedly assigned by Josef Stalin to watch Malinovsky. He next commanded the Voronezh Front in October and the Second Guards Army in November. In the latter capacity, he played a key role in the Battle of Stalingrad, in December, defeating Army Group Don, the German relief force under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

Malinovsky was promoted to colonel general in February 1943, commanding the

Southern Front that month and the Southwest Front in March. In April, he was promoted to general of the army. He played a major role in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 and then spearheaded the drive across the Ukraine, taking Odessa in April 1944. His command was redesignated the Third Ukrainian Front in October 1943 and the Second Ukrainian Front in May 1944. From the Ukraine, he led the Soviet forces into Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In September 1944, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union.

When the war in Europe ended, Malinovsky took command of the Trans-Baikal Front in the Far East, pushing into Japanese-held Manchuria. A prominent member of the Soviet military hierarchy after the war, he headed the Far East Command during 1947–1953 and the Far East Military District during 1953–1956. He was deputy minister of defense during 1956–1957 and then succeeded Marshal Georgy Zhukov as minister of defense. In this post, Malinovsky introduced strategic missiles into the Soviet arsenal and oversaw Soviet military modernization.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev, now premier of the Soviet Union, asked Malinovsky how long it would take U.S. forces to crush Cuba. Malinovsky replied with an estimate of “two or three days,” a statement that Khrushchev passed along to a furious Fidel Castro. Malinovsky died in office of cancer in Moscow on March 31, 1967. Marshal Andrei Grechko succeeded him as minister of defense.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Frunze Academy; Grechko, Andrei (1903–1976); Kharkov, Battle for (March 1–14, 1943); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Spanish Civil War

(1936–1939); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Maloiaroslavets, Battle of (October 24, 1812)

An important battle between the French and Russian forces in October 1812. After spending a fruitless month in Moscow, Napoleon finally commenced his retreat on October 19. His forces had dwindled to some 100,000 men, accompanied by thousands of noncombatants and an enormous baggage train laden with loot. Napoleon planned to move his forces to the western provinces of Russia, where supply stores had been prepared. The route from Moscow to Smolensk via Gzhatsk, however, was devastated after the French forces had fought their way to Moscow in August and September. Napoleon therefore decided to advance by the Kaluga route toward the unharmed regions in the southwest.

Initially, Napoleon successfully deceived the Russian forces about his plan; however, heavy rains soon made the roads almost impassable and considerably delayed the French movements on October 22. During the night of October 22–23, Russian scouts finally realized that Napoleon was moving his entire army southward. Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov immediately dispatched General Dmitry Dokhturov’s corps from

Tarutino to the little town of Maloiaroslavets, the only point where Kutuzov could join the new Kaluga road and block the French advance.

Late in the evening of October 23, the French advance guard under Eugène de Beauharnais, the viceroy of Italy, approached Maloiaroslavets, where it launched attacks against the bridge during the night of October 23–24. In fierce fighting, the bridge changed hands several times, and the town of Maloiaroslavets, built entirely of wood, was set ablaze. General Alexis Joseph Delzons, with the French 13th Division, initially carried the town, but he was killed in action, and the Russians drove the French back in a counterattack. The French made one last effort and, despite suffering almost 6,000 casualties, regained control of the bridge and the town. Dokhturov withdrew to the heights overlooking Maloiaroslavets.

By the afternoon of October 24, Napoleon brought the rest of his army to Maloiaroslavets, while the main Russian army under Kutuzov appeared in the southern suburbs of the town. General Nikolai Raevsky with 7th Corps arrived in time to reinforce Dokhturov, while two divisions of Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout's corps supported Eugène. Neither side committed its main forces, however. The fighting was extremely savage, with the town changing hands at least eight times. Over the course of the day, the place was completely destroyed, and the streets were strewn with hundreds of corpses. The fighting ended with the French in control of the burning town, but they failed to secure a bridgehead.

On October 25, Napoleon conducted a reconnaissance on the southern bank of the Lusha River and barely escaped being captured by Cossacks. Although his troops gained a tactical victory, Napoleon realized that he would be unable to break through the Russian army in front of him. After a council

of war on the evening of October 25, the emperor began a withdrawal to Smolensk by way of Borodino and Gzhatsk. Remarkably, Kutuzov ordered his army to retreat southward, fearing Napoleon might outflank and defeat him. Thus, both armies simultaneously began retreating in opposite directions.

The Battle of Maloiaroslavets had a crucial impact on Napoleon's campaign in Russia. The French were prevented from reaching the rich provinces in southeastern Russia and forced to return along a devastated route to Smolensk. The marching and fighting at Maloiaroslavets consumed seven crucial days; a week after the battle, the snow began to fall.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18, 1812)

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Manchuria Campaign (August 9–September 5, 1945)

Soviet conquest of Manchuria. At the Yalta Conference (February 11–14, 1945), Soviet leader Josef Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan “two to three months” after the conclusion of fighting in Europe. The Soviets began serious preparations in April 1945, when they initiated the transfer of the equivalent of

12 army corps and tremendous amounts of supplies from eastern Europe to three commands fronting Manchuria: the Trans-Baikal Front to the northwest; the Second Far Eastern Front to the northeast; and the First Far Eastern Front on the east.

For this campaign, *Stavka* (the Soviet high command) established a theater-level command under Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky. The Soviets amassed 1.5 million men, 28,000 guns and mortars, 5,500 tanks, and 4,370 aircraft; they faced the defending Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army which, although it contained 1.2 million men, including forces in Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, was a shell of its former self. Many of its units had been transferred to the defense of the home islands. The commander, General Yamada Otozō, called up 250,000 reservists for new units, pulled back

his border forces, and planned a defense of central Manchuria, where the bulk of the population was located.

Japanese military intelligence, however, failed to ascertain the extent of the Soviet buildup and believed the terrain in the Trans-Baikal, where the Soviets had planned their main attack, would be impenetrable for armor. Fearing Japan's use of biological agents, the Soviets vaccinated their troops against plague and issued masks to them.

The Soviets presented their declaration of war to Japanese Ambassador Satō Naotake in Moscow only minutes before they attacked. Soviet plans called for nearly simultaneous night attacks from the three fronts beginning after midnight on August 9, 1945, all to converge on the central plain of Manchuria. Vasilevsky later acknowledged that U.S.-supplied trucks and fuel landed at



Soviet troops of the Second Far Eastern Front in Manchuria, 1945. (Bettman/Corbis)

Vladivostok were vital in the Soviets' ability to launch this campaign.

The main attack was delivered by the Trans-Baikal Front of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, operating from Mongolia. The Sixth Guards Tank Army, with 1,019 tanks and self-propelled guns, acted as a forward detachment. The intent was to bypass Japanese strongpoints where possible to preempt the defenses of the Japanese Third Area Army. The Soviets raced for the passes of the Greater Khingan Mountains and managed to cover 300 miles in only three days, encountering more problems from terrain and fuel shortages than the Japanese.

The Japanese forces held on to Haliar until August 18. Changchun and Mukden (today's Shenyang) fell on August 21. Meanwhile, air-landed troops entered Darien and Port Arthur on August 19, followed by forces sent via rail.

Driving from the Soviet Maritime Provinces, Marshal Kirill Meretskov's First Far Eastern Front overran or bypassed seven districts held by the Japanese First Area Army. Attacking in a torrential thunderstorm, the Soviets skirted most fortified areas, leaving their reduction to follow-on forces. Mutanchiang was held by Japanese forces until August 16. Soviet aircraft dominated the skies, with the few Japanese planes seeking refuge in Korea or Japan.

Although secondary to the deeper, pincer-like thrusts of the other fronts, the efforts of the Second Far Eastern Front in northern Manchuria, supported by the Amur River Flotilla, tied down some of the best-prepared Japanese forces by crossing the Amur and moving up the Sungari River toward Harbin. Although the Japanese emperor had signed the Imperial Rescript of Surrender on August 14 and General Yamada had accepted it on August 18, the Soviets wanted to regain the territories lost in the Russo-Japanese

War. Thus, Soviet forces continued combat operations until the armistice on September 2, by which time they had reached the 38th parallel. In the Kuriles, they fought until September 5. The Soviets subsequently turned over a huge cache of Japanese weapons to the People's Liberation Army of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), including 3,700 guns, 600 tanks, and 861 aircraft.

During the campaign, the bulk of the Guandong Army was not committed to battle, but the Soviets estimated 83,737 Japanese were killed compared with Soviet casualties of more than 12,000 dead and nearly 25,000 wounded. More than 100,000 Japanese in Manchuria died after the cease-fire, and an estimated 594,000 Japanese prisoners were taken back to forced-labor camps in the Soviet Union.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967); Meretskov, Kirill Afanasievich (1897–1968); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Mannerheim, Baron Carl Gustav Emil (1867–1951)

Russian army general; later Finnish field marshal and president of Finland. Born at Louhisaari in southwest Finland, which was

then part of the Russian Empire, on June 4, 1867, Carl Mannerheim graduated from the prestigious Nikolaevsky Cavalry School in St. Petersburg in 1889. Initially commissioned into a dragoon regiment based in Poland, Mannerheim transferred to the elite Chevalier Guards Regiment in St. Petersburg in 1890. Following a posting to the Cavalry School, Lieutenant Colonel Mannerheim saw combat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and was promoted to colonel.

Mannerheim then led a special mission for the Russian government, collecting intelligence along Russia's border areas in the Far East during 1906–1908. His excellent reports made a favorable impression on Czar Nicholas II, whom he met in 1908. Mannerheim then commanded cavalry units in Poland and was promoted to major general.

Mannerheim saw considerable combat during World War I, mostly commanding cavalry divisions under General Aleksei Brusilov. He took command of the 12th Cavalry Division in the Galician Campaign of 1915 and participated in the subsequent Brusilov Offensive in 1916. After Romania joined the war, Mannerheim transferred to the Transylvanian Alps. Promoted to lieutenant general in June 1917, he commanded the VI Cavalry Corps.

Mannerheim opposed the Russian revolution that deposed the czar in March 1917, and following the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, he retired from the Russian Army and returned to Finland. Mannerheim then commanded the White Army in Finland, defeating the communist Red Guards and freeing Finland of Russian troops. He then resigned his command and traveled in western Europe. Appointed regent in December, he returned to Finland. Defeated in the presidential election in July 1919, Mannerheim retired from public life and traveled widely, including to India.

Mannerheim returned to public service as Finnish minister of defense in 1931 and urged a program of increased spending on the nation's defenses. As part of this, he oversaw construction of what became known as the Mannerheim Line, which held invading Soviet troops at the beginning of the Finnish-Soviet War (the Winter War, 1939–1940). Mannerheim commanded Finnish forces in the Winter War and in the renewal of fighting in the Continuation War (1941–1944) with the Soviet Union.

Promoted to field marshal in June 1942, Mannerheim was elected president of Finland in August 1944 and negotiated the armistice with the Soviet Union on September 19. He retired for reasons of ill health in 1946 and moved to Switzerland to write his memoirs. Mannerheim died in Lausanne, Switzerland, on January 28, 1951. A staunch patriot if not a convinced republican, Mannerheim served his country loyally and well as both a capable and determined military commander and as its president.

Michael Snare and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Manzikert, Battle of (July 10–26, 1915)

Engagement on the Caucasus Front involving Ottoman and Russian forces. Manzikert is located in eastern Anatolia. Fighting here ended offensive actions initiated in the summer of 1915 by Ottoman minister of war Enver Pasha to drive Russian forces from Armenia. Despite actions by rebel Armenians that prevented Ottoman forces from concentrating fully on the Russians, a tenuous supply line, and troop shortages, Enver continued attacks on Russian Caucasus Army commander Nikolai Yudenich's forces.

On July 10, 1915, in the belief that Ottoman forces in the area were weak, Yudenich's subordinate, General Oganovski, launched an attack in the area just west of Manzikert. Oganovski had some 22,000 men. Unknown to him, the attack fell on General Abdul Kerim Pasha's Third Army of 40,000 men. The Russian attack failed, and on July 16, Kerim Pasha launched a counterattack that forced Oganovski to abandon his supply train and withdraw back on Manzikert. Ottoman forces retook the city on July 20, and by July 27, they had taken Muş. In the fighting, the Russians suffered some 7,000–10,000 casualties. Ottoman casualties are unknown, although they included 6,000 men taken prisoner.

Learning of events only on July 22, Yudenich sacked Oganovski and prepared a counterattack of his own against the thinly stretched Ottoman northern flank.

Jon C. Anderson Jr. and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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MARS, Operation (November–December 1942)

Soviet codename for an offensive launched against German Army Group Center in the Rzhev salient near Moscow in November and December 1942. The operation resulted in heavy fighting between November 25 and December 20, 1942.

The Soviet High Command (*Stavka*), under Marshal Georgy Zhukov, conceived MARS as part of a larger plan with three major operations. The other two were Operation URANUS, aimed at surrounding and destroying German forces in Stalingrad in southern Russia, where a bloody battle had been in progress since September, and Operation JUPITER, to be launched as a follow-up after the completion of MARS. The overall objective of the three offensives was the destruction of the German armies in central Russia and the Ukraine and the expulsion of the invaders from most of the conquered territory.

MARS constituted the third major Soviet offensive against the Rzhev salient over the previous year, reflecting Zhukov's concern with the Moscow/Smolensk axis. The first battle had been part of the general Soviet offensive beginning in December 1941 that had driven the Germans away from Moscow. The second, in the spring and summer of 1942, sought to destroy the German forces in the salient and divert enemy troops from southern Russia.

The Soviets began planning for MARS in September 1942. Their immediate aims were the destruction of the German Ninth Army (under the command of General Walter Model) in the Rzhev salient, preventing the Germans from diverting elements of Army Group Center to reinforce their forces in the Stalingrad area, and pushing the Germans further west away from Moscow and toward the Polish-Soviet border. The ambitions that Stalin, Zhukov, and their cohorts had for the attack on the German's central front were reflected in the forces and material allocated for it. They deployed 36.5 divisions from the Kalinin and Central army groups ("fronts" in Soviet usage) including approximately 1,900,000 troops, 21,700 artillery pieces of varying calibers, 3,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,200 aircraft. Moscow placed both fronts under the command of Colonel General Ivan S. Konev.

Soviet planners called for massive attacks by the Kalinin Front—the Forty-First, Twenty-Second, and Thirty-Ninth armies—on the German left flank to the north, while Western Front forces would strike the German right to the southeast. The Western Front's Twentieth and Thirty-First armies were to attack from the east through the German defenses around Sycheka, roll up the German positions near Rzhev, then link up with the northern pincer, cutting the Germans off in the salient and destroying them.

The offensive ran into trouble from the start. Zhukov originally intended to launch MARS on October 12, but bad weather delayed its start until November 25. Weather continued to play a role. The offensive began early on November 25 with massive artillery barrages against both flanks. Fog and heavy snow, however, prevented Soviet forward artillery observers from observing results and adjusting fire. Storms also hampered Soviet air operations and close infantry support.

The frozen and muddy ground and marshy terrain also created difficulties for Soviet tanks.

This, along with stubborn German resistance, limited the Red Army's initial gains. The northern thrust by the Kalinin Front made little progress. The Western Front's attack did slightly better, making encouraging gains across the Vazuza River near the town of Belyi. The Germans, however, managed to hold most of their key strongpoints—even those the Soviets managed to encircle or bypass—forcing the attackers to divert troops to reduce these pockets. The German infantry, skilled in antitank tactics and the use of artillery, used preregistered barrages and automatic weapons to cut down massed Soviet infantry and destroyed the isolated Soviet tanks with antitank guns or with their own tanks and self-propelled artillery. The *Wehrmacht's* defensive successes made it increasingly difficult for the Soviets to maneuver and also for supplies to reach those units that had advanced the farthest.

Their initial defensive success notwithstanding, the German position in the Rzhev salient remained dangerous. The fighting around Stalingrad and the need to support their encircled force in the Stalingrad pocket forced the Germans to send much of their strategic reserve to the south. General Model would have to make do with what was left. The local reserves of the Ninth Army and Army Group Center controlled were quickly used up. Model emptied out rear-area clerical and supply personnel, motor pool and aircraft mechanics, and cooks—anybody who could carry a rifle—and sent them into battle. Combined with skillful shifting of units from quiet sectors of the bulge to threatened areas, these measures enabled Model to hold the salient.

By November 27, it was clear that the Soviet offensive on both sides of the salient

had stalled and any further advance was impossible. Nevertheless, Zhukov insisted that the attacks in both the north and the east continue. After a two-day battle near the Rzhev-Sychevka road, the Germans had not only halted the Twentieth Army's attacks but were threatening to encircle it. Similarly, German counterattacks in the Belyi sector threatened to cut off the Forty-First Army. Thousands of Soviet soldiers were thus trapped behind German lines. A few of these survivors managed to fight their way out of the Belyi pocket and make their way back to Soviet lines. Many would remain in the German rear and fight as partisans for weeks. Soviet forces remained in the northwest pocket, and the Germans could not remove them. Because of the difficult terrain and general exhaustion, the Soviets were unable to mount any significant attacks. By mid-December, the fighting had ceased as both sides were exhausted.

Operation MARS had failed to achieve its goals and was thus a major Soviet defeat and, correspondingly, a great defensive success for the Germans. Soviet killed, wounded, and missing totaled between 200,000 and 350,000. Material losses were equally severe, with the loss of between 600 and 800 tanks out of 1,000 committed to the attack as well as 1,200 other vehicles. The Germans also lost heavily, with over 40,000 killed and wounded.

The operation did have some positive achievements for the Soviets. It prevented the Germans from further reinforcing their armies in southern Russia. It also damaged Army Group Center sufficiently to cause the Germans to withdraw from the Rzhev salient in March 1943 to shorten their lines and economize their forces. Considering the resources the Soviet command allocated to MARS, however, its outcome was disappointing for Stalin and his generals, particularly Marshal Zhukov.

Historically, Operation MARS has been the subject of continuing controversy. For decades after the battle, Soviet histories and memoirs ignored or minimized the battles around the Rzhev salient. Soviet failure at Rzhev was overshadowed by the Red Army's spectacular victory at Stalingrad. It is only since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of long-closed military archives that Operation MARS has received the attention it deserves. Although the Soviet failure at Rzhev had short-term operational and tactical consequences, in the end, it only constituted a bloody bump on the Red Army's long and violent road to Berlin.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Masampo Incident (1900)

Result of Russian and Japanese machinations regarding the strategic Korean seaport of Masampo that nearly led to war between Russia and Japan.

Russia's Far East policy in the late 1890s included construction of a railway in Manchuria and extending its naval influence into Pacific waters. This caused friction with

Japan, which was wary of any foreign incursions into its sphere of influence. Japan became uneasy when Russia secured for its navy the lease of Port Arthur, a strategic seaport on the China coast in 1898. Because Port Arthur and the Russian port of Vladivostok are separated by 1,100 miles, Russian vessels could not travel between the two without either a coal resupply operation at sea or a stop at a Japanese coaling station. Russia therefore turned its attention to the Korean Peninsula, seeking an ice-free port and coaling station to link Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

In 1899, the Russian chargé d'affaires in Korea attempted to lease the port of Masampo from the government of Korea. Masampo, one of the best natural ports to be found in all of East Asia, lies on the southern coast of Korea within 50 miles of the Japanese island of Tsushima. Control of Masampo would give the Russian navy command of the lines of communication between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Japan viewed Russian control of Masampo as a danger not only to its trade with Korea and China, but as a threat to their home islands. Japan therefore attempted to block the lease.

Japanese subjects in Korea purchased the foreshore of the ground Russia had selected at Masampo, and the Korean government issued title deeds to the Japanese purchasers, effectively shutting off Russia from Masampo waters. The Russians then attempted to secure the island of Kargodo, approximately 10 miles from Masampo Bay, which would afford excellent anchorage. Japan strongly objected.

In March 1900, three Russian navy vessels arrived at Chemulpo, Korea. Japan, seeing this as part of the Masampo maneuvering, mobilized its navy and put part of its army on high alert. Russia, not prepared to go to war over Masampo, withdrew its vessels.

The Masampo Incident was settled when Russia secured the establishment of a coal depot and naval hospital on the coastline about 1.5 miles long and a half-mile inland, near the town of Masampo. Along with this lease, Russia pledged not to make any future demands for the island of Kargodo, the shore opposite Masampo, or any surrounding islands. Korea also pledged not to give this territory to any foreign power. Japan was satisfied with this restrictive lease and halted its war preparations.

William R. Donovan II

See also: Port Arthur; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Vladivostok

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Maskhadov, Aslan (1951–2005)

Aslan Alievich Maskhadov was born on September 21, 1951 in the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, where Chechens settled after mass deportations ordered by Josef Stalin in 1944. His family resettled in Chechnya in 1957. At 17, Maskhadov joined the Soviet army and trained in Georgia; he graduated from the Tbilisi Artillery School in 1972, and with honors from the Kalinin Higher Artillery Academy in 1981. His postings included Hungary and the Baltic Military District, where as chief of staff in Vilnius, Lithuania, he participated in the “January Events” of

1991. He retired in 1992 as a colonel with two Orders for Service to Homeland. Returning to Chechnya, he headed the Civil Defense Department until November 1993.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Maskhadov participated in raids against the Chechen rebels trying to overthrow the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. These actions, coupled with an averted coup against Dudayev, led to his posting as chief of staff of the military in March 1994. In December, the First Chechen War against the Russians began. Maskhadov was instrumental in defending the capital city of Grozny, and he was promoted to general in February 1995. He played a key role in negotiating the Khasayurt Accord on August 31, 1996 that ended the war.

Maskhadov then entered the political arena. He became the prime minister of Chechnya on October 17, 1996, while retaining his posts as chief of staff and defense minister. He subsequently nominated himself for president and won. He was inaugurated on February 12, 1997, and immediately abolished the office of defense minister, and became commander in chief. He soon lost control of districts to warlords, however, and the rise of Wahhabis and other Islamic fundamentalists became alarming. Maskhadov introduced *sharia* (Islamic) law in February 1999, trying to compromise. He survived three assassination attempts while trying to curb organized crime and kidnappings.

Citing growing lawlessness, Vladimir Putin of Russia declared Maskhadov's government illegitimate and sent in Russian troops, beginning the Second Chechen War, on October 1, 1999. Grozny again became the focal point of fighting; Maskhadov defended the city until 2000, then withdrew and led a guerilla defense. The Russians put a bounty of \$10 million on him, and he was denounced for masterminding the Moscow

theater-hostage crisis of 2002 and the Nazran raid in 2004. Maskhadov called for more attacks, but did condemn the Beslan school siege.

On January 15, 2005, Maskhadov called for a cease-fire until the end of February, and a negotiated end to the war. On March 8, Russian Special Forces attacked his hideout, and Maskhadov was killed. The Russians buried him in an unmarked grave.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Baltic Rebellions (1991); Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Chechen War, Second (War in the Northern Caucasus; October 1999–February 2000); Dudayev, Dzhokhar M. (1944–1996); Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914)

One of the initial series of battles in East Prussia between the Russian and German armies that initiated action on the Eastern Front in World War I. Conducted between September 8–15, 1914, this battle occurred shortly after the Russian defeat at Tannenberg (August 26–31).

Outnumbering the defending German Eighth Army waiting behind the north-south line of the Masurian Lakes by nearly 2–1, Russian General Yakov Zhilinsky's Northwestern Front, consisting of General Pavel Rennenkampf's First Army in the north and General Aleksandr Samsonov's Second

Army in the south, entered East Prussia on August 15, 1914. Between the two Russian armies lay a countryside strewn with natural obstacles: forests, rolling hills, marshes, and the Masurian Lakes that canalized the Russian advance and forced their deployment on relatively narrow fronts, slowing their march and diffusing their mass. Zhilinsky failed to establish effective communications between the two armies to synchronize their actions, and, making coordination even worse, the two army commanders refused to communicate with each other, allegedly because of ill feelings between the two, dating from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.

These Russian command failings allowed German Colonel General Paul von Hindenburg, who had replaced Colonel General Max von Prittwitz as Eighth Army commander following the latter's panic after his defeat at the August 20, 1914, Battle of Gumbinnen, to throw his Eighth Army against Samsonov, routing the Second Army at Tannenberg, while Rennenkampf essentially dawdled after his victory at Gumbinnen. Hindenburg was then free to shift his entire forces southward and turn them against the Russian First Army.

Having failed to support the Second Army at Tannenberg, Rennenkampf had spent the end of August deploying his army in defensive positions stretching from the Baltic coast to the northern end of the Masurian Lakes. His troops were well rested and entrenched but spread too thin, with 12 divisions covering a front of more than 80 miles and four reserve divisions concentrated to meet an expected German attack from the fortress of Königsberg. Reinforced from the west with two corps, Hindenburg and his chief of staff, Major General Erich Ludendorff, planned a two-pronged attack against the Russians. Four corps were to pin their main positions in the north, and two corps

were to strike and break through the thin Russian lines near the lakes.

Eighth Army opened its attack on September 8, 1914, with the Russian line holding against the attack in the south. By September 9, the holding attack in the north had also ground to a stop; however, on that day, the German corps under General of Infantry Hermann von François, after marching 80 miles in four days, crashed through the southern end of the Russian line. *Rennenkampf*, fearing his army would be cut off, ordered a general retreat. Leading the retreat in a near panic, *Rennenkampf* had sufficient presence of mind to order a sacrificial spoiling attack with two divisions directly at the German center. Driving the German XX Army Corps back in disarray and leaving the flanking units exposed, the Russians' suicidal attack caused Ludendorff to hesitate and halt Eighth Army's pursuit.

The remainder of the First Army was allowed to escape—clearing East Prussia of all Russian forces. The Germans suffered some 40,000 casualties but Russian losses were much higher, on the order of 100,000 men (70,000 killed and wounded and another 30,000 taken prisoner), along with some 150 guns, huge quantities of supplies, and nearly half of its transport. A Russian counterattack between September 25 and 28—the Battle of Nieman—retook much of the ground lost in the battle.

In his headlong retreat, *Rennenkampf* severed all communication with General Zhilinsky, leaving the army group commander completely unaware as to First Army's whereabouts. Eventually, reports reached him that *Rennenkampf* had abandoned his army and fled to the Russian fortress of Kovno, farther to the rear than anyone expected. Within days of the retreat, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, supreme commander of Russia's armed forces, relieved

Zhilinsky of his command at the end of September; however, Rennenkampf's friends at court were able to protect him from the grand duke's wrath. Rennenkampf could not escape recrimination entirely, however, and resigned in October 1915. The (First) Battle of Masurian Lakes completed the disaster of Russia's offensive into East Prussia, made legends of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and firmly established a picture of Russian military incompetence in historical memory that was not entirely truthful.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Gumbinnen, Battle of (August 20, 1914); Masurian Lakes, Second Battle of (February 7–22, 1915); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Samsonov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1859–1914); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914); Zhilinsky, Yakov Grigorevich (1853–1918)

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Masurian Lakes, Second Battle of (February 7–22, 1915)

The Second Battle of Masurian Lakes was part of Central Powers' commander on the Eastern Front Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg's plan for a simultaneous and decisive Austrian-German thrust on the Eastern Front to defeat the Russian Army and force Russia from the war. Also known as the Winter Battle of Masuria, the battle opened

in the midst of a *metel*, the Russian word for a severe blizzard in which gale force winds from the east whip blinding sheets of snow for days on end. This storm blew from Russia across Poland and into East Prussia just as the German Ninth Army attacked in early February 1915 toward Bolimów to fix the Russian Tenth Army in place. The blizzard quickly brought that attack to a standstill.

The German plan called for the commitment of two armies—the Eighth and Tenth—in East Prussia. General of Infantry Otto von Below commanded the Eighth Army. Colonel General Hermann von Eichhorn commanded the Tenth Army, which was formed from four corps recently transferred from the West. It was to attack south from staging areas near Tilsit, Insterburg, and Gumbinnen into the right flank of the Russian Tenth Army deployed north of the Masurian Lakes. Meanwhile, the German Eighth Army would drive east toward Lyck (Luck) and Augustów from bases at Lötzen, Ortelsburg, and Thorn.

General Thaddeus von Sivers (Sievers), commanding the Russian Tenth Army, believed that the Germans could not attack in such severe conditions and thus was caught by surprise when the attack began on February 7, 1915. With most of his staff nearly 70 miles in the rear at Grodno, Sivers threw up a hasty and stubborn defense focused around infantrymen of the III Siberian Corps. Fighting with limited means because most of their ammunition and supplies were snowbound at railroad depots, the Russians were forced on February 10 to fall back when the German XXI Army Corps cut the rail line to the Russian fortress at Kovno and the XXIX Reserve Corps captured 10,000 Russian soldiers near Wirballen. On February 14, the Germans entered Lyck and seized that vital rail junction.

On February 21, advanced elements of the two German armies met at Lipsk, south of the Augustów Forest, closing the ring on the

remnants of the Russian Tenth Army. Fighting primarily with fixed bayonets on empty rifles, the men of Sivers's III Siberian Corps, accompanied by the badly mauled XXVI Corps, forced their way out of the ring the next day. While total German casualties were relatively low at 16,200, the Russians lost 100,000 killed and another 110,000 captured, along with 300 guns. Further German progress eastward ended when Russian General Pavel Pleve's Twelfth Army attacked the German right flank on February 22.

Although a tactical success, the German victory proved to be of little strategic importance. The Austro-Hungarian Army's effort in the south had been less than effective, and the Russians, having great recuperative ability, were not driven from the war. However, the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes caused the Russian public to further doubt a positive outcome to the conflict.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); Pleve (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Mazepa, Ivan Stepanovich (ca. 1640–1709)

Hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine Cossacks, 1687–1708.

Ivan Mazepa was the son of a Cossack officer, and claimed a noble Ruthenian

heritage as well. Likely born in late 1639 or early 1640, Ivan attended the Kiev Academy and then a Jesuit college in Warsaw. During the late 1650s, Mazepa traveled across Europe, returning to Poland in 1659 to enter the service of the Polish king. He returned to Ukraine in 1663, when his father took ill.

From 1669 to 1673, Mazepa served as a squadron commander in the Cossack Hetman Guard, and also carried out diplomatic missions on behalf of the Cossack hetman. He soon became involved in the rivalry between Cossack factions, who had support from Russia, Poland-Lithuania, or the Ottoman Empire. He served in the Chyhyryn Campaigns of 1677–1678 against Yuri Khmelnytsky, and by 1682, Mazepa had risen to be a Cossack general. In 1687, Mazepa was elected hetman of Left-Bank (Russian) Ukraine. He quickly made a name for himself as a patron of the arts, commissioning churches, schools, and publishing houses.

In 1702, with the permission of Czar Peter I, Mazepa intervened in a rising in Right-Bank (Polish) Ukraine, hoping to unite the two Cossack regions. As Russia suffered reverses in the Great Northern War, however, Peter began to see a strong Cossack state in his south as a threat. He decided to centralize his military, and drew Cossack forces to fight in the north—which Mazepa interpreted as a violation of the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslavl that had granted Left-Bank Cossacks autonomy. Further, when the Poles attacked Ukraine in support of the Swedish attacks in the north, Peter refused to send military forces south. Mazepa therefore allied himself with the Swedes and Poles in October 1708.

This course was not popular among the Cossacks, who soon thereafter elected a new hetman. Mazepa's force of only 3,000 thus was unable to resist when the Russian army entered the hetmanate and sacked his capital at Baturyn. His force did play a key role in

the Battle of Poltava, but Peter's reformed army carried the day, and Mazepa fled to the fortress of Bendery in the Ottoman Empire, where he died in October 1709.

Mazepa remained a figure of contempt through both the Imperial and the Soviet periods of Russian history, reviled as a traitor and a "bourgeois nationalist." The Russian Orthodox Church excommunicated him. Since Ukraine gained independence in 1991, however, Mazepa has been rehabilitated as a national hero.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657); Peter I ("the Great"; 1672–1725); Pe-riaslavl, Treaty of (1654); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)

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Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Danilovich (1673–1729)

Generalissimo of the Russian Army under Czar Peter I.

Aleksander Danilovich Menshikov was born in Moscow on November 16, 1673. His family background is unclear, but he certainly did not come from the upper reaches of the Muscovite society; legend has it he was spotted by Franz Lefort while working as a food vendor and taken into military service because of his wit. That same quality soon made him a favorite of Peter I, then co-regent with his sister Sophia.

Menshikov participated in the Azov Campaigns of 1695–1696, and accompanied Peter during his first European tour the following year. He commanded a battalion during the Great Northern War, serving under Boris Sheremetev, and distinguished himself at the Battle of Poltava.

Promoted to field marshal, Menshikov commanded Russian forces during the Courland and Pomeranian campaigns of 1709–1714; he then became governor general of Ingria and Peter I's most trusted aide in carrying out his program of reform and Westernization. Menshikov was also famously corrupt, however, which earned him the czar's wrath and several warnings. Menshikov was never seriously punished, however, and during the reign of Peter's wife and successor, Catherine I (r. 1725–1727), he served as the de facto ruler of Russia.

When Catherine died though, other nobles conspired to see that his power was curtailed. In September 1727, Menshikov was deprived of his offices and banished to Siberia, where he died on November 23, 1729.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Lefort, Franz (1656–1699); Peter I ("the Great"; 1672–1725); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709); Sheremetev, Boris Petrovich (1652–1719)

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Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Sergeevich (1787–1869)

Born on August 26, 1787, Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov was the great-grandson of

Aleksandr Danilovich Menshikov and was also related to the powerful Golitsyn family. He began his career as an attaché in the Russian embassy in Vienna in 1809. Menshikov soon joined the retinue of Czar Alexander I in the campaigns against Napoleon, and in 1817, he was appointed quartermaster general for the Russian General Staff.

Menshikov retired from army service in 1824, but Czar Nicholas I appointed him to head naval headquarters in 1826, and Menshikov commanded Russian forces at the Siege of Varna during the 1828–1829 Russo-Turkish War. From 1831, Menshikov served as governor general of Finland, where his meddling retarded the training of the Russian Baltic Fleet, in particular, and the development of the Russian navy as a whole.

Menshikov was on a special mission to the Ottoman Empire when war broke out in 1853, but on his return to Russia, he took command of the Russian land and sea forces. His inept performance in this role in the battles of Alma and Inkerman led to his removal in February 1855. Menshikov then served as governor general of Kronstadt until April 1856, when he again retired. He died in St. Petersburg on May 1, 1869.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Alma River, Battle of the (September 20, 1854); Crimean War (1853–1856); Inkerman, Battle of (November 5, 1854); Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Danilovich (1673–1729); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Russo-Turkish War, (1828–1829)

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Meretskov, Kirill Afanasievich (1897–1968)

Marshal of the Soviet Union who commanded the First Far Eastern Front in 1944. Born in Nazaryevo, near Moscow, on June 7, 1897, Kirill Meretskov began as a factory worker but joined the Bolshevik (Communist) Party in 1917, and entered the Red Guard. Wounded twice during the Russian Civil War, he decided to make the army a career and was a member of the first class of Red Army officers produced by the newly established General Staff Academy (later the Frunze Military Academy). His studies were interrupted by fighting during both the Russian Civil War and the Russo-Polish War of 1920.

Meretskov rose rapidly through the ranks thereafter, mostly in staff positions. By 1922, he was a brigadier general and chief of staff of a cavalry corps in the Belorussian Military District. During the next decade, he held a variety of posts in the Chief Personnel Directorate and the North Caucasus and Moscow Military Districts. Meretskov was selected for secret training in Germany in 1931. After a tour in the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (1935–1936), he went abroad, first as an observer to Czechoslovakian military maneuvers and then as a military adviser to the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. He returned to the Soviet Union during Josef Stalin's purges of the army (1937–1938) and was assigned as deputy commander of the General Staff.

In 1938, Meretskov headed the Leningrad Military District. When Stalin decided on war with Finland, Meretskov was given only three days to prepare an attack by four

armies. The attack was a disaster, and he lost his command. He nonetheless participated in the successful phase of the Finnish war (Continuation War) and was promoted to general of the army in June 1940.

Meretskov took over as chief of the General Staff in August 1940, but his tenure was short-lived after his performance, again with little preparation time, in a briefing of a bilateral strategic war game against the Germans, in which General Georgy Zhukov commanded the “German” side. Zhukov succeeded Meretskov as chief of staff in January 1941.

Meretskov was subsequently arrested on false charges but was released in September 1941 and assigned as the *Stavka* (Soviet high command) representative in Leningrad. He then commanded the Volkhov Front (army group) between the Leningrad and Northwest Fronts until April 1942, when he was transferred to the Western Front as Zhukov’s deputy commander. Stalin, recognizing his error in judgment, restored Meretskov to command of the Volkhov Front, which helped break the siege of Leningrad in early 1944.

Meretskov assumed command of the Karelian Front in February 1944 and forced Finland from the war that October. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union that same month, he received command of the First Far Eastern Front in Manchuria, which carried out a supporting attack in the most heavily fortified Japanese-held area (opposite Soviet *Primore*) and helped crush the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in a nine-day campaign in August.

Meretskov then was given assignments by Stalin to keep him out of the limelight, for the Soviet dictator feared his more popular generals might unseat him. After Stalin’s death, Meretskov served as an assistant minister of defense from 1955 until his retirement in 1964. He died in Moscow on December 30, 1968.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Black Reichswehr; Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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MGB (Ministry for State Security; *Ministerstvo Gosdarstvennoye Bezopasnosti*; 1946–1953)

The MGB operated as the primary security agency of the Soviet Union in the immediate post–World War II years, succeeding the Peoples’ Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrikh Del’*; NKVD; 1934–1943) and the Committee for State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoye Bezopasnosti*; KGB; 1943–1946).

Created in March 1946, the MGB inherited the NKVD’s internal political policing and foreign intelligence-gathering directorates. These continuing reorganizations and

name changes in the Soviet Union's security and intelligence community reflected its complex relationships with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the internal affairs commissariat, and the senior members of the government—particularly Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and the overall chief of security, Lavrenty Beria. Shortly after Stalin's death in March 1953, its functions were incorporated into the KGB under the Council of Ministers.

Many analysts believe that the continuing reorganizations of the security apparatus reflected efforts by Beria's rivals to undermine his power. If so, their efforts were limited. The MGB's head from 1946 to 1953, Victor Abakumov, was a Beria protégé and long-time political ally.

Efforts to undermine MGB's control over foreign intelligence were initially more successful. In July 1947, at Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's suggestion, the foreign intelligence directorate of the MGB and the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) were combined to form a new agency—the Committee of Information (*Komitet Informatsy; KI*). Molotov argued that combining intelligence organizations would improve the coordination and control of intelligence operations. From the perspective of the ever-suspicious Stalin and Beria's other rivals, this reorganization undermined Beria's power. KI faltered in 1948 when Molotov fell from favor. Abakumov, with Beria's support, fought successfully to return the foreign intelligence directorate to MGB's control.

The MGB also carried out political and social repression in the Soviet Union. Although the MGB terror of the late 1940s and early 1950s was not as extensive as the purges of the 1930s, it was still considerable. Estimates of arrests, deportations to the Gulag, and executions vary widely, but

anywhere from 750,000 to 1 million victims were involved. The intensification of the Cold War, the break with Yugoslavia, and other international developments fed the endemic paranoia that characterized Stalinist Russia. In this atmosphere, MGB operatives zealously sought out phantom “Zionist,” “Titoist,” and CIA plotters.

In January 1953, Stalin nevertheless accused the MGB of “lack of vigilance” for its failure to expose a (supposed) conspiracy of doctors in the pay of Israeli and American intelligence to murder top Soviet officials. During the last months of Stalin's life, the MGB struggled to identify the perpetrators of what came to be known as the “Doctors Plot.”

Stalin's death in March 1953 abruptly ended the threat. Shortly afterward, the MGB's directorates were combined into an enlarged Ministry of Internal Affairs with Beria as its director. Beria, however, did not survive the power struggle. In June 1953, he was arrested in a coup instigated by Nikita Khrushchev, and executed later that year for “criminal antiparty and antistate activities.”

Stalin's successors, anxious to bring the Soviet security apparatus under tighter party and government control, transferred all directorates to control of the new KGB, which came under the Council of Ministers and the Communist Party Central Committee. There it remained until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); NKVD; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Mi-G (Mikoyan-Gurevich) Aircraft

OKB-MiG is one of the world's premier aircraft design firms. OKB is Russian for *Opytno-Konstruktorskoe Biuro*, or "Experimental Design Bureau." MiGs have developed a reputation for being fast, agile, and extraordinarily capable. In the Soviet aircraft design system, the MiG bureau is solely responsible for fighters, fighter-bombers, and

interceptors, as well as reconnaissance aircraft. MiG is an acronym for the two founders of the aircraft design firm, Artem Ivanovich Mikoian and Mikhail Iosifovich Gurevich. Both men served to improve the Soviet Air Force both before and during World War II. Their friendship and partnership began in 1938, when both worked for the Polikarpov aircraft design firm. Mikoyan and Gurevich also complemented each other with their skillsets; Mikoyan was good at manufacturing and project designs, and Gurevich used his technical and math skills to design innovative aircraft. Bureaus such as MiG began to bolster a flagging Soviet aircraft industry and end reliance on foreign manufacturing for engines, parts, and aircraft.

In October 1939, both men were assigned to the experimental research unit OKO-1, separate from the Polikarpov OKB. The MiG-1 was approved by the Soviet government in September 1940 and production



A Soviet-made MiG-29 fighter, part of a former East German fighter squadron. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

ran until December 1940. The MiG design team continued to operate throughout World War II, designing and improving the various MiG aircraft. The Soviet government, however, increasingly chose more established designs over MiG submissions, like the Yak-9 or the Il-2.

MiG success came about during the Jet Age. Mikoyan and Gurevich experimented with proposed jet aerodynamics in the late 1930s, and this enabled them to lead the Soviet Union in jet research after World War II. These efforts led to the completion and adoption of the MiG-9 in October 1946. Further research and refinement led to the development of the MiG-15, one of the most famous MiG aircraft. The MiG-15 incorporated the hallmarks of the MiG aircraft design of optimum wing load, high thrust-to-wing ratio, easy-to-service armament and avionics, advanced structural technology, sturdy landing gear, and reliable engines. Simplicity, durability, and ease of maintenance are integral features of all MiG aircraft. The MiG-15 met the Soviet Air Force requirements of being able to be operated from rough airstrips, high maneuverability in air combat, flown inverted, and capable of being handled by average pilots. All these criteria proved to be central to MiGs throughout the Soviet era. The MiG-15 became operational in the winter of 1949–1950 and saw its first combat tests during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953.

The MiG-17 came along in 1951 as an effort to gain more speed from the same engine as the MiG-15. The improved aerodynamics allowed the aircraft to achieve a higher rate of speed, have more maneuverability, and climb at a higher rate than the MiG-15. Improved engines, when mated with the MiG-17, allowed for the growth of aircraft performance. The MiG-17 was used by almost 40 countries and proved itself in

combat during the Suez Crisis of 1956, and during the Vietnam War.

The Cold War greatly influenced the Soviet aircraft industry as the MiG and Western aircraft competed to see who could achieve air superiority. The Vietnam War and Arab-Israeli conflicts showcased the pros and cons of Soviet and Western aircraft, as tested in real combat conditions. The immediate successor to the MiG-17, the MiG-19, was approved in February 1954, and the Soviet Air Force began to deploy the aircraft in March 1955. Though at least the equal of Western fighters, the MiG-19 was only an intermediate aircraft until MiG could unveil one of its most iconic aircraft of the Cold War era.

The most famous product of the MiG design bureau is the MiG-21. Over 30 different versions of the MiG-21 flew for around 49 countries. The MiG-21 was produced from 1959 to 1987 in at least 15 primary versions. The aircraft was also built under license in Czechoslovakia, China, and India. The success of the MiG-21 can be found in the improvement of the thrust-to-weight ratio for better performance, a reinforcement of the weapons systems, and the growth of the aircraft's safety of flight and operational availability. The swept wing design of the MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 led to the improved delta wing design of the MiG-21. This allowed the aircraft to achieve the notable performance feats listed earlier. The MiG-21 was the first production MiG to be armed with air-to-air missiles, starting with the MiG-21F-13 model. This model was also the first to be exported and built outside of the USSR. Models for export were never fitted with the latest Soviet technology. The same applied to those models built under license.

The next innovative fighter was the MiG-23. This plane served as a fighter-bomber and was also a variable-geometry or swing-wing

aircraft. The swing-wing design allowed for better airflow characteristics and flight data, which meant that the MiG-23 functioned as one of the highest performing frontline fighters of the 1970s. An upgraded version of the MiG-23, the MiG-27, had a stronger power plant and an improved navigation/attack system. The MiG-27 remained a fighter-bomber aircraft but with a greater emphasis on the bombing and deep tactical support role.

Another innovative aircraft from the MiG design team in the 1970s was the MiG-25. This aircraft was the Soviet's answer to the American YF-12A interceptor and the SR-11A reconnaissance aircraft. The MiG team used steel alloys, advanced aerodynamic designs, and advanced construction techniques in the building of the MiG-25. The project was approved in the 1960s and a prototype flew as early as 1964, but the MiG-25 was not state-approved until 1970. The recon/bomber carried no cannon or missiles for self-defense. The aircraft relied on speed and altitude to elude any attackers. Other versions of the MiG-25, such as the MiG-25BM/02M, served as antiradar platforms. These versions were ordered in 1972 and manufactured from 1982 to 1985. These MiGs carry powerful electronic countermeasure equipment and Kh-58 antiradiation missiles.

The next aircraft, the MiG-31, was designed to counter the threat of the B-52 bomber carrying long-range cruise missiles. This aircraft was designed to be capable of destroying multiple invaders at high or low altitudes, in the forward or rear sectors. The MiG-31 also provided look-down/shoot-down capability whatever the weather conditions, even if the invader tried to maneuver and used active countermeasures. The MiG-31 flew with a two-man crew, pilot and flight engineer, similar to the F-14 Tomcat configuration of pilot and radio intercept officer. The MiG-31 first flew in 1975 but did

not enter production until 1979. The first operational squadrons appeared in 1982. The current version is the MiG-31M, with heavy modifications to the 1970s era technology.

The MiG-29 was developed to maintain the MiG standard of having a highly maneuverable frontline fighter like the MiG-15 and MiG-21. The MiG-29 was the Soviet's answer to the F-15, F-16, and F-18. The MiG-29 is an all-purpose fighter, an air superiority fighter as well as an aircraft that can destroy enemy ground targets. The MiG-29 first flew in October 1977 and entered mass production in 1982, even though not officially state-sanctioned until 1984. The MiG-29 was exported to 11 countries, including East Germany, and these planes are now part of the unified German Air Force. The first production MiG-29s were equipped with conventional hydraulic flight controls. The fly-by-wire controls of most modern aircraft are included in the MiG-29M, the second-generation version of the aircraft. The latest version is almost a completely new aircraft, being totally redesigned from the ground up. The MiG-29KVP is the carrier version of the MiG-29M and the first MiG to be used in naval aviation. Further advances of the MiG-29M are incorporated into the MiG-35, the latest fourth-generation fighter developed by the MiG design bureau. The MiG-35 is still undergoing testing.

MiG and Western aircraft faced off in various conflicts throughout the 20th century. The most notable are the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the various Arab-Israeli conflicts. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) operated various Western aircraft over its operational life and flew against various Soviet- and Communist-bloc aircraft, mostly MiGs. The IAF achieved an impressive 44:1 kill ratio in all conflicts up to 1982 in air-to-air combat. U.S. forces in Korea and Vietnam also fought against primarily MiG aircraft. The first

dogfight of the Jet Age occurred during the Korean War, with both the U.S. and Soviet sources claiming the first kill. However, the U.S. Air Force and Navy managed at least a 4:1 kill ratio and possibly as high as a 10:1 ratio. This number dropped during Vietnam, as the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy achieved a 3:1 ratio. These numbers fluctuate depending on which sources are cited.

The Soviet and Western aircraft were comparable, however, and the major differences were pilot skill and training. The Arab pilots were not as skilled as the Israeli pilots, and this explains the high combat ratio achieved during the Arab-Israeli conflicts. The United States faced a combination of Soviet, Chinese, and Korean pilots during the Korean conflict but still achieved a high ratio versus many highly skilled pilots. The United States fought Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese pilots during the Vietnam War with the bulk being the North Vietnamese after 1965. The low kill ratio stems from many reasons, from poor tactics to overreliance on missiles, to the growing skill of the North Vietnamese pilots. The constant in all of these conflicts is the rugged construction of the various MiG aircraft, which were very fast and agile, as well as able to take damage and still function. Pilot skill and training often proved to be the deciding factor, with Western pilots usually coming out on top. Soviet and American pilots did face each other over “MiG Alley” in North Korea and over the skies of North Vietnam, in a test of the best of Soviet and American technology and training. Neither side could gain the upper hand, as the advantages and disadvantages of the respective aircraft cancelled each other out. The final result fell on the shoulders of the individual pilots as to who won and who lost in these contested skies.

Artem Mikoian became the general designer and chief bureau engineer in 1956, and

remained the head of the MiG design bureau until his stroke in May 1969. His deputy, Rostislav Apollosovich Beliakov, took over the day-to-day operations of the MiG bureau and served as the unofficial chief engineer. Mikoian died from heart surgery complications on December 9, 1970. Belyakov had been the unofficial chief bureau engineer since 1969 and assumed this role officially in early 1971. Beliakov appointed Mikhail Waldenberg as his deputy and both men confirmed that the name MiG would forever be the name of the design bureau. Mikhail Gurevich retired from the MiG bureau in 1964 after serving as the chief constructor since 1956. He died on November 12, 1976.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, MiG has remained the centerpiece of state-owned Moscow Aircraft Production Association-Military-Industrial Complex (MAPO-VPK). This combined the Aviation Research and Production Complex with the Russian aircraft manufacturing enterprise, essentially consolidating the separate design bureaus for economic reasons. In May 1995, MAPO-MiG was established by government decree as a state enterprise incorporating 12 companies of the aviation industry and a commercial bank. The bureau relied on domestic and export sales to make a profit and get the company solvent. OKB-MiG (MAPO-MiG) is now the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG or RAC MiG, and is a Russian joint-stock company. In 2006, the Russian government merged 100 percent of Mikoyan shares with Ilyushin, Irkut, Sukhoi, Tupolev, and Yakovlev as a new company named United Aircraft Corporation. Specifically, Mikoyan and Sukhoi were placed within the same operating unit. This was part of President Vladimir Putin’s Industry Consolidation Program.

The government of Russia has granted to RAC MiG the full-fledged licenses for

design, production, and technical support of civil and military aeronautical engineering. RAC MiG is an official prime contractor of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. MiG-brand aircraft are the bases for fighter aviation of the Armed Forces of Russia. The government of Russia performs the target financing of priority areas of the Corporation activities from the budget. The government of Russia delegated the power to RAC MiG for carrying out the independent foreign trade activities with respect to deliveries of spares, aggregates, units, devices, vendor items, special training and support equipment, and technical publications for the previously supplied military products; conducting of activities on inspection, standardization, prolongation of operating life, maintenance, repair (including upgrading that does not require the research and development work), utilization, and other works ensuring integrated maintenance of the previously supplied military products; and training of the foreign specialists.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Air Forces, Russia (to 1917, and since 1991); Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Korean War (1950–1954); Tu-4 (Tupelov) Strategic Bomber; Tupolev, Andrei Nikolaevich (1888–1972); Vietnam War(s), Soviet Union and (1945–1975); Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973)

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Mikhail I (Romanov). *See* Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1632)

Mikhail Aleksandrovich, Grand Duke (1878–1918)

Born at the Anichkov Palace, St. Petersburg, on December 8, 1878, Mikhail (Michael) Romanov was the third son of Czar Alexander III of Russia and Princess Dagmar (Marie Fyodorovna) of Denmark. After the death of his elder brother Georgy in 1899, Mikhail was heir to the throne and, following the birth of Nicholas II's son Aleksei in 1904, a potential regent. Mikhail served in the Horse Guards and, after 1902, as squadron commander of his mother's elite Chernigov Hussars (Blue Cuirassiers). After several unsuitable romantic entanglements, Mikhail eloped with twice-divorced Nathalia Wulfert, by whom he had a son, George, in 1910. Their October 1912 marriage by a Serbian Orthodox priest in Vienna enraged the imperial family, and Mikhail was banished and all his property was put into trusteeship.

Mikhail lived in exile in rural England and Paris from 1912 until the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, when he was recalled and given command as a major general of a new division, the Caucasian Native Cavalry, composed of volunteer Muslim Caucasian horsemen, that quickly won the sobriquet the "Savage Division" for its fighting on the Galician Front in November 1914 and in the Carpathian Mountains during January–March 1915. In February 1916, Mikhail was given command of II Corps in the Seventh Army, which took part in the June 1–September 4, 1916 Brusilov Offensive.

Despite Mikhail's popularity and his military experience, Czar Nicholas II and

Alexandra refused to consider naming him as regent during the February 1917 crisis, a move that might have stabilized the throne. On Nicholas II's abdication on March 2, 1917, Mikhail, then technically the czar, issued a manifesto refusing the crown unless it was offered by a future Constituent Assembly and pledging his support to the Provisional Government. Mikhail was discharged from the army on April 5, 1917. He then lived as a private citizen, although he fell under intense suspicion because of the Savage Division's participation in the Kornilov Plot to overthrow the government.

In November 1917, as the Bolsheviks seized power, Mikhail helped smuggle Alexander Kerensky out of the country under a Danish passport obtained from his royal relatives. The Cheka (Bolshevik secret police) arrested Mikhail on March 7, 1918, and exiled him to Perm, from which he was kidnapped on orders of the Ural Soviet and murdered in the woods outside the city on June 12. His wife and family had him declared legally dead by a London court in 1924. There was no official Russian confirmation of his death until 1989.

Margaret Sankey

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); February (March) Revolution (1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917)

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Military Colonies. *See* Arakcheev, Alexis (1769–1834)

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Military Specialists. *See* Commissars, Military (1917–1991)

Miliukov, Pavel Nikolaevich (1859–1943)

Russian statesman. Born on January 27, 1859, in Moscow, Pavel Miliukov was a historian by training. He taught at the University of Moscow and wrote a number of important works on Russian history, including *Studies in the History of Russian Culture*. Miliukov's political views, which were liberal democratic, led to his dismissal from the university and exile. He spent most of the next decade abroad.

Miliukov was lecturing at the University of Chicago when the Russian Revolution of 1905 occurred. Believing that the autocratic czarist regime was about to give way to democracy, he returned to Russia. Miliukov was promptly jailed for one month, but upon his release, he played a major role in founding the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) Party. He was elected to the Third and Fourth Dumas, in which he was instrumental in forging a coalition of center-left political parties known as the Progressive Bloc.

Miliukov supported Russia's entry into the Great War despite his opposition to the government. As the war dragged on and Russian

military disasters multiplied, his support turned to increasingly vehement criticism of the government's incompetence and corruption. Miliukov and other members of the Progressive Bloc called for the establishment of a government of public confidence to take control of the war effort from inept and corrupt czarist bureaucrats such as Ivan Goremykin and Boris Stürmer. Those calls, however, were rejected by reactionary elements at court around the fanatically autocratic Czarina Alexandra.

On November 1, 1916, Miliukov voiced his mounting frustration in a pivotal speech before the Duma. This speech, in which Miliukov listed the regime's many failings and inquired rhetorically whether those shortcomings were the result of treason or stupidity, electrified the opposition and signaled the beginning of the end of the czarist regime.

Following the March 1917 revolution, Miliukov became the foreign minister of the Provisional Government. Finding himself politically to the right in the new government, Miliukov publicly reiterated Russia's continuing commitment to the war and pursuit of czarist war aims, including the annexation of the Dardanelles. Such pronouncements not only put him at odds with the new government, which had proclaimed a policy of "peace without indemnities," but they also aroused the wrath of the increasingly powerful Petrograd Soviet, which was suspicious of Miliukov's moderate politics. Nor were they popular with the war-weary public, and in the wake of demonstrations in Petrograd, Miliukov resigned on May 2, 1917.

Following the November 1917 revolution, Miliukov made his way to southern Russia and assisted in the formation of the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army. After the collapse of the White (anti-Bolshevik) effort in the Russian Civil War (1917–1923),

Miliukov returned to exile. He then became a journalist and writer in France until his death in Paris on March 31, 1943.

John M. Jennings

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Goremykin, Ivan Logginovich (1839–1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Stürmer, Boris Vladimirovich (1848–1917)

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Miliutin, Dmitry (1816–1912)

Dmitry Alekseevich Miliutin was one of Russia's most important military figures between 1861 and 1881, a period in Russian history known as the Great Reforms. During that time, he served as minister of war and enacted a series of changes to military service in Russia. Those reforms eventually had a major impact on Russian society in general.

Miliutin, the youngest of six children, was born on June 28, 1816, in Moscow, Russia, to a noble family. Although the family was not wealthy, Miliutin's mother provided him with a good education by tutoring him at home before enrolling him in the special section for nobles at Moscow University.

After he graduated in 1832, Miliutin entered military service in the First Guards Artillery Brigade. Three years later, he entered the Imperial Military Academy and graduated from there in 1836. He worked for the next three years as a staff member of the Guards Corps in St. Petersburg.

Miliutin read a wide range of literature to attain an excellent education during the early years of his military duties, and he also attempted to improve military education by publishing more than 150 articles for encyclopedias, two important military journals, and the prestigious conservative periodical *Notes of the Fatherland*.

On December 6, 1838, Miliutin was transferred to active military service in the Caucasus where he reached the rank of staff captain. He was lightly wounded during a skirmish. Hospitalized, Miliutin was shocked at the medical treatment and deplorable physical conditions in which the Russian soldiers lived. In 1840, he traveled for 13 months throughout Europe and became further convinced after his long tour that the Russian military was in need of reform. He fell in love with Natalia M. Ponse, the daughter of a general, in 1843, and the two were soon married. The couple would eventually have six children.

Two years later, after returning to St. Petersburg, Miliutin became an instructor for the War Academy, an assignment that lasted 11 years as he taught geography courses, military statistics, and continued his literary endeavors. Miliutin wrote for many journals and even turned to pioneering work in military history. In 1847, Miliutin was appointed colonel, and in 1854, major general. A year later, he was appointed as a member of the suite of Czar Nicholas I, one of the most prestigious positions in all of Russia.

It was not until after Czar Alexander II came to power later that same year, however,

that Miliutin was given the opportunity to reform the Russian army as a member of the Commission for the Improvement of the Military. In a short article, "Thoughts on the Present Shortcomings in the Russian Military System and the Means to Eliminate Them," Miliutin expressed his ideas. Even though the political and social climate in Russia was not ripe for the kind of military reforms Miliutin envisioned, those early efforts foreshadowed many of the measures that would be enacted in the coming years. He proposed at that time the establishment of a military journal devoted to improving military education.

On August 30, 1860, Miliutin was appointed deputy minister of war, a position he would hold until his appointment as minister of war on November 9, 1861. During the 20 years that he held that position, he undertook a series of important reforms to modernize the army, the most notable of which was the introduction of universal conscription for all males regardless of class. All adult males in Russia were compelled to register for the draft, and conscripts were chosen by lot. Exemptions were provided for hard-luck cases, and those with education were required to serve for shorter periods. Truly a revolutionary change, the democratization of conscription would mark a serious break with tradition and led many in Russia to consider efforts for limited democratization in the rest of society.

That reform was accompanied by such innovations as the organization of a military reserve; the shortening of the average military service from 25 years to 6 years; a close reexamination of military law and punitive measures; and increased education for all levels of the troops, manifested by requirements that even the lowest ranking troops receive at least an elementary education. Miliutin also attempted to professionalize

the officer corps by establishing military academies and deeming that promotions be based on merit rather than social status. Miliutin's far-reaching military reforms mirrored the reform efforts in Alexander's regime as a whole, as various ministers attempted to change Russia's backward image both at home and abroad.

Miliutin retired officially on May 21, 1881, just two months after Alexander was assassinated by a violent faction of radicals. After his retirement, Miliutin spent the majority of his time writing his memoirs. He died on January 25, 1912, outliving his wife of 68 years by three days.

Elizabeth Dubrulle

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1777–1825); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855)

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Minin, Kuzma (Late 1500s–1616)

Born in Balakhna, Russia, Kuzma Minich Zakhariyev-Sukhoruky is known as a national patriot for his efforts in organizing and gathering the funds for a volunteer army in the town of Nizhny Novgorod that went on to defeat the Polish forces in and around Moscow in October 1612. Minin died on May 21, 1616. In 1818, a monument was dedicated to Minin and Prince Pozharsky, who led Minin's army, in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, located in Moscow's Red Square.

During Russia's Times of Troubles, Polish king Sigismund III moved to take Moscow after defeating Czar Vasily IV (Shuisky) in June 1610. A temporary government of seven boyars negotiated to make Sigismund's son, Władysław, czar. A rival candidate, the second False Dmitry, was based in Kaluga, south of Moscow. Russia was in chaos, with large political divisions and no clear means of electing a new czar.

In the midst of this civil war, the Russian Orthodox Church and its patriarch, Germogen, rallied Russians to resist Polish rule. Kuzma Minin, a prominent merchant butcher, helped form a militia with the blessing of the city elders of Nizhny Novgorod in the late summer of 1611.

Minin, like many other Russians, was weary of the social strife. Collecting financial support from his fellow townspeople, Minin convinced a local noble, Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, to lead a militia of peasants, townspeople, and even nobles but not, as yet, Cossacks. In the spring of 1612, the force captured Yaroslavl, 160 miles northeast of Moscow; they liberated the capital by August.

Minin and Pozharsky set up a provisional government and called a *zemsky Sobor* (assembly of the land) to select a new czar. In the original invitation, sent in November 1612, a diverse pool of representatives was called to "restore a sovereign czar and grand prince to the states of Moscow and Vladimir and to all the great states of the Russian czar-dom." In February 1613, largely because of the efforts of Minin and Pozharsky, the assembly selected Mikhail Romanov. This marked the end of the Time of Troubles and the beginning of Russia's most enduring dynasty, the Romanovs.

Adam M. Schultz

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Pozharski, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich (1578–1642);

Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1632); Time of Troubles

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Ministry of Internal Affairs.

See NKVD

Minsk, Battle for (June 27–July 9, 1941)

Large German encirclement operation on the Eastern Front. Under Adolf Hitler’s *Führer Directive 21* for Operation BARBAROSSA, Army Group Center had responsibility for the destruction of Soviet forces in Belorussia. The Germans considered this essential for subsequent drives on Leningrad and Moscow. Thus, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Center was the most powerful of the three German army groups.

Bock commanded three field armies, along with two of the four available panzer groups. To support his ground effort, Bock could rely on the largest German air fleet on the Eastern Front at the time, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s 1,000-aircraft Second *Luftflotte*.

Bock’s forces were actually matched in terms of numbers and matériel by the Soviet Western Front, consisting of four armies commanded by Colonel General Dmitry G. Pavlov. Unfortunately, three of these armies—the Third, Fourth, and Tenth—were positioned in the westward-protruding

Bialystok salient, which turned into a trap. The Soviet Thirteenth Army was more to the east, near Minsk. Pavlov also was handicapped by Defense Commissar Marshal Semen Timoshenko’s Directive No. 3 that required all fronts, regardless of circumstance, to take the offensive. In the event of a German invasion, the Northwestern and Western fronts were to launch coordinated attacks from Kaunas and Grodno, respectively. Despite having two mechanized corps each, the front commanders were unable to mount a coordinated offensive. Still, Pavlov appointed Lieutenant General Ivan Boldin to form a “shock group” and attack south of Grodno, near Brest. Boldin soon found promised support unavailable, however, and encirclement a distinct possibility.

Disgusted with Pavlov, Timoshenko replaced him with Lieutenant General Andrei I. Yeremenko. In the meantime, Timoshenko ordered Pavlov to hold Minsk and the Slutsk Fortified District with the Thirteenth Army and his second-echelon mechanized corps. Pavlov was ordered to withdraw his armies from the Bialystok salient, where they were now threatened by the German Third Panzer Group sweeping around Minsk from the north, while the German Second Panzer Group drove around the city from the southwest.

On the night of June 25–26, Pavlov ordered his four armies to withdraw east, but this plan succeeded no better than his earlier offensive. The Germans had torn a 60-mile gap between the retreating Eleventh Army of the Soviet Northwestern Front, moving to the northeast, and the Third Army of the Western Front, retreating southeast, by attacking along the frontal boundary. Boldin’s force, aiding Major General Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev’s Tenth Army, pleaded for an air drop of fuel and ammunition. By June 26, it had withdrawn into a thick forest

south of Minsk. Pavlov had assigned Fourth Army the task of holding Shchara and defending the Slutsk Fortified District in the southwest, only to discover Slutsk had sent all its weapons to Brest.

The Battle for Minsk was joined by June 26 as Pavlov withdrew with his staff to Mogilev, leaving the weak Thirteenth Army to defend Minsk, even as the inner encirclement progressed as part of the double battle of Bialystok-Minsk. Slutsk fell the next day as the German spearheads raced toward the Berezina River. Pavlov's Third and Tenth armies withdrew toward Minsk, hoping to break the inner encirclement despite having little ammunition, but both were cut off by June 28, along with Thirteenth Army. Pavlov's pride, the VI Mechanized Corps—a unit that began the campaign with more than 1,000 tanks—was shattered and its commander was killed.

On June 29, Yeremenko took command from Pavlov, who was sent to Moscow. Meanwhile, Yeremenko lost the race to the Berezina to the German panzers. The savaged Soviet Western Front was scattered over a 200-mile area, as Minsk had fallen on June 29. By July 9, German mopping-up operations ended. The Germans claimed to have destroyed five Soviet armies and taken nearly 324,000 prisoners, 1,809 guns, and 3,332 tanks.

The Soviets took advantage of the spring rains and managed to break out about 300,000 men. Although Josef Stalin's inept decisions had contributed greatly to the Soviet military failures to that point, Pavlov was made the scapegoat for the Minsk disaster and shot, along with Fourth Army commander General Aleksandr Korobkov and XLI Rifle Corps commander General I. S. Kosobutsky, both of whom had managed to escape the German trap.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Pavlov, Dmitry Grigorievich (1897–1941); Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970); Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich (1892–1970)

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Mogilev, Action at (July 23, 1812)

A battle fought between the Second (Russian) Western Army and Marshal Nicolas Davout's forces in the early phase of Napoleon's advance on Moscow in 1812, Mogilev is also known as the Battle of Saltanovka. As Napoleon's forces invaded Russia, Prince Pyotr Bagration's Second Western Army eluded their enveloping maneuvers and hastily retreated eastward to join General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly's First Western Army. Threatened by the forces under Jérôme Bonaparte from the rear and Marshal Louis Davout's corps from the north, Bagration moved by forced marches toward Mogilev, where he intended to cross the Dnieper River and join Barclay de Tolly.

Davout beat him to the town, however, arriving with some 28,000 men on July 20. The Russians approached Mogilev on the July 21, and their advance guard under Colonel Vasily Sysoev engaged Davout's advance troops near the village of Dashkovka, south of Mogilev. Bagration then decided to attack Davout with only the VII Infantry Corps under General Nikolai Raevsky. If Mogilev

proved to be held only by Davout's advance troops, Raevsky was strong enough to drive them out, move to Orsha, and cover the route to Smolensk. If Davout were there in force though, Raevsky was to fight a delaying action to keep the French on the right bank of the Dnieper, while Bagration crossed the river with the army to the south of Mogilev.

Davout's forces, reduced by fatigue from marching, were still further weakened by the strategic situation. The effective forces at his command to oppose Bagration's army amounted to only 22,000 infantry and some 6,000 cavalry. Taking into account the numerical superiority of the Russians, Davout positioned his troops at Saltanovka. His left was deployed on the marshy bank of the Dnieper and was unassailable. A stream flowing in a difficult ravine, spanned from the village of Saltanovka by a wooden bridge, covered his front. Dense forest surrounded the village, especially on the northern bank of the stream.

Davout reinforced these positions with additional earthworks. His soldiers cut the bridge at Fatova, fortified the buildings on the high road, and established strong batteries there. Davout deployed five battalions of the 108th Line and one battalion of the 85th Line here. Behind them he placed four battalions of the 61st Line in reserve between Fatova and Selets. On the left wing, at Saltanovka, Davout arranged three battalions of the 85th Line and an independent company of *voltigeurs* (light infantry operating as skirmishers). Finally, he deployed the battalions of the 85th and 61st lines and several cavalry units.

Around 7:00 a.m. on July 23, the advance guard (6th and 42nd Jägers) of the Russian VII Corps led the attack on Davout's left wing at Saltanovka. Pushing the French outposts back, it reached the bridge over the Saltanovka stream at 8:00 a.m. Despite the

fierce fire, the Jägers, under the command of Colonel Andrei Glebov, overran the defenders on the bridge and continued their advance. Davout immediately counterattacked with the 85th Line. The Russian advance was halted by heavy artillery fire and musketry, but their infantry then stood stoically for several minutes, allowing themselves to be shot down rather than yield ground. Raevsky then launched almost simultaneous assaults on the French positions at Saltanovka and Fatova.

The 26th Infantry Division under General Ivan Paskevich was ordered to march on a narrow path through a forest to attack the French; this maneuver would serve as a signal for the main forces of VII Corps to attack. Paskevich deployed his division in extended column and attacked the village. In fierce fighting, the Russians overran the 1st Battalion of the 85th Line, forcing its retreat. To support the 85th Line, Davout sent a battalion of the 108th Line with a few guns. Both French battalions took up a position on the heights to the south of Fatova and repulsed the Russian attack.

Paskevich rallied his troops on the edge of the forest and, supported by a 12-gun battery, launched another attack that carried the village. After passing Fatova, however, the advancing Russian battalions were suddenly counterattacked by four battalions of the 108th Line, concealed by Davout in the wheat fields behind the village. The French inflicted heavy casualties on the Russians and forced their retreat.

Despite this setback, Paskevich rallied his troops again and counterattacked. At first the attack was successful and he captured the village once more. Davout, however, moved the 61st Line to strengthen his defenses. The French repulsed the Russian attack and drove them back; on the right flank, two French battalions overwhelmed the

Orlov and Nizhniy-Novgorod regiments and crossed the brook. Paskevich was compelled to move the Poltava Regiment to contain the French advance and prevent the Russian right wing from being turned.

Meanwhile, the main effort of VII Corps was focused on Saltanovka. Raevsky led the Smolensk Infantry Regiment to seize a dam and cover the approach of the main forces. This column was to be supported by the 6th and 42nd Jäger regiments and artillery deployed on the heights on both sides of the road. It was agreed that the attack would be launched simultaneously with Paskevich's advance on Fatova.

Raevsky did not hear the cannon shots that signaled the advance though, and so his attack started too late. Russian units endured devastating artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties. At one point, seeing the confusion in his troops, Raevsky (supposedly; he claimed it never happened) held the hands of his two sons, Aleksandr (16) and Nikolai (10), and, yelling "Hurrah!" led the attack. Notwithstanding this inspiration, the charge was repulsed. Learning from prisoners that Davout had gathered reinforcements, Raevsky ordered a general retreat and withdrew his troops to Dashkovka.

Following the engagement at Mogilev, the Second Western Army completed construction of a bridge at Novy Bikhov and crossed the river toward Smolensk. The Russians acknowledged 2,548 killed and wounded in the battle, and claimed the French lost 4,134 dead and wounded. Although Davout admitted to only 900 casualties, the French losses were close to 1,200. Mogilev is often acknowledged as a French victory, though in reality, Bagration achieved his goal of eluding the French envelopment and breaking through to Smolensk, where the Russian armies united.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856)

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Molodi, Battle of (July 26–August 3, 1572)

The Battle of Molodi was fought between July 26 and August 3, 1572, at the village Molodi in the Moscow region. The battle was the final and deciding event of the Russo-Crimean War (1552–1576) between Muscovy and the Crimean Khanate.

The Russian army was headed by Prince M.I. Vorotinsky (1516?–1573); the Crimean army was led by the Tatar Khan Devlet Girey (1512–1577). The battle was a turning point of the larger Russo-Crimean conflict (1552–1576). Some of the major early sources that mention the battle are the military "deployment books" (*Razriadnye knigi*) dated by the old Russian calendar of the year 7080 (1571/1572) and the chronicles—*Piskarevskii letopisets*, *Moskovskii letopisets*, and *Solovetskii letopisets* of the end of the 17th century.

The Russian army consisted of 25,000–30,000 men, including cavalry (*deti boiarskie* and their servants, up to 20,000), infantry (*streltsy*, around 2,000), Livonian

mercenaries (around 300–400), the Cosacks (up to 4,500), and *datochnie ludi*, the men recruited to a lifelong military service from the populations under the state servitude (3,000–4,000). The Russian forces possessed some 100 small firearms. The army commanders, after Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotinsky, included many princes: Ivan Vasilievich Sheremetev Menshoi, Nikita Romanovich Odoevsky, Fedor Vasilievich Sheremetev, Andrei Petrovich Khovansky, Dmitry Ivanovich Khvorostinin, Ivan Petrovich Shuisky, Vasily Ivanovich Umny Kolichev, Andrei Vasilievich Repnin-Obolensky, and Pyotr Ivanovich Khvorostinin.

The commanders of the Devlet Girey's army included Devlet's sons Muhammad Girey and Adil-Girey, his grandson Saadet Girey, and the two members of the Nogai aristocracy, Murza Divey and Murza Taghribirdi. The army consisted of about 40,000 men, including Crimean Tatars, Nogai, and the forces of princes of the northern Caucasus. The army included about 1,000 men with firearms (possibly a few Janissary units) and had around 20 small cannon.

After a successful raid on Moscow in May 1571, Khan Devlet Girey demanded the surrender of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, which had been captured by the Russians in 1552 and 1556, respectively. Girey also demanded of Moscow the payment of regular tribute. Ivan IV (the Terrible), the Russian czar, refused. In response, Girey decided to undertake another invasion of Moscow. The Russians carefully prepared for the raid, bringing to order frontier fortresses, storing supplies of food and equipment, and developing a plan of action. The troops, reinforced after the defeat in May 1571, were deployed along the left bank of the Oka River with a focus on the locations most accessible for crossing. Reconnaissance units patrolled the steppe.

In mid-June 1572, Girey began his campaign. His army moved along the Muravsky Trail (*Muravskii Schliah*), one of the main routes by which the Tatars historically invaded Rus. The steppe patrols detected the Tatars in early July. The Russian troops were put on alert. On July 25, Girey left the town of Tula; he reached the banks of the Oka near the town of Serpukhov on July 26. An attempt to conduct a crossing by rapid force met Russian opposition. The next day, the Tatar cavalry, led by Murza Divey and Murza Taghribirdi, dislodged the Russian troops from their positions on the banks on both sides of Serpukhov and took control of the left bank of the river. The artillery barrage continued from morning to dawn.

During the night of July 27, Girey secretly left the main camp near Serpukhov with his main army units, crossing the Oka east of the town. The army then rushed north. Prince Vorotinsky was notified promptly; after holding a military council, Vorotinsky decided to follow the Tatars and force them to engage in the vicinity of the village of Molodi, 50 kilometers south of Moscow, where it would be difficult for the khan to deploy cavalry. To drive the khan's army into a disadvantaged position, Vorotinsky secured the troops in trenches and constructed a *guliai-gorod*—a moveable fortification made of wooden shields with openings for the infantry to shoot at the enemy.

The following day was marked by a series of short-term encounters between Tatar and Russian cavalry troops. At dusk, both armies returned to their camps. On the next day, Girey launched an attack, which the Russians repulsed. The Tatars suffered heavy losses. Murza Divey, the best Crimean commander and a chief advisor of the khan, was captured. The armies spent the next two days putting their forces in shape. On August 2,

Girey launched the major assault against the Russian positions.

The attack commenced with several attempts to break the Russian defensive line. As the intensity of the Tatars' offensive decreased, Vorotinsky ordered a counterattack headed by Prince D.I. Khvorostinin's Russian and Livonian cavalry divisions. Vorotinsky flanked with the elite units. The Tatars fled and suffered heavy losses. That night, Girey retreated to the Oka and began a rapid return home. The Russians followed, capturing many men and taking rich trophies, including the two sabers that belonged to the khan and two sets of bow and arrows.

Unfortunately, existing sources do not allow estimating the amount of casualties on either side. One could only project, from the character of the battle, and the consequential actions of the troops, that the Tatars losses were significantly greater than those of the Russians.

The Battle at Molodi was a turning point in the long-term confrontation between Ivan the Terrible and Devlet Girey. The khan had to renounce his claims to tribute, and to the territories of Kazan and Astrakhan. He also had to abandon his plans for future campaigns against Russia. Furthermore, it marked the beginning of a gradual decline of the Crimean Khanate as a military and political power, and the rise of Moscow.

Vitaliy Penskoy

See also: Cossacks; *Gulai-gorod* (*gulyay-gorod*, *gulay-gorod*, or *gulai-gorod*); Ivan IV ("the Terrible"; 1530–1584); Sheremetev, Boris Petrovich (1652–1719); Tatars (Mongols); Vorotinsky, Prince Mikhail Ivanovich (1516?–1573)

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Molotov Cocktail

An improvised small bomb designed to explode on impact. Usually, a bottle is the carrier of inflammable liquid, thus the device is also known as a bottle-, liquid-, gasoline-, or petrol-bomb. It consists of a gasoline-filled bottle with a cloth or rope sticking out of the neck for setting the contents ablaze. It is thrown like a hand grenade after setting the cloth (or rope) on fire and has the effects of a small incendiary bomb. It is mostly used in urban warfare or civil unrest by insurgents against heavily armed opponents, usually police or armed forces. It became a well-known symbol of political defiance and as the common man's antitank explosive with the Prague Spring in 1968.

While various forms of thrown small, incendiary bombs were used for centuries, "Molotov cocktails" were first formally deployed as an antitank weapon by fascist armies during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). In that war, Spanish Nationalist dictator Francisco Franco fought the Spanish Republican (Loyalist) armies in alliance with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Both sent weapons to Franco, while the Loyalists received large shipments of arms and equipment from the USSR. In the Battle of Toledo in September 1936, most Spaniards were unprepared for tank warfare; no antitank missiles existed yet.

When the first Soviet tanks arrived for a Loyalist attack on Madrid, Franco's Nationalist

forces defended against the siege by desperately throwing masses of bottle-bombs from close range against the advancing tanks. Those early tanks had open ports in the armored side panels for quick refueling, and this made them particularly vulnerable to fire attacks. As the Loyalist units were also inexperienced with tank battle and often broke formation, single, separate tanks were easy targets for attacks by Franco's soldiers and their bottle-bombs.

Despite the familiar name, Soviet commissar of foreign affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, had nothing to do with the invention or with the first formal deployment of the "Molotov Cocktail" in Spain. The emergence of the term *Molotov Cocktail* comes from the rather sarcastic response of Finnish forces to a euphemistic speech by Molotov in the winter of 1939. At this early stage of World War II, to disguise Soviet air strikes on Finland, Molotov declared on Radio Moscow that Soviet planes were delivering humanitarian relief packages and not bombs. Hence, the Finnish forces referred to the six-foot cylinders with 100 small magnesium incendiary bombs that the Red Air Force used, as "Molotov's Picnic Baskets."

The Finns replied that they would serve a "cocktail" upon the arrival of Molotov's "breadbaskets." Because they lacked anti-tank weapons, Finnish defense lines battled the Soviet ground invasion with more than 500,000 "cocktails." Many were thrown straight into the unprotected steel grills covering the engine compartments of the tanks. Finnish Molotov Cocktails are reported to have destroyed approximately 350 Soviet tanks and armored vehicles during the Soviet invasion. Thus according to this most favored version, the Finns coined the term *Molotov Cocktail* during the Soviet attack on Finland in the winter of 1939.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); Mannerheim, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil (1867–1951); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939)

Non-aggression pact with Germany. Prior to World War II, Soviet foreign policy had one central goal: avoiding war with Germany, especially a war that Britain and France remained out of in an attempt to have one dictatorship weaken, or even destroy, the other. As war became increasingly likely in the spring and summer of 1939, however, the Soviet Union did not have a clear path to achieve this aim. A rapport with Britain and France appeared to be the most likely option because the capitalist democracies were far less ideologically implacable than National Socialist Germany. Communication about an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty began in April, with drafts of agreements crafted in May. In some ways, this planning was built on the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance from May 1935, which had been created in response to Germany's decision to rearm.

Negotiations continued into June and July 1939 and culminated in August. An Anglo-French delegation arrived in Moscow on August 10, but it was evident to the Soviet government that this delegation was not serious about solidifying relations. The senior British representative, Admiral Reginald Drax, did not have the authority to negotiate a military convention, and while his French counterpart, General Joseph Doumenc, could negotiate military matters, he was not authorized to sign a formal agreement. These two men were also junior in rank to their Soviet hosts, the Soviet defense minister Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, and they did not have a detailed strategy for a potential war against Germany.

Discussions nonetheless began on August 12, but by August 14, it was evident that nothing was getting accomplished. One of the major stumbling blocks was the hostility of other nations to joining a collective security agreement that included the Soviet Union. The Polish government did not want to see Soviet troops in Poland, fearing that once there, they would never leave.

As the possibility of a treaty with Britain and France faded, the Soviet Union began to consider other options, including an alliance with Germany. However, there were many reasons to be leery of Germany. Besides the anticommunist rhetoric endemic to National Socialism, Germany had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1936 and the Pact of Steel with Italy in May 1939. Germany also had abrogated its 1934 nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in April 1939. As Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov put it in a July 1939 telegraph to the Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin, "Until recently the Germans did nothing but curse the USSR, did not want any improvement in political relations with it and refused to participate in any conferences where the USSR was represented."

That these two states could find common ground was not entirely unfeasible, however. Germany and Russia had a long history of trade relations, namely, exchanging German industrial goods for Russian agricultural ones. Even after the German National Socialist and Soviet Communist governments had come to power, the two countries had worked together. Due to the continuing need for industrial and agricultural exchange, the two nations had signed an agreement in December 1938 and had opened negotiations for additional trade arrangements in early 1939. These preexisting agreements set precedents for further relations.

There are discrepancies between German and Soviet records that make it difficult to determine which side was open to a pact first. More recent Russian research suggests that it was Germany. Hitler's advisers had convinced him that Stalin did not want a world revolution, but wished only to establish his country as a great power. In contrast, the Soviet Union might not have been prepared to open negotiations with Germany yet due to the state of the Foreign Ministry. Molotov had replaced Maxim Litvinov only in May 1939, and his office was still suffering from the purges. Plus, the Foreign Ministry was in the midst of negotiations with Britain and France.

Then there was Stalin. He tried to keep his options between the West and Germany open as long as possible, and there is no clear evidence, according to newer research, that he wanted war. Stalin understood that his country had two options by August 1939: continue talks with Britain and France, or open negotiations with Germany. The former option appeared less likely as negotiations with Britain and France had stalled by August 17. Two days later, Molotov gave the German ambassador Friedrich von der Schulenburg a formal statement proposing a nonaggression

pact. Schulenburg was informed later in the day that German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop could come to Moscow in late August. On August 21, Schulenburg gave Molotov a personal message from Hitler for Stalin, requesting that Ribbentrop visit Moscow because of the current international situation. Stalin agreed to the request, permitting Ribbentrop to arrive on August 23. All of these exchanges and decisions were made while the Soviet Union was still negotiating with Britain and France.

Within hours of Ribbentrop's arrival, two meetings were held and the details of an agreement were finalized. Following the second meeting, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, which has commonly become known as both the Molotov-Ribbentrop and the Nazi-Soviet Pact. It was valid for 10 years and would be automatically renewed for five more years unless one side terminated the agreement one year before it was renewed. There were three major terms of the pact: the two countries would not attack one another; neither country would support a third power who attacked the other signatory; and the two countries would consult one another on issues of common interest as well as resolve any differences that arose between them through further negotiations. In addition to this official nonaggression pact, the two nations signed a secret pact that divided Eastern Europe between them. Poland was split, while Finland, Latvia, and Estonia were allocated to a Soviet sphere of influence. Finally, there was an economic agreement, one which predated the other two treaties by several days and built upon prior trade relations.

Germany's motivations for signing these pacts were fairly straightforward: prevent an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance and secure Soviet neutrality in a German-Polish war. Soviet motivations were not as clearly defined,

but three factors most likely influenced the Soviet Union. The first was the lack of results from Anglo-French negotiations; the inability to create concrete plans impelled the Soviet Union to look elsewhere for an alliance partner. The second reason was the preference of Soviet leaders to remain neutral in a war between Germany and the West, although war was by no means inevitable as Britain and France could have once again appeased Germany as they had less than a year prior in Munich. The third factor that probably influenced the Soviet Union was the security it could gain with a German promise to remain out of eastern Poland and the Baltic states. These three reasons demonstrate that neither communist ideology nor antifascist rhetoric, which had been common in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, dissuaded Soviet leaders from allying with their ideological enemy.

On August 24, the text of the pact—that is, the official nonaggression pact—was published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, two major Soviet newspapers. This announcement came as a shock to the West, which thought an accord between the Soviet Union and Germany was impossible due to their ideological differences. Equally dismayed was Germany's anti-Comintern partner Japan, as it had been fighting the Soviet Union throughout the 1930s. It too came to terms with the Soviets in September, however, and would sign its own five-year nonaggression treaty in April 1941. Even the Comintern was at a loss for how to proceed in light of the pact. It had not been given new instructions for how to direct communist policy.

Its initial response was to support the diplomatic solution presented by the pact while simultaneously maintaining an antifascist position. Germany officially remained the primary enemy, according to the Comintern, until September 7, when Stalin dictated a

new line based on the idea that the recently started World War was an interimperialist conflict. Comintern leaders accepted this new position, as did communist movements globally, though many individual communist adherents were disappointed or began to question the movement. The British Communist Party, for instance, went from supporting British and French initiatives to attempting to sabotage the war effort and campaigning for peace with Germany.

The Soviet Union waited more than two weeks to see if Hitler would hold to his part of the bargain in Poland, then began to claim its sphere of influence when the Red Army invaded eastern Poland on September 17, 1939. Shortly thereafter, Molotov and Ribbentrop met and signed a secret Friendship Treaty (September 28) that demarcated the boundaries between their countries and expanded their economic relationship.

The Soviet Union also sought to occupy the other territories it coveted beyond Poland. It signed mutual assistance pacts with Estonia in late September and with Latvia and Lithuania in early October. Less than a year later, in July 1940, the Red Army invaded these states and incorporated them into the Soviet Union the following month. The last territory that the Soviet Union wanted greater influence over was Finland, but the Finnish government was not willing to negotiate the Soviet's request to shift their border to allocate more land to the Soviet Union. As a result, war broke out in November 1939 and lasted until a Soviet victory in March 1940.

Relations with Germany remained cordial for almost two years, and the two countries even expanded their economic relations with treaties on February 11, 1940 and January 10, 1941. The latter treaty was not without some irony, at least from the German perspective, as Hitler had signed the order

authorizing Operation BARBAROSSA—THE invasion of the Soviet Union—almost a month prior. While Germany was planning to break the pact, however, the Soviet Union continued to abide by its terms. In fact, as the German Army crossed into Soviet territory on June 22, 1941, the latest trains with Soviet grain were arriving in Germany; to the very last moment, the Soviet Union upheld the pact, as Stalin had promised Ribbentrop the Soviet Union would on August 23, 1939. Following this invasion, the Soviet Union joined the sole country that remained unconquered by Germany: Britain. This alliance proved profitable, as being on the winning side of the war allowed the Soviet Union to retain all that it had gained from its secret alliance.

In the postwar period, the Soviet government denied the existence of a secret protocol and suggested that such claims were forgeries. Authorities only admitted to the secret pact in 1989, as part of Mikhail Gorbachev's program of glasnost (openness). In June of that year, the Commission of the Congress of the USSR People's Deputies for the Political and Legal Estimation of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact was established. The commission wrote a report that declared the pact was "in conformity with the norms of international law," but it also condemned the secret protocols for depriving the states of eastern Europe of their sovereignty. On the basis of this report, in December 1989, the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact null and void. The Baltic states in particular embraced this report and declaration, as they had always claimed that they had not been legally incorporated into the Soviet Union; invalidating the pact facilitated their subsequent secession.

There has also been condemnation by European bodies. A January 2006 resolution

passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe condemned the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe issued a resolution in July 2009 that equated Stalin's regime with Hitler's. However, European condemnation stands in contrast to the most recent Russian position. In 2007, a presidential commission was created to counter supposed falsifications of history when such falsification was viewed as detrimental to Russia's interests. New books published in Russia were only minimally critical about the pact or Stalin. These new resources have also advanced more nuanced arguments, for example, suggesting that territorial annexation was not unheard of at that time in history. Poland had taken territory from Russia in 1920–1921 as well as seized land from Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the Soviet Union and Britain had jointly occupied Iran in 1941 to prevent Germany from doing so. These conflicting views in the present demonstrate that the issues created by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact have yet to be resolved.

Amy Carney

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Japan, Border Incidents with (1938–1939); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Lake Khasan, Battle of; Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Mongol Invasion of Russia

The Mongol invasion of Russia began in the 13th century under Genghis Khan and continued into the 14th century.

During the time of Genghis Khan, his general Subedai rode westward on a reconnaissance-in-force to scout the steppes of southern Russia. Subedai and Jebe Noyan, another general, roamed over the vast plains west of the Volga, searching for possible invasion routes and testing the mettle of the inhabitants. Their main opponents were the Kipchaks, Turkic-Mongols who had moved to the area from Central Asia some centuries before. The Kipchaks had established themselves as bandits and pillagers throughout the area north of the Black Sea, making themselves enemies of the Russian principalities.

Only after the Kipchaks had been forced to retreat into Russian lands did the Russian princes reluctantly join with them to resist the Mongols, or Tatars, as the Russians called them. In 1223, the combined Russo-Kipchak force was defeated at the Kalka River along the northern shore of the Black Sea, but the Mongols did not follow up on their victory; instead, they joined with Genghis Khan's son Jochi and returned to report to their leader. The Russians hoped that the Mongols would prove to be no more than passing raiders.



Illustration from the 19th century depicting Mongols crossing the Don River (part of present-day Russia) by night. (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

After attacking and destroying the Bulgars at the junction of the Volga and Kama rivers in 1236, the Mongols returned to the trans-Volga steppes. This time, they came not as raiders but as invaders; the entire tribe of Genghis Khan's heir Batu migrated into the area. It is questionable whether any Russian defensive measures could have halted the Mongol onslaught, but it certainly could not be stopped by the divided, squabbling nobles who inhabited the Russian principalities.

Batu's invasion was made easier by the inability of the princes to cooperate. The Mongols crossed the Volga in late 1237 and entered the state of Riazan. They made their way easily across the territory, capturing land and burning cities. By 1239, they had defeated the major noble in the area, Prince Yuri of Vladimir, and seemed to be taking aim at the city of Novgorod. Instead, they turned back onto their invasion path and moved southeast to the territory of the

Kipchaks, whom they again defeated and then drove into Hungary. With a secure flank on the Black Sea, the Mongols drove on to Kiev, capturing the city in December 1240. The Russian princes would not cooperate, even with much of their land under foreign control, so Batu drove his forces into Poland and Hungary. He returned to Russia in 1241, possibly on news of the death of Ogadai, the great khan who succeeded Genghis.

Batu settled into Russia, creating what came to be known as the Khanate of the Golden Horde. He established the city of Sarai as his capital, and for the next 200 years, the Mongols dominated Russia. The princes of Russia became his vassals, and none could rule without Mongol permission. The settling of the Mongols into one place, however, diminished their traditional warlike manner, and they soon began to act more like the Russian nobles, arguing over succession and wealth. The Russian princes, bound

by their oaths to provide taxes for the Mongol overlords, soon got the job of collecting it themselves; they jockeyed for favor in the Mongol court by promising higher tax revenues in return for political appointments. That meant more suffering for the peasants paying the taxes to keep their prince in the good graces of the Mongols. The Russians paid nominal service to the Mongols, occasionally revolting but always finding a Mongol army in response. Between 1236 and 1462, the Mongols made 48 military expeditions into Russian lands, either to put down rebellions or to aid one Russian faction vying with another. In all that time, only once did the Russians score a major victory.

In the mid-13th century, the Golden Horde assisted some of its Mongol brethren in an assault on the Islamic Near East. Genghis's grandson Hulegu led his forces against the Muslims in Mesopotamia in the siege of Baghdad in 1258. He killed most of the city's inhabitants and destroyed its mosques and libraries, bringing to an end Baghdad's reign as the intellectual capital of Islam. His treatment of the caliph, however, offended the Golden Horde's Muslim ruler, Birkai. He withdrew his support, and after Hulegu had allied himself with the crusader armies, Birkai offered an alliance to the Mameluks defending Syria and Egypt. That threat to Hulegu's rear while facing Muslim forces under the brilliant general Baybars I gave Hulegu too many enemies. After the defeat of one of his contingents by the Mameluks, Hulegu retreated across the Euphrates River and ended his quest for Egypt and his ties to his cousin in Sarai.

Ultimately, the Golden Horde lost their fighting edge by easy living and personal greed. They took advantage of their position to profit from the Asian trade with Europe, dealing in silks, carpets, and wine from Persia and China; furs from Russia; jewels from India; and their own horses and leather

goods. After the Golden Horde broke from the control of Mongolia in the latter part of the 14th century, they spent much of their time on court intrigues. Other more vigorous nomads wrought havoc on the sedentary Mongols when Timur's invasion in 1395 destroyed the capital city of Sarai. The Golden Horde split into two factions in the middle 1400s, creating the Kazan Mongols along the upper Volga and the Crimean Mongols around the Black Sea. That split so dissipated the military power of the Mongols that Russians, under the leadership of Moscow, finally defeated the Mongols in 1480 and re-established Russian independence.

Paul K. Davis

See also: Dolgoruky, Yuri; Ivan I ("Kalita"; ca. 1288–1340); Tatars (Mongols)

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Mongols. *See* Tatars

Moonsund Operation (August 1915)

Russian operation to block two attempts by the German Navy to penetrate the Gulf of Riga in August 1915. The Gulf of Riga is a large expanse of water, protected to the north by the Moonsund Archipelago, a group of

small, sparsely populated islands. The gulf had never been included in Russian naval planning, but it gained strategic importance as a result of the German Kurland Offensive, which had begun in April 1915. Russian naval forces now had the opportunity to harass German forces advancing along the coast. The Germans, on their part, hoped to control the Gulf of Riga and thereby cut off a Russian outlet into the central Baltic.

Recognizing the gulf's new-found importance, as soon as the winter ice broke up, the Russians laid a minefield across the Irben Strait, the gulf's western entrance. They also established a small naval force to support the Russian Army ashore. The Russian ships involved in this were based at Kuivast in the Moonsund, the eastern channel along the Estonian coast linking the gulfs of Riga and Finland.

In June 1915, as the German army threatened Riga, the German navy's Baltic Squadron attempted a probing raid into the Gulf of Riga, but Russian defenses at the Irben Strait proved far more extensive than expected, and the operation was called off. In the course of withdrawing, the Germans lost the seaplane carrier *Glyndwr* to a Russian mine.

This abortive raid showed that more extensive preparations were required, and the Germans set about planning a major operation to break into the gulf. Meanwhile, the Russians, alerted to German intentions by intelligence from both agents and radio intercepts, decided to reinforce their forces in the gulf by sending the old battleship *Slava* there. Because the Moonsund Channel was too shallow for it, the *Slava* was brought through the Irben Strait. It arrived on July 31.

Early on August 8, a massive German force arrived off the Irben Straits and began clearing the Russian minefields. The breakthrough force was to be made up of the pre-dreadnoughts of the IV Squadron,

commanded by Vice Admiral Erhard Schmidt. In case the Russian fleet should emerge from the Gulf of Finland, Schmidt was covered by a powerful detachment of ships from the High Seas Fleet under the command of Admiral Franz Hipper, including eight dreadnought battleships of the *Nassau* and *Helgoland* classes and the battle cruisers *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Von der Tann*.

Despite the Germans' overwhelming advantage in force, the Russian minefields proved far denser than the Germans had anticipated, and Schmidt decided to call off the operation, having already lost to mines two minesweepers sunk and the light cruiser *Thetis* and the destroyer *S.144* damaged. His escorts were running low on fuel, moreover, and he was worried about the possibility of Russian and British submarines.

The Germans returned on August 16 with a new operational plan. More time was allotted to the minesweeping phase and the pre-dreadnoughts, with their weak underwater protection, were eliminated from the breakthrough force; instead, the dreadnoughts *Nassau* and *Posen* would lead the thrust into the gulf. The Russian defenders could do little to interfere with the process; despite heeling their ship by 3.5 degrees to increase the elevation of its guns, the *Slava*'s old 12-inch/40-caliber guns were outranged by the 28-centimeter (cm)/45-caliber guns of *Nassau* and *Posen*, although the *Slava* was able to hinder the work of the minesweepers. At dusk, the mine-clearing efforts were suspended; one minesweeper had been lost during the day.

During the night, the new German destroyers *V.99* and *V.100* worked their way around the southern end of the minefield, but they were unsuccessful in their mission of locating and torpedoing the *Slava*. After several skirmishes with Russian destroyers, they were intercepted by the big Russian

destroyer *Novik*, which drove *V.99* into a minefield, where it struck two mines and was wrecked. The *V.100* managed to escape.

Things did not go well for the Russians on August 17, however. The *Slava* was hit by three 28-cm shells, one of which caused a dangerous fire near one of its magazines, forcing it to withdraw. By noon, it was clear to the Russian commander, Captain First Rank P.L. Trukhachev, that he could not stop the Germans; once they broke into the gulf, they would be able to cut off the slower Russian ships from their escape route through the Moonsund Channel. He therefore ordered all his forces to retreat to the Moonsund, even though this seemed a virtual death sentence for the *Slava*, the draft of which was too deep to permit it to escape through the relatively shallow channel.

Even unhindered by the Russian defenders, it was only on the afternoon of the third day of operations, August 18, that the Germans finally cleared paths through the minefields. Schmidt judged that it was too late in the day to risk ships in the gulf itself, so it was only on the morning of August 19 that the battleships *Nassau* and *Posen*, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers, cautiously entered the Gulf of Riga. That same morning, the British submarine *E-1* torpedoed the battlecruiser *Moltke* outside the gulf. Although the ship was never in danger of sinking, it was a sharp reminder of the risks involved in keeping big ships in a confined area for too long.

As the Germans cautiously advanced into the gulf, the Russians prepared a last-ditch defense of the Moonsund. The *Amur* laid a minefield off the southern entrance to the channel, and the *Slava* made ready for what its crew was certain would be its last battle. But as the German battleships approached the Moonsund in the late afternoon, they spotted a floating mine, and Schmidt decided

to retire for the evening to an anchorage near the island of Kihnu.

On their way, they intervened in an action involving the Russian gunboats *Sivuch* and *Koreets*, caught while trying to reach the Moonsund, and the German light cruiser *Augsburg*. The *Sivuch* was soon overwhelmed by fire from the *Posen*, but the *Koreets* managed to escape to Pernov, where it was scuttled by its crew.

On August 20, the Russians began evacuating auxiliary vessels and light forces north through the Moonsund Channel; only a few destroyers were to remain behind to cover *Slava*'s last action. But even as the Russians prepared for action, Admiral Schmidt decided to halt further operations and withdraw from the gulf. During the night, he had lost the destroyer *S.31* to a mine, and that morning, the Germans had sighted the small Russian submarine *Minnoga*. Mines and submarines made the gulf simply too dangerous a place to operate; moreover, General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the German General Staff, had decided to halt the land offensive, which meant that Riga would remain in Russian hands.

Without Riga, the German navy would have no base in the gulf, and would therefore be unable to maintain a blockade of the Moonsund Channel. This rendered the entire naval operation pointless, and by August 21, German forces had abandoned the Gulf of Riga, while the Russian defenders began to move cautiously back into it.

The German failure to take and hold the Gulf of Riga meant that for the next two years, the Russian navy would be able to provide invaluable artillery support for their troops at the northern end of the front line. But the Germans had learned a valuable lesson: only a combined army-navy operation could gain control of the Gulf of Riga. They

made full use of this in September 1917 during Operation ALBION.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: ALBION, Operation (October 8–18, 1917); Kurland (Courland) Offensive (April 26–September 26, 1915)

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Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942)

Key battles in World War II, and the first time the *Wehrmacht* met a significant defeat. The dates given are for the start of Operation

TAIFUN and the end of the Red Army counteroffensive, but some define the battle as beginning much earlier and lasting until April 1942, depending on whether actions such as the Rzhev offensives are included.

The *Wehrmacht* seemed unstoppable in the autumn of 1941, having already occupied most of Europe and advanced hundreds of miles into the Soviet Union. But Moscow was “a bridge too far.” The Germans were hopelessly overextended, woefully under-supplied, and never had sufficient troops to capture everything by brute force; their plans hinged on the collapse of the Soviet regime. German chancellor Adolf Hitler believed that a “shock and awe” approach, along with the seizure of key resources in Ukraine and southern Russia, would topple Stalin’s government. Most senior German military leaders favored a traditional attack on the nation’s capital to annihilate the defending Red Army forces.

In August 1941, Hitler’s main objectives were in the south and north, but in early



Soviet cavalry pass through Red Square, Moscow, on November 7, 1941 (the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution), before heading to the front. (The Dmitri Baltermants Collection/Corbis)

September, he switched the focus to Moscow. The main attacking force would be Army Group Center, with some 75 divisions. This was the largest German force in the war, but it operated on a front of 650 miles, longer than the entire Western Front of World War I.

The Soviets tried to prepare Moscow against attack. All summer, tens of thousands of civilians, especially students, were deployed to dig antitank ditches and defensive positions for the army. They worked on minimal rations and were often attacked by the Luftwaffe; thousands were killed. The Luftwaffe bombed Moscow from July 1941 until April 1942, and the raids intensified as German forces got closer to the city, although most Luftwaffe resources were supporting the army. The Luftwaffe had to operate at tremendous distance, and was forced to use makeshift airfields. Sadly, much of this work was in vain; it was left uncompleted as the *Wehrmacht* simply outflanked the defenses.

The Germans implemented Operation TAIFUN (Typhoon) on October 2. The German directive stated this would be the last decisive battle of the year, to be completed before winter. The majority of German armor and aviation resources were allotted to the drive on Moscow. In October, the Germans had numerical superiority, with close to 2 million troops facing 1.25 million Soviet forces. Army Group Center was reinforced and began offensive operations in the areas of Viaz'ma and Bryansk. Soviet forces fought hard but endured massive losses and huge encirclements.

The first snow fell a few days later; it quickly thawed, ushering in the autumn *rasputitsa*, when rain, freezing, and thawing turned dirt roads into morasses of mud, churned into bogs by the movement of troops and heavy vehicles. The *Wehrmacht*'s advance slowed dramatically, and its use of

fuel increased to almost three times the normal rate, further straining supply lines.

Stalin recalled General Georgy Zhukov from Leningrad, and on October 10, made him commander of the Western Front. The German breakthrough had decimated Soviet defenses, however, and on October 13, Stalin gave orders to evacuate most of the government and party officers from Moscow to Kuibyshev. On October 16–17, rumors and fears reached a peak, resulting in widespread panic in Moscow.

Even then, however, Zhukov was working on plans to stop the German offensive and begin a counteroffensive. While the Germans were bogged down by mud, the Red Army still had the use of railways to bring in reserves from the east. Despite the loss of immense amounts of territory and population in Belorussia and Ukraine, and the huge military casualties suffered in the summer and fall of 1941, some 200 new divisions were formed, activating 5 million reservists. On November 7, Stalin appeared as usual at the annual parade in Red Square marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Some units marched through the square and straight on to the front lines. These recruits were pulled from factories and farms, causing a severe labor shortage. Women, teenagers, and the elderly therefore were mobilized on the labor front. The Battle of Moscow was the first major test of the ability of the Soviet Union to mobilize efficiently. It did so, but at great cost to the home front.

The German offensive resumed in mid-November. Freezing temperatures firmed up the roads, permitting forces to move. But the offensive had taken a toll on the attackers; German forces were down to half strength or less, and up to two-thirds of motorized vehicles were nonoperational. Zhukov threw forces against the enemy in disastrous spoiling attacks to buy time. General Ivan

Panfilov's 316th Rifle Division, fighting on the Volokolamsk Highway with many Kazakh and Kyrgyz soldiers, became the stuff of legend.

Heated disagreements erupted between Zhukov and some of his subordinates, particularly General Konstantin Rokossovsky. Zhukov had ordered most forces to remain in place, fighting to the death if necessary. Rokossovsky, commanding the 16th Army on the road from Smolensk to Moscow, allowed some retreats to avoid encirclement. The last two weeks of November saw the Red Army continually being pushed back, but then the German advances slowed. *Stavka* (Soviet staff headquarters) decided to make a stand. Thirteen divisions had just arrived from Siberia and Far East and, on November 29, two new Soviet armies entered the fray and halted the Germans outside of Tula, southwest of Moscow.

The Soviet 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division conducted an impressive antitank defense along the Minsk-Moscow highway, and the 33rd Army under Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov hit the German flanks. By December 5, the German advance was stopped. The closest the Germans got to Moscow was when a reconnaissance battalion briefly reached a point only five miles distant; a couple of divisions got within 12–20 miles before being pushed back.

The Germans did not see this as a defeat. They believed that the Soviets had exhausted their reserves. But the Soviet Union was far from defeated. Red Army troops recaptured Rostov on November 29, less than 10 days after the Germans had taken it—the first time in the war that German forces had to give up a significant conquest.

The Soviet counteroffensive was an improvised affair; Zhukov sketched his plan by hand on November 30. On December 6, when temperatures fell to -36°F , the Red

Army went on the attack. It was aided by the timely arrival of about 100 Lend-Lease British tanks and took the *Wehrmacht* completely by surprise. German commanders requested permission to withdraw to more defensible positions; Hitler refused, and relieved many of their commands. Stalin might have destroyed Army Group Center at this point, if he had not overextended the Moscow counteroffensive into a misguided general offensive. Like Hitler, Stalin underestimated the enemy's determination.

The number of casualties incurred in the struggle for Moscow is still disputed, with some historians citing estimates of 650,000 Soviet casualties while others calculate 1 million. Most German sources indicate *Wehrmacht* casualties were fewer than 200,000, but Russian sources claim 400,000. Soviet casualties were higher because they included substantial numbers of encircled troops who became prisoners during the defensive phase of the operation.

German sources blame “General Winter” for their failure to take Moscow, but in fact, the *rasputitsa* hampered their operations more. In any event, poor German planning, coupled with overconfidence in their ability to force a Soviet surrender before winter was more to blame for the failure to take Moscow than the weather. The increasingly dynamic Red Army leadership with a core of young generals also deserves credit. With dogged determination, a few scrappy leaders, and good timing, the Red Army stalled the Blitzkrieg (German military tactic meaning “lightning war”) machine and ushered the Germans back 150 miles—the first time in the war the *Wehrmacht* found itself in retreat.

Reina Pennington

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Rokossovsky, Konstantin

Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Moscow Conference (October 19–30, 1943)

First meeting of the “Big Three” Allied foreign ministers, yielding the Four-Power Declaration.

U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt prodded Soviet leader Josef Stalin in 1943 for a meeting of the Allied heads of state, and the Soviet leader reluctantly agreed but suggested their foreign ministers get together in advance. Hoping to enlist the Soviets in the general American plans for postwar cooperation, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull therefore flew to Moscow. Hull understood that Roosevelt intended to resolve the thorniest questions with Stalin at their subsequent meeting. British foreign minister Anthony Eden generally favored broad internationalist ideas but also hoped to forestall Soviet expansionism and protect the interests of the exiled Polish government in London.

Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov chaired the 12-day meeting in the old Spiridonovka Palace, intent on burnishing

the image of Allied cooperation, securing firmer assurances regarding the timing of Operation OVERLORD, and asserting the Soviet Union’s right to play some role in Italy. Hull and Eden affirmed that OVERLORD, the invasion of northern France, would commence in the spring of 1944, although Eden shared British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill’s hints of possible modest delays.

Hull’s crowning achievement was the acceptance of the statement of general principles regarding postwar cooperation and creation of the United Nations. For Hull, it was particularly important that the Soviets and British accept the Chinese among the signatories, acknowledging China’s status as a major power. The Soviets agreed to the declaration but only after revising it so as to retain greater freedom in how they might use military or political forces in Eastern Europe after the war. Hull and Roosevelt thought Moscow’s commitment to the general principles of cooperation outweighed resolving any specific problems at that stage.

Conversely, Eden sought a self-denying pledge from the Soviets regarding future conduct along their western borders, and he suggested a statement affirming nations’ rights to self-determination, similar to the Declaration on Liberated Europe that emerged some 15 months later. The Soviets, however, would go no further than stating their desire to see an independent Poland favorably disposed toward Moscow.

The conferees set up two joint commissions to address postsurrender issues in Italy and the rest of Europe, and proclaimed their intent to punish Nazi war criminals. Having agreed on some general principles and set the stage for later, more substantive discussions, the diplomats concluded their work on October 30. At the closing banquet, Stalin unambiguously volunteered to join the war against Japan after Hitler was defeated. Hull

was tremendously pleased by this and by Soviet support for the United Nations. Roosevelt pronounced the spirit of the conference “amazingly good,” but Eden and others were already worried about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.

Mark F. Wilkinson

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Katyn Forest Massacre (1940); Manchuria Campaign (August 9–September 5, 1945); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Muennich, Count Burkhard Christoph von (1683–1767)

Field marshal and military reformer.

Born May 9, 1683, in the Duchy of Oldenburg, Burkhard Muennich came from a noble military family. He entered French military service in 1700, and subsequently served in Hesse and Saxony, rising to the rank of major general. Trained as an engineer, in 1721 Muennich was invited to Russia, where he presented Czar Peter I with a plan for the fortification of Kronstadt. Muennich was promoted to lieutenant general in 1722, and placed in charge of the construction of the Ladoga Canal. Success there earned a promotion to general in 1726, and an appointment as governor of St. Petersburg in 1727. From 1728 to 1734, Muennich served as governor of Ingria, Karelia, and Finland. He did a great deal to improve the ports of the region, and was promoted to field marshal in 1732.

Czarina Anna appointed him president of the Russian War College that year, with a charge to reform the Russian army. Muennich revised the Table of Ranks, and founded several new, elite formations, including the Guards Cavalry Regiment and the Izmailovsky Regiment. He also established Russia’s first sapper regiments, and the first engineering school for officers. In 1734, Anna sent him to oversee the siege of Danzig, and in 1736–1739, Muennich commanded Russian forces sieging Ottoman fortresses on the Black Sea and in Moldova.

On his return to Moscow, Muennich got involved in political affairs and quickly fell victim to intrigue. Sentenced to death for his part in a rebellion in 1741, Muennich was reprieved at the last minute and banished to Siberia. Czarina Catherine II brought him back to St. Petersburg and appointed him director of the Baltic ports in 1762. Muennich died in Tartu on October 16, 1767.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kronstadt (Kronshtadt); Peter I (“the Great”); 1672–1725); Table of Ranks (1722)

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
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Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905)

Culminating land battle of the Russo-Japanese War, and the largest and longest land battle to that date.

When the Russo-Japanese War began in February 1904, General Aleksei Kuropatkin,



the commander in chief of the Manchurian Army, decided strategic retreat was Russia's best hope. He planned a fighting withdrawal from the Yalu River to Liaoyang in the central Manchurian plain. This would give Russia time to send forces from Europe and overwhelm the Japanese, who would have expended their limited resources in reaching Liaoyang. The retreat was more hurried than

planned, however; the Japanese reached Liaoyang by September 1904, and Kuropatkin believed his forces were not yet adequate. The Russians therefore withdrew north to Mukden, where both sides dug in through the winter.

In early 1905, Kuropatkin felt confident enough to plan an offensive. He had about 300,000 men in front of Mukden on a front

of some 145 kilometers. Kuropatkin hoped to destroy the Japanese forces in the field before their Third Army could march north from Port Arthur, which had surrendered on January 1. The other four Japanese armies totaled only 220,000 men, and the Russians held significant numerical advantages in cavalry and artillery.

Field Marshal Iwao Oyama, commander of the Japanese armies in Manchuria, was determined to attack nonetheless. He felt it was imperative to move before Russian numbers became insurmountable and the Russian Baltic Fleet arrived to challenge Japanese naval supremacy and his means of supply. With Third Army moving rapidly and the Russians sitting motionless, Oyama launched a daring plan. He used the Japanese First Army commanded by General Tametomo Kuroki to pin the Russians on the eastern half of the front, while the newly formed, understrength Fifth Army of General Kageaki Kawamura moved behind it to the northeast and attacked the mountain passes the Russians' extreme left on February 23–24. Commanded by General Nikolai Linievich, the Russians' First Manchurian Army mostly held its ground; however, panicked reports from the scattered Russian forces holding the passes convinced Kuropatkin he was in danger of being flanked. He therefore abandoned his attack in the west and shifted his strategic reserve to the east.

Oyama then unleashed his secret weapon. The Japanese Second and Fourth armies launched pinning attacks against the Russians' Second (General Aleksandr Kaulbars) and Third (General Aleksandr Bilderling) Manchurian armies on the western sectors of the front. Third Army, just arrived, swept wide around the Russians' right flank. Had the Russian cavalry been active, it would have discovered the movement; instead, the

Japanese force simply appeared well to the northwest of the Russian fortifications at the end of February.

Kuropatkin shifted his forces, deflected the initial Japanese stroke, and delivered an effective counterattack on March 1–2. Oyama directed Third Army further north, and threw in almost his entire reserve. Kuropatkin drew his right flank back slightly and, with Japanese attacks in the mountains now halted, recalled his strategic reserve. On March 6, he launched Third Manchurian Army against Oyama's Third Army, but a lack of communication between commanders rendered the Russian strike ineffective. This was a blow to Russian morale, but tactically and strategically, the situation appeared to favor Russia—until Kuropatkin panicked.

Worried that the Japanese might be able to cut his lines of communication, the Russian commander pulled back his center and left on March 7, abandoning positions the Japanese had been unable to take. The Russians' second line proved equally strong, however, and Kaulbars still held Nogi's forces back in the west. With his reserve still unavailable though, and the gap to the north between the wings of the Japanese advance at 13 kilometers and shrinking, Kuropatkin abandoned Mukden on March 9. After issuing a flurry of orders for the retreat, the Russian commander left headquarters for the front, determined to rally his troops and prevent a collapse.

Kuropatkin's actions instead led to disaster. Left without direction in a fluid and dangerous situation, his subordinate commanders proved incapable of coordinating the retreat. Units from both wings collided in a rush to escape before the gap closed. Some 20,000 Russians went missing during the retreat, with most ending up prisoners of the Japanese. Otherwise, casualties had

been nearly even; the Russians lost 20,000 dead and about 50,000 wounded, while the Japanese numbers were 15,000 and 55,000, respectively. Oyama's forces were too exhausted to pursue the Russians as they withdrew 130 kilometers north to Tieling.

In truth, the Japanese lacked the resources to continue, but the Russians lacked the heart. Czar Nicholas II wanted to fight on, but could find no better commander than Linievich, who swapped places with Kuropatkin. Thus, while the Battle of Mukden was not decisive in the traditional sense, it convinced leaders on both sides they could not afford to continue.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904); Nanshan, Battle of (May 1904); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); San-de-pu (Sandepu), Battle of (January 25–29, 1905)

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N

Nagorno-Karabakh

Landlocked region of the former USSR located in the southern Caucasus. It became part of Russia in 1805. The area has a large Armenian minority, but has been a part of Azerbaijan (or the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic) since 1920, leading to continuous conflict.

The civil war in the Nagorno-Karabakh region has its roots in historic animosities between the primarily Muslim Azeri people and the Christian Armenians, and more directly to Josef Stalin's policy of playing ethnic chess in setting up Soviet republics. In July 1923, Stalin set up the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was an enclave of ethnic Armenians cut off from the rest of Armenia, inside the territorial borders of Azerbaijan in an attempt to end fighting between the two groups. It is separated from the rest of Armenia by a small strip of land called the Lachin Corridor. With this arrangement, Stalin could use Nagorno-Karabakh (literally, "mountainous Karabakh") to extract compliance from the larger republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, either by threatening Armenia with the loss of "autonomy" of Nagorno-Karabakh or by employing it as a fifth column against the Azeris.

After Stalin's death, Karabakhians petitioned to either attach Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia or elevate it to a Soviet republic. They were concerned that Azerbaijan was suppressing the Armenian culture by neither recognizing the Armenian language nor allowing in Armenian literature and

media. The Azeri population in the region, moreover, had increased almost fourfold, from just under 6 percent to about 25 percent. Neither petition was granted while the USSR existed.

When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the policies of perestroika and glasnost in 1985, however, oblast leaders used the opening to further their cultural aims. In 1988, they voted in favor of unifying with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic despite concerted efforts of the communists to block this vote. The declaration sparked communal conflict between Armenians and Azeris. Minority groups in and around both capital cities, Baku and Yerevan, became victims of violence. Fighting intensified so greatly in Nagorno-Karabakh that Moscow assumed direct control.

The collapse of the Soviet Union thus paved the way for an all-out war. Azerbaijan claimed territorial sovereignty within the 1923 borders and, freed of Soviet constraints, took up arms to enforce that sovereignty. The Karabakhian-Armenians announced their intent to secede based on self-determination. They were supported by Armenia, whose politicians were riding a large wave of irredentist nationalism.

In May 1991, Azerbaijan began an intense, coercive campaign to squash the Karabakh secessionist movement. Armenia officially joined the conflict in 1992 when its forces crossed the Lachin Corridor to capture the strategic town of Khojaly, from which the Azeris were launching an intense artillery and missile barrage on the Karabakh capital of Stepanakert. Armenia then

helped the Karabakh Armenians establish a security zone in the southwest section of the Azerbaijan state. Russia is also alleged to have supported the Armenians initially, and then backed off when it became apparent the Armenians might prevail. Turkey and Iran supported the Azeris diplomatically, but not materially. The conflict remained a hot war until Azerbaijan recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as a legitimate third party in Russian-sponsored negotiations. A cease-fire was reached on May 12, 1994. No permanent peace settlement has been reached.

Armenian troops still occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and it is a de facto, if not de jure, autonomous state. The conflict caused the death of over 10,000 combatants and the death or displacement of between 500,000–900,000 civilians. Approximately 1 out of 10 Azerbaijanis is a displaced refugee of the war.

Russia currently supports the Armenian/Karabakhian position as Armenia tends to support Russian policies within the Commonwealth of Independent States, at least more so than Azerbaijan. Armenian policy is to keep forces in place until the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region is recognized. Azerbaijan still claims sovereignty over the region. The most recent attempts at resolution were captured in the Madrid Principles that came out of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe conference in Spain, November 2007, and were revised in 2010. These call for Armenian withdrawal and autonomous status within the state of Azerbaijan until a referendum determining the will of the Nagorno-Karabakh people and legal status of the territory can be held.

Brian J. Crothers

See also: Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Nakhimov, Pavel (1802–1855)

Russian admiral, fleet commander, and naval hero. Born July 5, 1802, in Smolensk, Pavel Nakhimov became a naval cadet at 16 and thereafter entered service with the Baltic Fleet. He began a long association with the progressive captain Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev aboard the frigate *Kreiser*, circumnavigating the world from 1822 to 1825, then sailing with him to the Mediterranean in 1827 aboard the new ship of the line *Azov* to join forces with British and French squadrons against the Ottomans at Navarino Bay.

Nakhimov's valor in the battle won him promotion to captain as well as command of a captured Turkish corvette, renamed *Navarino* to commemorate the victory. In 1834, after duty in the Baltic that included commanding the frigate *Pallada*, he returned to the Black Sea Fleet and to further mentorship under Admiral Lazarev, whose encouragement and example bolstered Nakhimov's own increasingly successful command style, which had already won the trust and devotion of his officers and seamen aboard a succession of warships.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1845 and vice admiral in 1852, Nakhimov continued his support of Lazarev's modernization campaigns for the Black Sea Fleet, procuring

up-to-date guns, effective armor, and the application of steam power where practicable, in the end creating a naval force, the tactical and technological prowess of which overwhelmed a Turkish fleet numerically its match at Sinop in 1853.

Having precipitated the Crimean War, Russia now had to face the Ottomans' new allies, Britain and France, as enemies. Rather than meet those fleets in battle as they sailed toward the Crimea, Nakhimov received the unwelcome order to scuttle his ships as a barrier to the port of Sevastopol, thereafter joining in the prolonged land-based defense of the city, during which he was killed on June 30, 1855.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Navarino Bay, Battle of (October 20, 1827); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); Sinop, Battle of (November 30, 1853)

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Nanshan, Battle of (May 1904)

The Battle of Nanshan (Nanshon) May 25–26, 1904, was a small but significant Japanese victory during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Nanshan Hill's location at the neck of the Liaodong Peninsula meant its capture by the Japanese would isolate Port Arthur, the Russian naval base, from the main body of the Russian army.

The hill was about 300 feet high, and it dominated the middle of a narrow isthmus, only 3,300 yards wide. The overall Russian

commander at Nanshan, Lieutenant General Alexander Fok, had four regiments at his disposal and he ordered the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, along with small elements of the 13th and 14th regiments (roughly 3,000 men in all) under Colonel Nikolai Tretiakov to man the formidable defenses on the hill. These consisted of barbed wire, artillery, trenches, and machine guns. Against this strong position, the Japanese commander General Yasukata Oku could throw the strength of the Japanese Second Army, and he committed three infantry divisions to the fight (about 35,000 men). The Japanese navy provided ships to augment the Japanese bombardment.

General Oku lined up two divisions for the assault, and took the town of Chin-Chou (just to the northeast) as a preliminary to the main attack. A storm delayed Japanese movements, and heavy rain affected visibility and movement for much of the battle. The narrow isthmus meant that General Oku had little option but to attack the Russian defenses frontally, and his men were bloodily repulsed at least nine times.

Despite these reverses, Japanese troops had greatly weakened Russian resistance. Colonel Tretiakov appealed repeatedly for reinforcements, only to find that Lieutenant General Fok had withdrawn with all of the supporting troops. Fok had panicked at the thought of a Japanese amphibious landing in his rear and ordered a withdrawal without informing Tretiakov. Although abandoned, Tretiakov's men bravely fought on until the Japanese 4th Division waded through the ocean surf to outflank the Russian left. This finally forced the Russians to retreat. The other two Japanese infantry divisions (1st and 3rd) then rushed forward to capture the now undefended hill. The battle had lasted about 14 hours, and casualties were heavy on both sides. The Japanese lost some 4,800

men, the Russians roughly 700 men in the fight on the hill, and another 800 during the initial retreat.

This battle cut off Russian supply to and probably sealed the fate of Port Arthur, which surrendered to the Japanese on January 2, 1905. The Japanese success against infantry equipped with machine guns and protected by trenches and barbed wire, had a significant impact. Victories such as Nanshan led observers to believe that morale could overcome modern weaponry, which had disastrous consequences in the opening months of World War I.

Nicholas Murray

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Port Arthur; Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Sandepu (Sandepu), Battle of (January 25–29, 1905); Sha-ho, Battle of the (October 10–17, 1904); Stoessel (Stessel), Baron Anatoli Mikhailovich (1848–1915); Telissu (Vafangou, Wafangkou), Battle of (June 14–15, 1904); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815)

Series of wars between Napoleonic France and coalitions of Britain, Austria, Russia, Spain,


and various German states, during which Napoleon's quest for hegemony destabilized European institutions, and spread Enlightenment ideals and revolutionary politics across the continent.

When Napoleon Bonaparte came to power as first consul in 1799, he assumed direction of the Wars of the French Revolution that had been raging since 1792, and in which he had distinguished himself as a commander. Only Austria and Britain were left opposing France, and Bonaparte's victory at Marengo on June 14, 1801, enabled him to conclude an advantageous peace with Austria in the Treaty of Lunéville on February 8, 1801, isolating Britain, with whom he signed the Treaty of Amiens on March 25, 1802. The European powers thus had a respite from a decade of hostilities, but Napoleon dreamed of European hegemony. Difficult territorial questions still vexed Franco-British relations and Napoleon massed troops at Boulogne to pressure Britain with the threat of invasion. The British responded by declaring war on May 16, 1803, inaugurating the so-called Napoleonic Wars that would spread throughout Europe and beyond over the next 12 years.

The first phase was naval, as Britain sought both to extinguish Napoleon's invasion threat by seaborne attacks on the flotilla he was assembling at the mouths of the Rhine and to counter French efforts to control the Mediterranean Sea, the East Indies, and the West Indies. Meanwhile, British diplomacy created a new coalition to oppose France. Austria and Sweden joined the British, and Czar Alexander I—with his naïve proposal that France withdraw to its natural frontiers behind the Rhine and the Alps rebuffed—woke to the French threat and sent Prince Adam Czartoryski to Britain to arrange the Third Coalition.

The new alliance proposed to destroy the 50,000-man French army in Italy and then

Russian Campaign, 1812



move on the French forces menacing Britain. The Habsburg general Mack von Leiberich advanced on Ulm with 50,000 troops while Archduke Charles and a 100,000-man army prepared to confront Marshal Masséna in Italy. Russian armies totaling over 100,000 men were marching westward to join the campaign.

On August 31, 1805, Bonaparte abandoned his plans to invade Britain and instead marched his 200,000-man *Grande Armée* eastward to meet the new threat. On October 6, Mack was shocked to encounter French cavalry outside Ulm. While he rushed to deal with them, the *Grande Armée* swept around his right and surrounded him. Mack surrendered on October 17. Two weeks later, Masséna attacked Archduke Charles and started him on the road out of Italy. Early in November, Napoleon marched into the Austrian capital, Vienna, despite the efforts of Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov and his 55,000-man army.

Napoleon had surprised the allies, disrupted their plans and seized the initiative but he was nonetheless surrounded by numerically superior forces, having sent several corps south to interdict Archduke Charles's retreat from Italy and left garrison troops elsewhere. With 73,000 men, he positioned himself at Brünn, 70 miles north of Vienna. To his northwest, at Prague, Archduke Ferdinand commanded an army of 18,000. To his northeast, at Olmütz, the emperors Alexander of Russia and Francis II of Austria had a combined force of 86,000. To the southwest, the Habsburg archdukes Charles and John were trying to bring 80,000 men out of Italy with French armies attacking them from behind and blocking them in front. If these allied armies could coalesce, they could cut Bonaparte's lines of communication and crush him.

Counting on their eagerness to make them overreach, Napoleon disposed his troops on

low ground outside the village of Austerlitz with a weak right wing extending in plain sight for nearly two miles. On the morning of December 2, ignoring Kutuzov's counsels of caution, the two emperors attacked the French right wing. As it gave ground, they moved troops across their own front to strengthen the attack. At the right moment, Marshal Nicolas Soult's corps broke through the allied center and turned right to outflank and destroy the allied left. Marshal Jean Baptiste de Bernadotte's corps drove through the center gap and turned left to smash Prince Pyotr Bagration's corps against Marshal Lannes's assault on the allied right wing. The Austro-Russian army lost 26,000 men to Napoleon's losses of 9,000, and its survivors were scattered and disorganized. On December 4, Francis surrendered to Napoleon while Nicholas led the remnants of his army home to Russia.

The Treaty of Pressburg, signed on December 26, conceded southern and western German territories to Napoleon's German allies and gave the province of Venetia to Bonaparte's Italian kingdom. Napoleon was able to install his brother Joseph as king of Naples and his brother Louis as king of Holland. At the end of 1805, the only allied success had been won at sea, with Admiral Horatio Nelson's victory at Trafalgar on October 21, destroying French naval power and enabling Britain to wage economic war by blockade.

With his *Grande Armée* quartered in southeastern Germany, Napoleon in 1806 dissolved the Holy Roman Empire and created the Confederation of the Rhine to replace it. His interference in German politics so offended the Prussians that they resolved to put an end to his adventures. Prussia and Saxony formed a joint army of 130,000 men under the command of the Duke of Brunswick and sent an ultimatum to France on October 1, 1806.

Napoleon, however, was already on the move, marching north from Bavaria. On October 12, the Prussians found that Bonaparte was closer to Berlin than they were. The Duke of Brunswick led his army of 63,000 men northeast toward Auerstadt, while Prince Hohenlohe and his 51,000 men protected his rear. On October 14, Napoleon, with 100,000 men, routed Hohenlohe while Marshal Davout's 27,000 men blocked Brunswick's line of communication at Jena and held until Bernadotte attacked the Prussians in the rear and finished them off. Within 10 days, Napoleon was in Berlin, and by November 30, had crossed the Vistula and occupied Warsaw. By the end of April 1807, he had captured Danzig, and on June 14, he defeated Count Benningsen's Russians at Friedland.

The Treaties of Tilsit (July 7–9) compelled the Prussians to surrender huge amounts of their territory, reduce their army to 42,000 men, and pay a 140 million franc indemnity. Czar Alexander, a tough negotiator in a better bargaining position, fared better. In return for Bonaparte's promise of support for Russia in its ongoing conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, he promised to join France's economic war against Britain.

Unable, after Trafalgar, to contest the world's oceans with Britain, Napoleon in November 1806 issued his Berlin Decree banning the importation of British goods to the European mainland. The effectiveness of this "continental system" of economic warfare depended on France controlling the coasts of Europe. When Portugal opened trade with Britain, Bonaparte was compelled to cross the Pyrenees and intervene. Defeating the Spanish army, he gave the Spanish throne to his brother, Joseph. Soon, however, guerrillas, encouraged and financed by Britain, rose up to oppose the French. For six years, the ugly Peninsular War bled huge

quantities of troops, supplies, and money from other theaters of war more vital to France.

Apart from this bleeding ulcer though, Bonaparte held sway in Europe, unable to coerce only Britain, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire. Only Austria dared resume hostilities in 1809, and it was speedily defeated. The Franco-Russian situation steadily deteriorated, however. Plans for Russia to join France in an attack on the Ottoman Empire and India evaporated when the powers couldn't agree which of them would occupy Constantinople. Russia was unwilling to enforce the "continental system" in the Baltic because British trade was so vital to Russia. And all the while, Alexander, upset at his army's performance against Napoleon, was reorganizing and reequipping his army.

Not long after Tilsit, he appointed Alexis Arakcheev, an artillery officer with a pragmatic problem-solving bent, as minister of war with undisputed authority over the army. Having already upgraded the weapons, equipment, and administration of the artillery, Arakcheev now introduced a better musket and ordered rigorous training in its use, made the military bureaucracy more efficient and improved the training of recruits. After two years, he was succeeded by Prince Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, an experienced field officer who created a new law on field armies embodying clear rules on how the army should run in wartime. He combed out the garrison regiments to provide more than 20,000 trained men for the field army and 17,000 for internal security forces to preserve public order and guard prisoners of war, as well as collecting and transporting recruits. For the first time, a Russian General Staff emerged. Russia had become a much more formidable military power.

In the spring of 1812, Napoleon offered Alexander continued peace and a favorable

trade treaty in return for rigorous enforcement of the “continental system.” But Alexander, who had protected his northern flank by a treaty with Sweden and was concluding one with the Ottoman Empire to secure his southern flank, now defied him. On June 24, 1812, therefore, Bonaparte’s *Grande Armée* of 400,000 French, Austrians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, Dutch, and Italians began crossing the Niemen River. Opposing them were three Russian armies: Barclay de Tolly’s 127,000 men at Vilnius; Prince Bagration’s 48,000 men east of Bialystok; and Count Tormasov’s 43,000 men in reserve.

The Russian armies fell back in the face of Napoleon’s attack, destroying as they retreated everything that could be of value to their foes. Frustrated in his attempts to prevent Barclay de Tolly and Bagration from combining their forces, Napoleon tried for a decisive battle at Smolensk but the Russians slipped away. Alexander replaced Barclay de Tolly with Marshal Kutuzov to appease critics of the abandonment of Russian territory but remained wedded to his defensive strategy.

On September 7, the Russian army finally stood and fought at Borodino, the greatest battle of Bonaparte’s career, with 58,000 Russian dead as against 38,000 of the *Grande Armée*. It was a lost opportunity for Napoleon, whose failure to commit his elite troops at the proper moment saved the Russian army from destruction. Nevertheless, he marched into Moscow on September 14 and waited for the czar to sue for peace. Instead, the city burned as his soldiers looted it; the French position steadily worsened as Cossacks and partisans harassed his lines of communication, while Kutuzov recruited his strength at Tarutino, southwest of Moscow.

On October 19, Napoleon abandoned Moscow. He was forced to retreat the way

he had come, over territory that had already been fought over and stripped of shelter and provisions. Though poorly coordinated and timidly led Russian forces could not destroy the *Grande Armée*, the bitter winter, the Cossacks, and the partisans did the job so thoroughly that only about 12,000 of the invaders survived to recross the Niemen.

Napoleon returned to Paris to raise another army. By April, he returned to Germany with 200,000 hastily recruited men to face a coalition of British, Russian, Prussian, and Swedish forces. He beat the allies at Lützen and Bautzen in May and, after a truce that enabled him to train his green troops, won his last major victory at Dresden on August 26–27, 1813. The allies closed in and defeated him decisively in the Battle of Nations at Leipzig on October 16–19, then drove him back to France.

When he received a peace offer that would have required France to yield all claim to territories beyond the Rhine and the Alps, Bonaparte refused. Three allied armies marched on France at the outset of 1814. Despite Napoleon’s frantic and often brilliant efforts, Paris surrendered on March 31. By April 11, he had abdicated unconditionally and was given the principality of the Mediterranean island of Elba with the title of emperor and an annual subsidy of 2 million francs. The Bourbon monarchy was restored, with Louis XVI’s brother coming to the throne as Louis XVIII.

The First Treaty of Paris on May 30 reduced France to its 1792 frontiers and recognized the independence of other areas of Napoleon’s conquests. Representatives of the allies met in the Congress of Vienna in the autumn to construct a general European solution to all the problems posed by 20-plus years of war. In February of 1815, however, Napoleon escaped Elba and, with the help of troops that had been sent to capture him,

entered Paris triumphantly on March 20. Raising a new army, he marched north to confront an Anglo-Dutch army commanded by the Duke of Wellington and the Prussians led by Gebhard Blücher. On June 18, his 72,000-man army attacked Wellington's force of 68,000 at Waterloo in Belgium and pressed them hard, only to be overwhelmed when Blücher arrived on Bonaparte's right flank with his 61,000 men. On June 21, Napoleon abdicated once more and surrendered to the British, who exiled him to the remote island of St. Helena in the South Atlantic. On September 26, 1815, Russia, Prussia, and Austria declared a Holy Alliance to guarantee European stability. The Second Peace of Paris on November 20 further reduced France to its 1790 borders and levied an indemnity on it.

Post-1815 Europe has been referred to as *a world restored*, yet much had changed. In the art of making war, Napoleon adopted and transformed the best of 18th century weapons, tactics, and doctrines into a new way of making war that was variously understood by those reflecting on it, most notably Karl von Clausewitz in *On War* and Antoine Henri de Jomini in *The Art of War*. More important, the French armies brought with them to every part of Europe the ideals of Revolutionary France, leaving behind them seedlings of romantic nationalism that would grow in profusion.

Joseph M. McCarthy

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Arakcheev, Alexis (1769–1834); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolley, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Bautzen, Battle of (May 20–21, 1813); Bennigsen, Leonty Levin (1745–1826); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Cossacks; Eylau, Battle of (February 8, 1807); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Holy

Alliance (1815); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813); Lutzen, Battle of (May 2, 1813); Patriotic War of 1812; Second Coalition, War of the (1798–1802); Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18, 1812); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800); Third Coalition, War of the (1805); Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

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Narev Offensive (July 13–22, 1915)

Battle in the northern part of the Polish salient on the Eastern Front that helped prompt the Russian “Great Retreat” in late July 1915. The city of Narev is located about 25 miles north of Warsaw in what was then the northeastern portion of the Polish salient. The German attack there was part of a three-pronged offensive against the Russians in 1915 that included Galicia, Narev, and Kurland (present-day Latvia).

The Germans had tried to break through west of the Narev River in February and

March 1915 and failed. This time they were determined to leave nothing to chance. For the attack, German general of artillery Max von Gallwitz, commanding Army Group Gallwitz, assembled in East Prussia 20 divisions and 200,000 men, supported by 1,000 guns in the charge of master artilleryist Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchmüller. Facing the Germans at their point of attack, the inner wings between the First and Twelfth Russian armies, were seven weak Russian divisions of some 100,000 men, supported by only 377 guns with fewer than 40 rounds of ammunition available per gun.

The German attack opened with a four-hour artillery barrage on July 13. German infantry then moved forward. Striking to the southeast toward the Narev River, they split the Russian First army from the Twelfth Army and opened a gap in the Russian lines 25 miles wide. Too late, chief of staff of the Russian army General Mikhail Alekseev ordered reserves to this area; they were still many miles from the front when the German blow fell. Coordination between the First and Twelfth armies was inadequate, and the Russian positions were poorly prepared, not being designed for defensive operations.

By July 17, the Germans had advanced some five miles and had inflicted 70 percent losses on the Russian defenders, including 24,000 prisoners. Alekseev had no choice but to pull back his troops to the Narev, with corresponding withdrawals on the flanks. Alekseev fought the battle well, and as the Germans advanced, they encountered increasing numbers of Russian troops.

Gallwitz would have had great difficulty in forcing the Narev line, but at this point, the Russian High Command (*Stavka*) lost its nerve. With the Russians suffering reversals elsewhere, on July 22, *Stavka* ordered Alekseev to withdraw the Narev forces to the east and, if necessary, evacuate Warsaw. The

“Great Retreat” now began, involving seven Russian armies in a withdrawal several hundred miles to the east. Warsaw fell on August 5. The withdrawal continued, wiping out the Polish salient and seeing the Germans push into Belarus (Byelorussia) along a line north of the Pripet Marshes. Alekseev, however, conducted the retreat with great skill, denying the Germans any opportunity to break through and trap major units in the process.

Jon C. Anderson Jr.

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Narva, Battle of (1581)

The Battle of Narva took place in August and September of 1581, as a Swedish fleet and mercenary army commanded by Pontus de la Gardie attempted to seize the city of Narva, along what is now the Estonian-Russian border. It was one of the last major actions of the Livonian War (1158–1583). In 1554, Czar Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) concluded a treaty with Livonia in which the smaller Baltic principality promised not to ally with the unified kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When the Livonian leader Gottard Kettler sought protection from Poland-Lithuania, Ivan

launched an immediate invasion. Russian troops soon captured most of Livonia before the other claimants to the region could organize a counterattack. Russia did not possess a navy, however, and attempts at diplomacy did little to stop the enemies from launching annual campaigns against Russian holdings. Ivan had neither the manpower nor the economic resources to hold off every advance.

In 1576, Stefan Batory was elected king of Poland-Lithuania. He promptly began attacking Russian fortifications along the Polish border. He also pursued an alliance with Swedish king John III, to whom he promised Livonian territories in exchange for military assistance. The Swedes hired German and Scottish mercenaries to conduct land operations in Livonia, supported by fleet actions.

Because Ivan had to hold most of his forces further south, the Russian garrison at Narva could expect little support. In 1581, la Gardie arrived at the head of a mercenary army. He ordered the construction of zigzagging trenches to approach the walls of the city. He emplaced heavy mortars capable of lobbing shells over the walls, and his infantry stormed the city, killing thousands of defenders and civilians. The capture of Narva forced Ivan to admit defeat and sign a humiliating treaty in 1583.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Livonian War (1558–1583)

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Narva, Battle of (1918)

First battle of the Estonian War for Independence. Although the Soviet Union won the battle, it could not prevent the spread of Estonian nationalism. Narva remained one of the key positions of the entire conflict, situated on the border between the Soviet Union and the newly proclaimed nation. It was the site of several more clashes before the Soviets recognized Estonian independence in 1920.

On March 3, 1918, German and Soviet negotiators concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ending World War I on the Eastern Front. When Germany concluded an armistice with the Western Allies on November 11, 1918, the prevailing assumption was that Germany must give up any wartime conquests. Before the Treaty of Versailles could be completed, several states took advantage of the chaos by proclaiming their independence, seeking to present a *fait accompli* to the negotiators in France. Although the Soviets had officially proclaimed the right of people to self-determination, they saw the burgeoning independence movements as a bourgeois attempt at counterrevolution, and immediately invaded, ostensibly to guarantee the rights of workers in the newly independent areas.

On November 28, 1918, barely two weeks after the German army had begun to evacuate Estonia, the Soviet 6th Rifle Division attacked the city of Narva. Its defenders included the 4,000 poorly armed, untrained members of the Estonian Defence League, as well as a German regiment that had not completed its withdrawal. After only one day of fighting, the Soviet division assumed control over the city.

As the departure point for a full-scale invasion, Narva quickly became a key logistical position for the Red Army. It also

attracted Estonian Bolsheviks who wished to side with the Soviet occupiers.

Foreign intervention propped up Estonian efforts to secure their independence, providing much-needed arms and advisors. On January 17, 1919, Estonian forces landed 1,000 troops near Utria, behind the Soviet front lines. This cut off the occupiers in Narva, who were forced to abandon the city. For the remainder of the war, the Narva River became a fairly stable front, with the numerically superior Red Army of 120,000 unable to drive out the dogged 40,000 Estonian defenders. The Soviets indiscriminately shelled the city, but could not recapture it. After a year of combat, the Red Army had made inching progress at a cost of 35,000 casualties, exhausting itself for little gain. On February 2, 1920, the Soviets agreed to a peace treaty and accepted Estonian independence, with the border drawn at the Narva River.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Narva, Battle of the (February–March 1944)

Attempt by the Soviets to expel the last units of the German army from the Soviet Union.

After besieging Leningrad for over two years, German Army Group North escaped being encircled by the Soviet army and withdrew to defensive positions at the Narva

River, which represented the border between Russia and Estonia. The Soviets sought revenge against the now beleaguered invaders while Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Estonian, and even Russian volunteers joined the German troops to prevent a Communist invasion.

Upon reaching the Narva, German forces found that the Panther Line, which should have provided substantial defensive positions, existed only on paper. Frozen ground made preparation of trench lines difficult. Both sides knew the bridges were the key to success.

On February 2, 1944, Major General Feduninsky’s Second Shock Army attacked the German bridgehead stretching north to south from Lilienback to Dolgaja Niva. The following day, Soviet tanks broke through and established a position on the west bank of the river. A counterattack by two German tank battalions pushed the Soviets back, allowing the Germans to recapture the bridgehead.

On February 11, the XLIII Rifle Corps attacked north of the city but was held off by German defenders; the CIX and CXXII Rifle Corps had more success attacking from the south. Two days later, the Germans wiped out an amphibious landing from the northwest intended to surround them. Through February 20, the Soviets made several assaults but, despite heavy fighting, all footholds were forced back across the river.

In late February, an assault south of Narva by the Soviet XXX Rifle Guard Corps broke through, reached the railway and nearly encircled the German forces, but was stopped by a counterattack. After several calm days, on March 1, units of the Soviet Second Shock Army and four rifle corps launched another attack; despite the heavy artillery barrage that preceded it, the well-dug-in German defenders inflicted heavy casualties with the help of the accurate artillery and the Luftwaffe.

General Govorov launched another attack the following day but the Soviet Army was unable to secure its gains before a series of German counterattacks on March 4–6 pushed them back to their February lines.

On March 6–7, the Soviet Air Force conducted massive night bombings of Narva, reducing the city to ruins. While civilians fled west, the bombings and artillery failed to dislodge the defenders. Over the next two weeks, Govorov continued attacking along the line of defense while the Germans counterattacked, but neither side made headway. The German counterattack of March 26 even eliminated the Soviet bridgehead held by the XXX Rifle Corps since February.

March ended in stalemate, with the Germans having been able to reinforce their positions and achieve near manpower parity. The April thaw halted further operations until May.

Kevin S. Bemel

See also: Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Narva, Battle of the (November 20, 1700)

Opening battle of the Great Northern War.

In summer 1700, Czar Peter I declared war on Sweden, hoping to gain access to the

eastern Baltic Sea. By early October, Russian forces were besieging the key fortress of Narva, on the river of the same name. There were numerous Western European officers, like the Duc du Croy, advising Peter on siege techniques; Russian artillery nevertheless faced numerous perpetual problems such as its carriages collapsing.

The impetuous king of Sweden, 18-year-old Charles XII, responded by sailing across the Baltic to Riga with a force of some 10,500 men. On November 13, the Swedes began the 150-mile march from Riga. Russian cavalry under General Boris Sheremetev screened and skirmished with the advancing Swedish troops, and carried out a scorched-earth policy. Peter, who was directing the siege personally, had built an earthen wall and ditch to combat the Swedish relief force. The night before the Swedish attack, Peter left Narva, passing command to the Duc du Croy. The Russians did not believe that the Swedes would be able to attack after a long march.

On the morning of November 20, 1700, however, Charles XII ordered an assault. As the Swedish attack began, a snowstorm started. The Swedes filled the trenches with fascines, and soon, brutal hand-to-hand fighting began. Many Russian soldiers panicked and fled toward the Narva River, where thousands drowned. Soon, much of the Russian army was reduced to a fleeing rabble. Russian soldiers turned on their foreign officers and Du Croy, who was afraid of his men, fled; he later surrendered to the Swedes. A few Russians made a last stand at a laager of wagons, but fighting generally ended around 8:00 p.m. The Swedes had lost 677 killed and 1,205 wounded, while the Russians lost over 8,000 men and had 10 generals captured. They also lost over 181 guns—a majority of Peter’s artillery.

Most of the Russian enlisted men were allowed to walk away. Narva instilled a

contempt of Russian forces in Charles and led him to underestimate them later. The Battle of Narva made Peter determined to create a modern army, on the other hand, and he ordered the church bells in Russia melted down to make new cannon.

William T. Dean III

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709); Sheremetev, Boris Petrovich (1652–1719)

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Navarino Bay, Battle of (October 20, 1827)

The most important engagement of the Greek War for Independence (1821–1823), it removed any barrier to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the next year, Russia declared war on Turkey, hoping to gain control over the Black Sea ports of the Romanian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, territory in the Caucasus, and the right to sail its warships through the Bosphorus.

The Greek War for Independence started with a nationalist rising in 1821. By 1827, the Greeks were perilously close to defeat. The Ottomans had deployed Egyptian forces ruthlessly in 1825, overrunning the eastern portion of the Peloponnesus and driving onto the mainland. The Ottomans had some 30,000 troops against only 5,000 or so Greek


regulars, and in June 1827, they captured the acropolis of Athens. The Greeks remained defiant, however, and with good cause. In addition to intense popular support for Greek independence in Great Britain and the direct military aid of philhellenic French and British officers, the Greeks now had reasonable hope of Russian assistance.

Czar Alexander I, despite his desire for gains in the Black Sea, had refused to support any liberal causes in Europe because of his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars. He had died in 1825, however, and his brother and successor, Nicholas, had no such qualms. Though he continued to oppose liberal revolutions in Europe, Nicholas pragmatically supported revolutions against the Ottomans because Russia stood to gain. To prevent unilateral Russian action, therefore, British foreign minister George Canning proposed a joint diplomatic solution: Britain and Russia would support autonomy for the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire, and bend the sultan to it with the threat of intervention.

Britain and Russia signed a protocol to this effect in 1826. Nicholas proceeded to publicize the agreement, using it as a lever to pry concessions in the Romanian principalities and Serbia from the Ottomans that were finalized in the October 1826 Convention of Akkerman. Sensing weakness, Nicholas continued to press. He dispatched a naval squadron to the Mediterranean, and broadened negotiations to extend the protocol with Britain to a full treaty that would include France.

Representatives of the French, British, and Russian governments concluded the Treaty of London on July 6, 1827. It called on the Ottomans to agree to an armistice and for the Egyptians to withdraw. Should the Ottomans reject an armistice, the three allied powers would come to the aid of the Greeks with their naval forces. In the meantime, the

BATTLE OF NAVARINO BAY, OCTOBER 20, 1827



British made a strong but ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic effort to get Egyptian ruler Mohammed Ali to remove his forces from Greece.

On August 16, the European powers sent a note to the Sublime Porte demanding an armistice. When the Ottomans rejected it on August 29, the British, French, and Russian governments issued orders to their naval commanders in the Mediterranean to cut off waterborne Ottoman and Egyptian resupply to Greece. In late August 1827, despite warnings from the European governments not to do so, Ali sent a large squadron with reinforcements to Navarino Bay (Pylos) on

the west coast of the Peloponnese. It arrived on September 8, joining several Ottoman ships already there. On September 12, a British squadron under Vice Admiral Sir Edward Codrington arrived off the bay.

On September 25, Codrington and French admiral Henry Gauthier de Rigny met with Ibrahim Pasha, the Egyptian commander in Greece, to discuss a mediation arrangement already accepted by the Greeks. Ibrahim agreed to an armistice while awaiting instructions from the sultan. Ibrahim, however, soon discovered that while he was expected to observe a cease-fire, Greek naval units under British mercenary commanders

(Admiral Lord Cochrane had charge of the Greek navy) were continuing operations in the Gulf of Corinth, at Epirus, and at the port of Patras. Codrington warned these British officers, who were not under his command, to desist; however, this had little effect. Ibrahim duly protested and, when nothing changed, decided to act.

On October 1, Ibrahim ordered ships from Navarino Bay to assist the Ottoman garrison at Patras. Codrington's squadron intercepted these ships at the entrance to the Gulf of Calydon and forced them to return to Navarino. On the night of October 3–4, Ibrahim personally led another relief effort. Although they managed to avoid detection by the British picket ship in the darkness, a strong lee wind prevented his forces from entering the Gulf of Calydon. He was forced to anchor off Papas and wait for the storm to end. This allowed Codrington time to come up with his squadron, and firing warning shots, he again forced Ibrahim to return to Navarino Bay.

Ibrahim continued land operations, which included the wholesale burning of Greek villages and fields. The fires were clearly visible from the allied ships. A British landing party reported that the Greek population of Messenia was close to starvation. On October 13, Codrington was joined off Navarino Bay by the French squadron under de Rigny and a Russian squadron under Admiral Count Ledewjk Heidin (Heyden). Both of these commanders were inferior in rank to Codrington, who also had the most ships, and they agreed to serve under his command.

On October 20, following futile attempts to contact Ibrahim Pasha, Codrington consulted with the other allied commanders and made the decision to enter Navarino Bay with the combined British, French, and Russian squadrons. The allies had 11 ships of the line and 15 other warships. Codrington flew his flag in the ship of the line *Asia* (84

guns). He also had two 74-gun ships of the line, four frigates, and four brigs. Admiral de Rigny had four 74-gun ships of the line, one frigate, and two schooners. Heidin's Russian squadron consisted of four 74-gun ships of the line and four frigates. The Egyptians and Ottomans had 65 or 66 warships in Navarino harbor: 3 Ottoman ships of the line (2 of 84 guns each and 1 of 76 guns), 4 Egyptian frigates of 64 guns each, 15 Ottoman frigates of 48 guns each, 18 Ottoman and 8 Egyptian corvettes of 14–18 guns each, 4 Ottoman and 8 Egyptian brigs of 19 guns each, and 5–6 Egyptian fire brigs. There were also some Ottoman transports and smaller craft.

Around noon, the allied ships sailed in two lines into Navarino Bay. The British and French formed one line and the Russians the other. The Ottomans demanded that Codrington withdraw, but the British admiral replied that he was there to give orders, not receive them. He threatened that if any shots were fired at the allied ships, he would destroy the Egyptian-Ottoman fleet.

The Egyptian-Ottoman ships were lying at anchor in a long crescent-shape formation with their flanks protected by shore batteries. Shortly after 2:00 p.m., the allied ships took up position inside the crescent. The British ships faced the center of the Egyptian-Ottoman line, while the French were on the Ottoman left and the Russians were on the Ottoman right. The shore batteries at Fort Navarino made no effort to contest the allied movement. Still, Codrington's plan appeared highly dangerous, for it invited the Ottomans to surround the allied ships, which, with the prevailing wind out of the southwest, risked being trapped. The allies, however, were confident of their tactical superiority.

Codrington dispatched the frigate *Dartmouth* to an Ottoman ship in position to command the entrance of the bay with an

order that it move. The captain of the *Dartmouth* sent a dispatch boat to the Ottoman ship, which then opened musket fire on it, killing an officer and several seamen. Firing immediately became general, with shore batteries also opening up on the allied ships.

The ensuing four-hour engagement, essentially a series of individual gun duels by floating batteries at close range without an overall plan, was really more of a slaughter than a battle. Three-quarters of the ships in the Egyptian-Ottoman fleet were either destroyed by allied fire or set alight to prevent their capture. Only one, the *Sultane*, surrendered. Allied personnel losses were 177 killed and 469 wounded; estimates of the Ottoman and Egyptian killed or wounded were in excess of 4,000 men.

The Porte demanded reparations and refused to admit defeat. He closed the Bosphorus to European vessels, revoked the Convention of Akkerman and, in a largely symbolic gesture, proclaimed a jihad against the European powers. The Battle of Navarino Bay had thus removed any impediment to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and in April 1828, Russia declared war on Turkey. That August, Egypt withdrew from hostilities, virtually ending the war. In May 1832, under the Treaty of London, Greece secured its independence. The Battle of Navarino Bay, which made all this possible, is also noteworthy as the last major engagement between ships of the line in the age of fighting sail.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Greek War for Independence (1821–1829); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829)

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Navy, Imperial Russian (ca. 1700–1918)

The navy of the Russian Empire existed from its founding by Czar Peter I (the Great) in 1693 until the Russian revolution in March 1917. Since Russia has traditionally been a land-based empire, historians have often given more attention to its army. It should be noted, however, that for Russia to emerge as a major European power in the 18th century, it was crucial to establish a navy. The fortunes of the Imperial Russian Navy throughout the next two centuries ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of the autocratic state.

There had been attempts to create a naval force well before the reign of Peter the Great; however, they had been limited to the control of the rivers and coastal areas, rather than aiming at a deep ocean (“blue water”) navy. Between the 9th and the 12th centuries, the Kievan Rus’ state sought to maintain access to trade routes with Scandinavia on the Baltic Sea and Constantinople (Istanbul) on the Black Sea. As the city-state of Moscow grew more powerful, its influence expanded to the White Sea with the establishment of Archangel (Archangelsk), which would be its only ocean port until the 17th century. The Muscovite state gained access to the east along the Volga River with the capture of Astrakhan in 1502. The ships that defended these trade routes were fairly simple vessels, with shallow drafts and light armaments.

During the 17th century, the newly established Romanov Dynasty began its policy of opening up trade with the West, beginning with an agreement between Czar Mikhail Romanov and the Duke Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein for providing aid to Russia with shipbuilding in August 1634. During the 1660s, Czar Aleksei hired Dutch shipbuilders as part of his policy of opening Russia to the West. The results of these attempts at building a navy were mostly failures because of the inefficiency of the Russian bureaucracy in the 17th century.

The establishment of a navy along European lines thus began with Peter the Great. During his youth, he was exiled to the outskirts of Moscow, where he freely associated with its foreign residents, particularly, the Scottish mercenary Patrick Gordon and the Swiss officer Franz Lefort. During his exile, he was freed from the isolated stuffiness of the court and indulged his curiosity in the culture of Western Europe. He was especially interested in Western military technology and established, with the help of Gordon and Lefort, “toy regiments” and “toy boats.” These early experiences were crucial as he embarked upon the Westernization of Russia.

In 1689, Peter became czar in his own right, which allowed him to build the navy he so desired after a visit to Archangel, which was to him an epiphany. The Azov Campaign against the Ottoman Empire provided such an opportunity. A labor force of about 30,000 men was gathered to construct a fleet. Small vessels were constructed at Briansk, while larger vessels were constructed at Voronezh overseen by Dutch, Italian, and English engineers. Peter inaugurated the Imperial Russian Navy with the construction of its first two warships, the *Apostle Peter* and the *Apostle Paul*. Peter’s fleet soon grew to 11 ships of 36–52 guns, 1 bomb vessel, and 4

galleys. In 1699, Peter claimed his first military victory, giving Russia control of the Sea of Azov.

This victory would prove hollow, however, since the Ottomans still controlled the straits that led into the Black Sea. In 1710, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia. Peter’s Black Sea fleet had so deteriorated that his gains were completely reversed.

Peter remained undeterred in his desire to build a navy though, despite his losses in the Black Sea. Peter applied the knowledge of his youth and the experience of his foreign advisors in establishing a naval bureaucracy. In 1700, Peter established the Admiralty Chancery and placed Fyodor Apraksin in charge. In 1712, it was enlarged into the Chancellery of the Navy. By 1718, Peter had reorganized the entire imperial bureaucracy into a college system, based on Sweden’s. The Admiralty College consisted of 11 offices that were led by a president who oversaw all naval affairs.

At the same time, he was using Sweden as a model, Peter saw Sweden’s control of the Baltic coast as an obstacle to Russia’s rise as a major power. Sweden had a navy of three squadrons, consisting of 42 warships and 12 frigates carrying 2,700 guns and 13,000 sailors. Peter therefore oversaw the construction of a Baltic fleet at the same time the new capital St. Petersburg was under construction. The lessons of the Azov fleet would be learned in the construction of the Baltic fleet. Shipyards and wharves were constructed along Lake Ladoga and along the Neva River. The construction of the Baltic fleet evolved from small craft that transformed men and equipment along Russia’s rivers to the ships of the line, comparable to those of naval powers such as England and the Netherlands.

Between 1702 and 1705, 50 vessels were built, but most were of poor quality. In 1706,

the Admiralty wharf was completed in St. Petersburg, where larger and more powerful ships of the line could be constructed. In 1709, the *Poltava*, the ship of the line, was completed at St. Petersburg; it was a 54-gun vessel. In 1710, the *Riga* and the *Vyborg* were completed, followed by the *St. Catherine*, the *Schlusselfburg*, and the *Narva*. These warships were built under the supervision of English shipwrights Richard Cosens, Joseph Nye, and Richard Brown, and English-trained shipwrights, Fedosei Skliaev, Gavril Menshikov, and Czar Peter himself.

The fruit of Peter's efforts to build a navy became evident at the Battle of Hangö in 1714. Despite being outnumbered at 11 ships of the line to Sweden's 16, the Russian navy won a significant victory that complimented its great land victory at Poltava, establishing the Russian Empire as the preeminent power in the Baltic, and as a European power. By 1720, Russia had 34 ships of the line, 15 frigates, and numerous galleys.

After the death of Peter the Great in 1725, Russia entered a period of political disorder. By 1762, German-born Catherine II (the Great) emerged as empress; she would continue the modernizing policies of Peter and establish Russia as a major European power. The most important of Catherine's policies was to extend Russia's influence south to the Black Sea and southwest toward the Mediterranean to fulfill the old dream of gaining access through the Straits of the Dardanelles. Additionally, her goals were to explore the northern coasts and Siberia, to construct fortifications, and to promote trade.

In 1769, the Imperial Russian Navy made its first voyage to the Mediterranean. Sent by Catherine, a squadron of seven ships of the line and eight smaller vessels sailed from the Baltic to the North Sea, through the English Channel, into the Mediterranean, and ending

in Greece. The ships, however, were in such disrepair by mid-voyage that the British government opened its yards at Portsmouth and Port Mahon to repair them.

After arriving in Greece, the Russians provoked a war with the Turks. In 1770, the Russian fleet attacked and destroyed the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Chesma (Chesme), destroying 11 battleships, 6 frigates, 8 galleys, and 32 small craft—the worst defeat of the Ottoman navy since the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. In 1771, therefore, Catherine turned her attention toward the Black Sea. The Turkish Black Sea Fleet had a significant advantage with 40 large ships, while the Russian Black Sea Fleet consisted of only 7 smaller vessels, each carrying 14–16 guns. In 1772, the Black Sea Fleet gained two 32-gun frigates and two 58-gun battleships.

It was Turkish sluggishness though, that led to victories by the Russians in various operations by 1773. By 1774, Catherine was rewarded with the annexation of Azov, Taganrog, and Kerch; a protectorate over the Crimean Peninsula; and the right to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea, as Peter the Great had dreamed. In another war with Sweden in 1788, Russia reiterated its dominance in the Baltic Sea. By 1790, Baltic fleet consisted of 46 ships of the line and would not be challenged for another century.

When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, Russia was clearly on the side of the ancien régime. Upon the executions of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, Catherine the Great severed diplomatic relations with France. Catherine established the precedent of giving imperial patronage to the navy by making her son, Paul, the general admiral of the Russian Imperial Navy and head of the Admiralty College. In the last year of her reign, she ordered 40 ships of the line to be mobilized on the Baltic. During the early years of the Napoleonic Wars, the

Russian Navy cooperated with the British in the North Sea. On August 30, 1798, a joint Anglo-Russian fleet attacked the Dutch allies of Napoleon in the Battle of Texel, in which the Russians captured two Dutch ships of the line. On September 16, 1798, however, the Russians failed in an invasion of Holland.

In the aftermath of this disaster, the new Czar Paul I withdrew Russian support for the British, whom he blamed for Russia's defeat. Paul took a personal interest in the Russian Navy. Odessa became a major naval base for the Black Sea Fleet. To consolidate his control over the navy, Paul abolished the Black Sea Fleet Admiralty and placed control of all naval affairs in St. Petersburg. He even oversaw the promotions or demotions of naval officers, and went so far as to issue regulations for their uniforms. Under Paul, the Baltic Fleet grew to 390 vessels, of which 45 were battleships; the Black Sea Fleet now contained 115 vessels, of which 15 were battleships. He opened two schools for officer training that emphasized the latest findings in science.

Russia's main involvement in the first years of the Napoleonic Wars was in the Aegean and Italian campaigns. Russia gained control of Malta and the Ionian Islands. Overall though, its performance was spotty at best, and the Russian navy was beset by problems in logistics and reinforcements. Under the Treaty of Tilsit signed between Czar Alexander I and Napoleon in 1807, Russia ceased its operations in the Mediterranean and gave up its gains.

In the interim, Russia focused on its old enemies, the Ottoman Empire and Sweden. Russia scored a victory against the Ottomans at the Battle of Athos on June 30, 1807. Against Sweden, however, the Russian navy was less successful because of British support given to the Swedes. In the end, however,

Russia defeated Sweden and gained the last portions of its Baltic empire—most notably Finland. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Russia's strategic position in Europe was strong, having weakened Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. Russia's supremacy in the Baltic remained and, for a short time while Napoleon focused elsewhere, its navy was second only to that of Britain's.

In the years after the Battle of Waterloo, Russia, like the other naval powers, was in the transition from sail to steam power. The navy, once again though, was neglected during peacetime. Under Nicholas I, however, the navy gained new attention, and Russia possessed the third most powerful navy in Europe. The sailing fleet had its last hurrah in engagements against the Ottomans during the 1820s.

Russia was slow to adopt steam technology during the 1850s, however, perhaps as a reflection of the absolutism of Nicholas I. The *Arkhimed* was launched as the first Russian screw frigate in 1848, but it sank by 1850 and was not replaced. Rather, the navy simply purchased ships and technology from abroad.

The Imperial Russian Navy would suffer the consequences of its technological backwardness in the Crimean War (1853–1856). As in the previous wars against the Ottomans, the goal was access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. By the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was “the sick man of Europe,” and Russia was eager to benefit from its demise. At the Battle of Sinope in 1853, the Russians devastated the Turkish fleet, and it appeared that Russia might gain control of the Black Sea.

Britain and France, however, came to the aid of the Ottomans to prevent an upset in the balance of power. The combined forces of the British and the French navies blockaded Russia's Baltic ports. Their fleets of

steam-powered warships, moreover, were vastly superior to Russia's Black Sea Fleet. The Siege of Sebastopol (Sevastopol) was especially devastating to the Russian navy, costing the lives of four capable admirals. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet lost 14 sailing battleships, 4 sailing frigates, 5 corvettes and brigs, 5 steamships, and 82 other vessels. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 was a huge reversal to Russia's interests by denying it the right to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea.

The humiliating defeat of the Crimean War spurred a period of reforms during the 1860s, especially within the navy. Even before the emancipation of the serfs came in 1861, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, the head of the Naval Ministry and brother of Alexander II, called for the end of serf labor in the navy. After the war, the entire sailing fleet was destroyed, and the navy invested in new technology. Admiral Andrei Alexandrovich Popov was instrumental in the construction of modern battleships for the Imperial Russian Navy. He advocated unconventional naval designs such as the circular floating batteries, one of which, the *Popov*, was named in his honor.

Starting in 1856, the navy inaugurated a 20-year project of building screw-propeller warships, and its remaining steamships were converted into ironclad warships. By 1865, the Imperial Russian Navy had 5 ironclad warships, compared to France's 16 and Britain's 12. The first modern Russian battleship, the *Petr Velikii* (Peter the Great), was launched in the 1870s. Additionally, the navy developed mines and torpedoes. By the 1890s, as its navy was thoroughly modernized, the Russian government looked to East Asia as an area to expand Russia's influence and to acquire a warmwater port. Like the other European powers, Russia secured a sphere of interest in China in Manchuria and acquired Port Arthur on the Liaotung

Peninsula in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).

The doctrine behind Russia's naval expansion was influenced, in large part, by the ideas of the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan calling for a large navy to project a nation's power. Nikolai Klado was Mahan's Russian counterpart and sought to apply his ideas; he found Nicholas II to be among his most enthusiastic readers. By 1898, the Imperial Russian Navy continued to maintain its place as the world's third largest navy, which consisted of 20 battleships, 22 coastal defense vessels, 11 armored cruisers, 2 protected cruisers, 20 cruisers, 9 torpedo gunboats, 5 destroyers, and 75 torpedo boats. The truth behind those numbers, however, was that these ships were foreign-built and often of poor quality, which deteriorated during extreme weather.

Despite the condition of the navy, Nicholas II and his advisers dismissed the rising power of Japan, which was also eager to expand into northern Asia. On February 6, 1904, however, Japanese forces launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Seven battleships of the Russian Pacific Fleet were at Port Arthur—*Sevastopol*, *Poltava*, *Petropavlovsky*, *Peresvet*, *Pobeda*, *Retvizan*, and *Tsesarevich*—along with one armored cruiser, *Baian*; and five protected cruisers (*Askold*, *Diana*, *Pallada*, *Novik*, and *Boiarin*), twenty-five destroyers, and twenty-one torpedo boats. The *Tsesarevich* and *Retvizan* were damaged by Japanese torpedo boats in the initial attack. The Japanese were able to blockade the Russian Pacific Fleet, and thus landed ground forces in Korea without interference.

Russia's war with Japan (1904–1905) fared badly, both on land and on sea. The navy though, was Russia's last hope to stem Japanese advances. Nicholas II had ordered the Baltic Fleet, under the command of

Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, consisting of 11 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 9 destroyers, to join the Pacific Fleet at the outset of the war in October 1904. On the way around the world to accomplish this, however, it sank British fishing boats, mistaking them for Japanese torpedo boats. After hearing of the loss of Port Arthur, the Pacific Fleet's goal was to reach Vladivostok, but Tsushima Strait, which leads to Vladivostok, had been thoroughly mined by the Japanese.

On May 14, 1905, the Japanese fleet engaged the Pacific Fleet at Tsushima. The Japanese, under Admiral Heihachiro Togo, used the classic maneuver of “Crossing the T” to defeat the Russian Pacific Fleet. The Russian fleet was annihilated, losing 8 battleships (*Knyaz Suvorov*, *Imperator Alexander III*, *Borodino*, *Oslabria*, *Navarin*, *Sissoi Veliki*, *Nakhimov*, and *Imperator Nikolai I*), 3 cruisers, and 3 destroyers, as well as 4,380 men killed and 5,917 taken prisoner, including Rozhdestvensky. Japan clearly had the advantage of having the latest ships and more accurate gunnery, which contributed to its victory. On the other hand, for Russia, the defeat of Tsushima contributed to social discontent that exploded into the Revolution of 1905, transforming Russia into a constitutional monarchy—at least in theory.

After the Russo-Japanese War, the navy suffered a severe blow in prestige, having dropped from the third to the sixth largest naval power in the world. In the aftermath of the defeat at Tsushima, Nicholas II wanted to rebuild the fleet, but in light of the Revolution of 1905, he would have to contend with the Duma, which refused to allocate funds. The resulting deadlock over Russia's naval policy delayed any new construction for several years. The introduction of the dreadnought by the British Royal Navy had also rendered all previous warships obsolete,

complicating the reconstruction of the Imperial Russian Navy. The Naval Ministry proposed a 15-year construction plan starting in 1913 with the construction of four battleships or four cruisers per year.

In 1910, however, as part of the “Small Plan” for rearmament, construction began on three battleships that were to be added to the Black Sea Fleet: *Ekaterina II*, *Imperatritsa Mariia*, and *Imperator Aleksandr III*. By the outbreak of World War I, Russia had 8 pre-dreadnought battleships, 14 cruisers, 105 destroyers, 25 torpedo boats, and 25 submarines available. Under construction were 7 dreadnought battleships, 4 battle cruisers, 8 light cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 18 submarines.

The Imperial Russian Navy played a significantly diminished role during World War I, due in large part, to its defeat at Tsushima. The delays in the rebuilding program of the navy meant it could not play an active role in Allied strategy, particularly against the Germans at the Baltic, beyond minelaying. On the Black Sea, while the Russians held numerical superiority, the Ottoman Empire was bolstered by German naval support with two cruisers. The Russian Black Sea Fleet had five battleships: *Sv. Yevstafy*, *Ioann Zlatoust*, *Panteleimon*, *Tri Sviatitelia*, and *Rostislav*. The Russian strategy on the Black Sea remained the age-old goal of gaining control of the Dardanelles and access to the Mediterranean. The navy, however, was diverted in the Caucasus campaign to disrupt Turkish supplies, which was generally unsuccessful. Russian participation in the Gallipoli Campaign was also ineffective in establishing an Allied supply line through the Black Sea.

Between 1914 and 1916, engagements between Russia and the Central Powers consisted of minor skirmishes. There were some Russian successes in the mining of the Bosphorus. Additionally, in the Black

Sea, the Russians claimed one cruiser, four destroyers, five submarines, five gunboats, and other smaller vessels. The biggest blow to the Imperial Russian Navy, however, was the explosion of the *Imperatritsa Mariia* under mysterious circumstances in 1916; it was rumored to have been sabotage, though strong evidence was lacking, and portended the coming revolution.

As in other areas of Russian society and the Russian army, the Imperial Russian Navy was ripe for revolution by 1917. The officer class, dominated by the elite, inflicted harsh abuses in their discipline upon the rank-and-file sailors. Bolshevik influence permeated the navy, triggering minor revolts on the *Rossiia* and the *Gangut*. Continuing dissatisfaction grew among the rank and file, exploding into outright mutiny during the February Revolution of 1917. At Helsinki, 88 officers were massacred on the *Pavel I* and *Andrei Pervozvannyi*. At Kronstadt, the center of revolutionary activity in the navy, Captain M.J. Nikolsky of the *Avrora* (*Aurora*) was killed while trying to put down a rebellion.

The Provisional Government, established by the Duma in March 1917, was ineffective in halting the advance of Bolshevism in the navy. Sailors began organizing themselves into committees, first by addressing immediate concerns such as food and work assignments, then by trying officers for various offenses. During the November (Bolshevik) Revolution of 1917, the Central Committee of the Baltic ordered the navy to support the Bolshevik uprising. The *Avrora*, anchored near the Winter Palace that housed the Kerensky government, fired a blank round to signal the start of the revolution. After the collapse of the Provisional Government, the Central Committee gained control of the Ministry of Marine, thus abolishing the Imperial Russian Navy.

Dino Buenviaje

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Apraksin, Count Fyodor Matveevich (1661–1728); *Aurora* (Protected Cruiser); Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Chesme, Battle of (July 5–7, 1770); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); Crimean War (1853–1856); Dogger Bank Incident (October 21, 1904); February (March) Revolution (1917); Gordon, Patrick (1635–1699); Kronstadt (Kronshtadt); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Popov, Markian Mikhailovich (1902–1969) Port Arthur; Revolution of 1905; Rozhdestvensky (Rozhdestvensky), Zinovy Petrovich (1848–1909); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); Sinop, Battle of (November 30, 1853); Tilsit, Treaty of; Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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Navy, Russian (1991–)

After arguably achieving rough parity with the U.S. Navy during the Cold War, the Russian Federation Navy has experienced significant decline over the subsequent two decades. Some of this decline has been due to serious financial constraints preventing fleet modernization, with other contributing factors being the superior political clout of the army, and problems with the navy’s supporting industrial infrastructure that have kept it from

maintaining anything resembling Soviet-era blue-water strength and capabilities.

A vivid demonstration of the navy's declining power was the August 12, 2000, sinking of the nuclear submarine *Kursk* in the Arctic Ocean that produced 118 deaths. This tragedy produced a rare public outcry against the government's and the navy's incompetence. Another notable demonstration of the Russian navy's inability to modernize and demonstrate professional competence has been the failure to successfully test and deploy the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile. This program began development in the late 1990s and has experienced cost overruns and repeated test-launch failures, although some successful launches prompted former president Dmitry Medvedev to say it was ready for service in December 2011. The navy's political clout was further diminished by its 2012 relocation to St. Petersburg from Moscow, which removed it from ready access to the centers of Russian Federation political power—although President Vladimir Putin's hometown is St. Petersburg.

Navy ships are constructed by the United Shipbuilding Corporation which is a collaboration between the Russian Government and privately managed companies; its technological skill and capacity are far behind global competitors and pacesetters. The majority of Russian navy ships still date from the Soviet era, and slow production timetables are a serious problem. The *Lada*-class submarine *St. Petersburg* took nearly 10 years to reach the testing stage. The Russian navy has had to end its traditional autarkic supply policy by importing unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel and *Mistral*-class ships from France.

Russian naval strategy and doctrine place increasing emphasis on accessing and using the Arctic Ocean. This was visibly demonstrated

on August 2, 2007, when two Russian mini-submarines planted a flag on the North Pole seabed, thus staking claim to immense Arctic oil and natural gas reserves, and demonstrating Moscow's desire to increase its global maritime influence. Climate change in the Arctic is making it possible for ships to use the Northern Sea Route with greater frequency, and Russia seeks to take advantage of that to enhance its economic and military influence along with transportation links between Europe, Asia, and North America. This could increase the possibility of conflict with the United States, China, and other Arctic countries. Russia is also concerned with having the ability to conduct naval operations in the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas and in the Pacific Ocean, although the navy's amphibious assault ships were unable to support Russian ground forces fighting Georgian troops during the August 2008 war between these countries.

The Russian Federation Navy still aspires to Soviet-era power and prestige, and seeks to include a mixture of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in its arsenal though it lacks the industrial base capacity to achieve its objectives. The Kola Peninsula remains the headquarters for Russia's nuclear deterrent; the navy retains 172 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 612 nuclear warheads.

An even more serious problem is the belief under President Vladimir Putin's leadership that the United States and NATO have military designs on Russia requiring the maintenance of a large Cold War-size fleet.

Russia is likely to use its naval forces to influence Arctic Ocean activities to its benefit, and to apply maritime and other pressure on neighboring countries, such as Ukraine, which used to be part of the former Soviet Union and are not NATO members. The possibility of economically constrained NATO countries and the United States not

being willing or able to intervene on behalf of maritime countries adjacent to Russia may increase the possibility of even a weakened Russia being able to exert greater influence or dominate these countries outright. This was very much the case when Crimean separatists, likely backed by Russia, forced Ukraine to cede the peninsula back to Russia in the spring of 2014.

Bert Chapman

See also: Georgian War (2008); *Kursk* (Submarine); Navy, Soviet (1917–1991); Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–)

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Navy, Soviet (1917–1991)

The sailors of the Russian Imperial Navy had played a central role in both the February (March) and the October (Bolshevik) Revolution. In February 1917, sailors from the Baltic Fleet had murdered the commander of the naval depot troops in St. Petersburg and marched on the Winter Palace. In October, it was the cruiser *Aurora*, again from the Baltic Fleet, that had anchored in central St. Petersburg and fired the shot that launched the revolution. During the Russian

Civil War, the Baltic sailors were used as an elite force, sent by Red Army commander Leon Trotsky to suppress counterrevolution wherever it appeared.

It is thus somewhat ironic that when the Bolshevik regime finally settled in, it had no navy to speak of. Most of Russia’s new capital ships had been lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and the czarist regime had launched a significant naval building program only in 1914, just before World War I began. Given these conditions, and Russia’s traditional focus on maintaining large land forces to protect its extensive borders, it is hardly surprising that naval forces had played little role in the 1914–1917 conflict, or that the Bolsheviks inherited only a shell of a navy. A rebellion by the sailors at Kronstadt in 1920, moreover, raised the question of whether any navy would be reliable. Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, briefly contemplated doing without a navy altogether, so bad was the situation.

The real question though, was not whether Soviet Russia should have a navy, but what kind of navy it could afford. The ravages of World War I and the Civil War had left the Russian economy in a shambles, and building a navy was hardly a priority. Any attempt to replicate the czarist “blue-water” navy, with its mission of defending trade and supporting land forces, would take time and money the Bolsheviks did not have. Younger, more radical naval thinkers, sometimes called the “Young School,” therefore advocated a type of guerilla navy, comprised of patrol boats, destroyers, and submarines. Such a force, they argued, could protect Russia’s coastlines effectively and at a much reduced cost.

For most of the 1920s, the debate was largely theoretical, as the Russian economy was slow to recover. By 1927, at latest, the economy had returned to 1913 levels, and



A starboard quarter view of a Soviet Victor III class nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSN) on October 26, 1983. (Department of Defense)

military leaders could envision building a new, Soviet navy. The Black Sea Fleet was reestablished in 1930, with the Northern and Pacific fleets following in 1932 and 1933, respectively. It took another four years for that navy to take shape though, and in the end, it was a compromise between the traditional fleet of battleships and destroyers, perhaps augmented by aircraft carriers, and the Young School's notion of a guerilla force. What emerged was a navy that concentrated on submarines and land-based, organic naval aviation, with a doctrine calling for "limited command of the sea." The early Soviet navy was thus to be a largely defensive force, protecting the Soviet Union's long and vulnerable coastline, but also capable of protecting shipments of resources when necessary. Despite the wishes of some from both the

traditional and the Young School, it would have no aircraft carriers.

Scarcely had naval leaders come together in the restored Naval Commissariat (December 30, 1937) and agreed on this program when they were struck down in the Great Purges initiated by Stalin. Most of the advocates of the Young School were purged in 1937; in 1938, the navy's commander in chief, Admiral V.M. Orlov was arrested and shot. Almost all of the navy's leaders followed, as every fleet, down to the Caspian and Amur flotillas, was thoroughly purged. While the navy did not suffer the losses the army and air forces did in sheer numbers, proportionally, a greater percentage of its officers disappeared in the purges. Somehow, Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, the head of the Commissariat, survived.

Under Stalin's direction though, Kuznetsov and the new naval leadership set about building a more traditional navy that focused on destroyers, cruisers, and battleships. Traditional, czarist nomenclature was restored as well, with L. M. Geller and I. S. Isakov joining Kuznetsov as admirals, while the commanders of the Baltic (V. F. Tributs) and Pacific (I. S. Yumashev) fleets were vice-admirals.

When World War II started on September 1, 1939, the Soviet navy was thus in the process of a great change. In August 1939, the Naval Staff had finalized a building plan for the next 10 years containing 15 battleships of 59,150 tons, 16 battlecruisers of 35,240 tons, 2 light aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, 36 destroyer leaders, 163 destroyers, 442 submarines and many smaller vessels. Of the new ships, only 1 cruiser, 4 leaders, 13 destroyers, and 158 submarines had been completed by September 1, 1939. In addition, only 3 old battleships, 5 cruisers, 17 destroyers, and 7 submarines were available.

During the "Winter War" against Finland, from the end of November 1939 to March 1940, the Baltic Fleet contributed coastal bombardments from surface ships and submarine operations against the supply traffic to Finland. Only a few ships were sunk, and one submarine was lost. As a result of the war though, the borders of the USSR were pushed forward in the Arctic by the inclusion of the entire "Fisherman's Peninsula" and in the Baltic in the Karelian sector—thus improving the strategic naval situation of Leningrad—and by the acquisition of Hanko at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland as a new base. In the summer of 1940, the Baltic Fleet improved their base system further with the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. In the Black Sea, gains in Bessarabia created a larger buffer

for Odessa and allowed the establishment of a Danube flotilla.

The rising danger of a war with Germany forced the navy, in October 1940, to reduce the building program. Though Soviet intelligence agencies received many reports about German preparations for an attack, Stalin refused to believe Hitler would attack the Soviet Union before he concluded the war in the west. He even forbade preparations for a preventative counterattack into the German deployments proposed by his General Staff. The German attack on June 22, 1941, therefore caused great disorder and led to heavy losses, especially for the Soviet Army and Air Force, and also for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.

The big ocean-going fleet-building program had to be stopped. In all, 4 cruisers, 7 leaders, 30 destroyers, and 204 submarines had been commissioned, and the Soviets had added a further 4 submarines from the Estonian and Latvian fleets to their forces. Ships in the Far Eastern yards would be completed, while the bigger ships in the Western yards were laid up for completion after the war. Of the ships partially completed, only 3 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, 10 cruisers, 2 leaders, 42 destroyers, and 91 submarines would be launched.

The Baltic Fleet, now comprised of 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 2 leaders, 19 destroyers, and 70 submarines, had to defend the entrances to the Bay of Riga and the Gulf of Finland by laying mine barrages. At the same time, the Germans and the Finns tried to block the Baltic Fleet in by laying mines. The German attack forced the Soviets to abandon the Baltic bases and the Finnish harbor at Hanko, incurring great losses in the process. The "Juminda Barrage" was particularly effective, augmented as it was by air attacks against the ships in the enclosed harbor fortress at Kronstadt and in Leningrad.

While the Leningrad shipyards managed to complete 7 destroyers and 5 submarines in 1941, 1 battleship, 15 destroyers, and 28 submarines were lost in mine and air attacks, with many more vessels damaged.

From 1942 until October 1944, the Baltic Fleet was blocked in the innermost portion of the Gulf of Finland. Only the submarines could even try to break out into the open. This tactic met some success in 1942, when the Soviets launched 31 submarine operations; 22 of these breached the mine barriers and reached the Baltic, where they sank 25 ships. Twelve submarines, however, were lost in these actions. In 1943, the attempts to break through the barriers failed, and four more submarines were lost. Only after the Finnish truce of October 1944 did Soviet submarines again try to reach the Baltic Sea. By the end of the war, the remaining 22 submarines managed to sink 35 ships, including the liners *Wilhelm Gustloff*, *General Stuben*, and *Goya*. Vessels from the Baltic Fleet, in conjunction with aircraft, also supported the operations of the Red Army in late 1944 and early 1945, carrying out landing operations in the Gulf of Finland and on the Baltic Islands as well as attacking German naval forces in the area.

The Black Sea Fleet, in June 1941, consisted of 1 battleship, 6 cruisers, 3 leaders, 13 destroyers, and 44 submarines. The attack on the Ukraine that month forced the navy to first support and then evacuate the cities captured by German and Romanian forces in operations beginning in the Danubian estuaries, which lasted through mid-1942. Nikolaev, where the Soviets' main building yards were located, had to be evacuated in August 1941. The cruisers, leaders, and destroyers already launched there were towed to Caucasian ports while the remaining ships were destroyed before the German forces occupied the city. Between August and October,

Odessa was surrounded and had to be supported via landing operations by the fleet, which then evacuated the city successfully. The Soviets' main base at Sevastopol also had to be supplied and supported by naval operations for a period of six months, which involved nearly all available naval forces.

In December 1941, the fleet undertook a great amphibious operation against German forces occupying the Kerch Peninsula in an attempt to relieve the defenders at Sevastopol. By May 1942, however, the Germans had annihilated the Soviet ground forces, and only remnants could be evacuated. During the final German attack on Sevastopol, Soviet surface ships and submarines attempted to supply the fortress and evacuate the wounded up to the last minute. During these operations, which lasted through mid-July 1942, the Black Sea Fleet lost 1 cruiser, 2 leaders, 9 destroyers, and 12 submarines. Five of the submarines were lost during operations to interdict Axis sea traffic on the west coast of the Black Sea, an area heavily mined by the Germans and Romanians.

From August 1942 until September 1943, the Black Sea Fleet concerned itself primarily with the supply of harbors on the Caucasian coast that were endangered by the German offensive. This allowed the Red Army to hold Taupse, and naval landing operations coordinated with submarine and motor torpedo boat attacks assisted in the Soviet offensive on the Kuban Peninsula as well. Here Soviet forces successfully interrupted the sea traffic between Romania and Crimea. The attacks against German sea traffic along the west coast, however, largely failed.

The battle for Crimea began in October 1943 and lasted until May 1944. The Black Sea Fleet again tried to disrupt sea traffic from Konstanta to Sevastopol with submarines, light surface forces, and air attacks.

The larger ships were held out of these operations by Stalin's order. After a short pause in August 1944, the Red Army began its offensive into Romania. Once Romania capitulated, Bulgaria was occupied, and the Germans were forced to scuttle the remainder of their naval forces in the Black Sea, effectively ending naval combat in that theater. Between July 1942 and the end of naval operations there, the Black Sea Fleet lost 1 leader, 2 destroyers, and 14 submarines. A few small submarines were transferred via inland waterways from the Arctic and by rail from the Pacific to augment the fleet, but they arrived too late to participate in operations against German-Romanian shipping.

The Northern Fleet began the war with 8 destroyers and 15 submarines. Its first task was to support the Red Army in halting the German offensive toward Murmansk. The submarines were then sent to attack German supply traffic along the Norwegian coast from the Lofoten Islands to Kirkenes, though they met with limited success. A few British submarines sent to Murmansk for some months achieved slightly better results. The Northern Fleet was soon augmented by the transfer of eight submarines along interior waterways from the Baltic in 1941. A further 5 submarines came from the Pacific in 1942–1943, and 12 new submarines arrived from the Caspian during that time as well.

The fleet carried out operations throughout the war, inflicting some losses on German shipping and losing 25 submarines, mainly to mine barrages and antisubmarine forces. It also supported Allied convoys over the final portion of the route to Murmansk with destroyers, including three sent from the Pacific Fleet via the Northern Sea Route, and naval aircraft. The main defense burden for these convoys, however, fell to the British Home Fleet. In the later years of the war, British and American surface ships and

submarines assisted in defending the Northern Sea Route as well. Overall, the Northern Fleet suffered minimal losses beyond the submarines; only three destroyers and some escort vessels and auxiliaries were damaged or sunk.

The Pacific Fleet served as a reservoir of personnel and for the training of naval crews for most of the war. A few destroyers were transferred to the Northern Fleet along with some submarines though. In the last month of the war, strengthened by Lend-Lease deliveries of American ships, the Pacific Fleet took part in the war against Japan, conducting landing operations on the east coast of Korea, Sakhalin Island, and in the Kurile Islands. Lend-Lease played a vital role in securing the route along the Aleutian Islands to Kamchatka and Soviet bases in the Far East, especially Vladivostok. This proved to be a much safer route than either Murmansk or Arkhangelsk for Allied supplies to reach Russia, not least because of the Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression pact of March 1941. The fleet lost only five submarines through accidents during these operations, though two were eventually recovered. One more submarine was lost to a Japanese submarine attack just off the west coast of the United States while en route to the Northern Fleet, and one submarine went down in the final days of the war as well, sunk in all likelihood by a Japanese mine.

Outside of these major theater operations, the Soviet navy also used river flotillas. The first flotilla operations came on the Pripjet River in September 1939, against the Poles. Other operations followed: on the Danube and the Dnieper in 1941; on the Volga in 1942; and on the Danube again in 1944–1945. Flotillas carried out operations on Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega throughout the period 1941–1944 and assisted the Red Army in its operations on smaller seas, rivers, and lakes.

For the most part, the Soviet navy had played a secondary role in the Great Patriotic War, limited by its lack of material, poorly trained personnel, and a weakened command structure. Under the withering German assault, it was also natural that the navy should act to support the army. When coupled with the wartime losses of material, this rather underwhelming performance led again to questions about the future of the Soviet navy. There was no Black Sea or Baltic fleet worthy of the name, and the United States, rapidly emerging as a possible enemy, possessed vastly superior naval forces, having won a submarine war in the Atlantic and a carrier war in the Pacific. Catching up would require massive investment, and the Soviet Union, again devastated by war, hardly possessed sufficient resources for its domestic economy.

The short-term solution was to rebuild the navy from its strengths—submarines and naval aviation—augmented by captured German technology. The Soviet *Whisky*-class (the designations are American, since the Soviet terminology was unknown) submarines produced during 1951–1957, for instance, derived directly from the German Type XXI; the Soviet *Zulu*-class that followed was simply a larger version with slightly longer range. By 1946, the Soviets had developed MiG-9 and Yak-15 jets for naval aviation. While the Soviets still lagged behind the United States in both areas, this force was likely sufficient for defensive purposes, and even extended the Soviet defensive perimeter. So long as Stalin was alive, however, the long-term aim was the reestablishment of a big, ocean-going navy that could control the seas.

Before any major building program was launched though, Stalin died (March 8, 1953). His eventual successor, Nikita S. Khrushchev, placed little value on a traditional navy. For Khrushchev, the advent

of nuclear weapons and the corresponding aerial delivery systems rendered battleships and even aircraft carriers obsolete. Kuznetsov and the Soviet naval leadership strongly opposed this position, but by summer 1955, Khrushchev had accumulated sufficient support to dismiss Kuznetsov and replace him with Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who had gone so far as to hint that fleets might vanish altogether. Under his leadership, the Soviet navy scrapped or sold 300 surface vessels by 1957, and reduced its naval aviation arm significantly. At the end of the Korean War, the Soviet Union had roughly 4,000 naval aircraft; under Gorshkov, that number was reduced to under 800, as most planes were detailed to National Air Defense Units.

In the end though, Gorshkov was not so radical. While he supported Khrushchev's emphasis on technology and new weapons systems like nuclear submarines and surface-to-surface missiles, Gorshkov still believed there was a role for traditional ships. He fought to keep the construction of 14 *Sverdlov*-class cruisers online, and supervised the construction of 8 *Krupny*-class missile destroyers between 1959 and 1961.

Gorshkov's position was strengthened considerably by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, where the U.S. Navy successfully blockaded Cuba. Khrushchev's building program, which had focused on submarines with increased range and improved missile-launch capabilities, turned out to be worthless in this type of low-intensity conflict. In the first place, Soviet naval technology remained consistently behind American developments. The Soviet *Juliet*-class submarine (1959), for example, had two missile launchers fore and two aft, but was still outclassed by the USS *Enterprise* (1958), a nuclear-powered carrier that extended American range far beyond that of the *Juliets*. Soviet naval building under Khrushchev, despite

his emphasis on technology, also remained reactive. Central economic planning and a general lack of resources meant that once the Soviets found a solution to a problem, they tried to focus there; however, American technology continued to forge ahead, creating new problems for the Soviets.

This general lack of relative progress, along with the failure of many of Khrushchev's domestic schemes, like the Virgin Lands Program, and his increasingly unpredictable behavior led to his downfall in 1964. Leonid Brezhnev, who took over, was more conservative. Rather than pursue Khrushchev's "limited navy" concept, he put Soviet naval planning on a more traditional footing, emphasizing carrier-borne naval aviation alongside submarine-borne missiles. And, where Khrushchev had, grudgingly, approved two small carriers (the 17,500-ton *Moskva* and *Leningrad*, launched in 1964 and 1966, respectively) in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, between 1970 and 1985, the Soviet navy laid down four 36,000-ton *Kiev*-class carriers (*Kiev*, *Minsk*, *Novorossisk*, and *Baku*) and two 65,000-ton *Kuznetsov*-class carriers (*Kuznetsov*, and *Variag*). Combined with the 36,000-ton, nuclear-powered *Kirov*-class battlecruisers, the first of which was laid down in 1973 and commissioned in 1977, the Soviets possessed by 1980 a force capable of area control for the first time in their history. Only the ascent of Dmitry Ustinov as defense minister in 1976 prevented an even-larger construction program.

The major blow to the new Soviet navy, however, arrived in 1985. In the Ustinov regime, Soviet naval theorists had begun to challenge the carrier doctrine that had emerged in the 1970s, arguing that a more balanced fleet, based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and mid-sized carriers would be just as effective and cost far less. Such a force, they contended, would also fit better with

the Soviet Union's traditional defense structure emphasizing land forces. In the midst of this debate, in 1985, a new leader emerged in the Soviet Union: Mikhail Gorbachev. Like Khrushchev, Gorbachev intended to reform the Soviet Union, and for that he required resources; also like Khrushchev, he saw the traditional navy as both unnecessary and too costly. The Soviet submarine force was three times that of the United States, and increasingly lethal. In such circumstance, Gorshkov's navy—and Gorshkov—were unproductive burdens. Gorshkov was, in any case, already 75 years old and ready for retirement. Gorbachev replaced him with Admiral V.N. Chernavin, an advocate of the smaller force Gorbachev favored.

Under Gorbachev and Chernavin, the Soviet navy shifted its emphasis from open-water operations to defensive missions. The Soviets began to close port facilities in the Pacific, and surface ships increasingly remained at anchor in Soviet waters. In the 13th Five-Year Plan, set to begin in 1991, the navy would lose 45 surface vessels, 26 submarines, an air regiment, and a naval infantry unit. Policies such as these led to an attempt on the part of military hard-liners to oust Gorbachev in August 1991, but Chernavin numbered among the Soviet leader's supporters. Most of the navy leadership was more conflicted, but it hardly mattered. The attempt brought about the end of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Soviet navy. Major ports were lost in the Baltics and in Ukraine, and the ships that had been rusting away were now broken up or sold. As in 1917, the naval cupboard was nearly bare.

Timothy C. Dowling and Jürgen Rohwer

See also: *Aurora* (Protected Cruiser); Baltic Fleet Mutiny (March 1917); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); February (March) Revolution (1917);

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Gorbachev, Sergei Georgievich (1910–1988); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Korean War (1950–1954); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich (1904–1974); October (November) Revolution (1917) Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Ustinov, Dmitry Fyodorovich (1908–1984); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression

Pact. See Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939)

Nepenin, Adrian Ivanovich (1871–1917)

Russian navy admiral born on November 2, 1871, in Pskov province, Russia. Adrian Ivanovich Nepenin graduated from the Navy

School as a midshipman in 1892. His early service was in the Baltic Fleet and the Siberian Flotilla and he took part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1900–1901). At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) in February 1904, Nepenin was serving aboard the gunboat *Mandzhur* at Shanghai; blockaded there by the Japanese, the gunboat was scuttled by its crew, some of whom managed to reach Port Arthur, Nepenin among them. There he distinguished himself in command of the torpedo boat *Storozhevoi*.

After the war, Nepenin returned to the Baltic, where he served aboard a variety of ships before being appointed chief of the Communications Service of the Baltic Sea on June 12, 1911; he was promoted to captain first rank on December 9, 1911.

The Communications Service of the Baltic Sea was responsible for a series of observation posts and radio stations along Russia's Baltic coast; their purpose was to report the movements of ships and maintain radio contact with any Russian warships in their area. Nepenin also had charge of the Baltic Fleet's nascent air service.

The role of the Communications Service of the Baltic Sea expanded after the German light cruiser *Magdeburg* ran aground on Odensholm Island on August 26, 1914. Its signal book, captured by the Russians, laid the foundations not only for Britain's famous Room 40 O.B. code-breaking unit, but for Russian code-breaking as well. After somewhat haphazard initial efforts, a special radio interception station was established in a secluded forest at Shpitgamn in Estonia in 1915, linked by cable to Nepenin's headquarters in Revel, where the operations staff charted the movements of German ships as determined by intercepted signals and radio direction finding. Thanks to this detailed information on the situation at sea, it became a standard

procedure for ship and submarine commanders to receive a briefing from Nepenin before going out on missions. He was also given the right to contact ships at sea if radio information revealed the need for an urgent change during the course of an operation.

Nepenin was promoted to rear admiral on September 14, 1914. When Czar Nicholas II was persuaded in September 1916 to replace Vice Admiral Vasily A. Kanin as commander of the Baltic Fleet, Nepenin was tapped as his successor and promoted to vice admiral. He immediately set out to reverse Kanin's somewhat lax command style; unfortunately, his attempts to restore discipline did not sit well with the increasingly restive crews.

Nepenin also began planning more aggressive operations for the spring of 1917, including a plan for landing two divisions behind German lines. These plans were aborted by the March 1917 Russian Revolution, during which Nepenin found himself caught between crews on the verge of mutiny and the ambitions of Duma deputy Mikhail V. Rodzianko, who hoped to manipulate events and thereby become prime minister.

Arrogating to himself an authority he did not possess, Rodzianko ordered Nepenin to keep news of the czar's abdication secret from the crews. Nepenin reluctantly complied; meanwhile, rumors were already running rampant throughout the fleet, and in the end, mutinies broke out on the battleships, which were locked in the ice of the frozen harbor. Nepenin's failure to announce the czar's abdication aroused distrust among the sailors, and on March 17, 1917, while on his way to address a gathering of sailors, he was shot in the back and killed by an unknown assailant.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: Boxer Rebellion Russia and (1899–1903); Kanin, Vasily Aleksandrovich (1862–1927); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Neva River, Battle of the

The Battle of the Neva River near present-day St. Petersburg, Russia, was fought in AD 1240 by the forces of Prince Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod against an invading Swedish army. By surprising the Swedes and destroying most of their army, Alexander maintained Russian control over a strategic path to the Baltic Sea.

The Neva River flows 46 miles from Lake Ladoga to the Baltic Sea. In the 13th century, the Neva River and its surrounding area belonged to the city of Novgorod, an essentially autonomous Russian principality with ties to Kievan Rus'. Novgorod profited greatly from its control of this river, which provided an excellent trade route between the markets of the Baltic Sea and those of the Russian interior.

In 1240, the Swedish earl Birger invaded Novgorod's territory along the Baltic, calculating that the recent Mongol invasion of Russia would prevent other Russian territories from coming to Novgorod's aid. Prince Aleksander Yaroslavich of Novgorod learned of the Swedish attack, and he quickly led his troops to meet the invaders. On July 15, the Russian forces took the Swedes by surprise on the banks of the Neva, and the Russians secured a decisive victory. Because of that

triumph, Alexander was given the honorific title “Nevsky” (of the Neva). Alexander went on to win several other important victories for Novgorod.

The Russian victory on the Neva was strategically important in that it headed off what could have been a substantial invasion of Russian lands, and it secured Novgorod’s control over an important trade route. The battle’s greatest influence, however, may have come from its symbolic value. Alexander’s victory on the Neva has become a standard component in Russian folklore, and multiple governments have promoted it as a symbol of Russia’s ability to defend itself from foreign invaders. Alexander was recognized as a saint by the Russian Orthodox Church, and he was hailed as a military hero by both czarist regimes in the 18th century and Soviet regimes in the 20th century. The groundbreaking Russian film director Sergei Eisenstein created a landmark 1938 film about him—entitled *Alexander Nevsky*—with an original score by famed Russian composer Sergei Prokofiev.

Ryan Hackney

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Nevsky, Alexander (1220–1263)

Saint Alexander Nevsky is a heroic figure in Russian history. He defended the Rus’, founders of the Czarism of Russia,

against invading Mongols and Swedish armies. He was also an able politician and diplomat who negotiated an alliance with the powerful leaders of the “Golden Horde,” or Tatars, turning a potential enemy into a formidable ally.

Alexander Nevsky was born Aleksander Yaroslavich on May 30, 1220. His father, Prince Yaroslavich II, was the grand prince of Suzdal and a descendant of the family of Rurik, an eastern Scandinavian Viking who settled Novgorod (New City) in 860. Young Alexander is remembered for many exploits, but two of the most important were his defeat of the Swedish army at the Neva River battle on July 15, 1240, and The Battle on the Ice, where he defended Russia from German invaders on April 5, 1242. These



Nineteenth-century engraving of Alexander Nevsky, prince of Novgorod and Kiev, and grand prince of Vladimir. (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

battles, particularly Alexander's defeat of the Teutonic Knights, a religious-military order that restricted membership to Germans, took on a symbolic meaning for the Russian people during The Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) when Hitler sent his forces to conquer Russia.

Alexander was 19 years old when his small army defeated the Swedish. The victory strengthened his political influence and earned him the name “Nevsky,” which means “of the Neva.” Although his 1240 victory against the Swedes prevented a full-scale invasion, it was only two years later that he engaged in one of the most important battles in Russian history, known as The Battle on the Ice.

In 1938, Josef Stalin, leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, commissioned Sergei Eisenstein to make a film based on Alexander Nevsky's exploits. Eisenstein was the most likely choice because of his politically charged films like *The Strike*, *October*, and *Battleship Potemkin*, which critics considered his masterpiece prior to *Alexander Nevsky*.

The film *Alexander Nevsky* was supposed to be the “supreme” expression of patriotic, proletarian sentiment. It was made at a time when war between the Soviet Union and Germany seemed inevitable so the allegorical connections between the Teutonic Knights of 13th century and Nazi Germany of present-day Russia were impossible to overlook.

Of course, the climactic sequence in the movie was The Battle on the Ice (on Lake Peipus), in which the Russian people brutally defeated their German invaders. They were inspired in part by Alexander Nevsky's rallying call: “Russia Lives!” Paraphrasing a passage from the Bible, he declared that those who come to Russia with sword in hand would perish by the sword. It was

his solemn belief that with the combined strength of the Russian people Russia would stand forever. Alexander Nevsky died in Gorodets while returning from a visit to Sarai in 1262. Prior to his death, he took monastic vows; his body was interred in the Great Abbey at Vladimir.

John G. Hall

See also: Ice, Battle on the (April 5, 1242); Neva River, Battle of the; October (November) Revolution (1917)

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Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855)

As czar of Russia from 1825 to 1855, Nicholas I developed an integral, absolute system of governing that vested all decision-making power in the autocrat. His reign was one of increasing suppression for all dissident elements of Russian society as he strove to unite Russia as a single, monolithic nation based on a shared culture and religion and centralized in the monarch. Such unity, however, came only at the price of severe oppression for all people and ideas not specifically Russian in character. It also masked Russia's developing social problems and its failure to industrialize or modernize as the other nations of Europe were doing in the mid-19th century.

Nicholas was born on July 6, 1796, the third son of the future Czar Paul I. His elder brother would ascend to the Russian throne as Czar Alexander I. Nicholas's education was supervised by his parents, rather than his

grandmother, Catherine II, who had supervised the education of his two older brothers. As a child, Nicholas evinced a great interest in all things military.

On July 13, 1817, Nicholas married the Prussian grand duchess Charlotte, known as Alexandra after she joined the Russian Orthodox Church. She was of poor health and sickly, but she shared Nicholas's love of the military. Nicholas and Alexandra would have seven children, one of whom would eventually become Czar Alexander II.

In early December 1825, Nicholas received word that his eldest brother Alexander I had died unexpectedly while in southern Russia. His other brother, Constantine, had relinquished his rights to the throne after his marriage to a Polish woman who was not of royal blood. Nicholas, therefore, was the unwilling heir.

On December 26, after several weeks of uncertainty and confusion, Nicholas finally ascended the throne. He faced a number of problems, including an enserfed peasantry, the poor condition of the state's finances, an impoverished nobility, underdeveloped industry, and a poor court system. He also quickly faced his first political crisis.

Members of the secret Northern Society planned a revolt, which became known as the Decembrist Uprising. Gathering in the Senate Square, they demanded a constitution, and the accession of Constantine, who they assumed was the legitimate heir. Although the revolt was quickly crushed, its psychological and political ramifications made Nicholas acutely aware of the dangers such an uprising posed to the stability of Russian absolute autocracy and thus fostered his lifelong fear of revolution.

Ruling mainly from fear rather than confidence, Nicholas proved to be a strict and harsh ruler with an almost maniacal predilection for duty and order. Obsessed with

maintaining the monarchical powers he had inherited from his ancestors, Nicholas attempted to enact a few minor reforms to improve the lives of his people and thus stave off revolution or any other attempts to undermine his authority.

Nicholas took a two-pronged approach to this. In 1826, he created the Third Section, a secret police that reported on any deviations from accepted behavior by Russians. This was only the clearest example of Nicholas's wish to keep potentially dangerous ideas from the masses and preserve the social elite from Western influences. It was also his attempt to suppress the organization of the kind of discontent that had led to the failed Decembrist Uprising. He also instituted a



As czar of Russia from 1825 to 1855, Nicholas I developed an integral, absolute system of governing that vested all decision-making power in the autocracy. (Library of Congress)

strict censorship regime, and limited access to higher education.

Nicholas drastically increased the Russian bureaucracy during his reign by creating several new bureaus and departments, all of which were run by his military cronies who reported directly to him. If a committee could not solve a particular administrative problem, Nicholas simply formed a new committee, which then encountered the same problems as had the first committee.

Nicholas did make some preliminary efforts at reform. He recognized that no bigger problem plagued Russian society than the poor conditions of the serfs, and during his reign, nine different committees were established to enact reforms in this area, although most of the committees' efforts proved fruitless. The most successful was led by Count Paul Kiselev, who implemented reforms for the state peasants—those serfs who were controlled by the government. Kiselev's reforms centered around shifting the tax burden from the peasants to the land, thus increasing taxes for the nobility, and creating a series of social programs to make the peasants' lives easier, including primary schools, medical facilities, limited self-government, and small land allotments.

Although Russia lagged far behind such Western nations in terms of industrialization and modernization, Nicholas did little to bridge the gap. Instead, his love of the military prompted him to focus all of his efforts on building up Russia's military during the 1830s and 1840s. Russia's military prowess played a central role in the policy that dominated his reign—the doctrine of "Official Nationality." This ideology, first articulated publicly in 1833, promoted the triumvirate values of autocracy (as embodied by the monarchy), orthodoxy (as espoused by the Russian Orthodox Church), and nationality (promoted through the elevation of all things

Russian and the suppression of minority cultures). To promote this doctrine, Nicholas strove for national greatness, using the military as well as censorship and other forms of social control to cultivate the image of Russia as the center of the civilized world.

During the final years of his reign, Nicholas's carefully crafted image of both Russia and his power began to crack. The wave of liberal reforms that swept across Europe in 1848–1849 was ruthlessly suppressed in Russia but not without fomenting some discontent. The revolutions alarmed Nicholas to such an extent that all efforts at reform in Russia came to an abrupt halt. Russian citizens were prohibited from traveling abroad. Censorship tightened dramatically, and whole disciplines of thought were restricted, including literature, philosophy, and constitutional law. Such repression eventually earned Nicholas the reputation as "the czar who froze Russia for 30 years."

The disastrous Crimean War, however, showed the world just how backward Russia had become. The Russian military forces suffered several humiliating defeats at the hands of the British, which emphasized not just the inferiority of Russia's military but also the country's lack of industrialization, poor economy, and ineffective centralized government.

Nicholas did not live to see the full extent of Russia's defeat, however. On March 2, 1855, Nicholas died after suffering from a slight cold that took a turn for the worse. He was succeeded by his son, Alexander II, who initiated a series of sweeping reforms in Russia.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Crimean War (1853–1856); Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825); Paul I (1754–1801)

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Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918)

Last czar of Russia. Born the son of Czar Alexander III and Empress Marie Fyodorovna, daughter of King Christian of Denmark, on May 6, 1868. He was the eldest of three boys and two girls. He grew up in the Anichkov Palace in St. Petersburg and at Gatchina, just outside the city. Alexander's imposing personality overwhelmed young Nicholas. Yet, he became a firm believer in autocracy and the idea of divine right, which he inherited from his father.

While Nicholas proved to be proficient in languages, his training in politics was woefully deficient. Alexander, whom most people expected to have a long life, did not allow Nicholas to have any experience in the affairs of state. When Nicholas turned 21, however, Alexander appointed him to the State Council and to the Committee of Ministers, both of which were purely ceremonial, but nonetheless had the potential to inform Nicholas on the social and political issues of the day. Overall, the experience did not give Nicholas the political experience necessary for the role he was expected to fulfill.

Czar Alexander III died on October 20, 1894, at a surprisingly young age of 49. His death suddenly elevated Nicholas from czarovich to "Czar of All the Russias," a post for which his father had given him little preparation. During the period of mourning, Nicholas married Princess Alix, the daughter

of the grand duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, on November 14, 1894. Despite her ambivalence throughout their courtship, she then converted to the Orthodox Church and was baptized with the name Alexandra Fyodorovna. Throughout his reign, Nicholas was devoted to Alexandra and children, Marie, Olga, Tatiana, Anastasia, and Aleksei, who suffered from hemophilia. His qualities as husband and father, however good, did not qualify Nicholas for the role of czar.

Upon his accession, Nicholas declared that he would continue to uphold the principles of autocracy as his father had, which dashed hopes of political reform among Russian liberals; Nicholas discounted such hopes as "senseless dreams" in an 1895 address. The entire government served at his pleasure. There were some capable ministers, notably Sergei Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, who



The indecisiveness and fatalism of Nicholas II led to disaster for Russia in two wars and to the end of the Romanov dynasty. (Library of Congress)

made solid efforts to modernize Russia's economy. The Okhrana, or secret police, enforced the policy of autocracy, which brutally suppressed any dissent. Russification was imposed on the various nationalities of the Russian Empire, most notably the Poles and the Finns. Overall, the imperial bureaucracy was slow and inefficient in meeting the needs of its subjects, both in the cities and in the fields, which sowed the seeds for revolution.

Because of his inexperience and political naiveté, Nicholas proved obtuse to the changes overtaking the world. A faction of expansionists, particularly A.M. Bezobrazov and V.M. Vonliarliarsky, induced Nicholas to support the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, with the purpose of extending Russia's influence into Asia and to rally popular support for the government. Instead, a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of the Japanese triggered a domestic crisis. Nevertheless, the majority of the Russian people still saw Nicholas as a father figure and protector and hoped reforms might save them and Russia.

On January 9, 1905, however, that image was shattered, on what has come to be known as "Bloody Sunday," when approximately 150,000 peaceful protesters were fired upon by troops outside the Winter Palace. The massacre precipitated waves of civil unrest throughout Russia. Defeats at Mukden and in the naval Battle of Tsushima forced a reluctant Nicholas to negotiate peace in the Treaty of Portsmouth of August 1905, and limited his ability to suppress the unrest. After much resistance, therefore, Nicholas issued the October Manifesto, promising for the first time in Russian history "freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and association" and the creation of a Duma, or parliament.

Nicholas did not relish his role as a constitutional monarch, which clashed with his

belief in pure autocracy. He therefore undermined the Duma's independence, since he had final approval over all decision-making. He repeatedly dissolved assemblies he disagreed with, and increasingly restricted the franchise. Social tensions heightened further, when Pyotr Stolypin, whose reforms might have stabilized Russia's peasantry, was assassinated in 1911.

Nicholas's reign unraveled with the coming of World War I. Russia's involvement was part of the spiral of events that followed the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, and Nicholas demonstrated his characteristic indecisiveness in dealing with them. Of the major belligerents, Russia was perhaps the least prepared to fight a modern war, and the early battles exposed Russian inefficiency both at home and at the front, yet Nicholas refused to allow reforms that might have improved the condition of the military. Nicholas's fatal mistake though, was taking personal command of the Russian army in August 1915, leaving Alexandra to rule in his stead. Alexandra's German heritage and rumors of her involvement with the mystic Grigory Rasputin made her a target for criticism from all levels of society. Political and social leaders soon lost what little faith they had in the czar, and by the winter of 1916, unrest was spreading both in the army and on the home front.

Amid the bread riots and the breakdown of social order in the March Revolution of 1917, Nicholas abdicated as czar under pressure from his generals. He also abdicated for Aleksei because doctors predicted the czar would not survive in his condition if he were to be separated from his family. Nicholas and his family became virtual prisoners of the Provisional Government, and later on, by the Bolsheviks. As long as they were alive, they continued to be a rallying point for anti-Bolshevik forces during the

Russian Civil War. On July 18, 1918, at Ekaterinburg, therefore, Nicholas and his family were executed by their Bolshevik captors, under the command of Yakov Yurovsky.

Dino E. Buenviaje

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Bloody Sunday; February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); October (November) Revolution (1917); Revolution of 1905; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929)

Russian army general and commander of the Russian army during the early stages of World War I. Born in St. Petersburg on November 18, 1856, Nikolai Nikolaevich (“the Younger”) was a member of the Russian imperial family and received the customary Russian military education. He completed the Nikolaevsky Engineering School in 1873 and graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1886.

During the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War, Nikolai Nikolaevich served first as an aide to the Russian field commander,

his father, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (“the Elder”), and then in the Guards Cavalry. A major general by 1885, during 1895–1905, he served as the army’s inspector general of cavalry.

In 1901, during the reign of his nephew, Czar Nicholas II, Grand Duke Nikolai was promoted to general of cavalry. Four years later, during the October Revolution of 1905, he enhanced his reputation as a political liberal by refusing to suppress unrest and pushing the czar toward constitutional reform.

The grand duke gained the reputation as a military reformer during the period after the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. He headed the Council of State Defense during 1905–1908, coordinating the operational tasks of the army and navy. In response to unjust criticism from the Duma, he resigned from the Council on State Defense in 1908 and became inspector general of cavalry and commander of the St. Petersburg Military District.

On August 2, 1914, during the Russian mobilization for war, Czar Nicholas II appointed his uncle commander in chief of the army. This came as a surprise in military circles because of the grand duke’s lack of combat experience and of the operational and administrative skills required in this post. Grand Duke Nikolai ordered a series of offensives that proved to be his primary contribution to the 1914 campaign, but he did not control daily operations. Continued military reversals, although hardly the fault of the grand duke, led Czar Nicholas II to remove his uncle on August 21, 1915, and take command of the army himself. The grand duke then became the head of the Caucasus Military Region.

During the February 1917 revolution, Grand Duke Nikolai urged his nephew to abdicate. He then retired and moved to the Crimea. In March 1919, he went abroad,

living out his final years in Italy and France. He died in Antibes, France, on January 5, 1929.

Joseph D. Montagna

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russia, Army; Russia, Revolution of March 1917; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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NKVD

The Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*), abbreviated as NKVD, was the main civil and security police organization of the Soviet Union between 1934 and 1943. During that period, it enforced political terror and repression for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leader, Josef Stalin.

The NKVD controlled the regular police (including traffic, criminal, and railroad police, fire departments, and border guards), but it is best remembered for its expansion and rule over the system of prison camps (the Gulag), and terror unleashed by the Main Directorate for State Security (*Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti*, or GUGB) against all elements of Soviet society and the peoples of those territories and nations that came under Soviet control before and during World War II. It was through the NKVD that Stalin conducted the purges

of the late 1930s in which millions of Soviet citizens were arrested, sent to the Gulag, or executed, often without trial.

As the guardian of the Soviet state, the NKVD inherited the task of policing its opponents from the *Cheka* (the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter Revolution and Sabotage, December 1917–February 1922) and the OGPU (*Obedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie*, or Unified State Political Administration). Its formation was the product of the prevailing social and political chaos that resulted from agricultural collectivization and the massive drive for industrialization that took place in the early 1930s. The dislocation created by these policies left millions homeless, unemployed, and starving, and generated a wave of crime (often hand in hand with resistance to government violence), theft, hoarding of food, and other illegal activities that the decentralized and fragmented police and legal system could not control. In addition, rising international tension, particularly the Nazi takeover in Germany and Japan's growing aggressiveness in the Far East heightened the fears of Stalin and the rest of the Soviet leadership that the USSR was being encircled by hostile capitalist countries that would try to undermine the Soviet Union from within.

These real and imagined dangers fed Stalin's paranoia and also reflected an ongoing power struggle between established party and government bureaucrats on the one hand, and ambitious mid- and lower-level factions seeking to replace them on the other hand. The new NKVD was created in late 1934 under the direction of Genrikh K. Yagoda who had also run the OGPU and had advocated a stronger, more centralized police agency for a number of years. In its structure and authority, the NKVD corresponded nicely with Stalin's conception of a

hypercentralized state with a security organ directly responsible to him. Between 1934 and 1936, Yagoda expanded the NKVD's size and power.

The new commissariat's most notorious feature, apart from the Gulag, was the *Troikas*—extra-legal police courts empowered to arrest and sentence suspected criminals and political offenders to death or imprisonment at their own discretion. Through its Foreign Department, the NKVD maintained surveillance over Soviet foreign diplomatic missions and foreign communist parties, and the Foreign Department was responsible for intelligence and espionage against foreign governments. During the Spanish Civil War, the NKVD used its aid to the Republican government to implement a police state in Republican-controlled areas. It ran secret prisons and conducted executions aimed more at anti-Soviet leftist organizations than at Nationalist elements.

Under the direction of Yagoda and his two successors—Nikolai Yezhov (1936–1938) and Lavrenty Beria (1938–1943)—the NKVD became the most feared institution in the Soviet Union. Ironically, Yagoda became a victim of his own creation as an increasingly suspicious Stalin turned on him. Deserted by the Soviet dictator and undermined by Yezhov, Yagoda was summarily removed as NKVD chief in September 1936 for failing to unmask the regime's opponents. A *troika* subsequently charged him with being a German agent, and he was executed in March 1937.

Yagoda's fall and Yezhov's ascent provided an overture to a reign of terror that lasted from September 1936 until the end of 1938, the so-called *Yezhovshchina*. None of the government or party institutions, including the Red Army, the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or even the NKVD itself escaped the purges or the

NKVD's reach. Indeed, in the autumn of 1936, Yezhov removed most operatives that had been installed by regional party heads and made his headquarters in Moscow responsible for all appointments. Overall, an estimated 650,000 individuals were shot in 1937–1938 and another 630,000 sent to the Gulag.

The NKVD ultimately turned upon itself. When Stalin decided to halt the purges in late 1938, Yezhov—like Yagoda before him—was arrested for sabotage and allowing the purges to become excessive. He was tried and executed. In addition, all of the NKVD's high-level operatives associated with Yezhov were purged along with their mentor. This heavy loss of experienced personnel left the NKVD in turmoil. It fell to Beria, who Stalin brought in from Soviet Georgia where he had led both the Georgian NKVD and the Georgian Communist Party, to restore order. Beria, a skilled organizer and administrator, had the support of Stalin (also a Georgian) and was able to quickly rebuild the NKVD's security administration.

In the wake of the purges, Stalin and the politburo moved to curb the NKVD's discretionary powers to arrest and execute those suspected of opposition to the regime. In a politburo order of November 1938 signed by Stalin, the *troikas* were disbanded and the mass executions halted. Beria took steps to upgrade and professionalize the personnel in the GUGB. Nevertheless, the security organs of the NKVD, like the other state institutions it had terrorized, had been devastated by the purges. As of July 1940, only 3 percent of NKVD staff had more than one year of experience. Moreover, continuing reorganizations caused more administrative chaos; for example, in February 1941, the NKVD's Special Sections responsible for military counterintelligence were transferred to the army and navy. The GUGB was separated from the

NKVD and renamed the People's Committee for State Security (*Narodnyi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or NKGB). In July 1941, shortly after the German invasion, the NKVD and NKGB were reunited. The military counterintelligence arms reverted to NKVD control in January 1942.

In the early months of the Russo-German War, the NKVD's functions and power expanded again. Much of this growth was a function of Beria's influence in the State Defense Committee and the desperate conditions in the wake of the German attack, as well as both his and Stalin's pathological suspicions. The need for labor from the Gulag to build roads, railroads, port facilities, and airfields, and to move and build armaments factories in Siberia and the Urals away from the combat areas led to the expansion of Beria's power and influence. NKVD operatives also served in Soviet-controlled partisan units in German-occupied territory screening rank-and-file members for suspicious activities and affiliations. In addition, the NKVD's military counterintelligence arm conducted surveillance of Red Army combat arms, monitoring political opinion within the ranks. Thousands of Red Army soldiers were shot on suspicion of defeatism or antistate views. NKVD rear-area blocking units hunted down suspected deserters and executed them.

As the war shifted in the Soviet's favor, the NKVD was once again divided into two parts: the GUGB was transformed into a separate NKGB. The armed forces counterintelligence branch was separated from NKVD control, renamed SMERSH (*smert shpionam*, or Death to Spies) and placed directly under the Army General Staff. It is unclear to what extent this reorganization was instigated by Beria's rivals in Stalin's inner circle (or Stalin himself) to curb his power or motivated by the need to streamline the

efficiency and effectiveness of the Soviet security organizations. Beria managed to retain control of the Gulag administration and the NKVD's combat arm, which amounted to several hundred thousand troops. His allies kept control of the NKGB. Furthermore, Beria kept his positions in the SDC and the politburo.

Although the reorganization reduced the NKVD's power, it still had considerable influence. It was responsible for the massive deportations of Volga Germans, Crimean Tartars, and other ethnic groups suspected of having collaborated with the Germans. The NKVD also trained recruits from Eastern European countries for the secret police agencies that the Soviets installed as the Red Army overran those countries in 1944 and 1945.

Following the war's end in 1945, the Soviet security apparatus underwent further reorganization. In March 1946, the NKVD/NKGB was subordinated to the new Ministry of State Security (*Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti*, or MGB). Its arrest powers were subject to the Procurator General and the authority of the Council of Ministers, where Beria continued to serve as chairman. Following Stalin's death in March 1953 and Beria's subsequent arrest and execution, the former NKVD/NKGB/MGB was created as an independent agency—the Committee for State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or KGB) which was subject to strict party and government control. It remained the primary state security organ of the Soviet Union until the USSR folded in 1991. Although fabled in Western Cold War lore, the KGB never enjoyed the power of its murderous predecessor.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); *Cheka* (*Chrezvychaynaya komissiya*); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Great

Purges and the Military (1934–1938); KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security); Partisans (*Partizans*, Guerrillas), World War II; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II; World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Norrköping Bay, Actions Off (June 1916)

A pair of skirmishes between Russian and German naval forces off the Swedish coast. Swedish iron ore was vital to the German war effort, and while ore ships could take advantage of the protection offered by neutral Sweden's territorial waters for most of the journeys, there were several points where, because of the configuration of the coast or navigational hazards, they had to sail beyond the three-mile limit. One of these points was off Norrköping Bay, about 75 miles (roughly 120 kilometers) south of Stockholm.

Following the depredations of Allied (mainly British) submarines in the Baltic in 1915, in April 1916, the German Naval Staff instituted a convoy system to protect the iron ore trade. The escorts consisted of small auxiliary vessels and occasionally a

“Q-ship.” The need for this protection was emphasized when, on May 17, 1916, the Russian submarine *Volk* sank three merchant ships sailing independently.

The Russian Baltic Fleet staff decided to take advantage of the short summer nights to carry out surface raids on these convoys. The strike force would be composed of the new fast destroyers that were then entering service, while cruisers would provide covering support. The first such raid took place on the night of June 13–14, when the Russian destroyers *Novik*, *Pobeditel*, and *Grom*, supported by the cruisers *Riurik*, *Oleg*, and *Bogatyr*, intercepted a convoy off Norrköping Bay. Because the convoy was showing lights, the commander of the Russian destroyer force, Rear Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak, concerned that the ships might be Swedish, fired warning shots, alerting the convoy escorts.

In response, the escort commander boldly interposed his three small auxiliary minesweepers between the convoy and the Russian destroyers and laid a smoke screen. As the minesweepers retired, the Russians made out what looked like a bigger prize—a large steamer trailing the convoy, which was in fact the Q-ship *Hermann*, armed with four 105-millimeter guns. Although it was quickly overwhelmed by Russian gunfire and torpedoes, by the time the Q-ship had been sunk, the convoy and its escorts had reached Swedish waters. The sinking of the unfortunate *Hermann* was therefore the only result of the action.

The next Russian sortie proved even more disappointing. On June 29, the destroyers *Pobeditel*, *Orfei*, and *Grom*, supported by the cruisers *Gromoboi* and *Diana*, were put to sea to intercept another convoy; but before long, the commander of the group, Rear Admiral A. P. Kurosh, was

informed that the German convoy would not be sailing due to foggy weather, information probably obtained by the Russian radio intelligence service. Nevertheless, Kurosh decided to continue the operation. About an hour before midnight, the Russian destroyers, which had separated from the cruisers as planned, encountered a Swedish steamer; after establishing its nationality, they released the ship, but it apparently passed on a warning, for when the Russian destroyers reached Norrköping Bay, they encountered eight German destroyers, including three newly commissioned ships (*V77*, *V78*, and *G89*) of the 20th Half-Flotilla.

Thanks to their superior speed, the Russian destroyers were able to lead the German ships toward the Russian cruisers. The cruisers' first salvos straddled the German destroyers, which launched torpedo attacks at ranges as close as 5,000 yards. The Germans then retired behind a smoke screen. The action lasted only a few minutes, with no hits being scored by either side.

Russian raids by surface forces on the German convoys came to an end after the destroyers *Vnushitelnyi* and *Bditelnyi* seized the German steamers *Worms* and *Lissabon* on July 11, 1916, in Swedish territorial waters in the Gulf of Bothnia. Swedish diplomatic protests led the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to insist on, and *Stavka* (Russian military headquarters) to approve, a ban on similar raids in future. Thus in terms of sinkings and captures, the Russian raids had little effect; but they did force the Germans to allocate more substantial forces for the protection of their convoys.

Stephen McLaughlin

See also: Baltic Operations, Sea; Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Navy, Russian (ca. 1700–1917)

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Northern System

The Northern System, also referred to as the *Northern Accord* or the *Northern Alliance*, was a network of alliances brokered by Count Nikita I. Panin, foreign minister under Czarina Catherine II.

After the June 1762 revolution and coup d'état that placed Catherine II on the throne, Count Panin assumed control of Russian foreign affairs and became a major figure in Russian foreign policy. Panin's Northern System influenced Russia's foreign affairs for the next decade and more. The principles and foundations for a Northern System developed early Panin's career in Russian foreign policy. The Northern System was not simply a treaty of peace that followed the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), it was Russian policy molded into an international agreement to dominate the internal affairs of Sweden and Poland, to foster closer ties with Prussia and Denmark, to concentrate Russian power on events in the Baltic Sea states, and to maximize Russia's commercial advantages. Achieving such ambitious goals required allies, which Russia found in Prussia and Denmark. The nascent Northern System intended Prussia and Denmark to play the role of active powers with Poland, Sweden, and Saxony as passive powers, while Russia played the master to all.

Panin recognized the threat of French power on the European continent that stemmed

from French support of Russia's three enemies—Poland, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire—and France's early success in the colonial war with England. Austria—until recently a Russian ally—was now aligned with France as well, and Russia sought a counter to this “southern alliance.” The Polish situation dominated Russian foreign policy from Catherine II's ascendance to the throne in July 1762, however, with the major issue being who would replace the elderly Polish king, Augustus III, upon his death. Catherine II and Count Panin hoped to arrange the election of a Polish ruler who owed his crown entirely to Russia.

The first parts of the Northern System therefore involved Prussia, with whom the Russians shared an interest in weakening Poland. The two states signed first a peace treaty in 1762, and then a treaty of alliance on April 11, 1764. The alliance also included Great Britain. Panin then stage-managed the election of Catherine's former lover, Stanislaw Poniatowski, as king of Poland in 1764. Catherine II further cooperated with Prussia in partitioning the Polish state in 1772. This expansion not only eliminated a French ally in the east but also increased the strength of both Prussia and Russia vis-à-vis the Habsburg Empire. Ironically, Panin opposed the partition and thus fell out of favor; with his decline, Catherine increasingly turned her attention southward.

Even though the Northern System did not fully realize its goals, the long-term vision inherent in the Northern System together with the short-term exigencies of the Polish situation brought about Russia's international coming of age.

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See also: Panin, Nikita Ivanovich (1718–1783); Catherine II (“the Great”); 1729–1796);

Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Novgorod, Siege of (1169)

Twelfth-century battle between the principalities of Novgorod and Suzdal (Vladimir-Suzdal). Known as the Lord Novgorod the Great, the city of Novgorod was an important economic and political component of Kievan Rus'. As a trading center, it connected northwestern Russia and the Baltic with the Dnieper River trade route to Kiev and the Black Sea, and was often under the rule of the sons of the grand prince of Kiev. The death of the grand prince of Kiev, Vladimir Monomakh, in 1125, and the death of his son and successor Mstislav in 1132, all but completed the decline of Kievan Rus' and its political fragmentation into a new appanage system of rule. The principalities of Kievan Rus' began to act as independent states, effectively ending the central authority of Kiev.

With its access to extensive trade networks and increasing wealth, Novgorod grew to become an important principality, control over which enhanced a prince's position in

the struggle for seniority. One of the most prominent princes of the time, Andrei Bogolyubsky, prince of Suzdal, and son of Yuri Dolgoruky (grand prince of Kiev, 1155–1157), sought to exert control in order to restore the dynastic traditions of succession and establish stability not seen in Kievan Rus since his grandfather Monomakh was grand prince of Kiev.

When Novgorod evicted Prince Sviatoslav in 1167—an event that violated Bogolyubsky’s belief of the traditional order of succession—he sent forces from Suzdal to close roads and trade routes leading to Novgorod, and intercepted Novgorod’s northern tribute collection to convince Novgorod to return Sviatoslav to the throne. With these efforts failing, Bogolyubsky ordered the army of Suzdal to Novgorod in the winter of 1169. Emissaries of Suzdal entered Novgorod and, after three days of negotiations, failed to return Sviatoslav to Novgorod.

On February 25, the army of Suzdal attacked the city and fought the entire day. In sharp contrast to Bogolyubsky recent successes against Kiev, the Novgorodians defeated the army of Suzdal; many Suzdalians were killed or taken prisoner. Legend describes Novgorod’s successful defense and victory over the army of Suzdal as the miraculous intercession of Our Lady, the Holy Mother of God. Even though Bogolyubsky was defeated militarily, Novgorod still depended on imports of grain for its food, as well as its survival. With food supplies dwindling and Bogolyubsky in possession of both Suzdal and Kiev, which included the important trade routes vital to its commerce and wealth, Novgorod sued for peace and restored Sviatoslav to the throne in 1170.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Bogolyubsky, Andrei (1111–1174); Dolgoruky, Yuri (1099?–1157)

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Novik (Cruiser)

Constructed in Schichau, Germany, between 1898 and 1901, the protected cruiser *Novik* was the only ship of its class. Commanded by Captain Maximilian Schultz, the *Novik* was at Port Arthur when the Japanese attacked in February 1904, opening the Russo-Japanese War. While most of the Russian fleet remained in the harbor following the April 22 death of Admiral Stepan Makarov, the *Novik* escaped.

Following the August 10, 1904, Battle of the Yellow Sea, the speedy *Novik* slipped away and headed for Vladivostok, where a portion of the Russian Pacific Fleet was operating as the Vladivostok Independent Cruiser Squadron. Schultz chose to loop around the Japanese islands, hoping to avoid detection and the blockade at the Tsushima Straits. The *Novik* was spotted nonetheless on August 19 just off Yakushima, and the Japanese gave chase with the cruisers *Chitose* and *Tsushima*. The *Novik*, which displaced over 3,000 tons and had a top speed of 25 knots, fled north, but the Japanese caught up the next afternoon outside the Russian port of Korsakovsk, on Sakhalin Island.

When the *Novik* again tried to flee, it took a hit from the *Tsushima* that penetrated the ship’s 76-millimeter armor, damaged the boilers, and flooded the steering compartment.

The *Novik* carried six 12-centimeter (cm) guns, six three-pounders, and five 3.8-cm guns, and managed to score two hits on the *Tsushima* even while retreating to Korsakovsk. The *Chitose* remained outside the port, however, and with the *Novik* damaged, Schultz decided to scuttle it rather than try to fight his way out.

When the *Chitose* finally ventured into Korsakovsk on August 21, the Russians were in the process of removing anything of value they could carry. The Japanese shelled the beached cruiser until it was a wreck; most of the crew escaped to serve with the Vladivostok Squadron.

After the war, the Japanese salvaged the *Novik* and recommissioned it as the *Suzuya*. It served until 1913.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Makarov, Stepan Ossipovich (1848–1904); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Vitgeft, Villem (Vilgelm) Karlovich (1847–1904)

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Novikov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1900–1976)

Soviet army marshal. Born in the village of Kryukovo in Kostroma Province on November 19, 1900, Aleksandr Novikov was called up for the Red Army in 1919 during the Civil

War. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1920. He took part in the bloody suppression of the Kronstadt Revolt in March 1921, where he was impressed with the role of aircraft in a ground-attack role. In 1921, Novikov attended the field academy of the Red Army at Vystrel, and in 1927, he attended the Frunze Military Academy. In 1933, despite his defective eyesight, Novikov secured a transfer from the infantry to the air force and learned to fly. In 1935, he took command of the 42nd Light Bomber Squadron, and in March 1936, he won promotion to colonel.

Novikov managed to avoid the great purge of the military, although many of his colleagues were arrested and shot in 1937 and 1938. Novikov became chief of staff of the Karelian Front during the 1939–1940 Soviet-Finnish Winter War. As a major general, he commanded aviation in the Leningrad Military District, which became the Northern Front after the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Novikov became deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force in February 1942. Promoted to lieutenant general in April, he received command of the Red Army Air Force, a post he held until March 1946. In this position, Novikov was responsible for coordinating Soviet air assets in Stalingrad, Kursk, and Operation BAGRATION. Promoted to colonel general in 1943, Novikov was the first Soviet marshal of aviation and one of only two officers to be made chief marshal of aviation in the war. Following the defeat of Germany, Novikov directed air actions against the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria.

Arrested in March 1946 in a purge of the military as Josef Stalin removed war heroes whom he feared might emerge as rivals, Novikov was held under strict confinement from 1946 to 1953. He was released in May 1953 following Stalin's death. Rehabilitated the next month, he held a succession

of important posts, including commander of long-range aviation units and deputy chief of staff of the now-independent Soviet Air Force in 1954–1955. Novikov retired in 1956 because of ill health. He died in Moscow on February 3, 1976.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BAGRATION, Operation; Frunze Academy; Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Nuremberg Trial (and Others)

From November 1945 until October 1946, the Soviet Union, alongside its wartime allies, convened the Nuremberg Trial, the major war crimes trial for Europe. This was neither the first nor last war crimes trial in which the Soviet Union participated. The Bolsheviks had held military tribunals during the Civil War to try Red Army soldiers for treason and espionage. Following their victory, Soviet leaders used the legal system to secure their power. Josef Stalin, in particular, utilized political show trials to eliminate “enemies of the state” and ensure that no one would oppose his rule.

Such trials continued during World War II. Following the 1941 German invasion, martial law was proclaimed in parts of the country, which extended the jurisdiction of military tribunals. Thousands of Soviet

citizens were brought before them for “betraying the motherland.” The first major public tribunal was convened at Krasnodar in July 1943. Eleven Soviet citizens were charged with collaborating with German occupation officials. All but one had worked for *Sonderkommando* 10a, an SS unit responsible for mass exterminations in the region. Despite a lack of evidence connecting them to any specific crime, all 11 defendants admitted their guilt when interrogated; they repeated these admissions during the trial. The defendants begged forgiveness from the court and asked to be sent to the front as punishment. Instead, three were sentenced to hard labor, while the other eight were hanged, executions that some 30,000 spectators watched. This trial was also publicized by the Soviet press to highlight German atrocities.

Following Krasnodar, the focus of the tribunals shifted from Soviet collaborators to German perpetrators. This shift occurred because in 1943 Soviet authorities had issued a decree permitting the prosecution of foreign soldiers. Evidence of their crimes was discovered by investigators who had uncovered the deaths of Soviet citizens and examined the damage to Soviet property as the Red Army pushed the German army out of eastern Europe. In the summer of 1943, trials were convened in Krasnodon and Mariupol, and another was held in Kharkov in December. Between these and additional trials, Soviet officials tried over 10,000 people by the end of the war. The defendants often claimed they were following orders. The courts accepted this defense because Soviet leaders wanted to utilize it as evidence to trace responsibility for crimes committed against the Soviet Union to higher authorities, including Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, and Adolf Hitler.

Soviet leaders, however, were not solely responsible for bringing these higher officials

to trial. Rather, they worked in conjunction with their allies. In November 1943, Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt issued the Moscow Declaration, vowing to punish the people responsible for crimes committed throughout occupied Europe. The declaration also established jurisdictional principles for future legal proceedings. Those proceedings were clarified in August 1945 when the Allied Powers signed the London Agreement. It established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) as the body responsible for trying major war criminals in Europe. American, British, French, and Soviet delegates all contributed to the legal framework of the IMT. This was a complicated task because no precedent existed for an international war crimes trial. In addition, each nation had a different legal system, and the Soviet system was complicated by its history of show trials. The Allies nonetheless worked out a format, which Soviet delegates contributed to, including Aron Trainin, a lawyer who provided the foundation for defining crimes against peace and conspiracy.

Each Allied power provided a judge and a chief prosecutor for the Nuremberg Trial. The Soviet judge was Major General Iona Nikitchenko. He had served as a judge during the Moscow show trials and was then the vice president of the (Soviet) Supreme Court. Based on the Moscow Declaration, he believed that the defendants had already been convicted. The purpose of the trial was to confirm that conviction and to show the measure of the defendants' guilt—views Nikitchenko shared with other Soviet officials. The chief Soviet prosecutor was Lieutenant General Roman Rudenko, who had been the primary prosecutor in the Ukrainian show trials and was then the chief prosecutor in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He, like his British and French counterparts, contributed to the prosecution at Nuremberg, although

all three were dwarfed by the massive American prosecution team.

The Allies selected 24 Germans to stand trial, although only 21 appeared in court. Each was charged with up to four counts: war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to conduct a war of aggression. Many defendants claimed ignorance of the atrocities and denied responsibility for them, although as in the earlier Soviet trials, they also pleaded that they had been following superior orders. This time the Soviets did not want to accept this justification and argued that following orders did not absolve a subordinate from responsibility for his actions. The other Allies concurred, and it was not allowed as a mitigating circumstance when the court rendered its judgment.

Three of the twenty-one defendants were found not guilty, a verdict which displeased Soviet leaders, including Stalin. Nikitchenko wrote the dissenting opinion, arguing that there had been sufficient evidence to convict them. The remaining defendants were either sentenced to prison or execution. The hangings were carried out on October 16, 1946, though one defendant, Goering, committed suicide before he could be hung.

Concurrent with the Nuremberg Trial, the Soviets held additional trials in more than half a dozen cities in eastern Europe. Lower-ranking Germans were charged with war crimes. The Soviet press stressed that the timing of these trials was not coincidental. The Western Allies, however, did not believe that these trials represented a legitimate legal process because no documentary evidence was presented. Nonetheless, they were conducted according to the norms of the Soviet legal system, which included using testimony given under interrogation and circumstantial evidence. Their purpose was more to support Soviet politics and take retribution rather than to mete out justice.

The Soviets continued to conduct trials after 1946, as did the other Allies. They were permitted to hold additional trials in their respective zones of occupation in Germany by Control Council Law No. 10, issued in December 1945. The most famous trial in the Soviet zone was held in Sachsenhausen, a former concentration camp near Berlin, in late 1947. Beyond this trial, there is no accurate count of how many legal proceedings the Soviets convened, although they probably held more in their zone than were held in the other three combined. There were also postwar trials in the Soviet Union. More than 300,000 collaborators were arrested, most of whom were tried and sentenced as traitors. Such trials continued until the 1980s.

Amy Carney

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Holocaust in the Soviet Union; Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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October (November) Revolution (1917)

The second of two internal uprisings in 1917 Russia. Led by the Bolshevik Party, this revolution (really a coup d'état) resulted in Russia's withdrawal from World War I and the transformation of the Russian government and society. It is often referred to as the *October Revolution* because at the time Russia followed the Julian calendar, 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar of the West, or as the Bolshevik Revolution.

Spontaneous uprisings in February 1917 led to the collapse of the imperial government and the abdication of Czar Nicholas II. Two self-appointed governing bodies—the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet—sought to fill the vacuum. On the one hand, the Provisional Government lacked the allegiance of the masses of the people, however, especially in the capital, because its authority theoretically derived from the Duma (legislative council), which the czar had tried to dissolve. On the other hand, the Petrograd Soviet had limited popular support, because it was elected by workers and soldiers in the capital only. It hesitated to lead, fearful of being tainted by the “bourgeois” nature of the revolution. Instead, its leaders second-guessed and undercut Provisional Government decisions. Thus, from February to October 1917, Russia had two governing bodies, one claiming formal authority without power, and the other with power but no authority.

An example of the cross purposes at which the two worked was the Soviet's

Order No. 1. It removed control and discipline in the armed forces by abolishing the death penalty, establishing political commissars at every level, and directing command by committee where privates and officers had equal votes. Spurred on by the Bolshevik Party, Russia's frontline soldiers began to fraternize with the enemy, and officers' attempts to enforce discipline encountered hostile resistance.

The revolution in February 1917 led to the return of thousands of veteran revolutionaries from internal and external exile. From Switzerland via Germany and Sweden came 38 exiles, including Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks. Lenin arrived in Petrograd on April 3, 1917, and presented speeches over the next two days that were later printed as the April Theses. Lenin claimed that the revolution marked the beginning of the international revolution of the proletariat, rejected cooperation with the Provisional Government, called for all power to the soviets (the councils that had sprung up across Russia mirroring those of the Revolution of 1905), and demanded an end to what he called the “predatory” war.

One compromise between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet was continuation of the war. The Western Allied governments insisted on this as a condition of financial loans. When the Provisional Government proclaimed support for Russia's original war aims and planned a major offensive though, the compromise fell apart.

This June 19-July 7 Kerensky Offensive, named for War Minister Alexander Kerensky, collapsed in part due to war-weariness

and the indiscipline prompted by Order No. 1. Some units of the Petrograd garrison, fearing they would be sent to the front, revolted and were joined by idle workers and radical sailors from the nearby Kronstadt naval base. Eventually, the uprising was quelled, though with some loss of life. Because Bolsheviks had joined the uprising, believing they would be blamed for it in any case, the Provisional Government ordered Bolshevik leaders arrested, but Lenin escaped to Finland.

On July 26, a prolonged government crisis developed following the resignation of Prince Georgy Lvov over anticipated labor and agrarian policies. Kerensky succeeded him as prime minister. His cabinet was moderately left-oriented with 12 of the 16 ministers divided between Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs, the largest political party in Russia) and the Mensheviks (an evolutionary socialist party). Kerensky tried to placate both the left and the right, but fearing the Bolsheviks, he ordered recently appointed commander of the armed forces General Lavr Kornilov to prepare to march on Petrograd if the Bolsheviks stirred insurrection.

In early September, when the German army occupied Riga and the road to Petrograd lay open, Kornilov sent a cavalry corps toward the capital, ostensibly to protect it. His action was seen as a right-wing attempt to reverse the revolution, however. Sensing the approaching danger, the Soviet organized to protect the revolution. The Petrograd garrison and Kronstadt sailors, joined by idle workers, all strongly influenced by Bolshevik calls for peace, land, and bread, were now mobilized to barricade and protect the capital. Kerensky appealed to the Bolsheviks to assist in defending against counterrevolution, released imprisoned leaders such as Leon Trotsky, and armed the Bolshevik's Red Guard. Meanwhile,

Bolshevik-influenced railroad workers stopped Kornilov's troops short of the capital, convincing even the most trusting soldiers that they were helping to restore the hated monarchy.

The Bolsheviks, able to claim that they had saved the revolution, now gained 50 percent of the seats in the Petrograd Soviet. In September, backed by leftist SRs, Trotsky was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He immediately withdrew that body's support from the Provisional Government. When in September the rumor circulated that the government might move the capital to Moscow to protect it from the German army, the Petrograd Soviet claimed full control of troop deployments in and around Petrograd. On October 14, the Petrograd Soviet appointed a Military Revolutionary Committee. Ostensibly it was to defend the capital, however, its members became the General Staff of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Lenin had slipped back into Petrograd and, although many leading Bolsheviks balked at his suggestion that the time was ripe for an armed uprising, on October 17, in a secret meeting, the Central Committee of the party voted narrowly in favor of an attempt to seize power. The Provisional Government remained passive, although it was vaguely aware of Bolshevik preparations. The non-Bolshevik Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets postponed its meeting until October 26 and ordered a halt to all demonstrations and issuing of arms without the committee's approval.

On October 24, the Bolsheviks sent regiments under their control to occupy strategic sites around the capital. On the evening of October 25, the provisional government announced a state of emergency and declared the Soviet's Military Revolutionary Committee, controlled by Trotsky, to be illegal and ordered his arrest along with other

Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin. Too late, the Provisional Government, barricaded in the Winter Palace, called for loyal troops to deal with the Bolsheviks.

On the morning of October 26, revolutionary sailors on the cruiser *Avrora*, which was anchored in the Neva River, fired blank rounds from its guns, the signal for the uprising to begin. Bolshevik forces seized, almost without bloodshed, key buildings and facilities in the capital and, on October 27, stormed the Winter Palace, arresting 13 members of the provisional government. Kerensky managed to escape and fled into exile.

Lenin declared victory and announced the formation of the Soviet of People's Commissars with himself as chairman. The Soviet era had begun. Lenin immediately announced an end to Russian participation in the war. When the Germans insisted on punitive peace terms, the government balked and attempted to follow a strategy of "neither war nor peace." This proved impossible when the German army initiated a major offensive, forcing the Bolsheviks to conclude the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on German terms in February 1918. Lenin concluded that even yielding vast amounts of territory was preferable to renewal of the war and the possibility of the Bolsheviks in turn being driven from power. The new leadership also set aside the results of national elections, planned before their seizure of power, which had gone strongly against them.

Meanwhile, civil war had erupted between the Bolsheviks and their supporters (the Reds) and conservative counterrevolutionary forces (the Whites). This ended with the Reds victorious in 1920. At great human cost, the Bolsheviks also gradually reshaped the socioeconomic structure of the country. The ensuing Union of Soviet Socialist Republics endured until December 1991.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1912–1922); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Lvov, Prince Georgy Yevgenievich (1861–1925); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Revolution of 1905; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Oktiabrsky, Filip Sergeevich (1899–1969)

Soviet navy admiral. Born in the village of Lukshino, now in Kaliningrad Oblast, on October 23, 1899, Filip Oktiabrsky entered the Red Navy in 1918 and joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919. After carrying out routine assignments, he commanded the Amur Military Flotilla in February 1938 and then the Black Sea Fleet during the period March 1939–May 1943. He was promoted to rear admiral in June 1940 and to vice admiral in June 1941.

Oktiabrsky directed Odessa's land defenses from July to October 1941 and executed a masterly evacuation of Odessa on the night of October 15–16. From November 1941 to June 1942, Oktiabrsky directed the defense of Sevastopol against German attack, being evacuated on orders

from Moscow at the last moment. He again headed the Amur Military Flotilla from June 1943 to March 1944 and then commanded the Black Sea Fleet as a full admiral.

Continuing as commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Oktiabrsky was also first deputy commander in chief of the navy until 1950. His criticism of naval policy led to his retirement that year, but he reemerged in 1957 to head the Black Sea Higher Naval School. In 1959, he joined the General Inspector's Group. Oktiabrsky died in Sevastopol on July 8, 1969.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Black Sea, Area of Operations, World War II; Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Operational Art

Operational Art, in its Soviet form, is the level of planning between tactics and strategy. The aim of Operational Art is to link a series of tactical missions to accomplish strategic aims. It developed, at least in the Soviet Union, as the answer to the problems of overwhelming firepower that curtailed mobility on the battlefield and modern transportation that allowed militaries to shift resources and manpower rapidly, thus negating the value of breakthroughs.

Soviet military theorists were not, of course, the only ones seeking answers to these problems. World War I had amply demonstrated to

the Western powers that technology aided the defense and rendered modern warfare largely static. Time and again, one side or the other had broken the enemy lines on the Western Front only to find it had outrun its supply lines, while at the same time, the enemy was able to bring up reserves rapidly and plug the gap.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Western military thinkers like J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell-Hart developed theoretical solutions they felt would create breakthroughs at lower costs. Soviet thinkers like Vladimir Triandafillov, Georgy Isserson, and Mikhail Tukhachevsky, meanwhile, sought not lower casualty counts but a theory that would create mobility on the battlefield. Unlike their Western counterparts, they started from the assumptions that mass armies would be the norm, that wars would start from static positions, and that no single battle or field action could end a war. Thus while Heinz Guderian and other advocates of Blitzkrieg sought to destroy enemy forces in a single battle, Soviet theorists hoped to destroy the enemy's ability to resist in a series of battles.

The key to Operational Art, as it developed in the Soviet Union, was the echeloning of forces. This allowed planners to design a series of consecutive operations that would follow one from the next seamlessly. It was essential, according to Isserson, not to pause and regroup or resupply, for the enemy could also use the pause to strengthen himself. Thus, in the Soviet conception of Operational Art, each battle would become increasingly difficult as the enemy neared his supply bases and concentrated his forces. Where Western theorists saw the breakthrough as the most difficult task, the Soviets believed that ending the battle would be the hardest.

They therefore developed the concept of the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG),

which would replace the corps as the basic unit of the army. These groups were to be combined-arms units, with air components capable of striking far to the rear, mobile artillery, and shock groups to pinpoint the initial breakthrough points. Once a unit had achieved a breakthrough, a second unit within the OMG would push forward to the enemy's second line or beyond, in accordance with its objective, and engage; a third echeloned unit within the OMG would follow through the break made by the second, and so on. Something like this had been attempted on a limited scale in the Brusilov Offensive of 1916; unlike that operation, which echeloned troops for a single battle, Operational Art echeloned troop units for operations over days and weeks, and hundreds of miles.

Unfortunately, the theory of Operational Art far outstripped Soviet military capabilities—and likely those of any nation—in the 1930s. The Soviets were further hampered, however, when the Great Purges of Soviet leader Josef Stalin swept up and killed many of the thinkers behind Operational Art. The theory, in limited form, would be revived and prove its value in the latter stages of World War II, but it took two painful years and many millions of dead for Operational Art to be rehabilitated.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Deep Battle; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Triandafillov, Vladimir Kiriakovich (1894–1931); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937)

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Oprichniki

Czar Ivan IV's personal bodyguard, which conducted a violent campaign against the Russian people in the 16th century.

Certain scholars liken the *oprichniki* (singular *oprichnik*) to a modern political police, though they operated from 1565–1572 in Moscow and the surrounding countryside. Ivan named the lands to the north and northeast of Moscow the *oprichnina*—his personal fief. (This inclusive term, by extension, references the *oprichniki* and their operation of terror as well).

Controversy exists over the formation of the *oprichniki*. Either Ivan was an insane medieval dictator who concocted the *oprichniki* to carry out wanton acts of violence against imagined usurpers; or Ivan was a rational ruler who formed the *oprichniki* to consolidate power, which lay partly in the hands of princes and boyars (Russian upper nobility). The truth remains difficult to discern because few Russian primary sources specifically about the *oprichniki* remain—many were lost during the Time of Troubles (1598–1613) and the 1626 Moscow fire. Therefore, the records of contemporary foreign correspondents and fragmented Russian evidence represent the bulk of the data concerning the *oprichniki*.

Some modern scholars have established a more balanced understanding of the *oprichniki*: they were a political tool used by Ivan to conquer the aristocracy and institute an iron autocracy in Russia. After the government granted far-reaching powers to the czar, in February 1565, perhaps influenced by Czarina Maria Temriukovna (his second wife), Ivan decreed the formation of the *oprichnina* and assembled the *oprichniki* to seize and rule those lands as the czar's own. Ivan selected 1,000 men from the upper aristocracy,

but as the *oprichniki* grew, foreigners like the German mercenary Heinrich von Staden and lower-ranking nobles expanded their ranks. The *oprichniki* numbered around 6,500 at its peak.

An *oprichnik* swore a loyalty oath to the czar and answered only to him. He wore black clothing, carried a long knife and rode a horse ornamented with a dog's head and broom—symbols of his duty to hunt, slay, and sweep all treason from the realm. During the next five years, the *oprichniki* devastated the ruling class and their lands. Many exaggerated tales of horrific violence exist concerning the *oprichniki*; but they did kill thousands and dispossessed thousands more from the lands they ruled. The *oprichniki* oppressed the peasantry with heavy taxes and confiscated grain supplies. Many peasants fled their land in fear. The most violent act committed by the *oprichniki* occurred in Novgorod for six weeks in 1570. Ivan suspected a coup arising from Novgorod, so he and his men sacked and looted the city while murdering thousands. The *oprichniki* returned to Moscow with hundreds of captives from Novgorod, whom they then tortured and executed.

When the Turks and Tatars invaded Russia in 1571, the *oprichniki* and Ivan proved powerless to stop them from burning Moscow to ruins. The following year, Ivan realized only a united Russia could withstand foreign invasion. He dissolved the *oprichniki* and attempted to return the lands within the *oprichnina* to their rightful owners, but the damage was done. The death and destruction the *oprichniki* had caused weakened rather than strengthened the country, as decades of instability (the “Time of Troubles”) plagued Russia until the Romanovs gained the throne.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Kazan, Siege of (August–October 1552); Time of Troubles

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Order No. 1 (March 1, 1917)

March 1917 saw upheavals in Petrograd, the disintegration of czarist authority, and the rise of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma (the Provisional Government). Fearing the soldiers would become an unruly mob and turn against them, Executive Committee Member Nikolai D. Sokolov, was given the task of writing Order No. 1. Soldiers looked over his shoulder, offering suggestions as he wrote. The units were ordered to return to their barracks and obey their officers, so long as they did not conflict with the Petrograd Soviet decrees.

Issued on March 1, 1917, and read to all units, including the Russian forces serving in France, the order stated that “[in] all companies, battalions, regiments, batteries, squadrons and separate services of various military departments and on board naval ships, committees shall be immediately elected from among the enlisted ranks.” If representatives were not elected, the Petrograd Soviet would choose them; all representatives were to report to the State Duma on March 2, 1917.

Order No. 1 further stated that only the orders issued by the Military Commission of the State Duma should be carried out, except when in conflict with decrees issued by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. All weapons were to be under control of the company and battalion committees, and they were under no circumstances to be issued to any officers. It called for all soldiers to adhere to strict military discipline while on duty, but to have the full rights granted to citizens otherwise. No longer would soldiers be obligated to stand at attention or salute when off duty. All officers, moreover, were now to be addressed as "Mr." instead of "Your Excellency" or "Your Honor." Any rudeness to the ranks was forbidden, and all violations were to be reported to the appropriate committees for action.

The result was a complete breakdown of discipline, and numerous excesses committed against the officer corps. In an attempt to restore the situation, the government issued "Order No. 2" on March 14, but the soldiers could not be brought back under the officers' authority and control. On March 15, 1917, Czar Nicholas II abdicated. Two days later, he addressed a written appeal to the troops noting that all authority had passed to the Provisional Government. He stressed the need for discipline and the fulfillment of duty as ordered by the new government, and as necessary for the defeat of the German foe. For the soldiers, however, gaining land and peace was their major concern. Nicholas's plea went largely unheard and, over the next six months, the Russian army disintegrated.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918);

October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Order No. 227 (June–July 1942)

Stalin's order forbidding his soldiers to retreat.

On April 5, 1942, Adolf Hitler issued *Führer Directive No. 41*. Believing that the Soviets were on the verge of defeat after their winter offensive, it said, all the Germans needed was one last push to destroy the Soviet army, drive into the Caucasus, and seize the oilfields. Operation BLAU (Blue) was to begin in June. This operation concentrated on the south, whereas Soviet leader Josef Stalin and *Stavka* braced themselves for a continuation of the assault toward Moscow.

The preliminary battles were fought in May 1942, and by June, the German forces seized the Donets and Don rivers, to include the vital city of Rostov. The Germans were now in position to launch their summer campaign against the Caucasus. Soviet leader Josef Stalin was incensed, convinced the Germans would cut the Soviet Union in two. On June 28, 1942, therefore, as the Germans were celebrating the fall of Rostov, Stalin decided to stiffen the will of his soldiers to resist. He ordered Chief of Staff General Aleksandr Vasilevsky to rewrite his *Stavka* order of the previous August that called for

deserters to be shot immediately and their families to be arrested and incarcerated. Stalin felt his soldiers and commissars had forgotten this order and demanded the rewrite immediately.

Vasilevsky returned that evening with a draft. Stalin made many changes and signed what would become known as Order No. 227, “Not One Step Back” (*Ni shagu nazad*). It said, in part: “Panic-mongers and cowards must be destroyed on the spot. The retreat mentality must be decisively eliminated.” Surrender was not an option, and those who did were considered “traitors to the Motherland.”

On July 28, all Soviet units formed up and “Not a Step Back!” was read. Order No. 227 implemented fear as a motivational factor to Red Army soldiers of all ranks and gave commanders the ability to dispose of any serviceman that they did not like.

Each Soviet army subsequently organized three to five armed detachments (“blocking units”) to shoot any soldier who tried to run away. Camps were set up to interrogate anyone who had escaped from the German encirclements. Where Stalin’s previous order had resulted in mass executions, now the Soviet intelligence service, the NKVD, instead formed offenders into penal companies (*shtrafrotty*), using them to clear minefields during combat and for other suicidal missions. Criminals from the Gulag system were released into these penal units, but not political prisoners.

Chances of survival in the penal units were extremely low. By 1944, monthly losses in the regular units were 3,685; in penal units it was 10,506, according to one account. At least 1.5 million men reportedly served in these units; how many survived is unknown. Upon completion of an individual’s term, or if wounded in battle, he was sent back to his former unit with his former rank and

military awards. The men who served in the *shtrafrotty* were noted for not using foul language; they also took neither prisoners nor German trophies.

The last known victim of Order No. 227 was General V.N. Gordov, whose criticisms of Stalin were secretly recorded. He was relieved from the Stalingrad Front (army group) on August 7, 1942. On August 24, 1950, the Military Collegium sentenced Gordov to death, and he was executed.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: NKVD; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); *Stavka*; World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Order No. 270 (June 1941)

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, marked by the “*Blitzkrieg*” concept of combined arms warfare, proved disastrous for the Soviet army on the western frontiers. In the first days of the invasion, Red Army soldiers quickly found themselves surrounded and outgunned, and they surrendered en masse. By July, the discipline of Soviet troops was at its lowest levels, which prompted Soviet leader Josef Stalin to take draconian measures.

Stalin directed Lev Mekhlis to form the Main Political Administration; one of Mekhlis’s

first steps, on July 16, was to reintroduce the “dual-command” system that put a military commissar in position of direct control and supervision of military units. He also wrote Field Directive No. 81, which established these commissars as guardians of discipline and the backbone against “panic, cowardice and treachery.”

The Supreme Soviet approved the establishment of three-man military tribunals, which gave the NKVD (internal secret police) the right to impose death sentences if they chose. There was no appeal. Many commanders took it upon themselves to execute their men for any infraction, fearing for their own lives. Others complained about the excesses of such executions at a time when the military was short of manpower. Stalin paid no heed, and cruelty within the Soviet ranks—already accepted—reached unprecedented levels. The tribunals changed nothing on the front, however, and the German invasion continued unchecked.

On August 16, 1941, Stalin again emphasized the necessity of punishing the failures of officers in the field by signing Order No. 270. General Georgy Zhukov, who was then still a junior commander in the Far East, protested the order, but signed on regardless. The order was not published, but widely read out at meetings to all troops by frontline commissars. It stated that any officer or commissar who surrendered would be considered a malicious deserter and could be shot immediately. If they refused to lead from the front, they could be shot immediately as well, for this was considered desertion. NKVD “holding companies” (blocking units) were formed behind the units to prevent retreats. The order also declared that the families of those men who surrendered were to be arrested, and sent to prison. All men escaping German encirclement were subjected

to intense investigation, and most were sent to penal battalions or prison on charges of collaboration or treason. Even prisoners who survived the terrible conditions of the Nazi prison camps and forced labor to return to the Soviet Union after the war were usually imprisoned as collaborators and traitors.

Order No. 270 was designed to make the officers and enlisted men of the Red Army fight harder. Whether it did is debatable. Many men still “deserted” after Order No. 270, for surrender to the Germans seemed better than certain death. The harsh reality of Nazi occupation policies, however, soon reversed that.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); NKVD; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II; World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. *See* Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

Orlov, Count Aleksei Grigorievich (1737–1808)

Aleksei Grigorievich Orlov was born in Lyubini, the son of the governor of Novgorod, Grigori Orlov. He began his military career

during the Seven Years' War, joining the Preobrazhensky Regiment. At the Battle of Zorndorf, he earned distinction before being wounded. Orlov joined the 1762 coup against Peter III led by his elder brother. For their efforts, each brother received the title "count" and a substantial cash award from the grateful new empress, Catherine II. Orlov had personal responsibility for guarding the deposed ruler, who died under suspicious circumstances on July 17, 1762. Some accounts accuse Orlov of murdering Peter III, although the official cause of death was an acute attack of hemorrhoids.

Orlov soon gained the rank of major general, commanding of the Baltic Fleet. When Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in 1768, Orlov led the Baltic Fleet to the Mediterranean. There, his squadron of nine ships of the line and three frigates encountered an Ottoman fleet twice as large commanded by Pasha Mandalzade Hüsameddin. The fleets fought at the Battle of Chesme over July 5–7, 1770, and Orlov's forces prevailed. For the next five years, Orlov's fleet held control of the Aegean, providing support to a revolt of Ottoman Greek provinces.

In 1775, Orlov received the odd assignment to seduce and capture Elizaveta Alekseevna, a pretender to the Russian throne. She was enticed aboard a Russian warship at Livorno and spirited away, destined to spend her remaining days in captivity. Shortly after, Orlov retired to a country estate near Moscow, where he experimented with cross-breeding livestock, eventually creating the Orlov Trotter and the Orloff Chicken. During the War of the Fourth Coalition against France, Orlov commanded the fifth district militia. Shortly after the Treaty of Tilsit was signed on July 7, 1807, Orlov died, leaving behind an estate of 5 million rubles and 30,000 serfs.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Chesme, Battle of (July 5–7, 1770); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Orlov, Count Fyodor Grigorievich (1741–1796); Orlov, Count Grigory Grigorievich (1734–1783); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Paul I (1754–1801); Seven Years' War (1754–1763); Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

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Orlov, Count Fyodor Grigorievich (1741–1796)

Fyodor Grigorievich Orlov was born in 1741, the fourth son of Grigory Orlov, governor of Novgorod. Like his elder brothers, Orlov enlisted in the Russian army and served with distinction in the Seven Years' War. After the conflict, he returned home and became involved in court intrigues. In 1762, he joined the coup against Czar Peter III. The new empress, Catherine II, elevated the Orlov brothers to the rank of count. Feodor was appointed chief procurator for the Governing Senate and promoted to major general.

When Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in 1768, Orlov held a leadership role in his brother Aleksei's command of the Baltic Fleet. At the Battle of Chemse, Orlov served directly under Admiral Grigory Spiridov aboard the *Evstafi*. Their ship, which mounted 68 guns, directly engaged the *Real Mustafa*, an 84-gun ship of the line. When the Ottoman ship

caught fire, its mast fell upon the *Evstafi*, spreading flames that caused an explosion and destroyed both ships. Orlov remained on active duty until he retired from public service in 1775. He never married, but fathered at least five children, including Prince Aleksei Fyodorovich Orlov and Mikhail Fyodorovich Orlov. He died on his estate near Moscow in 1796.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Chesme, Battle of (July 5–7, 1770); Orlov, Count Aleksei Grigorievich (1737–1808); Orlov, Count Grigory Grigorievich (1734–1783); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

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Orlov, Count Grigory Grigorievich (1734–1783)

Grigory Grigorievich Orlov was the second son of Grigori Orlov, the governor of Novgorod. Born in 1734, he attended the military academy at St. Petersburg and fought in the Seven Years’ War. While facing the Prussians at Zorndorf (August 25, 1758) he sustained three wounds but kept fighting. Afterward, he was assigned to St. Petersburg as an artillery officer. Noted for both his size and good looks, Orlov soon caught the eye of Grand Duchess Catherine Alekseevna, with whom he began a decades-long affair that resulted in two children. Her influence brought him rapid military advancement,

both as captain of the Izmailovsky Guards and paymaster of the artillery. In 1762, Orlov was one of the leaders of a coup that dethroned Peter III and named Catherine empress. She immediately elevated Orlov and his brothers to the rank of count, and named him a major general.

When Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in 1768, bubonic plague swept through the empire, triggering riots in Moscow in 1771. Orlov volunteered to pacify the city, using harsh measures to restore order and halt the spread of the disease. In 1772, he led a peace delegation to Focșani, but the talks failed, in part due to his intransigence. As punishment, he was banned from court. Desperately seeking redemption, he gave Catherine one of the largest diamonds in the world, the Orlov Diamond. The attempt failed, and Orlov spent most of his remaining years traveling abroad, returning to Moscow only shortly before his death in 1783.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

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Orlov, Mikhail Fyodorovich (1788–1842)

Russian general who fought in the Napoleonic Wars. Orlov participated in the Decembrist Uprising of 1825, and spent his last years on intellectual pursuits. He called for

major reforms to the Russian autocratic system, and only avoided imprisonment due to the intervention of his brother, Aleksei Fyodorovich Orlov.

Orlov was born in Moscow in 1788, the illegitimate son of Fyodor Grigorievich Orlov. In 1805, he joined the Russian army and marched west to confront Napoleon Bonaparte's armies as they swept through central Europe. When he returned home in 1814, he was a major general, commanding the 16th Infantry Division.

Orlov became intimately involved with reform organizations, including the Union of Salvation and the Union of Welfare, both a part of the group later called the Decembrists. Many Decembrists expected him to be the military leader of an uprising against Czar Nicholas I. When the revolt occurred on December 26, 1825, however, it was put down in a day, and its leaders arrested.

Orlov was not in the capital for the revolt, but was still arrested. Unlike most of the leaders, who were sent into Siberian exile, Orlov was allowed to retire to his estate in Moscow. He remained under house arrest for the remainder of his life, devoting his time to scholarship. In 1833, he published *On State Credit*, a study of state economics. He died in Moscow in 1842.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825); Orlov, Count Fyodor Grigorievich (1741–1796); Orlov, Prince Aleksei Fyodorovich (1787–1862)

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Orlov, Nikolai Alekseevich (1827–1885)

Nikolai Alekseevich Orlov was the son of Prince Aleksei Fyodorovich Orlov. He served first as an army officer and then as a top-ranking diplomat. He adopted liberal attitudes, pushing for significant changes in the Russian legal code. Specifically, Orlov advocated an end to the use of corporal punishment in Russia and Poland. He also recommended the establishment of legal protections for religious dissenters within Russia, an issue of particular importance as the empire expanded into Catholic and Muslim regions.

Orlov was born in Moscow in 1827 and joined the army in 1845. When the Revolutions of 1848 swept through Europe, Habsburg emperor Franz Joseph appealed to Czar Nicholas I for military support to put down a Hungarian rebellion. Orlov accompanied a small force into Hungary in 1849. He also fought in Wallachia during the Crimean War, losing an eye in combat.

Orlov served as ambassador to Brussels from 1859 to 1869, with later assignments in Vienna and London. In December of 1871, Orlov was named ambassador to France. The French had just lost a war with Prussia, and witnessed the proclamation of the German state at Versailles. Soon, French and Russian interests coincided in an effort to restrain the rising German power. Orlov's final diplomatic post was in Berlin, where he served from 1882 until his death in 1885.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Orlov, Prince Aleksei Fyodorovich (1787–1862); Revolutions of 1848

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Orlov, Prince Aleksei Fyodorovich (1787–1862)

Military officer, diplomat, and administrator who devoted his life to the service of the Russian state. He was born in Moscow in 1787, the illegitimate son of Count Fyodor Grigorievich Orlov. In 1805, he joined the Russian army, which soon marched west in the first of several wars against Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1814, Orlov returned to Russia, where he commanded a cavalry regiment in the Life Guards during the Decembrist Rebellion of 1825. As thanks for his loyalty, Czar Nicholas I elevated him to the court rank of count. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, he was promoted to lieutenant general and named the Russian plenipotentiary at the Adrianople peace conference.

In 1830, Orlov sought Austrian cooperation in putting down the 1830 Revolution in France, but the mission failed. The czar then sent Orlov to Constantinople to serve as the ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and command the Black Sea Fleet. In that capacity, he negotiated the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, an eight-year defensive alliance between the former rivals. A secret provision absolved the Ottoman Empire of responsibility to intervene on Russia's behalf, if it closed the Dardanelles Strait to any enemy warships.

In 1844, Nicholas named Orlov the head of the Third Department of the chancery. This made him the chief of the Russian secret police. Although the organization had little reputation for efficiency or effectiveness,

the position put Orlov in constant contact with the czar. Their relationship quickly developed, and Nicholas became increasingly dependent upon Orlov, as did his successor, Alexander II.

When the Crimean War erupted, Orlov headed to Vienna to appeal for Austrian support in the war. Emperor Franz Joseph had begun to regard Russia as a threat, however, and Orlov was rebuffed. He was still selected as a representative to the Congress of Paris in 1856 though, to negotiate an end to the conflict. For his service, Orlov was raised to the rank of prince and made the president of both the imperial council of state and the council of ministers.

Orlov then was chosen by Alexander II to chair the emperor's private advisory committee on reforming serfdom. Orlov was a committed reactionary, determined to maintain the status quo. In spite of Alexander's stated desire for change, he refused to consider emancipation, and did everything possible to block reform. He was replaced by the czar's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich in 1860, and died in 1862 in St. Petersburg.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Crimean War (1853–1856); Konstantin Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1827–1892); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Orlov, Count Fyodor Grigorievich (1741–1796); Orlov, Mikhail Fyodorovich (1788–1842)

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OsoAVIAKHIM, Operation

OSOAVIAKHIM (*Obschestvo sodeistviia oborone i aviatsionno-chimicheskomu stroitelstvu*, or *Society for the Advancement of Defense [Technology] and the Development of Aviation and Chemistry*); and secret operation during and after World War II.

OSOAVIAKHIM began as a paramilitary organization formed in 1927 in the USSR to foster technical developments designed to aid the Soviet military, especially its reserves. Targeted at youth, the organization formed marksmanship, aviation, and parachuting clubs. One estimate placed the organization's membership at over 10 million in 1941.

OSOAVIAKHIM was also the name of a secret operation carried out by the Soviet secret intelligence service, the NKVD (*Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrikh Del*", or Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs), to bring more than 3,000 German engineers and scientists from the Soviet occupation zone of Germany to the Soviet Union. In fact, OSOAVIAKHIM was not the name of the operation, but the name of the secret coordinating society founded well in advance of the transfer of the technical war spoils in 1946.

During the war, the NKVD collaborated with special officers in the Soviet army who spied on German scientists and their research projects. Stalin had ordered industrial plants and whole factories to be dismantled and, along with their technical drawings, crated up and shipped to the USSR. The dismantling of German industrial assets had started immediately after the war. Now the technical personnel were to be taken as well; without their expertise, the Soviets could not use much of it. NKVD and army commanders of the occupying Soviet forces secretly

mapped out and simulated the transfer operation in all its details.

Eventually, these operations affected many East German cities: in the morning of October 22, 1946, families of German scientists and engineers were awakened by banging at their doors. Soviet soldiers then announced that they would have to work in the Soviet Union "in reparation" for the many losses that the Nazis had caused the Soviet nation. The local Soviet commanders had ordered them to leave immediately for the USSR.

The Germans were forced at gunpoint to gather a small number of belongings and household items for their "temporary stay in the USSR" and informed that the whole family would come with them. The families were then escorted to the train station, where they spent another day detained in assigned train cars before departing on a two-week journey to the USSR on October 23, 1946.

Their first task on arrival was to reassemble captured assembly lines, install captured technology and laboratories in newly created science centers in Russia, and generally incorporate the scientific projects they had previously run for Nazi Germany into Soviet research plans. Many found themselves at empty factories with the trainloads of war spoils waiting to be reassembled under their guidance. One team of 23 scientists from the *IG Farben- und Filmfabrik Wolfen*, for example, recreated the technology they had developed for making color film in 1936, but which the Soviets still lacked. Nuclear scientists were put to work in the Soviet atomic program.

Between 1951 and 1955, groups of the "OSOAVIAKHIM-GERMANS" were repatriated to East Germany, a country still in tatters and trapped in the global politics of the Cold War. There, the deportation of the families and their years-long stay in the isolation of

security areas were portrayed as “voluntary technological reconstruction help for the Soviet Union.” Many of the scientists managed to slip into the Western zones, especially after the workers’ uprising in June 1953. Some personal stories of their lives in Russia naturally emerged in the Western press. It was only with the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, that the archives were opened and a more authentic historical interpretation of the events was revealed.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Fuchs, Klaus Emil Julius (December 29, 1911–January 28, 1988); Kapustin Yar; NKVD

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P

Paléologue, Georges Maurice (1859–1944)

French diplomat. Born in Paris on January 13, 1859, Georges Maurice Paléologue earned a degree in law and entered the French Foreign Ministry in 1880. He was posted to Tangiers in 1882, to Rome in 1885, and then to China and Korea. Rising through the ranks, Paléologue became ambassador to Bulgaria in 1907. In 1909, he returned to Paris as deputy political director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1911, he became political director. As a result of that appointment, Paléologue was identified as a protégé of French Premier Raymond Poincaré.

In January 1914, Paléologue became ambassador to Russia, a post he held through the first Russian revolution of March 1917. In July 1914, Poincaré, now president, and Premier René Viviani visited St. Petersburg and met with Czar Nicholas II and Russian officials. The leaders confirmed and strengthened the French-Russian military alliance, assuring Russia of full support in case of war. Following their departure, Paléologue gave Nicholas even stronger support, claiming that his alleged close ties with Poincaré gave his words even more credence.

When the Great War began in August 1914, Paléologue urged an immediate Russian offensive in East Prussia to take German pressure off the French, who were facing potential disaster. While the Russians advanced to defeat, their faster-than-anticipated military offensive caused chief of the German General Staff Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke to divert five divisions from the

Western Front, helping the French win the decisive First Battle of the Marne (September 5–12, 1914).

Paléologue remained in St. Petersburg after the March Revolution, but the Bolshevik takeover that November forced his return to Paris. His subsequent memoir is one of the best eyewitness accounts of the Russian Revolution. Paléologue was then secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, but he resigned in 1921 to devote his whole energies to writing. Among his works are historical accounts, literary criticisms, his impressions of China and Italy, art books, and several novels. He was elected to the French Academy in 1928. Paléologue died in Paris on November 18, 1944.

Michael Share

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Paltzig, Battle of (July 23, 1759)

The Battle of Paltzig signified Russia's emergence as a legitimate military power

and a nation of influence on the international scene. Also known as the Battle of Kay, the Battle of Paltzig was a battle fought between the Russian army of Empress Elizabeth and the Prussian army of King Frederick II (the Great) in the summer of 1759, as part of the Seven Years War (1756–1763). After suffering heavy losses at the Battle of Zorndorf in August 1758, the Russian army, now under its third commander in three years, Field Marshal Count Pyotr Semenovich Saltykov—was under orders from Elizabeth to begin its third offensive of the war. Though in his 60s, Field Marshal Saltykov was a more aggressive and skilled field commander than his predecessors had been and immediately began a methodical advance westward into Prussia in June 1759 with an army of 41,000 men (although some estimates have the Russian army at 70,000 men). King Frederick II ordered General Richard van Wedell, with a 26,000-man army, to stop the westward advance of the Russian army.

Meanwhile, the main Prussian army under Frederick II remained engaged with the Austrian army to the south, to prevent it from joining forces with the Russians. After the Russian army crossed into Prussian territory, General Wedell unwisely and rashly launched a frontal attack on Field Marshal Saltykov's well-prepared Russian forces at Paltzig, just inside the Prussian border on July 23, 1759. Repeated assaults into the Russian positions resulted in the slaughter of the Prussian army under General Wedell and a stinging defeat for Frederick II. The Prussians lost 6,000 to 8,300 men, the Russians less than 5,000.

His forces rendered ineffective, General Wedell retreated across the Oder River. The defeat of his army at Paltzig forced Frederick II to rush north with 43,000 men to take over the defense against the Russian army personally and try to force the Russians into a decisive engagement. After the Battle of

Paltzig, the Russian army built fortified positions around the village of Kunersdorf on the Oder River, opposite Frankfurt. Frederick's task of winning for a decisive engagement with the Russian army became even more daunting when the Austrian commander, Count von Daun, sent a force of 35,000 men from Saxony to join the Russians.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Kunersdorf, Battle of (August 12, 1759); Seven Years' War (1754–1763); Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

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Panin, Nikita Ivanovich (1718–1783)

Foreign minister under Catherine "the Great," Count Nikita I. Panin was one of the most talented diplomats and influential politicians of 18th-century Russia. Nikita Panin was Catherine's key assistant and principal advisor in foreign affairs during the first two decades of her reign. Even though Panin was involved in domestic political and commercial reforms, his most significant role and successes were in foreign policy. Well educated and well travelled, Panin spent his early diplomatic career abroad, first in Copenhagen and then in Stockholm, where he gained exposure to Western political thought. After the June 1762 revolution and coup d'état that placed Catherine II on the throne, Panin assumed control of foreign

affairs and became a major figure in Russian foreign policy. Panin's Northern System, or Northern Accord, influenced Russia's foreign affairs in the next decade and more.

The Northern System was not a treaty of peace that followed the Seven Years War, it was Russian policy molded into an international agreement brokered by Panin in order to dominate the internal affairs of Sweden and Poland, foster closer ties with Prussia and Denmark, and to concentrate Russian power on events in the Baltic Sea states. By the late 1770s, Russia was influential on the international scene and much sought after for advice and counsel. Panin's influence with Catherine II declined, however, and in the fall of 1781, he was unceremoniously removed from his position and forced to retire.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Panin, Peter Ivanovich (1721–1789); Potemkin, Grigory Aleksandrovich (1739–1791); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Panin, Pyotr Ivanovich (1721–1789)

Younger brother to Count Nikita I. Panin, Pyotr I. Panin made his mark in the Russian army, reaching the rank of general for his exploits against the Prussians during the Seven Years War (1756–1763). In contrast to his

subtle and refined diplomat brother, General Pyotr Panin was straightforward and candid, a stern disciplinarian respected for his military skill and boldness. General Panin distinguished himself as a brilliant field commander in the battles at Gross-Jagersdorf, Zorndorf, and Kunersdorf in the Seven Years War, and his leadership won him honor and awards in Empress Elizabeth's court.

After the coup d'état in 1762, Catherine II named General Panin commander of the Russian forces in the field and entrusted him with the removal of the army from the war. In command of the Russian Second Army during the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), General Panin laid siege to the Ottoman fortress at Bendery; the previously impregnable bastion fell in September 1770. After his success at Bendery, General Panin resigned his commission and went into retirement near Moscow, in part due to personal grievances with Catherine II and in part due to the side effects of wounds received in the Seven Years War. Catherine II recalled General Panin back to service in 1774 to lead her forces against the most serious Cossack-peasant uprising in Russian history, the Pugachev Rebellion, and to defeat Emelian Pugachev's peasant army. By the end of September 1774, General Panin ended the rebellion, forced Pugachev's arrest, and defeated the peasant army.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Panin, Nikita Ivanovich (1718–1783); Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Panjdeh Incident (1885)

The Panjdeh Incident occurred in 1885 when Russia vanquished Afghanistan from the disputed Panjdeh Oasis, igniting a diplomatic row between London and St. Petersburg.

In the 1860s and 1870s, Russia made rapid advances in Central Asia and encroached on the territory of Afghanistan, resulting in numerous border disputes. Following the fall of the Turkmen stronghold at Gok Tepe (Geok Tepe) to the Russians in 1881, the emir of Afghanistan was keen to secure the submission of the Turkmen tribes east of the Caspian Sea, including in the Panjdeh Oasis, which lay only a few hundred miles north of the Afghan city of Herat. In 1883, an Afghan governor was appointed to the Panjdeh, but was chased out when he attempted to collect taxes from local Sariq Turkmen tribesmen. A punitive military expedition was launched from Herat against Panjdeh, and confiscated livestock and took hostages, which were only released once the Turkmen agreed to submit to Afghan rule. In 1884, Russia seized the Merv Oasis, situated north of the Panjdeh, setting up a direct military conflict between Afghanistan and Russia.

Russian gains alarmed Britain, which had only recently concluded the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Following the fall of Merv, London and St. Petersburg agreed to a joint commission to delineate the Russo-Afghan border, but by the time the British commissioner arrived at Panjdeh in late 1884, Russian and Afghan troops were

deployed just miles apart. The Russian commander, General Aleksandr Komarov, and his Afghan counterpart, General Ghaws al-Din Khan, exchanged barbs; in March 1885, Afghan forces redeployed directly opposite the Russian position.

The Afghan forces consisted of 2,000 infantry and horsemen, and six 6-pounder guns, while the Russians had 4,000 infantry, Cossack and Turkmen cavalry, and eight 6-pound and 8-pound guns. On March 30, Russian forces attacked, routing the Afghans and killing hundreds as the enemy attempted to retreat across a river. The Afghan defeat elicited war cries in London and Calcutta, but tempers subsided and, in 1877, Russia and Britain agreed to a demarcation of the Russian-Afghan border and confirmed that the Panjdeh was Russian territory.

After Afghanistan broke free of the British yoke following the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, Moscow offered to reconsider the status of the Panjdeh Oasis, but relations between Moscow and Kabul soured due to the Basmachi Insurrection that raged on Russo-Afghan border. Today the Panjdeh is divided between the districts of Tagtabazar and Serhetabat in Mary Province in the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan,

David P. Straub

See also: Basmachi Insurgency (1918–1933); Great Game, The (Russia in Central Asia)

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Partisans (*Partizans*, *Guerrillas*), World War II

Indigenous combatants operating in enemy-held territory, and conducting military and paramilitary operations. During World War II, numerous partisan or guerrilla units operated in Axis-controlled areas, carrying out intelligence-gathering, sabotage, pilot-rescue, and harassment operations. Partisans, formally conceived, worked together in organized units.

The Soviet partisan (*partizan*) movement grew out of necessity following the German invasion of June 1941. The rapid German advance through the Ukraine and White Russia (Belorus) led many Red Army stragglers and those opposed to the Nazis to find refuge in the forests. Only 11 days into the war, Soviet leader Josef Stalin called for a partisan uprising to harass the Germans.

Motivations for joining partisan movements varied widely. Many became members

as an act of survival; others joined from ideological motivations or to protect their families. Some groups were made up of escaped prisoners of war and political prisoners. Jews able to escape the German grasp also sought to organize. Jewish partisans, however, lived in constant danger because of rampant anti-Semitism among others, apart from the Nazis. Partisans usually organized resistance in accordance with their own political agenda. Sometimes this led them to save Jews, and sometimes it led them to sacrifice Jews. Some partisan groups welcomed Jews, others shunned them as an unnecessary danger or on other grounds. Soviet partisan units, particularly those sanctioned by the Red Army and the Communist Party, were usually the most receptive.

The Bielski Partisans were the most famous of the Jewish resistance groups on Soviet territory. The movement began as an act of simple self-preservation and the rescue



Russian partisans behind enemy lines setting fire to a freight train at a German supply depot during World War II. (UIG/Getty Images)

of other Jews fleeing the Nazis. Eventually it grew to more than 1,000 people, including children and the elderly. Inside the Vilna (Vilnius) Ghetto, the Jewish-led United Partisan Organization included several communists, including its military commander, Itzak Witenberg. Communist and Zionist resistance organizations also collaborated closely in Kovno (Poland), and in Slovakia.

Regardless of why they joined, partisans assumed an incredible burden as well as the risk of being shot out of hand if they were apprehended. German suppression tactics included reprisals against villages aiding partisans, and the taking and execution of hostages, often at the rate of 20 or more executed for every German killed. Despite this, and probably because of the Germans' ruthlessness, the partisan numbers continued to grow. The harsh Nazi occupation policies played a key role, driving many who had initially greeted the Germans as liberators into the partisan camp.

Life for the partisans was difficult. For their own security, they tended to live in, and operate from, inhospitable terrain such as mountains, swamps, and deep forests. Partisans had to endure primitive living conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical assistance, and enemy patrols. Soviet partisans operated extensively in the region of the Pripet Marshes south of Minsk. They formed around smaller cells known as *Orgtroikas* (triumverates), consisting of officers and operatives from the state, the party, and the *Narodnyy Kommissariat Vnutrenniakh Del* (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs; or NKVD).

Early on, partisans spent much of their efforts merely establishing their organizations and working to sustain them by securing food, supplies, weapons, and ammunition. Late in 1942, as Axis battlefield fortunes turned, the partisans began conducting raids

against railways and supply depots. Some even participated in assassinations of Axis officials.

By the summer of 1943, about 17,000 partisans were conducting sabotage and harassment operations in the Pripet Marshes near the Polish border; at the time of Operation BAGRATION in 1944, these numbers reached 140,000 people. Despite the efforts of special German antipartisan units, Soviet partisans carried out some 40,000 railway demolitions alone, greatly aiding the Red Army offensive.

In the Ukraine, nationalist movements such as the *Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya* (UPA, Ukrainian Insurgent Army) formed, bent on driving out both the Germans and the Soviets. Roman Shukhevich, leader of the UPA, controlled a wide swath of territory. Although conflicts between pro-Soviet partisans and nationalist partisans reduced the effectiveness of the movement, their activities forced the Germans to divert significant military resources to maintaining lines of communication. German general Heinz Guderian later wrote that this was one of the prime factors in the defeat of the German army in the east.

The limits of Soviet support for partisan activity were most clearly and infamously displayed in Poland, which the USSR had invaded and partially occupied in September 1939. The NKVD then executed some 10,000 military officers and other potential resistance leaders in the Katyn Forest. Many Poles continued the fight, however, and resistance groups coalesced into the Polish Home Army, which sought to combat the occupation of the country by both German and Soviet troops.

With nearly a fifth of the country in forests, the Poles had a natural base for unconventional warfare. The Polish Home Army provided useful intelligence to the Western

powers and, once the tide of war had turned, began to attack German supply trains and tie down German forces that might otherwise have been at the front. Their most spectacular action by far, however, was the Warsaw Rising of August–October 1944.

When Soviet forces arrived at the city limits of the Polish capital, the Home Army came out in the open and battled the Germans for control. The Soviets refused for more than two months to move to assist the Poles, and would not allow British and American aircraft to use bases in Soviet-controlled territory for relief missions. The Home Army fought on virtually alone until it was defeated. Warsaw was largely destroyed in the fighting. Some accurately viewed the Soviet's refusal to act as a deliberate decision to effect the destruction of the remaining Polish leadership and thus ensure Soviet control of Poland in the postwar period.

Contrary to popular belief—and to Stalin's chagrin—the success of the communist partisan movement in Yugoslavia owed nothing to the Soviet Union. The resistance movement there originally comprised two chief groups: the Četniks (named after the Serbian guerrillas who had fought the Turks), who were loyal to the monarchy and were led by General Dragoljub “Draza” Mihajlović, and the Partisan movement led by veteran communist Josip Broz (Tito). These two organizations, often at odds with each other, fought the occupying Axis powers and the fascist Ustaše movement in Croatia.

Partisan activities here were among the most effective in Axis-occupied Europe and tied down a great many Axis troops, but they also exacted a high cost in the form of reprisals and casualties to the civilian population. During the course of the fighting, the British government, which was supplying aid to the Yugoslav Resistance, decided to back the Partisans exclusively because, unlike the

Četniks, they did not hesitate to engage the Germans. At the end of the war, the Partisans were the dominant force in Yugoslavia and, in consequence, liberated much of the country themselves. As a rule, the more crucial the role that partisan groups played in liberating their country from occupation in Eastern Europe, the more likely they were to have a major part in establishing and running its postwar government.

Robert W. Duvall and Benjamin F. Jones

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Holocaust in the Soviet Union; NKVD; Warsaw, Battle for (August 16–25, 1920); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856)

Born in Poltava on May 19, 1782, Ivan Pashkevich was the son of Cossack gentry. He was educated in the corps of pages, and commissioned in the Imperial Guards as a sublieutenant in 1800. Pashkevich became aide-de-camp to Czar Alexander I during the campaigns against Napoleon, and saw action in the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805.

From 1807 to 1812, Pashkevich served in the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, winning a reputation as a brave and daring officer. Promoted to major general in 1812, he returned to the fight against Napoleon in command of an infantry division. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1814, and served as a commander in the wars with Persia in 1826–1827, where his performance earned him a bonus of a million rubles, a diamond-encrusted sword, and the title Count of Erivan (Yerevan). He also enjoyed success as commander of Russian forces in the 1828–1829 wars against the Ottomans, earning promotion to field marshal in 1829.

After serving in Dagestan during 1830, Pashkevich was transferred to Poland and tasked with crushing the rebellion there. His slow but systematic approach led to a decisive victory in the 1831 Battle of Warsaw. Pashkevich then became viceroy of Poland, where he ruthlessly implemented Russification policies. In 1849, Pashkevich commanded Russian troops in Hungary, suppressing the rebellion there as he had in Poland.

When war broke out with the Ottoman Empire in 1853, Pashkevich was sent to command the Army of the Danube. A combat injury suffered in June 1854 compelled him to return to Poland, however; he died in Warsaw on January 20, 1856.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Polish Rising (1863); Revolutions of 1848; Russo-Iranian War (1826–1828); Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829); Russo-Turkish War (1853–1856)

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Patriotic War of 1812

Decisive conflict between France and Russia, also known as the Russian Campaign of 1812, and part of the larger Napoleonic Wars. Following the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, relations between Napoleonic France and Russia became increasingly tense. Czar Alexander I of Russia did not forget the painful lessons of 1805–1807, and was aware of the widespread displeasure prevailing in Russia over the “ignominious” peace. Although Napoleon and Alexander confirmed their relations at Erfurt in 1808, the fissures became evident the following year, when Russia took only half-hearted steps to support France against Austria. Russia was concerned by Napoleon’s aggressive policy in the Germanic states as well as his creation of the Duchy of Warsaw, which threatened Russian interests in Poland. In addition, the Continental System, which Russia was forced to join in 1807, proved disadvantageous to the Russian economy. Russia’s decision to open its ports to British goods was a direct threat to Napoleon’s efforts to defeat Britain.

In 1811, Napoleon began preparing for the “Second Polish Campaign,” as he described it. The enormous *Grande Armée* of some 600,000 soldiers (including reserves) and 1,372 field guns was created. About half of Napoleon’s troops came from his allies, including Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Spain, Bavaria, Poland, and Italy. Anticipating war, Russia sought support from Austria and Prussia, but the presence of the Napoleonic armies in Germany and the recent defeat of Austria (1809) left these states little choice but to submit to the French. Napoleon’s



Napoleon I and his army march into Moscow during the French invasion of Russia in 1812. (Library of Congress)

overall strategy considered the use of Sweden and the Ottoman Empire to form his extreme flanks. Russia formed an alliance with Sweden (April 1812), however, and concluded the Treaty of Bucharest (May 1812) with the Turks.

By the spring of 1812, Napoleon's army was deployed in three groups along the Vistula River, stretching from Warsaw to Koenigsberg. The main force of about 220,000 men was under Napoleon's direct command. The central army of some 70,000 men was under the command of Napoleon's stepson Eugène de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy. The right-wing army group (about 75,000 men) was led by Napoleon's young brother, Jérôme Bonaparte, King of Westphalia. Marshal Jacques-Etienne Macdonald's X Corps (with a Prussian contingent) guarded the left flank of the *Grande Armée* close to the Baltic coastline, while 30,000 Austrians under

Prince Karl Philip Schwarzenberg covered the right flank.

Russia fielded about 650,000 men in 1812, but these were scattered throughout the empire, leaving some 250,000 men with over 900 guns (organized in three major armies and a few separate corps) in the western provinces to fend off Napoleon's invasion. The First Western Army of Mikhail Barclay de Tolly (120,000 men) deployed in the vicinity of Vilnius, while the Second Western Army under Pyotr Bagration (49,000 men) assembled in the area of Volkovysk and Belostock (Bialystok) in the south. Aleksandr Tormasov commanded the Third Reserve Army of Observation (44,000 men) around Lutsk, covering the route to Ukraine. In addition to three reserve corps deployed in provinces, Lieutenant General Baron Fadey Steinheil's Finland Corps (19,000 men) in the north and Admiral Paul Chichagov's

Army of the Danube (57,500 men) in the south protected the extreme flanks of the Russian army.

On June 23–24, Napoleon’s army crossed the Russian border at the Nieman River while the Russian armies began to withdraw toward the fortified camp at Drissa. On July 8, the First Western Army reached Drissa, where Alexander left the army without appointing a commander in chief. On July 14, Barclay de Tolly left camp in the direction of Smolensk, leaving General Peter Wittgenstein with some 20,000 men to protect the St. Petersburg direction. In the south, Second Western Army withdrew first toward Minsk and then to Smolensk, eluding Napoleon’s enveloping maneuvers and gaining minor victories at Mir and Romanov. On August 2, the Russian armies joined at Smolensk.

Meantime, Tormasov defeated a French corps at Kobryn and then pinned down Schwarzenberg in Volhynia. On July 31, Chichagov’s Army of Danube moved from Moldavia to support Tormasov’s army. In the north, General Oudinot’s corps captured Polotsk on July 26 but was defeated by Wittgenstein in combats at Klyastitsy on July 30–August 1, forcing Napoleon to divert General Saint Cyr to support him. In the Baltic provinces, General Macdonald’s corps remained pinned down near Riga. Thus by August 1812, Napoleon’s initial plan to destroy the Russian army in a decisive battle failed while the *Grande Armée* suffered high losses from strategic consumption and desertion.

At Smolensk though, the Russians faced a crisis of command. The conflict stemmed from a political discord between the old Russian aristocracy and the “foreigners,” who played an important role at the court and the army. The factions disagreed on strategy. Barclay de Tolly was surrounded by the “German party,” which supported

a defensive strategy. The “Russian party” surrounding Bagration urged an immediate counteroffensive. Anti-Barclay sentiments were so strong among the senior officers that they openly intrigued for Bagration’s appointment to supreme command.

Giving in to pressure, Barclay agreed to an offensive from Smolensk but his subsequent vacillation led to futile maneuvering and gave Napoleon time to recognize Russian intentions. In a brilliant maneuver, Napoleon moved his army across the Dnieper to capture Smolensk. General Dmitry Neverovsky’s resolute rearguard action at Krasnyi on August 14 enabled General Nikolai Rayevsky to prepare the defense at Smolensk while the two Russian armies rushed back to the city. On August 15–16, the Russians repulsed French assaults on Smolensk but were nonetheless forced to abandon the city. As the Russians withdrew to Moscow, Napoleon attempted to cut their line of retreat but, in the battle of Valutina Gora on August 19, Barclay’s army succeeded in clearing its way to Dorogobuzh.

The surrender of Smolensk further aroused general discontent against Barclay de Tolly. On August 20, Alexander replaced him with General Mikhail Kutuzov, who joined the army on August 29 at Tsarevo Zaimische. Kutuzov withdrew further to the east before engaging Napoleon at Borodino, just west of Moscow, on September 7. Napoleon chose frontal attacks on fortified Russian positions (Bagration’s fleches and the Great Redoubt) and, in savage and bloody fighting, both sides demonstrated great bravery and steadfastness. Although the French controlled the battlefield, the Russian army withdrew in good order and remained battle-ready. The French lost between 30,000–35,000 men, including 49 generals, while the Russians suffered some 44,000 casualties, including 29 generals.

At the military council at Fili on September 13, Kutuzov ordered Moscow abandoned without a fight. The following day, Napoleon's troops entered Moscow. The same day, the city was engulfed by the fires ignited by the retreating Russians and, by September 18, two-thirds of the city was destroyed.

Meantime, the Russian army skillfully maneuvered from the Ryazan road to the Kaluga road, where Kutuzov established the Tarutino Camp. Through this maneuver, Kutuzov protected the southern provinces with their abundant supplies and manufacturing. He reinforced his army, began intensive preparations for future operations, and encouraged guerilla operations against the enemy communication and supply lines. Napoleon made several peace proposals to Alexander I, but they were all rejected.

On October 18, Marshal Joachim Murat's advance guard suffered a sudden defeat on the Cherneshnya River, north of Tarutino. Napoleon realized he had to abandon the devastated Moscow before the winter arrived. The French commenced retreat on October 19, 1812. Napoleon's forces dwindled to some 100,000 men, accompanied by thousands of noncombatants and an enormous baggage train of loot.

The route from Moscow to Smolensk was devastated after the French forces had fought their way to the Russian capital in August–September, so Napoleon planned to move his forces toward the untouched regions to the southwest. Kutuzov intercepted the *Grande Armée* at Maloiaroslavets, however, where in a savage battle on October 23–24, the French captured the town but failed to break through the main Russian army. As a result, Napoleon had to return to the old route to Smolensk while Kutuzov pursued him, scoring a victory at Vyazma on November 3.

Meanwhile, in the south, Admiral Chichagov merged his forces with Tormasov's

army and took command of some 60,000 men. Wittgenstein scored another victory at Polotsk on October 20, securing the northern direction. By now, the Russians were implementing the so-called St. Petersburg Plan, which envisioned joint operations of three Russian armies (under Wittgenstein, Kutuzov, and Chichagov) to trap Napoleon on the Berezina River.

The *Grande Armée* reached Smolensk in early November. Napoleon hoped to rally his forces there, but lack of supplies and Kutuzov's advance forced him to continue retreating. On November 14–16, the Russian forces attacked three French corps (under Eugene, Davout, and Ney) while they were marching from Smolensk to Krasnyi. Each corps was temporarily cut off and Ney's corps was even surrounded, but none of them was forced to lay down arms. Nevertheless, the French losses were horrendous due to constant skirmishes, cold weather, and lack of supplies. The poorly dressed French soldiers began to freeze and thousands of stragglers were killed or captured by the Russian guerillas. By mid-November, only some 49,000 French troops remained under arms, but they were accompanied by tens of thousands of stragglers. The main Russian army also suffered severely in the harsh winter conditions, losing thousands of men.

As Napoleon retreated westwards, the Russians had a chance to trap him on the Berezina. Kutuzov pushed Napoleon's forces from east, while Wittgenstein converged from northeast and Chichagov from southwest. Russian indecision and mismanagement allowed Napoleon to extricate most of his army. Although Chichagov is often blamed for the Berezina failure, other Russian generals share the responsibility. Thus, Kutuzov's faltering actions at Krasnyi and the Berezina served as a basis for

the so-called golden bridge theory in the Russian historiography, which argued that Kutuzov purposefully refrained from attacking the French to preserve Russian armies and let the winter and hunger finish off the *Grande Armée*.

By December, the *Grande Armée*, suffering from elements, exhaustion, and constant attacks, effectively ceased to exist as an organized military force. On December 5, Napoleon put Murat in charge of the army and left for Paris. By December 25, the last remnants of the *Grande Armée* crossed the Nieman River.

The Russian campaign had disastrous consequences for Napoleon. His military might was shattered following the loss of up to half a million men in Russia. The French cavalry was virtually wiped out and never fully recovered. Austria and Prussia exploited the moment to break with France and, furthermore, joined their efforts to destroy the French empire.

The war also had important effects on Russia. The Russian army became the main force in the subsequent struggle for Germany, giving Russia tremendous clout in European affairs. By 1815, Russia had become one of the arbiters of European affairs. The war also deeply influenced cultural and social life in Russia. It launched the period of national self-definition when a sense of Russia's place and mission in the world began to form.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Chichagov, Pavel Vasilievich (1767–1849); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Maloiaroslavets, Battle of (October 24, 1812); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18,

1812); Tilsit, Treaty of; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

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Paul I (1754–1801)

Paul I's reign as czar of Russia from 1796 to 1801 was marked by a number of beneficial reforms, but it is most remembered for Paul's bizarre, paranoid behavior and use of a large police force to spy on his own people.

Paul was born in St. Petersburg on October 1, 1754, the only child of Peter III and Catherine II; there is some doubt about his paternity, as Catherine was engaged in an affair at the time with Sergei Saltykov, a military officer. From the moment of his birth, Paul was taken away from Catherine by Czarina Elizabeth Petrovna to raise as her heir. He rarely saw his parents until the empress's death in 1761. In the disorganized household of the czarina, Paul was raised by a peasant nurse (who inculcated a love of Russian folk culture) and tutored by Feodor Dmitrievich Bekhtev, the former Russian ambassador to Paris, and Count Nikita Panin. After the overthrow and murder of his father by Catherine's supporters, Paul was brought to the court of his mother in 1762. Catherine was determined that Paul should



Paul I's reign as czar of Russia from 1796 to 1801 is most remembered for his bizarre, paranoid behavior. (Library of Congress)

have the education of the Enlightenment and personally oversaw the curriculum. She also insisted that Paul be inoculated for smallpox, a daring procedure.

In 1773, Catherine arranged Paul's marriage to Wilhelmina of Hesse-Darmstadt, continuing Peter the Great's plan for marrying the Romanovs into European families. Unfortunately, Wilhelmina, who took the name Natalia Alekseevna, was a terrible disappointment. She was unable to fit in at the Russian court and carried on an affair with Count Kirill Razumovsky. When she died during childbirth in April 1776, Paul was crushed. Catherine demanded that he marry again and produce children; she deliberately had Paul shown proof of Wilhelmina's infidelity.

Catherine then sent Paul on a tour of Germany and arranged a meeting with his prospective bride, Sophia Dorothea of

Wurttemberg, en route. After her marriage and conversion to Orthodoxy, Sophia Dorothea took the name Maria Fyodorovna and greatly pleased the empress by producing a son, Alexander (later Alexander I), less than a year later. Like her predecessor, Catherine intended to raise her grandchildren and removed them from Paul and Sophia's custody immediately. Of the six children they had, three sons and three daughters, only the girls were allowed to live with their parents.

Paul was not welcome at his mother's court and instead lived at an estate at Gachina, where he experimented with agricultural reforms and organized the estate as a self-contained kingdom. It had a bank, hospital, and school system, although all were run on a military model of strict discipline, with the peasants in uniform and subject to harsh military justice. Paul also developed an experimental private army at Gachina of more than 2,000 men, whom he took great pleasure in drilling. Paul and Sophia made a successful tour of Europe during 1782–1783, but the honor shown to him in foreign courts contrasted bitterly with his unimportant role in Russia. Problems with his mother were only exacerbated by Paul's adamant opposition to the French Revolution and Catherine's interest in Poland at the expense of Western Europe.

Upon Catherine's death in 1796, Paul became czar, although Catherine wanted to pass him over in favor of Alexander, who now took his place as his father's chief aide. Once in power, Paul showed a strong streak of the bizarre. He had his long-dead father, Peter III, exhumed, crowned, and formally buried next to Catherine in the Romanov family vault. Many of Catherine's friends were exiled, and Grigory Potemkin, her lover and chancellor, suffered the posthumous indignity of being exhumed and his body thrown into the Moika Canal.

Paul's reign is largely remembered for the use of an enlarged secret police force to enforce curfews, dress codes, and carry out internal spying on a grand scale. The czar insisted that people bow in the snowy streets even to his empty carriage and demonstrated an increasing paranoia. For all that, Paul attempted genuine reforms. He reorganized the Senate, established ministries for commerce and to administer imperial property, allowed tolerance for Jews, began the Imperial School for Law, consolidated foreign debt, and founded a Bank of Assistance for the Nobility—part of a plan to force the nobles to modernize their landholdings and pay their debts.

Politically, Paul was an archconservative horrified by the French Revolution. Generous to émigrés, he gave an allowance to the exiled Louis XVIII and joined the military coalition against France. He committed Russian money and troops to actions in the Netherlands that failed miserably. Paul then left the coalition and concentrated his hostility on Great Britain, which he intended to damage through an attack on India while he approached an agreement with Napoleon I, who had come to power in France.

Paul became so paranoid that he distrusted his wife. He had a new palace built as a secure compound against the intentions of assassins. The estate, the Michael Palace, was ready in 1801, and Paul took up residence. On March 23, 1801, while getting ready for bed, Paul was confronted by his son Alexander and army officers, who tried to pressure him to abdicate as part of a plan that had at least 68 known subscribers. Instead, a struggle broke out in which Paul was strangled and killed.

Alexander and Sophia quickly announced that Paul had died of an attack of apoplexy. Alexander assumed the throne, rejoined the coalition against France, and quashed the attack on India. Even though Paul's death lifted the weight of his suspicions from

the Russian populace, the centralizing tendencies and increasing power of the secret police were direct legacies of his rule. The more positive aspects, including a plan for the modernization of the nobility and their finances, were lost in the aftermath of his death.

Margaret Sankey

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Potemkin, Grigory Aleksandrovich (1739–1791)

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Pavlov, Dmitry Grigorevich (1897–1941)

Soviet army general. Born in the village of Vonyukh, Kostroma region, on November 4, 1897, Dmitry Pavlov fought in World War I and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He joined the Red Army and Communist Party after the war. Commissioned in the cavalry, Pavlov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1928 and the Military-Technical Academy in 1931. He then commanded the 4th Mechanized Brigade, one of the Red Army's first mechanized units. He next headed the Armored Directorate, in 1937, and was chief of the Soviet tank advisers sent to assist the Republican side in the 1936–1939

Spanish Civil War. In 1939, Pavlov became head of the Armed Tank Directorate. As a result of his experience in Spain, however, Pavlov concluded that there was no future for large armor formations. Although he was not alone in this idea, his thinking helped bring the disbandment of the Soviet mechanized corps and—at least until the death of Josef Stalin—Pavlov took the blame for it.

As a colonel general, Pavlov was appointed to the Main Military Council in July 1940. Promoted to full general in February 1941, he received command of the Western Front on June 6, just prior to the German invasion. Facing German Army Group Center, Pavlov positioned three of his armies well forward and kept only one in reserve.

A week after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the collapse of his sector of the front, Pavlov and his chief of staff, Major General V.E. Klimovskikh, were ordered to Moscow with several other commanders. Pavlov was made the scapegoat for Soviet military failures, accused of collaboration with the Germans, tried, and found guilty. He was shot on July 22, 1941.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze Academy; Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Perekop and Azov Campaigns. *See* Holy League, Wars of the (1686–1696)

Periaslavl, Treaty of (1654)

Agreement ending the Khmelnytsky Uprising.

At the end of 1653, Russian czar Aleksei Mikhailovich sent the boyar Vasily Butarlin to meet with Bohdan Khmelnytsky and negotiate an end to the conflict over Ukraine. Talks opened on January 6, 1654, and proceeded quickly, as both sides wanted peace. A draft of the treaty was presented to the Cossack assembly on January 8, and it was ratified in Moscow on March 21.

Under its terms, Kiev, Bratislav, and the Chernigov palatinates, along with portions of the Volhynia and Starodub regions, would come under the protection of Russia. In return, the czar recognized the registration of some 60,000 free Cossacks in Ukraine; they would be organized into 10 regiments in Right Bank Ukraine and 7 in Left Bank Ukraine.

This agreement effectively ended the Peace of Polivanka and led directly to the Thirteen Years War, as Aleksei assumed he could now easily conquer and hold the areas of western Russia then held by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Khmelnytsky, Bohdan (1595–1657); Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657); Polivanka, Peace of (June 4, 1634); Thirteen Years' War (Russo-Polish War, First Northern War, War for Ukraine; 1654–1667)

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Persian Front, World War I

A secondary fighting front during World War I, but nonetheless one of great strategic importance. A vast empire bordering most of the focal points of Great Power rivalry in Central and South Asia yet stricken with an utterly weak central government and persistent feudal and tribal structures, Persia (modern-day Iran) represented a power vacuum that almost by default became a battleground for the Great Powers in the war. Persia was extremely important to both sides because of its strategic location and because of recently developed, British-controlled oil fields. Vulnerable to foreign intervention, it was ruled by the weak and vacillating 17-year-old Ahmad Shah. His miniscule military consisted largely of an 8,000-man Cossack Brigade commanded by Russian officers and a Swedish gendarmerie of 7,000 men led by Swedish officers who favored the German side.

Supposedly, foreign troops entered Persia during the war to uphold the shah's authority. In reality, British troops entered south Persia to protect the Anglo-Persian oil installations around Abadan and keep open the sea route through the Persian Gulf. Western Persia became a convenient extension of the Anglo-Turkish Front in Mesopotamia and the Russo-Turkish Front in the Caucasus. In central Persia, British, Russian, Ottoman, and German forces and missions battled for dominance over what little central power the monarchy possessed; in eastern Persia, Britain tried to shield its Indian empire from German, and later Russian, interference. In 1918, northern Persia became the springboard for British intervention in the Russian Civil War.

The Ottoman Empire was the only power that hoped to take Persian territory. War Minister Enver Pasha was pursuing his fantastic Pan-Turkic schemes when he ordered the *Van Jandarma* (paramilitary police)

Division into Persia in December 1914, simultaneously with the Caucasian offensive of the Third Army. In spite of some success in bringing local tribes on their side, the Ottoman invaders were unable to secure a permanent foothold in Persia. In the spring of 1915, Russian forces drove them back.

Late in 1915, Russia reinforced its forces, commanded by General Nikolai N. Baratov. That December, the Russians advanced on Hamadan, Tehran, and Qum, driving the Ottomans back further and bringing most of northwestern Persia under Russian control. Seesaw action continued through the winter of 1915–1916 with inconclusive engagements between Turkish, Russian, and Persian tribal forces in which little ground actually changed hands. On February 25, 1916, Baratov took Kermanshah.

In the spring of 1916, in order to support the Russian defense in the Caucasus, Baratov received orders to move on Khaniqin. His advance, however, collided with a renewed Ottoman effort in Persia. Ali Inan Pasha's Ottoman XIII Corps of three crack infantry divisions totaling 25,000 men hit the scattered Russians and drove them back. On June 26, the Ottomans were in Karind, and on July 2, they reached Kermanshah.

Operating at the extreme end of a fragile supply line through hostile country, Baratov had no real hope of stopping the Ottoman thrust. The Allies considered a diversionary attack on the Ottoman flank by the British Expeditionary Force in Iraq, but this did not materialize. On August 9, Ali Inan took Hamadan. Realizing that he had little chance of permanently holding vast stretches of territory deep in Persia with his small force, he advanced no farther. The Russians remained firmly entrenched on the mountain passes just beyond Hamadan.

A lull occurred in Persia during the winter of 1916–1917. In the spring, the Ottoman

XIII Corps was withdrawn from Persia to help fend off the British advance in Mesopotamia. Baratov followed, and on March 31, 1917, he retook Qasr-i-Shirin. The Ottoman invasion of Persia was over.

In central and southern Persia, the first two years of the war saw German influence increasing. German diplomatic personnel succeeded in winning over local tribes to oppose the British and Russians, and the Germans even managed to incite revolts in south Persia. The Germans also sent a military mission to Tehran to train Persian troops under German leadership, and German expeditions traversed the country toward Afghanistan, hoping to win Emir Habib Allah of Afghanistan to their side and thus exert pressure on British India. If the British overstated the case in their claim that Persia was virtually a German colony in 1915–1916, it was nevertheless obvious that upholding British influence there would require additional resources.

The British response was multifaceted. Britain asked its Russian allies to bring pressure to bear on the central government by advancing on Tehran. The British also reinforced, with units of the Indian Army, their position in the Persian Gulf and in southern Persia, and in Fars and Kerman, the British raised an indigenous force under their control. Known as the South Persian Rifles, the force later expanded to two brigades of more than 6,000 men. Finally, in the vast expanses of eastern Persia, the British established a military cordon to prevent German incursions into Afghanistan.

In the southeast, the British maintained throughout the war the so-called Seistan Force, later styled the East Persian Cordon Field Force. It consisted of several Indian squadrons and companies, and some 100 indigenous troops. British forces in southern and eastern Persia spent the rest of the war

upholding British influence and quelling tribal unrest in continuous small wars.

In the northeast, the Russians controlled vast expanses of Persia bordering their central Asian provinces. In 1916, after the Russian advance in northwestern Persia, the Germans found themselves cut off from their lines of communications.

The Russian revolutions of March and November 1917 dramatically changed the military situation in Persia. Internal unrest sapped Baratov's force and loosened the Russian hold on northwestern Persia. Simultaneously, the Ottomans again pushed into the Caucasus region with the aim of finally securing a Pan-Turkic empire. Meanwhile, German progress in southern Russia posed a threat not only to the British position in Persia but also to its influence in Afghanistan.

To remedy this situation, the British dispatched to northern Persia forces under Major General L. C. Dunsterville. A confusing strategic situation developed when the Ottoman Ninth Army advanced southeast into Persia and took Tabriz, while Dunsterville moved his troops, known as "Dunsterforce," north to secure a road to the vital oil-producing region around Baku. The British forces were finally drawn into the Russian Civil War, at times fighting alongside the counterrevolutionary "White" forces against the Bolsheviks in northern Persia, Caucasia, and Turkestan.

The Ottomans, meanwhile, tried to hold on to Azerbaijan even after the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918). Only on November 7, 1918, did British forces finally enter Baku. The British intervention in Transcaspia (Turkestan) continued into March 1919, when Russian White forces took over from them.

Dierk Walter

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; February (March) Revolution (1917); Khanaqin,

Battle of (June 3, 1916); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Peter, False (?–1607)

Pretender to the throne of Russia who fronted a rebellion during the Time of Troubles.

Czarevich Peter, or the False Peter, as he is sometimes known, was the second great pretender to the Russian throne in the early 17th century. Where the False Dmitri claimed to be the son of Ivan IV (the Terrible) who had died under mysterious circumstance in 1591, Peter claimed to be the son of Ivan's son, Czar Fyodor I—who had no male children. Many people nevertheless believed—or claimed to believe—Peter's story and supported his rebellion against Czar Vasily Shuisky during 1607–1609.

Most of Peter's support, however, came from the Cossacks who had chosen him to play the part and, they hoped, rally popular support for their cause. The Cossacks were upset by the increasing restrictions on their numbers and movements that czars Boris I (Godunov) and Vasily IV (Shuisky) had imposed upon them, and thus supported Czar Dmitry I (the False Dmitry), who promised to restore their freedom. When Shuisky assassinated Dmitry in June 1606, the Poles

who had supported Dmitry seized upon the Cossack pretender, the Czarevich Peter.

The Czarevich had begun life as Ilia (or Ileika) Korovin, the illegitimate son of a cobbler. He had traveled to Moscow in his youth, worked as a shop assistant in Nizhni Novgorod, served as a cook on a merchant ship plying the Volga, sold leather goods in Astrakhan, and served in a *streltsy* detachment before running away to become a Cossack. It was this “worldliness” that led to his selection, even before Dmitry was assassinated, as the Cossacks' spokesman.

Initially, the Czarevich's military force was small—perhaps 300 men—and his story was not taken seriously. By early 1606, however, he had raised an army of some 4,000 Cossacks and was marching up the Volga River. Unlike the forces of the False Dmitry, Peter's Cossacks raped, burned, and pillaged as they went, and thus never garnered true popular support.

Dmitry's supporters nonetheless hoped Peter might serve as a rallying point for their faction after the czar's assassination, and invited him to Putivl, which had briefly served as the former pretender's capital. Dmitry's boyar and *dvoranie* supporters established him there as at least the nominal head of a court and council of war. Peter was never convincing as a czar, however, and in December 1606, he left Putivl and traveled to Poland. His mission, supposedly, was to find the “true Dmitry” that supporters claimed had miraculously escaped Shuisky's assassins.

The Czarevich returned to Russia in January 1607 with renewed support from Poland and from the Zaparozhe Cossacks, but without Dmitry. His force of nearly 7,500 Cossacks managed to take the fortified town of Tula, but their attempt to join forces with Dmitry's supporters under the command of Ivan Bolotnikov at Kaluga in February

1607 met with defeat. A second attempt in April was also deflected, and Peter’s support began to wither. The obvious falsehood of Peter’s story, combined with his boorishness and the senseless acts of violence perpetrated by his forces had alienated most people. A new pretender, Czarevich Ivan-August, who claimed to be Ivan IV’s son by his fourth wife (who had been childless) soon appeared, followed by at least 10 others, including Czar Dmitry’s son.

During the summer and autumn of 1607, Czar Vasily’s forces slowly drove Peter’s dwindling force back to Tula. The Czarevich gained a brief reprieve when a second Dmitry appeared, raised a small force and engaged the czar’s forces at Kozelsk. Tula fell on October 11, 1607, however, and Peter was turned over to the czar. He was forced to confess by being tortured repeatedly, and then hanged in violation of the terms of surrender Bolotnikov had negotiated with Vasily.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608); Bolotnikov Rebellion; Cossacks; Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”, 1530–1584); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles; Tula, Siege of (June–October 1607)

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Peter I (“the Great”); 1672–1725)

Czar of Russia. Born the son of Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich and his second wife, Natalya Naryshkina on June 9, 1672, in Moscow at the Kremlin. Peter had two half brothers, Fyodor and Ivan, from his father’s first wife, Maria Miloslavskaiia. As a result, the Naryshkin and the Miloslavsky families competed for power in the court.

In February 1676, Czar Aleksei died suddenly, leaving Fyodor to succeed as czar, bringing the Miloslavsky family back to prominence at court. Fyodor was sickly and not expected to reign for long. In May 1682, Fyodor died, and Peter was elected czar by the *zemsky Sobor*, an assembly of nobles. A mutiny of *streletsy* (musketeers) led by Peter’s half sister, Sophia, nullified that election, however, and instead declared that her brother, Ivan rule as co-czar with Peter, and she as regent.

For seven years, Peter and his mother lived outside the Kremlin and explored Moscow. Among his closest friends were the Swiss officer Franz Lefort and the Scottish mercenary Patrick Gordon, who would serve Peter in his campaigns. Peter’s intelligence and general curiosity of the outside world were further stimulated by these formative years. As a boy, he formed his own regiment, which was outfitted with Western-style uniforms and guns. Uncharacteristically for a czar, or any Russian at the time, Peter gained a love for the sea and shipbuilding. Peter grew into a healthy, robust young man who would eventually fulfill his role as czar.

On January 27, 1689, Peter married Eudoxia Lopukhina, a woman from a distinguished family with connections to the court.

Arranged by his mother, the marriage was doomed from the beginning. Peter soon grew tired of her company and could not stand to be near her. Still, Eudoxia bore Peter two sons, the Czarevich Aleksei and Aleksandr, who died after seven months. In 1698, Peter finally banished Eudoxia to the Pokrovsky Monastery in Suzdal. He married his mistress, Martha Skavronskaya, in 1712.

Soon after his marriage to Eudoxia, Peter clashed with Sophia over who would be the ultimate sovereign in Russia. Though supposedly ruling in the names of Peter and Ivan as regent, Sophia had been gradually accruing power as a czarina in her own right, with the help of her supporters, the Miloslavskys and particularly, the *streltsy*, who formed the core of the standing imperial army. As long as Peter was a child, Sophia felt secure in her position. She left him free to explore Moscow and even indulged his tastes for Western fashions and guns. Hearing a false rumor that Sophia had sent soldiers to kill him in August 1689, Peter fled to the Troitsky-Sergeeva Monastery for protection. There he planned her removal as regent.

Gradually, Sophia lost support as the *streltsy* and members of her circle sided with Peter. Peter exiled Sophia to Novodevichy Convent on the outskirts of Moscow where, though comfortable, she was to be completely secluded. On October 16, 1689, Peter entered Moscow as czar in his own right.

After consolidating his reign, Peter began the task of opening Russia to the West. The foundations had been already laid by his father, Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich, and his half-sister, Sophia. Not only would he continue to engage his boyhood army drills he would now also apply what he learned. In 1695, Peter announced a campaign against the Tatars and the Ottoman Empire on Russia’s southern border. Archangel (Arkhangelsk)



Peter I, also known as Peter the Great, ruled the Russian empire from 1682 until his death in 1725. He is renowned for introducing European civilization to Russia and elevating Russia to a recognized entity among the European powers. (Library of Congress)

had been the only seaport of the Muscovite state, but it was blocked with ice for six months. A warmwater port on the Black Sea would be an economic and strategic advantage for Russia.

The Azov Campaign was, in many ways, similar to the drills Peter performed with his regiments, but on a larger scale. More than 1,400 barges were constructed to transport troops down the Don River to the Black Sea, plus the *Apostle Peter* and *Apostle Paul*, the first two warships of Peter’s navy. For the construction of these vessels, 4,743 peasants were conscripted, which established a precedent for future projects. After a siege of two months, Azov became part of the Russian Empire in May 1696, and thus, Peter celebrated his first major military victory as czar.

In the aftermath of the Azov Campaign, Peter began to construct a sea-going fleet to gain access to the Black Sea. He conscripted thousands more for peasant labor in constructing harbors and shipyards, uprooted 3,000 *streltsy* and their families to colonize Azov, and hired engineers and shipbuilders from all over Europe. Additionally, in 1696, Peter declared that he would accompany 50 young Russian noblemen throughout Western Europe to learn shipbuilding and other skills, much to the horror of many Russians, who had never gone abroad. These were but a taste of what Peter had in store.

In March 1697, Peter departed on his “Great Embassy” to Western Europe. He would spend 18 months visiting Poland, Austria, The Netherlands, England, and Venice. The Great Embassy had two main purposes. One was to strengthen Russia’s political alliances against the Ottoman Turks to gain foreign support for access to the Black Sea. More fundamentally, Peter wanted to go to Western Europe to satisfy his curiosity. He was particularly interested in learning and applying the latest techniques in shipbuilding, which was why England and Holland were part of his itinerary.

Peter traveled incognito as “Peter Mikhailov” so he could have more freedom of action and to detract attention from himself. In his absence, Peter left Russia under the charge of his closest allies, his uncle Lev Narhyshkin, Prince Boris Golitsyn, Prince Peter Prozorovsky, and Prince Fyodor Romodanovsky. On his tour, Peter had the air of a student, diligently studying diverse fields like shipbuilding, artillery gunnery, or anatomy, as well as the practical arts such as dentistry and carpentry. He was enthralled at the prosperity and sophistication of Western cities such as Amsterdam or London that made Moscow appear increasingly backward.

Peter was forced to cut short his journey on July 1698, when Romodanovsky wrote to him about a rebellion by the *streltsy* caused by long-simmering resentments over Peter’s association with foreigners, his openness to Western ideas, and their increasing marginalization in Peter’s reign. Even though the rebellion already had been suppressed, it rekindled Peter’s fears of a plot by the Miloslavsky family to usurp his throne. Upon his return, Peter ruthlessly executed those involved in the rebellion and disbanded the *streltsy*. Sophia now was forced to become a nun.

Peter quickly began to apply what he had learned in the Great Embassy with the aim of transforming Russia from a backward feudal society into a modern European state. He reorganized the government into “colleges,” or departments, an idea borrowed from Sweden. Russia would be reorganized into eight *Gubernias* or “governorates.” The Russian economy was reformed into a more mercantile economy, in order to provide revenue. A Table of Ranks was instituted, which bound the Russian nobility to the state and put civil service on a par with military service. The modernization of the army and the navy was an ongoing process.

Peter also reformed the social behavior of the nobility by forcing them to conform to Western European fashions and manners, going so far as to shave their beards or cut their Oriental gowns short himself, when necessary. His reforms allowed for women to succeed to the throne, which had not been possible before in Russia. To culminate his reforms, Peter established a new capital, the city of St. Petersburg in 1703, which was a reflection of his Western tastes and policies, built with massive peasant labor and the subservience of the nobility. The catalyst for many of these reforms was the looming war

between Russia and Sweden in the Great Northern War.

Since the 17th century, Sweden had dominated northern Europe through its powerful army and control of the Baltic coastlands. Peter realized that Sweden stood in the way of Russia’s modernization by depriving Russia of access to the Baltic Sea. Having secured his southern border against the Turks, Peter now made plans against Sweden. Peter initiated his campaign against Sweden with the Battle of Narva in October 1700 in an attempt to gain control of Ingria and Karelia.

The Russian army of 40,000 troops was led by Boris Sheremetev, who besieged the town of Narva with an artillery bombardment. The siege proved unsuccessful. On November 20, 1700, the Swedes, led by King Charles XII, fought the Russians in the middle of a snowstorm and handily defeated Peter’s army, which retreated in disarray. The Russians lost 145 cannon, 32 mortars, 4 howitzers, 10,000 cannonballs, and 397 barrels of gunpowder. The defeat had shaken Peter, while Charles XII was celebrated as a military genius. In the aftermath of Narva, Peter modernized his army by adopting Western European tactics and new weapons. To replace the artillery lost at Narva, Peter ordered that all the churches in Russia give up one quarter of their bells to be melted down into cannon.

Peter’s modernization paid off with a string of victories against the Swedes. In 1702, he seized the fortress of Noteborg. In 1703, the Russians acquired the fortress of Nyenskans. In 1704, Dorpat and Narva fell to the Russian army. By 1706, Kurland was under Russian control. Finally, harried by cold winters and attacks by the Russians, the Swedes had surrounded the town of Poltava on April 1709, which then was fortified by the Russians.

On June 27 though, Charles XII called for an attack with 24 infantry battalions and 17 regiments of cavalry, which totaled 25,000 men, to retake the town. The Russians had 87 infantry battalions and 27 cavalry regiments, totaling 60,000 men. The Swedish army was decisively defeated after a few hours of combat. As a result, Peter gained control of the Baltic coastline, ending Sweden’s supremacy. That fact was confirmed by the Treaty of Nystadt in 1722.

Peter faced one more obstacle to his reforms: his son, the Czarevich Aleksei Petrovich. After his mother, Eudoxia, had been banished to the convent, Aleksei was given a Western education. He remained devoted to the traditional ways, however, and surrounded himself with reactionaries and priests, who believed Peter to be the Antichrist. Peter’s attempts to give him responsibility ended disastrously, and Peter frequently threatened to disown him. Peter arranged Aleksei’s marriage to Princess Charlotte von Brunswick-Wolfenbittel, whom Aleksei disdained, though she bore him two children.

The final straw was when Aleksei defied Peter’s command to enter the army. Instead, Aleksei ran away with his mistress in 1716 and sought refuge with his father-in-law, Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI. Peter saw this as an act of betrayal as well as a threat to his sovereignty. He also suspected Eudoxia of conspiring with Aleksei. He pleaded with Aleksei to return, promising him a quiet life. Against his better judgment, Aleksei returned to Moscow in 1718, where he and anyone associated with him was arrested and tortured for evidence of treason. Aleksei died under mysterious circumstances, and suspicion hovered around Peter. The death of Peter’s son thus opened the way for conflict over the succession.

Peter nevertheless had secured Russia's place as a major European power. His new capital, St. Petersburg, reflected Peter's desire to bring Western influence into Russia while retaining the autocracy of his forebears. Limited Westernization only strengthened his absolute power over the nobility. After a lifetime of heavy drinking and a urinary infection, Peter died on February 8, 1725, in St. Petersburg. Martha Skavronskaya succeeded him as Catherine I.

Dino E. Buenviaje

See also: Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Gordon, Patrick (1635–1699); Great Northern War (1700–1721); Narva, Battle of (1581); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709); Table of Ranks

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Peter III, Czar (1728–1762)

Peter III was czar of Russia for six months during 1762. He is considered one of Russia's worst rulers for his irresponsible behavior and for voluntarily returning all the territory Russia had gained during the Seven Years War.

Peter was born on February 21, 1728, the son of Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp and Anna Petrovna. His mother was the daughter of Peter I (the Great) and his second wife, Catherine I. Because his

mother died young in 1731 and his father died in 1738, Peter was placed in the care of military tutors under the supervision of his uncle, Adolph Frederick, the bishop of Lubeck. A Swedish marshal was his primary tutor and he treated Peter with harshness crossing into abuse, forcing Peter to kneel for hours on dried peas after making mistakes. Instead of producing a young officer, the tutors brought up an immature, emotionally unbalanced boy who had no experience of kindness and whose proudest moment was being promoted to lieutenant by his distant father.

In 1742, Peter was summoned to Moscow to the court of his aunt, Czarina Elizabeth Petrovna. She named him her heir and supervised his conversion to Russian Orthodoxy. Peter never sufficiently learned Russian, and neither Elizabeth nor a specially recruited team of teachers could correct the defects in Peter's early education, although they tempted him with a series of miniature scientific and military models that Peter used as toys.

Disgusted, Elizabeth decided to find Peter a wife and concentrate on developing their offspring as future czars. She chose Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, a cousin of Peter's from a minor German court, and brought her to Russia for betrothal in 1744. From the beginning, Sophia made an effort to fit into the Russian court. She took the name Catherine after her conversion to Orthodoxy.

Peter and Catherine were married in St. Petersburg, and Elizabeth awaited the birth of an heir. When nothing happened, she literally locked up the young couple in their apartments under the strict supervision of chaperones. Under that pressure, Peter revealed his ugly nature. He beat dogs, abused servants, and threw tantrums, none of which endeared him to Elizabeth (who described him as a monster) or to his young

wife. Eventually, in September 1754, Catherine gave birth to a son named Paul, who might have been fathered by Sergei Saltykov with Elizabeth's blessings. Having done his duty, Peter was allowed to take a mistress; he chose Elizabeth Vorontsova, an uncouth, badly behaved aristocrat whose tastes matched his own. Peter nonetheless was embarrassed and humiliated by Catherine's affair with Grigory Orlov. He conspired to turn the czarina against Catherine but failed.

Czarina Elizabeth died on January 5, 1762, leaving Russia in the middle of the Seven Years War against Prussia. Peter acted swiftly to end the war and enter a treaty of aid with Prussia, an action that outraged the Russian officer corps. Peter behaved badly at Elizabeth's funeral and openly planned to get rid of Catherine and marry Vorontsova. He seemed determined to outrage all sections of Russian society. He snubbed priests by establishing a Lutheran chapel in the palace, brought in a Holstein bodyguard, and planned to turn Russian resources to conquests in northern Germany.

With the support of the army and the influential Orlov family, Catherine successfully overthrew Peter. In June 1762, she was crowned czarina as Catherine II while Peter and Vorontsova were en route to the country estate at Peterhof. With 14,000 Russian soldiers marching against him, Peter fled to Kronstadt, where he was forced to surrender to Catherine, placed under house arrest and sent to the royal estate at Ropsha. Peter sent a stream of messages to Catherine, offering to abdicate and asking that Vorontsova join him in imprisonment. Fearing Peter's existence would give opportunity to enemies, Catherine and Orlov arranged that he be killed there on July 18, 1762. Peter's death was explained as a severe case of colic, and the body was displayed publicly (the strangulation marks

around his neck were neatly hidden by a neckerchief). Years later, Emilian Pugachev, a Cossack rebel, claimed to be Peter III, escaped from prison and lived in hiding.

Margaret Sankey

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Orlov, Count Grigory Grigorievich (1734–1783); Paul I (1754–1801); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Petlyakov, Vladimir Mikhailovich (1891–1942)

Soviet aircraft designer. Born at Sambek (now Novoshakhtinsk) near Taganrog on July 27, 1891, Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov studied at Moscow Higher Technical School under Nikolai Zhukovsky, and while there, he worked as a laboratory assistant at the Central Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Institute (CAHI), graduating in 1922.

After graduation, Petlyakov continued at CAHI as a structural designer. He became Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev's deputy (and head of the heavy airplane brigade) in 1931. Petlyakov's first independent design was the ANT-42 of 1934. It eventually entered production as the Pe-8, the Soviet Union's sole long-range heavy bomber of World War II.

This excellent aircraft carried 5 tons of bombs, but because the Soviet military leadership had little interest in strategic bombing, only 79 Pe-8s were produced.

Petlyakov became chief of CAHI's experimental aircraft factory in July 1936 and its chief designer a year later. He was arrested on July 20, 1937, during Stalin's purges and sent to a *Sharashka*—a Soviet labor camp used for secret research and development. There Petlyakov set up Special Technical Department 100, where he designed the Vi-100, a sophisticated prototype high-altitude fighter and dive-bomber.

Although it was successful, the air force decided the MiG-3 could better meet the high-altitude requirement. On May 25, 1940, the air force gave Petlyakov's team until June 1 to design a conversion to a three-seat attack bomber. The mock-up PB-100 passed inspection on June 1, 1940, and the type was approved for production on June 23.

Petlyakov's success led to his release from prison in July 1940 and his own experimental design bureau (*Opytnoe Konstruktorskoe Byuro* or OKB) in Moscow. The production PB-100 was redesignated the Pe-2 and became the Soviet air force's most successful standard tactical bomber of World War II. The two-engine Pe-2 was the counterpart to the German Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber, U.S. A-20, and British Mosquito. With some 11,000 produced, the Pe-2 made up two-thirds of Soviet bomber production in World War II. The Pe-2 had a crew of three, was armed with five machine guns, and could carry 6,600 pounds of bombs. Its maximum speed was 360 miles per hour; even some fighters had problems keeping up with it.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), the Petlyakov OKB was evacuated to Kazan in October 1941. Petlyakov was killed when the Pe-2 in

which he was traveling from Kazan to Moscow caught fire and crashed on January 12, 1942.

Paul E. Fontenoy

See also: Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991); Tupolev, Andrei Nikolaevich (1888–1972)

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Petragge Raid (October 22, 1915)

Russian Baltic Sea amphibious operation, also known as the Demesnes Raid. The little-known Petragge Raid has significance in inverse proportion to its fame and to what it accomplished. It is worthy of study because of its innovative tactics and because of the response to the operation.

German army offensives in the Baltic region had by mid-1915 forced the Russian army from Poland and were threatening the city of Riga in Latvia. Both the Russians and the Germans understood the strategic significance of the Kurland Peninsula that formed the western edge of the Bay of Riga. Despite Russian numerical superiority, German forces were driving on Riga by the end of the summer. German naval units had not been able to force their way into the Bay of Riga, and this gave some encouragement to the Russians that they could maintain control there. Hoping to build on its limited success in denying the Germans naval access to the bay and endeavoring to slow the German

land advance, the Russian navy conceived an amphibious raid that would come ashore just behind the German front lines.

For the operation, the navy committed the pre-dreadnought *Slava*, already a stalwart in operations against the Germans in the Baltic; the seaplane carrier *Orlitsa*; the gunboats *Grozyashchi* and *Khrabryi*; and 15 destroyers. The goal was to land troops at the coastal town of Demesnes, but the landing actually occurred 7 miles east of the village of Petragge (or Pitragge).

The operation began at 5:50 a.m. on October 22, 1915, with 22 officers and 514 men being put ashore. Caught by surprise, the Germans had insufficient forces in the area to defeat the attack on the beaches, and those German troops on hand immediately fell back. By 1:00 p.m., the raiders had blown several bridges. The Russians had not made allowance for any follow-on operations and, with the Germans regrouping, the raiders returned to their ships that same afternoon. The flotilla weighed anchor at 5:50 p.m. and returned to base the next day.

The Petragge Raid was a boldly conceived operation, based on the Russian navy's control of much of the Baltic and the success of its forces in keeping the German navy from the Bay of Riga, but the failure to provide any supporting forces meant that it had only limited tactical advantage and no lasting effect. Following the raid, the Germans created a cavalry division for the express purpose of guarding the coast against any repetition. Furthermore, the Petragge Raid awakened the Germans to the feasibility of such ventures, which they later demonstrated so effectively in their own Operation ALBION.

David A. Smith

See also: ALBION, Operation (October 8–18, 1917); Baltic Operations, Land, World War I; Baltic Operations, Sea, World War I

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Petrov, Ivan Yefimovich (1896–1958)

Soviet army general. Born in the village of Trubchevsk, Bryansk region, on September 30, 1896, Ivan Petrov studied in a theological seminary and was commissioned in the Russian army from military school in 1917. He joined both the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party in 1918 and fought in the Russian Civil War as a platoon leader, rising to political commissar in a cavalry regiment. In the 1930s, he commanded a cavalry regiment and cavalry brigade, and he then headed the Tashkent Infantry College.

In March 1941, Petrov formed a mechanized corps in the Central Asian Military District, and in May, he won promotion to major general. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Petrov served mainly in the Crimea and Caucasus regions. He first commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division before Odessa and then the Special Maritime Army in the Crimea from August to October 1941. Forced to withdraw to the Crimea, he commanded Sevastopol's land defenses and escaped at the end of June with other senior commanders just before Sevastopol was captured by the Germans. In October, Petrov took command of the Forty-Fourth Army in the Crimea. Promoted to lieutenant general, he was then chief of staff of the North Caucasus Front.

Promoted to colonel general in August 1943, Petrov led the Novorossiysk-Taman Offensive during September and October 1943 and was advanced to general of the army. Following command differences, he was demoted to colonel general and removed from his post in January 1944. That March, he took command of the Thirty-Third Army. He took command of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in August 1944, regaining the rank of full general.

Petrov led the Western Carpathian Offensive in January and February 1945, but he was removed following a failed offensive in March. At war's end, he was chief of staff of the First Ukrainian Front in the Berlin Offensive. He was among the Soviet generals dispersed to distant posts after the war and headed the Tashkent Military District from July 1945 until 1952. Petrov died in Moscow on April 7, 1958.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Battle of (January 15–17, 1878)

Culminating battle of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878.

Russian forces under General Iosef Gurko had surprised the Ottomans by slipping through a narrow, unguarded defile of the Balkan Mountains on the Upper Danube

River in July 1877, thus appearing in the rear of the Turkish defenses and forcing them to abandon Sofia. The Ottoman position was still viable, however, as they held the strategic Shipka Pass in the eastern Balkans, and a strong defensive position east of Sofia at the entrance to the Maritza Valley, which ran along the base of the Balkans toward Constantinople. Behind both of these lay the fortress-city of Plovdiv (Philippopolis), which blocked the way to the Straits.

In early January 1878, Gurko's forces set out from Sofia in three columns. On the right flank, moving along the base of the Rhodope Mountains to the south, were eight battalions of the Russian IX Corps under Lieutenant General Wilhelminov. His left and center, respectively, were comprised of 30 battalions under Lieutenant General Count Shuvalov and 24 battalions under Lieutenant General Krüdener. A smaller detachment of eight battalions served as a rearguard, and six battalions were sent in advance to try and outflank the Ottomans before they could anchor their position. The key to the Ottoman defense was Trajan's Gate, the narrowest pass along the old Roman road, where the Ottoman commander at Plovdiv, Suleiman Pasha, had stationed his main force of some 20,000 men. Forcing the pass would be an extremely difficult task, especially under winter conditions, where the Russians would have to haul their artillery (about 160 guns between all three detachments) up the icy slopes by hand.

Fortunately for Gurko, Russian forces took the Shipka Pass on January 10; this left the Ottoman position exposed to the rear, and Suleiman Pasha hurriedly ordered a retreat. Over the next three days, the Russians and Turks skirmished, with the Ottomans throwing up a rearguard defense at any opportunity, and then hurrying away before the larger and more cumbersome Russian forces

could pursue. On January 15, the Ottoman retreat reached Plovdiv; after destroying the bridges leading to the fort, the Ottomans waited behind their defenses. Just before dark, a small Ottoman force sortied against the Russian advance, but suffered heavy casualties in the face of well-aimed fire. The following day, the Russian main force took the Ottoman outpost of Karagatch, only five miles from Philippopolis; the Russians captured 18 guns, but lost 260 men, and Gurko decided not to pursue.

It turned out to be a wise choice, for during the night of January 16–17, the Ottoman force guarding the flank approaches fled. When the Russians approached the next morning, the battle was brief. Superior Russian numbers overwhelmed the Ottoman defenders, who lost some 5,000 men killed and wounded. The remainder of Suleiman Pasha's force scattered, fleeing back toward Constantinople. Had the other Great Powers not intervened at this point, Gurko might easily have taken the Ottoman capital.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Gurko, Iosif Vladimirovich (1829–1901); Plevna, Siege of (July 20–December 10, 1877); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); San Stefano, Treaty of (1878)

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Plevé (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916)

Russian army general. Born on June 11, 1850, to a Russian noble family of German origin, Pavel Adamovich Plevé (also known

as Wenzel von Plehve) graduated from the Nikolaevsky Cavalry School in 1870 and from the General Staff Academy in 1877. He first saw action in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War. Plevé remained in the Balkans as Bulgarian minister of war after the war against the Ottoman Empire until 1880.

In 1880, Plevé returned to Russia to follow the customary career pattern of a General Staff officer. He held various command and staff positions, and in 1909, he was appointed commander of forces in the Moscow Military District. Plevé remained in this post until the outbreak of World War I.

Plevé proved to be one of the outstanding senior Russian generals of World War I. At the onset of hostilities, he commanded the Russian Fifth Army in Galicia. With General Aleksei Evert's Fourth Army on its right, the Fifth Army met the initial Austro-Hungarian advance northward from Galicia at the end of August 1914. Plevé's forces sustained 40 percent casualties during the Battle of Komarów (August 26–September 2) because of miscalculations by Russian front commander General Nikolai Ivanov. Plevé was nevertheless able to avoid encirclement by Austro-Hungarian forces under General of Infantry Moritz Auffenberg, skillfully extracting his forces.

In November 1914, Plevé marched his forces 70 miles in two and a half days to relieve the Second Army at Łódź. In early 1915, he received command of the newly formed Twelfth Army and received the assignment of attacking East Prussia from the south along with General Baron Rudolf F. Sivvers's Tenth Army. Sivvers's army was badly beaten by the Germans and would have completely succumbed had not Plevé mounted an offensive to relieve pressure.

During the summer of 1915, Plevé again commanded the Fifth Army in the northwestern sector of the Eastern Front (known

to the Russians as the Northwestern Front). That September, the Germans mounted an offensive against the Fifth Army in the area from the Gulf of Riga to Kovno. Pleve's forces, the only barrier to a German drive on Petrograd, held their ground, halting the German attack. Pleve, then in poor health, commanded the Northwestern Front from 1915 but left active duty in February 1916 because of health problems. Appointed to the State Council, he died in Moscow on April 10, 1916.

*James F. Russell III and
Bache M. Whitlock III*

See also: Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Komarów, Battle of (August 26–September 2, 1914); Lodz, Battle of (November 11–December 6, 1914); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Plevna, Siege of (July 20–December 10, 1877)

The siege of Plevna was one of the key struggles of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878).

Situated on the western flank of the Russian advance, Turkish troops at Plevna led by the best Turkish general of the war, Osman Nuri Pasha, posed a severe threat to the Russian army in Bulgaria. Over a period of nearly five months, the Russians, supported by a Romanian contingent, fought three unsuccessful

battles in Plevna before settling down for a siege. Starved and depleted, the besieged Turks thrice attempted to break out and were defeated at a fourth battle on December 9, 1877; they surrendered the next day. This allowed the Russians to renew their advance on Constantinople, forcing an end to the war.

Though quite small, the town of Plevna stood on an important road junction in north-central Bulgaria. The Russians had moved troops into Plevna as early as July 8, when advance parties of Cossacks had driven Ottoman troops out of the town. Later that same day, a small Ottoman force arrived and drove out the Russians. Despite its importance, the Russian commander on the spot, General Krüdener, did not attempt to retake the town. The Russian army's capture of the strategic Shipka Pass on July 19 in the Balkan Mountains diverted attention from the threat to their western flank. Sensing an opportunity, Osman Pasha had rushed troops to Plevna just in time to repel the first Russian attack, led by Lieutenant General Schilder Schuldner, on July 20. The assault (the First Battle of Plevna) was a disorganized affair, compounded by the Russian failure properly to reconnoiter the Ottoman positions. The Russians had attacked a Turkish force that was much larger than their own, and lost heavily. The Russians suffered around 3,000 casualties from a force of 7,500 against Turkish losses of 2,000 from a force of 15,000.

This defeat forced the Russian army in the Balkans to treat the threat to their flank more seriously. To that end, they again tried to storm the town, on July 30 (the Second Battle of Plevna). General Krüdener took personal charge of this second attempt, but it too ended in failure. By now, the Russians had 35,000 men and 176 guns, against Osman Pasha's 22,000 men with 58 guns. The advantage in men and guns, however, was somewhat negated by the fact that the

10 days between the battles had allowed the Turks time to fortify their positions around the town, and the relatively open ground provided an excellent field of fire for their superior rifle. The Turks possessed the excellent Martini-Peabody rifle, while the Russians had the obsolete Krenk. Again, Russian losses were heavy: 8,000 casualties against the Turks' 2,000.

This second defeat placed the Russians in a precarious position. Their advance into the Balkans had stalled, and there was now a serious threat to their western flank. Czar Alexander II personally ordered his troops to capture the town, as much for morale as for its strategic location. The Russians were determined to prepare more thoroughly for their next attempt.

Both the Russians and Turks used the time to pour reinforcements into the struggle. The Turks increased their strength to 30,000 men and 72 guns, the Russians to 90,000 and 442 guns. In preparation for a major assault, the Russians opened a preliminary bombardment of the Turkish positions on September 7, which continued for four days. The Russians attacked on September 11, and despite some local successes, the result was another bloody failure. To the east of Plevna, the Romanian contingent captured one Turkish redoubt, though this was of little use as a Turkish-occupied neighboring redoubt dominated it. To the south, General Skoblev briefly captured two Ottoman redoubts before being forced to withdraw after fierce fighting. This final attempt to storm the town cost the Russians around 20,000 men. Turkish losses were also heavy, between 8,000–10,000 men, but they had held their ground.

The Russians now brought in General Eduard I. Todleben, of Crimean War fame, to take charge. He decided to besiege the town rather than attempt more bloody assaults. This proved a slow process, as the

Russians methodically cut the Turks' lines of communications with the rest of the Turkish Army in the Balkans. Eventually, tired and half-starved, Turkish forces at Plevna surrendered on December 10 following a failed attempt to break out. This brought an end to the siege, and allowed the Russian army to resume its march on Constantinople.

Nicholas Murray

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Gurko, Iosif Vladimirovich (1829–1901); Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Battle of (January 15–17, 1878); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); Skoblev, Mikhail (1843–1882)

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Poland, German Offensive in (September 28–December 16, 1914)

Poland was a major area of military operations early in the war. The Kingdom of Poland had disappeared in the late 18th century, absorbed by its neighbors in a series of partitions. In 1914, most of Poland was part of Russia, although portions of the former

Polish kingdom belonged to Germany (West Prussia, South Prussia, and New East Prussia) and Austria (Galicia). For the most part, Russian Poland was flat and, apart from rivers, without major physical barriers.

World War I had opened in the east with a Russian offensive in East Prussia, which the Germans smashed in the battles at Tannenberg (August 26–31, 1914) and Masurian Lakes (September 8–15). At the same time, however, the Russians had met success against the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia, inflicting a near-fatal blow there from which the Austro-Hungarian Army never really recovered. Austrian morale was at a low point, with its armies having been defeated by both the Serbians and Russians. Furthermore, the Russians now held most of Galicia and were poised for further strikes into Silesia and Hungary. Had their pursuit been more determined, they might have secured the crucial passes to the interior of Austria and Hungary; but the Russian army had also suffered heavily.

The Austro-Hungarian defeat in Galicia posed a major problem for the Germans because Silesia, one of Germany's main industrial centers, now was in danger of being outflanked from the south. Russian army commander Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich had also done much to rebuild the Russian army following its defeats at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes. German army chief of staff General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn ordered his commander in East Prussia, Colonel General Paul von Hindenburg, to do something to relieve Russian pressure on Austria-Hungary. On September 18, Major General Erich Ludendorff, Hindenburg's chief of staff, met with Austro-Hungarian army chief of staff Colonel General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf and proposed a flanking attack by German forces in East Prussia should Russian forces move against Kraków (Cracow).

By the end of September, both sides were busy preparing new offensives. Hindenburg requested reinforcements from Falkenhayn, but the latter, then mounting his own drive against the Channel ports on the Western Front, had none to spare. Hindenburg then withdrew four of the six German corps in East Prussia along with a cavalry division and formed them into the new Ninth Army under General of Cavalry August von Mackensen. This left only two German corps to cover East Prussia.

Utilizing their superb railroad net, in only 11 days, the Germans shifted the Ninth Army's more than 220,000 men, horses, artillery, and equipment some 450 miles south to the vicinity of the Polish city of Czestochowa. Here they linked up with the Austrian First Army to protect Silesia. Hindenburg and Ludendorff took direct control of the Ninth Army while also retaining operational control of the Eighth.

The Russian High Command (*Stavka*) had been divided concerning its next military objective. Grand Duke Nikolai favored another offensive into East Prussia; commander of the Southwestern Front General Nikolai Yudovich Ivanov and chief of staff General Mikhail Alekseev argued for Silesia, where the possibility existed of forcing Austria-Hungary from the war. In the end, Nikolai compromised by detaching the Russian Ninth Army (under General Platon Alexeevich Lechitski) from the northern force to drive on Kraków (Cracow) along with the Fourth Army (under General Aleksei Evert) and the Fifth Army (under General Pavel Pleve). The reforming Second Army (under General Philipp Scheidemann) was to be positioned west of Warsaw, where it could be used to reinforce the offensive. This left only General Baron Rudolf F. Sivers's Tenth Army and General Pavel Rennenkampf's First Army for a northern offensive, but the

shortest route to Berlin was in fact through western Poland.

Although in theory the Russians had more available men than the Germans, the invasion was poorly prepared and coordinated, with Ivanov and Northwestern Front commander General Nikolai Ruzsky sharing command. Delays plagued the Russians as elements of the three Russian armies moved into position along a 50-mile front on the east bank of the Vistula River.

On September 28, Mackensen's Ninth Army struck south, opening the German Polish offensive. On October 8, Mackensen received orders to take Warsaw. The Germans reached the Vistula River the next day, but they were slowed because of inferior numbers, supply problems, exhaustion, and unfamiliarity with the terrain. Despite knowledge from a captured Russian order that *Stavka* was planning to invade Silesia, Hindenburg continued the attack. The Germans came within a dozen miles of Warsaw before Hindenburg finally ordered a withdrawal on October 17. By November 1, the Ninth Army was back at its starting point, and Hindenburg was faced with the prospect of an invasion of Silesia by four Russian armies.

Designated commander in chief of Central Powers' armies on the Eastern Front on November 1, Hindenburg continued to benefit from intercepts of unencoded Russian radio messages. On November 3, privy to Russian plans, he made his decision. With a promise by Falkenhayn of 12 new army corps, half of them from the Western Front, Hindenburg sought to replicate Tannenberg. Based on a plan developed by Colonel Max Hoffmann, Hindenburg would strip Silesia and East Prussia of forces in order to hurl all available manpower against the Russian right flank at Łódź and Warsaw in the expectation that they would crush the Russian

Second Army and trap the remaining Russian forces behind the Vistula River.

Between November 4 and 10, Mackensen's entire Ninth Army was again moved, this time, 250 miles north from Czeszochowa to Torun, at the northern tip of the Polish salient. There it was in position to strike the Russians' right flank as they prepared to invade Silesia. Acting in concert, Conrad von Hötzendorf moved the Austrian Second Army north from the Carpathians into Mackensen's former positions. The Central Powers thus hoped to trap the Russians in a great pincer movement.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff refused to wait for Falkenhayn's promised reinforcements. Instead, on November 11, Mackensen's Ninth Army attacked up the Vistula into the hinge between the Russian First and Second armies as the Russians were just completing their dispositions. Mackensen's troops caught Rennenkampf's First Army on its northern flank as it was moving to its staging areas, capturing 12,000 prisoners and 15 guns in the first two days. This led *Stavka* to relieve Rennenkampf of his command and replace him with General Aleksandr Litvinov. Driving into the wedge between the First and Second armies, Mackensen then smashed into the flank of Scheidemann's Russian Second Army.

In the ensuing battles of Łódź and Łowicz (November 16–25), it was again Russian manpower against German firepower as the Russian Second Army sought to extricate itself. On November 20, the Russians repulsed almost all of the German Ninth Army's attacks. The exception was General of Infantry Reinhard Scheffer-Boyadel's force of the XXV Reserve Corps and several attached divisions that penetrated the Russian eastern flank and advanced as far as Rzgów. Russian reinforcements now arrived, and by November 22, they had surrounded the

German penetration. XXV Reserve Corps managed to fight its way from the trap by reversing direction to the northeast.

On November 24, Scheffer won a crucial victory at Brzeziny when his 3rd Guards Division destroyed the Russian 6th Siberian Division and opened a four-mile-wide escape route to the north. The next day, Scheffer's men reached the main German lines. They had suffered 4,500 casualties, including 1,000 killed, but had brought out 2,000 of their own wounded, as well as 16,000 Russian prisoners and 64 guns.

Both Russian armies now fell back on their supply center at Łódź. When the pursuing Germans arrived there, they found seven Russian corps on the town's perimeter and were surprised by the Russian Fifth Army's attack. Briefly, the Russians were in position to envelop the Germans but were unable to exploit the opportunity.

Fighting continued until early December. On December 6, the Russians evacuated Łódź, and by December 16, halted their retreat at the Bzura-Rawka River line some 30 miles southwest of Warsaw. Winter brought an end to the fighting. While the Battle of Łódź could be counted a Russian tactical victory, strategically it went to the Germans because the Russians called off their Silesian offensive, not to be renewed. German losses in the Polish campaign totaled approximately 35,000 men; Russian casualties approached 75 percent of the combined strength of the First and Second armies, some 95,000 men, including 25,000 prisoners of war and 79 guns. The campaign resulted in a widespread perception that the Russian Army was no match for the Germans.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Evert, Aleksei Ermolaevich (1857–1918?); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919);

Litvinov, Aleksandr (1853–1932); Lodz, Battle of (November 11–December 6, 1914); Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Plevé (Plehve), Pavel Adamovich (1850–1916); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Ruzski, Nikolai Vladimirovich (1854–1918); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939)

World War II began in Europe with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The subsequent 36-day campaign triggered a global war that lasted six years. The Poland Campaign was soon overshadowed by the campaigns and battles that followed. As a result, it is best remembered today by a series of myths and legends, almost all of them untrue. Contrary to the most popularly cherished beliefs about World War II, Polish horse cavalry units never mounted suicidal charges against German Panzers; the Polish air force was not destroyed on the ground on the first day of the war; and the Polish army was far from a pushover for the German army. The participation of the Soviet Red Army in the dismemberment of Poland is usually overlooked as well.

Under the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Pact



German and Soviet military officers sign an agreement on September 28, 1939, delineating the border between Germany and the Soviet Union, in effect partitioning Poland. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

of August 23, 1939, the Soviets were to gain a sphere of influence that included Bessarabia (a province of Romania), Estonia, Latvia, Finland, and eastern Poland. The Soviets had only just defeated the Japanese in heavy fighting at Kalkhin Gol when the Germans launched their attack into Poland on September 1, 1939. Stalin was therefore naturally cautious; despite several diplomatic notes from the Germans urging the Red Army to join in the fighting, Soviet forces remained immobile as the Nazi armies swept across Poland.

Under the command of Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the Polish army in the summer of 1939 had roughly 500,000 men, organized into 30 regular and 9 reserve infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, and 2 mechanized brigades. The Polish army had 887 tanks, less than one-third of the

almost 2,500 tanks fielded by the Germans. When it became obvious they would be attacked by Germany, the Poles had opted for a forward defense followed by a fighting withdrawal designed to buy more time for mobilization—Plan Zachód (Plan West). The Poles assumed Britain and France would make a strong supporting attack against Germany in the west. Unfortunately for the Poles, that promised attack never came.

In August 1939, the *Wehrmacht* had 51 active divisions, 51 reserve divisions, and 1 active cavalry brigade. All the reserve divisions were infantry units, and the active force included 6 Panzer and 4 motorized divisions. The *Wehrmacht*'s active strength was roughly 730,000 men, and its reserve strength was about 1.1 million men. A total of 52 divisions, including all of the Panzer and motorized divisions, were allocated to

the attack on Poland. In addition, the German air forces (Luftwaffe) provided more than 4,000 aircraft to support the attack. The Polish air force totaled 392 combat aircraft.

Three German dive-bombers fired the first shots of World War II in Europe at 4:30 a.m. on September 1. The Luftwaffe immediately followed with attacks on Polish airfields and rail centers. Polish pilots put up a stiff resistance, but by September 6, Polish fighter units were down to 50 percent of their original strength. A few days later, the surviving fighters began withdrawing toward Romania.

Polish ground forces fared little better. German forces attacked from several directions, and by September 4, they had driven a deep wedge between two Polish armies. The next day, the first major clash between German and Polish tanks occurred at Piotrkow. The Germans penetrated Polish defenses and secured the key road links to Warsaw; by evening, the Polish armies were retreating all along the line. Rydz-Śmigły ordered a withdrawal to the line of the Vistula. By September 13, the Germans had trapped the remaining Polish forces inside Warsaw; on September 15, they launched their first attack into the city.

That same day, the Soviets and the Japanese signed a treaty ending the border conflict in Manchuria. A cease-fire took effect in the Far East on September 16, and on September 17, the Soviets declared war against Poland. According to the declaration read by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Union had to intervene “to protect its fraternal Belorussian and Ukrainian populations.” The Red Army, which had used the intervening two weeks to mobilize, crossed the border that very day.

The Soviets marched in with two fronts (army groups). The Belorussian Front under Army Commander Second Rank (Lieutenant

General) Mikhail P. Kovalev consisted of four field armies: Third, under Corps Commander (Major General) Kuznetsov; Fourth, under Division Commander (Brigadier General) Vasily Chuikov; Tenth, under Corps Commander Zakharin; and Eleventh, under Division Commander Medvedev. The Ukrainian Front led by Army Commander (General) Semen Timoshenko contained three field armies: Fifth, under Division Commander Ivan Sovetnikov; Sixth, under Corps Commander Filip Golikov; and Twelfth, under Army Commander Tulenev. They had a combined strength of nearly 1 million men, in 24 infantry divisions, 15 cavalry divisions, and 2 tank corps.

The Polish army still possessed some 700,000 men and could not be readily dismissed. Around 250,000 Polish soldiers were fighting in central Poland; 350,000 were getting ready to defend the Romanian Bridgehead; 35,000 were north of Polesie; and 10,000 were fighting on the Baltic coast of Poland. Polish war planning, however, had assumed the Soviets would remain neutral, so most defenses were oriented to the west. To make matters worse, Polish leaders decided not to resist the Soviet incursion. The Polish government fled to Romania and ordered all units to evacuate and reassemble in France. Communication difficulties nevertheless led to some clashes as the Poles tried to defend themselves against the rapidly advancing Red Army. The Soviets took Vilnius only after two days of fighting, for example, and the conquest of Grodno required a four-day battle (September 20–24). After only 11 days of the campaign, however, the Soviets had already reached the line of demarcation agreed upon in August.

Many German units had been operating well to the east of the demarcation line, however, and there were, predictably, some difficulties between the two forces.

On September 20, therefore, Hitler ordered a withdrawal to the designated line, with movement to start the next day. The Soviet government meanwhile initiated negotiations to shift the line to the east in exchange for Lithuania. The Germans agreed, and on October 1, a new demarcation line was established along the general line of the Bug River. This extended the German zone to the east by as much as 100 miles in some places.

Ironically, the Soviets had been greeted as liberators in many areas. Local communists welcomed the troops with bread and salt in Brest, while Belorussians, Jews, and especially Ukrainians viewed the arrival of the Red Army as a source of protection. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists had organized an uprising to support the Soviets as they entered Poland.

Poland suffered staggering losses in the campaign, amounting to 66,300 killed, 133,700 wounded, 587,000 taken prisoner by the Germans, and at least 200,000 taken prisoner by the Soviets. (Some sources say the Soviets took as many as 450,000 prisoners.) Polish civilian deaths were close to 100,000. Tens of thousands of prisoners were murdered by the Soviets—some during the fighting—and thousands more Polish officers would be killed during the occupation, most notably in the Katyn Forest Massacre, but also by the NKVD. As many as 150,000 additional Polish citizens perished during the Soviet occupation. The Soviet invasion, it turned out, was only the first act in a long tragedy.

David T. Zabecki

See also: Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich (1900–1982); Golikov, Filip Ivanovich (1900–1980); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); NKVD; Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970); War Crimes, Soviet, World War II

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Poland–East Prussia Campaign (July 1944–April 1945)

On June 22, 1944, the third anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army launched Operation BAGRATION, a massive offensive to drive German forces from western Belorussia. By mid-1944, the German army was only a shell of what it had been in 1941, whereas the Soviets had superior numbers of artillery pieces, tanks, trucks, and aircraft as well as a 4–1 manpower advantage on the Eastern Front. The Soviets had also developed new tactical doctrines that took advantage of their improved mobility.

The great Soviet offensive involved 11 fronts (army groups) and stretched from the Baltic in the north to the Black Sea in the south. Within two months, the Red Army had liberated Belorussia and destroyed German Army Group Center, but even before the conclusion of BAGRATION, Soviet leader Josef Stalin issued new orders for the liberation of the Baltic states and Poland, and a drive on Berlin. From north to south, this effort involved the First Baltic and Third, Second, and First Belorussian fronts.



Soviet troops cross a river in the approach to Lvov, Poland, in 1944, during World War II. (UIG/Getty Images)

On July 20, 1944, units of the First Belorussian Front crossed the Bug River in three places and captured Lublin. There the Soviets established their own Polish government and army, and declared open season on the London government's anti-Communist Polish Home Army. On July 25, the Red Army reached the Vistula. Brest fell on July 28 after a single day of fighting; Lvov capitulated on July 27, as the other fronts achieved their objectives. Some German army units, however, cut off and isolated against the Baltic, did not surrender until the end of the war.

At the end of July, *Stavka* (Soviet High Command) ordered the First and Second Belorussian fronts to drive to the Narew River and Warsaw. The Second was to advance to Ostrołę and Łomża. The First drove on the Warsaw suburb of Praga, seizing crossing points over the Narew and Vistula rivers. In the drive, the Soviets destroyed 28 German divisions, inflicting 350,000 casualties, but logistical problems, in consequence of the

rapid advance and two months of solid fighting, forced a pause.

On August 29, Stalin ordered all Red Army fronts to dig in along the line of the Vistula and Narew rivers. Although the First and Second Belorussian fronts continued limited attacks, Soviet forces made no effort to cross the Vistula River and move into Warsaw. This decision produced one of the most controversial episodes of the entire war, the Warsaw Rising of August 1–October 2, 1944.

With the rapid Soviet advance, Polish Home Army commander General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski had ordered a general uprising in Warsaw, which brought quick reaction from the German army. The Soviets made only half-hearted efforts to assist the Home Army with air-dropped supplies. Although the Red Army suffered from genuine logistical problems, it is also true that Stalin was delighted to see the Germans eliminate the anti-Communist Home Army forces. The Soviets also obstructed efforts

by the Western Allies to air-drop supplies to the Polish fighters. The fighting brought the destruction of 90 percent of the buildings of Warsaw, but it also claimed 10,000 German casualties.

Stavka now laid plans for the final control of Poland. The massive offensive involved Marshal Georgy Zhukov's First Belorussian Front, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's Second Belorussian Front, General Ivan Cherniakovsky's Third Belorussian Front, and Marshal Ivan S. Konev's First Ukrainian Front, all of which were on the Narew-Vistula Line. General Ivan Petrov's Fourth Ukrainian Front occupied positions along the San River line in southern Poland and Galicia.

Stalin's orders were to destroy Army Group A, with the secondary objective of drawing off German reserves in response to Western appeals during the German Ardennes Offensive. The First Belorussian Front was to take Poznan and destroy forces cut off in the Warsaw area. The Second Belorussian Front would assist in surrounding Warsaw and also take Marienburg. The First Ukrainian Front, with five combined-arms armies, two tank armies, and four tank/mechanized corps, would carry the brunt of the offensive, breaking out of the Sandomierz bridgehead and driving to Breslau. The Fourth Ukrainian Front would drive on Kraków.

The offensive was massive. The First Ukrainian and First Belorussian fronts together contained 2.2 million ground troops (a 6–1 advantage over the defending Germans) in 163 divisions supported by more than 32,000 artillery pieces and almost 4,800 aircraft.

The second half of the offensive to clear Poland began on January 12, 1945. Radom fell on January 16. By January 17, Zhukov's First Belorussian Front and the Soviet-controlled Polish First Army had liberated

Warsaw. Within the next week, the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian fronts punched a 310-mile hole in the German lines and drove 100 miles. There was little the German forces could do to arrest the Soviet advance. Kraków and Poznań were taken in late January, and on January 22, Konev's First Ukrainian Front bridged the Oder. Zhukov also reached the river and got his troops across, although it took three weeks to close the 70-mile gap separating these two Red Army fronts.

On January 28, forces of the First Belorussian Front entered German Pomerania, where they were met by the hastily formed Army Group Vistula, commanded by the inept head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler. Königsberg was surrounded and taken on April 9. Meanwhile, the First Ukrainian Front eliminated pockets of German forces in southwestern Poland.

Soviet forces had once again outrun their logistical support and were forced to halt. Nevertheless, the Red Army was now poised to begin its final offensive: the drive on Berlin to end the war.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Belorussia Offensive (June 23–August 29, 1944); Cherniakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich (1906–1945); Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Petrov, Ivan Yefimovich (1896–1958); Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Warsaw Uprising (August 1–October 2, 1944); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Polish Rebellion (1794): See Catherine II (“the Great”); 1729–1796)

Polish Rebellion (1830–1831)

Also known as the November Insurrection, the Polish Rebellion of 1830–1831 was a failed attempt by a large segment of Polish society to throw off the yoke of Russian domination.

Following the third partition of Poland (1795), during which the nation was divided between Prussia and Russia, Poland no longer existed as a sovereign state. Polish dissidents soon began to agitate for independence. Pockets of Polish soldiers working within the Russian army formed secret societies under an umbrella organization called the National Association against Russia. Pledged to fomenting rebellion against czarist rule, the organization drew droves of supporters from the Polish civilian population.

Influenced by the Revolution of 1830 in France, members of the Warsaw training school staged a revolt on November 29, 1830. They attacked heavy Russian cavalry units and sacked the palace of the Russian grand duke in Warsaw. Violence increased when members of the Polish Army and prisoners joined the fighting.

The Russians fled. The Poles elevated General Joseph Chłopicki to lead the rebellion, though he acted as a dictator and failed to command the respect of Czar Nicholas I.

After Polish leaders announced that the Russian dynasty would no longer be allowed to succeed to the Polish throne, Russian armies attacked. A draw was reached on February 25, 1831, after a lengthy engagement at the Battle of Grochow.

During the winter, the Polish forces disintegrated due to internal squabbles. Russian forces emerged rested from winter quarters and attacked the weaker Polish army. Russian troops decimated Polish units at the Battle of Ostrołęka on May 26, 1831. Russian forces then advanced and took Warsaw on September 8, 1831. Russia then completely absorbed Poland into its political system, and Nicholas I attempted to eradicate all aspects of Polish culture from the defeated nation.

One of several failed attempts by Polish people to remove Russia from its internal affairs in the 19th century, the Polish Rebellion of 1830–1831 and the repression of Polish nationalism following the war helped to keep the independence movement alive in Poland.

Jason Newman

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856)

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Polish Rising (1863)

The Polish Rising, also known as the January Uprising of 1863, was a nationalist

rebellion against Russia and occurred as a result of the complex political situation of Poland due to the partitions of the country during the latter half of the 18th century. Poland had been divided and dispersed between Russia, Prussia, and the Austrian Empire on three occasions (1772, 1793, and 1795). The Congress of Vienna convened in 1814 to create a new political map after the Napoleonic Wars and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. As a result, in 1815, a relatively small section of land was identified as the Kingdom of Poland; as the 19th century progressed, it was eventually integrated into Russia, in direct violation of the Treaty of Vienna. Torn among neighboring rulers, the Polish national identity was suppressed. Polish insurgents therefore periodically (in 1831, 1846, and 1848) rose against their oppressors; they especially resented the Russians, whom the Poles viewed as culturally and intellectually inferior.

The 1863 uprising was an attempt to gain independence for Poland. During the Crimean War (1854–1856), Nicholas I of Russia died, and his son, Alexander II, assumed power and attempted to redefine the delicate relationship between Russia and Poland. Having suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the British, French, and Austrians, the Russians were both weak and chastened. Reluctantly, but in keeping with the spirit of the “Great Reforms” he was introducing at home, Alexander II initially promoted social reform for the Polish people and advocated a degree of Polish autonomy. He implied that Russia would allow Poles to assume their own religious and linguistic preferences without interference from Russia.

The promises of Alexander II had evaporated by 1861, however, and Poland was soon once again suffering under Russian persecution, with Catholicism and the Polish

language under particular scrutiny. Discontent and fury at the injustice riddled Polish society. Rumors of a Polish uprising circulated as Poles held secret meetings to address the problem of Russian dominance. In an attempt to eradicate the anonymous organizers of a Polish revolt, in January 1863, Russia conscripted Polish men into the Russian army. Polish men were gathered and transported to remote Russian outposts, including Siberia. This outrage sparked the uprising that quickly spread from the Russian-controlled areas of Poland to the ethnically Polish areas in the Baltics and Ukraine that had been incorporated directly into the Russian Empire after 1815.

Many of the organizers of the Polish insurgency had fled the cities to avoid conscription and were able to resume quickly their underground war against Russia, whose military leaders were impressed with the professionalization and efficiency of the Polish rebel organization. The Polish forces, however, consisted of only about 10,000 poorly armed men at the outset. Despite occasional political infighting within the various Polish underground factions, the insurgents developed an extensive organizational command and supply chain, and successfully carried on a guerrilla war against Russia. They raided Russian armories, executed many of the most hated Russian officials, organized a provisional government, promised to distribute land to the peasants who worked it, and proclaimed all citizens equal. The Russian forces, commanded by General Anders I. Ramsay, numbered some 90,000 men, but were unable to crush the rebellion quickly. On February 3, the Poles liberated the town of Wegrow and established a short-lived military base there. The Russian counterattack, while ultimately successful, suffered the humiliation of being held at bay by pikemen long enough for the main Polish force

to escape in a battle often referred to as the *Polish Thermopylae*.

Russia's unjust treatment of Poland was widely discussed across Europe. Despite Western ideological support for the Polish people, no Western ally was willing to intervene against Russia. Prussia, in fact, cooperated with the Russians, allowing Russian troops to move freely across its territory. While eventually some 30,000 men fought on the Polish side, the Russians were thus able to assemble roughly 125,000 troops in Poland proper, with another 145,000 operating against the insurgency in the Baltic region and some 45,000 troops deployed in the Ukraine. The Poles were outnumbered by at least 10–1 in every encounter with the Russians, who nevertheless had difficulty in containing outbreaks of violence and insurgency. In late April and early May, the rebels defeated the Russian forces at Raguva, Birzai, and Mediekai.

The Polish Rising of 1863 concluded in 1864, however, when leaders of the Polish underground movement were exposed and brought to trial. General Mikhail Murayev, commander of the Northwestern Region, proceeded to crush the remnants of the rebellion ruthlessly. His troops burned villages suspected of supporting the rebels, and summarily executed captured insurgent leaders. More than 125 Polish rebels were hanged on his orders, while over 9,000 Poles were sentenced to a lifetime of hard labor in Siberian camps. Murayev forced the Catholic Church, which he suspected was behind the revolt, to pay for the resettlement. The last leaders of the insurgency were executed in the Warsaw citadel in late 1864.

Russian governors soon resumed the process of extinguishing the Polish national identity. Some 70,000 Polish men and women were deported to Siberia, and the Russian government seized more than 3,000

estates from families that had supported or sympathized with the rebellion. A war indemnity tax of 10 percent was levied on all Polish-owned estates, and nearly 400 resisters and suspected rebels were executed. Severe religious and linguistic regulations were reinstated with a vengeance. After the uprising, only the Russian language could be utilized for official transactions, or in public settings such as schools, publications; the illegality of the Polish language extended to private settings, including the home. The Kingdom of Poland was officially absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1867.

Jennifer Daley

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Polish Rebellion (1830–1831); Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

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Polish Succession, War of (1733–1735)

Also known as the War for the Polish Throne, the War of the Polish Succession from 1733 to 1735 was one of numerous wars in the jockeying of European dynasties for domination in the 16th through the 18th centuries. The major European powers in 1733 were England, France, Spain, Austria, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. Less powerful were Holland, Savoy-Sardinia, Naples-Sicily, Denmark, Prussia, Portugal, Poland, and

Sweden. Numerous other states complicated the picture, along with the Holy Roman Empire, which the Habsburgs of Austria ruled. The various states in the empire often acted independently, however, depending on how their leaders viewed circumstances.

Once one of the Great Powers of Europe, Poland was by 1733, a relatively minor country that tempted the major powers to compete for influence. This eventually led to a succession of partitions of Polish territories and the disappearance of Poland as a nation by 1795.

The War of the Polish Succession began after the death of King Augustus II in February 1733. Polish kings were elected by the *Sejm*, or Diet. There were two contenders for the throne, Stanislas Leszczyński, a former Polish king, and Frederick Augustus, elector of Saxony. The first was a father-in-law of Louis XV of France, so he had French support, along with that of the Bourbons of Spain and Sardinia. The second was a son of Augustus II, backed by Austria and Russia. Separate Polish Diets elected both, but Leszczyński took the throne in Warsaw in September.

Russia and Saxony sent forces to remove him in favor of Frederick Augustus. Leszczyński retreated to Danzig. French support had a greater distance to go to relieve Danzig. It sent a small force by sea, but dedicated most of its military against Austria in the west. The French were no match for the Russians in Poland, especially after the Russians provided siege artillery delivered by sea. The presence of the Russian navy forced the French naval forces to leave. Danzig fell in June 1734, and Leszczyński fled to Prussia. Augustus became king as Augustus III in October.

The war in Poland continued, however, as Leszczyński remained the favorite for many Poles. Augustus's position benefited

from support by the Russians and their Austrian allies. Fighting in Poland was essentially a civil war, and the side with Russian and Austrian backing won. Major fighting in the War of the Polish Succession then turned west.

From the beginning, France focused on expanding its borders. France declared war against Austria in October 1733. This part of the war is called the Rhine Campaign. Fighting mainly Austrian troops, France conquered Lorraine, the Electorate of Treves, and Kelh. The next target was Philipsburg, where the French commander, the Duke of Berwick, died during the siege. At this point, Austria called on the states in the Holy Roman Empire for support, and the empire declared war on France in March 1734. Some imperial states provided troops, but many did not. Saxony continued to support Russia in Poland because their elector claimed the throne there. The siege of Philipsburg continued, and Prussian troops came to aid Austria, along with other imperial troops. The Prussian contingent of 10,000 was most important. Prince Eugene of Savoy, long in the service of the Habsburgs, commanded the Imperial forces. Frederick the Great (as he was later known) of Prussia served under Eugene and Russia sent 12,000 troops to the Rhine in 1735. France and its allies took Philipsburg, but Eugene and the imperial troops did not allow any more French advances. The Rhine Campaign petered out.

At the same time, France and its allies, Spain and Sardinia-Savoy, contested Habsburg control of much of Italy. By February 1734, France and Sardinia had control of Milan and its surroundings, as well as part of Mantua. Spain dispatched 16,000 infantry to Italy by sea and 5,000 cavalry overland. Rather than joining France and

Sardinia-Savoy in northern Italy, Spain looked south to Naples and Sicily where Austria had substantial influence backed by its military. Both fell by June 1735. Spanish forces then turned north to aid France and Sardinia-Savoy, which had not made much progress against the Hapsburgs. By this time, however, France had concluded an armistice designed to end hostilities and prevent the war from expanding with such powers as Britain, Holland, and others joining the war on the side of Austria.

The War of Polish Succession was in reality a European war. Most of the fighting in the War of the Polish Succession was not in Poland. Most of the agreements in the October 1735 Peace of Vienna, formalized in the Treaty of Vienna in 1738, did not involve Poland. The elector of Saxony became Augustus III of Poland, and Leszczyński became the duke of Lorraine. The current duke of Lorraine became the duke of Tuscany. Don Carlos, heir to the Spanish throne, gained Naples and Sicily as king with the understanding that the crowns of the two nations would not be united. Spain gave Austria Parma and Piacenza, inherited by Don Carlos in 1731. France recognized the Pragmatic Sanction, assuring the Habsburg crown for Maria Theresa.

Daniel E. Spector

See also: Lacy, Count Peter (1678–1751); Muennich, Count Burkhard Christoph von (1683–1767)

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Polivanka, Peace of (June 4, 1634)

Agreement that brought an end to the Time of Troubles.

Mikhail Romanov had been elected czar of Russia in 1613, but his rule was disputed. Prince Władysław of Poland still aspired to the throne of Russia, and Sweden contested Mikhail's claims as well. Both issues were settled in the 1619 Truce of Deulino, but that agreement provided only for a 14-year truce with the Swedes. When the Polish king, Zigmund, died in 1632, however, the truce was broken.

The Smolensk War involved mainly only Poland-Lithuania and Russia, as Sweden was occupied by the Thirty Years' War in Europe, and the Ottoman Empire did not come to Russia's assistance as promised. A large Tatar force did enter the fray on the Polish side though, and devastated Moscow in 1633. Overall, the conflict proved a disaster for Russia, and when Mikhail's father, Filaret—who had launched the war—died in October 1633, Moscow sued for peace.

The Peace of Polivanka stipulated that Smolensk, Chernigov, and Sversk would all remain in Polish hands. Władysław did give up his claim to the Russian throne, but Moscow had to disband its foreign formations, which had spearheaded its military efforts. This put Russia at a distinct disadvantage against any European power, and thus Moscow turned its attention south for the next half century.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Deulino, Truce of (1618); Periaslavl, Treaty of (1654); Time of Troubles

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Polivanov, Aleksei Andreevich (1855–1920)

Russian army officer and minister of war (1915–1916). Born in Russia to an influential noble family on March 16, 1855, Aleksei Andreevich Polivanov graduated in 1874 from the Nikolaevsky Engineering School and served in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War. From 1899 to 1904, Polivanov was on the General Staff. He became chief of the General Staff in 1905. War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov appointed Polivanov deputy minister of war in 1906. This promotion came as a result of the disappointing and humiliating performance of the Russian army during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Polivanov called for far-reaching modernization of the Russian military and the political machine behind it.

In 1912, Polivanov staunchly defended maintaining Russian fortresses as defensive positions, despite the sharp disapproval of Sukhomlinov. This and suspicions by the aristocracy about his liberal predispositions led to Polivanov's dismissal that same year. Still a prominent political figure, Polivanov served on the State Council from 1912 to 1915. This allowed him the opportunity to plot the dismissal of Sukhomlinov and secure the post of minister of war for himself in June 1915.

As the new minister of war, Polivanov set out to completely reform the Russian military. He implemented a new training regimen and worked to overcome supply and communication problems. These efforts met only partial success, as was demonstrated by

Russia's continuing difficulties in the field. In September 1915, Czar Nicholas II decided to take personal command of the army at the front. Polivanov objected to the czar's interference, incurring the wrath of the Czarina Alexandra, who then began scheming with Prime Minister Boris Stürmer to bring about Polivanov's termination. Polivanov was dismissed as minister of war in March 1916.

Polivanov had little influence during the rest of the war, though his reforms certainly contributed to the success of the 1916 Brusilov Offensive. After the Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917, he offered his services to the Red Army and helped negotiate the 1920 Soviet-Polish peace talks at Riga. While there, he contracted typhus and died on September 25, 1920.

Scott T. Maciejewski

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); October (November) Revolution (1917); Stürmer, Boris Vladimirovich (1848–1917); Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1848–1926)

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The Battle of Poltava, July 8, 1709. Russian forces under Czar Peter I defeated the Swedes led by King Charles X in the decisive battle of the Great Northern War. Engraving by Nicolas de Larmessin, Maurice Bequoy, and Charles Simonneau between 1709 and 1728. (Library of Congress)

Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)


The Battle of Poltava took place near the city of Poltava in present-day Ukraine, on July 8, 1709 between the Swedish army of Charles XII and the Russian forces of Peter I.

The Great Northern War had begun in 1700 with a series of Swedish victories against Poland, Denmark, and Russia. By the winter of 1708, however, chances for a final Swedish victory had ended with the destruction of the main Swedish auxiliary corps, which made it impossible for the Swedes to reinforce or resupply their main body of troops. The Swedish army was thus greatly outnumbered by the Russians and lacked adequate gunpowder and matériel.

The Russians were well-prepared. Peter had made the modernization of the Russian army a primary concern. He had hired

foreign officers to train his infantry in Western European tactics, acquired modern firearms, and streamlined the financial and logistical administration of the armed forces. An early, crushing defeat at the Battle of Narva (1700) led to further reforms, and during 1704–1705, the Russians fought the Swedes to a standstill along the Baltic.

Peter had then offered to return all territories taken from Sweden to date and end the war but Charles, intent on crushing Russia, refused. He kept his army in winter quarters during 1707–1708, where disease and hunger severely weakened his forces. In June 1708, he marched against Smolensk but ran short of supplies and was forced to turn south. A Russian force checked his advance and deprived the Swedes of most of their supplies and some artillery at the Battle of Lesnaya in September. Stunned, the Swedes



broke off the invasion and established winter quarters.

In the spring of 1709, however, Charles again began his assault and besieged Poltava. The fortified town sat on a hill west of the Vorskla River, with a citadel at its center. The Swedish force numbered only about 20,000, with the main body of some 8,000 infantry and an equal number of cavalry situated northwest of Poltava. A detachment of 1,000 irregular cavalry occupied a position directly north of the village, on the heights near Yakovetski, while a further 1,500 Swedes conducted the siege to the southwest. They had only two cannon.

Poltava's garrison of over 4,000 men disposed of 28 guns, and Peter's relief force

approaching from the north had nearly 40,000 men and over 100 artillery pieces. His main force of 25,000 infantry camped directly opposite the Swedish irregular cavalry, while the Russian cavalry established a series of redoubts facing southwest.

Outnumbered, Charles knew he had to come up with a daring plan or the Russians would raise the siege. On the night of June 26–27, the Swedish infantry stealthily advanced against the Russian redoubts in preparation for a surprise assault. The Swedes' cavalry lost contact in the dark, however, and delayed the operation past dawn. Russian pickets soon discovered the Swedish positions. Charles ordered his troops to charge through the Russian

redoubts and attack their main defensive lines.

The plan called for extreme quickness and courage, since the Swedes had little field artillery, but his commanders either failed to act quickly enough or did not understand his strategy. The Swedish center advanced head-on and took the first and second redoubts in fierce, no-quarter battles, but failed in six attempts to storm the third. Both Swedish flanks, however, managed to fight their way past the entire line of redoubts and re-form on low ground west of the Russian camp, where they waited for the central battalions.

Those battalions, however, were now under attack by the Russian troops that had been bypassed in the redoubts. Outnumbered and outflanked, the Swedes fled. Peter then attacked the waiting Swedish main force from the camp with his entire infantry, pinning the Swedes between two branches of a river and cutting them off from their supply train.

The Swedes attempted to fight their way out, but the left wing of the infantry was unable to make any headway against the Russian line and the Swedish cavalry was ineffective in the wooded, marshy terrain. As the Swedish left wing crumbled, Peter launched his cavalry from the north and set the entire army to flight. The Swedish besiegers drew back from Poltava to their baggage train near Pushkarovka and joined the retreat.

The Russians, perhaps surprised by the scale of their triumph, did not pursue. Peter rather held an impromptu parade, followed by a celebration banquet. The Russians had incurred roughly 5,000 casualties, including approximately 1,500 dead. Swedish losses totaled nearly 7,000 killed, with perhaps 1,500 wounded and an astonishing 2,800 taken prisoner. Charles and approximately 1,500 of his

troops eventually escaped into territory held by the Ottoman Empire; he did not return to Swedish-held territory until 1714.

The Battle of Poltava was Russia's first major military victory against a modern European army. It marked not only the end of Swedish hopes in the Great Northern War but also the beginning of Russian ascendancy in eastern Europe. The battle was celebrated in an 1829 poem by Alexander Pushkin, and it remains a touchstone of Russian pride today.

Steven Strom

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Narva, Battle of the (November 20, 1700); Peter I (“the Great”); 1672–1725)

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Pomestie (Pomeste)

Form of landholding conditioned upon military service to the Muscovite prince.

Prior to the 15th century, servants (vassals) of the princes and grand princes of the Kiev and other cities of Rus' (including Moscow) were granted lands in return for service along the lines familiar from European feudal society. These vassals (nobles) in turn granted peasants the right to cultivate the land in exchange for a percentage of the yield or income, often referred to as a *tithe*, and occasional military service. Once granted, these lands belonged to the family, and could be passed down from father

to son. In Rus', such hereditary landholding was known as *votchina*.

As in feudal Europe, both the prince and his vassals raised armed forces with which to protect and expand their lands. The problem was that while each vassal served his lord in time of war, those same vassals also possessed independent military forces, with which they could either support or oppose the prince. A noble thus could neither rely on a certain number of military servants nor maintain a trained military force of his own. The process of "the gathering of the Russian lands," however, afforded the princes of Moscow—later czars of Russia—with a means to circumvent this uncertainty and establish a military force subject only to them by means of *pomestie*.

The practice of *pomestie* was introduced by Grand Prince Ivan III ("the Great"; r. 1447–1505) and practiced on a large scale after the annexation of Novgorod in 1478. That city had long resisted the attempts of Moscow to control its trade and government, and Ivan III intended to break the power of the citizens. He arrested most of the prominent boyars (nobles) of the town, as well as the archbishop and several leading clerics and, as punishment, confiscated their estates. These he then distributed to some 200 Muscovites from the middle or upper classes as conditional landholdings.

In return for land from which they might derive an income—either by taxing the peasants who worked it, or by working it themselves—these men owed the grand prince military service. Though the ratios varied from region to region and decade to decade, on average, each landholder (called a *pomeshchik*, plural *pomeshchiki*) was to provide one fully armed cavalryman (with a horse) per 100 *chetverti* he controlled. If he could not or did not provide

these forces upon request, the land could be confiscated.

This simple device allowed Ivan III to at least triple the size of his armed forces, in addition to providing greater central control and more consistent numbers. As Moscow continued to expand, therefore, *pomestie* became common practice and the *pomeshchiki* it created (also known as gentry cavalry) formed the core of the Muscovite military. The poor harvests of the mid-16th century, however, in combination with the Time of Troubles and the so-called military (gunpowder) revolution rendered the system ineffective by the 17th century, when the czars began to build standing armies.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Gentry Cavalry; Ivan III ("the Great"; 1440–1505); Ivan IV ("the Terrible"; 1530–1584); *Streltsy*; Time of Troubles

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Popov, Markian Mikhailovich (1902–1969)

Soviet army general. Born in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya, Volgograd Region, on November 15, 1902, Markian Popov became an ensign in the Russian army in 1916

and fought in World War I. After the war, he joined both the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party. Chief of staff of a division during the Russian Civil War, Popov graduated from the Military Political Academy in 1931.

Popov was chief of staff of the First Special Red Banner Army in the Far East in 1938 and 1939. He assumed command of the Leningrad Military District in January 1941 and held a succession of commands there following the German invasion that June. Popov commanded the Sixty-First Army in the Briansk Front from November to June 1942. Then, in succession, he commanded the Fortieth Army, the Fifth Strike Army, the Forty-Fifth Tank Army, and the Reserve Front during 1942–1943. Promoted to colonel general, he directed the Briansk Front from June 1943 until he was promoted to general of the army. He took command of the Baltic Front, which became the Second Baltic Front, in October 1943. In this capacity, Popov helped liberate Leningrad in January 1944.

A cautious commander, Popov came under criticism for moving too slowly. When his forces failed to take Riga, he was removed from command, reduced in rank, and made chief of staff of the Leningrad Front and the Second Baltic Front in 1944 and 1945. After the war, Popov headed various military districts. He was restored to the rank of general of the army in 1953 and was appointed to the military inspectorate in 1962. Popov died in an accident in Moscow on April 22, 1969.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Port Arthur

Russia's main naval base during the Russo-Japanese War.

Situated on the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, the Chinese port of Lushun was established as a naval base in 1880. The captain of a British gun vessel, William C. Arthur, noted the small fishing village there in 1860, and a German engineer later pointed out the strategic potential of the site. The Chinese governor general of Chihli Province, Li Hongzhang, subsequently chose it as the base for the new Peiyang navy. Construction on the docks and shipyards began in 1882; the harbor was dredged, and land fortifications were constructed on the hills overlooking the portage. By 1894, the site contained more than 20 forts with 70 guns.

This made Lushun a target during the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War; it was captured by the Japanese after a day-long battle, and officially ceded to Japan as part of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonseki. Russia, in combination with France and Germany, protested the seizure and demanded Japan evacuate the Liaotung Peninsula. When Great Britain counseled evacuation as well, the Japanese acceded.

Just two years later though, Russia occupied the port. In March 1895, the Russian government agreed it needed to connect the Trans-Siberian Railroad to a warmwater port; in June 1896, Russia signed an agreement to protect China's territorial integrity in return for permission to build the Chinese Eastern

Railway (CER), a spur of the Trans-Siberian, through Manchuria. In December 1897, Russian warships entered Lushun, and on March 27, 1898, Russian forces occupied the town, which now took the recognized Western name of Port Arthur. China reluctantly granted Russia a renewable 25-year lease.

The Russians soon built another spur, the South Manchurian Railway, which traveled the length of the peninsula and linked Port Arthur to the CER, and constructed a commercial port at Dalny for foreign traders. They also established a new residential town alongside the old Chinese village and, beginning in 1901, undertook the restoration and improvement of the fortifications.

The main line of defense ran for 19 kilometers along the base of the hills overlooking the city; it anchored on the Yellow Sea on one side, and at the waters of the harbor on the other. A series of inner defenses, anchored by forts designed to be built on the Chinese foundations, culminated in a defense-in-depth of trenches and redoubts on 203-Meter Hill, which overlooked both the town and the harbor. Czar Nicholas II approved plans to cut a second entrance through the peninsula that could be better defended, but like so many others, it was not completed by 1904.

Port Arthur was the focal point of the Japanese attacks in February 1904, as the military commanders realized control of the sea was essential. After a prolonged siege, the fortress surrendered on January 2, 1905. It passed to Japan in the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese War, and became the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that would occupy Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s. Port Arthur was occupied by the Soviet army in August 1945, and the USSR obtained a 30-year lease on the facility in the Sino-Soviet treaty signed that month. When the Chinese Communists triumphed in 1949, however, they demanded

the return of Manchuria and Port Arthur. The Soviets consented in the February 1950 Treaty of Friendship that also returned all railway rights and property in Manchuria to China without compensation for the USSR. Events in Korea delayed the formal handover until 1955 though.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Trans-Siberian Railway

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Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905)

Key Japanese victory that destroyed the Russian Pacific Fleet and released land forces that would defeat the Russians at Mukden to end the Russo-Japanese War.

Russia had acquired Port Arthur, at the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and were making the port into their main naval base for the Pacific Fleet, then situated at Vladivostok. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, however, neither the docks nor the port's narrow entrance could accommodate a fleet of battleships; only one large ship at a time could navigate the passage, and then only at high tide.



Two Russian warships shown wrecked in the harbor in December 1904, during the Japanese siege of Port Arthur. (Library of Congress)

Work on the fortifications was also barely underway in early 1904, though the network of trenches and redoubts was still extensive. Only 116 guns of the more than 500 planned for the fort were in place in early 1904, and only 8 were not facing the sea. The garrison consisted of about 18,000 soldiers, with another 18,000 sailors attached to the fleet there. The two residential parts of Port Arthur, the old Chinese town and New Town, contained some 20,000 civilians, most of them Chinese.

The Japanese fleet had attacked Port Arthur in the first hours of the conflict, before the Russian forces there were even aware they were at war. Just before midnight on February 8, 1904, Japanese destroyers torpedoed the Russian cruiser *Pallada* and the battleship *Retvizan* as they lay at anchor outside the port; two hours later, a second attack crippled the battleship *Tsarevich*. None of the Russian ships was sunk, however, and they managed to slip into the harbor for quick repair. A confrontation the next

day saw four more Russian ships damaged, but return fire struck the Japanese force and forced it to retire. Having failed to destroy the Russian fleet, the Japanese then laid siege to Port Arthur.

The Japanese first attempted to sink several ships and block the entrance to the harbor, but three attempts (on February 23, March 26, and May 3) all failed. Only one blockship even got close to the harbor; Admiral Heihachiro Togo, the Japanese naval commander, nonetheless declared the operations a success, and his forces proceeded to land the Second Army on May 5. On May 26, this force defeated the Russians at Nanshan, effectively cutting Port Arthur off from the Manchurian mainland. The Japanese Third Army, commanded by General Maresuke Nogi, then took up the siege.

Nogi had been in command when the Japanese occupied Port Arthur during the Sino-Japanese War, and many observers expected the operation to follow similar lines, and to be achieved with similar ease. Third Army contained more than 80,000 men in two divisions (1st and 11th), and Nogi had 474 guns and 17 companies of engineers at his disposal.

The Russian force inside the fort was about 42,000 men under the overall command of Lieutenant General Baron Anatoli Stoessel. Lieutenant General Konstantin Smirnov had command of land forces, while Rear Admiral Villem Vitgeft led the naval forces. After the Russian fleet made a half-hearted attempt to escape to Vladivostok on August 10, it remained in harbor and its guns were added to the fort's defenses. All together, the Russians deployed well over 600 guns.

The Russian defenses, which included over 60 machine gun posts, held up surprisingly well. Nogi's initial attack, on July 3–4, 1904, was repelled with heavy casualties, as was a second attempt on July 26. On the night of July 27–28, however, the Japanese

managed, despite again suffering heavy casualties, to force the Russian defenders back to a second line of defense. Third Army had already lost over 4,000 dead though, and Nogi realized he had to change his approach.

Beginning on August 7, the Japanese bombarded Port Arthur from land and sea for 13 straight days. Nogi's soldiers crept forward where they could under this covering fire, and during the night of August 19–20, when the bombardment stopped, they launched a full frontal assault on the Russian north-eastern defenses. After intense fighting, the Japanese took two forts, but not the “Eagle's Nest” that dominated the area; Third Army's casualties now stood at almost 18,000. The Russians refused to let the Japanese collect their dead and wounded, giving the area a gruesome appearance.

With manpower becoming evermore precious, Nogi now decided to mine under the Russian defenses. For three weeks, Japanese engineers worked virtually without interference, yet when the Japanese 1st Division launched its assault at dawn on September 19, the Russians, entrenched on Long Hill and 203-Meter Hill, again inflicted heavy casualties and forced a retreat. Even when Nogi received several 280-millimeter howitzers and resumed shelling, the fortress held out. Japanese attacks throughout October and November gained incrementally, but at high cost.

At the end of November, having received a full division of reinforcements, Nogi attempted another frontal assault. The Russians inflicted about 4,500 casualties while suffering only 1,500 themselves. Over the next two weeks, Nogi sent wave after wave against 203-Meter Hill, an emplacement that overlooked the harbor. He lost more than 10,000 men, but finally captured the position on December 5. After hauling the howitzers up the hill, the Japanese began to bombard the ships in the harbor, sinking all but one by December 15.

Inside the fort, debates raged over which course of action to follow. Stoessel advocated an honorable surrender, while Smirnov and Lieutenant General Roman Kondratenko led the faction in favor of fighting on. General Aleksei Kuropatkin, commander of Russian land forces in Manchuria, sided with Smirnov and received from Stoessel assurances that Port Arthur would hold out and keep Nogi's large force from joining the battles in the north.

Kondratenko was killed on December 15, however, and one by one the Russian defenses began to fall. Without consulting his commanders, Stoessel decided on January 1, 1905, that it was useless to fight further. Following a short negotiation, he surrendered Port Arthur to Nogi the following day.

When the Russians marched out, Nogi was amazed to see that Stoessel still had a force of more than 30,000 men available, with another 15,000 sick or wounded. The Russians also had a supply of some 80,000 artillery shells and more than 2 million bullets, along with large stocks of food. The officers were allowed to keep their swords and return to Russia, where Stoessel would face a court martial for his actions.

The Japanese Third Army, despite having lost over 90,000 men in the siege—including 15,500 dead and 44,000 wounded, immediately marched north to play a key role in the Battle of Mukden. The Japanese fleet was also free now to concentrate its forces against the Russian Second Pacific Fleet, which it would annihilate at Tsushima.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Boxer Rebellion Russia and (1899–1903); Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Nanshan, Battle of (May 1904); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Stoessel (Stessel), Baron Anatoli Mikhailovich (1848–1915); Trans-Siberian

Railway; Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905); Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

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Potemkin, Grigory Aleksandrovich (1739–1791)

Prince Grigory Potemkin is best remembered as the chief political and military adviser of Catherine II (“the Great”; r. 1762–1796), though he was also her lover for a time. His great energy and audacity sparked the ambitions of the empress. As a soldier, he displayed considerable ability and bravery. As a civil administrator, Potemkin possessed grand ideas and a willingness to stretch the truth. His name entered literary currency when he built fake villages and communities (“Potemkin villages”) across southern Russia to impress Catherine during an inspection tour.

Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin was born on September 24, 1739, in Chizevo, a village in Belorussia (now Belarus) in western Russia. His father was a minor noble. At an early age, Potemkin was taken to Moscow, where his formal education began. The boy showed intelligence and alertness, and he did well in his preparatory studies. He then attended the University of Moscow, where he lost all interest in academic studies. Potemkin was so negligent that he was expelled in 1760. He then left Moscow for St. Petersburg, where he became a soldier in the Horse Guards Regiment.

In 1762, Potemkin was one of a group of soldiers who staged a coup d’état that

brought Catherine II to the throne. Her husband Peter III was murdered, leaving Catherine as the sole ruler of Russia. Catherine generously rewarded those who placed her in power; Potemkin received a small estate, money, and a raise in rank. Catherine was taken with the young soldier and admitted him to her small circle of friends. Potemkin’s charm and charisma quickly won him acceptance. Ambitious and able, Potemkin was willing to take advantage of every opportunity to advance his career.

Potemkin first saw military action in Catherine’s first war against the Ottoman Empire. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, he fought with distinction and bravery and advanced quickly in rank. By the end of the war, he was a lieutenant general. With the successful conclusion of the war, Catherine chose Potemkin to be her fifth lover. Their passionate affair lasted for three years. During that time, Catherine rewarded Potemkin with vast estates, large sums of money, and high honors. She also persuaded Emperor Joseph II of Austria to make Potemkin a prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Potemkin differed from Catherine’s earlier lovers in that he not only had the inclination to assume governmental responsibilities but also the ability to carry them out successfully. Catherine was willing to entrust him with major tasks, and Potemkin became one of the major forces in the empire. He also became one of its richest men, but being profligate in his habits and generous to his friends, he often had to appeal to Catherine for funds.

In 1776, Catherine replaced Potemkin as her lover with Pyotr Zavadovsky, but kept him as her friend and adviser. She respected his capabilities and trusted his judgment, even in the selection of her new lovers. He retained his importance to the empire and continued to serve Catherine as a diplomat,

general, and administrator. Potemkin's vision of a Russian empire stretching east toward India and south toward Constantinople guided Russian diplomacy and military plans for many years. Due to his ideas, Russia continued to war periodically against the Ottoman Turks. Catherine named Potemkin as the governor general and military head of the region recently taken from the Ottoman Empire.

Known as New Russia, that region was north of the Black Sea and included Azov and Astrakhan. Potemkin was ordered to make that area militarily secure and to strengthen its economy. To do so, he sponsored various colonization projects, including granting plantations to Russian landholders. To attract German Mennonites, he granted them religious and cultural freedom in exchange for their settlement of the new areas. Settlers were also sponsored from Russia and other regions. He built cities as well, including Sevastopol, Kherson, Nikolaev, and Ekaterinoslav. In 1778, Potemkin established a major arsenal at Kherson. In 1783, he annexed the Crimea to the area he controlled. Recognizing the importance of controlling the Black Sea, Potemkin built a new Black Sea flotilla, including 15 ships and 25 smaller vessels. A new harbor was built at Sevastopol to service the fleet.

Potemkin had a great deal of energy and many ideas, but he lacked real sustained administrative talent. In 1784, Catherine rewarded him with a promotion to field marshal. When Potemkin's enemies attacked him, Catherine decided to personally inspect his work in New Russia. Her inspection tour of 1787 was a triumph for Potemkin. He ensured that Catherine would be impressed. Where his settlement policies had failed, Potemkin built fake villages and filled them with peasants prepared especially to impress



Prince Grigori Potemkin is best remembered as the chief political and military advisor of Catherine II, though he was also her lover for a time. His great energy and audacity sparked the ambitions of the empress. (Library of Congress)

Catherine. As a result of his audacious fraud, Potemkin was named Prince of Tauris. "Potemkin villages" became a byword for fraud. In addition to his work in the south, Potemkin also continued to travel frequently to St. Petersburg. He advised Catherine, served on the State Council, helped reorganize the army, and participated in diplomatic negotiations.

Potemkin continued to work for Russian expansion against the Ottomans. He established a network of agents throughout the Balkans. He also revived the idea of the Byzantine Imperial throne, to be held by Catherine's grandsons. Potemkin's activities contributed to an outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire in 1787.

The second Russo-Turkish War did not begin well. Potemkin was Russian commander in chief. Early defeats nearly caused his resignation, but Catherine's support revived his determination. He was fortunate to have Aleksandr Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov, two of Russia's most talented soldiers, among his generals. Their successes enabled Potemkin to invade Moldavia and force the Turks back into Romania.

Potemkin took time out from the war to return to St. Petersburg to overthrow Catherine's last lover, Platon Zubov. Developments in the French Revolution were demanding Russian attention by 1791, and Catherine decided to conclude a peace. When the Ottomans indicated a willingness to negotiate, Catherine ordered Potemkin to return to Jassy and conduct the negotiations. He was concluding peace when he died outside Jassy on October 16, 1791, of malaria complicated by exhaustion.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); German Colonies in Russia (1763–1993); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Potemkin Mutiny (June–July 1905)

Part of the Revolution of 1905, the mutiny by the crew of the battleship *Potemkin* became part of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary lore, largely due to the film *Battleship Potemkin* produced by famed director Sergei Eisenstein in 1925. The *Potemkin* was part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and thus did not see service during the Russo-Japanese War. Many of the ship's more experienced officers and sailors, however, were transferred to ships in the Pacific Fleet to replace losses during that conflict. Discipline and morale, always problematic in the Russian navy, suffered even more with a crew of second-rate officers and raw recruits. Many of the freshly minted sailors, moreover, were disaffected by the news of "Bloody Sunday"—the massacre of protestors in St. Petersburg in January, 1905—even before they arrived aboard the *Potemkin*. When news of the catastrophic Russian defeat at Tsushima reached the Black Sea Fleet in May 1905, many of the sailors decided to join the revolution. They formed a secret "Committee of the Social Democratic Organization of the Black Sea Fleet" (*Tsentralka*) to organize a rising.

Tsentralka had not yet decided on a time when the revolution broke out though. The direct cause was a shipment of maggot-infested meat that found its way into the *borscht* served aboard the *Potemkin* on June 27, 1905. When several enlisted men refused to eat the meal, the ship's executive officer, Ippolit Giliarovsky, threatened to shoot them for insubordination and summoned the ship guard. Several sailors resisted, and Giliarovsky shot one of the mutineers, which turned this minor event into a full-scale revolt. Members of *Tsentralka* established a committee and took control of the *Potemkin*, having killed the captain and

six other officers. The *Potemkin* then headed for the port of Odessa, flying the red flag of revolt.

The city was already in the midst of a revolution; a general strike was in progress when the ship arrived in port that evening, which gave way to rioting over the next day and a half while the *Potemkin* awaited the arrival of the remainder of the fleet. In the interim, the government sent two squadrons to retake, or sink, the *Potemkin*.

Commissioned in 1900, the battleship was classified as a pre-dreadnought. Displacing almost 13,000 tons, it was 378 feet long and 73 feet wide, with a draft of 27 feet. The *Potemkin* carried two twin 12-inch guns, sixteen 6-inch guns, fourteen 3-inch guns, and six 1.5-inch guns; its armor was 9 inches thick at the waterline, and its top speed was 16 knots. It normally sailed with a full complement of 25 officers and over 700 men. Led by Afansy Matushenko, the *Potemkin* sortied to meet three battleships of the first government squadron (*Tri Sviatitelia*, *Dvenadsat Apostolov*, and *Georgy Pobedonosets*) on June 30, but the loyalist ships refused to engage. When the second squadron arrived, the *Potemkin* went out to meet it as well, and sailed right through the combined squadrons without a shot being fired. Unopposed, but with no support forthcoming from their brother sailors, the committee aboard the *Potemkin* decided to sail for Constanta, Romania, where they could resupply.

The governor of Constanta refused to supply the ship, however, so the *Potemkin* sailed to the smaller port of Theodosia, in Crimea where, on July 5, they managed to obtain food, but nothing else. The *Potemkin* then returned to Constanta and, on July 7, the mutineers surrendered in exchange for asylum. Matushenko ordered the ship scuttled, although it was easily refloated and, renamed *Panteleimon*, continued to serve until 1923.

The significance of the *Potemkin* mutiny in the short term was minimal. Other mutinies followed during 1905–1906, but none amounted to much. When the Bolsheviks rose to power in 1917, however, they claimed to have inspired and led the mutiny, using it as an example of their support for the sailors and peasants. This was completely false, but Eisenstein’s film, often considered a masterpiece of cinematography, depicted the mutiny as such. Over time, the myth and imagery of the film have triumphed over the reality events.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bloody Sunday; Revolution of 1905; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945)

The Potsdam Conference was the final meeting of the “Big Three” Allied leaders in Europe of World War II. The leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States participated in the conference, which occurred following the defeat of Nazi Germany but before the surrender of Japan. Held at Cecilienhof, the former home of the eldest son of the last German Kaiser, in Potsdam near Berlin, the conference was a

critical event in the development of post-World War II political relations between the East and the West.

The Allied leaders had agreed at their conference held at Yalta in February 1945, to meet following the defeat of Germany to decide a number of issues, including the postwar borders of Germany. By the time the Potsdam Conference began on July 17, however, Harry S. Truman had replaced Franklin D. Roosevelt as president of the United States following Roosevelt's death in April 1945. Winston S. Churchill started the conference as prime minister of Great Britain, but the results of the first postwar election in England announced on July 26 resulted in a massive defeat of Churchill's political party. Clement Attlee then replaced Churchill as



U.S. president Harry Truman (center) shakes the hands of British prime minister Winston Churchill (left) and Soviet premier Josef Stalin (right) on the opening day of the Potsdam Conference in Berlin, Germany, from July 17 to August 2, 1945. (Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)

head of government and as Great Britain's leader at the conference. (Attlee had been present at Potsdam from the conference's beginning while awaiting the results of the election.) Thus, the only Allied leader present for the entirety of both the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference was Josef Stalin, the ruler of the Soviet Union. Stalin suggested that Truman preside over the conference as the only head of state in attendance, a suggestion accepted by Churchill and Attlee. (Mikhail Kalinin was chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and thus technically head of state, while Stalin's power came through his position as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.)

The conference was marked by disagreements among the victorious Allies regarding the treatment of Germany and post war Europe more generally. Churchill had increasingly viewed Stalin with distrust as the war progressed. President Truman was more suspicious of Stalin and his motives than President Roosevelt had been. Furthermore, the day before the conference started, the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb. Truman apparently believed that this event increased his bargaining power. Famously, President Truman told Stalin on July 24 that the United States possessed a new, very powerful weapon. Stalin appeared unimpressed and unconcerned by the news, according to witnesses. In fact, he was well aware of the United States' efforts to develop an atomic bomb as a result of Soviet spies who had infiltrated the project.

The Big Three agreed on demilitarizing Germany, decentralizing its economy, and altering its judicial, educational, and social structures to be less authoritarian and more democratic. They reversed all prewar annexations by Nazi Germany. The Allies also approved the division of Germany, as well as Berlin and Vienna, into four zones

of occupation, to be controlled by France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States; the holding of trials of German war criminals; and the creation of the Allied Control Commission, which would manage Germany during occupation and reconstruction.

Stalin wanted to obtain as much economic assistance for the Soviet Union as possible, because its industrial and agricultural economy had been heavily damaged by the war. At Yalta, Stalin had successfully argued for severe reparations from Germany, most of which would flow to the Soviet Union. At Potsdam, however, President Truman succeeded in reducing the impact of this decision by gaining an agreement that reparations could only be taken from each power's zone of occupation. As a result, the Soviet Union effectively stripped its zone of occupation in Germany of all industrial and manufacturing capabilities, in some cases dismantling entire factories and shipping them back to the Soviet Union.

One of the more controversial conclusions reached at the Potsdam Conference was the decision to shift the borders of Poland to the west in compensation for territory taken by the Soviet Union in the east. As a result, the territory of Germany was reduced by approximately 25 percent. In addition, Stalin gained recognition of the provisional government of Poland, which the Soviet Union controlled, thereby ending the long-standing Polish government-in-exile based in London. No meaningful agreements were reached to constrain the occupation by the Soviet Union of most of eastern Europe. The Allies also failed to take any real action to prevent the expulsion of German populations from eastern European countries, including Hungary and Czechoslovakia, both of which had been occupied by Soviet troops.

The Allies did form the Council of Foreign Ministers, which would act on behalf of the Big Three plus China to prepare peace treaties with Germany's former allies. The Allied chiefs of staff decided to temporarily partition Vietnam into northern and southern areas, with the British accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in the south, while those in the north would surrender to Chinese troops. The conference participants also revised the 1936 Montreux Convention, which had given Turkey control over the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardenelles.

Finally, China, led by Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the nationalist government, Great Britain, and the United States announced on July 26 the "Potsdam Declaration," which threatened Japan with complete destruction if it did not promptly surrender. The Soviet Union did not sign the declaration because it had not yet declared war on Japan. Japan's failure to respond clearly to the somewhat vaguely worded Potsdam Declaration, coupled with fears that the Soviet Union would gain additional spheres of influence in the Far East if the war there did not end soon, led to the decision at Potsdam to use the new atomic bomb against the Japanese.

With the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference on August 2, 1945, the leaders of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, who had remained allies through most of World War II, went their separate ways and never met again to consider postwar collaboration, government, or rebuilding. The lines had been drawn and the seeds sown for the commencement of the Cold War.

Alan M. Anderson

See also: Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943); World War II, Soviet Union in

(1939–1945); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Pozharski, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich (1578–1642)

Born October 17, 1577, Prince Dmitry Pozharsky traced his lineage to the sovereign princes of the Rurikid Dynasty who ruled the town of Starodub near Suzdal in medieval times. Pozharski's early career is undocumented, as the family played little role in Russian politics. Dmitry Pozharski first appears as part of the *zemsky Sobor* that elected Boris Godunov czar in 1598, after which he is a regular figure at court.

Pozharski served at the defense of Kolomna in 1608, fighting against the rebel forces of Ivan Bolotnikov, and he assisted Czar Vasily IV the following year during the siege of Moscow. He commanded a force that routed rebel Cossacks at the Pekhorka River in 1609 as well, and led the defense of Zaraysk in 1610. When Vasily IV was deposed in the

face of a Polish invasion that year, however, Pozharski went over to the rebel side.

During March 1611, Pozharski participated in a general uprising in Moscow against the Polish forces occupying the city, and was wounded. While he was recuperating, a delegation of Muscovites visited to offer him command of a “national militia” then gathering in Nizhny Novgorod; Pozharski agreed on condition that Kuzma Minin, who had organized the force, work with him. Pozharski thus took command of the national militia in late 1611.

He made no move to liberate Moscow until August 1612, however, spending the interval in prayer. By the time Pozharski's force arrived outside of Moscow, the Poles had been reinforced and resupplied. Nevertheless, Pozharski now moved resolutely, bringing the militia to the gates of Moscow on August 19 and engaging the Poles in battle from August 21 to 24. Russian forces captured the Poles' provisions during the engagement, and thus forced them to surrender in October. Although Pozharski guaranteed the Poles safe passage, his forces fell upon them and slaughtered most of them as they departed the Kremlin.

Pozharski and his commanders then spent six months organizing a new *zemsky Sobor*, which eventually selected Mikhail Romanov as czar. Pozharski, now raised to boyar (noble) status, went on to command Russian forces against the Poles in 1615 and 1618, and to serve as governor of Novgorod during 1628–1630. He also held a series of government offices between 1618 and his death in Moscow on April 30, 1642. Though his family line died out in 1672, Pozharski is immortalized in a bronze statute depicting him and Kuzma Minin that stands in front of the Church of the Savior on Red Square in Moscow. November 4, the date Pozharski and

Minin entered Moscow has been a Russian national holiday (“Unity Day”) since 2005.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608); Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Minin, Kuzma (Late 1500s–1616); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles

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Prague Spring (1968)

Brief period of liberalization in communist-ruled Czechoslovakia, short-circuited by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of the country.

On January 5, 1968, the Communist Party leadership of Czechoslovakia ousted Stalinist first secretary Antonín Novotný. Having been elevated to first secretary in March 1953 and thus enjoying one of the longest tenures among communist leaders in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, Novotný fell victim to growing economic, political, and national discontents. Since the early 1960s, he had rejected reform while exhibiting a willingness to use repression against workers, intellectuals, and students who questioned the existing system.

Novotný’s replacement as first secretary was 46-year-old Alexander Dubček. As leader of the Slovak Communist Party since 1963, Dubček had championed reform in general and the cause of equality for Slovakia in particular. While committed to

maintaining Czechoslovakia’s relationship with Moscow, he advocated “socialism with a human face,” sponsoring reforms designed to transform the Czechoslovak system into one in which socialism coexisted with democracy, individual rights, and moderate economic freedoms. The result was a brief era of political, cultural, and economic liberalization known as the Prague Spring.

While Dubček’s accession to power brought an immediate change in the political climate in Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring commenced in earnest on April 9, 1968, when the Czech Communist Party announced the so-called Action Program. This promised, among other things: reduced state economic planning, and thus greater freedom for both industry and agriculture; a commitment to economic equality between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; protection of civil liberties; and autonomy for Dubček’s native Slovakia. The Communist Party would



A Soviet tank rolls on despite the efforts of protesters who attempt to stop it with burning torches during the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968. (Libor Hajsky/CTK/AP Photo)



retain its leadership position, but the program stipulated that henceforth it would be more responsive to the desires of the people.

With the support of Ludvik Svoboda, who had replaced Novotný as Czechoslovak president in early April, Dubček fulfilled many of the program's promises over the next several months. He abolished censorship, sanctioned the creation of workers' councils in factories, moved to increase trade with the West, allowed greater freedom to travel abroad, and supported the writing of a new party constitution designed to democratize the party. The Dubček regime even went so far as to enact a Rehabilitation Law in June that provided retrials for individuals previously convicted of political crimes by the communist regime.

The Czechoslovak population responded enthusiastically to the reforms, basking in a freedom it had not enjoyed since before the communist coup of February 1948. The press, radio, and television especially

flourished, raising openly for the first time questions about political purges, show trials, and concentration camps. By early summer, the public was pushing for further reforms, to include the creation of independent political parties, the establishment of genuine political democracy, and more radical economic reforms.

As the Prague Spring unfolded, anxieties arose in Moscow. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev viewed the Czechoslovak reforms as a rejection of the Soviet political and economic model and worried that Prague might unilaterally withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Similar anxieties took hold among German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and Polish conservative communist leaders who feared that the Czechoslovak reforms might destabilize their countries.

On July 16, Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders sent a joint letter to Prague demanding a halt to the reform movement. Blaming recent

developments in Czechoslovakia on “reactionaries” supported by imperialism, the letter explained that the Czechoslovaks appeared headed off the socialist path and that the reforms threatened the entire socialist system. Dubček responded that his reforms should not be construed as anti-Soviet and that Czechoslovakia had no intention of leaving either the Warsaw Pact or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). He also met twice with Brezhnev, in Prague on July 22 and in Cierna on July 29, apparently to prevent Soviet military intervention. The Soviet leader agreed to withdraw Red Army forces that had been on maneuvers in Czechoslovakia since June and allow the Czechoslovak Party congress scheduled for September 9 to proceed, but demanded increased control of the press and other signs of loyalty in return.

On August 3, Czechoslovak representatives met with delegates from their Warsaw Pact counterparts and the Soviet Union. The resulting Bratislava Declaration affirmed their commitment to the communist cause, and the Soviet Union clearly stated its willingness to intervene in any Warsaw Pact country to help prevent the establishment of a “bourgeois regime.” The Red Army left Czechoslovak territory after the conference, but remained on the borders. Believing he had satisfied the Soviets’ demands, Dubček continued with the Action Plan.

Annoyed with Dubček’s refusal to end the reforms and unconvinced of either his communism or his loyalty, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners—Romania and Albania excepted—decided to act. On the night of August 20–21, 1968, an estimated 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops (primarily Soviet Red Army but including units from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) supported by some 2,000 tanks invaded Czechoslovakia. Dubček called

on the Czechoslovak people not to resist, and there was little violence, though many people took measures of passive resistance. Images of young Czechoslovaks pleading with Red Army soldiers mounted on tanks became icons of the Prague Spring in the West.

Claiming they had been asked in to aid the Czechoslovak government—which recent evidence suggests may have been true—the Warsaw Pact forces quickly arrested the reformist Czechoslovak leaders, including Dubček. Romanian communist leader Nicolai Ceaucescu publicly denounced the invasion, and Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in protest. Most Western communist parties joined in the denunciations. Transported to Moscow on August 21, Dubček surrendered to Soviet demands to end the reforms. Alarmed by the level of protest, the Soviets agreed to allow Dubček to continue as first secretary and carry out some moderate reforms. On August 27, he returned to Prague, tearfully informing the Czechoslovak population that the era of liberalization was over.

In April 1969, Dubček was removed as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia’s first secretary; he was expelled from the Party and took a job as a forestry official. Dubček’s replacement, Gustáv Husák, thereafter presided over one of the most repressive communist regimes in eastern Europe. The Prague Spring’s most significant reforms were annulled as the old political and economic system was restored.

Moscow justified its intervention by formulating what soon became known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which declared that no individual communist party had the right to make unilateral decisions that might be potentially damaging to socialism. It further stated that because a threat to the socialist system in any given country

represented a threat to the socialist system as a whole, it was the duty of other socialist countries to intervene militarily to suppress any potential deviation from prescribed communist policies.

While military intervention in Czechoslovakia headed off what Moscow perceived as a dangerous development, it exacerbated the Soviet Union's already precarious relations with the People's Republic of China, whose leaders publicly compared it to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler's aggression against Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. Equally significant, the intervention elicited public condemnation by the United States and led to the postponement of already scheduled Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between U.S. president Lyndon Johnson and Brezhnev in Moscow.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Brezhnev Doctrine; SALT I (November 1969–May 1972); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO)

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Protopopov, Aleksandr Dmitrievich (1866–1918)

Russian politician. Born on December 30, 1866, in Simbirsk Province, Aleksandr Dmitrievich Protopopov was of noble descent. After studying law, he returned to his hometown to run his family's textile factory. His work with the local zemstvo (assembly) led eventually to election to the Third and Fourth Dumas as a member of the Octobrist Party. Protopopov's liberal reputation, gained in part by his frequent championing of Jewish rights, led to his selection as a Duma vice president in 1914. In 1915, Protopopov was appointed to chair the war industries committee on metals.

In early 1916, Protopopov visited several of the capitals of Russia's allies at the head of a Duma delegation. On his way back to St. Petersburg, he met with a German diplomat in Stockholm who was seeking to extend peace feelers. This encounter, however, led nowhere. Protopopov made a full report on the matter to Czar Nicholas II and to the Duma, but the incident later gave rise to rumors of treason.

After his return, Protopopov became acquainted with Grigory Rasputin when the latter, said to possess healing powers, was summoned to cure a deteriorating case of late-stage syphilis. Rasputin's influence led Nicholas to appoint Protopopov minister of internal affairs in September 1916. The czar hoped that Protopopov's political antecedents would help mollify relations with the Duma, the members of which were increasingly critical of the government. The by-now-insane Protopopov merely further infuriated his former colleagues by attending Duma sessions wearing a uniform of the hated gendarmerie. His manifest incompetence, increasingly close relationship with Czarina Alexandra (with whom he conducted

seances to contact Rasputin), and rumors of treason inspired repeated calls for his ouster, but Protopopov retained his post until the collapse of the Romanov Dynasty. Arrested after the March 1917 revolution, he was shot by the Bolsheviks on January 1, 1918.

John M. Jennings

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Prut (Pruth), Battle of the (July 18–20, 1711)

An interesting sideshow in the Great Northern War of 1700–1721, the Battle of the Prut on July 18–20, 1711, was a humiliating defeat for Peter the Great's Russia in his long struggle with Charles XII of Sweden for control of eastern Europe south of the Baltic. Although focused on defeating Sweden, Russian Czar Peter I also continued to press the Muslim Ottoman Empire to free its Christian subjects and thereby hoped to gain territories along the Black Sea as well. The Prut Campaign offered the opportunity to achieve both of these goals. Peter had defeated Charles's Swedish army decisively in the 1709 Battle of Poltava, leading Charles XII to flee to Ottoman Turkey, where he convinced the Ottomans to declare war in November 1710 against Russia.

Peter was eager for war, seeing it as a way to get the Ottomans to evict Charles XII, as well as a chance of gaining Ottoman territory. After gaining the support of Moldavia, nominally subject to the Ottomans, Peter dispatched a cavalry force of 7,000 to cover his advance with an army of 30,000 Russians, 5,000 Moldavians, and 114 cannon south along the Prut River. Peter's companion Catherine, later his wife and his successor as Empress Catherine I in 1725, accompanied him on what was intended to be an easy campaign.

The Ottoman sultan Ahmed III did not lead his forces, but left that to Grand Vizier Baltaldji Pasha. Joining Baltaltji's 120,000 men were 70,000 cavalry from the Crimea. He advanced north along the Prut. The two armies met near Stanileski, in modern Romania, on July 18. This day's battle was inconclusive, but in the end, Peter withdrew to a better fortified position nearby. The next day though, he found himself surrounded by superior forces with no chance of reinforcements, while Baltaldji could draw on additional forces if needed.

Seeing no alternative, Peter offered to withdraw to Russia, an offer sweetened by Catherine's personal appeal to Baltaldji and a large bribe backed by her jewels. On July 21, the Treaty of Prut, ratified in the 1713 Treaty of Adrianople, ended hostilities. Peter withdrew to Russia, abandoned Azov in the Crimea, demolished several Russian forts on the border, and promised to cease interfering in Polish and Lithuanian affairs. Charles XII pressed the sultan, unsuccessfully, to continue the war with Russia; he finally left for Sweden in 1714.

The Battle of the Prut is more important for what did not happen than for what did. Baltaldji could have destroyed the Russian army and ended Peter's efforts to make Russia a great European power. The Ottomans, later labeled the *sick man of Europe*, thus

might not have become such an easy target for the expanding Austrian and Russian empires, or at least not as soon as it did. The battle was important for Peter's goals simply because it still allowed him to pursue them, and likely taught him not to underestimate his opponents. Had he not paid the humiliating price for withdrawal in the short run, his long-term goals might well have vanished.

Daniel E. Spector

See also: Adrianople (Edirne), Treaty of (1829); Great Northern War (1700–1721); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Russo-Turkish War (1710–1711)

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Przemyśl, Siege of (September 24, 1914– March 22, 1915)

The successful Siege of Przemyśl resulted in a devastating defeat for Austria-Hungary and in the surrender of over 115,000 troops to Russian forces. One of the greatest sieges of World War I, the siege occurred in two stages, with the initial investment running from September 24 to October 11, 1914. The second stage lasted from November 9, 1914 to March 22, 1915, when the garrison finally surrendered.

Przemyśl was located in Austrian Galicia (in present-day Poland), north of the Carpathian Mountains and near the Austro-Hungarian border with Russia. The city had been fortified in the years preceding 1914,

and had a string of modern forts surrounding the town. At the start of World War I, Przemyśl was used to support the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Polish Russia (the Grand Duchy of Warsaw). However, Russian forces under the command of General Nikolai Ivanov commenced an offensive along the entire front from Galicia to Lemberg (L'vov) in early September. The Battle of Galicia drove the Austro-Hungarian forces back over 100 miles across its entire front and resulted in massive losses to the Austro-Hungarian army. One Austro-Hungarian corps retreated into the city and, along with the garrison troops already there, comprised 150,000 men defending Przemyśl.

By September 24, the Russians had cut off the last line of retreat from the fortress of Przemyśl. It was completely within Russian-controlled territory by September 28, and the Russian army commander demanded that the Przemyśl fortress commander surrender. He refused; however, Russian forces lacked sufficient siege artillery to reduce the city's defenses. Instead of waiting for appropriate cannon to arrive, the commander of the Russian Third Army, General Radko Dimitriev, ordered an assault before Austro-Hungarian relief forces could arrive. In three days of constant, heavy fighting, the Russians failed to reduce the city's defenses and suffered 40,000 casualties.

The initial investment of the city was rather short-lived. While the futile Russian attack was under way, on September 28, German forces counterattacked in the north toward Warsaw. Aided by the initial success of this offensive, an Austro-Hungarian relief force moved toward Przemyśl. General Dimitriev was forced to retreat, and the initial siege was lifted on October 11, 1914.

Much like the initial siege, Przemyśl's relief did not last long. The German attack toward Warsaw was checked in

mid-October and, with the weather turning cold, a counterattack by 60 Russian divisions forced the Germans to retreat toward Cracow by October 31. Similarly, the Russians halted the Austro-Hungarian advance at the San River, and the Austro-Hungarian armies were forced to retreat over the same roads on which they had recently attacked. By November 9, 1914, Przemysł again was surrounded and under siege.

General Dimitriev's troops were moved north, and responsibility for the siege moved to the Russian Eleventh Army under the command of General Andrei Selivanov. Rather than order any frontal assaults, General Selivanov instead settled into long-term siege operations, intending to starve the garrison within Przemysł into submission. Nearly 120,000 Austro-Hungarian troops were still in the city, with sufficient stores for three months.

As the weather deteriorated, however, neither side was adequately prepared. Proper clothing was scarce in both the Austro-Hungarian forces and the besieging Russian army as winter descended. Food rationing began within the city by mid-November. Carrier pigeons and balloons sent out news of the siege and the conditions within the city. The world's first airmail flights occurred from Przemysł during the siege, when airplanes delivered mail from the city 27 times.

The failure of the Austro-Hungarian winter offensive of 1915 sealed the fate of Przemysł. A relief column toward Przemysł started out in mid-February 1915, but by early March, it had been defeated at a cost of over 50,000 casualties. The Austro-Hungarian chief of General Staff, Colonel General Conrad von Hötzendorf, told the city's commander that no further relief efforts would occur and that Przemysł would be left to its fate. During the last days of the siege, the city was enveloped

in massive blizzards. Hundreds of wounded soldiers froze to death before they could receive treatment.

General Selivanov's troops broke through the defenses on the northern side of Przemysł on March 13, 1915. Temporary defense lines held back the Russian onslaught while the city's defenders destroyed the defensive fortifications, most artillery pieces, and any other item of possible use to the Russians. The Russians defeated a final attempt by the Austro-Hungarian troops to escape from their encirclement on March 19. With literally the last crumb of food gone, the garrison surrendered on March 22, 1915. Over 100 generals and senior officers, as well as nearly 100 pieces of artillery, were captured along with approximately 117,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers.

The surrender of the fortress of Przemysł was hailed as a great victory for the Allies. Indeed, the loss of the fortress devastated the Austro-Hungarian army's morale and, along with the significant casualties associated with the siege, decimated the Austro-Hungarian officer and noncommissioned officer corps. However, the Allies' success did not last long.

In early May 1915, the German and Austro-Hungarian armies launched the Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive. Caught by surprise, the Russians were forced to retreat. On June 3, 1915, a combined German-Austro-Hungarian force reentered Przemysł. For the remainder of the war, the city remained in the hands of the Central Powers.

Alan M. Anderson

See also: Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); Masurian Lakes, Second Battle of (February 7–22, 1915); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775)

The Pugachev Rebellion was the largest social upheaval in 18th-century Russia, and posed a significant threat to Czarina Catherine II's reign. Termed a *peasant war* in Soviet historiography, it was distinguishable from previous uprisings by its scale, its greater degree of organization, and by its more clearly defined objective to destroy the existing nobility and to take its place in the Russian social hierarchy.

From 1762 to 1772, some 160 popular uprisings occurred in the Russian Empire, but the ruling class was not prepared for the fierce rise of peasant discontent that ignited Pugachev's Rebellion in 1773. As in similar events dating back to the early 17th century, the instigators and chief actors were Cossacks. With public opinion diverted by the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), the whole southeast of Russia, the middle and lower Volga River, and the Ural districts

were incited into an uprising led by Eme-
lian Pugachev, a renegade Don Cossack
and veteran of both the Seven Years War
(1756–1763) and the Russo-Turkish War.
Charismatic and cunning, Pugachev pro-
claimed himself the resurrected Peter III—
the czar Catherine II and her adherents had
overthrown and killed more than a decade
before. Pugachev announced the abolition
of serfdom, freed all peasants belonging
to estate owners, and promised religious
freedom.

Following the tradition of earlier upris-
ings, Pugachev combined his claim as Rus-
sia's legitimate czar with an appeal to poor
Cossacks. He also benefited from the deep
opposition to Moscow's rule among non-
Russian peoples of the Urals, particularly the
Bashkirs; factory serfs (peasants attached to
an industrial enterprise instead of land) were
also eager recruits. Beginning with 300 fol-
lowers, Pugachev was able to gather a force
of more than 30,000 supporters from the dis-
contented and disaffected elements across
the Volga River and Ural Mountains. His
movement grew large enough that he estab-
lished a rudimentary government and royal
court. Throughout the autumn of 1773 and
the summer of 1774, Pugachev's rebels ter-
rorized defenseless gentry and seized major
provincial centers in Kazan, Penza, and
Saratov. Much to Pugachev's dismay, the
government garrisons at Orenburg and Iaikst
refused to capitulate, which cost Pugachev
and his movement precious time and al-
lowed the Imperial Russian Army to engage
with his peasant army.

The Russian army defeated Pugachev's
forces in two battles at Ufa and at Tatish-
chevo in March 1774, and lifted the sieges
of Orenburg and Iaikst. Pugachev's rebel-
lion between the Volga and the Yaik (Iaik)
rivers began to collapse. Pugachev remained

at large and, with his remaining followers, swept north through the factories of the Ural Mountains, sacking and burning the city of Kazan. A small Russian force reached Kazan just after Pugachev, however, and smashed his peasant army.

Defeated thrice, Pugachev changed tactics. He now appealed to his followers to murder their masters and end serfdom. This message, spread by his Cossack followers and the peasants themselves, caused destruction down the Volga as the Russian army chased the remnants of the peasant army south. Like other uprisings of this magnitude, the Pugachev Rebellion had its share of bloodshed, incidents of barbarism, and vandalism. Thousands of nobles, government officials, clergymen, townspeople, and ordinary soldiers who refused to recognize the pretender's authority became victims of the uprising; and the rebels laid waste to churches, monasteries, and icons.

Pugachev continued down the Volga, reaching Tsaritsyn (once Stalingrad, now Volgograd) in the Ukraine in August 1774. By this time, Pugachev's chances of success were all but over, as the end of the Russo-Turkish War released large numbers of Russian forces for use against the rebellion. Catherine II dispatched forces under General Peter I. Panin to end the uprising. Panin's army finally caught Pugachev and his peasant army just south of Tsaritsyn and, in a series of actions in August along the Volga River, a strong detachment under Colonel Ivan I. Mikhelson cornered Pugachev's force and inflicted a decisive defeat that effectively ended the armed rebellion.

Pugachev's remarkable ability to escape continued, but was short-lived as his own people betrayed him. Pugachev's Cossack followers arrested him and turned over to Russian authorities, who took him to Moscow and paraded him around the city in an

iron cage. After a trial in late December 1774, Pugachev was publically executed in Moscow on January 10, 1775.

Estimates suggest that Pugachev and his followers were responsible for about 3,500 deaths, of which half were nobles, the rest government officials, soldiers, and about 200 members of the clergy. On the rebel side, the number of deaths is about 20,000, not including those suffered by the Bashkirs and those killed by Russian troops as reprisals after the rebellion ended. Participants of the uprising were subjected to repression by Russian authorities; Pugachev's followers were knouted or forced to run the gauntlet, while others were branded, had their noses slit, or were exiled to hard labor. The more prominent leaders of the uprising faced execution.

To obliterate the memories of the rebellion, in 1775, Catherine II ordered Pugachev's birthplace, Zimoveiskaia, renamed Potemkinskaia, the Yaik River the Ural River, and the Yaik Cossacks the Ural Cossacks. The Pugachev Rebellion was the last great peasant uprising in Russia until the start of the 20th century, and made evident to many Russian elite the necessity of solving the peasant issue. It also planted the fear of future peasant uprisings; some responded by entrenching the institution of serfdom, others by striving to abolish it.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Cossacks; Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657); Panin, Peter Ivanovich (1721–1789); Peter, False (?–1607); Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

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Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775)

Emelian Pugachev was a Don Cossack who led the most serious mass uprising in Europe prior to the French Revolution. He pretended to be the murdered Czar Peter III, attracting support from peasants and religious dissenters. The Pugachev Rebellion threatened to overturn the existing social order in Russia. Only a massive effort by Catherine II and her army prevented Pugachev's success.

Pugachev was born around 1742 in Zimoveiskaia-na-Donu, in the eastern part of Russia. He was a member of the Don Cossacks, although his family had moved east to the Urals to escape the expansion of Muscovite domination. The Yaik Host of Cossacks, to which he belonged, lived along the Yaik River (now known as the Ural River). They valued their freedom but were nominally vassals of the czar, who paid them a small stipend to defend the Russian frontier.

Beginning with Peter the Great (Peter I) in 1721, the czars began to limit the autonomy of the Cossacks. They were placed under the authority of the War College in St. Petersburg, with an appointed ataman (hetman) to lead them. They lost their authority to select their own officers. Even worse, Cossacks were conscripted into ordinary units, losing their distinctive uniforms and beards. The Yaik Host rebelled in 1772, but the uprising was crushed quickly. The

Cossacks' grievances remained, however, and they awaited another chance to regain their freedom.

Pugachev was a typical Cossack of his era. At 17, he was married to a Cossack girl from Esaulov. The same year, he was conscripted into the army and served in the Seven Years War against Prussia. He was an orderly to Colonel Iliia Denisov but was whipped and dismissed for allowing the colonel's horse to get away during a Prussian raid. In January 1762, Russia withdrew from the war with the accession of Peter III to the throne. Pugachev returned home to his family. He was recalled to the army in 1764, when an expedition was mounted to retrieve fugitive Old Believers from Poland. In 1768, Pugachev returned to the Russian army again when war broke out against Turkey. He participated in the siege of Bender as a noncommissioned officer. Afterward, Pugachev fell ill with pains in his chest and legs and was sent home to recuperate. He requested early retirement, but was denied. He refused to return to the army. After two attempts to flee Russian territory and two arrests, he escaped across the border to the Old Believers colony at Vetka in Poland.

Pugachev returned to Russia under an amnesty for Russian Old Believers around 1770 and spent the following months traveling across Russia. Peter III had been murdered by the supporters of his wife, Catherine II, in 1762, leaving Catherine on the throne. Soon after, a fellow refugee suggested that Pugachev had a resemblance to the murdered czar. To appeal to the people of Russia, Pugachev decided to present himself as Peter III. Others had already pretended to be Peter III, indicating a general disbelief among the people toward the official government reports that Peter was dead. During the course of his travels, Pugachev was struck by the bitter unrest he found among

the lower classes. He became convinced that the time was ripe for a revolt. He determined to lead that revolt, to sweep away the aristocratic class that oppressed the lower classes.

With about 80 Cossacks committed to him, Pugachev publicly proclaimed himself to be Peter III in September 1773. He called on the oppressed to rise up and follow him in a revolution against Catherine II. He began his campaign along the Yaik River and attracted many followers among those who were unhappy with Russian society. These included disgruntled Cossacks, Russian peasants, fugitive and factory serfs, released convicts from Siberia, Old Believer religious dissenters, and such non-Russian tribesmen as Bashkirs, Tatars, and Kirghiz. The force Pugachev assembled was not well trained or disciplined, but it was large and enthusiastic. He was able to defeat the local militia units sent against him and captured several Russian military posts along the Yaik River. In October 1773, Pugachev laid siege to the city of Orenburg, the major center of government strength and authority on the Yaik. He set up a headquarters and began operations. One government relief operation was defeated by his army.

The revolt quickly spread northward into the Urals, eastward into Siberia, and westward to the Volga River. Bloody uprisings against government officials and landlords became more common. Thousands left their homes to join Pugachev, whose army numbered around 25,000. Late in 1773, Catherine decided the revolt was serious and sent a large force to relieve Orenburg. Pugachev's forces were defeated in late March and early April 1774, and he was forced to raise the siege. He eluded capture and escaped south to Bashkiria in the southern Urals. He raised a large army of dissidents and in July 1774, again took the offensive. His army quickly



Emelian Pugachev was a Don Cossack who led the most serious mass uprising in Europe prior to the French Revolution. (Library of Congress)

sallied to the northwest, surprising the defenders of the city of Kazan. Most of the city was burned on July 23, 1774. At the same time, a new serf uprising took place near Nizhni Novgorod (now Gorki), only 275 miles east of Moscow. Catherine was alarmed by the evident spreading of the revolt and sent new forces to destroy Pugachev. He was defeated near Tsaritsyn (present-day Stalingrad), and most of his army was destroyed. Pugachev again evaded his captors and returned to the Yaik River, hoping to raise a new army among the Cossacks. He was betrayed by Cossacks loyal to the Russian government, however, and was handed over to Catherine's forces.

Pugachev this time was taken in an iron cage to Moscow, where he was put on trial and quickly sentenced to death. On January 10, 1775, he was beheaded and quartered

before a crowd of aristocratic Russians near the Kremlin. His three children and two wives were imprisoned in the fortress of Keksgolm, never to be released. One daughter lived there until 1834. Pugachev's rebellion failed, but he became a symbol to later Russian reformers and revolutionaries. His revolution was also the largest and most serious class uprising in Russia until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Catherine II ("the Great"; 1729–1796); Cossacks; Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

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Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–)

Russian politician who has served as prime minister and president.

Putin was born in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), on October 7, 1952. After growing up in a communal apartment, Putin attended Leningrad State University, earning a law degree in 1975. That same year, Putin entered the Committee for State Security (KGB, or *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*). Putin served with the KGB until 1990, retiring as a lieutenant colonel, and remained a member of the Communist Party until the

Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. He returned to St. Petersburg and served as deputy mayor under Anatoly A. Sobchak, an economic specialist and reformer who was one of Putin's primary political mentors. While in St. Petersburg, he attended the city's Mining Institute and Technical University, receiving his candidate of economic sciences degree in 1997. Putin then served as the director of the Federal Security Service (the successor to the KGB) from 1998–1999. He later became prime minister under President Boris N. Yeltsin, who appointed Putin as his successor before unexpectedly resigning in December 1999. Putin served as president from 2000–2008, and began his third term in 2012. He served again as prime minister under President Dmitry A. Medvedev from 2008–2012, but Putin retained true power.

Once obtaining political authority as prime minister in 1999, Putin displayed an action-man persona, exemplified by his martial arts prowess—the International Judo Federation awarded him the eighth judo *dan* (degree) in 2012. In the 1990s, the Russian economy and military withered, but Putin realized the need for reform and aggressive policies. He used overwhelming force to crush Chechen terrorists in 1999, and when he became president, he installed *siloviki* (representatives from military and security ministries) in the government bureaucracy to consolidate his control. Under Putin, Russia's economy boomed. The country's gross domestic product went from \$195 billion in 1999 to \$185 trillion in 2011. The source of this wealth stems from Putin's nationalization of oil and natural gas industries. This vast fortune enabled Putin to formulate a geopolitical doctrine that seeks to reestablish Russia as a world power.

The Putin Doctrine comprises three key policies: nuclear parity with the United



Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, speaks at the Kremlin in Moscow. (Presidential Press and Information Office)

States; the reclamation of its role as Eurasian hegemon; and the expansion of Russia's geo-strategic position. The core of all three policies involves a stronger military, which the government reorganized and spent billions renovating. As Russia's nuclear program expands, Putin continues to block American attempts to establish missile defense systems in eastern Europe. In addition, Putin courts America's enemies abroad, such as Iran, where Russia aided in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

To regain Eurasian hegemony and geo-strategic prestige, Putin employs strong-arm tactics against former Soviet satellites. In

2006 and 2009, Putin's government threatened or did cut off Ukraine's natural gas supply, bending Ukrainian political will. When Georgia attempted to join NATO in 2008, the Russian military invaded and changed Georgian diplomacy. Putin has also moved toward establishing a Eurasian Union to counteract the European Union and NATO. When Ukraine appeared on the verge of joining NATO in late 2013, Putin's government essentially forced the Ukrainians into his counter-organization. A group of separatists, undoubtedly funded and supplied by Russia, then seized Crimea and forced its return to Russia in the spring of 2014.

Putin's government believes Russia requires a strong military to protect it from external threats. Putin's primary goal will likely remain returning Russia to superpower status.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Chechen War, Second (War in the Northern Caucasus; October 1999–February 2000); Georgian War (2008); KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security); *Kursk*, (Submarine); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Quadruple Alliance (November 20, 1815)

Alliance reached among the European powers Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia on November 20, 1815, in which the four nations sought collective security and a balance of power.

The Quadruple Alliance had its antecedent in the Treaty of Chaumont of March 1814, in which the four powers pledged themselves not to seek any separate peace with Napoleon Bonaparte and France but agreed instead to maintain their military coalition until Napoleon surrendered. Coalition action provided the only means Europe had to defend itself against the overwhelming military superiority of France. When Napoleon left Elba and returned to Paris, the allied powers declared him an outlaw and renewed the Treaty of Chaumont. With Napoleon defeated at Waterloo and in final exile on St. Helena, and with the Bourbons restored a second time, the coalition wanted full insurance against a resurgent France.

Considering the ease of Napoleon's return from Elba, it was especially clear to Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, that paper arrangements creating territorial adjustments or limited military establishments would not, by themselves, keep the peace. Guided by Castlereagh's diplomatic search for a more effective guarantee, on the same day of the signing of the second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815), Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia agreed to the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship. Also known as the Treaty of Defensive

Alliance but best recognized as the Quadruple Alliance, the powers directed their military precautions solely against France, pledging that they would collectively secure Europe through a formal alliance.

The powers pledged themselves to uphold the second Treaty of Paris by force, to prevent the return of any Bonapartist, and to repel any attack by the French against the allied army of occupation. The alliance members committed an additional 60,000 troops, if necessary, to maintain order. The Quadruple Alliance went beyond military assurances though. Castlereagh's efforts in early 1814 led to allied diplomatic unity. In Article VI of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance, the allies pledged to hold "meetings at fixed periods . . . for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests." By agreeing to periodic conferences, the allies could also use joint diplomacy, in concert with combined military measures, to ensure order and the execution of the second Treaty of Paris.

Each of the Great Powers seemed to have its own interpretation of the primary role of the Quadruple Alliance. National self-interests guided each of the alliance members. Britain saw the alliance as a bulwark directed against renewed French aggression. The British were committed to the maintenance of frontiers and the exclusion of the Bonapartists from the French throne, but they were unwilling to consider the Quadruple Alliance as a means to ensure Bourbon rule or as a license to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. The Russian czar, Alexander I, was committed to Bourbon rule and saw the

alliance as a means of suppressing all revolutionary movements that might arise on the continent. Prince Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister, believed allied unity was a means of keeping all four powers involved in European affairs to deal collectively with revolutionary threats, which if ignored, could provoke Russian troops to march unilaterally across the Continent.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of October 9, 1818, ended the military occupation of France. France was invited to enter the mainstream of European diplomacy and became an important part of the balance of power in Europe. The French acceptance of this offer has led historians to see France as the fifth member of the so-called Quintuple Alliance. The original four powers remained suspicious of a French resurgence, however, and secretly renewed the Quadruple Alliance on November 1, 1818. The French never gave cause for use of the renewed treaty and later played an active role in alliance matters.

In the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, the principal members of the Allied coalition of 1813–1814 held several congresses to deal with perceived threats to peace, but the powers failed to act in concert. The revolutionary outbreaks in Spain and Naples in 1820 led to calls for an allied conference at Troppau in 1820. Castlereagh restated Britain's commitment to the balance of power but rejected the alliance's role in intervening in the domestic affairs of other nations. Alexander I hoped that the alliance would check these revolutions before they engulfed all of Europe. Austria, Prussia, and Russia agreed to Metternich's proposal, known as the Troppau Protocol, that political changes caused by revolutionary actions would not be officially recognized and that the powers had the right to suppress these changes. Britain rejected the reactionary agreement.

To suppress the ongoing rebellions, the 1821 allied coalition conference at Laibach authorized Austrian military operations in the Italian Peninsula, while the 1822 Verona conference sanctioned a French military incursion into revolutionary Spain. Britain refused to support either operation. The formal alliance was all but dead.

The Quadruple Alliance, however weak it proved to be, should be seen as an integral part of the comprehensive peace achieved at the Congress of Vienna. Among the principles followed by the congress, and all of the achievements of Vienna, the Quadruple Alliance created the sense of collective security and established a balance of power that helped guide European diplomacy for three decades. While revolutionary fervor continued to erupt from the 1820s through 1848, and the dying balance of power ended in 1854 with the Crimean War, the European powers remained determined to avoid war on the scale of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, an effort that only ended with the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

Thomas D. Veve

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

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Radzievsky, Aleksei Ivanovich (1911–1978)

Born in Uman, Ukraine, on July 31, 1911, Aleksei Radzievsky left school at 16 to work in a factory. He joined the Red Army in 1929, and graduated from the cavalry school in 1931. After rising to command a cavalry squadron, Radzievsky attended the General Staff Academy during 1938–1941.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Radzievsky joined the 4th Guards Cavalry Division in the defense of Moscow. He later saw action at Khar'kov, Kiev, and Zhitomir. In February 1944, Radzievsky was promoted to major general and appointed chief of staff for the Second Guards Tank Army. When his commanding officer was seriously wounded during the Lublin Offensive that July, Radzievsky assumed command. His forces helped liberate Poland, advancing to Warsaw by the end of the month. In November, Radzievsky was promoted to lieutenant general.

When the war ended, Radzievsky was appointed commander of Army KA, where he specialized in officer training. He subsequently served as commander for the Northern Armed Forces Group during 1950–1952, the Turkestan Military District during 1952–1953, and the Odessa Military District from 1954 to 1959. Radzievsky became the deputy commandant of the General Staff Academy in 1959, transferring to command the office of military studies in 1968. From 1969 to 1978, he was commandant of the Frunze Military Academy. Promoted to full general

in 1972, Radzievsky was made Hero of the Soviet Union in February 1978. He died in Moscow later that year.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Frunze Academy; Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942)

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Raids in the Pamir Mountains, Soviet (1930s–1940s)

In the 1930s and 1940s, Soviet forces crossed into neighboring Afghanistan and China to raid local communities living in the Pamir Mountains. The Pamirs, a collection of high mountain grasslands divided between (Soviet) Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and China, are populated primarily by nomadic Kirghiz and Tajiks. Soviet forces based in the Murghab District in the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan frequently employed military means to enforce the closure of trade with neighboring communities in China and Afghanistan.

In the mid-1930s Soviet authorities in Murghab stopped Afghan Kirghiz from crossing into Soviet territory to access land

they had traditionally used for pasturage. The first Soviet raid into Afghanistan took place in 1935 at Gonju Bai, near Aktash on the Afghan-Soviet border. The target was an influential Kirghiz tribal leader who encouraged tribesmen to oppose the Soviets. The chief escaped into China, but his sons were taken into custody and brought to Tajikistan, and his tribesmen were robbed of most of their belongings.

A second raid in the fall of 1941 resulted in stolen livestock and property, and the deaths of more than 40 Afghan Kirghiz in the Great Pamir and Little Pamir.

During World War II, there was a rebellion among the Kirghiz of the Murghab District in Soviet Tajikistan. A number of leaders of the rebellion escaped to Afghan territory, but in the fall of 1943, Soviet forces reportedly crossed into Afghanistan and killed 41 Kirghiz, including two tribal leaders, or khans, of the Greater Pamir.

In 1944, Soviet authorities turned their attention east, toward Puli County in Xinjiang Province, China. In the fall of 1944, a reported 600 Soviet troops, composed of mostly Kirgiz, crossed into Puli County, overwhelmed the local defense force and brought back 10,000 sheep and 1,000 yaks. In August 1945, Soviet troops occupied Puli County as part of a preliminary campaign to support a 1946 general uprising by Turkic Muslims against the central Chinese government. Soviet aggression in the Pamir Mountains was part of the overall policy of expanding the Soviet Union's influence and borders during the 1940s.

Toward the end of World War II, the Soviet Union employed diplomacy and military force to significantly expand its territory at the expense of Japan in the east and Eastern European neighbors in the West, as well as occupying Manchuria. It is within this

context that Soviet actions in the Afghan Pamirs are best understood; the last Soviet incursion occurred in 1946, the same year, Kabul and Moscow finalized a border treaty that divided the 1,192 islands in Amu Darya River. The Afghan-Soviet border would remain uneventful until 1978 when, on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, most of the Kirghiz in Afghanistan fled to Pakistan.

David P. Straub

See also: Great Game, The (Russia in Central Asia); Manchuria Campaign (August 9–September 5, 1945); Baron Carl Gustav Emil (1867–1951); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna (1912–1943)

Soviet Air Force officer. Born in Moscow on March 12, 1912, Marina Raskova (née Malinina) mastered air navigation as a laboratory employee at the N. E. Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy and was the first Soviet woman to qualify for a navigation diploma. She then taught navigation at the academy while training to fly and studying mechanical engineering at the Aviation Institute in Leningrad.

On September 24–25, 1938, Raskova, with pilot Valentina Grizodubova and copilot Polina Osipenko, took part in a nonstop pioneer flight from Moscow to the Pacific in the ANT-37 aircraft *Rodina* (*Homeland*). The three aviators became the first females to receive the Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet decoration. As a major in the Soviet Air Force, Raskova persuaded Soviet leader Josef Stalin to form three women's combat wings at a time when there was no shortage of male aircrews. She then trained her new 122nd Air Group at Engels, near Stalingrad, in 1941 and 1942. In late 1942, she received command of the 587th Dive Bomber Regiment (renamed the 125th M.M. Raskova Borisov Guards Dive Bomber Regiment after her death).

On January 4, 1943, Raskova died in a plane crash at an undetermined location while making her way to the Stalingrad Front during a heavy snowstorm. Members of her unit pledged to make it worthy of bearing her name and qualify for the honorific "Guards" designation, attaining both that same year. The tactics of this wing's 2nd Squadron, applied in the air battle of June 4, 1943 (during which the unit shot down several German fighters), became a model for Soviet bomber aviation.

Kazimiera J. Cottam

See also: Air Forces, Soviet, (1917–1991), Women in; Grizhodubova, Valentina (1910–1993); Litvak, Lidiia (Lilia or Liliia) Vladimirovna (1921–1943)

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
Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916)

Siberian peasant and mystic who became an adviser and confidant to the Russian imperial family. Born near the Ural Mountains in the western Siberian village of Pokrovskoe sometime between 1864 and 1872, Grigory Yefimovich Rasputin was a precocious child who learned to read the Bible at an early age. As a young man, he ran afoul of the law for petty thievery and dalliances with young girls. Rasputin came under the influence of a religious sect known as the *Khlysty*

(Flagellants) and became a self-declared holy man who claimed healing powers.

Rasputin was a wandering “holy man,” a *Strannik* (pilgrim) in search of God in the tradition of many Orthodox Russians. He was known alternately as a *Starets* (spiritual guide) and a *Yurodivy* (holy fool). Though he was careful not to wander too far from Orthodoxy, many of his practices were akin to those of the quasi-Christian sects, which fit his personal licentiousness.

Rasputin arrived in the capital of St. Petersburg in the first years of the new century, and in October 1905, his contacts within the religious hierarchy and among the nobility secured him access to the imperial family. The politics and ideologies of the era



Grigory Rasputin was a mystic whose influence on the imperial court of Russia is often cited as contributing to the downfall of the Romanov dynasty during the Russian Revolution of 1917. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

created a growing crisis of faith for Orthodoxy that emphasized saints, holy men, and miracle workers. This trend opened the way for Rasputin’s rise to prominence. Rasputin was said to possess two miraculous powers: healing and precognition. He seemed able to “read” a person’s character and quickly assess his or her strengths and weaknesses. His greatest ability, however, was to calm people in distress, which drew him to the attention of the imperial couple.

Czar Nicholas II and Czarina Alexandra were extremely devout members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but they also believed in miracles and faith healing. Young Czarovich Aleksei Nikolaevich, heir to the throne, suffered from hemophilia. Called to the boy’s bedside on occasions of distress, Rasputin seemed able to stop the czarovich’s hemorrhaging. Explanation of Rasputin’s success in controlling the bleeding, either through hypnosis or positive thinking, is elusive, but certainly his perceived success endeared him to the czarina especially and gave him an intimacy with the royal family enjoyed by few. Soon his unfettered advice extended to state business, as he attempted to influence the czar’s decisions in ministerial and policy matters. From 1910, he is believed to have exercised considerable political power.

Rasputin’s frequent affairs with women and his drunkenness are well documented. He opposed Russia’s involvement in World War I, reportedly telling the czar that if Russia went to war it “would drown in its own blood.” When Czar Nicholas II took personal command of the war effort in the fall of 1915, the czarina came to exercise political power in St. Petersburg in his absence. Rasputin held considerable influence over her and the selection of cabinet ministers. Indeed, rumors circulated that the czarina was Rasputin’s lover. Convinced that Rasputin now threatened the very survival of the

Romanov dynasty, members of the nobility and right-wing supporters of autocracy plotted his assassination.

Following a half dozen unsuccessful attempts, in the early morning hours of December 17, 1916, Prince Feliks Iusupov, son-in-law of the czar's sister, supported by others in the imperial family and government, poisoned, shot, and finally drowned Rasputin. Upon learning of Rasputin's death, the czar abandoned his command of the army, leaving no one in authority, and replaced every able minister of his government. Even members of the imperial family who asked for leniency for the assassins were exiled from the capital. With the breakdown of capable governance and command of the war effort, as well as the widening chasm between the monarchy and the people, Russia stood on the brink of revolution. Although Rasputin did not materially affect the coming of the revolution that would sweep away the czarist regime, he did perhaps hasten it.

Arthur T. Frame

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929)

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Razin, Stepan (ca. 1630–1671)

Stepan Razin (also known as Stenko or Stenka Razin) led the greatest rebellion

against the central Russian government before the 18th century. He was a Don Cossack, but his revolt against increasing oppression and centralization of power found a ready audience among serfs and soldiers of Russia. His movement reflected an anger and distrust of the czar that culminated in a rebellion, killed many nobles, and sought to destroy the structure of Russian government.

Razin was born around 1630 into one of the most prominent Don Cossack families. Little is known of his early life, although he quickly developed a reputation among the Cossacks as a leader. Razin was described as dark and moody, capable of quickly working himself into a temper. Given to drunken carousing, Razin was also willing to suffer any hardship with superhuman endurance.

Razin was known for his courage, but he was also regarded by many as a sorcerer. In 1652, Razin made a traditional Cossack pilgrimage to the famous Solovetsky Monastery on the shores of the White Sea. In 1658, he traveled to Moscow with a Cossack delegation to negotiate the annual payment from the czar. Three years later, Razin was entrusted by the Cossack leadership with the mission of negotiating an alliance with the Kalmyks against the Nogai Tatars, who lived on the lower Volga River. That same year, he returned to Moscow to report on his negotiations and to request permission for another pilgrimage. Razin also participated in an expedition in 1663 to the Crimea, which recovered 350 prisoners seized by the Tatars.

Though the Don Cossacks appeared to have good relations with the Russian government, the success of the Romanov Dynasty in consolidating its power was shifting the balance. The Romanov czars curtailed the privileges and liberties of many groups outside the nobility and passed the repressive Law Code of 1649. At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church divided over

the reforms proclaimed by Patriarch Nikon, and the czar levied heavy taxes and penalties against the Old Believers, who resisted these reforms. Price increases fuelled other disturbances, and many of those who protested were exiled to the garrison towns on the middle and lower Volga, where they joined Razin's rebellion.

The specific motives for Razin's uprising remain unclear. A story about an older brother executed by the Russians may be only a myth. Razin nevertheless conceived a dislike for the privileged few and accurately gauged the anger of the people who lived along the Volga against those they viewed as exploiting them.

In 1667, Razin planned an expedition down the Volga to attack the Persian settlements and shipping on the Caspian Sea. He first ambushed a large convoy of riverboats carrying goods owned by the czar, the patriarch, and rich Moscow merchants. Over the next few months, Razin easily overwhelmed the government forces sent to arrest him. Many of the czar's soldiers came over to his side, listening to his promise to treat poor and plain folk as brothers while fighting against the nobles and the rich.

In 1668 and 1669, Razin again attacked the Persians living around the Caspian Sea. A myth of Razin's invulnerability quickly grew. In August 1669, Razin returned to the Volga, loaded with booty and captives. He was greeted with joy by the common people. Many of the poor, both Cossacks and runaway serfs, joined him. Near the end of 1669, Razin began attacking Orthodox churches along the Volga, driving away priests. He also attacked the wealthy officials and nobles of the region, accusing them of oppressing the people. Razin did not attack the czar or his authority, but accused imperial agents of misrepresenting the czar.

In the spring of 1670, Razin led an army pledged to destroy the traitors around the

czar. They captured Tsaritsyn (later Stalin-grad) and the rich city of Astrakhan. The time Razin spent taking the latter city was considered a mistake, because it allowed Czar Aleksei I time to raise forces.

While the peasants supported Razin, and looked out for his army, the nobility united against him. Serfs rose up against their masters, killing them and burning their houses. The revolt became a class war of commoners against nobility. The patriarch denounced Razin as a bandit who had forsaken his faith and turned against God. Razin defeated various government forces sent to defeat him and, in July 1670, began to move his army up the Volga to attack Moscow.

Aleksei assembled his best soldiers under the leadership of Prince Yuri Dolgoruky, an experienced commander. By the time Razin reached the town of Simbirsk, his army totaled 20,000. Prince Ivan Miloslavsky commanded the garrison at Simbirsk, and he pledged not to surrender. For a month, the city held out. Dolgoruky's relieving army arrived on October 1.

In the subsequent battle, Razin's badly trained army was defeated, mostly by artillery fire and disciplined cavalry. Razin escaped, but thousands of his followers were captured and killed. The revolt was brutally put down, with thousands of peasants and Cossacks killed by the nobility. Razin was captured by rival Cossacks in April 1671 and taken to Moscow. After being tortured, Razin was executed on June 16, 1671.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Cossacks; Dolgoruky, Yuri (1099?–1157); Tatars (Mongols)

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Red Guards

Following the March Revolution of 1917, the Russian Empire was on the verge of collapse. Russian soldiers, weaponless, bootless, starving, and dying from exhaustion and exposure, were under a constant barrage by the German army and were forced to retreat and abandon more and more of their motherland. People were dying in the streets

of Moscow due to shortages of food and fuel. Soldiers mutinied in Petrograd. Anarchy reigned in both Moscow and Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was now called), and “the entire bureaucratic machinery of the state dissolved.” Out of this social and political chaos rose a group of armed workers and soldiers known as the Red Guards.

Despite the significant role they were destined to play during the Bolshevik (November) Revolution, the Red Guards did not begin as revolutionaries determined to overthrow the government and rule Russia. They were “simple” factory workers, women and men, who demonstrated for better working conditions, a living wage, and decent houses where they could raise their children. They



A few scattered German civilians watch without emotion as a smart Red Army Infantry outfit marches into the German town of Weissenfels, July 6, 1945. Russians are taking over the territory occupied by American troops as adjustment is made to the occupation's territorial boundaries agreed upon by the Big Three. (United States Army Signal Corps)

were, in many ways, swept along like the rest of Russia in the cataclysmic events between February and October 1917, but most had been politically active prior to the revolution and joined Red Guards' units to defend and promote their beliefs. These paramilitary formations, like many others, were affiliated with both specific factories and with political parties. The largest such formations were created in Moscow and Petrograd.

After Nicholas II abdicated on February 19, 1917, the leaders of the State Duma (parliament) established a provisional government with the cooperation of the liberal and leftist political parties. This new regime formed its own "self-defense units" and "people's militia," as well as incorporated several "workers' squadrons" and committees for public safety patterned after the revolutionary bodies of 1905 and associated with factories and neighborhoods. In April 1917, however, Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia (with German assistance) and denounced cooperation with this government. The Bolsheviks resolved, on April 14, to create their own Red Guards; its charter appeared in *Pravda* two weeks later.

Workers, sailors, and soldiers who had formed and supported the parallel Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies thus often were torn in their loyalties. For those who favored the Bolsheviks and their program of immediate withdrawal from the war, red became the color of the day, the color of revolution. Workers and soldiers marched beneath red banners and wore red armbands. Many joined the Bolshevik Party and pledged to defend the revolution. Enrollment was voluntary, and training often took place at work. By October 1917, perhaps a quarter of a million Russians belonged to Red Guard units, both infantry and mounted. The Petrograd Red Guards commanded by Konstantin Yurev numbered some 30,000.

The Red Guards played a key role in the November Revolution, controlling the streets of Petrograd and storming the Winter Palace. This was their final episode as an independent entity, though Red Guard units continued to serve in transitional functions under the new regime. On December 20, 1917, Lenin formed the Cheka, which served as Soviet state security and took over many Red Guard police functions. In January 1918, the Red Guards officially became members of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Since then, the term *Red Guards* has often been used interchangeably with "Red Army."

John G. Hall

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); *Cheka* (*Chrezvychaynaya komissiya*); February (March) Revolution (1917); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Reinsurance Treaty (1887)

German chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Russia's ambassador to Berlin, Paul Shuvalov, negotiated the Reinsurance Treaty. This was part of a series of negotiations conducted by Bismarck in the 1870s and 1880s to complete the diplomatic isolation of France and to ensure Germany's security.

The agreement was an attempt to continue an alliance between Germany and Russia after the collapse of the Three Emperors' League. It was signed on June 18, 1887, and was to last for three years. Russia insisted that it be kept secret.

In the treaty, Germany and Russia each promised to remain neutral if either should find itself at war with a third great power. Russia would remain neutral unless Germany attacked France, and Germany would remain neutral unless Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. Germany also acknowledged Russia's interest in Bulgaria and promised diplomatic support if the Russians attempted to defend the entrance to the Black Sea, particularly the Straits of the Dardanelles, which gave Russia access to the Mediterranean Sea.

On March 17, 1890, Shuvalov proposed the renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty for six years, and the possibility of making the treaty permanent, but the political situation in Germany was changing. Bismarck submitted his letter of resignation on March 18, 1890, after a dispute with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Leo von Caprivi, the new German chancellor, believed that the treaty contradicted Germany's commitment to Austria-Hungary and that the German government would be greatly embarrassed if the contents of the treaty were ever revealed. Caprivi also thought Germany gained nothing from the treaty, as there was nothing in it to prevent Russia and France from making an alliance. Caprivi therefore refused to renew the treaty, and it was allowed to expire on June 18, 1890. Four years later, Russia allied with France.

Since its existence was made known in 1896 and its contents published in 1918, this treaty has received greater scrutiny than any other negotiated by Bismarck. Some view it as incompatible with the Dual Alliance

and an example of Bismarck's dishonesty, but Bismarck repeatedly informed the Austrians that the alliance did not promise German support of Austrian claims in Bulgaria or any other part of the Balkans. Despite the controversy, the Reinsurance Treaty marked the completion of Bismarck's system of alliances that guaranteed Germany's security until his resignation in 1890.

James Scythes

See also: Franco-Russian Alliance (1894)

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Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918)

Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf was a long-term professional soldier with a reputation for discipline and efficiency. He proved inept, however, while commanding large numbers of men, and he was responsible for one of Russia's biggest disasters of World War I, perhaps due to his personal animosity for another Russian general.

Rennenkampf was born into an aristocratic Russian family of Baltic German descent on April 29, 1854. His birth predestined him for a military career, and he graduated from the Helsingfors (Helsinki) Infantry Cadet School in 1873. After several years of service with the cavalry, Rennenkampf was allowed to attend the prestigious General



Pavel Rennenkampf led Russian troops during the disastrous Battle of Masurian Lakes in 1914. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

Staff Academy in 1882; three years later, he assumed command of a cavalry regiment in the Kiev Military District.

Rennenkampf was a capable officer but much given to drinking, gambling, and womanizing. He received command of the Trans-Baikal Cossacks in 1900 and fought in the relief expedition to Peking (Beijing) during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Moving his forces rapidly, he defeated larger Chinese detachments and captured several important positions with mere handfuls of men.

He was accordingly promoted in rank and responsibility so that in the Russo-Japanese War he commanded a cavalry division and, during the Battle of Mukden, a corps. He performed credibly in some minor engagements, although his ability to handle large formations under stress came into question. General Aleksandr Samsonov, a fellow cavalry commander, believed Rennenkampf had failed to reinforce him at a crucial point during the Battle of Mukden.

After the war, Rennenkampf led the way in suppressing several rebellions, including the Republic of Chita, in Siberia. He rose to full general in 1910 and assumed control of a corps. On the eve of World War I, he was in charge of the Vilna (Vilnius) Military District in anticipation of a major Russian offensive against the Germans.

Following Russia's declaration of war in August 1914, Rennenkampf was entrusted with command of the Russian First Army. His orders were to march directly to Berlin, assisted by Samsonov's Second Army, deployed further south. The Russian high command did not consider in its plans that Rennenkampf and Samsonov were bitter, personal rivals.

The two armies' strategy was a concerted advance westward, with Samsonov inclining northwest, to catch the solitary German Eighth Army stationed in East Prussia in a pincer movement. Rennenkampf crossed the German border on August 17, 1914, and stumbled onto a German corps. In the ensuing fight, the Russians were badly mauled and thrown back to the border with a loss of 3,000 men, but the Germans withdrew.

Collecting his men, Rennenkampf resumed his advance. On August 20, First Army lost another battle against the same German corps, but the German commander panicked and ordered a retreat. This resulted in a change of command in the German forces, putting General Paul von Hindenburg in control of Eighth Army. Hindenburg immediately took to the offensive, despite being badly outnumbered.

Hindenburg perceived that the First and Second Russian armies under Rennenkampf and Samsonov were advancing slowly, in an uncooperative fashion. He adopted a bold strategy, moving his troops facing Rennenkampf's army and rushing them south by rail to envelop Samsonov's army. This was achieved with brilliant speed and efficiency between August 26 and 30. Rennenkampf, opposed by

only a single German cavalry division, failed to advance. Worse, he ignored Samsonov's request for immediate reinforcement.

In the ensuing Battle of Tannenberg, Samsonov's army was annihilated. Hindenburg then redirected his forces north, engaging Rennenkampf's army around the Masurian Lakes during September 9–14. The Russians were completely defeated, but Rennenkampf managed to escape back across the border with most of his army intact.

Despite the disaster, Rennenkampf retained command of First Army, and in fact served under Grand Duke Nikolai in another offensive that November. As he advanced slowly, the Germans launched a counterthrust between the Russian First and Second armies. Rennenkampf had a chance to envelop a German reserve corps, but his dilatory movements allowed them to escape at the Battle of Lodz during November 11–25, 1914.

Rennenkampf's behavior resulted in his removal from command shortly thereafter, and he was called before a commission of inquiry. Amazingly, he resigned from the service without punishment on October 6, 1915, and subsequently served as governor of St. Petersburg. The Russian provisional government arrested Rennenkampf following the March Revolution and levied criminal charges against him, but the Bolsheviks freed him in November 1917.

Rennenkampf moved to Taganrog on the Black Sea. He refused the Bolsheviks' offer of a command in the Red Army in March 1918; they promptly arrested Rennenkampf and executed him on April 1, 1918.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Boxer Rebellion, Russia and (1899–1903); Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Nikolai Nikolae-vich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Samsonov, Aleksandr

Vasilievich (1859–1914); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Repin, Prince Nikolai Vasilievich (1734–1801)

Russian statesman and general.

Born in St. Petersburg on February 28, 1734, Nikolai Repnin followed in his father's footsteps as a soldier and diplomat. He served in the army under his father during the 1748 campaign on the Rhine, and lived for several years thereafter in Germany. In 1763, Czar Peter III appointed him ambassador to Prussia; Czarina Catherine II transferred him to Warsaw that same year.

Repin resigned his post to take part in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, taking an independent command in Moldavia. His forces fought with distinction at Larga and Kagul, and Repnin was appointed supreme commander in Wallachia in 1771. He resigned after quarreling with Pyotr Rumi-antsev, the overall commander, but still participated in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kinardji in 1774. During 1775–1776, Repnin served as Russian envoy to Constantinople.

Repin again commanded Russian forces against the Ottomans in the 1787–1792 war, though politics mitigated his military success. In 1793, he was appointed governor general of Russia's newly acquired

Lithuanian provinces, and Repnin served as commander of the Russian forces that suppressed the rising in Poland that year. Promoted to field marshal in 1796, Repnin was sent on a diplomatic mission to create an anti-French alliance. His failure led to his dismissal from service. Repnin died in Riga on May 1, 1801.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791)

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Revolution of 1905

A series of uprisings and mutinies that erupted across Russia throughout the year of 1905 and culminated in Czar Nicholas II issuing the October Manifesto granting Russia a parliamentary body, the Duma.

Ever-growing discontent with the ruling autocratic system had first emerged during the early 19th century began to boil over by the turn of the century. The long string of Russian defeats against Japan during 1904 only exacerbated the situation. Faced with increasing shortages and hardships caused by a distant and unfamiliar war, Russians became increasingly vocal. Workers at the vital Putilov steel works went on strike in early December 1904, leading to a rash of sympathy strikes. On January 9, 1905, Father Georgy Gapon (who may have been a police spy) led a demonstration of workers in front of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to present a petition to the Czar for better working conditions. The demonstration was met

with a violent reaction from soldiers guarding the Winter Palace, which resulted in 800 deaths. This became infamously known as “Bloody Sunday.”

In the aftermath of “Bloody Sunday,” a wave of riots and general strikes erupted through Russia’s major cities. In St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other urban centers, “soviets” or councils of workers, soldiers, and sailors arose to direct the revolution. In response to the growing crisis, Czar Nicholas II made a public announcement on February 18 of the formation of an elected Duma that would act as an advisory body. The czar intended to contain the situation as quickly as possible so as to be able to concentrate on the ongoing war with Japan. Yet the military situation was not favorable, and the eventual disaster of the Russian defeat would only make the situation worse.

In wake of news of the loss of the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima on May 14, another wave of general strikes and mutinies erupted across Russia. Fierce fighting occurred on the streets of Odessa throughout June. At the same time, offshore, mutiny erupted aboard the battleship *Potemkin* on June 15. Originally inspired by the lack of quality meat aboard, the mutineers soon aligned themselves with the revolutionary strikers in Odessa. Yet any attempts to win over other elements of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as fully coordinate their efforts with revolutionary leaders in Odessa, ended in failure. As a result, the crew of the *Potemkin* sailed toward Romania to escape.

It was around this time in June that nationalist insurrections broke out in non-Russian areas of the empire, seeking independence. Textile workers in Łódź rioted on June 10, inspired by Polish nationalism. A similar rising broke out in Georgia, and temporarily succeeded in driving out Russian authorities. Another wave of nationalist uprisings

occurred in the Baltic. In the end, all such attempts were suppressed by force as Cossack police units and the military remained loyal to the czar.

With the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian army was able to bring in greater numbers of soldiers to suppress internal insurrections. By the end of July, most uprisings were on the decline. It appeared that the fervor of the revolutionary moment had come and gone. By August 19, the first session of the Duma was conducted, yet little was achieved. This lack of results helped spark a surge in revolutionary fervor in September and early October as a new wave of general strikes swept across the country.

The situation had become critical for the czarist regime. Prime Minister Sergei Witte advised Czar Nicholas II that suppressing the uprisings through military force was no longer feasible, and that certain concessions were necessary to restore order. The czar detested Witte, but had returned him to office as the only statesman capable of settling the war with Japan honorably, and he now was forced by Witte's popularity to heed his advice. On October 17, therefore, the czar agreed to the October Manifesto that granted Russia a constitution, certain civil liberties, and an elected parliament with legislative powers.

The promises of the Manifesto helped extinguish many of the general strikes among workers and other civilians; ironically, it also fueled a series of spontaneous mutinies within the Russian army throughout the rest of 1905. One of the first was the mutiny at the naval base at Kronstadt on October 26–27, which was suppressed when reinforcements were brought in sufficient quantity to convince the mutineers to disperse. A few days later, on October 30–31, soldiers and sailors rioted in Vladivostok. This helped spark a wave of mutinies among reserve

units stationed in Manchuria through the middle of November. Mutinies would still occur into 1906, and many were suppressed without violence.

The revolution was not without costs, however; some 13,000–15,000 people were killed during 1905–1906, and some 75,000 imprisoned. The military measures to suppress peasant rebellions in the countryside spurred by the land hunger and mistreatment of serfs were particularly onerous. The noose used to hang peasant rebels became known as a “Stolypin necktie” after the Interior Minister Pyotr Stolypin, who oversaw the campaigns. The czar, moreover, gradually recouped the liberties he had granted under duress in 1905 and thus created a groundswell of mistrust and revolutionary sentiment. The revolutionaries vowed, moreover, that they would not be so easily taken in next time.

Stephen T. Satekiewicz

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Revolutionary Military Council.

See October (November) Revolution (1917)

Revolutions of 1848

A series of social, political, and economic upheavals that spread across Western and Central Europe in 1848, breaking out within a few months of one another and starting in

February. The revolutions did not reach Russia, although from the first of the revolutions in 1848, Czar Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) had worried about their repercussions in Russia. Russia's involvement with the revolutions came primarily in 1848–1849 and especially in Hungary, where Nicholas aggressively deployed troops. Nicholas supported Austria against the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, ordering Russian troops to invade Hungary and repress its new institutions in June 1849.

Though inspired by common ideologies, the Revolutions of 1848 consisted of distinct, separate events. The general cause of the revolutions was the frustration of liberals and nationalists, coupled with an economic setting of depression. Although at the beginning of 1848 no one in Europe thought revolution was imminent, there was in fact a pre-revolutionary insurrection that occurred on January 12, 1848, in Sicily, and over the next month, other warning signs of immense civil strife in other regions of Italy and in France.

By the end of the first week in March 1848, news had reached Saint Petersburg of the overthrow of King Louis Philippe and the proclamation of a republic in France. Nicholas was not surprised. One of the aims of his foreign policy had been to check the spread of revolutionary ideas from France, so Nicholas's first concern was with military preparations. Despite the reservations of his advisers about adding to Russia's financial burdens, he authorized the calling up of army and navy reserves, as well as an increase in military expenditure of 7 million silver rubles. Nicholas announced that, while he did not intend to recognize the new French government, he would not interfere in French affairs, as long as the treaties of 1815 that Russia was instrumental in drafting were respected, including the Holy Alliance.

Nicholas therefore attempted to isolate Russia from revolutionary ideas by limiting

foreign travel. He also established a secret committee to exercise a stricter control of the existing censorship of the press. The committee, which was set up on March 10, 1848, and reconstituted on April 14, would continue its repressive activities for the remainder of Nicholas's reign. These actions were followed by the publication of a manifesto and official commentary in March 1848 proclaiming Russia's rejection of revolution along with an assurance that Russia would not intervene in the affairs of other countries.

Throughout 1848, the Russian government tightened controls on imported publications. Nonetheless, a police search of bookshops in 1849 revealed the presence of 2,581 books that had been banned by Nicholas's reign in one St. Petersburg bookstore alone. Restrictive measures were also introduced in university and secondary education, with the aim of limiting the number of students and ensuring that instruction in such potentially dangerous subjects as history and philosophy was subject to suitable safeguards. On May 5, 1849, nevertheless, members of the Petrashevsky Circle, a literary group in St. Petersburg influenced by Hegelian philosophy and other works of literature that had been banned by Nicholas in Imperial Russia, and whose members included the young novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, were finally arrested after a year's investigation of their allegedly subversive activities. They were sentenced to death, although a pardon from the czar arrived at the last minute.

It was not the czar's intent to act as the policeman of Europe, although in July 1848 he had agreed to the occupation of Moldavia by a small Russian force under General A. O. Duhamel to stem the rebellion there. Nicholas's greatest fear, however, was that the changes in Austria and Prussia would encourage Poles in Poznan and Galicia

to revolt, and that revolution would spread from these provinces to Russian Poland. His reluctant decision to intervene in Hungary came about largely because of the involvement of the Poles in the Hungarian revolt, a fact that the Austrians fully exploited. The movement for Hungarian independence led to a short-lived republican government in Budapest for all Hungarian lands, but there was an insurrection by Croat, Serb, and Transylvanian forces in Hungary that was defeated by Austrian and Russian forces. On April 14, 1849, the chamber announced the deposition of the Habsburgs and proclaimed Hungarian independence.

On May 1, Nicholas made an official announcement of Russian support for Austria in its attempts to regain control of Hungary, and within the month, three Russian armies marched into the empire. The initial Russian force of some 8,000 soldiers was met and defeated by a Hungarian force upon entering Transylvania in April 1849. The Russian III Corps under General Ivan F. Pashkevich then occupied Cracow and Western Galicia as a preliminary measure to intervening in Hungary that May. In all, Nicholas I put some 200,000 troops in the field and kept a further 75,000–80,000 on alert in Congress (Russian) Poland. The Hungarian rebel army numbered roughly 175,000 men, but was facing a like-size Habsburg force under Field Marshal Prince Alfred Windischgrätz approaching simultaneously from the west as well, and was thus outnumbered more than 2–1.

The Hungarians chose to fight near Szegeged, on the southern border, where they could unite with their forces fighting in Serbia. This provided the Austrians and Russians a chance to concentrate as well, however, and they planned a massive pincer movement to crush the rebels. Russian armies under Pashkevich (c. 120,000) and General Pavel K.

Grabbe (c. 80,000) marched south from the Carpathians on June 17, with the Hungarians conducting a fighting retreat.

The Hungarians harassed Pashkevich's army, but were never able to unite their forces and bring the Russians to battle. Throughout the campaign, the Russian army suffered severely from disease, however, especially cholera. Out of 11,871 Russian deaths, only one in 12 was caused by enemy action. It was the Russian cavalry general Friedrich von Rüdiger who accepted the final Hungarian surrender at Vilagos on August 13, 1849. While Czar Nicholas I thus reinforced his reputation as “the policeman of Europe,” it was the Habsburg commanders who carried out fierce reprisals in an attempt to crush the spirit of revolution for good.

Dustin Garlitz

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Holy Alliance (1815); Hungarian Rebellion (1956); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856)

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Riga, Battle of (September 1–3, 1917)

Key battle of World War I on the Eastern Front. On the strategic level, the battle for the Baltic coastal city of Riga effectively eliminated Russia from the war and allowed

Germany to focus the majority of its military resources against the Allies in the West in 1918. On the operational level, it was the war's first successful large-scale penetration and breakthrough. On the tactical level, the Germans for the first time applied on a large scale many of the war-fighting innovations they had developed between 1914 and 1918, foreshadowing the end of the battlefield stagnation that had characterized ground combat in World War I.

Riga was the extreme right anchor of the Russian line, which ran roughly east and west along the Dvina River and was held by the 10.5 divisions of the Russian Twelfth Army under General Vladislav N. Klembovsky. North of the river, the Russian defenses consisted of two parallel positions. The forward position began on the dunes along the riverbank and had three, and in some places four lines of trenches. The rearward position began 2 miles back from the river and had two sets of trench lines. The Russians also heavily fortified several of the islands in the river.

Along the south bank of the river, General of Infantry Oskar von Hutier's Eighth Army had 7.5 divisions deployed along the 80-mile sector from the coast to Jacobstadt. The Russian defenses were oriented to directly repel a German attack against Riga. Hutier, however, planned an attack across the Dvina near Uxkull, about 20 miles east of Riga. Once his men were across the river, Hutier intended that his forces would then maneuver behind Riga and cut off the Russian garrison. Hutier believed that 10 divisions would be necessary for the river crossing, and the German High Command accordingly reinforced Eighth Army with eight more infantry and two cavalry divisions for the operation.

At 9:10 a.m. on September 1, 1917, the German LI Reserve Corps launched the assault across the 200-yard-wide Dvina on a

6-mile front. The 19th Reserve Division on the right and the 2nd Guards Infantry Division on the left crossed in assault boats. In the center, the 14th Bavarian Infantry Division captured and neutralized the heavily fortified Borkum Island before continuing on to the north bank.

Once the three first-echelon divisions were consolidated on the far bank, they quickly overran the forward Russian defensive position. As the lead divisions moved against the rear defensive position, German pioneers finished building pontoon bridges across the Dvina in each of the three divisional attack sectors. Three second-echelon divisions then crossed the river on the bridges and closed up rapidly behind the lead divisions, ready to exploit the breakout from the second defensive positions.

The Russian Twelfth Army began to crumble only three hours into the attack. By the end of the first day, the Germans had six divisions on the far bank in an eight-mile-wide bridgehead. Riga fell late on the afternoon of September 3. The Russians suffered more than 25,000 casualties in the battle, while the Germans sustained only 4,200 casualties. On September 21–22, the German Army again attacked across the Dvina, this time at Jackobstadt on the other end of the Russian line. The two German victories in rapid succession effectively eliminated any Russian military threat to the Baltic sector.

Although Riga initially was regarded as one of the great feats of arms of World War I, some historians in recent years have argued that Riga was not so much captured by the Germans using new tactics as it was given up by a dispirited and broken Russian army.

David T. Zabecki

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Kornilov Rebellion (1917); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Rize Landing (April 7, 1916)

Russian navy's amphibious landing on the Ottoman coast during the Black Sea and Caucasus campaigns. Rize is located on the Black Sea in northwestern Anatolia. Carried out on April 7, 1916, the operation was part of a series of Russian amphibious landings that spring. Rize was a larger version of landings made at Erzurum in February and Atina in March. Commanded by Admiral Nikolai Yudenich, the Rize landing was in support of operations by the Russian army, which was moving through the Ottoman coastal areas toward the Black Sea port of Trabzon. Russian capture of this port would mean completion of the second stage of the Russian campaign on the Caucasian Front and would cement Russian control of the Caspian Sea.

Cognizant of the Allied failure at Gallipoli in 1915, Russian naval planners made certain that the landing at Rize had sufficient naval support. They also selected Rize because its geography and lack of defenses favored a successful operation. Yudenich committed to the operation of the dreadnought *Imperatritsa Maria*, three cruisers, and three improvised seaplane carriers, as well as minesweepers and smaller craft. The Russians had also developed special flat-bottomed landing craft to take the troops ashore.

Indicator nets protected the bay at Rize from submarines. Although the major Russian warships left the area on sighting a submarine, the landing on April 7 was successful with the navy landing all 16,000 troops ashore within nine hours. Within 24 hours, half of the Russian forces were engaged with Ottoman forces. Trabzon fell on April 19.

While it would be wrong to exaggerate the importance of this operation as there was no determined opposition, the landing at Rize helped consolidate gains made by Russia in March, solidified its hold on the Black Sea, and led to an expansion of the navy's coastal support role.

Christopher J. Tudda

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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Rodzianko, Mikhail Vladimirovich (1859–1924)

Russian politician. Born on April 12, 1859, to a family of wealthy landowners in Ekaterinoslav Province, Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzianko received his early education in the elite Corps of Pages and served in the Imperial Guards cavalry. After leaving the service to manage his family's estates, he served in the local zemstvo (assembly), which led to his election to the Duma in 1907. A member of the Octobrist Party, Rodzianko was elected president of the Third

Duma in 1911 and was reelected as president of the Fourth Duma.

As the wartime Duma president, Rodzianko, at heart a constitutional monarchist, grew increasingly pessimistic about the monarchy's prospects for surviving the Great War. He repeatedly urged the replacement of incompetent and corrupt ministers such as Ivan Goremykin and Boris Stürmer, only to be ignored by Czar Nicholas II, who disliked and distrusted him.

Nor could Rodzianko persuade Nicholas to prevent Czarina Alexandra and her amateur advisor Grigory Rasputin from meddling in political decisions. Appalled by the czar's decision to take personal command of the army in 1915, Rodzianko came to believe that the Duma should play a greater political role, but the czar and his ministers rebuffed his efforts.

The outbreak of the March 1917 revolution placed Rodzianko in a difficult position. On the one hand, he realized that the czar's government was hopelessly incapable of carrying on the war effort. On the other, he was essentially conservative and loyal to the monarchical institution. Caught between the revolutionaries and the czar, Rodzianko urged Nicholas to abdicate in favor of his son Aleksei and appoint his younger brother Mikhail regent. By that time, however, the monarchy was already beyond redemption.

Rodzianko was not invited to join the provisional government. He eventually went into exile in Yugoslavia, dying in poverty in Belgrade on January 19, 1924.

John M. Jennings

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Goremykin, Ivan Logginovich (1839–1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916); Stürmer, Boris Vladimirovich (1848–1917)

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Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968)

Marshal of the Soviet Union, marshal of Poland, deputy prime minister of Poland, and Polish minister of national defense (1949–1956). Born December 9, 1896, in Velikie Luki, Russia, the son of a Polish railway worker and a Russian mother, Konstantin Rokossovsky moved with his family to Warsaw in 1900. Inducted into the Russian army at the beginning of World War I, he rose to the rank of sergeant, and in November 1917, became a member of the Red Guard. During the Russian Civil War, he fought in Siberia, the Far East, and Manchuria with the Reds (Bolsheviks).

Rokossovsky completed the cavalry short course in 1923 and the Frunze Military Academy in 1929. He then successively commanded a regiment, a brigade, and a cavalry division. During 1935–1937, he commanded V Cavalry Corps. He was arrested in 1937 and accused of spying for Poland and Japan. Tortured and almost executed on two occasions, he was released from prison in March 1940 and resumed command of V Cavalry Corps and later IX Mechanized Corps. Beginning in August 1941, he was commander of Sixteenth Army, comprised entirely of penal battalions, in the defense of Moscow.

Rokossovsky was seriously wounded in February 1942 and, upon recovery, served as commander with the following fronts: Briansk, Donsk, Central, Here and next, Belorussian, 1st Belarussian, and 2nd Belarussian. He took part in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the liberation of Ukraine, the taking of East Prussia, and the Berlin Campaign. Promoted to colonel general in January 1943, he became a full general that April and a marshal of the Soviet Union in June 1944.

Rokossovsky then commanded Soviet forces in Poland (1945–1949). In November 1949, Soviet leader Josef Stalin arranged Rokossovsky's appointment as Poland's minister of national defense, deputy prime minister of Poland, and member of the Polish politburo. His exceptional political position enabled him to make decisions without consulting other members of the Polish government. During 1950–1954, he increased the size of the army by almost 200 percent and carried out a thorough modernization effort. He also introduced military regulations based on the Soviet model. He removed officers from the prewar army, Home Army, and Polish Armed Forces in the West, and he appointed Soviet officers to all of the most important positions.

In October 1956, Rokossovsky placed part of the Polish Army on combat alert and ordered several detachments to enter Warsaw. When Władysław Gomułka returned to power, therefore, Rokossovsky was not reelected to the politburo but recalled from his posts.

In November 1956, he left Poland and became deputy minister of defense of the Soviet Union and the chief inspector of the Soviet Army. In 1957, he assumed command of the Transcaucasian Military District, but returned to his post as deputy defense minister in 1958. In March 1962, he moved to the Group of General Inspectors of the Soviet Army, although he was already effectively



Konstantin Rokossovsky survived the Great Purges to become one of the Soviet Union's ablest field commanders in World War II. (Getty Images)

retired. Rokossovsky died in Moscow on August 3, 1968. His ashes are buried in the Kremlin wall.

Paweł Piotrowski

See also: Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Frunze Academy; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Red Guards; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Romania Campaign (August–September 1944)

With 1.2 million men under arms in 1944, Romania fielded the third largest Axis military force in Europe. By mid-August 1944, Romania’s battered troops held the Traian defensive line from the headwaters of the Sereth to the Dniester. The Fourth Army guarded the northern approaches to Bessarabia, and Third Army defended the lower Dniester. On August 20, a 10-hour artillery barrage from 11,000 Soviet guns opened the Battle of Jassy-Kishinev. The Romanian 5th Infantry Division, pulverized by the bombardment, was quickly finished off by the Soviet Twenty-Seventh Army. Soviet tanks of the Fifty-Second Army annihilated the Romanian 7th Infantry Division and took Jassy. Romanian aircraft flew 161 sorties as ground troops counterattacked in futile efforts to stem the tide. Meanwhile, the German 20th Panzer Division fled, taking with it every Romanian tank it could locate.

On August 20, waves of Soviet planes broke through heavy anti-aircraft defenses protecting Romania’s harbor at Constanta, sinking the torpedo boat *Naluca* and damaging three other ships, including the destroyer *Marasesti*. Romania capitulated three days later, and by September 5, the entire Romanian navy was in Soviet hands. In an attempt to maintain Romania’s independence, its figurehead monarch, young King Michael (Mihai)—aided by several army officers and armed, Communist-led civilians—had staged a coup

on August 23, arresting head of government General Ion Antonescu. That same night, Michael announced by radio that Romania was withdrawing from the Axis alliance.

German troops tried to restore control by seizing the capital of Bucharest, but they were repulsed by the Royal Bodyguard supported by an armored platoon. Ninth Army enveloped the remaining Germans outside Bucharest on August 27, taking 7,000 prisoners. An outraged Adolf Hitler ordered his top commando, Otto Skorzeny, to lead a parachute battalion in a rescue of Antonescu. The plan was foiled when Antonescu was handed over to the Red Army and hurriedly spirited off to Moscow. Some 20,000 Germans fought to hold the *Ploesti* oil fields, but Soviet armor and Romania’s 4th Parachute Battalion secured the area. Romanian pilots also shot down 24 German planes.

The Red Army entered Bucharest on August 31. On September 12, Michael signed a formal armistice in which he agreed to wage war on Germany and Hungary, to repeal anti-Jewish laws, to ban Fascist groups, and to pay \$300 million in goods and raw materials to the Soviet Union. Moscow calculated those goods at reduced 1938 prices, making the actual reparations closer to \$2 billion.

On August 28, Romania’s 1st Armored Division fought its way through the Ghimes Pass, eliminated a German penetration, and seized a bridgehead for the Soviet XXIV Guards Corps near Reghin (Szászrégen). Romanian troops then blocked a Hungarian attempt to seize the Carpathian passes on September 7. A few days later, First Army helped stop a German-Hungarian thrust out of Yugoslavia, but on October 26, the Soviets reduced the size of the Romanian army and ordered most of its divisions to be kept at the front outside the country, clearing the way for a Communist takeover.

Gerald D. Swick

See also: World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Romanian Campaign of 1916

Upon their declaration of war against the Central Powers on April 27, 1916, the Romanians mobilized four large armies, which with reserves, numbered as many as 700,000 men. The First Army, commanded by General Ioan Culcer, consisted of three infantry divisions with three infantry divisions in reserve. General Alexandru Averescu commanded the Second Army of four infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two infantry divisions held in reserve. The Third Army, under the command of General Mihail Aslan, consisted of six infantry divisions. General Constantine Prezan commanded the Fourth Army of three infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and one infantry division held in reserve.

Three of these armies were positioned on the Transylvanian frontier—two in Wallachia and one farther north in Moldavia—while the remaining army guarded the Danube and

the Dobrudja salient on the Black Sea facing Bulgaria. About 350,000 Romanian troops, although poorly trained, inexperienced, and short of equipment, marched into eastern Transylvania with little difficulty.

Russian troops pushed from the Kirilibaba Pass in Galicia in early September and made contact with the Romanian right on September 11. The combination of early snow in the Carpathians and the diversion of troops north to battles around Halicz, however, stalled the offensive a few days later, crippling any further movement into northern Transylvania.

Austro-Hungarian forces, comprising roughly 30,000 reservists, militia, and local police, meanwhile fell back in the face of the Romanian advance, losing control of the frontier railway and the important city of Kronstadt (Brasov). At the same time, however, the excellent Austrian radio-intercept service began decrypting Romanian message traffic, made easier by the lack of telephone lines and carelessness by Romanian code clerks and telegraphers. This intelligence allowed the Central Powers to discern plans for future Romanian movements and position blocking forces.

In the south, meanwhile, the Entente forces at Salonika tried without success to pin down the Bulgarian army. Faced with strong Bulgarian forces in the east, a combined Serbian and French attack advanced up the Tchernava Valley in early September. Supported by diversionary British attacks on the Struma River, these forces ground their way north, eventually liberating Monastir in November. While ultimately successful, this slow, set-piece offensive failed to divert Bulgarian troops south or prevent Central Powers' operations on the Danube.

The first countermove against Romania came on September 1, a mere four days after that nation's declaration of war, when German field marshal August von Mackensen

led a 10-division force of Bulgarians, Austro-Hungarians, Ottomans, and Germans across the Bulgarian frontier into the Dobrudja. Supported by efficient air reconnaissance units as well as an Austrian radio-intercept section in Sofia, the attackers destroyed two Romanian divisions and drove the remainder back to the Tchernavoda-Constanza rail line. Three Russian divisions under Andrei Zaionchkovsky, supported by three Romanian divisions from Transylvania, stabilized this defensive line by the end of September. This maneuver protected the important port of Constanza.

Meanwhile to the northwest, former chief of staff of the German Army General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn arrived in Transylvania in early September and took command of the new Ninth Army, formed from troops rushed east in more than 1,500 trains from France. As these divisions were positioned, the Austrians continued to withdraw into the interior of Transylvania, drawing the Romanians farther into the mountains. Falkenhayn's headquarters kept track of the Romanian advance through situation reports, provided every three hours by the Austrian intercept service. Falkenhayn now prepared a counterattack, later called the "judgment of God."

Falkenhayn's first move occurred in mid-September with an attack against the Romanian First Army near the Danube, pushing the invaders from the city of Hartzeg. Although the Romanians clung to the Vulkan Pass, the advance cleared the flank for the main counterattack on September 22. Bavarian Jaegers outflanked their opponents near Hermannstadt (Sibiu) on September 26, took the Roter Turm (Red Tower) Pass, and forced the Romanians to withdraw in some disorder. Falkenhayn then turned east again and on October 4 hit the flank of the Romanian Second Army, then pushing toward Schassburg

(Sigisoara) to the north. With their supply lines in danger, the Romanians fell back toward Moldavia, abandoning the vital rail crossroads at Kronstadt on October 9.

The initial blows against Romanian troops revealed several advantages possessed by the Central Powers. In addition to much better operational intelligence, Falkenhayn's forces possessed superior artillery and greater freedom of movement. The Romanians were now pinned in a deep crescent position in an attempt to hold the Carpathian passes. The Austrian intercept service also knew that the reserve Romanian troops were deployed covering the railroad passes before Ploiesti in the center of the line, so Falkenhayn quickly planned another outflanking offensive.

Reinforced with heavy artillery, the Ninth Army's right wing pushed through the Vulkan Pass in mid-October. Although halted by tenacious Romanian resistance in the Jiu Valley, Falkenhayn regrouped and launched a five-division attack on November 10. Within a week, superior numbers and artillery crushed the Romanian defense, and German cavalry advanced into the Danube plain on a wide front. Two days later, Mackensen, supported by a flotilla of monitors and gunboats, began crossing the Danube in force at Sistovo and Belene; this was completed by November 25. Bulgarian cavalry detachments soon roamed the countryside, sacking towns and wreaking havoc in southern Wallachia.

With the Romanian left flank crumbling, the strong forces guarding the central frontier passes fell back to avoid encirclement. Many disintegrated as the Romanian peasant conscripts deserted and went home. The remnants of two armies, supported by a single Russian division railed south in support, tried to defend Bucharest but were broken on the Arges River in early December.

Mackensen's force entered the Romanian capital of Bucharest on December 6.

Meanwhile, Falkenhayn's main force pushed through the central passes and advanced on Ploesti, the center of the Romanian oil region. In response, Colonel John Norton-Griffiths, a member of the British Parliament connected with British intelligence, and the many American engineers employed in the oil fields, set about destroying the wells, refineries, stores, and fuel tanks on December 5.

Covered by forlorn rearguard actions, the broken remnants of the Romanian army retired behind the Sereth River in Moldavia. The Central Powers continued their advance, sweeping through eastern Wallachia in late December. Although the important railhead at Focsani was taken in January 1917, winter stalled any future operations on the Sereth or in the Moldavian passes.

The campaign had been a disaster for Romania, with 160,000 men killed, wounded, or missing and another 150,000 taken prisoner. Romania had also lost the Dobrudja and Wallachia. Penned up in Moldavia and abandoned by Russia when that nation collapsed into revolution in 1917, the army did well to maintain its position in the field until the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest in May 1918, by which Romania left the war. Although the Central Powers were forced to extend their Eastern Front to the Black Sea (adding 250 miles to the line), the successful campaign helped protect Bulgaria, removed a major threat to the Austro-Hungarian flank, and opened an improved communications line to the Ottoman Empire.

Timothy L. Francis

See also: Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Zaionchkovsky, Andrei Medarovich (1862–1926)

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Romodanovsky, Grigory Grigorevich (mid-1630s–1682)

State and military leader of 17-century Muscovite Russia, and a boyar of noble origins. A prince of the Starodubsky-Romodanovsky family, Grigory Romodanovsky was the eighth son of diplomat and military leader Grigory Petrovich Romodanovsky. Romodanovsky was married and had two sons, Andrei and Mikhail. His career was shaped by the imperial aspirations of Muscovy to control Ukraine. His military achievements are associated with two major conflicts: the Thirteen Years' War (1654–1667) between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; and the Russo-Turkish War of 1672–1681, in which Muscovy fought the Ottoman Empire supported by the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian forces.

Both conflicts were ignited by the terms of the Treaty of Pereiaslavl (1654), which transferred Ukraine from Kracow to Moscow, and Romodanovsky first appears in historical records related to that treaty. In 1653, as a *stolnik*, he served in a Russian diplomatic delegation headed by boyar Vasily Buturlin and participated in the *Pereiaslavskaya Rada*, the council where the

treaty was signed. With the commencement of the Thirteen Years' War, Romodanovski headed a number of military operations, first as a *golova* (head of a regiment), and later as a *voevoda* (military commander). He participated in the Smolensk Campaign in spring 1654, commanding one of the czar's regiments, and in taking Dubrovna in August that same year. In 1655, Romodanovsky took part in the failed siege of Lviv (Lvov) in conjunction with the forces of Buturlin and the Ukrainian Cossacks led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

In September 1655, Romodanovsky allied with Cossack commander Grigory Lesnitsky to defeat the army of Polish hetman Stanislaw Pototsky at Slonigorodok. Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich subsequently appointed Romodanovsky field commander of Belgorod. After 1658, Romodanovsky also headed the territorial military administration of the town, which was the key point in Muscovy's defenses on the Ukrainian border.

During 1657–1659, Romodanovsky led a series of military operations in Ukraine in response to the attempts of a new hetman Ivan Vigovsky to join the Commonwealth. In 1659, Vigovsky resigned, and Khmelnytsky's son Yuri was elected hetman. Romodanovsky participated in the 1659 Pereiaslavl Council that constructed the *Pereyslvaskie stat'i* (Pereiaslav Articles), which specified the limitations of a hetman's powers. In 1660, the czar met the *voevoda* and his troops as they entered Moscow, granted Romodanovsky a fur coat, a jeweled goblet, and a raise in salary for his service. Romodanovsky then returned to Belgorod.

In 1662, Romodanovsky returned to Ukraine in response to unrest caused by Khmelnytsky's surrender to the Poles. Romodanovsky allied with Yakim Somko, then acting hetman of Russian Ukraine, and led

military operations at Kaniv (1662) and Gluhiv (1664). During the siege of Gluhiv, Romodanovsky and Somko forced the Poles, led by King Jan II Casimir, to retreat with heavy losses. In recognition of Romodanovsky's loyalty, Aleksei Mikhailovich elevated him to boyar. After a three-year stay in Moscow, Romodanovsky returned to Belgorod in 1668. In the next years, he successfully prevented the spread of the Stepan Razin rebellion (1670–1671) on the territory under control of his regiment.

Romodanovsky's achievements during the Russo-Turkish War (1672–1681) are associated with the four campaigns to seize Chigirin (Chyhyryn), a strategic fort that served as a capital of the hetmanate. The first campaign began with the unsuccessful 1672 siege of Chigirin held by the forces of Pyotr Doroshenko, who allied with the Ottomans and the Tatars against the Russians. The joint forces of Romodanovsky and Ivan Samoilovich, the hetman of Left-bank (Russian) Ukraine, returned to Chigirin in 1676, took over the fort, and captured Doroshenko.

The Ottomans led two campaigns to regain the fort. In 1677, the Ottomans, headed by Ibrahim Pasha, took a brief possession of Chigirin before retreating under the attack of Romodanovsky and Samoilovich. In 1678, the Ottoman army, led by the Grand Vizir Kara-Mustafa, once again had a short-lived victory over the fort but retreated with heavy losses after battles with the Russian troops. The defeat led the Ottoman Empire to sign the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, ending its attempts to conquer Ukraine, in 1681.

At the end of the Chigirin campaigns, Romodanovsky was recalled to Moscow to the court of the Czar Fyodor Alekseevich (r. 1676–1682). In January 1682, he participated in the Court Council that abolished *mestnichestvo* and supported military

reforms. A few months later, Romodanovsky witnessed the death of Fyodor Alekseevich, which sparked *Streletski Bunt* (the *Streltsy Uprising*) in Moscow. Romodanovsky was killed during the rising on May 15 as one of the boyars supporting the Naryshkin family against the Miloslavsky clan for the Russian throne.

Romodanovsky represented a rare new type of a military commander in the Muscovite system that revolved around the principles of *mestnichestvo*, where military and political appointments rested upon nobility of origin. His career was built upon personal achievements of an experienced soldier, talented military commander, and a successful diplomat.

Ulia Popova

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Khmelnytsky, Bohdan (1595–1657); Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657); Periaslavl, Treaty of (1654); Razin, Stepan (ca. 1630–1671); Russo-Turkish War (1676–1681); *Streltsy* Rising (May–August 1682); Thirteen Years' War (Russo-Polish War, First Northern War, War for Ukraine; 1654–1667)

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Rostov, Battle for (November 17–30, 1941)

On clearing the Ukraine, German field marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South continued its advance east and south. Barring its way was the Soviet city of Rostov on the Sea of Azov at the mouth of the Don River. Rostov was the gateway to the Caucasus Mountains, the Soviet oil fields to the south, and the road to Persia, through which Britain and the United States were to supply the Red Army.

Between September 29 and October 13, 1941, Rundstedt's armies overran the coal- and iron-rich Donets Basin region, where 20 percent of Soviet steel was produced. They also forced the Mius River and captured Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. General Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army captured Kharkov on October 24. Rain and mud slowed the German movement, however. The Soviets were thus able to evacuate Rostelmash, a large agricultural machinery plant at Rostov, despite German bombing.

To counter the German advance, the Soviet Southern Front (army group) under Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko had recently been reinforced. Cherevichenko had at his disposal the Thirty-Seventh Army and the Fifty-Sixth Independent Army. On November 9, he submitted a plan for an attack against the concentration of German forces in the Rostov area on November 17. Soviet leader Josef Stalin approved the plan but refused to commit the Southern Front.

On November 17, Cherevichenko's forces struck Rundstedt's spearhead, First Panzer

Army, some 40 miles north of Rostov. Timoshenko had hoped to draw the Germans away from Rostov, but this failed, and Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen's III Panzer Corps drove on Rostov, entering the city's northern suburbs on November 19. On November 21, the 1st SS Panzer Division captured Rostov. But a gap had opened between the German forces and First Panzer Army withdrew from Rostov on November 22, only to have German army commander Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch insist Rostov be held.

On November 28, Cherevichenko's Southern Front forces composed of 21 divisions of the Thirty-Seventh and Ninth armies drove into the rear of III Panzer Corps, which was exhausted and seriously short of supplies, manpower, and equipment. The Soviets then succeeded at getting a bridgehead across the iced-over Don on the southern outskirts of Rostov. Night crossings reinforced the Soviet bridgehead, despite German opposition. By November 29, Soviet units had cleared Rostov, which was heavily damaged and burning as a result of German demolitions. By December 2, the Germans had withdrawn behind the Mius River, 45 miles west of Rostov. The battle marked the first serious setback for the Germans since the start of Operation BARBAROSSA (June 22).

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich (1895–1970)

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Rote Kappelle (Red Orchestra; 1941–1942)

German resistance organization. A group of loosely affiliated intellectuals and civil servants united only by their opposition to Nazism, the Rote Kappelle (Red Orchestra) became a Soviet espionage tool. Many of the members, such as Adam Kuckhoff, were longtime Communists or Communist sympathizers. Some, such as Arvid Harnack and his American wife, Mildred Fish, had previously been Soviet agents. Others, such as Harro Schulze-Boysen, merely opposed Nazism.

Schulze-Boysen's opposition to the Nazis dated from late 1932, and he was sent to a concentration camp in April 1933. Influential family contacts not only arranged his release but also secured him a position on the intelligence staff in the Air Force Ministry. In 1936, Schulze-Boysen passed information about Luftwaffe activities in Spain to the Soviet Embassy. Though the intermediary was arrested, the Gestapo found no evidence of the spy ring Schulze-Boysen had created, and the group resumed copying and disseminating anti-Nazi leaflets in Germany. The group dissolved in 1938.

Harnack, who had spied for the Soviet Union from his post in the Economics Ministry since August 1935, broke contact during the Great Purges. In September 1940, however, he sent a message warning that an attack on the Soviet Union was imminent, and he established a network of some 60 agents. Harnack had also been in touch with U.S. intelligence since 1938. He insisted that resistance to Adolf Hitler had to take priority over ideology. His contacts included not only industrial leaders but also several

military and political figures later involved in the July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler.

In early 1941, Harnack persuaded Schulze-Boysen to cooperate in passing information to the USSR. Schulze-Boysen was then employed on the Luftwaffe operational staff engaged in planning Operation BARBAROSSA, the German attack on the Soviet Union. This recruitment completed the organizational triad that became the Red Orchestra.

Each man headed a separate network. Kuckhoff, an author, wrote pamphlets and served as liaison for the three groups. Most information gleaned concerned the impending attack on the Soviet Union. As with the numerous other warnings that reached Soviet dictator Josef Stalin though, this vital intelligence was ignored.

Operation BARBAROSSA forced the group to rely on wireless transmissions. None of the members had been properly trained in wireless techniques, however, so Moscow sent an agent to rectify the situation. The German *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD, Security Service) intercepted his orders, and in June 1942, it broke the group's code. The Schulze-Boysen Group, as it was also known, continued to send reports, and also wrote and distributed anti-Nazi pamphlets. In August 1942, when it became apparent that Schulze-Boysen knew the codes were compromised, the SD arrested 119 persons connected with the Red Orchestra. Fifty-five of them, including Mildred Fish-Harnack and 18 other women, were executed for their activities.

Although the Red Orchestra had little immediate impact, it did prove that opposition to Hitler had existed in Germany. Fish-Harnack, though little known in the United States, became a heroine in the Communist pantheon, and the Red Orchestra was a staple in the founding myth of the German Democratic Republic.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)

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Rotmistrov, Pavel Alekseevich (1901–1982)

Soviet army marshal and commander of Fifth Guards Tank Army. Born at Skovorovo in the Kalinin Oblast, Russia, on July 6, 1901, Pavel Rotmistrov was too young to participate in World War I. He joined the Red Army in 1919, fought in the Russian Civil War, and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1931. Promoted to major general in June 1940, Rotmistrov was chief of staff of III Motorized Corps in the Baltic Military District when the German army invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. In September 1941, he took command of VII Tank Corps, attached to the Northwest Front, and participated in the defense of Moscow in October.

Rotmistrov was then transferred with his corps to the Leningrad area. As a result of its exemplary performance there, VII Tank Corps was renamed the III Guards Corps in January 1942. Promoted to lieutenant general, Rotmistrov commanded a tank corps in the Battle of Stalingrad, and in December 1942, he halted German major general Erhard Raus's attempt to reach the trapped German

Sixth Army. In the subsequent Soviet counter-offensive, Rotmistrov had charge of a mechanized group that outfought German general Hermann Hoth's Fourth *Panzer* Army.

In February 1943, Rotmistrov assumed command of the newly formed Fifth Guards Tank Army. When *Stavka* (the Soviet High Command) assembled a strategic reserve in April 1943, Marshal Ivan Konev's Steppe Military Front (army group), Rotmistrov's army was included. Thereafter, *Stavka* would utilize this force in crisis situations or as needed in preparation for Soviet offensives. Rotmistrov was a keen student of armored warfare tactics, and he also took on the responsibility of training all armored forces of this reserve.

Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army was part of Marshal Nikolai Vatutin's Voronezh Front. He then took part in the largest tank battle of the war, at Prokhorovka near Kursk. From July 10–12, Rotmistrov's 850 tanks successfully held off attacks by German lieutenant general Paul Hausser's II SS *Panzer* Corps of three divisions. Although many of his own tanks were outgunned by German armor with 88-millimeter guns, Konev was able to offset this disadvantage by ordering that his crews close as far as possible before engaging the Germans.

In August 1943, Fifth Guards Tank Army was redeployed to Marshal Konev's Second Ukrainian Front to take part in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Rotmistrov was promoted to colonel general in October 1943. Then, at the beginning of 1944, the Fifth Guards Tank Army was transferred to the Soviet Second Belorussian Front, where it participated in the Kirovograd (January 8), Korsun-Shevchenkovsky (January 24–February 17), and Uman (March 5) operations.

In February 1944, Rotmistrov was promoted to the newly created rank of marshal of armored forces. *Stavka* placed his army at the disposal of Marshal Ivan Cherniakhovsky's

Third Belorussian Front to take part in Operation BAGRATION. So vital was Rotmistrov to the successful outcome of this Soviet plan to destroy German Army Group Center that Josef Stalin personally urged Lazar Kaganovich, head of railways, and General of the Army Andrei Vasilievich Khrulev, head of home front services, to guarantee that Fifth Guards Tank Army would be in position for the start date of June 22, 1944. At the end of the war, Rotmistrov's forces took part in the drive on Berlin from the south.

In 1953, Rotmistrov resigned from the General Staff, but he remained within that institution as a professor of war sciences and theory. Between 1954 and 1964, he was chief of the Military Academy for Armored Forces, and in April 1962, he was named the first chief marshal of Soviet Armored Forces. From 1964 to 1968, he was deputy minister of defense, and he was appointed inspector general for the Ministry of Defense in June 1968. He also wrote a number of studies on armored warfare. During ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of the end of war, Rotmistrov was awarded his second decoration as Hero of the Soviet Union. He retired to his birthplace, where he died on April 16, 1982.

Neville Panthaki and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BAGRATION, Operation; Cherniakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich (1906–1945); Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

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Rozhestvensky (Rozhdestvensky), Zinovy Petrovich (1848–1909)

Russian naval commander who led the Russian Baltic Fleet to its demise at Tsushima.

The son of a doctor, Zinovy Rozhestvensky was born November 11, 1848 in St. Petersburg and joined the navy in 1865. He graduated from the Russian Naval Academy in 1868 and from the Artillery Academy in 1873. Rozhestvensky saw action in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) as commander of a torpedo boat and then a cruiser. He earned the St. George Cross for engaging a Turkish warship, but later admitted reports of the action had been falsified; he was subsequently sent to advise the Bulgarian navy on gunnery tactics. In 1885, Rozhestvensky was appointed naval attaché to London. He returned to Russia in 1892 to command the cruiser *Vladimir Monomakh* and, after earning promotion to captain, *Pervenets*.

By 1902, Rozhestvensky was chief of gunnery training for the Russian Baltic Fleet, where he impressed the czar during fleet exercises. Czar Nicholas II appointed Rozhestvensky aide-de-camp later that year, with a subsequent promotion to rear admiral. In March 1903, Nicholas appointed him chief of the main naval staff and, after the Russo-Japanese War broke out, added the post of commander of the Second Pacific Squadron. His task was to fit out and prepare the ships of the Baltic Fleet for a trip around the world to relieve the Russian outpost at Port Arthur.

Rozhestvensky opposed the plan from the outset. He felt he was given insufficient time to prepare—a fact reflected in

the Dogger Bank Incident (October 21–22, 1904), where panicky gunners opened fire on British fishing trawlers off the English coast—and that the Third Pacific Squadron, comprised of older ships, was nothing more than an anchor. Aloof and distant by nature, Rozhestvensky left Madagascar without informing anyone, which some have interpreted as an attempt to lose the unwanted squadron. He was equally uncommunicative as the doomed fleet approached Port Arthur, and his ships were strung out in a long, disjointed line. The Japanese took advantage, crossing the T and pouring devastating fire into the slower, Russian vessels.

Rozhestvensky's flagship, the battleship *Kniaz Suvorov*, took several direct hits, and Rozhestvensky received a serious head wound. Transferred to the destroyer *Bedovii*, Rozhestvensky was still unconscious when the ship was captured on May 27. He returned to St. Petersburg after the war and faced a court martial. Rozhestvensky took full responsibility for Tsushima, but was acquitted on grounds he had been unconscious. He retired in 1906, and died in St. Petersburg three years later, a sick and broken man.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Port Arthur; Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

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Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796)

Russian general and Czarina Catherine II's most successful military commander. As a strategist, Rumiantsev moved his forces efficiently, keeping his troops as far forward as possible between campaigning seasons, thus avoiding the wastage of a long march from winter quarters. Tactically, he developed innovative formations, including hollow divisional squares interspersed with cavalry and artillery, sacrificing some firepower to provide all-around defense and mutual support against enemy light cavalry. Rumiantsev organized and disciplined his troops to deliver potent shock action through bayonet attacks, especially at night, and emphasized aimed fire by both infantry and artillery. He also proved an effective military administrator, reorganizing and resupplying his forces in the field, as required.

Rumiantsev's methods showed some Prussian influence. He served as an attaché in the Russian embassy in Berlin, and he led his early commands against Prussia in the Seven Years War (1756–1763). While he appreciated Western military thought, he did not allow himself to become too impressed with the overly geometrical and "scientific" thinking about war that arose in the West, and he rejected Prussian-style heavy cavalry as unsuitable to warfare in Russia. Throughout his life, he read and reflected deeply on his chosen profession, including the relationship of politics to war.

Rumiantsev's greatest successes came in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774. In 1770, alone he won major battles at Riabaia Mogile, the Large River, and Kagul, with the latter being his masterpiece. After some feckless negotiations, Catherine granted Rumiantsev substantial military and political freedom of action, and in 1774, he led his army across

the Danube River, where his subordinate, General Aleksandr Suvorov, defeated the Ottomans at Kozludzha, leaving them little choice but to grant substantial concessions in the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774).

Rumiantsev had a notably affable style of leadership. While he used corporal punishment and sharp reprimands when he felt them necessary, he also used promotions and praise to good effect. He expended some effort in getting to know his men, remembering their names and treating them with courtesy, without ever becoming too familiar. This contrasts with his personality; Rumiantsev had a dry, detached, or even selfish temperament. Reputedly, he once failed to recognize his own son when the young man arrived on an unannounced visit. Rumiantsev then suggested the young man find a friend with whom to stay, rather than offering him shelter. He accumulated significant wealth and influence from his military successes, and lived a comfortable life when not in the field, building or renovating multiple great houses, and maintaining a troupe of entertainers.

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See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Cavalry; Kagul (Cahul), Battle of 1770; Kozludzha (Kuludzha), Battle of (June 20, 1774); Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Larga, Battle of the (July 7, 1770); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Russia and Arab-Israeli War (1956)

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the strategic Suez Canal, sparking a major crisis in the Middle East. The United States had long recognized the importance of allies in this region. The Soviet Union, under the new leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, also began to appreciate Arab nationalism as a potential asset. Nasser in turn had been manipulating the two superpowers for a number of years in an attempt to secure arms and finances. The Egyptian leader seized the canal when the U.S. Congress (and Great Britain) failed to pass legislation to fund the High Dam at Aswan along the Nile River. Khrushchev was impressed with Nasser's defiance. When that defiance led to war with Israel on October 29, however, the Soviets hesitated.

The Soviet response was delayed for two reasons. First, the Soviet military was occupied with a Hungarian uprising. More important, the Russians believed U.S. opposition to the war was mere rhetoric and it stood firmly behind the Anglo-Franco-Israeli coalition. American opposition was soon verified through intercepted embassy cables in Moscow, and further substantiated by U.S. secretary of state John F. Dulles, who condemned the war at the United Nations.

Khrushchev therefore launched an audacious diplomatic scheme, sending letters to the aggressor countries threatening military action, which implied a nuclear strike. At the same time, the Soviet leader suggested a joint Soviet-U.S. peace mission. Although rejected by the United States, the mere suggestion angered the Anglo-French-Israeli tripartite. On November 5, 1956, Khrushchev publically announced that Soviet nuclear missile launches were an option if a

cease-fire was not reached. Hostilities halted two days later.

From the outset, the Anglo-French-Israeli coalition assumed that with the Russians bogged down in Hungary there would be no intervention in Egypt, which was viewed as the most Soviet-friendly state in the Middle East. The threat of nuclear weapons allowed Russia to keep troops in Hungary and still apply pressure to stop the attack on Egypt. The fact that the cease-fire was established shortly after Khrushchev's public threat of nuclear attack gave the perception of a profound Soviet influence in stopping the crisis.

In reality, it was behind-the-scenes pressure from the United States that halted the invasion. Nasser admitted as much. Ironically, after resolving the crisis, the United States lost influence in the region, while Russia benefitted. The perception of a Soviet nuclear threat compelling a cease-fire boded well for Soviet relations within the Middle East.

Khrushchev considered his handling of the Suez Crisis one of his greatest diplomatic victories over the West. He defended his actions even in October 1964, when the Presidium was about to oust him from office. The Suez crisis marked Khrushchev's realization that a nuclear threat was just as powerful as a nuclear strike.

William E. Whyte III

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Suez Crisis (1956)

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Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

The Russian Civil War not only encompassed military actions but also had consequences for the international, economic, and social development of the new Russian Soviet structure.

The Russian Civil War began with the Bolshevik uprising in Moscow under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin. His forces were able to defeat General Krasnov's Cossacks outside the city limits and ended resistance inside Moscow. Lenin immediately

began setting up the Soviet (Bolshevik) state. The monarchists or "Whites" under the leadership of General Anton Denikin, General Pyotr Wrangel, and Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, having fled, began forming their resistance to the "Reds." They did not have a unified plan, and each group followed its own agenda. Russia was now divided, still at war with the Central Powers, and faced a complete collapse of industrial and agricultural production.

The Reds formed a Military Revolutionary Committee from the sailors and soldiers, coupled with factory workers and urban proletariat that formed the nucleus of the Red Guards. They were reinforced by the elite Latvian Rifle Division. These forces were



Armed Bolshevik revolutionaries reorganize in Petrograd in 1918 at the outset of the Russian Civil War. (Edgar Allen Forbes, *Leslie's Photographic Review of the Great War*, 1919)

under the control of Leon Trotsky, who built a conventional army with former czarist officers and military commissars to countersign orders and carry out political education among the troops. From the outset of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks controlled the urban centers and the railway network, and had a larger force than the White armies.

As the anti-Bolshevik forces organized in Ukraine and Siberia, Lenin realized they could not face the Central Powers and the threat of the White movement and began negotiating a settlement with the Germans. In January 1918, the Ukrainian Rada declared independence. The Ukrainians initially formed the Green Army, later the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of the Ukraine, also known as the Anarchist (Black) Army under Nestor Makhno. Makhno led his forces at first against both the Red and White forces in the area, but cooperated with the Bolsheviks against the Whites when necessary. When the Bolsheviks hesitated during the negotiation process, German forces moved into the Ukraine and surrounding areas, which led the Soviets to proclaim decrees on food procurements and the beginning of what would be known as War Communism, the nationalization of all production and industry. Under such duress, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ending Russia's involvement in World War I.

During this time, the Czechoslovak Legion made up of prisoners of war who had fought on the Russian side, now demanded their withdrawal from Russia. They allied themselves with the White movement, taking over key railroad centers. These events led to the intervention of the Allied powers in Russia. Fourteen countries sent forces to Russia to support the Whites on a limited scale. They supplied the Whites with aircraft, tanks and training, and ammunition.

The British were most active in support of the White movement.

Fighting during the early stages of the civil war favored the Whites. In the north though, the Red Army stopped the White advances, and the area remained relatively quiet for the remainder of the conflict. As the White Army made significant advances in the central and south regions, they advanced on Ekaterinburg, where the royal family was held. The czar, along with his wife and children, was executed by the Cheka on July 16, 1918. The White forces were eventually stopped at Kazan and pushed back.

The Bolsheviks condoned the use of "Red Terror" at all levels, carrying out killings, torture, and repression on a massive scale. White forces responded in kind. No quarter was given and no prisoners were taken, on either side. Caught in the middle were the peasants, who generally favored neither side but saw the Bolsheviks, who were untainted by foreign support, as advocates of Russia. Casualties, caused directly by the fighting, or indirectly by starvation, were enormous. By February 1919, the Red Army, bolstered by Trotsky's reforms, pushed the White forces almost completely out of the Ukraine.

In Siberia, the Whites formed a government at Omsk called the Directory, and proclaimed Kolchak supreme leader of Russia. They advanced west and made significant gains at first, but were stopped on April 26, before they reached the Volga River. The Red Army pushed Kolchak back to the east by June 9, then shifted west to halt a White offensive from Estonia against Petrograd led by Yudenich. Taking advantage of the Bolshevik's shifting forces, Denikin began an offensive from the south. By October 1919, he had taken Orel and was approaching Moscow. The Whites had failed to coordinate their offensives though and, taking advantage of interior lines, the Bolsheviks

regrouped and began a counterattack against Denikin, recapturing Orel. By the end of 1919, Red forces had taken the Ukraine and southern Russia.

By early 1920, Red forces had eliminated the White threat, by and large. Kolchak was captured in late 1919 and executed on February 7, 1920, and Denikin was bottled up in the Crimean Peninsula. Then on April 24, Poland attacked in an attempt to take the Ukraine, starting the Russo-Polish War. They quickly advanced but regrouped. Red forces met them and drove them back. By the end of July, the Bolsheviks were approaching Warsaw. The Poles stopped the Red Army there, however, and forced the Bolsheviks back. On October 12, 1920, an armistice was signed.

With the end of the Polish campaigns and the withdrawal of Allied forces from Russia, the Red forces turned their full power against the White forces in the Crimea. Denikin had stepped down after arriving in Crimea, and Wrangel took command. He rallied the White forces briefly, but without reinforcements or resupply, had no hope of defeating the Reds and, with his small remaining force, fled to Constantinople on November 14, ending the military portion of the civil war.

The Bolshevik forces then methodically eliminated all opposition, concentrating on the anarchist movement in Ukraine. Sporadic resistance in the Far East continued until 1922, and it took until 1924 before former Russian territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia were completely subdued. The total losses of Red Army personnel during the period of 1918–1922, irrecoverable, sick, and wounded, have been stated at 6,791,783. This figure does not include partisans or the Red Guards who perished or were wounded during the uprisings in the urban and rural areas. There are no figures calculated for the

White armies and their allies, but it is generally agreed that their losses were at least equal to those of Red Army.

The Russian Civil War was a formative experience for the Bolsheviks. Key personalities such as Mikhail Frunze and Mikhail Tukhachevsky emerged who would play important roles in the development of the Red Army. The experience of War Communism convinced Lenin and others that Russia needed “breathing space.” The allied intervention further solidified the Bolshevik views that “international capitalism” would use any opportunity to destroy them, and allowed them to portray their regime as the defender of the Russian people.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); *Cheka (Chrezvychaynayakomissiya)*; Czech Legion (August 1914–December 1919); Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Frunze, Mikhail (1885–1925); Japanese Intervention in Siberia (1918–1922); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich (1889–1935); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

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Russo-Iranian War (1722–1723)

Prior to the 18th century, Russia and Iran had sporadic contacts, although commercial activity between Iran and the Muscovite Russia increased following Czar Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in late 16th century. The reign of Czar Peter I (the Great) saw a major transformation in the nature of Russo-Iranian relations. Despite Russia's exhaustion after the Great Northern War (1700–1721), Peter turned his attention to the Caspian Sea but lacked legitimate excuse to declare war on Iran.

He did not have to wait long. In August 1721, Shah Sultan Husein freed Daud Khan of Daghestan, hoping he would support the shah against the Afghans who had rebelled in 1709. Daud Khan instead attacked and sacked Shemakha, an important Iranian trade center in eastern Caucasia. The attack claimed the lives of several thousand residents, including a few Russian merchants. Daud Khan then appealed to the Ottoman Empire for protection. Peter seized upon this news as a *casus belli* by claiming he was reclaiming Iranian land against a common enemy; if Iran protested, Russia could demand an indemnity. At the same time, King Vakhtang VI of Kartli (eastern Georgia), who had been long mistreated by the Iranians, appealed to Russia for help and offered to a join campaign against Iran.

As the Afghan tribesmen attacked Iran from the east, Russian troops advanced to Astrakhan where Peter arrived on June 29, 1722. The Russian ruler sent an envoy to the shah, offering help in defeating the Afghans in exchange for certain provinces along the Caspian Sea. If Iran refused, Russia still planned to occupy the Caspian provinces to prevent an Ottoman presence there.

Meanwhile, Russian forces seized the Iranian city of Derbent (Darband), but progress

stalled due to the loss of a large number of ships in a storm at sea and an epidemic that killed most of the horses in the Russian cavalry. Compelled to retreat to Astrakhan, Peter left garrisons at Tarqu, Derbent, and Baku. The Georgian-Armenian army that gathered under Vakhtang VI at Ganja was abandoned to face Iranian retribution.

Although Peter soon lost interest in the Caspian region, his forces continued the campaign and captured Rasht (Resht) in late 1722. When the local Iranian governor demanded a Russian withdrawal, a minor battle took place near Resht (March 28, 1723) that ended with a Russian victory and claimed about 1,000 Iranian lives.

At the same time, the Ottomans, threatened by Russian penetration into the Caspian region, launched an invasion of eastern Georgia and seized Tiflis (Tbilisi). Alarmed, Shah Tahmasp, who replaced Sultan Husein in 1722, agreed to negotiate with the Russians. By the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed on September 23, 1723, Russia gained control of Derbent, Baku, and the coastal areas in between as well as the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. The shah received Russian troops for domestic peacekeeping.

When the treaty reached Isfahan in April 1724, however, Shah Tahmasp refused to ratify it; by then it was clear that the Russian forces in the region were too small to threaten Iran. Still, news of the Russo-Iranian accord precipitated a crisis between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which declared it would not permit any other power to establish itself on the Caspian Sea.

War was avoided through French mediation that resulted in the Treaty of Constantinople (June 24, 1724), by which the Ottomans received Azerbaijan and most of southern Caucasia (Georgia and Armenia), while Russian retained the three Caspian

provinces of Iran and captured territories. The treaty specified that if Iran refused to accept the treaty, both Russia and the Porte would take common action against Iran and install a puppet ruler.

Russian involvement in Iranian affairs, however, withered away following Peter's death in 1725. In February 1732, Nadir Khan negotiated the Treaty of Rasht, which restored Astrabad, Mazandaran, and Gilan to Iran while the territory north of the Kura River remained temporarily under Russian control. Three years later, Russia accepted the Treaty of Ganja, by which it gave up all its previous conquests, including Baku, Derbent, and Tarqu.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Kazan, Siege of (August–October 1552); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725)

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Russo-Iranian War (1804–1813)

Despite brief Russo-Iranian hostilities in 1796, eight years passed before a new conflict erupted between the two empires. Iranian shah Agha Muhammad's successor, Fath Ali Shah Qajar, sought to consolidate his authority by securing land near the Caspian Sea's southwestern coast and in

southern Caucasia. Czar Alexander I was also determined to extend Russian sovereignty to the disputed territories across the Caucasus mountain range. In 1801, Russia annexed the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, and the appointment of Prince Paul Tsitsianov (Tsitsishvili) as Russian commander in chief in the Caucasus greatly accelerated Russian expansion in the region.

Despite his Georgian origins, Tsitsianov was a die-hard Russian imperialist who believed in Russia's civilizing mission in Asia. Between 1802 and 1804, he proceeded to impose Russian rule on the western Georgian kingdom of Imereti, and principalities of Mingrelia and Guria, as well as the khanates located around Georgia. Some submitted without a fight but Ganja resisted, prompting an attack. Ganja was ruthlessly sacked, with some 3,000 people killed and thousands more expelled to Iran. Russian attacks on the khanates, which Iran considered vassals, served as a *casus belli* for Fath Ali Khan.

On May 23, Iran demanded Russian withdrawal from southern Caucasia and, following Russia's refusal, declared war. In the spring of 1804, Tsitsianov's army of 3,000 troops marched to the Erivan Khanate after its ruler Muhammad Khan refused to accept Russian sovereignty. In June, the Russians besieged Erivan and engaged the Iranian forces in the region. On June 22, the Russians defeated Iranian detachments at Gumry (Leninakan) while Tsitsianov scored a victory over Iran's crown prince Abbas Mirza not far from the Echmiadzin Monastery (near Erivan) on July 2–3. Following these defeats, Iranian forces retreated to regroup while Tsitsianov continued to exert pressure on local khanates.

In 1805, Karabagh, Shakki, and Shirvan recognized Russian authority; Russian raids

continued against Baku and Resht. Although Tsitsianov was assassinated near Baku in February 1806, the Russians repelled Iranian attacks in Karabagh in the summer of 1806 and occupied Derbent and Baku. Inconclusive warfare persisted until 1812 since Russia, preoccupied with events in Europe, was unable to devote considerable resources to the Caucasian theater while Iran was unable to deal with the Russian threat.

The Iranian forces suffered defeats on the Aras (Araxes) and Zagam rivers in 1805, at Karakapet in 1806, Karababa in 1808, Ganja in 1809, and Meghri, the Aras River and Akhalkalaki in 1810. In August 1812, as Napoleon launched his invasion of Russia, Abbas Mirza led some 20,000 men into the khanate of Talysh (southern Azerbaijan) and captured the fortress of Lenkoran. By October, the Iranian army reached the Aras River and attacked a small Russian detachment (2,000 men) under General Petr Kotlyarovskii but suffered an unexpected defeat. On January 13, 1813, the Russians stormed Lenkoran, forcing Iran to sue for peace.

Negotiated with British mediation and signed at Gulistan on October 14, 1813, the Treaty of Gulistan forced Fath Ali Shah to relinquish claims to south Caucasia. Iran lost all its territories north of the Aras River, which included Daghestan, all of Georgia, and parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The shah also surrendered Iranian rights to navigate the Caspian Sea and granted Russia exclusive rights to maintain a military fleet there, with capitulatory rights to trade within Iran. Russia in return promised to support Crown Prince Abbas Mirza as heir to the Iranian throne.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Russo-Iranian War (1826–1828)

Following the disastrous Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813, Iranian leadership considered the Treaty of Gulistan more as a truce that allowed Iran to regroup. Peace reigned in the Caucasus for 13 years as Fath Ali Shah sought foreign support and modernized his forces. Abbas Mirza played an important role in Iranian military reforms; he sent Iranian students to Europe to learn Western tactics and employed British and French officers (as well as a few renegade Russian officers) to raise and drill troops. He introduced a new recruitment system to create a more predictable supply of manpower and to make himself independent of the local elite. The reformed army had some success in campaigns against the Ottomans in 1821–1823, but proved ill-prepared for the Russo-Iranian war that broke out in 1826.

Continued Russian encroachment into the southern Caucasian territories as well as the mistreatment of Muslim population had seriously strained Russo-Iranian relations. General Aleksei Yermolov, the new Russian commander in chief in the Caucasus, shared his predecessor Tsitsianov's worldview toward "Asiatics" and was committed to war as a means of achieving Russia's political goals. In May 1826, Russia therefore occupied Mirak, in the Erivan khanate, in violation of the Treaty of Gulistan.

In response, Iranian forces invaded the Karabagh and Talysh khanates, where local elites switched sides and surrendered to Iran the major cities of Lenkoran, Kuba, and Baku. Although Abbas Mirza regained considerable territory in the first months of the war, the Iranian offensive soon stalled. The Russian garrison at Shusha heroically defended the fortress for 48 days, allowing Yermolov to rush reinforcements to the theater. The Russian counterattack soon shattered the Iranian forces, first crushing Muhammad Mirza (future Muhammad Shah of Iran) on the banks of the Shamkhor River (September 15) and then defeating Abbas Mirza at Ganja (September 26).

In October, the Russian troops under General I. Pashkevich stormed Erivan. In 1827, the Russians drove Abbas Mirza back into Iran, capturing Nakhichevan, Abbasabad, Meren, Urmiya, Ardabil, and Tabriz. By 1828, Iran had lost all its southeast Caucasian territories and was forced to sue for peace. The treaty signed at Turkmanchai on February 22, 1828, acknowledged the Persian loss of the Caucasus region to Russia and the permanent division of Azerbaijan. It required Iran to cede sovereignty over the khanates of Yerevan, Nakhichevan, Talysh, Ordubad, and Mughan, in addition to regions Russia had annexed under the Treaty of Gulistan. The Aras River became the new border between Iran and Russia. Iran agreed to pay reparations of 20 million rubles in silver, transferred to Russia the exclusive right to maintain a Caspian Sea fleet, and guaranteed Russia preferential treatment for its exports, which generally were not competitive in European markets. Russian subjects were also exempted from Iranian jurisdiction.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856); Russo-Iranian War (1804–1813)

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Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

Conflict pitting Russia against Japan over territorial issues in Manchuria and Korea.

Japan waged a successful war against China in 1894–1895 over control of the Korean Peninsula, which, in Japanese hands, was a bridge to the Asian mainland, but in other hands, was a dagger pointed at Japan's heart. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized Korean independence, paid Japan an indemnity and ceded Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula containing Port Arthur, a strategic warm water port on the Yellow Sea. Immediately, the Russian government joined with France and Germany in successfully pressuring Japan to return the peninsula on grounds that Chinese territorial integrity should be respected. Yet in 1898, Czar Nicholas II ordered his army to occupy Port Arthur and forced China to grant Russia a 35-year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. Soon the Russians were building a railway north from Port Arthur to link up at Harbin with the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was operated by a Russian firm. When Chinese rebels attacked the railways during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, Russia had the excuse it needed to occupy Manchuria. The Japanese tried to ease tensions by offering recognition of Russia's rights in Manchuria in



Members of a Russian scouting party wounded and captured by skirmishers of the Japanese Second Division, circa 1904. (AP Photo)

return for a guarantee of Japan's in Korea. When the Russian government spurned the offer, the Japanese prepared for war.


Though Russia's armed forces were far larger than Japan's, there were only about 130,000 Russian troops in the Far East. Reinforcements, equipment, and supplies would have to be fed into the theater over a 6,000-mile, single-track railroad. The Japanese hoped to wage a "short, victorious war," overwhelming the Russians by attacking Manchuria with their regular army of 280,000 men and quickly bringing in 400,000 trained reserves before the Russians could bring their strength to bear. The Japanese therefore had to be able to ferry men and supplies to Manchuria, and this meant seizing control of the Yellow Sea.

Russian capital ships in the Far East included seven aging battleships and seven heavy cruisers at Port Arthur, two heavy cruisers at Chemulpo [Inchon] in Korea, and four heavy cruisers at Vladivostok, a

cold-water port usable only in the summer. The Japanese had 6 new battleships, 1 old one, 8 heavy cruisers, and 25 light cruisers. Although Japan had only 19 destroyers to Russia's 25, it had 85 torpedo boats, especially valuable when speed, surprise, and tactical ingenuity could pay huge dividends.

The Japanese struck without warning on February 8, 1904, attacking Russian warships in Port Arthur with torpedo boats; they damaged two battleships and a cruiser while Vice Admiral Togo Heihachiro's battle fleet established a blockade. The following day, Vice Admiral Kamimura Hikonojo's squadron destroyed the Russian cruisers at Chemulpo. Mutual declarations of war came only on February 10.

A week later, General Kuroki Tamesada's First Army landed at Chemulpo and marched toward the Yalu River to attack Manchuria. Caught off guard, the Russians sent Admiral Stepan Makarov to take command of the fleet at Port Arthur and find a way to break



the blockade. At the same time, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, field commander in the Far East, moved his forces into position for a fighting retreat on Mukden, during which he would await reinforcements. Unfortunately, Makarov drowned when his ship hit a mine on April 13, and Kuropatkin's strategy was muddled by the incompetence of his superior, Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, the czar's viceroy of the Far East, who insisted

on attacks that accomplished nothing and eroded troop strength.

On April 30, Kuroki's army swatted aside an inferior Russian force in the Battle of the Yalu and moved into Manchuria. In the next few weeks, General Oku Yasutaka's Second Army debarked 40 miles northeast of Port Arthur, and General Nozu Michitsura's Fourth Army landed west of the Yalu to guard the Second Army's flank. After

ferocious fighting in the Battle of Nanshan on May 25, Oku's troops cut off Port Arthur on the landward side and seized the port of Dairen (Dailan) to bring in supplies and reinforcements. The Third Army of General Nogi Maresuke, who had captured Port Arthur in 1894, arrived to besiege it again while Oku's army screened it from Russian interference.

The town was well protected by outworks, entrenchments, barbed wire, machine-gun positions and electrically detonated mines. The siege dragged on through the summer, the Russians fighting bravely, the Japanese wasting men in reckless frontal attacks in which their close-packed ranks were devastated by artillery and machine-gun fire.

On August 10, when Admiral Togo's fleet had lost two battleships to Russian mines, Makarov's successor, Admiral Vilgelm Vitgeft, sailed out of Port Arthur with 6 battleships and 4 cruisers to engage Togo's 4 battleships and 10 cruisers. As the fighting approached close range, Vitgeft was killed and his squadron retreated to the port. Four days later, Kamimura's cruisers sank one of the Vladivostok squadron's cruisers in the Korean Strait and chased the others back to their base. The investment of Port Arthur was unbreakable from the sea.

Oku and Kuroki won victories to the north in June and July that ensured Port Arthur could not be relieved by Kuropatkin, who began pulling his forces back to Liaoyang. Port Arthur held out against five great assaults, the last of which, on December 5, captured 203-Meter Hill, from which Japanese artillery was able to destroy the Russian ships in the harbor. With the fleet destroyed, the garrison commander, General Anatoli Stoessel, surrendered Port Arthur on January 2, 1905. The butcher's bill came to 59,000 Japanese and 31,000 Russian casualties.

Kuropatkin had developed a strong position at Liaoyang, manned by about 160,000 men. On August 25, he was attacked by 125,000 men of the Japanese First, Second, and Fourth armies united under the command of Field Marshal Oyama Iwao. After 10 days of bloody fighting, Kuropatkin withdrew to the north and fought the lengthy but inconclusive Battle of the Shao-Ho in October. Both armies were by now exhausted and glad to dig in for a respite.

With reinforcements bringing Kuropatkin's force to 300,000 effectives, he attacked Oyama's augmented army of 220,000 at Sandepu in a snowstorm on January 26–27; the Russians came close to victory but Kuropatkin's defensive mindset led to a stalemate. The climax of the campaign came between February 21 and March 10, when two armies of about 600,000 men each faced off on a 48-mile front in the largest battle the world had seen to that point.

Repeated Japanese attacks on the Russian flanks eventually so exposed the Russian center that Kuropatkin decided to retreat to Harbin. Though the Russians lost 100,000 men in the battle, their army could rest, refit, and swell its ranks with reinforcements from Europe, but the Japanese could not easily replace their 70,000 casualties.

The calculus of war had turned against the Japanese. They had not achieved the swift victory they needed, and their economy was under immense strain. Between the victories at Port Arthur and Mukden, their government was deciding whether to seek the good offices of Italy or the United States in arranging peace talks. The czar had economic problems as well, and had to deal with the political consequences of Bloody Sunday, when the massacre of protesters in his capital ignited a revolution. His advisors were pushing him to negotiate a settlement as well. A stalemate set in, the Russian army licking

its wounds in Harbin, the Japanese making an unenthusiastic effort to send an expedition through Korea to attack Vladivostok.

Yet one more great battle was to be fought. The success of the Japanese blockade at Port Arthur, and their dominance of the Yellow Sea had prompted Nicholas II to seek a naval alternative. His Black Sea squadron was treaty-bound not to exit the Black Sea, so he decided to send his Baltic Squadron around the world to attack the Japanese in their own waters. Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky, a gunnery expert, sailed from Libau in October 1904 in command of four new battleships, three old ones, one heavy cruiser, six light cruisers, nine destroyers and a gaggle of supply ships, colliers, and other auxiliaries. His armada, now known as the Second Pacific Squadron, was in Madagascar when he learned of the Fall of Port Arthur.

He proceeded on his mission and rendezvoused at Camranh Bay with the Third Pacific Squadron, a collection of ships he had previously turned down as useless. On May 27, Admiral Togo caught the squadron entering the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Straits and conducted a brilliant attack in which the superiority of Japanese ships, tactics, weapons, and gunnery were amply demonstrated. Virtually, the entire Russian fleet was sunk or captured. This final humiliation decided the czar and, early in June, he accepted the mediation of U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt in setting up peace negotiations that opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 9.

The resulting Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on August 23. Russia ceded half of Sakhalin Island and, with Chinese consent, surrendered Port Arthur, the Liaotung Peninsula, and southern Manchuria to the Japanese, and recognized Japan's preeminence in Korea. No indemnity was stipulated, which outraged Japanese public opinion and led to riots in Tokyo. Russian imperialism was

checked in the Far East, its poor military and naval performance emboldened German diplomacy in Europe, and the czar was forced into political reforms.

Joseph M. McCarthy

See also: Alekseev, Evgeny I. (1843–1917); Boxer Rebellion, Russia and (1899–1903); Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Nanshan, Battle of (May 1904); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Port Arthur; Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Rozhdestvensky (Rozhdestvensky), Zinvoy Petrovich (1848–1909); Sha-ho, Battle of the (October 10–17, 1904); Stoessel (Stessel), Baron Anatoli Mikhailovich (1848–1915); Tsushima Battle of (May 27, 1905); Vitgeft, Villem (Vilgelm) Karlovich (1847–1904)

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Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921)

War between the re-established Polish state and the emergent Soviet armed forces after World War I.

In the aftermath of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles substantially redrew the borders of Europe, creating new states, including Poland, out of the ruins of the German, Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires. German occupation forces withdrew from the region in 1919, creating a vacuum in the border area between Poland and the emerging Soviet state. Both nations claimed the territory, and the Russian and Polish forces began low-intensity combat in 1919, which soon developed into full-scale war in April 1920.

By 1919, the Soviet (Red) forces were close to victory in the Russian Civil War, and the Soviet leaders extended peace feelers to the Poles to end the fighting on the western border, in which the Poles had enjoyed some success, occupying large tracts of the western Ukraine and parts of modern-day Belarus. The Polish head of state, Josef Pilsudski, remained suspicious of Soviet intentions and rejected the peace overtures. Vladimir I. Lenin, leader of the Soviet government, wanted to regain the Russian territory lost as a result of the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but he and other Soviet leaders also entertained the idea of spreading communism beyond Russian soil, particularly to Germany. Senior Soviet leaders considered a socialist revolution in heavily industrialized Germany important to Soviet Russia's success. To encourage a revolution in Germany, however, Soviet armies would have to cross Polish territory.

For the Poles, Pilsudski greatly influenced Polish foreign policy and considered the acquisition of Russian border areas to be a guarantee of Polish independence and security on the eastern border. The Poles therefore struck first against the Soviet forces, which were slowly gathering in the Ukraine and Belarus. The Soviets were unprepared for a full-scale war.

Pilsudski's armies, numbering about 500,000 men, attacked further into the Ukraine on April 25, 1920, hoping to capture Kiev. The Polish armies were a conglomeration of formations made up of Poles who had served the armies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and imperial Russia. Pilsudski had multiple army-sized formations under his command during the campaign, though the size and composition changed often.

The Soviet forces on the Polish border consisted of two army groups or "Fronts," one commanded by General Aleksandr Yegorov (Southwestern Front) of 84,000 men, and the other led by General Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Western Front) numbering some 160,000. In total, Soviet forces fluctuated between 600,000–700,000 men during the campaign. The Soviet fronts operated independently, but their actions were to be guided and coordinated by Leon Trotsky, the Soviet commissar for war.

Yegorov's forces were in a state of disorganization when the Poles attacked and were soon retreating in front of the advancing Polish forces. The Poles captured Kiev on May 7, 1920. Tukhachevsky launched his own series of attacks into central Poland beginning in May 1920, in part to relieve the pressure on Yegorov to the south. As the Poles reacted to the new threat, the reorganized South-Western Front counterattacked with its shock force, the First Cavalry Army (*Konarmiya*) commanded by General Semen Budenny. The Soviet attacks broke the Polish line in a series of battles, and by the beginning of June, the Polish armies were in retreat.

The Soviets kept up the pressure. Tukhachevsky launched new attacks, led by the III Cavalry Corps commanded by General Chaia Ghai. On July 4, 1920, the Western Front took the offensive, with Ghai capturing Vilnius on July 14 and Grodno on July 20.

The Polish army continued to retreat, and the Western and Southwestern Fronts entered central Poland. Tukhachevsky intended to attack Warsaw as early as the beginning of August, but the Western Front could not do so because of logistical problems resulting from overextended and precarious Soviet supply lines.

The Polish defenses of Warsaw centered on a series of fortifications, including a bridgehead in the Praga suburb on the east bank of the Vistula River. During August 12–15, elements of the Western Front attacked Warsaw directly while Ghai's III Cavalry Corps crossed the Vistula so as to flank the defenses from the north, circling around to attack the Polish positions. Tukhachevsky had some 24 divisions at his disposal, putting severe pressure on the Polish defenders. Initially, the attacks centered on the fortifications around Praga; the Russian Third, Fourth, and Fifteenth armies engaged the Polish First Army, defending the city proper and the Fifth Army, covering the area to the north around the fortress of Modlin and Wloclawek. Ghai's forces and the Soviet Fourth Army attacked the Polish Fifth Army, at one point breaking through the northern Polish defenses. European observers concluded that the Polish defense was doomed and began to evacuate their diplomats from Warsaw.

The Poles gained a respite when a Polish cavalry regiment exploited a gap in the southern sector of the Soviet line, however, and overran the Soviet Fourth Army's radio communications section. Out of contact with Tukhachevsky, Fourth Army failed to receive orders to shift its attack to the south, disrupting the overall Soviet attack plan. Despite the setback, the Soviet attacks on and north of Warsaw continued, and Pilsudski concluded that he would have to launch a counterattack earlier than planned.

The Poles had identified a potential weakness in the Soviet front, where the Western and Southwestern fronts met. One advantage the Poles had was the ability to read Soviet radio traffic, as Polish cryptanalysts had broken the Soviet codes. Pilsudski then ordered a newly formed "Assault Group" to attack the hinge in the Soviet lines. The Assault Group, 20,000 strong, was comprised of the best troops available from the Polish Third and Fourth armies. In addition, Pilsudski ordered the Polish First and Fifth armies to counterattack the forces to their front, engaging the numerically superior Soviet Third, Fourth, and Fifteenth armies, during August 14–15.

On August 16, the Polish Assault Group counterattacked Tukhachevsky's southern flank near the city of Mozyr. The Soviet detachment, designated "Mozyr Group," consisted of a scant 8,000 men but was responsible for a 90-mile front and could not stop the Polish advance. Shattered, Mozyr Group retreated and left a large gap between the two Soviet fronts. Pilsudski exploited the gap with further attacks to the northeast, widening the breach between the Soviet army groups. Pilsudski hoped to cut off and surround the majority of the Western Front's formations, with the Assault Group joining up with the Polish Fifth Army advancing eastward from Warsaw.

The Soviet High Command, reacting to the Polish offensive, ordered Budenny's *Konarmiya* to redeploy to the north to support the Western Front, but the once formidable cavalry force had sustained heavy losses in fighting to capture the city of Lvov. At the time, Josef Stalin was the senior political officer (commissar) present at Yegorov's headquarters and did not hold a command position. He profoundly influenced Yegorov's and Budenny's actions, however, urging them to continue the attacks

on Lvov. Trotsky later claimed that Budenny disobeyed the order to redeploy the *Konarmiya* with Stalin's connivance, with the result that Budenny's shock troops did nothing to influence the fighting around Warsaw.

Tukhachevsky became aware of the disaster that had befallen his left flank on August 18 and ordered the Western Front to commence an orderly withdrawal. The Soviet command structure was disrupted after weeks of long campaigning, continued friction between the Front commanders, and overextended supply line. Orders arrived either too late or not at all. Bereft of orders, Ghai's cavalry continued advancing to the west, while the Third, Fourth, and Fifteenth armies attempted to reorganize and withdraw. Unable to communicate with Front headquarters and under increasing Polish pressure, the Western Front formations began disintegrating, and by August 21, the entire front was routed, with heavy losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Ghai's cavalry were briefly interned in East Prussia, as their escape route was cut off by the Poles.

The Southwestern Front, its northern flank laid bare, also retreated, after the Poles defeated the *Konarmiya* at Komarow on August 31. By September, the Soviets established a new defensive line on the Neiman River. The Poles attacked the Russian positions and established a bridgehead during the period of September 15–20; however, both sides were exhausted, with many formations on both sides at 50 percent strength or less. In addition, Britain and France put heavy pressure on Pilsudski to make peace. The fighting stopped on October 18, 1920. The Soviets lost an estimated 60,000 killed, with 80,000–100,000 prisoners and missing, compared with Polish losses of around 48,000 killed, 100,000 wounded, and 50,000 missing or prisoners. The war officially

ended with the ratification of the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921.

Tim Wilson

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); Warsaw, Battle for (August 16–25, 1920)

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Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743)

As a result of the Treaty of Nystad ending the Great Northern War in 1721, Russia gained control of Estonia, Livonia, Ingria, and part of Karelia from Sweden. This discontented the dominant faction in Sweden's parliament known as the “Hats” who wanted to topple the pro-Austrian regime of Czar Ivan VI's regent mother, as well as regain lost territories. The Swedish government accordingly reached a secret understanding in 1741 with Elizabeth, who agreed to return the Baltic territories in exchange for support in her efforts to seize the Russian throne from the infant emperor Ivan VI.

In July 1741, the Swedes declared war on Russia, announcing they would withdraw when Elizabeth became empress. Sweden believed the timing was fortuitous, as Russia

was at war with the Ottoman Empire, and Austria was entangled in the War of Austrian Succession. Russia, however, quickly signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, seized the initiative and struck first, with an army of 16,000 men under Field Marshal Peter Lacy advancing from Vyborg toward Villmanstrand. With a 4–1 superiority in numbers, the Russian forces inflicted a major defeat on the Swedish garrison there in August 1741. The Swedes nevertheless advanced toward St. Petersburg; their threat to the Russian capital enabled Elizabeth to stage a successful coup d'état on December 6, 1741. Thereupon, the Swedes retreated into Finland.

Elizabeth, however, then continued the war against Sweden. Russian troops conquered Helsingfors (Helsinki) and Åbo (modern Turku, then the capital of Finland) and occupied a large portion of Finland. Russian naval superiority moved the Swedes to offer terms in August of 1742, but in March of 1743, Sweden resumed hostilities. Russian Admiral Nikolai Fyodorovich Golovin managed to draw the Swedish fleet out of its anchorage while not actually engaging in a fight. The result was overwhelming Russian naval superiority in southwestern Finland and areas near Åland, which again forced peace negotiations.

Russia, taking advantage of a succession crisis in Sweden, offered to return most of Finland if Sweden would accept the Russian-supported candidate to the Swedish throne—Adolf Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp-Eutin—as heir apparent. The Swedes agreed, and the final settlement, signed at Åbo in August 1743, gave Russia a strip of southern Finland that included the cities of Vilmanstrand and Frederikshamn. Under the treaty, Russian forces were to be allowed to occupy Sweden to make sure that nothing interfered with Adolf Frederick's

selection, but leave when he was officially designated crown prince; in the meantime, Russia was thus able to exert a tremendous influence on Swedish affairs. Russian influence was short-lived, however; all Russian troops were withdrawn from Sweden by July 1744, and Adolf Frederick quickly ended his dependence on Russia.

The territorial provisions of the treaty were longer lasting. In 1788, while Russia was at war with Turkey, Sweden tried to alter the treaty's provisions. King Gustav III, demanding the return of Karelia and Finland, declared war on Russia (June 1788). Although the Swedes presented a threat to St. Petersburg and won a major victory at Svenskund (July 9–10, 1790), the Treaty of Värälä (August 1790) restored the prewar borders, which remained intact until 1809.

Jason Engler

See also: Elizabeth I, Czarina (1709–1761); Great Northern War (1700–1721); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725)

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Russo-Swedish War (1788–1790).

See Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743)

Russo-Swedish War (February 21, 1808–September 17, 1809)

The Baltic Sea, dominated by Sweden for centuries, was important to Russia for both strategic and commercial reasons. In a series

of wars between 1700 and 1791, Russia succeeded in annexing territories in eastern Finland and along the southern Baltic coastline. Russian sovereigns still sought to secure the free navigation of the Baltic and to protect their capital, St. Petersburg, by annexing Finland, then in Swedish possession. Following the Peace of Tilsit on July 7, 1807, Napoleon consented to the Russian takeover of Finland. Meanwhile, Britain, concerned about the Franco-Russian rapprochement, pressured Sweden to contain Russian interests in the region. In 1807, to prevent the French from acquiring the Danish fleet, a British fleet bombarded Copenhagen on September 2–5 and forced the Danes to surrender their fleet.

Czar Alexander was infuriated by Britain's aggression against Denmark, his ally. In addition, this attack violated the Russo-Swedish agreement on closing Baltic ports to British ships. Concerned about the British presence in the Baltic Sea, Alexander requested King Gustavus IV to expel the British from Swedish ports. Receiving a Swedish rejection on January 21, 1808, Russia considered it a *casus belli*.

Russian preparations for war had already begun in December 1807. A corps of three infantry divisions was deployed near the Russo-Finnish frontiers. General Fyodor Buxhöwden assumed overall command, while General Peter Bagration led the 21st Infantry Division, General Nikolai Tuchkov commanded the 5th Division, and Count Nikolai Kamensky led the 17th Division. The Russian divisions were understrength and exhausted by the previous campaign in Poland during the War of the Fourth Coalition. Their combined strength amounted to some 24,000 men. The initial Russian strategy called for the occupation of as much territory as possible before opening negotiations. The 1st Column under Tuchkov was to

march from Neschlodt and Sulkava toward Rantasalmi to prevent the Swedish forces deployed around Outokumpu from supporting their comrades at Tavastheus (Hämeenlinna). Bagration was ordered to Keltis (Kouyola), moving in the general direction of Tavastheus. The 3rd Column under Kamensky was to advance from Fredrikshamn (now Hamina) along the coast toward Helsingfors (Helsinki) to occupy Sveaborg.

The Swedes were able to mobilize some 50,000 men, but of these, only some 19,000 men (14,984 regular troops and 4,000 militia [*vargering*]) were under the command of General Carl Nathanael Klercker in Finland. A strong garrison of some 7,000 men protected the fortress of Sveaborg, known as the Gibraltar of the North, on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Despite all the intelligence on Russian troop movements they received, the Swedish government failed to make any preparations to repel an attack.

On February 21, 1808, the Russian army invaded Finland in three columns. The troops spread proclamations urging the local population not to oppose the occupation and promising to observe order and make payment for requisitions. Russian forces advanced quickly, capturing Kuopio, Tavastheus, Tammerfors, and Åbo, as well as the shoreline between Åbo and Vaasa in March. In addition, the Russian advance guard seized the Åland Islands and the island of Gotland. As Swedish forces withdrew northward, the Russians also took possession of Jacobstad, Gamllakarleby, and Brahestad.

The strategic situation soon changed though. The Swedes concentrated their forces in the north, where they were well supplied and reinforced from the mainland. Russian columns, on the other hand, were extended along lengthy lines of communication and supply. Considerable Russian forces were tied up at Sveaborg, and the Finnish

population displayed increasing discontent with the Russian presence in the region. In early April, Karl Johan Adlerkreutz, a young and energetic Swedish commander, was appointed second in command to Marshal Klingspor and attacked the dispersed Russian forces, defeating them at Gamlakarleby, Brahestad, Siikajoki, and Revolax.

These successful engagements improved Swedish morale and increased anti-Russian sentiment among the local population. In late April, the Swedes launched an offensive: Colonel Sandels with 3,000 men marched into the Savolax region, where he captured an entire Russian detachment at Pulkkila on May 2 and then seized Kuopio. In the south, the Swedes recaptured both Gotland and the Åland Islands after the Russian navy failed to support its land forces, partly because of animosity between Buxhöwden and the minister of the navy, Admiral Pavel Chichagov. On May 6, however, the Russians captured Sveaborg.

By the late spring of 1808, the Russian army was organized into three army corps. General Nikolai Raevsky commanded the first corps in the north covering the approaches to Vaasa. General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly's corps was to advance into the Savolax region and occupy Kuopio. Bagration commanded the troops on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia protecting the coastline between Björneborg and Åbo. As the Russians launched another offensive in June, Barclay de Tolly occupied Kuopio on June 19 and engaged the Swedish forces around Toivola, suffering from constant attacks by Finnish guerrillas. In the northwest, Raevsky found himself isolated from Russian reinforcements. As the Swedes counterattacked, Raevsky resolutely defended Nykarleby and Vaasa before suffering defeat at Lappo (Lapua) in central Österbotten on July 14.

The same month, Kamensky turned the tide of success. Taking over Raevsky's corps, he defeated the Swedish army under Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Fieandt at Karstula on August 21 and then achieved a series of victories at Lappfjärd (August 29), Ruona and Salmi (September 1–2), and Oravais (September 14). The Swedes were in full retreat, pursued by Kamensky. Infuriated by these reverses, Gustavus IV personally led a landing force on the southeast shore of the Gulf of Bothnia to divert the Russian forces in the north. Bagration successfully repulsed incursions between September 15 and 27, however.

An armistice was concluded on September 29, 1808. As he traveled to meet Napoleon at Erfurt, however, Alexander disapproved the cease-fire and ordered a new offensive. In October, the Russian army advanced northward to Uleåborg and, by late December, all of Finland was finally under Russian control. To bring a quick conclusion to the war, Alexander appointed General Bogdan von Knorring to command Russian forces in Finland. The Russians considered a three-pronged offensive into Sweden: Bagration was to cross the frozen gulf to the Åland Islands and then advance directly to the Swedish capital, Stockholm; simultaneously, Barclay de Tolly was to proceed with his corps across the gulf from Vaasa to Umeå, while another Russian corps marched along the gulf shore to Torneå. Bagration advanced his corps of some 17,000 men to the Åland Islands in early March 1809. The Swedes had some 10,000 men (6,000 regulars and 4,000 militia) under an energetic commander, General Georg Carl von Döbeln, who resolutely defended the islands before abandoning them on March 18. The Russian advance guard under Jacob Kulnev made a daring raid on the Swedish coastline, capturing the town of Grisslehamn, near Stockholm.

Simultaneously, dramatic events occurred at the royal court in Stockholm. Gustavus was unpopular even before the war started, and the military defeats were largely blamed on his ineffective command. With Russian forces crossing the Gulf of Bothnia, the agitation among the soldiers exploded, and Swedish officers organized a coup d'état on March 13, 1809, establishing a regency under Duke Charles of Sudermania (Charles XIII, r. 1809–1818).

Meanwhile, Barclay de Tolly and Pavel Shuvalov marched toward Umeå. In late March, Barclay de Tolly undertook a hazardous march across the frozen Östra Kvarken and captured Umeå. In the north, Shuvalov marched with his corps along the gulf coast from Uleåborg and occupied Torneå, forcing the surrender of a Swedish detachment of 7,000 men at Kalix.

With two Russian corps converging at Umeå and Bagration's troops already in the vicinity of Stockholm, the Swedes began diplomatic negotiations to halt the invasion. As negotiations dragged on, however, Alexander appointed Barclay de Tolly as commander in chief and ordered another invasion of Sweden.

The Russians resumed hostilities in early May, advancing from Torneå toward Luleå and Skellefteå. On May 2, General Ilya Alekseev's advance guard undertook a daring crossing of the Gulf of Bothnia at Skellefteå, where his detachment marched for 26 miles up to their knees in the melting ice to surprise the Swedish garrison and capture the town. On June 1, the Russians captured Umeå, defeating Swedish detachments at Savar and Ratan. Diplomatic negotiations began on August 15, 1809 and resulted in the Treaty of Fredrikshamn (now Hamina) on September 17. Sweden acknowledged the loss of all of Finland as well as the Åland

Islands, and Russia secured its position on the Baltic Sea.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Chichagov, Pavel Vasilievich (1767–1849); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Tilsit, Treaty of

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Russo-Turkish War (1676–1681)

The Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire shared a long border and were rivals for centuries. They competed for territory and influence in the Balkans, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Although the two were often brought into conflict because of their alliances with other Great Powers in Europe, the early Russo-Ottoman (Turkish) wars were caused mainly by Russia's desire to establish a warm water port on the Black Sea, which lay under Ottoman control.

The Ottomans initially used the term *Moskov* or *Moskovlu* to refer to the Russian state that emerged around the principality of Moscow (so-called Muscovy or Rus'). The first formal diplomatic contact between the two states took place in 1492, when the Muscovite embassy arrived at Constantinople to discuss long-distance trade. It was only in 1741 though, that the sultan recognized Russian czars as the "Emperor of All the Russias."

Early Russo-Ottoman relations were marked by clear distinction in status. The sultans refused Russian offers of alliance and often

delegated Russian affairs to their vassal khans of the Crimea, who conducted periodic raiding expeditions in the southern provinces of Muscovy. By the mid-16th century, however, Muscovy became strong enough to resist the Crimean Khanate. Czar Ivan IV destroyed the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, important allies of the Crimean Tatars, in 1552–1556.

Since the Black Sea was bordered by Ukraine to the north, Ukraine was an area of constant struggle between Russia, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, and the Don Cossacks for most of the 17th century. In 1637–1642, the Don Cossacks captured Azov, an important Ottoman fortress, which they offered to Czar Mikhail I of Russia; however, the first Romanov ruler declined it to avoid a direct conflict with the Porte.

In 1654, following a powerful Cossack uprising against Poland, Russia signed the Treaty of Pereiaslavl with the Cossacks, which granted Russia control over parts of eastern Ukraine. The Russian expansion, however, provoked a war with Poland and the Crimean Khanate, supported by the Ottoman Empire.

In 1672, the Ottoman army occupied parts of southern Ukraine, and a preliminary contest between Russia and the Ottoman Turks began in 1676 after the Cossacks, under Ivan Samoilovich, Hetman of Left-bank Ukraine, asked for Russian assistance against the Turks, who supported his rival Hetman, Petro Doroshenko. The Russian army, supported by Ukrainian allies, captured the Cossack capital of Chyhyryn in 1676. The following year, a large Ottoman army under Ibrahim Pasha invaded Ukraine and besieged Chyhyryn, although Russian attack soon forced it to retreat. In 1678, the Ottomans besieged Chyhyryn once again, capturing it in August. Over the next two years, the two sides limited their actions to raids and border attacks before the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, signed in 1681, established

a buffer zone between the Ottoman- and Russian-controlled regions of Ukraine.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Cossacks; Khmelnytsky Uprising and Aftermath (1648–1657); Romodanovsky, Grigory Grigorevich (mid-1630s–1682)

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Russo-Turkish War (1686). See Holy League, Wars of the (1686–1696)

Russo-Turkish War (the Pruth Campaign, 1711)

Excited by his military success against the Swedes, whom he crushed at Poltava in 1709, Czar Peter I decided to force the Ottomans to open Constantinople and the Straits to Russian commerce and thus gain free passage to the Mediterranean Sea. Hoping to incite anti-Ottoman rebellion among the Orthodox Christian population of the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia), Peter launched an ill-prepared campaign in the basin of the Pruth River, where he was defeated at Stanileshti (July 1711) and surrounded by the Ottoman (and Crimean) forces under Grand Vizier Baltaci Mehmet Pasha. On July 21, 1711, Peter accepted the Treaty of Pruth which required him only to restore Azov and its surrounding territory to the Turks. Considering Peter's desperate situation, the Turks certainly could have made greater demands.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Great Northern War (1700–1721); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)

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Russo-Turkish War (1735–1739)

In 1735, after a long period of occupation with European rather than Ottoman affairs, Russia, in league with Austria and Iran, declared a new war on the Ottomans. The new Russo-Ottoman War came in the wake of the War of the Polish Succession, which pitted their interests against each other, and continued raids of the Crimean Tatars. Russian troops led by Field Marshal Burkhard Christoph von Muennich and General Peter Lacy invaded Crimea (twice) and captured Perekop, Azov, and Ochakov but were later forced to retreat by logistical difficulties and plague. In 1739, the Russians advanced into southern Ukraine, defeating the Turks at Stavuchany, and capturing Khotin and Yassy.

Austria, whose troops had been less successful than Russia’s, was forced to sign a peace agreement that led to the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. With its ally gone and war with Sweden looming, Russia chose to sign the Treaty of Nissa in October 1739. Russia restored portions of Moldavia and Bessarabia, including the city of Khotin, to the Turks, and promised to dismantle the fortifications at Azov, which, however, Russians retained as a port. The Turks opened the Black Sea to Russian commercial activity in exchange.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Lacy, Count Peter (1678–1751); Muennich, Count Burkhard Christoph von (1683–1767)

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Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

During the reign of Catherine II, the Russo-Ottoman conflict entered a new stage determined by Russia’s role in the partitions of Poland. In 1768, Russian troops pressed Polish confederates toward the Ottoman frontier. Having promised help to Poland six years earlier, Sultan Mustafa III declared war on Russia in late 1768. Catherine made sure Russia was well prepared for war.

Russian troops led by Field Marshal Pyotr A. Rumiantsev advanced into Moldavia and defeated the Turks under Kaplan Girey and Ivazzade Halil Pasha at Larga (1770) and Kagul (1770); the defeat at Kagul, one of the worst in the Ottoman history, was so decisive that it spurred the Ottomans into introducing a series of Western-influenced reforms in the Ottoman army. By the summer of 1770, Moldavia was occupied by the Russians.

Meanwhile, the Russian fleet, under the command of Count Alexis Orlov, reached the coast of Greece, where it won the naval battle of Chios on July 5, 1770. Two days later, he completely destroyed the Turkish fleet at Chesma (Chesme) Bay. A Russian expeditionary force was also sent to eastern Georgia, where King Erekle II scored a major victory over the Turks at Aspindza (1770). In 1772, the Russian fleet bombarded Beirut

to assist local rebels against the Porte and conducted diplomatic negotiations with the Mamluke leader Ali Bey of Egypt.

After a failed attempt to negotiate in 1772, hostilities resumed in earnest. Russian troops under General Aleksandr Suvorov advanced into the Danubian Principalities, crossing the Danube in 1773 and scoring a decisive victory at Kozludzha (now Suvorovo) in 1774 that forced the Ottoman commander Muh-sinzade Mehmed Pasha to sue for peace.

The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji was signed in July 1774. It granted Russia additional territory on the shores of the Black Sea along with the right of navigation on the sea and free passage for Russian merchant ships through the Straits. The Crimean Khanate gained independence from the Porte. Encouraged by such unprecedented success, Empress Catherine invaded and annexed the Crimean Khanate in 1783 and ended Ukrainian autonomy in 1786. At the same time, Russia extended its authority to southern Caucasia, where it established a protectorate over the eastern Georgian kingdom.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Chesme, Battle of (July 5–7, 1770); Kagul (Cahul), Battle of 1770; Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Larga, Battle of the (July 7, 1770); Orlov Count Aleksei Grigorievich (1737–1808); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791)

Following their defeat in 1774, the Ottomans reorganized their army and fleet, preparing for revenge. Both sides complained about infringements of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, and Empress Catherine II’s triumphal procession through the annexed Crimea in 1786 further infuriated the Porte.

On August 19, 1787, Sultan Abdul Hamid I, influenced by the vociferous prowar ulama, refugee Crimean Tatar nobles, and Grand Vizier Hoca Yusuf Pasha, declared war on Russia in an effort to reclaim territories lost in preceding conflicts. Russia welcomed a new conflict since it provided an opportunity to expand influence in the Black Sea littoral and realize Catherine’s long-standing “Greek Project”: the reestablishment of a Byzantine state with Constantinople as its capital. Once the war began, Austria joined on the side of Russia.

The Turks were ill-prepared and failed to prevent further Russian expansion. Although they successfully dealt with the Austrians in the Banat (parts of present-day Romania, Serbia, and Hungary), the Turks could not stop the Russian advance. The Russian Black Sea Fleet defeated the Turks at Kinburn (1787) and Fidonisi (1788); Field Marshal Pyotr Rumiantsev captured Yassy and Khotin (1788), while Prince Grigory Potemkin seized Ochakov (1788) in the Crimea. In 1789, the Russian army, under Potemkin, Suvorov, and Rumyantsev, invaded the Danubian Principalities, defeating Hasan Pasha’s army at Focşani (July 1789) and at Rymnik (Rimnic) (September 1789).

Following these two defeats, the Ottoman army retreated in confusion, abandoning Bessarabia and Wallachia. In 1790, Gazi Hasan Pasha replaced Hasan Pasha as commander of the Ottoman forces in the Balkans. With his army in disarray and lacking supplies and quality recruits, the new commander could not rectify the situation. In December 1790, in one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century, Suvorov's army stormed the powerful fortress of Ismail on the Danube and gained control of the lower Dniester and Danube rivers. Continued Russian successes in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea compelled the Turks to sign the Treaty of Jassy on January 9, 1792, whereby the Ottoman Empire ceded the entire western Ukrainian Black Sea coast to Russia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812)

This conflict must be understood within the context of the Napoleonic Wars. As Emperor Napoleon scored decisive victories over the Russo-Austrian coalition in 1805, Sultan Selim III adopted pro-French policies, which alarmed Russia. The immediate cause for hostilities was the sultan's dismissal of

two pro-Russian rulers in the Danubian Principalities, which violated the provisions of earlier agreements. In late 1806, therefore, two Russian armies crossed the Dniester River and occupied the principalities. The Porte declared war on Russia but could not dislodge the Russian force.

Over the next three years, Russian armies gradually expanded their theater of operation, reaching the Danube River in 1809 and defeating the Ottomans at Frasin, Ras-sevat, and Tataritsa. In 1810, the Russians crossed the Danube, capturing Hirsovo, Razgrad, Silistra, Ruse, and Shumla, and advancing into Bulgaria. At the same time, Russia provided considerable support to the Serbs to sustain the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813), and conducted successful operations in western Georgia and eastern Anatolia, where the Ottoman army of Yusuf Ziya Pasha was routed at Arpa Su (1808). The Russian navy defeated the Turks in the Aegean Sea in 1807 and blockaded the Dardanelles Straits.

The Ottoman war effort was greatly constrained by domestic difficulties, as a series of internal political crises shook Istanbul in 1807–1808. Sultan Selim's effort to modernize the army provoked a violent response from the ulama and the Janissaries, who overthrew the sultan in the spring of 1807. Sultan Mustafa IV's reign proved brief as well, however; he was overthrown in 1808. These power struggles occupied the attention of the Ottoman High Command and provincial notables, forcing them to adopt a defensive posture against the Russians.

In 1811, Sultan Mahmud launched a counterattack under Ahmet Pasha, but the Russians, under Mikhail Kutuzov, surrounded and starved it into submission at Ruse in November 1811. Nevertheless, as the chances of a full-scale Franco-Russian war increased, Russia sought a quick end to

its current war with the Ottoman Empire. In May 1812, Russia agreed to rather disadvantageous Treaty of Bucharest, which restored all of the Danubian Principalities, except Bessarabia, to the Ottoman Empire.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Third Coalition, War of the (1805); Tilsit, Treaty of

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Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829)

During the reign of Nicholas I, the question of the independence of Greece became central to Russo-Ottoman relations. In 1827, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom took joint action against the Porte, and their combined fleet destroyed the Egyptian fleet at Navarino Bay on October 20. Later, after Russo-British cooperation had come to an end, Russia continued to support the Greeks and declared war on the Ottoman empire on April 26, 1828; in declaring the war at this time, Russia also sought to engage the Ottoman army before the extensive military reforms, launched by Sultan Mahmud II, could take effect.

A Russian army quickly advanced into the Danubian Principalities, reaching the Danube River. Once again, the Ottoman military was ill-prepared, with the Janissaries destroyed by Mahmud in 1826 and the Ottoman fleet shattered at Navarino Bay a year

later. Russia exploited its naval supremacy to establish reliable supply lines for its land forces. Crossing the Danube, the Russian army captured Silistra and Vidin as the Ottomans, under Husrev Pasha, fell back to the defensive line in the Balkan Mountains. In 1829, Russia opened a second front in the war in southern Caucasia, where Russian troops captured Poti, Ardahan, Kars, and Erzurum and besieged Trabzon. The Russian advance into the Balkan Mountains resulted in a decisive victory at Adrianople (Edirne) which opened the route to Istanbul. To prevent a catastrophe, the Ottomans signed the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne), the terms of which were highly favorable to Russia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Adrianople (Edirne), Treaty of (1829); Greek War of Independence (1821–1829); Navarino Bay, Battle of (October 20, 1827); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855)

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Russo-Turkish War (1853–1856)

Widely known as the Crimean War, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1853–1856 was a major conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, aided by France, Britain, and Sardinia. While the war revealed the military and administrative ineptitude of both sides, it was Russia that suffered a humiliating defeat.

The problems started when France and Russia became embroiled in a dispute over

control of religious sites near Jerusalem. When the Ottoman government allowed Roman Catholics equal rights with Greek Orthodox Christians in 1852, Russia (the self-appointed protector of the Orthodox Church) began to place strong military and political pressure on the Ottoman sultan. After the Ottomans allowed the Anglo-French squadron to sail through the Dardanelles, Russia deployed troops to the borders of Moldavia and Walachia, both of which were under Turkish rule, sent a commission to Constantinople to seek Russian rights to protect Orthodox Christians, and suggested to the British ambassador a plan to partition Ottoman territories. The commission failed, and Russia occupied Moldavia and Walachia under the protests of France and Britain. The Ottoman government declared war on Russia on October 16, 1853. Government officials in France and Britain who wanted to maintain the balance of power in Europe decided to support the Turks and declared war on Russia in March 1854.

The Crimean war was fought on three main fronts. On the Danubian front, some 82,000 Russian troops under General Mikhail Gorchakov faced Omer Pasha's army (about 150,000 men) while General V. Bebutov's corps (30,000) was tasked with countering Abdi Pasha's army (up to 100,000 men) on the Caucasian front. In the Caucasus, the war began in November 1853 with the Ottoman offensive toward Aleksandronopol and Tiflis. The Russian forces successfully repelled this attack, scoring major victories at Akhaltsikhe (November 26) and Bashgedikler (December 1). The cold winter weather caused a lull in operations in the Caucasus until the spring of 1854.

Meantime, the Russians launched an offensive on the Danubian Front, but failed to break through the Ottoman positions at Oltenitsa (early November). The Ottoman

counterattacks were repelled at Cetati, Giurgiu, and Keleres between January and March 1854. On November 30, 1853, the Russian navy secured its supremacy in the Black Sea following its decisive victory at Sinope which exposed the Ottoman capital to direct Russian attack.

Alarmed by the Russian success, Britain and France sent their joint fleet to protect the Ottoman coastline in the Black Sea in January 1854, prompting Russia to declare war against them on February 21. In March 1854, Russians launched a major offensive in the Danubian Theater, crossing the Danube at Braila, Talata, and Izmail and occupying Isaccea, Tulcea, and Macin. In May, the strategic fortress of Silistra was besieged and anti-Ottoman uprisings were incited in Bulgaria.

Following Austrian threats, however, Russia was forced to abandon its newly acquired territory, move its army across the Danube and allow Austria to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. In the Caucasus, Mustafa Sarif Pasha regrouped the Ottoman forces, incited North Caucasian mountaineers to attack Russian forces in eastern Georgia and launched offensives toward Alexandronopol and Kutaisi. The Ottoman attacks, however, failed in all directions. During the summer of 1854, Russians routed the Ottomans on the Chorokh River (June 16), on the Chingil Pass (July 29), captured the fortress of Bayazid on July 31 and won a major battle over the main Ottoman army at Kürük-Dar on August 5.

The Russian victories over the Turks, however, were negated by the Anglo-French-Sardinian invasion of the Crimea, where the tide of war turned against Russia as it suffered defeat at Inkerman, Alma, Chernaya, Malakov, and Sevastopol. Russian troops were more successful in the Caucasus. The Ottoman attack in Abkhazia was repelled

by General I. Bagration-Mukhransky on the Inguri and Tskhenistskali rivers in early November, while General Nikolai Muravyev launched an offensive toward Erzurum and captured the strategic fortress of Kars on November 28. Nonetheless, Russian defeats in the Crimea decided the outcome of war and forced Emperor Alexander II to sue for peace. The Treaty of Paris (1856) reduced the prestige and territories of Russia and maintained the Ottoman Empire without strengthening it. Moldavia and Walachia (which would unite as Romania in 1858) became self-governing territories under the guardianship of European powers. The treaty also demanded that Russia remove its warships on the Black Sea and that the Danube River remain open as an international commercial river.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alma River, Battle of the (September 20, 1854); Crimean War (1853–1856); Inkerman, Battle of (November 5, 1854); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 was the most decisive of all the Russo-Ottoman wars and had profound consequences for both empires and southeastern Europe in general.

The long-term causes of this conflict lay in Russian expansionism and the political

instability of the Balkan Peninsula. Russia sought to regain losses sustained in the Crimean War of 1853–1856. The immediate cause of the war was the Russian desire to aid Balkan rebellions against Turkish rule.

In 1875–1876, Bulgarian provinces of the Ottoman Empire experienced widespread peasant rebellions while Bosnia-Herzegovina was in the throes of an uprising as well. The Ottomans managed to crush the Bosnia rebellion in the summer and early fall of 1876, but faced an uphill struggle in Bulgaria where revolts intensified. Irregular companies of Turkish vigilantes, bashibazouks, had rampaged across the region, and it is estimated that at least 25,000 Bulgarians had been slaughtered in this crackdown. One of the worst massacres occurred at Batak, where Ottoman irregulars killed as many as 5,000 Bulgarian men, women, and children. This violence inflamed public opinion across Europe and especially in Russia, where Emperor Alexander II found himself under pressure to act in defense of his Orthodox brethren. On April 24, 1877, after several months of diplomatic maneuvering to secure the support of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Romania, Russia formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

Russia deployed two main armies: the Army of the Danube (about 185,000) under Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the Caucasian Army (some 75,000 men) under Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich. The Russian plan called for the Army of the Danube to cross the Danube River upstream, pass through the Balkan Mountains, and seize Adrianople before advancing on the Ottoman capital of Constantinople. Meanwhile, the Caucasian Army launched diversionary offensives in eastern Anatolia.

The Russian armies encountered difficulties from the beginning. Lack of proper infrastructure and flooding in the Danubian



Fighting in Plevna, Bulgaria, during the final stage of Russo-Turkish Wars, which began in 1877. (Library of Congress)

principalities caused delays in crossing the Danube River. The Russian forces finally moved across the Danube by early July and launched an offensive with three main columns: the Western Detachment advanced in Nikopol and Plevna, the Eastern Detachment (led by Czarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, the future Emperor Alexander III) proceeded to Ruse, while the Advance Detachment (under General Iosef Gourko) toward the Balkan passes. Although Gourko successfully raided Veliko Tarnovo and secured approaches to the Shipka Pass, the Russian detachments soon struggled in their advance, the result of a crucial Russian mistake of sending too few troops to the front.

The Ottoman army under Osman Nuri Pasha took up strong positions at the town of Plevna (Pleven) in west central Bulgaria.

The town's strategic importance lay in its locations at the crossroads of Bulgaria's vital roadways, from where the Ottomans could threaten Russian supply and communication lines. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1877, the Russian forces launched repeated assaults on the Ottoman positions at Plevna only to be repelled with heavy losses. Meanwhile, the Caucasian Army crossed the Ottoman border in eastern Anatolia and advanced toward Bayazid, Ardahan, and Kars but was soon forced to fall back under attack of the Ottoman forces led by Ahmet Muhtar Pasha. In August, the Ottomans attempted to push the Russian forces in the Balkan Peninsula. Leading some 27,000 men, Suleiman Pasha made an attempt to relieve Osman Nuri Pasha at Plevna but was defeated by the newly formed Southern Detachment (mostly

Bulgarian troops) at Shipka Pass (August 9). Similarly unsuccessful was the Ottoman attack on the Eastern Detachment as well.

On December 10, 1877, after five months long siege, Plevna finally surrendered to the Russian army. This marked the turning point in the war as the Russians seized the initiative. Despite cold weather and snow, the Russian troops (under Gourko) crossed the Balkan Mountains, occupied Sofia on January 4, 1878, defeated the Ottoman forces of Suleiman Pasha near Plovdiv on January 15–17 and seized Adrianople (Edirne) on January 20. The Russian army now lay in a position to directly threaten Constantinople.

The Russian success however caused profound alarm among other Great Powers and especially in Britain, which sent a naval task force to the Sea of Marmara and pressured Russia to negotiate a truce with the Turks. To avoid a pan-European conflict, Russia accepted a cease-fire on January 31 and halted at San Stefano, just a few miles from Constantinople. Throughout February, Russian and Ottoman diplomats conducted negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878) that granted independence to Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and established “Greater Bulgaria” that the Russians envisioned as a satellite state.

The Treaty of San Stefano demonstrated the extent of the expansion of Russia in the Balkan Peninsula and caused considerable consternation among the other European powers, which convened the Congress of Berlin and forced Russia to accept modifications in the treaty. The resulting Treaty of Berlin reduced Russia’s gains from the war. It granted Russia southern Bessarabia, Batumi, Ardahan, and Kars and a vast war indemnity but reduced Greater Bulgaria into a smaller independent state and

placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austrian protectorate.

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 left many unresolved issues, especially with respect to national aspirations of the newly independent states. The war had a profound impact on the Ottoman Empire, which lost about one-fifth of its total population and some of its most productive territory, and was saddled with heavy reparations.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Berlin, Congress of (June 13–July 13, 1878); Gurko, Iosif Vladimirovich (1829–1901); Plevna, Siege of (July 20–December 10, 1877); San Stefano, Treaty of (1878)

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Ruzsky, Nikolai Vladimirovich (1854–1918)

Russian army general. Born into a Russian noble family on March 18, 1854, Nikolai Vladimirovich Ruzsky graduated from Konstantinovsky Military College in 1872 and was commissioned as an infantry officer that same year. He served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and was deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Military District during 1896–1902. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, he served as chief of staff of the Second Manchurian Army.

In mid-September 1914, General Ruzsky took command of the Northwestern Front. Idolized by his staff and known as a clear

thinker with a rapid grasp of problems, he also suffered from poor health. That November, Ruzsky participated in the defense of Łódź, in which he demonstrated both caution and indecisiveness.

In March 1915, Ruzsky assumed command of the Sixth Army, and that August, he was given charge of the new Northwestern Front of three armies to defend approaches to Riga and Dvinsk. In March 1916, Ruzsky left this command because of illness. He returned to service that November in command of the Northern Front from the Gulf of Riga to Lake Naroch. During the March 1917 Russian Revolution, Czar Nicholas II found himself stranded at Ruzsky's Pskov headquarters, where Ruzsky played a key role in persuading him to abdicate.

Following the March Revolution, Ruzsky was dismissed from his command, possibly for cooperating with revolutionary innovations of elected army committees and political commissars. He then traveled south to the Caucasus, where he joined other czarist generals. Taken prisoner by the Bolsheviks, he was executed at Piatogorsk on October 19, 1918.

Michael G. Uranko Jr.,

See also: February (March) Revolution (1917); Lodz, Battle of (November 11–December 6, 1914); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917)

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Rymnik, Battle of (1789)

Decisive battle of the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1791, fought on the Rymnik (Rimnic) River (in modern-day Romania) where the Russo-Austrian forces routed the Ottoman army.

The start of the new war against Russia and Austria caught the Ottomans ill-prepared. Although they successfully dealt with the Austrians in the Banat (parts of present-day Serbia and Hungary), the Turks could not stop Russian advance. The Russian Black Sea Fleet defeated the Turks at Kinburn (1787) and Fidonisi (1788), Field Marshal Pyotr Rumiantsev captured Jassy and Khotin (1788) while Prince Grigory Potemkin seized Ochakov (1788) in the Crimea. In 1789, the Russian army invaded the Danubian Principalities, defeating Hasan Pasha's army at Focșani (July 1789).

In early September 1789, Ottoman Grand Vizier Cenaze Hasan Pasha, leading some 100,000 men, attempted to destroy the isolated Austrian corps (some 18,000 men) of Prince Josias of Coburg deployed in vicinity of Focșani. Hearing about the Ottoman advance, Russian General Aleksandr Suvorov departed with some 10,000 men from Byrlad and after making a 60-mile forced march, anticipated the Ottoman troops to Focșani. Taking command of the joint Russian and Austrian forces, Suvorov conducted reconnaissance that revealed the Ottoman army deployed between the Rymna and Rymnik rivers in four separate encampments (at Tirgu-Kukuli, Kringu-Meylor, Martinesti, and beyond the Rymnik River) that were too far apart for mutual support. Despite the enemy's numerical superiority, Suvorov insisted on attack counting on speed and audacity to destroy the Turks before they could unite.

On the morning of September 22, the Russo-Austrian force crossed the Rymnik River north of the Ottoman camps and deployed in a checkerboard formation. Suvorov directed his Russian troops to the westernmost camp at Tirgu-Kukuli, while the Austrians launched attack at Kringu-Meylor. The Russians easily captured the encampment and, brushing aside the Ottoman cavalry counterattack, supported the Austrian forces at Kringu-Meylor, which was captured. The Russo-Austrian forces then pushed toward the Ottoman encampment near Martinesti, which was carried by the end of the day. The fighting proved rather one-sided and demonstrated the superiority of European tactical deployment. Russian and Austrian squares easily repelled the Ottoman cavalry charges, inflicting nearly 20,000 casualties at the cost of fewer than 1,000 losses. The following day, Suvorov pressed on his victory and

threatened the remaining Ottoman encampment beyond the Rymnik River, but the Ottomans chose to abandon it.

The victory at Rymnik is considered among the best of Suvorov's battles. The Russian general demonstrated excellent understanding of the operational and tactical situation, and skillfully led his men into a victory over a much larger opponent.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989)

Soviet nuclear scientist, dissident, and human rights activist.

Born May 21, 1921, in Moscow, the son of a physics professor, Andrei Sakharov studied physics at Moscow University during 1939–1942 and at the Lebedev Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during 1945–1947 under the eminent theoretical physicist Igor Tamm. Sakharov earned his doctorate in 1947 and joined the Soviet nuclear weapons program in 1948, working in a special group then headed by his mentor.

Spearheaded by Sakharov, Tamm's group produced the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, successfully tested in August 1953, a development that greatly intensified the nuclear arms race with the United States. For his contributions to the development of the hydrogen bomb, Sakharov received both the Lenin and Stalin prizes and earned election as a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1953.

Sakharov's participation in the Soviet nuclear weapons program lasted nearly 20 years. Initially, he believed that his work was of vital importance to the global balance of power. Over time, he grew uneasy with what he characterized as moral problems inherent in his work, and he became disillusioned with the Soviet system, specifically the absence of civil liberties and the secrecy surrounding science, culture, and technology.

Beginning in the late 1950s, Sakharov called on the Soviet regime to ban atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In the early to mid-1960s, he moved on to criticize the continuing influence of the erroneous theories of T. S. Lysenko on Soviet genetics and to protest Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's tentative first steps toward rehabilitating the legacy of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Sakharov ultimately crossed the Rubicon to full dissident in 1968, when his essay "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" appeared in the Western press.

This extended essay, also known as the Sakharov Memorandum, warned of the dangers, including thermonuclear annihilation, that threatened humanity. He pushed for reconciliation between socialist and capitalist nations, advocated democratic freedoms in the Soviet Union, denounced collectivized agriculture, and called for a careful reexamination of the Stalin era. In response, the Brezhnev regime removed Sakharov from the Soviet nuclear weapons program and stripped him of all privileges to which he had been entitled as a member of the Soviet *Nomenklatura*.

In the summer of 1969, Sakharov became a senior researcher at the Lebedev Institute, but his primary concerns for the remainder of his life were human rights and the democratization of the Soviet Union. In 1970, he and fellow physicist Valeri Chalidze established the Moscow Human Rights Committee, which advocated freedom of speech, the full implementation of the Soviet constitution,



Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, March 16, 1974. (AP Photo)

and monitored violations of the law and the constitution including the arrests of dissidents by the Soviet regime. Sakharov's efforts in the name of human rights earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, making him the first Soviet citizen to garner the award, although he was not permitted to leave the Soviet Union to claim it.

Although the Soviet *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security, or KGB) harassed Sakharov and threatened him with prosecution, he remained a free man until 1980 when, in the wake of his criticisms of the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and with the 1980 Moscow Olympics approaching, the Brezhnev regime exiled him to Gorky, a military-industrial city closed to foreigners. There Sakharov remained until December 1986, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, as part of his policy of *glasnost* ("openness"), freed him, allowing him and his wife Yelena Bonner to return to Moscow and resume his scientific endeavors.

In 1989, the Soviet Academy of Sciences selected Sakharov to serve as a deputy in

the newly established Congress of People's Deputies, the first democratically elected national legislative body to sit in Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution. There Sakharov proved to be an outspoken critic of Gorbachev, constantly pushing him to carry his political and economic reforms further. Sakharov died of a heart attack in Moscow on December 14, 1989.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security)

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SALT I (November 1969–May 1972)

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were several rounds of bilateral talks and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of armament control. SALT I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, also known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

On May 20, 1968, Soviet's first deputy foreign minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov stated in a speech to the United Nations that the Soviet Union was ready for a discussion on nuclear arms limitations. By that time, the USSR had reached a strategic point that gave it a secure foundation for attempting to obtain military, political, and economic benefits from bargaining with the United States over arms limitations. The United States had leveled off its stock of nuclear arms in 1967, allowing the Soviets a chance to catch up. Soviet leaders thus viewed SALT I as a way of codifying a parity relationship with the United States and limiting future strategic expenditures. The Soviet military viewed SALT with suspicion, however, and hoped the talks would fail or allow the USSR to gain strategic superiority through diplomatic means.

SALT dealt with the issue of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Talks launched from the mutual acceptance of the others' ability to inflict unacceptable retribution in response to a nuclear attack. The Soviets feared a U.S. technological edge, and the United States feared a Soviet numerical advantage in missiles and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development. Both powers also wanted to stabilize spending on nuclear arms, for reasons of internal politics, foreign policy, and competing defense priorities. The United States was still deeply enmeshed in Vietnam, while the Soviets were facing challenges in Czechoslovakia and from communist China. Both sides thus saw such talks as a matter of practicality.

The opening round of talks was held in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969; the talks were exclusively between the United States and Soviet Union, although the Americans occasionally did consult with their NATO allies. Vladimir S. Semenov headed the Soviet negotiating team while Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the

United States, lobbied for SALT on Capitol Hill. U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger was the chief American negotiator, but both sides had dozens of supporting staff. Paul Nitze and Llewellyn Thompson also played key roles for the United States. The substance of SALT was a mix of weapon systems limitations and strategic doctrine. Thematic elements of SALT included: parity and comparability; crisis stability; shifting from hardened sites to mobile launchers; ballistic missile defense; and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). The initial talks lasted 35 days, with hosting duties alternating between the American and Soviet embassies. Both sides agreed to another round of talks in Vienna, beginning on April 16, 1970.

The broad range of issues not only required multiple negotiating sessions but also involved a wide range of experts on each side. On the American side, Kissinger created a Verification Panel in July 1969 to serve as the review board for all strategic implications of SALT as well as the bulk of the analysis on SALT. One major problem of SALT, however, was the lack of knowledge Soviet civilian delegates had concerning the nuclear forces of their own country. The Soviet military delegates did not disclose such matters, even during the talks, and the Soviet civilian delegates thus often relied on their American counterparts for such information. Talks continued for seven different sessions, held in either Vienna or Helsinki and labeled *SALT I* through *SALT VII* (not to be confused with the SALT II talks in 1977); proposals generally focused on controlling the arms race by limiting the number of launchers on each side.

The final talks on SALT took place in Moscow during May 1972. U.S. president Nixon and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev met personally to discuss SALT, but the bulk of the work was conducted by the teams

already in place. The “Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” signed on May 26, 1972, froze all strategic missiles as of July 1, 1972. It further halted the deployment of additional ballistic missile launchers, and each side agreed it would not deploy new submarine-based missile launchers without destroying an equal number of older intercontinental ballistic missile launchers or submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers.

The most important part of SALT I, however, was the ABM Treaty, which limited the number of sites that could be protected by ABMs in each country to two. Thirteen of the treaty’s sixteen articles were designed to prevent any deviation from the ABM agreement, and a joint Standing Consultative Commission would monitor compliance. Such verification clauses helped establish at least a small basis of trust for further talks, as did the general terms of SALT I, which granted the USSR a form of parity and some sense of security. The Soviets held a 3–2 advantage in missiles and three times as much megatonnage, but the United States held the edge in deliverable warheads with 5,700–2,500. The next phase of talks would settle questions of measure, balance, and proportion.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Brezhnev Doctrine; Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Prague Spring (1968); SALT II (1972–1979); Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)

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SALT II (1972–1979)

Series of meetings between United States and Soviet negotiators from 1972 to 1977 to discuss limiting the production of strategic nuclear weapons. It was a continuation of the SALT I (1969–1971) talks that had capped the number of launchers and antiballistic missile (ABM) sites each side could deploy, and the first nuclear arms treaty that assumed real reductions in strategic forces on both sides.

The United States viewed SALT I as a lead-in to further discussions; however, the Soviets viewed it as a strategic advantage (they had more launchers and a 4–1 advantage in throw weight) they could build on by getting the United States to agree to further limit its nuclear production. Early talks favored the Soviets; in October 1974, under the Vladivostok Agreements, both sides agreed to cap the overall number of delivery systems at 2,400, but neither the type of system nor the throw weights would be limited. New missile development was banned, but the Soviets were allowed to keep their SS-18 launchers while United States retained its cruise missile and Trident submarine programs. To get the Soviets to agree, however, U.S. president Jimmy Carter had declared unilateral reductions in many American weapons programs. This gave the Soviets a short-term advantage, but probably



Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev sign the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) on June 18, 1979, in Vienna. (Carter Library)

benefitted the United States over the long term, as the Soviets no longer felt obliged to deploy additional multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) to offset a perceived American superiority.

The SALT II discussions came to an impasse in 1975 and 1976, however, over the issue of Soviet compliance. The United States claimed the Soviets had violated the terms of SALT I by concealing the construction of new missiles and submarines, failing to deactivate old missiles, claiming false deactivations, and falsifying numbers. SALT II eventually spelled out the duties of the Standing Consultative Commission regarding compliance, which was to be verified using satellite reconnaissance, and procedures for the destruction and dismantling of strategic arms. A further agreement to limit strategic launchers was reached in Vienna on June 18, 1979, and signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter. The SALT

II treaty failed ratification in the U.S. Senate, however, in January 1980.

The main reasons were the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the tremendous numerical advantages granted the Soviets by SALT II. Where the United States possessed approximately 2,000 warheads, the Soviets had 7,000; the Soviets deployed 90 ballistic missile submarines to the Americans' 39, and 950 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to the Americans' 496. The United States held a slight lead in strategic bombers with 316, compared to the Soviets' 250; however, the Soviets enjoyed an almost 10–1 superiority in ABM and interceptor systems, and a 4–1 advantage in overall throw weight. The United States nevertheless honored the terms of the treaty (as the Soviets claimed they did) until 1986, when the Reagan Administration accused the Soviets of violating the pact.

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See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); SALT I (November 1969–May 1972); Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)

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Saltanovka, Battle of (July 23, 1812)

A rearguard engagement six miles south of Mogilev (in modern Belarus) during Napoleon's Russian Campaign.

On July 7, 1812, in accordance with the amended plan, the Russian Second Western Army led by General Pyotr Bagration was ordered to join, via Mogilev, the forces of the Russian First Western Army under General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly. While en route, Bagration learned that on July 20 some forces of the I Army Corps of the *Grande Armée* under Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout had taken Mogilev and blocked the Dnieper crossing. Davout's advance guard was soon attacked near Saltanovka by Colonel Ivan Sisoiev's Cossacks and routed. Bagration, while not having an accurate estimate of the French forces, followed the order to continue on and join with Barclay de Tolly.

Additionally, Bagration sent the VII Infantry Corps under General Nikolai Raevsky (17,000 men and about 90 cannon) against forces led by Marshal Davout (nearly 21,500 men and 55 cannon) penetrating between Bagration's main forces and the First Western Russian Army. Bagration's instructions to Raevsky included reconnaissance; based on this intelligence, Bagration would either send his army to take back Mogilev or cross the Dnieper down the river near the city. The French fortified positions between the villages of Saltanovka and Fatova, which had in front a deep ravine with a stream. Davout placed the 85th Infantry Regiment and four cannon up front, while other troops were positioned en echelon between Saltanovka and Mogilev. At 7:00 a.m., the Russian advance guard (6th and 42nd *Jäger* regiments) began exchanging fire with the French pickets. Raevsky sent in two battalions of the line infantry, which compelled the French to retreat to Saltanovka. Davout then sent in reinforcements; in their attack, the Russian *Jägers* tried to take a dam across the stream but were repulsed.

In the meantime, Bagration sent Raevsky a new order to repulse the enemy and storm Mogilev. Raevsky, therefore, sent the 26th Infantry Division under General Ivan Pashkevich to outflank the French from the right, while the 12th Infantry Division prepared to commence a frontal attack. Pashkevich initially took the village of Fatova, but Davout sent in reinforcements (parts of the 108th and 61st line infantry regiments) and pushed him back. The frontal attack of Raevsky, who personally led the Smolensk Infantry Regiment across the dam (where, according to a legend—disproved by Raevsky himself—his sons, 11-year-old Nikolai and 16-year-old Aleksandr, also took part) was also unsuccessful.

Raevsky soon received a report that Davout had assembled five strong infantry

divisions supported by numerous cavalry near Mogilev. Bagration sent Raevsky an order to retreat to the nearby village of Dashkovka and hold the enemy as long as necessary. Davout's attempt to pursue and attack the Russian rearguard later that night did not bring any result. The Russians lost at Saltanovka 2,504 men (including 564 killed); the French lost nearly 4,200 killed, wounded, and missing. This battle prevented Bagration from joining the main Russian army under Barclay de Tolly at nearby Vitebsk, forcing him to retreat, via a longer route, to Smolensk.

Eman M. Vovsi

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Samsonov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1859–1914)

Russian Army general. Born November 14, 1859, Aleksandr Vasilievich Samsonov graduated from the Nikolaevsky Cavalry College in 1877 and served in the 1877–1878 Russo-Ottoman War. He graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1884. Samsonov commanded a cavalry unit during the international relief expedition to the Beijing legations during the Boxer Rebellion (Rising

in China in 1900 and was a general officer by 1902. In the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war, he commanded first a brigade and then a division. There were reports alleging that he and General Pavel Rennenkampf engaged in a brawl at the Mukden Railway Station when Samsonov accused Rennenkampf of failing to provide sufficient reinforcements during the 1905 Battle of Mukden.

Samsonov served as chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District during 1906–1907. By 1909, he was governor general of Turkestan and commanded its military district. He was in this important but remote post at the outbreak of World War I in August 1914.

Assigned command of the Second Army, Samsonov was to carry out an invasion of East Prussia from the south in conjunction with the First Army to the north under General Rennenkampf. The two generals did not get along well, and communication between the two armies was further hindered by being physically separated by the Masurian Lakes. Rennenkampf won a modest victory over the Germans at Gumbinnen on August 20, but in a brilliant maneuver, the Germans bluffed Rennenkampf in place with a single cavalry division while moving the bulk of their forces by rail south to confront Samsonov's Second Army, which was being urged forward by commander of the Northeastern Front General Yakov G. Zhilinsky, himself pressured by the French.

German colonel general Paul von Hindenburg, commanding in the East, was confident, thanks to aerial reconnaissance and intercepts of uncoded Russian wireless messages. The German concentration of forces found Samsonov's army suffering from food and ammunition shortages and was dispersed over a 60-mile front. When contact was made with the Germans, Samsonov sought permission to withdraw east, but Zhilinsky refused. On August 28, Samsonov realized

that his army was encircled. On the night of August 29, 1914, only seven miles from the frontier, Samsonov rode off alone into the woods and shot himself. In the Battle of Tannenberg (August 21–31), the Germans took 92,000 Russian prisoners; fewer than 10,000 of Samsonov's men escaped.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Gumbinnen, Battle of (August 20, 1914); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1848–1926); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914); Zhilinsky, Yakov Gri-gorevich (1853–1918)

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San Stefano, Treaty of (1878)

Treaty ending the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878.

Signed on March 3, 1878, the treaty was highly favorable to Russia. It called for the creation of autonomous principality of Bulgaria, whose territory would extend from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea. Under Article 7, a prince elected by the people but approved by the sultan would rule over Bulgaria, while Article 8 called for the Ottoman evacuation of Bulgaria and deployment of Russian forces there for two years.

Russia also compelled Turks to cede territory to Montenegro and recognize its independence. Serbia received the cities of Nis and Leskovac, and was granted independence as well. The Porte was also forced

to grant autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina, under Austrian and Russian supervision, and to recognize the independence of Romania. In the Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire lost Ardahan, Artvin, Batum, Kars, Olti, and Beyazit to Russia. The Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were declared open to all neutral ships during war and peacetime (Article 24).

The treaty, so advantageous to Russia, was rejected by the Great Powers, notably Austria and Britain, who were concerned about the spread of Russian authority into the Balkan Peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea. As tensions escalated, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck negotiated a new agreement at the Congress of Berlin in June 1878 that was far less generous to the Russians.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Berlin, Congress of (June 13–July 13, 1878); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)

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San-de-pu (Sandepu), Battle of (January 25–29, 1905)

First and the only serious Russian offensive strike on land during the Russo-Japanese War.

Following the Russian defeat at Liaoyang in September 1904, the Russian commander in chief of land forces in Manchuria, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, had established his new headquarters in the central Manchurian city of Mukden. The Japanese, who had suffered heavy casualties at Liaoyang, pursued the Russians only slowly; their resources were limited, and their commander, Field Marshal

Iwao Oyama, hoped his Third Army might compel the Russian naval base at Port Arthur to surrender and thus be able to provide reinforcements before he engaged the Russian Manchurian armies again. Kuropatkin, for his part, was waiting for reinforcements to arrive from European Russia that would allow him to overwhelm the Japanese.

His hand was forced, however, by two events: Port Arthur capitulated on January 2, 1905, freeing almost 100,000 Japanese troops; and two weeks later, on January 22, Cossacks violently dispersed a protest march in St. Petersburg, touching off a wave of strikes and demonstrations across Russia. Kuropatkin realized reinforcements might be some time in coming, given the unrest at home, and determined to strike a preemptive blow at the Japanese to delay any siege of Mukden. His immediate objective was to drive Oyama's pursuing forces south of the Taizu River, toward the city of Liaoyang, and create a buffer that would allow his troops to improve their positions unhindered by raids.

Kuropatkin's plan called for an enveloping attack on the Japanese forces stationed around San-de-pu, a small village on the left of the Japanese position between the Hun River and the railroad, some 35 miles to the south of Mukden. Second Manchurian Army was to spearhead the attack under the command of General Oskar Gripenberg, a court favorite who had been dispatched from St. Petersburg specifically to prod Kuropatkin into action and restore the morale of the Russian forces in Manchuria. His plan was for a strong attack at San-de-pu. The main element in Gripenberg's force was I Siberian Corps; all together, Second Manchurian Army contained almost 75,000 men, including about 7,000 cavalry. If successful, this would drive the Japanese back against an arm of the Sha River that ran east to west and

formed the line between the two armies in front of Mukden. Generals Aleksandr Kaulbars and Nikolai Linevich, commanding Third and First Manchurian armies, respectively, would pin the Japanese forces there in place, and complete the envelopment.

Gripenberg, who had no significant field experience and was deaf and well beyond retirement age to boot, launched his attack on January 25 despite a severe winter storm. He had made no reconnaissance, and although Gripenberg had not relayed his orders to either Kaulbars or Linevich, the Japanese were well aware of his intentions. San-de-pu was defended by the Japanese Second Army (three divisions) commanded by General Yasukata Oku and a division under Lieutenant General Naobumi Tatsumi—about 40,000 men all told. I Siberian Corps managed to cross the Hun River and take a small village about two miles in front of San-de-pu, suffering heavy losses.

Shocked, Kuropatkin ordered a halt to the operation pending an artillery barrage. Gripenberg ignored the order, however, and sent I Siberian Corps against San-de-pu once again—at least he thought it was San-de-pu. Once the Russians took the village, they discovered that San-de-pu and the main Japanese defenses, were at quarter mile further south. On arriving, I Siberian Corps encountered hardened defenses and a withering fire they could not overcome. Gripenberg refused to believe the situation reports, and withheld the news from both his subordinates and Kuropatkin. Lacking concrete directions, I Siberian Corps fought on, losing over 7,300 men in futile attacks on San-de-pu and the neighboring villages. Many soldiers fought until they were exhausted and fell asleep in the snow; of course Gripenberg had not made any arrangements for the transport of wounded, and many died more of their wounds or the cold.

All together, the Russians suffered more than 12,000 men dead and wounded, as compared to only 9,000 Japanese casualties. Although Grippenbergr was relieved of command, the operation had no real positive effects. The front lines had not changed at all, and Kuropatkin was now further convinced that offensive actions were futile. He determined to dig in deeper at Mukden and wait.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Sarikamis (Sarikamish), Battle of (December 1914–January 1915)

First major battle of the war on the Caucasus Front. Ottoman minister of war Enver Pasha sought to take advantage of Russian preoccupation with Germany and Austria-Hungary to launch an offensive through Armenia to recover territory in the Caucasus lost to the Russians in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. For the Ottoman leaders, the oil fields of Baku were the ultimate prize, but Enver had even more ambitious plans. While both sides faced daunting logistical problems in this first Ottoman strategic

initiative of the war, Ottoman leaders failed to come to grips with the fact that the Caucasus was 500 miles from the nearest Ottoman railhead at Konia.

Following the declaration of war, Enver took personal command of the Ottoman Empire's Eastern Army, consisting of the Third and Second armies. He hoped to surprise the Russians, but his offensive was slow to develop because of both logistical problems and harassment by Armenian and Kurdish tribesmen. It also occurred in the dead of winter in the worst possible weather conditions.

Kars guarded the route from the Ottoman advanced base of Erzurum to the middle of the Caucasus. A railroad led from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea with branch lines on both sides. One of these ran through Kars to Sarikamis. Enver hoped to capitalize on his superior numbers of 150,000 men against 100,000 Russian defenders under General Viktor Myshlaevsky. Russian forces were also split between their headquarters at Tbilisi and the frontier bases of Kars and Ardahan.

Enver divided his forces to move against the two Russian frontier bases, hoping to entrap the Russians. The Ottoman advance from Erzurum began on November 18, but both axes made slow progress, in part because of deteriorating weather conditions. The Russians soon halted the smaller Ottoman Second Army drive on Ardahan, allowing Myshlaevsky time to concentrate 60,000 men at Kars, under his chief of staff Major General Nikolai Yudenich.

Although ordered to retreat, Yudenich instead advanced to meet the Ottoman Third Army east of the town of Sarikamis, located 30 miles inside Russian territory between Kars and Erzurum. Each side had a few dozen artillery pieces. The battle opened on December 26, and the next day, the Ottomans were repulsed from Sarikamis. The

Ottoman 28th Division reached the Kars Road but then was driven back. On December 29, the Ottoman 30th Division took Alisofu south of the road and railway line, isolating the Russians.

The decisive day of the battle was on December 29 when some 18,000 Ottomans supported by about 20 guns faced 14,000 Russians with 34 guns. The Russians repulsed the Ottoman 30th and 31st divisions, and the Ottomans were also forced to withdraw from Alisofu. Although the Ottoman 17th Division managed to penetrate Sarikamis proper, it was annihilated there, with about 800 men taken prisoner.

Reinforced on December 31 from Kars, Yudenich saw a chance to surround the Ottoman forces. On January 1, however, Enver ordered a retreat, evading pursuit by January 4 and the end of the battle. The Battle of Sarikamis effectively destroyed the Ottoman IX Corps. Exact casualty figures for both sides are unknown but are believed to have numbered some 30,000 Russians and 50,000 Ottomans.

The Ottoman attack on Ardahan was also beaten back on January 4, and two weeks later, both Ottoman armies were back in their base of Erzurum, their strength reduced to only some 18,000 men. Perhaps 30,000 may have died just of the bitter cold weather. Unfortunately, for the Russians, this victory was not decisive. Although Yudenich was promoted to lieutenant general and received command of the Russian Caucasus Army, he was seriously short of supplies and equipment and was unable to capitalize on the situation beyond mounting a number of probing attacks. Enver, meanwhile, was forced to shelve plans for a new spring offensive following the Allied naval assault on the Dardanelles and the resulting Gallipoli Campaign (April 25, 1915–January 9, 1916).

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Caucasus Front, World War I; Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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SATURN, Operation

With the completion of Operation URANUS by November 23, 1942, the German Sixth Army, Third and Fourth Romanian armies, and portions of the German Fourth Panzer Army were encircled at Stalingrad. The next day, generals Aleksandr Vasilevsky (chief of the General Staff), Nikolai Voronov (ground forces commander) and Aleksandr Noviko (Soviet Air Force commander) flew north to the Voronezh Front (army group) headquarters to discuss a new operation called SATURN, which was to be launched by the left wing of this Front.

The aims, as envisioned by Stalin, were to disrupt all relief efforts by German forces to Stalingrad; to conduct a full-scale offensive to recapture Rostov; to destroy all German forces in the “Great Bend” of the Don River; to cut off Army Group A and its withdrawal from the Caucasus; and then to isolate and destroy its forces. Stalin and *Stavka* approved the initial plans but emphasized that Vasilevsky would devote his full attention to reducing “the ring” around Stalingrad. Stalin hoped for a decisive victory against the whole southern wing, but the elimination of the Stalingrad pocket that would free units

for SATURN was crucial, and by December, Stalin demanded that Stalingrad operations be concluded.

While *Stavka* reorganized the units for the offensive, Germany reorganized for a containment of the Soviet operations and a relief effort to Stalingrad under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein called Operation WINTERGEWITTER (“Winter Tempest”). Manstein blocked the Don-Chir Front from all Soviet attacks against Rostov, which tied down Detachment Hollidt, and Army Group Hoth to attack simultaneously from the South. By early December, the Germans had established a strong circular defense for the Sixth Army and halted Soviet troops on the outer ring, tying down over half of all Soviet forces. To block the German advances, Stalin ordered Operation KOLTZO (“Ring”) on December 11. A German attack on December 12, however, forced the Soviet command to revise both KOLTZO and SATURN, which now was pushed back to December 16.

On December 14, Stalin revised SATURN, shifting the focus of the attack southeast rather than south, and aiming at the rear of the German forces fighting their way toward Stalingrad. BOLSHOI SATURN (“Big Saturn”) now became MALYI SATURN (“Little Saturn”). Filip Golikov, the Voronezh Front commander, accepted the new plans, but Nikolai Vatutin of the Southwestern Front rejected them and argued to save BIG SATURN. Voronov, Golikov, and Vatutin met to get a unified agreement with no success until Stalin intervened with a direct order for compliance for LITTLE SATURN.

Both commanders would act in tandem in limited operations. They were to surround and eliminate the Italian Eighth Army and Army Detachment Hollidt to develop an offensive through Nizhny-Astakhov to Morozovsk. The Voronezh Front, with its Sixth Army, was to secure all German attacks

from the west, while Vatutin would concentrate and attack eastward from Osetrovka. Fifth Tank Army would move south to block German advances. The LITTLE SATURN area of operations was 140 kilometers wide and 210 kilometers deep, located between the Northern Donets, Chir, Don, and Derkul rivers. The timetable was five to six days.

LITTLE SATURN began at 8:00 a.m. on December 16 with a 90-minute artillery bombardment that was hampered by heavy fog and left many German positions undamaged. It also forced the grounding of Soviet air operations until December 16. Despite the slow start, the Soviet forces pressed their attack. They drove into the German, Italian, and Romanian defenses, forcing a mass retreat westward. The Soviet XXIV and XXV tank corps penetrated south through these retreating forces, for a deep penetration south where logistical shortages hampered their effectiveness. By December 19, XXIV Tank Corps, under the command of Vasily Badanov had advanced 55 kilometers to Mankovo. It reached Degtevo on December 21, Bolshinka by December 22, and Skosyraskaya on December 23. With only 100 tanks still operational, he planned the attack against Tatsinskaya.

Meanwhile, XXV Tank Corps under Aleksandr Pavlov battled the retreating Italian forces until December 20, then resumed its advance toward Morozovsk, bypassing isolated enemy units, and on December 21, reached the Uryupin area, which was defended by the German 306th Infantry Division and the 8th Luftwaffe Field Division. Pavlov secured the area within three days, however, his losses were so great that he was unable to continue any further advance. The IV Guards Rifle Corps (from First Guards Army) followed both XXIV and XXV tank corps, securing Chertkovo and Millerovo. Their major problem was the many isolated enemy pockets caught in the trap.

As the Germans shifted forces to account for the collapse of the Italians and the threat to the supply lines at Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk, Badanov attacked Tatsinskaya with three tank brigades at 7:00 a.m. on December 24. His forces quickly overcame the German defenses and secured the supply depot and airfield for five days. The Germans were able to press a relief attack, however, and Badanov found himself surrounded. Stalin ordered Vatutin to make sure Badanov was not left behind.

Vatutin ordered an independent breakout. With only 30 tanks left and short of supplies, Badanov improvised by mixing German fuel oil with aviation octane, and his remaining forces broke through on December 29 after a running duel with German panzers. German forces reoccupied Tatsinskaya the following day.

By then Operation LITTLE SATURN had come to an end. It had accounted for 12,000 German casualties, including 4,769 prisoners, and the capture of 84 tanks, 196 guns, and 431 aircraft. The Italians lost 84,830 men killed, captured, or missing, and all of their equipment. The Romanian Third Army also suffered high casualties; neither the Italians nor the Romanians again factored into the order of battle on the Eastern Front. More important was that Germany could no longer relieve the surrounded Sixth Army at Stalingrad.

Operation LITTLE SATURN was the first Soviet deep penetration operation on the Eastern Front, and they had some difficulty coordinating the tank and rifle units. Their inability to quickly penetrate the enemy defenses had seriously upset the Soviet timetable, and inadequate or inaccurate artillery support and recurring logistical problems had crippled sustained operations. Nevertheless, the operation had achieved its major aims and more. For the first time on the

Eastern Campaign, hundreds of columns of prisoners escorted by Soviet troops went into captivity.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Golikov, Filip Ivanovich (1900–1980); Novikov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1900–1976); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); *Stavka*; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977); Vatutin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1901–1944); Voronov, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1899–1968); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich (1860–1927)

Russian diplomat and foreign minister. Born on July 29, 1860, in Riazan Province, Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov studied at the prestigious Alexander Lyceum. He entered the Foreign Ministry as a junior diplomat in 1883 and was sent to London in 1890. Rising rapidly through the ranks, Sazonov went to Rome as minister to the Vatican in 1894 and then to London in 1904. There he was the senior Russian diplomat resolving the potentially dangerous Dogger Bank Incident

during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) when Russian warships fired on the Hull fishing fleet during the night of October 21–22, 1904.

Following the resignation of Aleksandr Izvolsky, Sazonov became foreign minister in 1910. Deeply nationalistic and religious, and not the most skilled diplomat, Sazonov tried, albeit mostly unsuccessfully in the face of great odds, to prevent tensions from erupting into war. He went to Berlin in 1910 to reduce tensions with Germany over the Ottoman Empire. While this gambit was successful, it aroused the suspicions of Russia's allies, the British and French, that he was abandoning Izvolsky's pro-Western policy. The next year, Sazonov endeavored to prevent war in the Balkans. He failed, and the Balkan states and Ottoman Empire fought two wars, in 1912 and 1913.

Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Sazonov tried to ease Austria-Hungary's harsh ultimatum to



Russian foreign minister Sergei D. Sazonov, a key player in the lead-up to World War I. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

Serbia, but again he was unsuccessful. Sazonov did argue to Czar Nicholas II that Russia could not delay a general mobilization, as any delay would be regarded as appeasement. The czar ordered mobilization, and Europe went to war.

During World War I, Sazonov tried to entice various neutral states into joining the Allies, but that effort achieved mixed results. Romania and Italy entered the war on the Allied side, but the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria joined the Central Powers. A liberal monarchist, Sazonov urged Nicholas to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the Duma and dismiss Grigory Rasputin. Instead, the czar dismissed Sazonov in 1916. In 1918, the staunchly anticommunist Sazonov became foreign policy adviser to General Anton Denikin and Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, two White (monarchist) leaders in the Russian Civil War. Sazonov then left Russia and settled in France. He died at Nice on December 25, 1927.

Michael Share

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916); Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

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Schedule 19 (Plan 19)

Russia's mobilization and deployment plan that went into effect upon the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. General Yuri Danilov of the Russian General Staff (*Stavka*) developed the plan in 1910; it characterized a shift from previous Russian military plans, which had been defensive in nature following Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). As the Russians reformed and strengthened their armed forces, they revised their war plans accordingly. Schedule 19 was thus an offensive strategy aimed at both Austria-Hungary and Germany. Schedule 19 was not, however, specific about how and where to use mobilized reinforcements and resources arriving in the zone of operations, which caused serious problems when war came in 1914.

Schedule 19 provided for two divergent strategies: Plan A (if Austria was the primary enemy) and Plan G (directed against Germany). Schedule 19 shifted the mobilization center of gravity further east, which provided security but exposed the westernmost districts of Russian Poland. Additionally, Russian formations would have to go further to reach their assembly areas, straining an already limited logistical infrastructure. Both planning options envisaged early offensive operations, and *Stavka* would have to implement final planning on where reinforcements would go by the ninth day of mobilization (M+9)—toward variant A or G. *Stavka* planners did not like the complexity and ambiguity inherent in Schedule 19 and modified the plan in 1912 to include more specific resources and objectives. The dispersed nature of Schedule 19 still resulted in a lack of concentration after mobilization was completed. The Russian numerical advantage against Austria-Hungary, which should have been significant, was a narrow margin

of only about 20 percent. When war broke out in 1914, *Stavka* implemented Schedule 19. In the south, the Southwestern and Western fronts (army groups), a total of 16 corps, mobilized and attacked Austria along a 400-kilometer front. Despite some initial setbacks, they defeated the Habsburg armies by late September 1914 and had besieged the key Austrian fortress city of Przemyśl.

Matters were more complicated in the north. Under the provisions of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1890, the Russian General Staff was committed to invading East Prussia on the 15th day of mobilization—long before the Russian armies would be fully concentrated or have their logistical trains in order. The Northwestern Front, consisting of two armies of nine corps, nevertheless invaded East Prussia as called for by the plan, and as Czar Nicholas II had promised the French he would.

To make matters worse, *Stavka* improvised and withheld reinforcement divisions from the Northwestern Front in order to assemble a new army in the vicinity of Warsaw. These changes, combined with a lack of readiness and exacerbated by poor communications and coordination, doomed the East Prussian invasion, and played a significant role in the Russian defeat at Tannenberg in late August 1914.

Tim Wilson

See also: Galicia, Battle of (1914); *Stavka*; Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Zhilinsky, Yakov Grigorevich (1853–1918)

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Second Balkan War. *See* Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

Second Coalition, War of the (1798–1802)

A second attempt by the European powers to band together and stop the victorious French armies under Napoleon Bonaparte from conquering Europe.

After the Peace of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797), Bonaparte, the victor of the Italian campaigns of 1796–1797, received orders to prepare to invade Britain. He, however, suggested an alternative campaign. He realized the great challenges in crossing the English Channel in the face of a superior enemy navy. Egypt, on the other hand, seemed to him to be the crossroads of the world, and a hinge for the British Empire in the East. He therefore proposed taking a force across the Mediterranean to invade the land of the pharaohs.

In mid-May 1798, Bonaparte left the port of Toulon with some 36,000 men. The French managed to evade a British naval force, and landed at Malta where, on June 10, they took the island from the Order of the Knights of St. John. Shortly thereafter, Bonaparte left a small garrison force and with the majority of his army proceeded to Egypt where his troops landed near Alexandria on July 1. Bonaparte then fought a series of battles with the Mameluke rulers of Egypt.

On July 2, he seized Alexandria, and nearly three weeks later, on July 21, the French fought a force of 6,000 Mameluke cavalry, together with a large army of local levies—perhaps as many as 54,000

infantry, though many of these sat out the battle. The Mamelukes attacked the French on the west side of the river Nile near the Pyramids. The French infantry, deployed in squares, held fast, and their firepower easily repulsed the repeated charges of their opponents. Bonaparte was so impressed with the Mamelukes' courage that he recruited some of them into his own units. Thereafter, the French took Cairo. Bonaparte seemed to have achieved his goals.

At the height of this seemingly triumphant campaign though, the fleet that had transported Bonaparte's army to Egypt suffered a catastrophic defeat on August 1 in Aboukir Bay at the hands of a British force commanded by Commodore Sir Horatio Nelson. When the night battle ended, the British had captured or destroyed all but two ships in the French fleet. This victory at the head of the Nile cut off Bonaparte's communications with France, and thus condemned his troops to ultimate defeat.

Bonaparte tried to escape the consequences and preempt a Turkish offensive after Sultan Selim III declared war on France. He moved out of Egypt to invade Syria, brushing aside the ineffective Turkish resistance at Jaffa and besieging the port city of Acre. The small garrison, led by the British admiral Sir Sidney Smith and buoyed by two British ships anchored offshore, held on despite the presence of superior French forces outside the town. For a month, from mid-March to mid-April 1799, the French tried but failed to break into the city, and when plague struck his troops, Bonaparte had no choice but to raise the siege.

Austrian armies in Italy meanwhile had largely reversed the gains Bonaparte had made in his brilliant campaigns of 1796–1797, so Bonaparte decided to abandon his troops in Egypt. Moving secretly by frigate, he, several senior officers, some scientists,

and about 200 troops, sailed for France on August 22, 1799. The small group reached France on October 9, and within a week, Bonaparte had reached Paris.

The military situation in Europe was in flux. While Napoleon had been fighting in Egypt, the Second Coalition had come into being. Austria, Russia, Turkey, the Papal States, Portugal, Naples, and Britain had joined together to try to contain revolutionary France. Despite its combined military power, the coalition's fundamental weakness proved to be its failure to compel all coalition partners to remain faithful to the alliance and not conclude a separate peace. In time, Bonaparte was able to pick apart the coalition, exposing its lack of genuine unity.

While Bonaparte was campaigning in Egypt, fighting had resumed on the European continent in 1799. There were three main theaters of conflict. A combined Anglo-Russian army was threatening northern Holland, while Austrian armies with Russian support were moving through southern Germany to the Rhine and across northern Italy to reverse Bonaparte's great victories in the campaign for Mantua in 1796–1797. The center of gravity of this broad campaign was northern Italy, and its outcome determined the fate of the Second Coalition.

The French assumed the offensive when Lazare Carnot, in charge of the overall French military effort, formulated a strategy that called for an attack on all three fronts. After some early successes though, it seemed that Carnot's plan had proven over-ambitious. On March 25, 1799, at Stockach in southern Germany, the Austrians defeated a French army led by General Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, who first retreated across the Rhine, and then conceded his command to General André Masséna. As part of the allies' strategy, another Austrian army commanded by *Feldmarschalleutnant* Paul Kray *Freiherr*

von Krajova moved into northern Italy, and on April 5 at Magnano, south of Verona, it met General Barthélemy Schérer's army, halted its attack, and broke the French right flank, whereupon Schérer's troops retreated westward, followed closely by the Austrians reinforced with a Russian army.

At Cassano, just east of Milan, the combined Austro-Russian army attacked on April 27. Troops under Russian field marshal Aleksandr Suvorov stormed the French position along the river Adda. Despite hard-fought resistance from the badly outnumbered French, the Austrians seized the position, and soon thereafter occupied Milan and, in late May, Turin. The French under General Jean Moreau retreated across northern Italy to Genoa.

To assist Moreau, the French government sent another force, commanded by General Jacques Macdonald, to northern Italy. Suvorov, realizing he could become trapped between the converging French armies, moved to attack Macdonald at the Trebbia River on June 18–19. After two days of savage fighting, Macdonald retreated toward Moreau near Genoa, and it appeared that the Allies had reconquered Italy. The final battle took place north of Genoa at Novi, as General Barthélemy Joubert tried to stop Suvorov on August 15. The larger allied army seized the heights from the entrenched French defenders, leaving Joubert and four divisional commanders among the dead. Moreau then led the retreat back to France.

French forces managed to resist the allied offensive on the northern front. A combined Anglo-Russian army landed in northern Holland, and French forces under General Dominique Vandamme attacked on September 19 at Bergen op Zoom. While the British resisted the French surge, the Russians broke, and the Duke of York had to retreat north, ending the allied threat from that theater.

The allies also threatened southern Germany and Switzerland in the final offensive of its three-pronged assault. Between June 4 and 7, 1799, the Austrians and French clashed at Zürich in French-controlled Switzerland in a four-day battle that caused many casualties and forced the French under Masséna to retreat. The Austrian commander, Archduke Charles, became ill, and command devolved upon Suvorov, who continued the advance. He divided his army, sending different parts through the various mountain passes, where Masséna managed to hold up some columns while savagely beating others. As he maneuvered back and forth near Zürich on September 25–26, Masséna dealt Suvorov such a terrible defeat that, disgusted with the strength of France's resistance and the weak allied effort, Czar Paul I withdrew Russia from the Second Coalition in late October.

By this point, Bonaparte had returned from Egypt and sought to restore France's crumbling position in northern Italy. He helped to engineer a coup, claiming that the Directory, which had led France, was not up to the challenge. Now firmly in charge of the government at home, he moved to gain control of the war effort. He realized that the Austrians were the key, and the Italian front was the center of gravity. He intended to have French forces hold back the allies on the other two fronts while he fought for decisive victory in northern Italy.

As Masséna tried to defend Genoa, Bonaparte gathered forces, and moved from Switzerland through the Alpine passes in the late spring of 1800. Masséna surrendered Genoa on June 4, and Austrian troops under General Michael von Melas occupied the city. Bonaparte began a rapid march through the St. Bernard Pass to confront Melas who, though cheered by his victory at Genoa, remained concerned about Bonaparte's approach. The French vanguard fought the Austrian rearguard near Montebello on

June 9 and forced the Austrians back, as more and more French troops moved to concentrate east of Alessandria and south of the River Po.

The result was the Battle of Marengo, fought on June 14, 1800. Realizing that Bonaparte had concentrated on his rear—his line of retreat and communications through Italy to Vienna—Melas attacked, surprising Bonaparte and driving the outnumbered French back several miles throughout the morning and early afternoon. As more forces arrived though, Bonaparte committed them to halt the attack. Melas retired to Alessandria that afternoon and turned over command to a subordinate. The Austrians then paused, giving Bonaparte time to reorganize his troops, and to commit 6,000 late-arriving French cavalry, whom he sent crashing into the Austrians' flank. The reinvigorated and strengthened French army transformed a near defeat into a decisive victory. Melas agreed to a truce, and withdrew north of the Mincio River and east of the Po, while Bonaparte returned to France.

As Bonaparte was reestablishing French supremacy in northern Italy and the fighting stalled in Holland, the French regained the initiative in southern Germany. Moreau followed up his victory in the second Battle of Stockach, on May 3, moving from Baden into Bavaria. Pursuing the retreating Austrians, Moreau attacked on June 19 with such determination that his opponents, though outnumbering his own forces, could not organize a coordinated defense below Höchstädt, and after 18 hours, had to abandon the town.

Bonaparte's victory at Marengo led to six months of armistice talks between France and Austria. Fighting had ended in Holland, and both Bonaparte and Moreau halted after their victories at Marengo and Höchstädt. As negotiations ebbed and flowed, the Austrians built up their army facing Moreau to

more than 130,000, while Bonaparte reinforced Moreau to 119,000. On December 3, the Austrian commander, Archduke John, seeking to turn Moreau's left flank, attacked him east of Munich, near Hohenlinden, only to be decisively defeated. In the course of 15 days, the Austrians retreated nearly 200 miles, all the way to Vienna.

Two other French armies maintained the pressure on Austria. Macdonald moved from Switzerland into the Tyrolean Alps, and another army commanded by General Guillaume Brune completed the task of pushing the Austrians out of northern Italy. By this point, the Austrian emperor, Francis I, realized the futility of his position and signed the Treaty of Lunéville on February 8, 1801, which meant that Britain remained France's only significant opponent.

Undaunted, Britain took advantage of Bonaparte's preoccupation with the fighting in northern Italy to confront the remaining French forces in Egypt. On March 8, 1801, Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Abercromby landed an army at Aboukir Bay. As the British force marched to Alexandria, French general Jacques Menou came out to oppose them. Ferocious fighting on March 20–21 resulted in a British victory, and the subsequent French surrender of Cairo and Alexandria, in June. All other French forces followed suit and were returned to France in British ships. Britain also maintained its control of the seas.

As the Second Coalition teetered toward defeat, many of the Baltic countries came together in the League of Armed Neutrality (consisting of Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia) to protect themselves from Royal Navy vessels sent to the Baltic to interdict neutral commerce with France and its allies. On April 2, 1801, a British fleet under Nelson sailed into Copenhagen harbor, severely damaging 12 Danish warships in a fierce struggle. Denmark quickly agreed to

peace with Britain and a withdrawal from the League. After Russian czar Paul I was assassinated in March, however, his successor, Alexander I, adopted a decidedly pro-British policy. Thus ended any further threat posed by the Baltic States.

After about a year of inaction, during which time Britain found itself powerless to contest French power on the Continent, and France, conversely, proved itself unable to challenge Britain's mastery of the seas, the two belligerents signed a treaty at Amiens on March 25, 1802, ending the War of the Second Coalition. This peace was to last a mere 14 months before Britain and France once more went to war what contemporaries in Britain called "the Great War," now known as the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815).

Charles M. Dobbs

See also: Armed Neutrality, League of (1801); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Paul I, Czar (1754–1801); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Second World War, Soviet Union in (1939–1945). See World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

Sevastopol

Naval base and Hero City of the Soviet Union.

The city of Sevastopol, technically part of Russia today, is located on the southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula. In 2012, it had just

under 400,000 residents, and the city has a long history as a naval outpost of strategic importance. The ruins of an ancient Greek port can be seen in the western portion of the city. Modern Sevastopol was founded in 1783 by an Admiral Makenzie (possibly Rear Admiral Thomas Makenzie of the Royal Navy) who was working in the service of the Russian monarchy. In 1784, Czarina Catherine I commanded a permanent fortification be built to replace the earthworks of the harbor, and by 1788, Sevastopol became the permanent home of the Russian Black Sea Squadron.

One of the major events in the history of Sevastopol occurred during the Crimean War. For 11 months during 1854–1855, the Russian defenders of the city were under siege by British, French, Turkish, and Sardinian troops. While the Russians held out admirably, they were eventually forced to abandon their positions.

During World War II, the city once again withstood a siege by invaders. This time the siege was conducted by elements of the German Eleventh Army and consisted of not only ground assaults but also aerial bombardment. The city held out for a total of 250 days over 1941–1942 until it was forced to capitulate once more. The city was retaken by Soviet forces in 1944, and was awarded the title “Hero City of the Soviet Union” due to the tenacity with which it had resisted the German invaders.

During the Cold War, Sevastopol became what was known as a “closed city”; non-residents needed permission to enter, and the province was administered by Moscow, not the Ukrainian Socialist Republic. This designation resulted from the establishment of Sevastopol as a massive naval base that housed the entirety of the Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet. The base allowed the USSR to project strength across the entirety of the Black Sea, and to ensure it could not be easily

assaulted through the amphibious landings on the Black Sea. As the Cold War expanded during the 1950s and 1960s, aircraft carriers and their protective ships and submarines became vital elements of national security. Naval bases such as Sevastopol thus took on greater significance for military planning.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, however, control of the city came into dispute. Sevastopol was reluctantly handed over by Russia to the Ukrainian government in 1997. Until 2014, Sevastopol housed a naval base for Ukraine, as well as a naval base leased by the Russian government. It was also a popular seaside resort. In the spring of 2014, however, “independent forces” (likely Russian soldiers) seized control of Crimea and forced a plebiscite that invalidated the 1997 treaty and returned the peninsula to Russian control.

Nicholas Efsthathiou

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Crimean War (1853–1856); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918); Navy, Soviet (1917–1991); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

The Crimean War, in large measure, was fought over the issue of maintaining the balance

of power in Europe and preventing Russian expansion into the Ottoman territories. The allies needed to punish the powerful Russian Black Sea Fleet, based at Sevastopol, for its atrocious role in the Sinope “massacre,” of November 30, 1853, to contain Russian ambitions in the Dardenelles, and to destroy this threat to British naval supremacy. As a result, the capture of Sevastopol became a major objective of the war.

The allies landed their troops at Calamita Bay, on the Crimean coast, beginning on September 14, 1854. After the British, French, and Turks assembled their forces, they began the southward march toward Sevastopol on September 19. The next day, the Russians, defending on the south bank of the Alma River, attempted to halt the allied advance at the Battle of the Alma. After a hard fight, the allies continued their advance.

Opportunities were probably missed by not attacking Sevastopol from the north before the city’s defenses were better prepared, and the allies made a flank march around Sevastopol on September 25–26.

General (later Field Marshal) Fitzroy J.H. Somerset, First Baron Raglan, British commander in chief, made the decision to besiege Sevastopol on September 28, 1854, and directed that the siege trains be landed on shore. The allies held a war council on October 7, 1854, and the siege of Sevastopol began the next day.

The city defenses were strengthened considerably, mainly under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Eduard I. Totleben. Many of the Russian ships were intentionally sunk to block the mouth of the Sevastopol harbor, and the guns were removed for use in the defense of the city. The



Siege of Sevastopol, 1854–1855, by Franz Alekseevich Roubaud (1856–1928). The city, on the Black Sea, was besieged for 11 months during the Crimean War. (Prisma/UIG/Getty Images)



Russians quickly constructed ramparts and established six main redoubts on the Sevastopol perimeter. From west to east these redoubts were the Quarantine Bastion, the Central Bastion, the Flagstaff Bastion, the Redan, the Malakov, and the Little Redan. By the middle of October 1854, the Russians had in their defensive positions 342 guns, of which 118 were heavy caliber and able to reach the allied siege lines.

The first allied bombardment, using 126 land-based and other naval guns, began on October 17, 1854. This bombardment was

poorly coordinated, and all 30 major allied ships were damaged. The barrage continued until October 25, but was a failure. When the bombardment stopped, the Russians attempted to break the siege by attacking at Balaklava (October 25) and Inkerman (November 5). The former was a tactical success for the Russians, but the latter was definitely a tactical and strategic defeat for the Russians.

The allies were very slow in preparing their siege positions. Over the winter months, logistical mismanagement and dubious leadership

caused the British soldiers to suffer unimaginable privations. Shelter and clothing was inadequate, the diet monotonous, medical care poor, and transportation entirely insufficient to move supplies from Balaklava harbor to the soldiers.

Even though more and better supplies began to arrive for the British soldiers early in 1855, the strength of the British army had declined significantly, with only about 11,000 men physically fit for duty and 23,000 sick and wounded at the beginning of February 1855. In that month, the plan for the allied conduct of the siege changed, with the numerically superior French forming a second corps to take over the right sector of the siege works, especially in front of the Malakov and the Little Redan. The I French Corps remained in the left sector, and the British were to concentrate their operations in front of the Great Redan. This began the period of the “new siege.”

Attacks took place periodically. The Russians captured the Mamelon, a small hill about 400 yards in front of the Malakov, on the night of February 22, 1855. They also made a sortie against the French on March 22, 1855, and temporarily held some of the French line. The allies began their second large-scale bombardment of Sevastopol on April 9, 1855. For 10 days, 382 French and 138 British guns fired about 165,000 rounds into the fortress city, and were answered by 998 Russian artillery pieces that fired 90,000 rounds. The Russians worked indefatigably and repaired the damage each night, although they abandoned the destroyed Flagstaff Bastion. This bombardment caused significant casualties on all sides, including 6,131 Russian, 1,587 French, and 263 British casualties.

The French, under a new commander, conducted a fierce but successful night attack on May 22, 1855, on Russian defenses between

Quarantine Bay and the Central Bastion. This operation cost the French 2,303 men.

The third allied bombardment of Sevastopol began on June 6, 1855, enabling the British to advance to the Great Redan and the French to capture the Mamelon. Allied artillery again pounded the Russian defenses on June 17, preparing an allied assault the next day in which the British planned to capture the Great Redan and the French to seize the Malakov. Confusion and Russian preparedness caused the attack to fail disastrously, with the British sustaining about 1,500 casualties and the French twice that number. Demoralized and ill, Raglan died on June 28.

The last Russian attempt to break the allied siege by field operations was the Battle of Chernaya (August 16, 1855). Sardinian forces, which had arrived in the Crimea on May 8, 1855, assisted the French in defeating the Russians in this engagement. The allies, then with over 800 guns, responded by intensifying their bombardment of Sevastopol.

Beginning on August 17, 1855, the allies continually bombarded the defenses for 10 days, and again from September 5 to 8, 1855, causing more than 7,500 Russian casualties during the latter period alone. At noon on September 8, the allies attacked the defenses. The British, numbering 11,000 troops, were repulsed from the Great Redan three times, having seemingly lost their nerve and discipline. The French surprised the Russians and seized the Malakov, a decisive position.

That night the Russians, having lost 12,913 men, withdrew across a floating bridge to the north side of Sevastopol Bay, abandoning their defense of Sevastopol. The allies, having suffered about 10,040 casualties in the attack, entered the ruins of Sevastopol on September 12.

Other than operations at Kinburn and at Kars in October and November 1855, respectively, the allied capture of Sevastopol marked the end of major operations in the Crimea. The adversaries seemed to have lost heart for a continuation of combat.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.,

See also: Alma River, Battle of the (September 20, 1854); Balaclava, Battle of (October 25, 1854); Crimean War (1853–1856); Inkerman, Battle of (November 5, 1854); Kinburn, Battle of (October 17, 1855); Sevastopol; Sinop, Battle of (November 30, 1853); Tottleben, Eduard (1818–1884)

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Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

The term *Seven Years' War* is something of a misnomer, particularly with regard to Russian history. The war really began in 1754 with a conflict between Great Britain and France, aided by its Indian allies, known there as the French and Indian Wars, or King Phillip's War, or even the War of Conquest. The European component of this conflict did not get underway until 1756, but it is often seen as a continuation of the War of Austrian Succession, with this segment lasting seven years (to 1763). Russia did not get involved until 1757 and withdrew from the conflict in 1762, with the accession of Catherine II. The

Russian name, "The Prussian War," reveals the nature of Russian involvement.

Prussia had been for some time Russia's rival in the Baltics, and the foreign policy of Elizabeth I and her chancellor, Alexis Bestuzhev-Ryumin, generally supported Austria as a check on Prussian power. Prussia's seizure of Silesia in 1740, justified by its king, Frederick II (the Great), on the grounds that Maria Theresa was not, as a female, the legitimate Empress of Austria, must also have worried Elizabeth, particularly since few states had come to Austria's defense. Her position was awkward though, because Russia had only recently concluded a trade agreement with Great Britain that, not coincidentally, included subsidies for the empress's treasury, and Prussia was now allied with Britain. When Prussia took advantage of the declaration of war between France and Britain in May 1756 to launch an invasion of Saxony, however, Elizabeth foreswore the subsidies, renewed her pledge of support for Austria, and ordered Field Marshal Stepan Fyodorovich Apraksin to prepare her forces for war.

It took Apraksin just over a year, but in June 1757, he led some 75,000 troops toward Memel (Klaipeda), one of Prussia's strongest fortresses on the Baltic. After a five-day bombardment, the Russians took the fort by storm. After leaving a garrison at Memel and gathering reinforcements, Apraksin advanced into East Prussia. On August 17, the Russians met and defeated Frederick II in the Battle of Gross Jägersdorf. Instead of pursuing the reeling Prussians, however, Apraksin hurriedly retreated to Memel, scorching the earth as he went. This puzzling maneuver, which Apraksin blamed on a lack of supply during his court martial, allowed Frederick to regroup and concentrate his forces against first France, whom he defeated at Rossbach in November

1757, and then Austria, which was defeated at Leuthen the following month. His invasion of Moravia in early 1758, however, was stymied at Domstadt.

In the interim, Elizabeth had replaced Apraksin with General William Fermor, and during the winter of 1757–1758, Russian forces once again occupied East Prussia. Frederick II did not consider the Russians his most pressing threat though, and only turned east in summer. On August 25, 1758, his force of about 35,000 men fought Fermor's army of almost 45,000 to a bloody draw at Zorndorf. Each side lost some 10,000 men killed, and though it was the Russians who withdrew from the field, neither side was capable of further action. Elizabeth was horrified by the losses and replaced Fermor with General Count Peter Saltykov, but vowed to fight on.

During 1759–1761, Saltykov inflicted several defeats on the Prussians. At the Battle of Paltzig, in July 1759, the Russian army of nearly 47,000 men overwhelmed a Prussian force of only 25,000 under General Carl von Wedel. Saltykov then pursued the Prussians to Kunersdorf, where he joined forces with an Austrian army of 18,000 under General Ernst von Laudon to hand a stinging defeat to Frederick's army of 50,000. After some initial local defeats, the Russian artillery in the center of the allied position had shredded the Prussian attackers; Frederick lost more than 25,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or captured. Allied losses were slightly greater, but the Prussian force had fled in disarray and left the road to Berlin open. To Frederick's delight and amazement, Saltykov instead retired to Saxony, though the Russians would briefly occupy Berlin in October 1760.

The battles of 1760–1761 were, from the Russian perspective, relatively minor. The string of defeats in East Prussia had left Frederick short of troops, and he suffered

a string of defeats against the Austrians at Landshut (June 1760), against the French at Marburg, and against the Swedes in Pomerania. Fortunately for Frederick, his opponents' forces were increasingly dispersed, as Britain declared war on Spain, which caused France to join the Spanish in attacking Portugal, Britain's ally. Still, Russian successes in taking the Prussian fort at Kolberg in the autumn of 1761 left Prussia on the edge of disaster. Britain pressed Frederick II to make peace and concentrate his forces in the west, threatening to withdraw its subsidies if he did not.

Once again fortune smiled on Frederick; on December 25, 1761, Czarina Elizabeth I passed away and was succeeded by her nephew, Peter III. Peter, the son of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, was an admirer of Frederick, and of all things Prussian and German. He even donned a Holstein uniform when playing soldier. One of his first acts as czar, therefore, was to withdraw Russian forces from the war; he advised his erstwhile allies, the Austrians and Swedes, that they would be wise to do the same. Shortly thereafter, Peter III concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Prussia; in one of the articles, he ceded back to Prussia all territories Russia had taken over the previous five years.

This, on top of many other foibles, made Peter III exceptionally unpopular in Russia. In June 1762, a conspiracy among the Imperial Guards regiments overthrew him and placed his wife on the throne as Catherine II. With her position still insecure though, Catherine did not renew hostilities with Prussia. She opted instead for neutrality. This "Miracle of the House of Brandenburg," as it came to be known, allowed Frederick to recoup his forces, drive the Austrians from Silesia, and bring the war in Europe to a close in 1763 on relatively favorable terms.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Fermor, William (ca. 1702–1771); Gross-Jaegersdorf, Battle of (August 30, 1757); Kunersdorf, Battle of (August 12, 1759); Lacy, Count Peter (1678–1751); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762); Rumiantsev, Pyotr (1725–1796); Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

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Sha-ho, Battle of the (October 10–17, 1904)

Land engagement in the Russo-Japanese War.

When the Russo-Japanese War began, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, commander of Russian land forces in Manchuria, announced his intention to defend the city of Liaoyang to the end. Before that, he would stage a fighting retreat to drain the Japanese as they approached. When the Battle of Liaoyang started in September 1904, however, Kuropatkin still felt his force was insufficient to stage an offensive, and so after a defensive battle, he withdrew toward Mukden.

As part of the defense of Mukden, Kuropatkin positioned his forces south of the city along the Sha River (Sha-ho, in Chinese) that ran east to-west, with the intent of halting the Japanese advance through a preemptive stroke. The main attack would be carried out by the Eastern Detachment of Lieutenant General Georgy Stakelberg (Shtakelberg); as this force turned the Japanese right flank, General Aleksandr Bilderling's Western

Detachment would strike, cutting off the Japanese First Army and destroying it. Behind the lines, Lieutenant General Nikolai Zubarev commanded a strategic reserve of three corps and a Cossack cavalry brigade. Taken together, the Russian forces totaled more than 210,000 men.

Thirty miles to the south, Japanese Field Marshal Iwao Oyama disposed of 170,000 men in three armies. On his right (eastern) wing, General Tametomo Kuroki commanded First Army, while General Yasukata Oku's Second Army held the left wing. In the center was Fourth Army under General Michitsura Nozu. Oyama held only four brigades in reserve; nonetheless, he was determined to attack before the Russians could prepare.

Bilderling's Western Detachment started moving south on October 5, however, moving across the open plain to a position behind the Shli River by October 8. The Eastern Detachment reached its position near Bi-anyupusa, on the other side of the mountain range that extended slightly into the plain, that same day. As the Russian reserve, which comprised nearly one-third of Kuropatkin's total strength, had not yet deployed, Oyama still held the advantage.

He sent the smaller First Army against Stakelberg on October 10, and inflicted heavy casualties when the Russians attempted a counterattack. Meanwhile, the combined Japanese Second and Fourth armies pushed the Russians back, forcing Kuropatkin to send two corps from Zubarev's force to augment the Western Detachment.

The Japanese nevertheless turned the Russians right (western) flank the next day; and when Kuropatkin refused to send additional reinforcements, Bilderling ordered a withdrawal. Stakelberg assumed a defensive posture in the east as well, but Kuroki pressed the attack with his cavalry. Stakelberg continued

to retreat north, but Kuroki hurried forward in an attempt to cut the Russians off.

As Kuroki's forces reached the Sha River, the Russian line broke in the center. The Russian cavalry, led by Lieutenant General Pavel Mishchenko, quickly filled the hole while Zubarev's VI Siberian Corps moved forward to reinforce the Russian right. By October 15, however, the Japanese held the entire south bank of the Sha, which they surrendered only slowly, and at great cost of life to the Russians.

A winter storm set in on October 17 and brought an end to the battle. The Russians had suffered more than 40,000 casualties, including 11,000 dead, while the Japanese had lost 4,000 dead and over 16,000 wounded. Neither side had realized its objectives though, so the winter merely meant a delay of the climactic battle.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich (1882–1945)

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Born in Zlatoust in the southern Urals on October 2, 1882, Boris Shaposhnikov began his military career in the Russian Imperial Army as a private in 1901. He became an officer two years later on graduation from

the Moscow Military College. In 1910, after graduation from the General Staff Academy, he served in the Tashkent Military District and in Russian Poland. During World War I, he served in Galicia, and in 1917, he was promoted to colonel and given command of a grenadier regiment.

Shaposhnikov joined the Red Army in 1918 after the Bolshevik Revolution and served on its field staff during the Russian Civil War. In 1923, he published his first book, *The Cavalry*; shortly thereafter, he published *The Vistula: The History of the 1920 Campaign*. He was an assistant to Chief of Staff Mikhail V. Frunze by April 1924.

In 1926, Shaposhnikov took command of the Leningrad Military District. He became known internationally for his three-volume study *The Brain of the Army* (1927–1929), in which he argued that the General Staff should be the sole agency directing the Red Army. Soviet leader Josef Stalin reportedly always kept a copy on his desk, and it was required reading for Soviet officers throughout the 1930s. Long considered politically suspect, Shaposhnikov was admitted to Communist Party membership in 1930; the usual probationary period was waived. From 1928 to 1931, he was head of the Red Army staff. He was demoted in 1931, allegedly because he published an account of the Civil War that gave Leon Trotsky more credit than Stalin could abide.

From 1931 to 1937, Shaposhnikov was successively commander of the Volga Military District, chief of the Frunze Military Academy, and commander of the Leningrad Military District. Shaposhnikov then served on the board that helped purge the Red Army in 1937. Among those purged were his predecessor as chief of the General Staff, Aleksandr Yegerov and his successor, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky.

Appointed chief of staff of the army and deputy commissar of defense in May 1937,

Shaposhnikov did what he could to modernize and improve the Red Army, although much of his work in this regard was blocked by the opposition of Stalin and others. He also was unable to prevent the disbanding of seven mechanized corps in November 1939, despite Colonel General Georgy Zhukov's success with armor in the Battle of Khalkin Gol in Manchuria.

Shaposhnikov drew up the plans for the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland at the beginning of World War II and the belated successful offensive in the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War. Stalin had at first ignored his counsel, allowing General Kliment Voroshilov to pursue more aggressive plans. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in May 1940, Shaposhnikov relinquished the post of chief of staff because of poor health, although he retained the position as deputy defense commissar.

On the eve of the German attack, Shaposhnikov urged Stalin to abandon forward positions in Poland in favor of the so-called Stalin Line along the Soviet Union's former border. Stalin dismissed Shaposhnikov from his posts for this advice. With the German invasion, Stalin reinstated Shaposhnikov as chief of the General Staff on July 29, 1941, in a reorganized *Stavka* that apparently followed the form suggested by Shaposhnikov in *The Brain of the Army*.

Although ill, Shaposhnikov nonetheless played an important role in planning the Soviet defense of Moscow and the subsequent Soviet counterattack. In June 1942, he advised against an attack on Kharkov as being premature. He left his post as chief of the General Staff for reasons of health on June 26, 1942. Although still ill, he remained a part of *Stavka* and as deputy commissar of defense. In June 1943, he became commandant of the Voroshilov Military Academy. He continued to hold this post and serve

on the *Stavka* until his death in Moscow on March 26, 1945.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze, Mikhail (1885–1925); Frunze Academy; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); October (November) Revolution (1917); Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Shaposhnikov, Evgeny Ivanovich (1942–)

Last minister of defense for the Soviet Union.

Evgeny Shaposhnikov was born on a collective farm in the Rostov Oblast on February 3, 1942. He graduated from the Kharkov Aviation School in 1963, and from the air force academy in 1969. By 1987, he had risen to command Soviet air forces in Germany, and three years later he was appointed commander in chief of the Soviet Air Force. During August–December 1991, following the attempted coup against Mikhail

Gorbachev, he held the post of defense minister; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he became commander in chief of the armed forces of the Confederation of Independent States, a quasi-successor to the USSR. Shaposhnikov also served as secretary to the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Shaposhnikov retired in 1994 to work as a representative for President Boris Yeltsin; he then served as chief executive officer for *Aeroflot*, the Russian state airline, from November 1995 to March 1997. He still serves occasionally as a consultant on aviation.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Air Forces, Russia (to 1917, and since 1991); August Coup (1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Shcherbachev, Dmitry Grigorevich (1857–1932)

Russian army general. Born February 6, 1857, Dmitry Shcherbachev graduated from the Mikhailovsky Artillery School in 1876 and from the General Staff Academy in 1884. In 1907, he became commandant of the General Staff Academy, and in 1912, he took command of IX Infantry Corps.

At the beginning of World War I, Shcherbachev's corps spearheaded the Russian

advance to Lemberg (L'vov). By the end of 1914, Shcherbachev was promoted to general of infantry. In April 1915, he received command of the Eleventh Army just prior to its summer retreat. By October, he was in command of the Seventh Army and took part in General Nikolai Ivanov's disastrous Strypa River offensive. Shcherbachev favored attacks on narrow fronts supported by heavy artillery.

In 1916, Shcherbachev participated in the Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1) by the Russian Southwestern Army Group. His army crossed the Strypa River to cut the lines of communication for the Austro-German South Army commanded by German general of infantry Count Felix von Bothmer. The Russian attack stalled without support from the two other Russian army groups on the front. In April 1917, Shcherbachev became commander of Russian forces on the Romanian Front and advisor to Romanian Czar Ferdinand.

After the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Shcherbachev and troops loyal to him began planning a Ukrainian Front that would battle both the Bolsheviks and the Germans. His plan was preempted by peace negotiations that November between Ukraine and Germany. Shcherbachev remained in Jassy, Romania, after that country and the Central Powers concluded peace in May 1918, working to create a Russian and Romanian force to keep Bessarabia from falling to the communists. With anti-Bolshevik White forces building on the Don, he hoped to secure French reinforcements to aid the White armies. Following the armistice of November 1918, however, the French lost interest in such a plan.

Shcherbachev then fought on the Don as a general for the Whites against the Reds (Bolsheviks) in the Russian Civil War (1917–1920) while working to resolve disputes

among the anti-Bolshevik forces to create a unified White army. By the end of 1919, however, he was in exile in Western Europe. Shcherbachev died at Nice, France, on January 18, 1932.

Shelley K. Cox

See also: Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); White Armies in the Russian Civil War (1917–1921)

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Shein, Aleksei Semenovich (1662–1700)

The great-grandson of Mikhail Shein, Aleksei was born in Moscow during 1662, and entered court service at a young age. He became a favorite of the regent Sophia, who raised him to boyar status, and served as a military commander during 1680–1684. Shein also commanded a regiment during the Crimea Campaigns of Sophia's chief minister, Vasily Golitsyn, during 1687–1689.

When Peter I assumed the throne, Shein continued in his service, commanding Russian land forces in the Second Azov Campaign of 1696. Peter appointed Shein as commander in chief of the Russian army during his absence on the Grand Embassy, and it was Shein who led the suppression of the *Streltsy* Rising. He was implicated in the conspiracy indirectly, however, and Peter

deprived him of boyar status. Shein died in Moscow on February 12, 1700.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Crimea Campaign (April–May 1944); *Streltsy* Rising (May–August 1682)

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Shein, Mikhail Borisovich (?–1634)

Likely born during the late 1580s or early 1590s, Mikail Shein rose to prominence as a military commander during Russia's Time of Troubles. He led troops and suppressed peasant rebellions during 1602–1603, the last years of Czar Boris I's reign, and during the Bolotnikov Rebellion of 1606–1608, indicating he probably had entered court service under Boris Godunov. Shein was elevated to boyar (noble) status in 1607 for his service, and appointed commander of the important city of Smolensk.

Shein commanded Russian forces there during the prolonged siege of September 1609–June 1611. His forces withstood several direct attacks as well as an attempt to mine under the walls, but disease and hunger gradually reduced the defenders from more than 5,000 to just over 200. A traitor then led the Poles through a weak point in the defenses on the night of June 3–4, allowing them to take the fortress after a brief but fierce struggle. Shein was captured, tortured, and then imprisoned in Warsaw along with his family.

Shein was allowed to return to Moscow in 1619, as part of the Truce of Deulino, and he soon became a trusted advisor to the new Romanov Dynasty, having met Filaret during his captivity. When Filaret initiated a war against Poland in 1632, he gave Shein command of the Russian army charged with retaking Smolensk. With success near at hand after a 10-month siege, Shein's forces were surprised and defeated by a sortie from the fortress. His troops, suffering from disease and a lack of supplies, soon trickled away. In February 1634, Shein surrendered to the Poles.

On his return to Moscow, Shein was tried for treason. He was found guilty and executed on April 28, 1634.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Deulino, Truce of (1618); Filaret (Philaret; Fyodor Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1633); Smolensk War (1632–1634); Time of Troubles

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Sheremetev, Boris Petrovich (1652–1719)

Born April 25, 1652, in Moscow, Boris Sheremetev began his career as an imperial page. By 1681, he had risen to command Russian forces against the Crimean Tatars at Tambov; he was promoted to boyar (noble) status in 1682, and carried out several diplomatic missions between 1683 and 1687.

He then assumed command of the Russian garrison forces at Belgorod, on the southern frontier, and participated in Chief Minister Vasily Golitsyn's Crimea Campaigns of 1687 and 1689.

Sheremetev continued in the service of Peter I after 1689, commanding armies on the Dnieper River during the Azov Campaigns of 1695–1696. He served as an envoy to Poland, Austria, and Italy during 1697–1699 before returning as commander in chief of Russian forces during the 1700–1721 Great Northern War.

Sheremetev took a cautious approach, and suffered several initial defeats at the hands of King Charles XII of Sweden, losing notably at the Battle of the Narva in 1700. He was promoted to field marshal nonetheless in 1701. Between 1701 and 1704, Sheremetev had a mixed record, losing as many battles as he won; his successes tended to outweigh the losses, however, as they seemed to come at key times and places. He took the fortresses of Noteborg and Nyenskans in 1703, for instance, and conquered Dorpat and Narva in 1704. In 1705, he was sent to Astrakhan to suppress a revolt.

Upon his return to the field against the Swedes, Sheremetev again suffered a string of initial defeats during 1705–1707. He was the senior commander during the decisive Russian victory at Poltava, however, and his forces conquered Riga in 1710. Sheremetev subsequently led the main army against the Ottoman Empire in 1711, but his forces were encircled and defeated at Pruth. After serving in Germany during 1715–1717, Sheremetev returned to Moscow, where he died on February 17, 1719.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bulavin, Kondraty Afansievich (1660–1708); Great Northern War (1700–1721); Narva, Battle of the (November 20, 1700); Poltava, Battle of (June 27, 1709)

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Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–2014)

Georgian politician and past president who played a pivotal role in the end of the Cold War while serving as the minister of Foreign Affairs for the Soviet Union.



Eduard Shevardnadze played a central role in dismantling the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and was president of the Republic of Georgia from 1992 to 2003. (Department of Defense)

Eduard Shevardnadze was born January 25, 1928, in Mamati, Georgia, in the Soviet Union. His father, Ambrose Shevardnadze, was a teacher and ardent official of the Georgian Communist Party (GCP). Shevardnadze joined both the GCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1948. He quickly rose through the ranks of the GCP, and was elected the first secretary of the Georgian *Komsomol* (youth organization), becoming well known for his push to eradicate corruption.

In 1967, Shevardnadze was named the minister of Internal Affairs for the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. From this position, he ordered the arrest and trial of thousands of citizens for corruption. After five years, he was promoted to first secretary of the GCP. This allowed him to attack corruption on a broader scale. While Shevardnadze could not halt all black market activity, his initiatives led to a major economic expansion and brought attention from the national leadership. Not only was he considered for higher leadership positions but also many of his ideas were expanded to the entire USSR.

Shevardnadze proved extremely savvy about whom he supported for general secretary of the Soviet Union and offered his backing to a young reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev. In return, Gorbachev named him minister of Foreign Affairs for the USSR in 1985.

As the nation's top diplomat, Shevardnadze advised Gorbachev to pursue a policy of détente and engagement with the West. He also worked to extricate the Red Army from its disastrous invasion of Afghanistan and urged his comrades to accept the fall of communist governments in Eastern Europe in 1989. He feared a backlash in the USSR, however, and in 1990, he resigned in protest when reformers began deferring to the communist hard-liners.

In 1991, Georgia declared its independence. After three years of civil war, Shevardnadze was elected president of Georgia in 1995 and again in 2000 and 2003, though these contests were plagued by fraud allegations. Massive protests triggered his resignation on November 23, 2003. As president, Shevardnadze confronted breakaway republics in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both backed by Russia, and pushed for an invitation to join NATO. He continued to play a key role in Georgian politics after he retired. Shevardnadze died in Tbilisi on July 7, 2014.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–)

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Shtemenko, Sergei Matveevich (1907–1976)

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Born into a peasant family in Volgograd Oblast on February 20, 1907, Sergei Shtemenko joined the Red Army in 1926 and became a member of the Communist Party in 1930. He graduated from the anti-aircraft school in Sevastopol that same year, and entered the artillery service. Graduating from the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization in 1937, he commanded an independent heavy-tank training battalion

near Zhitomir. He went to the General Staff Academy in September 1938. Before graduation in 1940, Shtemenko's class was assigned in August 1939 to the Operations Department of the General Staff to prepare for the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland and, later, to work on preparations for the Soviet invasion of Finland.

On graduation, Shtemenko was reassigned to the General Staff, despite his request to command a mechanized unit. Shtemenko then worked in the Office of Operations as a senior assistant to the section chief in 1940, moving up to deputy chief by August 1941. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, he was appointed as section chief for the Near East, monitoring Soviet troops in Iran. General Aleksei Antonov made Shtemenko his deputy in April 1942. He succeeded Antonov as chief of the Operations Directorate in May 1943, a post he held until April 1946.

Shtemenko successfully organized the operations of the Transcaucasus Front (army group) in 1942, including the Battle of Stalingrad, and subsequently for the Black Sea and Northern Fronts. As chief, he was involved in planning for all fronts, and he played a key role in the planning for Operation BAGRATION against German Army Group Center and in the campaign against Berlin. By war's end, he was a colonel general.

In his subsequent two-volume work *The Soviet General Staff at War*, Shtemenko stressed the need for creativity in the direction of war. A genuine admirer of Josef Stalin, Shtemenko frequently praised the Soviet leader's role in the war. In November 1948, Shtemenko was promoted to general of the army. He then served as Soviet deputy prime minister, and in September 1952, he became a candidate member of the Central Committee.

Two months later, however, he was replaced by General Vasily Sokolovsky and

assigned to Germany as chief of staff of the occupation forces. His name was on the list of those supposedly involved in the “Doctors’ Plot,” indicating he was to be purged. Shtemenko survived in his offices when Stalin died in March 1953, but was nonetheless demoted in the aftermath of the dictator’s demise. He was promoted again in 1956 after three years of obscurity when Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who refers to Shtemenko in his reminiscences as an “outstanding strategist,” returned to prominence in the period of de-Stalinization.

Shtemenko was demoted again in 1957 when Zhukov fell out of favor with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. Shtemenko was again promoted to general of the army in February 1968, after Khrushchev had been deposed. Within six months of that promotion, he was appointed chief of staff of Warsaw Pact forces. He planned the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia that year, putting an end to the so-called Prague Spring. Shtemenko retired in 1975 and died in Moscow on April 23, 1976.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Antonov, Aleksei Innokentievich (1896–1962); BAGRATION, Operation; Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Prague Spring (1968); Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612)

Born September 22, 1552, Prince Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky traced his lineage to the early princes of Nizhni Novgorod from the Rurikad Dynasty. His family at one time had jostled for the title of ruler of Muscovy, and during Vasily’s childhood, was still one of the leading noble families in Russia. Vasily proved a loyal servitor to Czar Boris Godunov, for it was he who undertook the investigation of the death of Czarevich Dmitry that cleared Godunov. When Godunov died and the throne lay open, however, Shuisky changed course.

He first supported the “False Dmitry” against Godunov’s son, Fyodor II, claiming his investigation had actually revealed that Dmitry was still alive; however, once Dmitry had become czar, in July 1605, Shuisky conspired against him, seeking the throne for himself. Prince Shuisky arranged to have Dmitry assassinated on his wedding day, May 19, 1606, and then proclaimed that he had never believed Dmitry to be the true czar. A clique of boyar supporters then “elected” Shuisky as Czar Vasily IV, but his rule never garnered legitimacy with the populous.

Czar Vasily managed, with the help of his cousin Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky and a large Swedish force, to turn back the military challenge of a second False Dmitry during 1605–1606. Vasily then became jealous, and had Mikhail assassinated as well, throwing the country back into chaos. Vasily managed to stave off military threats from new pretenders supported by Poland until 1610, when his former supporters deposed him in an attempt to reach a settlement. Both Vasily and his cousin Dmitry were forcibly

tonsured and transferred into captivity near Warsaw. Vasily Shuisky died there on September 12, 1612; his rule was recognized by the new Romanov Dynasty in 1613 and, as a gesture of reconciliation, they allowed the reburial of his remains in Moscow in 1635.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Time of Troubles

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Shumikov, Mikhail Stepanovich (1895–1975)

Soviet colonel general, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Born in Verkhtchenskoe, in what is now Shadrinsk Raion in Kurgan Oblast, on November 17, 1895, Mikhail Stepanovich Shumilov graduated from the Chuguev Military School in 1916, joining the Russian army during World War I as an ensign. In May 1918, he joined the Red Army and by the following year, during the Civil War, became commanding officer of the 19th Special Rifle Brigade.

From 1939 to 1940, during the Finnish-Soviet (Winter) War, Shumilov commanded the XI Rifle Corps. He began service in World War II as the deputy commanding officer of the Fifty-Fifth Army and the deputy commanding officer of the Twenty-First Army, on the Leningrad and Southwestern fronts during 1941. From 1942 to 1945, he was the commanding officer of the 64th Army, later the Seventh Guards Army, which

fought successful campaigns south of Stalingrad, at the Don and Voronezh, in the Battle of Kursk, and at the Steppe Front, later the Second Ukrainian Front. Thereafter, he participated in the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, attaining the rank of colonel general.

After the war, Shumilov was made commander in chief of the White Sea Military District from 1948 to 1949 and commander in chief of the Voronezh Military District from 1949 to 1955. In retirement for the next two years, in 1958, he became a consultant to the inspectors general of the Ministry of Defense. During these years, he was deputy to the third and fourth convocations of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Shumilov died on June 28, 1975, in Moscow and was buried in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), on Mamaev Kurgan. Among his Soviet awards were four Orders of the Red Banner and three Orders of Lenin. Additionally, he received many foreign orders and medals.

Kevin S. Bemel

See also: Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Shuvaev, Dmitry Savelevich (1854–1937)

Russian army general and minister of war (1916–1917). Born in Orenburg Province on October 24, 1854, Dmitry Savelevich

Shuvaev enlisted in the army in 1870. He graduated from the Alexander Military School in 1872 and from the General Staff Academy in 1878. In 1905, he became a division commander, and in 1907, a corps commander. Later that same year, he became chief quartermaster and head of the Main Quartermaster Directorate. Shuvaev also served as the chief field quartermaster for the Russian Army from December 1915 to March 1916.

In March 1916, Czar Nicholas II appointed Shuvaev as minister of war on the dismissal of General Aleksei Polivanov, who had been replaced because of his liberal views and dislike of Grigory Rasputin. The biggest problem Shuvaev faced was that of supply, an area in which he had considerable expertise.

Loyal to the czar, Shuvaev tended to his duties diligently. He also believed that cooperation between the government and the Duma (parliament) was essential if the Russian war effort was to be successful. Shuvaev was identified as friendly with Duma leader Pavel Miliukov, an enemy of Rasputin, and in January 1917, following Rasputin's assassination, Shuvaev was replaced by General Alexandra Beliaev. Shuvaev's departure seemed nearly a foregone conclusion, however, as Czarina Alexandra Fyodorova had distrusted him from the start of his tenure. Shuvaev subsequently rallied to the Bolsheviks and retired from the army in the late 1920s after teaching in Red Army military educational institutions. General Shuvaev is believed to have died sometime in 1937, the year of the great military purge in the Soviet Union.

Joshua J. Robinson

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna Czarina (1872–1918); Miliukov, Pavel Nikolaevich (1859–1943); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Polivanov, Aleksei Andreevich (1855–1920); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916)

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Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich (1889–1972)

Russian aviation pioneer and inventor of the first multiengine aircraft used by a military air service; Sikorsky was also a prolific designer of military aircraft for use by the Imperial Russian Air Force during World War I.

Born in Kiev on May 29, 1889, Igor Sikorsky studied at the Imperial Russian Naval Academy in St. Petersburg, Russia, from 1903 to 1906. From 1906 to 1909, he studied engineering and aviation in Paris, Kiev, and Germany. Sikorsky returned to Russia in 1910 and began to design a series of fixed-wing aircraft for use by the Russian armed forces. Sikorsky developed over 20 different types of aircraft, ranging from single-engine fighters to the first practical four-engine bomber. Sikorsky enjoyed a good reputation, with his “S-6” aircraft winning a Russian army-sponsored competition in 1912 during the Moscow Aircraft Exhibition. Sikorsky's successes marked the beginning of increased collaboration with the Imperial Russian Air Force, established in 1909. Sikorsky designed evermore ambitious aircraft, culminating with the *Russki Vitiaz*—which

translates as “The Russian Knight” but was better known as the “Grand”—in 1913.

In December 1913, Sikorsky test flew the Grand, the prototype of what would become the *Ilya Muromets* (IM) series of new bombers. In early 1914, the second prototype of the Grand set world records for distance and passengers carried (16), flying from St. Petersburg to Kiev and back. Sikorsky was then made head engineer of the Russian-Baltic Railway Carriage Company (RBVZ), which had been given the contract to build the IM series of aircraft (Figure 1).

When the war began in August 1914, Sikorsky was the only qualified test pilot for the IM bombers and personally trained the first seven officer candidates assigned to fly them. The IM bombers were considered an important, if limited, military asset. The Russian High Command (*Stavka*) therefore retained direct command of what became known as the “Squadron of Flying Ships” (in Russian, *eskadrilia letaiushchik koroblakh* or EVK). During the war, IMs flew a number of missions, primarily strategic bombing and reconnaissance of key enemy rail and supply centers. The IMs were a serious problem for the Austro-German air services, and only three IMs were lost to enemy action during the war. A total of 30–35 IMs were built and saw service during the war.

In the aftermath of the Russian revolutions of 1917, Sikorsky was still chief engineer of Russian-Baltic Railway Carriage Company (RBVZ), but was increasingly threatened by Bolshevik assassination squads. He immigrated to France and worked briefly as an engineer for the French aviation industry. Postwar disarmament meant fewer job opportunities in Europe, so Sikorsky subsequently moved to the United States and, after a brief stint as a professor, began what would become a nearly 50-year career in seaplane and helicopter design. His company

produced the first twin-engine aircraft in the United States, as well as the “clipper” flying boats used for trans-Atlantic flights by Pan-American Airlines and, in 1929, the first helicopter. Sikorsky died in Easton, Connecticut, on October 26, 1972.

Tim Wilson

See also: Air Forces, Russia (to 1917, and since 1991); October (November) Revolution (1917); Sikorsky Ilya Muromets Heavy Bomber; *Stavka*; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Sikorsky Ilya Muromets Heavy Bomber

The Sikorsky Ilya Mourometz was an exceptional aircraft and the world’s first four-engine bomber. Ultimately produced in half a dozen models, it both preceded World War I and was built in Russia, the least advanced of the major aeronautical powers. The plane was designed by a brilliant young aeronautical engineer Igor Sikorsky, chief designer for RBVZ, the Russo-Baltic Railway Wagon Factories. Sikorsky envisioned a large multi-engine transport aircraft. The resulting two-engine design first flew in May 1913 but was found to be underpowered. Fitted with four 100-horsepower (hp) Argus engines in separate gondolas between the wings and known

as the *Russkyi Vitiaz*, it was test flown in July 1913 and proved to be a success.

Sikorsky then designed a larger four-engine aircraft with new fuselage. It first flew on December 10, 1913. With Sikorsky himself at the controls, on February 11, 1914, it carried aloft 16 passengers (a record) and a dog. The plane reached 6,560 feet on a flight of five hours, averaging 62 miles per hour (mph). The military implications of the giant plane (wingspan of 97 feet 9 inches, length of 57 feet 9 inches, and height of 13 feet 1 inch) were obvious, and the Russian government immediately ordered 10 of them, to be adapted for military use. The first two bombers joined the Russian air service in August 1914.

Named the *Ilya Muromets* (also spelled *Ilya Mourometz*) for the legendary medieval Russian folk hero, the aircraft was produced in a number of different versions. The A Model went to the Russian navy as a float plane. The next, the B Model, was a land type with more powerful engines. Thirty bomber-variant Muromets Vs were built in 1915, followed by 30 G Model aircraft with stronger wings and enhanced armament. The Type E had a smaller wingspan (124 feet) and engines mounted in tandem. The final variant was the most successful, with the E Model receiving four more powerful Renault engines, built under license in Russia. In all, 73 Ilya Muromets aircraft were built.

The Ilya Muromets E of 1917 had a crew of seven. Its four Renault 12-cylinder, liquid-cooled, in-line, 220-hp engines provided a speed of 85 mph. It had a ceiling of 9,514 feet and an endurance of five hours aloft. It could be armed with up to seven machine guns. Depending on armament, it could carry up to 1,543 pounds of bombs.

Employing the Ilya Muromets V, the first Russian bomber squadron carried out a bombing raid from Poland into East Prussia

on February 15, 1915. From that point until Russia left the war at the end of 1917, Ilya Muromets bombers mounted more than 400 raids into Germany and Lithuania. The bomber was difficult to handle in the air and it required considerable maintenance, which sharply reduced its sortie rate.

Amazingly, only three of the big bombers were lost. The bomber squadron claimed to have downed 10 German aircraft, perhaps the only time in history when a bomber aircraft had a positive kill ratio to fighter aircraft. In 1916, both Britain and France applied for permission to build the bomber but were turned down. A passenger version flew after the war, but difficulties of maintenance caused its withdrawal from service in 1922.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Air Forces, Russia (to 1917, and since 1991); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Sinop, Battle of (November 30, 1853)

A battle between Russian and Ottoman Empire naval forces fought in the Ottoman Black Sea port of Sinop (Sinope).

In July 1853, Russian forces invaded and occupied the Ottoman Empire-controlled principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The loss of territory, approximately modern Romania and Moldova, prompted the Ottoman Empire to declare war on Russia the following October.


In an effort to provide support to and communicate with anti-Russian insurgents and Ottoman army forces in the Caucasus, the Ottoman government sent a combined Ottoman and Egyptian naval and transport force under the command of Vice Admiral Osman Pasha into the eastern Black Sea. When the force encountered stormy weather en route, it took refuge in the port of Sinop.

Sinop, located about 530 kilometers east-northeast of Constantinople (Istanbul) on the central Black Sea coast of Anatolia, is situated on a narrow isthmus connecting the Boztepe Peninsula to the mainland. The anchorage used by the Ottoman force is located in an open roadstead on the southern side of the isthmus.

Accessible from the east and south, the anchorage was guarded by landside fortifications; although Sinop was fortified, the forts contributed little to the fight. The Ottomans' guns were too few in number and too small in weight (14 to 19 pounders) to inflict significant damage on the Russian ships, particularly, as the Ottoman ships were anchored in their fields of fire. In addition to the forts, the Ottoman force consisted of seven frigates and three corvettes armed with 382 guns, none larger than 24 pounders.

Vice Admiral Pavel S. Nakhimov, the Russian commander, led a much more substantial force composed of six Russian line-of-battle ships and smaller vessels (more than 600 guns) from the southeast into the Sinop anchorage on November 30, 1853. The Russian warships not only carried more weapons, their weapons were also heavier and counted among them 38 modern 68-pounder Paixhans shell-firing guns.

The Russian squadron sailed into the anchorage and attacked the stationary Ottoman warships that, with nearby shore batteries, ineffectively returned fire. After a six-hour battle, the entire Ottoman force was destroyed



Imperial Russian warships attacked and destroyed the patrol force of Ottoman ships anchored in the harbor at Sinop at the outset of the Crimean War. (Getty Images)

with the exception of the paddle steamer, *Taif*. No Russian ships were lost, and the Russians suffered fewer than one-tenth of the Ottoman losses of more than 3,000.

The Paixhans gun system, invented by French artillery general Henri-Joseph Paixhans in the early 1820s, offered an important advantage over the traditional naval gun firing solid-shot. By permitting the safe shipboard use of explosive-filled shells, it achieved much greater destruction against enemy ships.

Although Sinop was not the first time Paixhans guns were used, it was the most dramatic use to that time, though admittedly by a stronger against a weaker foe. Many naval historians mark the ultimate demise of wooden-hulled ships from the battle, but others suggest that

Russian superiority was so great that the outcome would not have changed even in the absence of the Paixhans guns.

It is worth noting that despite the advantage in guns, it took the Russians six hours to destroy the vastly inferior Ottoman fleet. Possession of the Paixhans guns, moreover, provided little advantage to the Russian navy against the navies of Great Britain and France in the Black Sea, though all of their ships were wooden hulled. Shell-firing guns were only one of a series of developments—better powder, rifled barrels, breech loading, improvement in barrel construction—over the course of the 19th century that led to the development of modern warships.

More significantly, the resulting Ottoman defeat made the British and French governments fear a rapid Ottoman collapse would leave Russia dominant in the region, and they feared unfettered Russian access to the Dardenelles might threaten their shipping in the Mediterranean. Diplomatic attempts to end the conflict failed for a variety of reasons. Popular unrest in Constantinople, militant press reports and anti-Russian propaganda compounded by political maneuvering in the British cabinet, and a determination by Napoleon III, Emperor of France, “to use Sinope as a pretext to take strong action against Russia” all compelled Western intervention.

Russia also cooperated in bringing war. The czar withdrew his ambassadors from London and Paris in response to Western pressure, and severed relations on February 16, 1854. The rebuff led to declarations of war by France and Britain on March 27 and 28, 1854, respectively, and to the expansion of the war from a Russo-Turkish conflict to a Great Power conflict that thereafter became known as the Crimean War (1853–1856).

Larry A. Grant

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Nakhimov, Pavel (1802–1855); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918)

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Sino-Soviet Border Conflict (1969)

By 1960, the Soviet Union and China’s alliance fractured over territorial disputes, communist ideology, Russian troop movements in Europe and Central Asia, and Chinese attempts to increase their control of Xinjiang; all of which led to armed conflict.

Nineteenth-century czarist Russia obtained control over vast stretches of central Asian territory at the expense of China and local states. Russia continued to gain territory at China’s expense through the end of World War II. China resented the loss of Outer Mongolia in particular, as they considered it an integral part of their territory.

After the communist victory in 1949, Mao Zedong sought to adjust the borders established by earlier treaties. Mao and Stalin, however, affirmed them in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in 1950. Mao still believed the borders were open to adjustment, however, upon terms of mutual respect for territorial integrity found within that treaty. Upon victory in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Chinese leaders became increasingly belligerent in their demands to adjust such existing

treaties. Chinese leaders showed their willingness to use force in adjusting border disputes, and felt betrayed at Soviet support for India during the war. As a result, negotiations during the early 1960s made little progress.

During this time, both sides increased their forces along the central Asian border. This included the disputed islands in the Ussuri and Amur rivers, the border with Mongolia, and the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan region. Russian troop strength went from 17 divisions in 1965, to 27 in 1969, to 42 divisions numbering almost 1,000,000 men by the mid-1970s. The Russians also stationed several divisions in Outer Mongolia, including a significant nuclear arsenal. These forces clashed with local Chinese citizens in minor border incidents throughout the mid-1960s, especially in Xinjiang Province but also the border between islands running through the Ussuri and Amur rivers.

Throughout the 1960s, China had sought to increase their control of the central Asian province of Xinjiang, only taken from Russia in the 1950s, by colonizing the province with ethnic Hans, resettling indigenous people, and implementing Chinese-style education and administration. Russia in turn accused China of setting up concentration camps, suppressing minorities, and persecuting Soviet citizens. Tension increased over the Soviet's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chinese denunciation of Soviet behavior as "social imperialist," and Russian insistence that they could fight a two-front war—the second front being east Asia.

In addition to thousands of minor incidents, the armies clashed twice during March 1969 along the Ussuri and Amur rivers. On March 2, 1969, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers attacked Damansky (Zhenbao) Island. Although supported by artillery and heavy guns on their side of the shore, the PLA failed to resist Soviet attempts to

retake the island. As many as 60 Russians died in this encounter. Early in the morning of March 15, 1969, the PLA attacked again. They committed a regiment consisting of 2,000 soldiers against Soviet defenses. The Chinese did not capture the island and sustained 800 casualties to the Soviet Union's 60. Both sides claimed victory in the Zhenbao (Damansky) Island incident and increased propaganda against the other side.

In August, Chinese troops either got lost, or penetrated the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan border. The resulting encounter with Soviet forces resulted in about 60 Chinese deaths and strained already tense relations. The Chinese though, gained by showing their willingness and ability to face the Soviets in combat. While the PLA did not win, the existence of battles between them and a superpower enhanced their reputation. They also signaled their intention to counter Russian influence in central and east Asia.

The tension continued throughout the 1970s as both sides added more soldiers and nuclear weapons. The Chinese added an extensive series of bunkers and moved their nuclear weapons facility to Tibet. The Chinese also became responsive to American overtures. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger worked to exploit the rift in Sino-Soviet relations and weaken the USSR. China sought closer relations with America and Japan to isolate Soviet allies in Southeast Asia.

Morgan Deane

See also: Ussuri River Conflict (1969); Xianjiang, Battle of (1937)

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Six-Day War (June 5–10, 1967)

Culmination of long-simmering tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Israel's Arab neighbors clamored for its destruction and refused to recognize it as a sovereign state because of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the dispossession of the Palestinians. Military setbacks in 1948 and 1956, however, had left even the most belligerent Arab leaders reluctant to directly engage Israel in a contest of force. Instead, they allowed the conflict to proceed via low-intensity state-sponsored terrorist attacks against Israel. For years Israel managed the undeclared war on a retaliatory basis, staging its own overt and covert counterstrikes on guerrilla camps and villages in the Golan Heights and in Jordan.

With the United States heavily engaged in Vietnam though, the leaders of the Soviet Union saw an opportunity to alter the balance of power in the Middle East to favor their client states, including Egypt and Syria. On May 13, 1967, the Soviets therefore provided the Egyptians an intelligence report falsely indicating that Israeli forces were building up along the Syrian border. The disinformation also may have been an attempt to create problems for West Germany, then a strong supporter of Israel.

Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced Egypt would stand alongside Syria. Israel's protestations that the Soviet report was untrue fell on deaf ears. Nasser sought to exploit the situation as much as his

Soviet sponsors, and he would not allow the opportunity to pass. Nasser proposed closing the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, a step that would severely disrupt the Israeli economy. He should have known that Israel would be forced to react militarily, but probably assumed the United States would refuse to support Israel. If his threat forced Israel to withdraw its allegedly mounting forces along the Syrian border, he could emerge as a regional hero; if the Israelis did not react, he could close the straits and force Israel to take the next step and present himself as the defender of the Arab world.

Israel maintained its innocence regarding affairs with Syria but simultaneously signaled its determination to keep open the Strait of Tiran. Hoping to find an international solution to the crisis, Israel sent Foreign Minister Abba Eban to Washington on May 26. The U.S. president, Lyndon B. Johnson, however, had little to offer. The United States supported a British proposal for an international maritime force, but only Britain and the Netherlands offered to contribute ships to it.

On May 16, Nasser ordered the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which had maintained a relatively demilitarized Sinai Peninsula for more than 10 years, to leave; United Nations (UN) secretary general U Thant complied. Two weeks later, Jordan's king Hussein arrived in Cairo to finalize a tripartite alliance among Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The alliance strengthened Egypt's position, but Nasser encountered new obstacles from his Soviet sponsors. The Soviet Union, responding to a hotline message from President Johnson on May 26, now urged Nasser to show restraint. They insisted the Egyptians should not strike first.

Nasser countered that a surprise first strike by Israel could neutralize Egypt's numerical superiority. The Soviets remained firm.

Despite having Israel surrounded—Syria to the north, Jordan to the east, and Egypt to the south—and outnumbered, Egypt and its allies would have to wait for Israel to initiate hostilities. Meanwhile, other Arab states, including Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan, began mobilizing.

On June 2, 1967, Israel sent a special envoy to meet with the Johnson administration. Perhaps to reassure its Middle Eastern ally, the United States revealed to the Israeli envoy the results of a U.S. Defense Department analysis, which concluded that Israel could defeat Egypt, Jordan, and Syria within two to three weeks even if it allowed them to strike first. The United States was not willing to take unilateral action, however, or to sanction an Israeli strike.

Following a heated exchange with his advisers on June 4, Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol nevertheless authorized a preemptive strike against Egypt. For weeks Egypt had moved large numbers of armored units into the Sinai Peninsula in preparation for a clash. Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin, however, planned to bypass Egypt's armor and strike instead at its air force.

The Egyptian Army had a nominal strength of 150,000 men, but more than 50,000 of its best troops were tied down in the civil war in Yemen. The IDF had a core force of 50,000 highly trained troops plus more than 200,000 mobilized reservists. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) had only about 200 combat aircraft against 420 Egyptian planes, mostly relatively modern Soviet models. The IAF's chief advantage lay in its highly trained and efficient ground crews' ability to turn their aircraft around quickly, allowing each IAF aircraft to launch up to four times, as opposed to the one or two sorties per day on average for aircraft in the Arab air forces.

At dawn on June 5, 180 Israeli aircraft launched against targets in Egypt and the Sinai. The Israeli strike force caught the Egyptians by surprise. Trapped on the ground, Egyptian aircraft were sitting ducks. Within minutes, all of Egypt's airfields were under attack. By noon, Egypt had lost more than 300 aircraft and 100 pilots. The Israelis lost only 19 aircraft.

The loss of Egypt's air force had an immediate and dramatic impact. The Egyptian forces in the Sinai consisted of some 100,000 troops, more than 900 tanks, 1,100 armored personnel carriers, and 1,000 artillery pieces, all organized into seven divisions. The IDF fielded some 70,000 troops and 700 tanks organized into three armored divisions under the IDF's Southern Command. The absence of air support, however, left Egyptian armor vulnerable to Israeli attacks from above. Egypt suffered tremendous losses.

When the IDF armored division under Major General Ariel Sharon broke through at Abu Ageila, Egypt's marshal Abdel Hakim Amer ordered a general withdrawal, but the damage was already done. Israel thoroughly routed the Egyptians. By the end of the fighting in the Sinai, Egypt had lost 80 percent of its military equipment and 11,500 troops killed, 20,000 wounded, and 5,500 captured. The IDF had, by contrast, lost only 338 troops killed.

The war might have ended with Egypt losing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip were it not for the lack of communications between Egypt and Jordan. Shortly after the surprise attack on the Egyptian airfields, Israel notified Jordan's king Hussein that it had no interest in Jordan so long as Hussein kept his forces out of the fray. Hussein, however, also received Egyptian state-run radio broadcasts claiming staggering victories and predicting the end of the Israeli nation. Hussein decided that the Israeli communique

was a desperate ploy and ordered his forces to attack West Jerusalem. Only then did Nasser admit to his ally what actually was occurring in the Sinai; it was too late.

Eshkol ordered the IDF on June 6 to seize all of Jerusalem, including the Old City, and force the Jordanian military out of the West Bank. The Jordanian Army had 55,000 troops and 300 Western-built tanks, organized into 11 brigades. The Jordanian Air Force, however, had only 20 relatively obsolescent British aircraft. IDF's Central Command had only five brigades.

Again, Israeli air superiority was decisive, as Israel successfully pushed the Jordanian forces back across the Jordan River. Israeli paratroopers entered the Old City of Jerusalem on June 7. The defeat was a staggering blow to Jordan, which lost almost 7,000 dead and more than 12,000 wounded. The Israelis lost only about 300 dead. Hussein called upon Nasser for help, but the Egyptian president could offer only a ruse that might bring the Soviet Union to the rescue.

Since Israel had struck first, Egypt could claim to have honored its earlier agreement with the Soviets. Nasser assured Hussein that the Soviet Union would waste no time becoming involved if it believed the United States already had done so. Thus Nasser alleged the United States had led the initial air strikes against Egypt. King Hussein supported Nasser's claim, and the war appeared on the verge of becoming a major Cold War superpower confrontation.

Giving credence to the Egyptian claim that the Americans had been involved, the Soviet Union planned to defend Syria. Soviet help in retaking the West Bank and Sinai would follow. When the United States learned that the Soviets were mobilizing air units for possible commitment to the region, however, President Johnson ordered the *Independence* carrier group in the Mediterranean

to head for Israel. The U.S. message to the Soviet Union was unequivocal. If the Soviets sought to raise the stakes, the United States would match them. Neither superpower relished direct confrontation, but neither wanted to be perceived as weak. For the United States, that meant standing firm against the Soviets publicly while pursuing diplomatic alternatives through the UN.

While the Israeli ambassador to the UN had little trouble justifying Israel's actions against Egypt, the UN demanded an immediate withdrawal from the West Bank and an end to hostilities with Syria in the Golan Heights. Arab delegates demanded an Israeli withdrawal on all fronts. For Israel, however, the opportunity to seize the strategic Golan Heights was too important to pass up. Eshkol ordered his ambassador to stall for time and claimed Israel had no further designs on Arab territory.

As the situation stabilized on the IDF's southern and central fronts, Dayan turned his attention to the Golan Heights and Syria. The IAF had already destroyed some two-thirds of the Syrian Air Force on June 5. The Syrians had 75,000 troops organized into nine brigades. The IDF's Northern Command attacked with four brigades, and by the morning of June 10, Israel controlled the Golan Heights, having lost only 141 soldiers killed. The Syrians lost 2,500 dead, 5,000 wounded, and almost all of their tanks and artillery on the Golan Heights. A cease-fire officially ended the conflict.

With the fighting over, the United States and the Soviet Union pulled back from the brink. Soviet intelligence had concluded that the U.S. carrier group in the Mediterranean could not have participated in the attacks of June 5, 1967, as Nasser had claimed. The Soviet Union did, however, sever diplomatic relations with Israel, and Soviet-sponsored regimes in Eastern Europe quickly followed

suit. The Soviets' ensuing coolness toward their Middle Eastern allies for having maneuvered them into a direct confrontation with the United States, however, ensured that Soviet support for recovering the lost territories would be a long time coming.

Bryan E. Vizzini and David T. Zabecki

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1956); Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973)

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Skobelev, Mikhail (1843–1882)

The brilliant, youthful Mikhail Skobelev was one of the outstanding combat commanders of the 19th century, and his exploits during Russia's conquest of Central Asia were legendary. Wearing a white uniform and astride his white charger, he became known to friend and foe alike as the "White General."

Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was born in St. Petersburg on September 29, 1843. His father, Dmitry Ivanovich Skobelev, was a common soldier who, through bravery and merit, fought his way to the rank of lieutenant general. As a child, Skobelev received instruction from foreign tutors and displayed brilliance as a linguist: he learned English, French, Greek, and several Balkan dialects. In 1861, he briefly attended St. Petersburg University, but the onset of student unrest there prompted him to become a cadet in



Mikhail Skobelev was one of the outstanding combat commanders of the 19th century, and his exploits during Russia's conquest of Central Asia were legendary. (Library of Congress)

a cavalry guard regiment. Two years later, Skobelev fought with Russian forces in Poland and distinguished himself by excellent tactics and foolish bravery. In 1864, he was selected to attend the prestigious General Staff Academy and also functioned as an official observer during the Danish-Prussian War of that year. In 1868, he graduated with honors as an ensign and transferred to the steppes of Central Asia to learn the art of war.

By 1871, Skobelev had already seen intense combat with the fierce nomadic warriors of the steppes and received official commendation from his superiors. Among his many exploits were the capture of Khiva with only two companies of infantry and a score of daring, personal reconnaissance missions. In August 1875, Skobelev led

1,500 troops at the Battle of Makram on a mad charge against the entire army of Abdurakhman Avtobachi. On January 8, 1876, he performed similar work and seized the fortified city of Andizhan, defended by 30,000 Muslim warriors, with only 2,800 Russians. In recognition of his amazing accomplishments, Skobelev received the prestigious Cross of St. George and acknowledgment as one of Russia's most promising young officers. He also became the first military governor of the newly created province of Fergana with a rank of major general.

In April 1877, when the Russo-Turkish War began, Skobelev found himself attached as an aide to the army of General Mikhail Dragomirov. At Svistov on June 26, 1877, Skobelev quietly slipped forces across the Danube River in boats and captured that imposing fortress with a loss of only 1,000 men. He next distinguished himself in fierce fighting around the fortress of Plevna. The Turkish garrison resisted gamely for several months, and the Russians incurred thousands of casualties. Meanwhile, Skobelev was directed to dislodge the Turkish garrison of 15,000 troops at nearby Loftcha. On September 3, 1877, he accomplished that goal and killed 5,000 while he sustained a loss of only 1,500 Russians.

By the time Plevna finally surrendered in December, Skobelev had been promoted to lieutenant general at the age of 34. He subsequently led a brilliant overland march across the Balkan mountains in the dead of winter. In January 1878, sharing every hardship of his men, the young general surprised and routed a much larger force of Turks at Shevna, capturing 36,000 men and 90 cannon. The following month, Skobelev stormed the fortress of San Stefano, outside the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. His army was camped outside the walls of that city as an ominous warning when an armistice was signed. He

subsequently rose to commander of the IV Army Corps and adjutant general of the army as of August 1878.

In 1879, Skobelev returned to Central Asia in the aftermath of a rebellion by the Turkomans of Akhal. Taking only 11,000 men, he closely besieged the city of Geok-Tepe for several months before delivering a devastating three-pronged attack that stormed the citadel. Resistance was so fanatical that the Russians ended up putting 6,000 of the 30,000 Turkomen garrison to the sword before they had success. Another 8,000 fell during the relentless pursuit that followed. Skobelev insisted that once enemies had laid down their arms, however, none were to be hurt (especially women and children), and his magnanimity helped pacify the province.

Shortly thereafter, Skobelev was recalled to St. Petersburg, where he assumed command of an infantry corps. He chafed in the role of an administrator, and while he visited Paris, he delivered a bellicose banquet speech and declared Germany the eternal foe of Slavic peoples everywhere. The government, which pursued a distinctly pro-German policy, was shocked, but Skobelev's outlandish behavior only made his national popularity soar. The young general was immediately recalled to Russia and suspended from his duties. Before disciplinary action could be taken, however, on July 7, 1882, Skobelev died of a heart attack following an all-night orgy in Moscow. Had Skobelev lived another two decades, contemporaries predicted that he would have emerged as one of the finest military commanders of the 19th century, if not in all of Russian history.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Dragomirov, Mikhail Ivanovich (1830–1905); Geok-Tepe, Battles of (1879, 1881); Plevna, Siege of (July 20–December 10, 1877); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)

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Skopin-Shuisky, Prince Mikhail (ca. 1587–1610)

Born to a noble family sometime near 1587, Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky lost his father at a young age and was educated by his mother. He entered the service of Boris Godunov as a young man, and served in the court of Czar Dmitry (the “False Dmitry”) during 1606. When Skopin-Shuisky’s cousin, Vasily Shuisky, orchestrated Dmitry’s assassination, Mikhail became one of Vasily’s military commanders.

In that capacity, Skopin-Shuisky twice defeated the rebel forces of Ivan Bolotnikov, narrowly preventing the capture of Moscow. He then pursued the rebels to Tula, where he besieged them and captured both Bolotnikov and a second pretender, the “Czarevich Peter.” Czar Vasily then sent him to negotiate for aid from Sweden against the forces of yet another pretender, the second False Dmitry.

Skopin-Shuisky returned with a force of more than 10,000 men under the command of Jacob de la Gardie. These forces captured Tver, and drove the rebels south toward the Oka River. Skopin-Shuisky’s success drove Czar Vasily to suspect him of plotting to take the throne, however; Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky died under mysterious circumstances—perhaps poisoned by his wife—on April 23, 1610.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles

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Skoropadsky, Pavlo Petrovich (1873–1945)

Russian army general and ruler of Ukraine in 1918. Born May 3, 1873, in Wiesbaden, Germany, into an aristocratic landowning family from Poltava, Russia (now in Ukraine), Pavlo Petrovich Skoropadsky enjoyed a successful career in the Russian military. In December 1905, Czar Nicholas II advanced him to the rank of colonel. A major general by 1912, Skoropadsky served with distinction in World War I. He was awarded the Order of St. George and was a lieutenant general by the time of the March 1917 Revolution, when he commanded the XXXIV Infantry Corps on the Southwestern Front.

Following the collapse of the Romanov Dynasty, nationalist leaders declared Ukraine’s autonomy from Russia and established a government centered on the Central Council (*Rada*) in Kiev. Skoropadsky at first offered to provide military support for the new government by forming an army consisting of units from the former XXXIV Corps, but the relationship between the socialist-leaning Rada and the conservative Skoropadsky soon soured. He then left the government and organized the Union of

Landowners to protect the interests of the Ukrainian aristocracy.

On April 29, 1918, Skoropadsky overthrew the Rada and proclaimed himself the ruler of Ukraine, using the traditional Cossack title of hetman. The Germans, who had entered Ukraine two months earlier, supported the coup in the belief that a Skoropadsky-led dictatorship would be better able than the Rada to carry out an agreement to ship large quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany. In return, German and Austro-Hungarian troops would help maintain Skoropadsky in power.

From the beginning, Skoropadsky's regime was on shaky ground. His superficial efforts to promote Ukrainian culture and education failed to win over the nationalists, and his slavish support of large land-owning interests all but guaranteed a lack of popular support. His dependence on German military support further alienated him from the Ukrainian people. Thus, when Germany sued for peace in November 1918, Skoropadsky's regime came to an end.

Skoropadsky went into exile in Germany and maintained close contacts with Weimar military and government officials. He refused, however, to collaborate with the Nazis after they came to power in the early 1930s. As the Soviet army swept into Germany during the last stages of World War II, Skoropadsky fled. He died at Metten, Bavaria, on April 26, 1945, when the train in which he was a passenger was attacked by Allied aircraft. Skoropadsky's vision for an independent Ukrainian state finally came to fruition in August 1991.

John M. Jennings

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 1918); October (November) Revolution, 1917; Russian Civil War (1918–1922); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917).

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Slava (Russian Battleship)

Russian pre-dreadnought battleship. The fifth and final ship of the *Borodino*-class, the *Slava* was launched in August 1903 but not completed until June 1905, too late to participate in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) in which all of its sister ships were destroyed or captured. Officially of 13,566-ton displacement, the *Slava* was 397 feet long, 76 feet in beam, and carried a main battery of 4 12-inch guns in two centerline turrets and 12 6-inch guns in six wing turrets.

Serving throughout its career with the Baltic Fleet, the *Slava* saw significant action in World War I in the Gulf of Riga, where on April 27, 1915, it became the first battleship to be hit in combat by an aerial bomb, which killed five of its crew. In August 1915, the *Slava* engaged superior German forces attempting to clear the gulf of Russian mines, destroying one minesweeper. In October and November, the ship supported the Russian right flank on the southern shore of the gulf by firing on the attacking German troops. The *Slava*'s effectiveness prompted the Germans to make specific plans for submarine

and seaplane attacks against it in 1916, but these failed.

In the fall of 1917, in Operation ALBION (October 8–18), the Germans opened a major offensive in the Gulf of Riga, and in fighting in the Moon Sound entrance to the gulf on October 17, the *Slava* exchanged fire with the more powerful German dreadnoughts *König* and *Kronprinz*. Seriously damaged, the *Slava* sank too low in the water to escape through the shallow channel and was scuttled that same day by a torpedo from the destroyer *Turkmenets-Stavropolski*.

John A. Hutcheson Jr.

See also: ALBION, Operation (October 8–18, 1917); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918)

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Slobodzea, Battle of (October 14, 1811)

The Battle of Slobodzea (Slobozia) ended all hopes of an Ottoman victory in the Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812) and, with the prospect of war with France once again on the horizon, provided Russia with the decisive victory it needed to end the war.

Czar Alexander I realized he could not afford to keep his forces engaged with the Ottoman Empire, as he would need them to face the threat from France. He ordered General Mikhail I. Kutuzov, the Russian commander in the Balkans, to end the war

with the Ottomans quickly. After five years of war that had not yielded tangible results for either side, Kutuzov decided to force the issue and sought a decisive battle. At Rushchuk (Ruse) in July 1811, an Ottoman army of 70,000 men attacked the Russian army of only 46,000 men. The Russians repulsed repeated Ottoman cavalry charges, and Russian counterattacks finally forced the Ottomans to withdraw, but Kutuzov did not achieve a decisive victory. Kutuzov therefore withdrew north across the Danube River to draw the Ottoman forces into pursuit.

Taking the bait, an Ottoman force of 36,000 men crossed the Danube west of Rushchuk and built fortifications; the rest of the Ottoman forces remained on the southern bank. Kutuzov then set his plan in motion; he encircled and held the main Ottoman force on the north bank of the Danube and sent a force of 7,500 men across to the southern bank. On October 14, Kutuzov's force on the southern bank attacked the Ottoman position. Routed and in disarray, the Ottoman forces scattered. The capture of the Ottoman position meant Kutuzov had cut off the main Ottoman force on the northern bank. Without communications or supplies, and under Russian artillery fire from all directions, the Ottoman army had few options.

Negotiations for the surrender of Ottoman forces began on October 15 and concluded on December 5, 1811. The Ottomans delayed, with French encouragement, but conceded when no French aid arrived. With the official surrender of the Ottoman army, peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire occurred at Bucharest in May 1812. The Treaty of Bucharest gained for Russia western Georgia and Bessarabia (the territory between the Dniestr and the Prut rivers), and free passage for commerce through the Dardanelles Strait. Approved by Alexander I in early June 1812, the treaty allowed

Russia to move its army from the Balkans in time for use against Napoleon's invasion of Russia.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812)

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Small Program. See Great (Large) Program (1910)

SMERSH

Military counterintelligence agency of the Soviet Union that operated during World War II.

The leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Josef Stalin, suggested the organization's name, which was an acronym for *Smert' Shpionam* (Death to Spies). Stalin selected Colonel General Viktor S. Abakumov to command SMERSH and established the agency on April 19, 1943, from a detachment of the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal

Affairs (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*, or NKVD). Stalin located SMERSH's headquarters in Moscow; it originally had 646 personnel. The number of field operatives ranged from 15,000 to 30,000; officers (known as *smershevtzy*) answered only to their superiors, not the military.

SMERSH's official objective was to counteract and capture German intelligence agents; however, they provided many other services for Stalin. These included preventing desertion, opposing counter-revolutionaries, and espionage. SMERSH's paramount mission involved the liquidation of treason and subversive activities, real or imagined, within the Russian armed forces (especially the Red Army), as well as within civilian populations in the rear. Many *smershevtzy* concocted cases of treason to retain their authoritative positions. Intertwined with the Red Army, *smershevtzy* wore an infantryman's uniform making them indistinguishable. A year after its creation, SMERSH outgrew the NKVD; at war's end, perhaps 2 million informants worked for SMERSH.

SMERSH aggrandized the horrendous conditions of the Eastern Front, aggressively uncovering any anti-Soviet actions. *Smershevtzy* used brutal interrogation methods, torturing an untold number of prisoners to death. Everywhere SMERSH went throughout Eastern Europe (and China in 1945), they planted the seeds of Stalinist communism. Their violent tactics and propagandistic dogma assisted in the construction of subservient foreign governments in and outside the Soviet Union in the years after the war.

By 1946, SMERSH had disposed of millions via execution or a 25-year sentence of hard labor in a Gulag (Soviet work camp system). That same year, on May 4, the MGB (*Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi*

Bezopasnosti, or Ministry of Government Security, the precursor to the KGB) absorbed SMERSH.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: *Cheka* (*Chrezvychaynayakomissiya*); KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security); MGB (Ministry for State Security; *Ministerstvo Gosdarstvennoye Bezopasnti*) (1946–1953); NKVD; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18, 1812)

The first major battle of the French invasion of Russia in 1812—also known as the Patriotic War of 1812—occurred during August 16–18, 1812. The Battle of Smolensk involved more than 125,000 troops on each side, although only between 50,000 and 60,000 French and Russian forces were actually engaged in the battle, with each side losing approximately 10,000 men. The battle was a tactical victory for the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte, although ultimately a strategic loss as it encouraged him to continue his pursuit of Russia's army deeper into the interior of the country, with eventual disastrous results when winter arrived.

When the *Grande Armée* under Napoleon began its invasion, the Russian armies were divided. They retreated before the advancing

French forces, primarily engaging in ambushes and short counterattacks. They were trading space for time. Napoleon planned therefore, to quickly flank around to the rear of the Russians in order to cut off their line of retreat and to decisively defeat them. On the night of August 14, 1812, French troops crossed the Dnieper River using temporary bridges, intending to take the city of Smolensk without a fight. The Dnieper River flowed through Smolensk, an old fortress city on the main invasion route from the west, with a population of about 12,500. The main roads leading to Moscow met in the city. Instead of entering an empty town, however, the French soldiers found the city fortified by troops commanded by General Prince Pyotr Bagration, who had disobeyed orders and occupied the town. Within two days, General Prince Mikhail Barclay de Tolly and the main Russian army had reinforced the city.

French and Russian forces fought the main battle on August 16. Two probing attacks by French troops captured two suburbs of Smolensk but failed to entice the Russians out to battle. Napoleon then ordered a general assault by three corps supported by 200 pieces of artillery. Initially successful, the powerful artillery barrage set the town on fire, but the French lacked ladders and other means to climb the city's walls. The Russians also struck back with their own cannon fire. At the end of the first day, the city was ablaze, and thousands of troops on both sides were dead. Barclay de Tolly decided to abandon the city in order to save the Russian army. He destroyed ammunition dumps and bridges and left a small force to cover his retreat.

At dawn on August 17, Polish troops of the *Grand Armée* broke through the city walls and occupied the remnants of the town, which was virtually destroyed. Napoleon

knew that most of the Russian army had escaped. Accordingly, he continued to pursue them. Russian covering forces prevented the French from catching the Russian troops, however. On August 18, the two forces fought a final action at Lubino, about 10 kilometers west of Smolensk. Considered the final act of the battle for Smolensk, the Battle of Lubino again resulted in the Russian army escaping to continue its retreat after heavy fighting and the loss of thousands of men on each side.

Although the Battle of Smolensk was a tactical victory for Napoleon, his troops and horses were already suffering from lack of food and fodder as the Russians engaged in a scorched-earth retreat. The destruction of Smolensk also deprived Napoleon of a good supply base, which further complicated his logistical problems. Napoleon's continued pursuit of the Russian armies deeper into the country eventually would spell his defeat when winter arrived in Moscow several months later.

Alan M. Anderson

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Smolensk War (1632–1634)

Attempt to reconquer lands ceded to Poland-Lithuania in the Truce of Deulino (1619). The truce ended 10 years of conflict that had seen both King Sigismund III of Poland and his son Władysław claim the Russian throne. At one point during 1612, Polish forces held Moscow. In the agreement, Russia acknowledged the loss of Smolensk, Seversk, and Cherniev. The Truce of Deulino was valid only for 14 years, however, and thus certain to bring renewed warfare. Smolensk was too grievous a loss for Moscow to accept, and Sigismund and Władysław never renounced their claims to the Russian throne.

After his return to Moscow from captivity in Poland in 1619, Filaret Romanov, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church and father of Czar Mikhail Romanov, dominated the Russian government. Filaret had developed a deep hatred for Poland, and a burning desire to regain Smolensk. He therefore immediately began preparations for war on the Truce of Deulino's expiration, importing enormous quantities of weaponry and ammunition. Working through Mikhail, he also reformed the army, creating new regiments along European lines, adopting Western equipment, and importing some European officers to train the troops. Beginning in 1630, Filaret even brought in some Western mercenaries to serve as elite formations. At the same time, Russia began developing its domestic production of metals and weapons, a process that continued long after the Smolensk War.

Thus when King Sigismund III died in April 1632, before the Deulino truce expired, Russia was prepared. Filaret moved to take advantage of the chaos surrounding

the election of a new Polish king by launching his war to regain Smolensk even though preparations were incomplete. Władysław, however, was elected king in November 1632, largely without the complications and internal divisions Filaret counted on. Russia's invasion force of 34,500—including 9,000 men in six new, foreign-formation regiments—was thus too small for the war Filaret encountered.

Mikhail Borisovich Shein led the Russian army and captured a number of small border towns before reaching Smolensk in October 1632. The city, which sat astride the main road from Europe to Muscovy, was surrounded by a system of entrenchments and earthworks. Shein, who had served as the commander of Smolensk 20 years earlier, knew the fortifications intimately and began a systematic siege. Although Shein was without heavy artillery until December and lacked heavy siege guns until March 1633, the siege proceeded methodically. By the summer of 1633, Smolensk was in a desperate state; the ceaseless bombardment had damaged the walls seriously, and the fall of Smolensk seemed only a matter of time.

Władysław had begun organizing a substantial relief army immediately upon his election. As soon as weather permitted, he launched raids on the Russian lines, and infiltrated troops and supplies into Smolensk. His main force of 20,000 men reached Smolensk in August 1633. Shein then halted the siege and consolidated his forces in a camp east of the city. A Polish raid soon destroyed Shein's main supply depot farther east at Dorogobuzh, which had been left largely unprotected. Władysław then seized the high ground around Shein's camp and used the cavalry to keep the Russian forces pinned against the Dnieper River.

Running short on food and ammunition, under constant barrage, and pressured by the foreign mercenaries to capitulate, Shein surrendered. He and his men marched out of camp on March 1, 1634, free to return home but forced to abandon their weapons and supplies. The foreign mercenaries had to swear not to fight against Poland; many went directly into Poland's service. Upon his return to Moscow—with only a quarter of the troops he took to Smolensk—Shein was tried and executed for incompetence.

Filaret was still desperate to have Smolensk return to Russian control, but died in October 1633. Czar Mikhail had little reason to continue the conflict after Shein's humiliating defeat. Władysław likewise had greater concerns. His retaliatory push toward Moscow had bogged down, and he feared an attack by the Crimean Tartars while engaged with Russia. The Peace of Polianovka thus ended the war in June 1634. It confirmed the prewar status quo with one exception: Władysław surrendered all claims to the Russian throne.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Deulino, Truce of (1618); Filaret (Philaret; Mikhail Nikitich Romanov; 1553?–1632); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Polivanka, Peace of (June 4, 1634); Shein, Mikhail Borisovich (?–1634); Time of Troubles

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Sokolov, Sergei Leonidovich (1911–2012)

The son of a czarist army officer, Sergei Sokolov was born July 1, 1911, in Yevpatoria, Russia. He joined the Red Army as a cadet in May 1932. Sokolov was commissioned a sublieutenant in 1935, became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1937, and saw action in the 1938 Battle of Lake Khasan. Promoted to captain in 1941, Sokolov saw extensive service on the Eastern Front during World War II (Great Patriotic War). He was promoted to major in 1942, to lieutenant colonel and then colonel in 1943. From March to September 1944, Sokolov served as the commander of a motorized company in the Thirty-Second Army on the Karelian Front.

He entered the J. V. Stalin Military Academy in 1947, and in May 1948, assumed command of a tank regiment, then joined the divisional staff in December 1949. He returned to military studies in 1951, subsequently taking command of a mechanized division in January 1952. Sokolov was promoted to major general in August 1953, and joined the General Staff in December 1954. He was promoted to lieutenant general in May 1959, and assumed command of the Moscow Military District in 1963 with the rank of colonel general. In October 1965, he became commander of the Leningrad Military District.

Promoted to general in 1967, Sokolov added the post of deputy defense minister to his portfolio; he served in both capacities until 1984. In 1978, Sokolov was promoted to field marshal, and he was placed in charge of Soviet ground forces during the invasion of Afghanistan. Sokolov personally led the incursion in December 1979, and was made Hero of the Soviet Union in April 1980.

During 1984–1987, Sokolov served as defense minister of the Soviet Union; he was dismissed after a young German managed to land a small aircraft in Red Square. Sokolov served as an advisor to the Russian Federation in defense matters from 1992. Sokolov earned some 37 Russian military honors; he also received more than 40 medals and decorations from 10 foreign countries. He died in Moscow on August 31, 2012.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Lake Khasan, Battle of

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Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968)

Soviet general and defense official. Born the son of peasants in the village of Kozliki, near Grodna (then Poland, now Belarus), on July 9, 1897, Vasily Sokolovsky in 1918 joined the Red Army. As a participant in the Russian Civil War, he commanded a company, a regiment, a brigade, and finally the 32nd Rifle Division. He graduated from the Red Army Staff Academy in 1921 and then served in Central Asia in the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. He was then chief of staff first of a division and then a corps. Later he was chief of staff of first the Urals and then the Volga military districts.

Promoted to major general in May 1938 and to lieutenant general in June 1940, Sokolovsky became deputy chief of the General Staff in February 1941. In mid-summer, he was chief of staff of the Western Front, with responsibility for the defense of Moscow. Promoted to colonel general in June 1942, he took command of the Western Front in early 1943. In August 1943, he was promoted to general of the army. From April 1944, he was chief of staff of the First Ukrainian Front. In the last months of the war, he was deputy commander of the First Belorussian Front.

After the war, Sokolovsky became deputy commander of Soviet occupation forces in Germany and governor of the Soviet zone of Berlin. During 1946–1949, he commanded Soviet occupation forces in Germany, a period that coincided with the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949. Indeed, it was Sokolovsky who suggested that American, British, and French soldiers in the western sectors of Berlin were guests of the Soviets rather than fellow occupiers.

Returning to the Soviet Union in 1949, Sokolovsky continued to play a major role in the Soviet military. During 1949–1960, he was first deputy minister of defense and then chief of the General Staff (1952–1960). At the end of his military career, he served as inspector general for the Ministry of Defense and oversaw the writing of *Voennaia strategiiia* (Military Strategy), a 1962 planning manual that shaped Soviet thinking for most of the remainder of the Cold War. Sokolovsky died in Moscow on May 10, 1968.

Roger Chapman and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942)

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Sorge, Richard (1895–1944)

The youngest son of a German mining engineer working in the Caucasus, Richard Sorge was born in Baku, Azerbaijan, on October 4, 1895. His family returned to Germany when he was still a young boy, and Sorge was educated in Berlin. He joined the German army at the start of World War I and served with the Third Guards Field Artillery on the Western Front. Severely wounded in March 1916, Sorge received the Iron Cross, promotion to corporal, and a medical discharge. He spent the rest of the war studying economics at a series of German universities, and became a convinced Marxist. He earned a doctorate in political science from the University of Hamburg in 1919, the same year, he joined the German Communist Party.

Unable to find work because of his politics, Sorge emigrated to the Soviet Union, where he was recruited as a spy for the Communist International (Comintern). He returned to Germany to work as a journalist, sending intelligence about the German business community back to Moscow. Sorge returned to Moscow in 1924, and by 1929, he had officially joined the Red Army as an intelligence officer. He was sent to Britain that year to study the labor movement, but later transferred to Germany, where he joined the Nazi Party.

Still working as a journalist, Sorge moved to Shanghai in 1930; while there, he made contact with other Soviet spies and established a loose communications network.

Posing as an agricultural reporter, he traveled the countryside, contacting members of the Chinese Communist Party. He returned to Moscow in December 1932. In May 1933, Sorge returned to Germany, where he renewed his contacts in the Nazi Party and found work with several publications that would send him to Japan, as Soviet intelligence wished.

Sorge arrived in Japan in September 1933, and made contact with an existing network. He then set about developing a network of his own, reporting to Moscow on Japanese foreign policy; his Nazi credentials also gave him access to the German Embassy in Tokyo. Sorge was thus able to inform Moscow ahead of time about both the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact and, in 1941, Operation BARBAROSSA. Soviet leader Josef Stalin, however, ignored Sorge's warnings, with disastrous results. When Sorge reported in September 1941 that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union though, Stalin listened; this intelligence allowed the transfer of Siberian forces to lend decisive aid in the Battle for Moscow.

In October 1941, Japanese authorities arrested a key member of Sorge's network in Japan. Four days later, they arrested Sorge as well. He confessed under torture that he was a Soviet spy; the Japanese hanged him on November 7, 1944, after the Soviets thrice denied he was an agent and refused to trade Japanese spies for him. Only in 1964 did the Soviet Union acknowledge that Sorge had been working for them.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act (April 13, 1941); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942)

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Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)

The Spanish Civil War was fought between the Republican (government) side, which was determined to eliminate an entrenched feudalism and introduce liberal reforms, and the Nationalists, who sought to destroy the government that had expelled the monarchy and threatened Spain's traditional values. Soon Spain's Civil War was hopelessly complicated and prolonged by the intrusion of outside forces, with Germany and Italy aiding the Nationalists while the Soviet Union, Mexico, and a host of international volunteers supported the Republic.

In 1923, King Alfonso XIII called on his confidante, General Miguel Primo de Rivera, to establish an authoritarian corporate state. When this failed to solve problems by 1930, Alfonso XIII dismissed Primo de Rivera, recalled the Spanish Parliament (Cortes), and allowed elections. Municipal elections of the spring of 1931 were such a repudiation of the king that he went into exile that year, and Spain became a republic.

The next five years were marked by continuous unrest. When the leftist Republicans were in power, they pushed through reforms to benefit workers and peasants. The Republicans also curtailed the privileges enjoyed by the church and the wealthy. In 1933, when the center and the right won power, they reversed the reforms and purged those not sympathetic with their cause from office. Both sides grew increasingly intolerant, and it was clear that the power struggle would not be resolved at the polls.

The Republicans won the hotly contested February 1936 elections. The Left parties (Republicans, Socialists, Syndicalists, and

Communists) had combined in a Popular Front and beat the Nationalist coalition of Conservative Republicans, Clericals, and Monarchists. The Nationalist rebellion opened on July 18, 1936, with a revolt of army regiments in Spanish Morocco and was led by the top echelons in the army, including generals Francisco Franco and Emilio Mola.

The Nationalists, sometimes (incorrectly) known as the Fascists, had support from perhaps two-thirds of the army and 90 percent of its officers, the church, die-hard monarchists, and the conservative old-line families who controlled the wealth of Spain. It also had support from the Foreign Legion and the powerful paramilitary groups, the Carlists and the Falange. The government side, also known as the Loyalists, could count on the navy and the bulk of the air force; the peasants and workers; and the most industrialized part of Spain, the Madrid-Valencia-Barcelona triangle. The loyalties of the middle class were evenly divided.

External support proved more important in the early going though. Only a week into the fighting, Adolf Hitler agreed to supply the Nationalists with transports and fighter escorts to ferry Franco's troops from Morocco to Spain. Beginning on July 29, the Germans aided in the transport of 13,000 crack Spanish and Moroccan troops to Nationalist-controlled Seville in southern Spain. Hitler hoped to tie the Western democracies down and distract attention from his arms buildup. A Fascist victory would also guarantee a supply of Spanish iron ore and other strategic materials. By the end of September, Germany had supplied 73 aircraft to assist the Nationalists; Italy had sent 56.

In November 1936, the Germans formed the *Kondor Legion* of some 5,000 men and more than 100 aircraft. Ultimately, some 19,000 men and 300–400 planes served in Spain during the course of the war. Spain

provided a training school for the coordination of ground troops and tactical air forces that would be so devastatingly effective in Poland and France during World War II.

The Italian intervention was both larger and less effective. Perhaps 48,000 Italian soldiers went to Spain in the Italian *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* (CTV), along with several hundred aircraft. During August and September 1937, Mussolini dispatched Italian submarines to the Mediterranean to attack Spanish Republic warships as well as merchant shipping from other nations that were supplying the Republican side.

The Soviet attitude was curious. Soviet leader Josef Stalin wished to simulate commitment to the Republican side while believing that an all-out victory by either side was undesirable. A Republican victory would most likely produce a left-wing government unresponsive to Kremlin control. Nationalist success would weaken France and free Hitler to concentrate on aggression in the east. Continuation of the war, on the other hand, might lead to a wider, inter-Western conflict where the Soviet Union would emerge as the arbiter of Europe. In any case, Soviet aid was always limited in scope and subject to many restrictions.

No Soviet fighting units were ever dispatched to Spain, although Stalin did send some 2,000 instructors, tank crews, and pilots. The Soviets also provided—sometimes via the Communist International, which was based in Moscow—some 700 tanks, over 300 aircraft, nearly 1,500 trucks, and 300 armored cars. In all, estimates are that the USSR sent nearly 70,000 tons of military supplies to the Republican side, along with guns of all types and sizes and nearly 30,000 tons of ammunition. The Soviets insisted on payment in cash for goods rendered, of course, and the Republican government shipped several hundred million dollars in gold to Odessa.

French premier Léon Blum initially promised to supply the Republican government with aircraft and other military equipment as well. Some aid was sent, but the British government insisted on embargoing military supplies to either side. London made it clear to Blum that if French aid led to an enlarged struggle involving Germany, Britain might not honor its pledge to defend France. France desperately needed British support against Germany, so Blum quickly reversed policy and halted aid to the Spanish Republic.

Ultimately 27 nations, including all the Great Powers, signed a nonintervention agreement pushed by London. Yet men and supplies continued to flow to the Fascist side from Germany and Italy. It was only relatively late, when it appeared the Republican side might collapse, that significant military aid came from the Soviet Union. The United States adhered to the noninterventionist position. Mexico was the only Western country to help the Loyalist side, sending 18,000 rifles, though Poland sold large quantities of arms to the Republican side.

Many individuals in the West were appalled by the attitude of their governments, however, and thousands volunteered to fight in Spain. The vast majority of these fought on the Republican side, and most were either socialists or communists. Some 40,000 men came from 54 nations, and 8,000 of them died in Spain.

Battles raged everywhere. Wherever the Nationalists were in control, they slaughtered members of the Popular Front as a matter of policy. A Red terror also broke out in Republican Madrid, as self-appointed *chekas* set about trying rebels and suspected rebels. Thousands, including many of the rich, were summarily executed after drum-head trials. Franco did not lament the deaths of tens of thousands of innocents, which the authorities organized and directed. The

militia killings on the Republican side were the work of men running wild.

The rebels had hoped to take Madrid at the outset of the war. Their plans hinged on storming into Madrid and ending the war quickly. When this failed, the Nationalists found their supply of weapons and ammunition dwindling rapidly while the militia on the Republican side gained experience. Franco perhaps missed an opportunity to win the war early when he turned away from Madrid, which was still unfortified, to try to relieve Nationalists besieged in the Alcazar in Toledo. The siege there, which lasted for 72 days, was one of the most dramatic episodes of the Civil War. As it transpired, the Alcazar, which had no strategic significance, fell to the Republicans before the Nationalist relief force arrived.

Madrid's resistance became legendary. When General Mola was informed that the resistance was much more stubborn than anticipated, he indicated that the four Nationalist columns converging on Madrid from different directions would be joined by a "fifth column"—that is, secret sympathizers or supporters of an enemy who would engage in sabotage or spying within defense lines or national borders. The expression entered the vocabulary. The inhabitants of Madrid vowed, "*No pasarán*" (they shall not pass), and blunted a series of Nationalist attacks between November 1936 and March 1937.

Generals Franco and Mola then moved their troops toward Andalusia and Extremadura, depriving the Republicans of the most important wheat-growing and cattle-raising regions in Spain. On February 8, 1937, the Nationalists took Málaga, although the Loyalists repulsed two Italian divisions at Guadalajara in mid-March.

In the spring of 1937, Franco began the Great Northern Campaign, a two-staged attack that caused the surrender of Asturias and

then the Basque area. On April 1, the Nationalists crushed the remaining Basque Loyalist resistance. On June 18, Bilbao fell to the Nationalists, who then moved against Santander. As part of their offensive in the Basque region, the Nationalists captured Bajadoz on August 4 and Santander on August 25, 1937. By the end of the year, the Nationalists controlled all of northwestern Spain.

In despair, the Republicans turned increasingly to the Soviets, who, as virtually the Loyalists' only source of help, steadily won greater influence. Gradually, the more moderate leaders were bypassed and ousted, until eventually the Communists took control under Largo Caballero. Soviet advisors cynically took advantage of their positions to purge the Republican side of anyone who did not follow the Soviet line, but exacted particular vengeance on the numerous Spanish followers of Stalin's avowed enemy, Leon Trotsky.

In 1938, Franco turned his attention east toward Aragon and Catalonia. The battles were hard-fought, but Nationalist forces reached the coast and split Republican-held territory. Before the Nationalist forces could exploit their victories though, Republican troops staged a great offensive along the Ebro River on July 24–25, 1938. The Republicans committed 100,000 of 400,000 men in their army. Caught by surprise, Franco halted operations in Catalonia. Fascist airpower and artillery, which gave the margin of difference throughout the Civil War, halted the Republicans and cost them 70,000 casualties. The failure of this summer offensive spelled the beginning of the end for the Republic.

On October 10, Franco launched an all-out counteroffensive along the Ebro. The Nationalists quickly regained all territory lost there and followed up by crushing remaining Republican forces in Catalonia. By December, Nationalist forces surrounded

Barcelona, causing its capitulation on January 26. The final blows came with the capture of Madrid on March 27 and of Valencia on March 30. The Civil War was over.

The toll of the Spanish Civil War has never been accurately determined. The most careful estimates are that about 600,000 Spaniards were killed on both sides, and after the war, another 100,000 were executed by the victorious Nationalists. Half a million more lived on as refugees in camps on the French side of the Pyrenees.

Spain was left with deep wounds that many decades later still had not healed. The West did not come off well in Spain; its failure to stand up for democracy encouraged other demands by the dictators elsewhere, and was the first step in convincing Stalin the democracies were unreliable allies against fascism.

Roger L. Rice and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: *Cheka (Chrezvychaynayakomissiya)*; Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

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Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

Soviet leader, born as Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili (Georgian) or Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Russian), in Gori, Georgia, sometime around December 1878.

Stalin, his most famous *nom de guerre*, literally means “man of steel.”

Any biographical research on Stalin quickly runs into difficulties and contradictions. The historical record has been heavily redacted and recast by those seeking to either exalt or condemn his tenure as the supreme architect of the Soviet system, promote his image as the savior of the world from the Nazi terror, or reveal him as a “bloodthirsty cannibal.” It is beyond dispute, however, that Stalin was chiefly responsible for the political and economic fates of Eastern and Central Europe after World War II, and the most powerful single person on the Eurasian landmass by 1945.

Early Life and Rebellions

One of the few things most sources agree on is that the future dictator was known as



Josef Stalin, secretary general of the Soviet Communist party, in 1942. (Library of Congress)

“Soso” (“little Josef”) to intimates all his life. His father, Iosif, was a shoemaker, and his mother, Ketevan, did whatever was necessary to keep the family going. Smallpox at age seven left young Iosif’s face pock-marked. At 12, an accident or illness rendered his left arm shorter and stiffer than the other. The senior Iosif was an abusive drunk who terrorized not only his family but also the entire village. When Ketevan enrolled young Soso in the Orthodox Seminary in Gori in 1888, Iosif abandoned his family and moved to Tbilisi (Tiflis).

In 1894, Soso enrolled in the Tiflis theological seminary. He was a fervent Georgian nationalist, and by 1895, he had declared himself an atheist as well. He insisted that his peers call him Koba, a character from a Robin Hood-like legend, and joined the (illegal) Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party. Although an excellent student, he was expelled from the seminary in 1899, likely because of his revolutionary proselytizing. After a brief stint at the Tiflis Meteorological Observatory, he went underground, became a full-time revolutionary, and discovered the writings of Vladimir I. Lenin. He began to sign his articles and poems “Stalin” in about 1904.

Using protection rackets, bank robberies, terror attacks, and extortion to fund his activities, Stalin was in and out of prison and exile while he grew closer to Lenin’s work and the Bolshevik (Communist) Party. In St. Petersburg (Leningrad) in 1912, he turned the weekly Bolshevik paper *Zvezda* (“Star”) into the daily *Pravda* (“Truth”) that ran continuously until 1991 as the official voice of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As editor, he rejected numerous articles by Lenin and met secretly with prominent Mensheviks (socialists). Lenin fired him, but made him senior leader of the Russian Bureau of the Bolshevik Party. Stalin was conscripted in 1914 but exempted because of his crippled arm.

Revolution and Civil War

Stalin was the first major Bolshevik leader to arrive in Petrograd after the February 1917 revolution began, having spent much of World War I in jail, hiding, or exile. Initially he felt compelled to support the provisional government while protesting against the continuation of the war. After Lenin's arrival in April, Stalin and the Bolsheviks openly opposed the provisional government and the war. Stalin helped organize support for the Bolshevik (October) Revolution, though his role was small compared to the parts played by Trotsky, Lenin, and others. He was rewarded with the relatively minor post of People's Commissar for Nationalities' Affairs.

During the subsequent Russian Civil War (1918–1921), Stalin was constantly at odds with Defense Commissar Leon Trotsky, whom he had met in 1905 and never liked. Assigned to establish order in Tsaritsyn in May 1918, Stalin ordered scores of former Czarist officers and other “unreliables” publicly shot, and burned villages to discourage hoarding. In 1919, Stalin served as political commissar for an army attempting to capture L'viv (Lvov) while Trotsky, the commander in chief, attempted to take Warsaw during the Russo-Polish War (1919–1921). Stalin refused to support Trotsky, and both L'viv and Warsaw were lost.

The nascent Soviet Union had recognized the independence of Georgia in March 1918 as part of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In 1922, the Red Army invaded Georgia, however; Stalin was in charge of the invasion and the occupation. He carried out a brutal gutting of its sovereignty, economy, and social structure. Lenin and Trotsky both disagreed with Stalin's policies, and Lenin denounced Stalin in the press. Stalin never forgot.

Lenin succumbed to a heart attack in January 1924, leaving no clear successor. Trotsky was the outstanding figure of the Party and seemed the logical choice, but

Stalin and the other Bolshevik leaders conspired to discredit him. Stalin then turned against his coconspirators and, ironically, worked with Trotsky to discredit them. This internal struggle ended with Stalin in power by 1928. Along the way, Stalin, using his power as party secretary, filled the ranks with his supporters or those he could bully. He forced Trotsky into exile, expelled him from the party, and finally had him killed. Other rivals and potential rivals, great and small, met similar fates.

The Great Famine, the Cult of Personality, and the Great Purges

Where Lenin had sought to persuade his opponents, Stalin's leadership emphasized the elimination of opposition, real or imagined. When the peasants in rural areas did not provide enough grain to support his program of industrialization in 1927, he invented the “Urals-Siberia” method (essentially expropriation by any means necessary) to meet his goals. He also created “kulaks”—supposedly a wealthier class of farmer—as class enemies to be liquidated so their land could be confiscated. Beginning in 1928, the forced collectivization of agriculture not only took peasants' land but it also expropriated their agricultural products, often including the seed grain, for foreign sale. This generated capital for industrialization, but starved millions. Numbers are unclear, but most authorities agree upward of 10 million people starved to death between 1928 and 1934, many in the richest agricultural areas of the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine. Millions more who resisted collectivization were thrown in the Gulag, where they provided free labor for Stalin's monumental construction works like the White Sea Canal, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Dam, or the Moscow Metro.

By 1934, this had evolved into a full-blown program of state-sponsored terror;

thousands of “anti-Soviet acts” were punishable by hard labor or death. Anyone who questioned or failed to meet the expectations of the First Five-year Plan for the industrialization of the USSR was labeled a counter-revolutionary, arrested, and executed or sent to the Gulag. Millions, including some of the founding members of the Bolshevik Party and Stalin’s closest collaborators, met such a fate. The “Great Terror” or the “Great Purges,” as they were known, also affected the Soviet armed forces. “Unreliable” officers, including many who had come up under the czars but also some of the best and most innovative military thinkers in the USSR, were eliminated. Over 60 percent of the staff officers on the register in 1934 were dead or in prison by 1938.

This bloodletting installed Stalin as the absolute and unquestioned leader of the Soviet Union by the end of 1937. Everywhere, “Comrade Stalin” was hailed as the savior of the Soviet Union, the “genius” behind the Soviet advances in industry and agriculture, and the defender and leader of world communism. The colossal, grandiose buildings so iconic of the early Soviet Union are known as “Stalinist Architecture,” and his picture—often in tandem with those of Karl Marx and Lenin, the “other” founders of communism—could be seen on posters, in murals, and in paintings everywhere. Stalin’s speeches (often hours long) were published in their entirety in *Pravda*, and he often wrote lengthy editorials for the paper as well. His birthdays were celebrated with lavish parades, and poems, songs, and novels were created as paeans to him. Without “Comrade Stalin,” it was said, there would be no Soviet Union.

The Great Patriotic War

To some extent, this was certainly true. During the 1930s, Stalin had driven industrialization

and militarization at a furious pace. Even as he destroyed the officer corps in 1937, Stalin expanded the Red Army significantly, built a huge Red Air Force, and created a navy that verged on world class. He tested those forces in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), sending tanks and advisors to aid the Republicans against the Nationalist rebels, who were in turn supported by both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. While ultimately defeated, the Red Army and Stalin learned many valuable lessons from the experience.

Certainly Stalin gained the impression that the Western democracies would not go to war in defense of their ideals. In his role as head of the Communist International (Comintern), Stalin had attempted to form a common Popular Front with the socialist parties in France and Western Europe (1934–1939), but found them internally divided and for the most part unwilling to follow his lead. The Soviet Union signed a treaty of alliance with France in 1935, but Stalin otherwise found only disappointment in his attempts to establish a regime of collective security against the rising power of Nazi Germany.

With an eye on the parts of Poland that had been a traditional Russian territory, Stalin therefore cautiously reopened communications with Germany in 1939. The Germans proved more than willing to offer Stalin part of Poland—and more—in return for Soviet’s neutrality. The two states signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Treaty in August 1939 (Nazi-Soviet Pact), establishing “spheres of influence” within Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin thus bought space and time to rebuild the defense establishment he had nearly destroyed. He did not believe the treaty would last past 1944, nor did he think it had to. Following the disastrous Winter War against Finland in 1940, he was told the Red Army could be reorganized, based on German performance in the West, by 1943. Stalin’s own propaganda

further held that any state that attacked the Soviet Union would immediately undergo a worker's revolt, though how much of this he believed is unclear.

When the Germans invaded in June 1941, however, Stalin was caught by surprise and purportedly went into a state of shock. He was neither seen nor heard from for 10 days, even as his forces were being annihilated in huge cauldron battles. When he reappeared, Stalin's response was predictable: while Soviet forces suffered about 800 deaths every minute, the policies of terror and retribution continued. Entire populations, from ethnic Germans in the Ukraine to the Tatars of Crimea, were deported to Central Asia under suspicion of treason. "Deserters" retreating from hopeless fights were shot by blocking forces that had more ammunition and better weapons than most assault battalions. Any soldier taken prisoner was declared a traitor, and his family punished. Wrongdoers, real and imagined, were put into penal units that cleared mines under enemy fire. Though he improved as a commander over the course of the war and learned to trust his subordinates, Stalin remained at heart a Machiavellian dictator.

Charismatic enough to charm Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, Stalin nonetheless demanded much from them and anyone else fighting Germany, and promised little in return. He knew exactly what he wanted, and altered borders with the same calm dispatch and the same blue pencil checkmarks with which he had signed the death warrants of millions of his own citizens. His insistence on retaining the ill-gotten gains of 1939–1940 as a "buffer zone" led Churchill to imagine an "iron curtain" between the communist world and the rest of humanity. On one subject, however, they did agree at the Yalta Conference in February 1945: the Soviets, with more experience in urban warfare, would fight for Berlin alone.

Cold War

At Potsdam, in July 1945, Stalin committed to an invasion of Japanese-held Manchuria and hinted, somewhat disingenuously, at an invasion of Japan. Through his spies, Stalin was well aware of the Americans' atom bomb capabilities, and he hoped to make some easy gains in the East. The sudden collapse of Japanese resistance in mid-August 1945 denied the Soviets an occupation zone in Japan, but this only bolstered Stalin's grip on Eastern Europe. His legions gutted the industrial base in Soviet-occupied zones as "reparations," then rebuilt them in the crude Soviet pattern. After their failure to bring Austria into the Soviet orbit in 1945, Stalin generally adhered to the letter of the Yalta concord. Maintaining the spirit of the agreements was another matter, for Stalin was unwilling to brook even the facsimile of opposition in areas he considered vital to Soviet interests, especially Poland and Germany.

Relations between Stalin and the West thus gradually broke down following the end of the war. Rigged elections brought malleable, pro-Soviet governments into being in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary during 1946–1948. When the Western Allies reacted by restricting economic aid, Stalin responded in typical fashion. The Berlin Blockade (June 1948–May 1949), followed quickly as it was by the founding of two German states under Western and Soviet domination, marked the pivot from alliance to Cold War. Where Stalin had sought to protect the Bolshevik Revolution through his doctrine of "Socialism in One Country" during the 1920s and 1930s, however, he now tried to use wartime success to build a protective socialist barrier.

His timing was shrewd, or perhaps merely fortunate. He had supported nationalist forces in China throughout the 1920s and 1930s, believing the country was not ready

either economically or ideologically for communism. When the communist forces of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) nevertheless triumphed in the civil war in 1949, Stalin was there to claim the credit. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship that followed in 1950 actually cost the Soviet Union dearly in economic terms, but Stalin undoubtedly figured the gain in prestige and security was worth it. The Korean War (1950–1954) was likewise not of Stalin’s making, but as it worked to his benefit, he did nothing to stop it and did everything to encourage China and North Korea to continue fighting against the West.

Domestic Policy and Personal Life

This was in keeping with Stalin’s renewed, hard-line ideology. Where during the war he had encouraged nationalism and cultivated public support from the Orthodox Church, once victory was assured, Stalin reverted to the norm. He put the population to work rebuilding, in a new Five-year Plan that retained the 48-hour workweek and an emphasis on heavy industry above consumer goods. Any unfavorable comparison to the West, or indeed any praise of the Soviets’ former Western allies, was once again treated as treason. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens suspected of collaborating with either the Nazis or the West—including the 300,000 prisoners of war the Western Allies had repatriated at Stalin’s insistence—were thrown into the Gulag on charges of “formalism” and “bourgeois cosmopolitanism,” and then put to work.

Andrei Zhdanov, political boss of Leningrad, served as the guiding spirit of this movement known as *Zhdanovshchina*. Zhdanov died in 1948, but Stalin continued and extended the policy, launching new purges that threatened to sweep away millions more, including a new generation of political

leaders who might have challenged him. Before the so-called Doctors’ Plot purge could be fully realized, however, Stalin suffered a severe stroke while at his dacha (summer house) in Kunetsovo. He died on March 5, 1953; by 1956, the Soviet Union had entered a period of “de-Stalinization” under Nikita S. Khrushchev—one of Stalin’s protégés.

The shifting nature of Stalin and his regime, with its constant tinge of terror, calls to mind the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Like Ivan, Stalin could be both charming and terrifying; both rulers produced monumental triumphs, yet slaughtered multitudes. Many scholars have even speculated that, as was the case with Ivan, the more horrific side of Stalin was unleashed by the death of his first wife. He married Ekaterina Svanidze in Georgia in 1906. She died of typhus (or tuberculosis) in 1907; her family was destroyed during the Great Terror. With her death, Stalin later stated, he lost what was left of his humanity. She bore him a son, Yakov Dzhugashvili, in 1907. In July 1941, he was captured by the Germans. Stalin refused to exchange him for Frederich Paulus, the German field marshal captured at Stalingrad, and Yakov died at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 1943.

Stalin also married Nadezhda Sergeevna Alliluyeva in 1919. She bore him two children, a son, Vasily Dzhugashvili, born in 1921, and a daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, born in 1926. Nadezhda was said to have been mentally unbalanced, and she frequently argued with Stalin, sometimes in public. In 1932, she died under mysterious circumstances. Some sources claim Nadezhda had a gunshot wound to the head and a pistol in her hand; others attribute her death to a severe beating, and yet others to tuberculosis. The doctors who signed her death certificate claiming acute appendicitis were liquidated during the Great Terror.

Neither of Nadezhda's children saw their father after her death until they were adults. Vasily joined the Red Air Force and was a major general by 1946. He was arrested and imprisoned soon after his father's death, and only released in 1960. He died of alcohol-related causes in 1962. Svetlana defected to the United States in 1967, returned to the Soviet Union in 1987, lived in Britain off and on, then returned again to the United States before her death in 2011. In his personal life, as in his political life, Stalin left behind only tragedy—which is also reminiscent of Ivan IV.

John Beatty

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949); Berlin Rising (June 16–17, 1953); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); Chinese Civil War (1911–1949); Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); February (March) Revolution (1917); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Korean War (1950–1954); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); October (November) Revolution (1917); Order No. 227 (June–July 1942); Order No. 270 (June 1941); Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945); Revolution of 1905; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Yalta

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Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

One of the epic battles of the war; some hold that the Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point on the Eastern Front. The Battle of Stalingrad, the first large encirclement of a German army in the war, gave the Soviets a psychological lift and the military initiative.




Soviet snipers looking for German targets during the Battle of Stalingrad. (National Archives)

In the spring of 1942, Soviet leader Josef Stalin expected the German armies to continue their assault on Moscow. The Red Army had suffered heavy losses and barely managed to deflect the initial German blow. German dictator Adolf Hitler, however, placed the major emphasis of the summer campaign on the southern portion of the German-Soviet Front in Operation BLAU (Blue). He sent General Fedor von Bock's Army Group South east from around Kursk to secure Voronezh, which fell to the Germans on July 6. Hitler then reorganized his southern forces into army groups A and B. General Siegmund W. List had command of the southern formation, Army Group A; General Maximilian von Weichs commanded the northern formation, Army Group B.

Hitler's original plan called for army groups A and B to cooperate in a great effort to secure the Don and Donets valleys and capture the cities of Rostov and Stalingrad. The two army groups could then move southeast to capture the oil fields that were so important to the Red Army. On July 13, Hitler ordered a change of plans, demanding the simultaneous capture of Stalingrad—a major industrial center and key crossing point on the Volga River—and the Caucasus.

Dividing the effort placed further strains on already inadequate German resources, especially on logistical support. This also meant that inevitably a gap would appear between the two German army groups, enabling most Soviet troops caught in the Don River bend to escape eastward. On July 23 Army Group A captured Rostov. It



then crossed the Don River and advanced deep into the Caucasus, reaching to within 70 miles of the Caspian Sea. Infuriated by the inability of his troops to halt the German advance, Stalin issued Order No. 227:

“Not a Step Back,” which put in place draconian penalties for any Soviet soldier who retreated or surrendered.

Dizzy with success, Hitler altered the German plan again, slowing the advance of

General Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army of Army Group B toward Stalingrad when he detached General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army to join Army Group A to help secure the Caucasus oil fields. Sixth Army reached the Volga north of Stalingrad on August 23.

The great city of Stalingrad curved for some 20 miles along the high western bank of the Volga River. Originally named Tsaritsyn, the city had been established in the 16th century to defend Russia's southern border. Tsaritsyn expanded rapidly, and contained a large German settlement. Commanding a key river crossing, Tsaritsyn had played a pivotal role in Pugachev's Rebellion as well as in the Russian Civil War. It was, in fact, in recognition of Stalin's role in organizing the defense of the city against the White (czarist) armies that the city was renamed Stalingrad in 1925.

Under Stalin's rule, the city became a center of industry and an important railway junction as well. Hitler's original intent had been merely to control the river by gunfire and to destroy the city's arms factories, notably the Tractor, Red October, and Barricades works, but now he demanded a full occupation of the Soviet dictator's namesake city.

To meet the German thrust toward Stalingrad, on July 12, 1942, the Soviet General Staff had formed the Stalingrad Front. It consisted of the Sixty-Second, Sixty-Third, and Sixty-Fourth armies, all under the command of Marshal Semen K. Timoshenko—though he was replaced by Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov on July 27. The Twenty-First Army and the Eighth Air Army were also integrated into the Stalingrad Front. General Vasily Chuikov, a protégé of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, commanded the Sixty-Second Army, which was holding on the west bank of the Volga. On August 1, Stalin appointed Marshal Andrei Yermelenko to command the

front; he would share planning duties for the defense of Stalingrad with the new commissar for the front, Nikita Khrushchev. Stalin also rushed reinforcements and supplies to Stalingrad.

Angered by the slow progress of the Sixth Army into Stalingrad, on August 11, Hitler ordered Hoth's Fourth Army to move north from the Caucasus, leaving a badly depleted Army Group A holding a 500-mile front and stalling the southernmost drive. Hitler also ordered his sole strategic reserve in the area, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Eleventh Army, north to Leningrad.

Such wide-ranging shifts of German resources took a terrible toll on men and especially on equipment. They also consumed precious fuel and stretched the German lines far beyond what was reasonable or safe. German army high command's chief of staff General Franz Halder and other German generals grew increasingly alarmed. They pointed out to Hitler that the German army in Russia now had to maintain a front of more than 2,000 miles. Between the two armies of Army Group B, a sole division held a 240-mile gap. North of Stalingrad, Romanian troops protected the single railroad bringing supplies to the Sixth Army. The possibilities open to the Soviets were enormous, providing they had the resources available.

Hitler claimed they did not. Halder disagreed, and tried to get Hitler to break off the battle for Stalingrad. This time, Hitler sacked Halder. He also relieved List, and from a distance of 1,200 miles, Hitler took personal command of Army Group A, which was nominally under General Paul von Kleist. The irony is that the Germans might have taken Stalingrad in July had Hitler not diverted Hoth south to assist Kleist.

Beginning on August 24, a costly battle of attrition raged over Stalingrad. Luftwaffe carpet bombing at the end of August killed

some 40,000 people, but it also turned the city into defensive bastions of ruined buildings and rubble. Stalin refused to allow the evacuation of the civilian population, believing that this would force the defenders, especially local militia forces, to fight more tenaciously. Most of the grain, cattle, and rolling stock had been shipped out long before the Germans arrived, and now bombing had rendered the Volga impassable. It was fight or die.

The ruined city posed a formidable obstacle. Germany's strength lay in maneuver warfare, but Hitler compelled the Sixth Army to engage the Soviet strength of static defense. Stalin ordered the city held at all costs, and Soviet forces resisted doggedly. The civilians inside the city, including women and children, were put to work digging trenches and building fortifications. To make things as difficult as possible for German artillery and aviation, Chuikov ordered his troops to keep within 50 yards of the enemy. Zhukov, who had just been appointed deputy supreme commander—second in authority only to Stalin—arrived at Stalingrad on August 29 to take overall charge of operations.

As the Soviet resistance grew, Hitler became obsessed with Stalingrad and wore down his army in repeated attempts to capture that symbol of defiance. Taking Stalingrad was unnecessary from a military point of view. The German Luftwaffe (air force) had wiped out the Soviet aerial defenses and, even though Stalin continued to send reinforcements, it had complete control of the skies. The 16th Panzer Division at Rynok controlled the Volga with its guns, closing it to north-south shipping. But Hitler insisted the city itself be physically taken.

For a month, the Sixth Army pressed slowly forward, but casualties in the battle of attrition were enormous on both sides,

with advances measured in yards. The battle disintegrated into a block-by-block, house-by-house—even room-by-room—struggle for survival. Soviet female antiaircraft gunners turned their weapons on German Panzer units; workers' militias manned the barricades. There was even fighting in the sewers.

While he fed the cauldron of Stalingrad with only sufficient troops absolutely necessary to hold the city, Zhukov patiently assembled 1 million men in four fronts (army groups) for a great double envelopment. To command the operation, he chose General Nikolai Vatutin, and gave him three complete armies: First Guards, Fifth Tank, and Twenty-First armies. Vatutin's forces thus included 18 infantry divisions and 8 tank brigades, with at least 1 antitank brigade. This deep movement, Operation URANUS, began on November 19 and was timed to coincide with the frosts that would make Soviet cross-country tank maneuvers possible against Axis infantry.

For the northern pincer (Fifth Tank Army and Twenty-First Army), the Soviets assembled 3,500 guns and heavy mortars to blast a hole for three tank and two cavalry corps and a dozen infantry divisions. They encountered Romanian infantry divisions. The Romanians fought bravely, but their 37-millimeter guns and light Skoda tanks were no match for the Soviet T-34s. The southern Soviet prong of two corps, one mechanized and the other cavalry, broke through on November 20 against two Romanian infantry divisions.

By November 23, Operation URANUS had encircled the Sixth Army and driven some units of the Fourth Army into the pocket. Hitler now ordered Manstein from the Leningrad Front and gave him a new formation—Army Group Don, drawn from Army Group A—with instructions to rectify the situation. Hitler forbade any withdrawal, convinced

that the Sixth Army could be resupplied from the air. *Reichsmarschal* Hermann Göring is usually blamed for assuring Hitler that this could be done, but responsibility is more properly be shared among Göring, chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe General Hans Jeschonnek, and Hitler. Hitler was no doubt misled by Luftwaffe success the previous winter in supplying by parachute drops 5,000 German troops surrounded at Kholm near Moscow and 100,000 men at Demyansk.

The decision to rely on air support to supply Stalingrad was taken at a time when the Soviets enjoyed air superiority. While the battle raged, Soviet factories churned out aircraft, producing more than 15,000 between June and December 1942. By November 20, the second day of URANUS, the Soviets committed roughly 1,400 combat aircraft to Stalingrad.

Meanwhile, General Wolfram F. von Richtofen's *Luftflotte 4*, flying in support of the Sixth Army, had 732 combat aircraft, of which only 402 were operational. The Soviets used their air superiority to attack German army positions and for bombing raids on the main Ju-52 base at Zverevo, where they destroyed a substantial number of German transport aircraft. Worsening weather impeded the relief effort, and much of the Luftwaffe's airlift capability was redeployed to resupply Axis troops in North Africa after Allied landings there in early November.

A fair appraisal of air transport available, even in the best weather conditions, was that the Luftwaffe could only bring in one-tenth of the Sixth Army's requirements. By the last week in December, the Luftwaffe delivered only an average 129 tons of supplies a day, condemning the German forces in the pocket to slow starvation and death. Then, on January 16, 1943, the Soviets took Pitomnik, the principal airfield within the

Stalingrad pocket. Its loss was the death blow to the airlift operation. During the last days of the battle, supplies were dropped only by parachute, and many of the supplies fell into Soviet hands.

Hitler still refused to authorize any attempt by the Sixth Army to escape. He would allow only a linking up with a relief force. None of the hard-won territory was to be surrendered, but it was simply impossible for Sixth Army to link up with a relief force and not surrender territory in the process. Paulus favored a breakout, but he was not prepared to gamble either his army or his career.

Manstein's force of three understrength panzer divisions managed to approach within 35 miles of Sixth Army positions, and he urged a *fait accompli*, forcing Hitler to accept it. Paulus replied with a pessimistic assessment of his army's ability to close the short distance to reach Manstein's relief force. There was insufficient fuel, he said; the horses had mostly been eaten, and it would take weeks to prepare. The relieving forces would have to come closer. A linkup could succeed only if Sixth Army pushed from the other side against the Soviets, but this could not be done without shrinking the Stalingrad pocket, which Hitler forbade.

In mid-December, the Volga froze, allowing the Soviets to use vehicles to cross the ice. During the next seven weeks, Zhukov sent 35,000 vehicles across the river along with 122-mm howitzers to blast the German defensive works. By then, seven Soviet armies had surrounded the German Sixth Army, and breakout was impossible. Even in this hopeless situation, Paulus refused to disobey Hitler and order a surrender. He himself surrendered on January 31 (he maintained he had been "taken by surprise"), but he refused to order his men to do the same. The last German units capitulated on February 2.

There may have been 294,000 men trapped at Stalingrad, including Hiwis (Soviet auxiliaries working with the Germans) and Romanians. Of only 91,000 men (including 22 generals) taken prisoner by the Soviets, fewer than 5,000 survived the war and Soviet captivity. The last Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad were not released until 1955. Including casualties in Allied units and the rescue attempts, Axis forces lost upward of half a million men. The Stalingrad Campaign may have cost the Soviets 1.1 million casualties, more than 485,000 dead.

The effect of the Battle of Stalingrad has been hotly debated. It is frequently seen as the turning point in the European theater of war, the decisive defeat from which the *Wehrmacht* could never recover, but militarily Stalingrad was not irredeemable. The German front lines had been largely recreated in the time the remnants of the Sixth Army surrendered.

Stalingrad was more important for its psychological than its military value. The city became a symbol of Soviet strength and sacrifice. It marked the first time the Soviets had not just stopped but destroyed a German army, and marked the start of a drive forward that would end, eventually, in Berlin.

*Eva-Maria Stolberg and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich (1900–1982); Hero Cities of the Soviet Union; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Order No. 227 (June–July 1942); Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970); White Armies in the Russian Civil War (1917–1921); Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich (1892–1970); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Stallupönen, Battle of (August 17, 1914)

First major battle of World War I in East Prussia. Although a minor tactical victory for the Germans over the Russians, Stallupönen was more important for upsetting the initial German strategy in East Prussia and shaping the larger struggle at Tannenberg.

In accordance with the Schlieffen Plan, Germany began the war by committing most of its forces against France and leaving only one army to face Russia. This force, the Eighth Army under Colonel General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, was to parry a Russian invasion of East Prussia. The Russian war plan called for a two-pronged invasion of East Prussia by the First and Second armies. The two Russian armies would initially be separated by sandy marshes and the Masurian Lakes. Prittwitz sought to strike the Russian First Army, commanded by General Pavel Rennenkampf before it could link up with the Second Army.

Prittwitz's plan envisioned allowing Rennenkampf's First Army to advance to the Angerapp River where the entire Eighth Army would concentrate against the Russian force. The aggressive commander of the

German I Army Corps, Lieutenant General Hermann von François, however, pushed his corps much farther to the east toward the village of Stallupönen. Reluctantly, Prittwitz ordered the rest of the Eighth Army toward Gumbinnen, a position between the Angerapp River and Stallupönen. On August 16, 1914, he also instructed François to fall back and allow the Russians to move farther west toward the hoped-for German trap. François ignored these instructions and prepared to attack the Russians.

The Battle of Stallupönen began on August 17 with a piecemeal commitment of forces on both sides. The German 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Richard von Conta, came under heavy attack from the Russian III Corps. By noon, increasing Russian pressure created a gap in the German line, and only the determined resistance of the German 41st Regiment and the timely arrival of François's heavy artillery prevented a disaster. For much of the afternoon, both sides settled into a stalemate. During this time, Prittwitz sent an order for François to pull back, but the German corps commander defiantly refused to withdraw. Later in the afternoon, the German 2nd Division arrived on the Russian left (southern) flank and struck the Russian 27th Division. The Russians had been engaged for the better part of a day, and after a sharp fight, the 27th Division fell back in disorder.

This local success gave the Germans a limited victory for the day, but Rennenkampf had more forces approaching François's isolated corps. François decided to pull back in compliance with Prittwitz's earlier orders, but his actions had drawn the rest of the Eighth Army forward to Gumbinnen where it again fought the Russian First Army several days later. In the end, Stallupönen was a minor engagement, but it emboldened François to further insubordinate actions and

ultimately led to a change in Eighth Army plans that fortuitously resulted in the German victory at Tannenberg.

Curtis S. King

See also: Gumbinnen, Battle of (August 20, 1914); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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State Committee for Defense.

See Stavka

State Defense Council

The Russian Federation's State Defense Council was established by President Boris Yeltsin on July 25, 1996. Led by Yeltsin's National Security Affairs assistant, Yuri Baturin, the council was charged with comprehensively implementing military reform. It held its first meeting on October 4, 1996. A key council objective included reducing the Russian military's size to 1.2 million personnel; creating a smaller, more flexible, and highly mobile military force; enhancing Russian military professionalism; and formulating new military doctrine.

Participating council entities included the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and several others as well as the Border Guards. It met monthly during the Yeltsin years; its

operating style was somewhat comparable to the U.S. National Security Council but with a narrower mandate, and had a staff of approximately 53 members consisting primarily of Foreign Ministry civilians and military officers. It also tapped external expertise, commissioned outside studies, and achieved modest success in pushing for military reform during the Yeltsin era.

The council quarreled with the Defense Ministry, however, and would lose power to the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies. A Military Industrial Commission was created on March 20, 2006 to centralize and reform military-industrial complex operational management. Various laws have enhanced SCRF's power and authority in recent years, and it is now the preeminent power in Russian national security policy making. The State Defense Council became an example of agency that had a brief time in the sun before losing out to political infighting, military opposition to its reform efforts, bureaucratic maneuvering and power plays, and the deeply ingrained authoritarian and centralized tendencies in Russian political and military policy making.

Bert Chapman

See also: Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Stavka

A term referring to the Russian army High Command, dating from Kievan Rus but most closely associated with the Imperial Russian Army of the late 19th and, especially, early 20th century and its general staff.

As war approached in 1914, Czar Nicholas II wanted to reserve command of the Imperial Russian Army for himself, but he was dissuaded by his ministers and appointed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to that post. Grand Duke Nikolai situated the headquarters at Baranovichi, a Polish railway town between the German and Austro-Hungarian Fronts. This headquarters came to be known as the *Stavka*, from the old Russian word for “tent” (literally) or (more figuratively) “camp of a military chief.” *Stavka* consisted of a dozen army trains in a wooded area off the Moscow-Warsaw track near an Orthodox church, all surrounded by three concentric rings of security.

The operation of *Stavka* was deficient because it was under the direction of personalities chosen by Defense Minister Vladimir A. Sukhomlinov, who would later be tried for treasonous incompetence. *Stavka* was expanded during the July Crisis of 1914 preceding the war and granted nominal control of operations. In practice, however, regional commanders tended to ignore its authority. Under Grand Duke Nikolai it was understaffed and suffered from unreliable communications and inconsistent strategy. The grand duke's chief of staff during 1914–1915, General Nikolai N. Yanushkevich, proved ineffective and delegated too much to the quartermaster general, General Yuri Danilov.

Stavka shared much blame for the Russian army's military disasters early in the war. The Russians enjoyed success against Austro-Hungarian forces, but they were repeatedly bested by the Germans, a consequence of superior German staff work, communications, and leadership. The Germans also possessed a better rail net and greater artillery resources. The Russian army's defeats in 1915 necessitated the relocation of *Stavka* from Baranovichi to Mogilev on the upper Dnieper River, where the headquarters was established in the residence of a former provincial governor.

In September 1915, Czar Nicholas II, believing his presence at the front might reverse the military situation, reassigned Grand Duke Nikolai to the Caucasus Front and assumed supreme command of the army himself. Nicholas was commander in name only, however; he remained silent at most conferences, and generally deferred to his military advisors. His chief of staff, General Mikhail Alekseev, established central control and professionalized the work routine but still labored under ineffective communications and an understaffed headquarters. Nonetheless, he planned the Galicia campaign that nearly forced Austria-Hungary from the war, and he shared in the spectacular, albeit temporary, success of the Brusilov Offensive.

While the Russian army began to collapse under the weight of casualties and poor supply in late 1916 and early 1917, Nicholas remained isolated and inactive. The day-to-day government rested largely in the hands of the reactionary Czarina Alexandra and her advisor Grigory Rasputin. As the situation worsened, Alekseev coordinated a coup among the generals. When riots broke out in St. Petersburg in March 1917 (February by the old Russian calendar), he informed Nicholas II that the army would not support the czar. Nicholas was forced to abdicate.

Stavka now passed under the control of the provisional government, which itself was overthrown in the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917 following the failure of the great Kerensky Offensive. The Bolsheviks named Nikolai V. Krylenko, a former draft dodger who had been sent to the Southwestern Front as an ensign, to be commander in chief of the army on November 9, 1917. Krylenko would be the last man to run *Stavka*, as Lenin and Trotsky established a Supreme Military Council in its stead on March 4, 1918. They named former chief of the Imperial General Staff General Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich as the new head of the Red Army, ignoring Krylenko's protests.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin revived the term *Stavka* in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of June 22, 1941; he signed a top-secret decree on June 23 that established the "Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (*Stavka Glavnogo Komandovaniya*). This new *Stavka* consisted of Stalin, as head of the government and leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; defense minister Marshal Semen Timoshenko, who served as president of *Stavka*; General Georgy Zhukov, chief of General Staff for the Red Army; Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov; Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, the head of the Soviet navy; Marshal Semen Budenny; and Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. On July 10, 1941, Stalin reorganized this body as *Stavka* of the Supreme Command (*Stavka Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia*), which became *Stavka* of the Supreme Main Command (*Stavka Verkhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniia*) on August 8, 1941. The term fell out of general use at the end of World War II.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Bonch-Bruevich, Mikhail Dmitrievich

(1870–1956); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973); Danilov, Yuri Nikiforovich (1866–1937); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich (1904–1974); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Molotov, Vyacheslav; Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1848–1926); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Yanushkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1868–1918); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Stoessel (Stessel), Baron Anatoli Mikhailovich (1848–1915)

Russian general.

Born June 28, 1848, Anatoli Stoessel was the son of Baron Vinogradov, a lieutenant general in the Russian Imperial Army. Stoessel graduated from the Pavlovsk Military College in 1866 and served as a staff captain in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). He then commanded the 16th Ladoga Infantry Regiment (1896) and the 44th Kamchatka Infantry Regiment (1897–1899) before receiving command of the 3rd East Siberian Brigade in 1900. Stoessel earned the Order

of St. George and promotion to lieutenant general for his actions during the international mission to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900) and, in 1903, he took command of the Russian garrison at Port Arthur in Manchuria. In January 1904, he was appointed commander of III Siberian Corps.

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February, Stoessel was appointed commander of the Kwantung Military District. He chose to remain at Port Arthur, however, assuming command of the forces there even though a successor, Lieutenant General Konstantin Smirnov, had been appointed. Ordered by General Aleksei Kuropatkin, commander of Russian land forces in Manchuria, to depart Port Arthur in July 1904, Stoessel again ignored orders and remained in place. Though he lacked formal authority, Stoessel invoked seniority to justify his continued command.

Unfortunately for the Russians, Stoessel's leadership was both ineffective and misguided. He countermanded virtually any directive issued by Smirnov, interfered constantly in naval affairs, and intrigued against his colleagues. Though the Japanese had, after the Battle of Nanshan (May 1904), effectively sealed off Port Arthur, Stoessel refused offers to evacuate noncombatants and vowed to hold out to the bitter end. The Russian defense of Port Arthur was surprisingly effective; their position eroded quite gradually and at great cost to the besieging Japanese. Stoessel nonetheless, without consulting his colleagues, offered to surrender Port Arthur on January 1, 1905. General Maresuke Nogi, the Japanese commander, accepted the surrender the following day; the Japanese were amazed to find that the garrison force was significantly larger than they had expected, in good health, and with supplies they estimated to be sufficient for at least three more months.

While most of the garrison went into Japanese prison camps, Stoessel returned to Russia on a British passenger ship. He was discharged in September 1906, court-martialed in 1907, found guilty in 1908, and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to 10 years in prison, however, and Czar Nicholas II pardoned Stoessel in April 1909. Stoessel then resumed his military career. He died in Khmylnyk, Ukraine, on January 5, 1915.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Boxer Rebellion, Russia and (1899–1903); Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Nanshan, Battle of (May 1904); Port Arthur; Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)

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Stolbova, Treaty of (1617)

Peace treaty that ended the Ingrian War, which was fought between Russia and Sweden from 1610 to 1617. Negotiations lasted, with frequent interruptions, for almost a year and were mediated by the Dutch and English. A preliminary agreement was reached on December 3, 1616, and the final treaty was signed on February 27, 1617. The treaty was regarded as a major success by Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus. The Swedish gave Novgorod, Staraiia Russa, Porchov, Gdov, and Ladoga back

to the Russians. The Swedes also gave up their claim to the Russian throne. The Russians surrendered to the Swedes Ivangorod, Jama, Koprje, Nöteborg, and Kexholm. Sweden also received 20,000 rubles, and the Russians renounced all claims to Livonia (Estonia), which was still mostly Polish. Russia also agreed to not aid the Poles against Sweden.

The Gulf of Finland was now completely controlled by the Swedish. Sweden had a continuous coastline on the Baltic Sea from Colmar to Riga, and Russia was completely cut off from the sea. Gustavus Adolphus boasted, “The enemy cannot launch a boat upon the Baltic without our permission.” As a result of this war, Russia’s emergence as a Baltic power was delayed for nearly 100 years. The Treaty of Stolbova was followed by nearly 40 years of cordial relations between Russia and Sweden.

James Scythes

See also: Livonian War (1558–1583); Time of Troubles

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Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadieovich (1861–1911)

Prime minister of Russia from 1906 to 1911.

Pyotr Arkadieovich Stolypin was born to a noble family in Dresden, Saxony, on April 14, 1861, and died of an assassin’s

bullet on September 18, 1911. Stolypin was noted for his political and agricultural reforms, although the success of his reforms is still debated by historians. He started working for the state in his mid-20s, shortly after graduating from St. Petersburg University, and was the district marshal of the Kovno Province by 1889. In 1902, he was the youngest person ever appointed governor, serving in the Saratov province. Czar Nicholas II noticed Stolypin's success in suppressing radical elements while at the same time attempting to improve the condition of the peasants. The czar faced similar challenges on a national scale during the Revolution of 1905 and, in 1906, he therefore appointed Stolypin minister of the interior and subsequently prime minister.

In the first post, Stolypin acted ruthlessly to suppress the rebellion in the provinces, so much so that a noose became known as a "Stolypin necktie." In the latter, Stolypin enacted a series of reforms he believed would placate the peasantry and modernize Russian agriculture. Stolypin's agricultural reforms, known as "The Wager on the Strong," allowed peasants to acquire private property and organize on a local level. He created a state land bank to extend credit for the purchase of land and agricultural equipment; encouraged agricultural education; and encouraged smaller, unproductive farmers to emigrate to either Siberia, where he made land readily available, or to the cities, where they would provide cheap labor for Russia's industrialization. By creating a strong, independent peasantry, Stolypin hoped to quell unrest and create support for the government. He recognized that it would take time, however; he estimated the reforms needed two decades to be effective.

Like the czar, however, Stolypin was not willing to surrender much of the aristocracy's position of power and privilege. He



Pyotr Stolypin was generally conservative, but as prime minister of Russia, he attempted to reform agriculture and modernize Russia. (Library of Congress)

worked with Nicholas II to roll back the concessions of the October Manifesto, dismissing the First and Second Dumas because they proved too liberal. Even during the period of the more conservative Third Duma, Stolypin and Nicholas ruled largely by decree. This, combined with the creation of a new land-owning class, gave rise to a new generation of revolutionaries.

On September 14, 1911, a revolutionary—perhaps a police agent—shot Stolypin while he was attending the opera with the czar in Kiev. He died four days later with the majority of his reforms incomplete.

Robert J. Smith Jr.

See also: Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Revolution of 1905; Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

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Strategic Rocket Forces, Soviet

Established in 1959 as an extension of the Red Army's long-range artillery, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) organization would become the pre-eminent branch of the Soviet nuclear triad, with the land-based component being more important than the naval and air branches in terms of resource allocation and prestige. Early Soviet missile force development was heavily influenced by World War II German rocket technology and captured German scientists. A significant part of this early development was directed by Sergei Korolev at Scientific Research Institute 88 near Moscow.

The size of these forces grew significantly following the Cuban Missile Crisis, which the Soviet leadership saw as a stinging defeat due to their numerical inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons. SRF infrastructural component construction, research, and development were influenced by Soviet-style earmarking, with SS-9 missiles being produced by the Dnepropetrovsk Missile Design and Production Center in Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev's regional political power base. This enormous governmental financial and political commitment to bolstering SRF quality and quantity paid

dividends, and by the late 1970s, Moscow had probably achieved strategic superiority over U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

SRF operational facilities were located in various military districts around the Soviet Union including Moscow, the Urals, Siberia, Kiev, Belorussia, and Trans-Baikal. These weapons were used to threaten tactical, intermediate-range targets such as NATO forces and populations in Western Europe, and strategic long-range targets such as China and the United States. Specific SRF launch facilities such as Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, and Tyuratam became the targets for U.S. aerial and space surveillance and reconnaissance as they sought to determine the quantity and quality of Soviet nuclear forces, and verify Soviet compliance and particularly noncompliance with U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements.

Making accurate intelligence estimates about SRF's intentions and capabilities was particularly challenging due to the virtual impossibility of U.S. and allied intelligence agencies being able to get human agents to successfully penetrate and extract reliable information from these highly secret facilities. Consequently, the United States and its allies were forced to rely on satellite, signals, and measurement intelligence to attempt to determine the intentions, quality, and quantity of the SRF. These efforts achieved both success and failure, and their accuracy would be the subject of often contentious debate between various branches of the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. national security policy makers.

Weapons produced for SRF by the Soviet defense industry and deployed against a global array of targets included the SS-9, deployed in 1967 with a two-stage liquid-propellant engine with a range of at least 10,200 kilometers capable of carrying three warheads; the SS-18, with similar

capabilities and range whose numbers were estimated to be 308 at the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse; and the intermediate-range SS-20, deployed between 1976–1988 which was a two-stage solid-fuel-propellant rocket carrying three warheads with an operational range of 5,500 kilometers targeted toward NATO forces and populations in Europe.

Soviet strategic planners had to adjust to changes in U.S. nuclear weapons development and strategy just as U.S. planners had to adjust to Soviet weapons development and strategy. The U.S. adoption of counterforce doctrine in 1974 stressing targeting Soviet military assets with nuclear weapons instead of civilian targets was criticized by Brezhnev as threatening Soviet nuclear forces—whose parity with U.S. nuclear forces, he believed, was a key basis for the on-going Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) arms control negotiations.

SRF experienced significant successes in becoming the world's preeminent strategic nuclear power. The program also experienced failure in the form of the bureaucratic stagnation and the lack of quality control incentives inherent in centrally planned economies. The enormous financial investment in SRF and overall military spending helped contribute to stagnant and declining economic development in civilian Soviet economic sectors. Arms control treaties with the United States reduced some of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal in the 1970s and 1980s. Soviet legacy nuclear weapons remain a significant part of the Russian Federation's nuclear deterrent, and the presence and possible use of nuclear weapons remain significant components in Russian military doctrine two decades after the Soviet Union's collapse.

Bert Chapman

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Kapustin Yar; Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich

(1906–1966); SALT I (November 1969–May 1972); SALT II (1972–1979)

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Streltsy

Musketeers, or literally "shooters."

The *streltsy* were Russia's first professional army, established as an elite unit to be loyal above all to the government of the czar. Unlike other such organizations in other countries, however, the *streltsy* did not maintain their military edge. Once they began to concentrate more on politics than on martial skill, their days were numbered, and they were finally destroyed by Peter I.

The *streltsy*, or musketeers, were established in the mid-16th century by Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) as a privileged force to guard the czar and his family. Ivan organized the force as a professional but loyal army, countering the power of the great Russian nobles (boyars) and their private forces. The *streltsy* were intended to have such modern Western technology as muskets. In 1550, Ivan set up six regiments who were settled in a body on Sparrow Hills west of Moscow. From that location, they would be able to



The *Streltsy*, 1907 by artist Sergei Vasilievich Ivanov (1864–1910). (Heritage Images/Getty Images)

protect the czar, and would also be separated from the general population and the temptations it offered. The number of musketeers quickly grew. Children and relatives of musketeers were expected to join the corps, though volunteers were also accepted.

The *streltsy* received regular pay as well as plots of land and an allowance for building houses. The musketeers soon acquired vegetable gardens and pasture land, which the government interpreted as a reason to cut their pay. As wages became more irregular, the *streltsy* depended more upon outside income, running barns, shops, stalls in the marketplace, and other small businesses. By the 17th century, the lifestyle of the musketeers differed little from that of other town dwellers. They served occasional guard duty, but were rarely drilled or exercised.

Thus, as a military unit, the *streltsy* were of doubtful value. Their weapons were often

obsolete, and they were outclassed by new-model units with Western technology and tactics. Still, the *streltsy* provided guards and police for many Russian cities, and sometimes served as firemen, although officers had to check them after fires, to prevent them from stealing things. During the reign of Czar Aleksei, the *streltsy* participated in the riots of 1648, protesting the cut in pay associated with the administration of Boris Morozov. Several hundred men were exiled, but Aleksei did his best to maintain the favor of the remaining musketeers. The *streltsy* developed a sense of corporate identity.

In 1682, Czar Fyodor III, successor to Aleksei, died, leaving an unclear line of succession. The *streltsy* were anxious to take advantage of the situation. They favored weak-witted Ivan V, with his half-sister Sofia Alekseevna as regent, instead of his brother Peter. On May 15, the musketeers

launched a three-day riot during which many high officials were murdered. Installing Peter and Ivan as co-czars, the *streltsy* proclaimed themselves as defenders of the rightful order who had eliminated traitors in the government.

Many *streltsy* also sympathized with the Old Believers, members of the Russian Orthodox Church who objected to reforms instituted by Patriarch Nikon in 1654. When the government pursued its persecution of these dissenters, it was forced to neutralize the *streltsy* by means of money and alcohol before it could move against the Old Believers.

Peter was understandably distrustful of the *streltsy*. In 1689, he moved against his fellow czar and Sofia. He was supported by Western-style units and two regiments of musketeers. The other musketeers did not participate on either side during the coup. When Peter became the sole ruler of Russia, he nevertheless exercised his new units against the *streltsy*, with the latter losing almost every time. Yet when Peter went to war against the Ottoman Turks at Azov in 1694, he committed *streltsy* regiments and gave them the most dangerous assignment. The *streltsy* suffered heavy losses. Several hundred men were killed in a single explosion, for which the *streltsy* blamed their commanders. The city of Azov finally fell in July 1696.

After Azov, many musketeers remained in the Crimea to do construction work, only returning to Moscow in 1697. While en route, they were suddenly sent to join a force assembling on the western frontier. The men were aggrieved that they had not been permitted to see their families prior to combat, as was usual. In May 1698, about 175 musketeers left their regiments without permission and went to Moscow to present a petition for payment of their grain allowance, which was in arrears. They tried to

exploit Peter's absence from Russia on his Grand Embassy to the West, and reestablish Sofia as ruler. They rallied other musketeers to their cause, but were quickly defeated by units loyal to Peter.

Peter hurried back to Russia, cutting short his Grand Embassy. He was now determined to destroy the *streltsy*, seeing them as a possible danger to his rule. He interrogated many soldiers personally, executing 799 within three weeks. The remaining soldiers were sent south, but Peter soon ordered the remaining 16 regiments of *streltsy* disbanded. The men were forbidden to ever reside in Moscow or to ever serve in the army. They were replaced by Western-style units, which Peter used in his later wars against the Swedes.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Azov Campaigns (1695–1696); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); *Streltsy Rising* (May–August 1682)

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Streltsy Rising (May–August 1682)

Revolt by musketeer units against the succession of Peter I.

When Czar Alekseev Mikhailovich died in 1676, he left the throne to his son, Fyodor. The new czar was rarely in good health,

however, and left no heirs when he died on April 27, 1682. When the Duma met to elect a successor then, they had to choose between Fyodor's brother Ivan and his half-brother, Peter. Ivan was 15, but feeble-minded and nearly blind. The Duma accordingly chose 10-year-old Peter, Alexei's son by his second wife, Natalya Naryshkin.

The announcement of Peter's selection met with general approval; the attending public and the Kremlin's musketeer (*streltsy*) units swore their loyalty to the new czar. On April 29, however, several *streltsy* appeared in the Kremlin demanding the arrest of eight colonels who commanded musketeer regiments and had, supposedly, abused soldiers by withholding pay or requisitioning labor illegally. Peter's government obliged, but the musketeers then complained about the exclusion of Ivan from the succession. The source of this new, political discontent is unclear, but certainly competition among the boyars (nobles) for positions within the new government played a role.

Rumors that members of Natalya's family had usurped the privileges of the czar triggered an armed revolt on May 15. Peter, Ivan, and Natalya appeared on the porch of the Kremlin palace to reason with the musketeers, but to no avail. When two of Peter's advisors appeared, the *streltsy* seized them, and tossed them over the porch rail onto the pikes of their comrades below. The *streltsy* then rampaged through the Kremlin, killing members of the Naryshkin clan and their supporters before fanning out into Moscow to hunt down "enemies." Shaken, Peter's government agreed to arrest and execute several people according to *streltsy* demands. Peter further appointed Ivan as co-czar, which halted the violence on May 18.

The *streltsy* continued to complain about pay and abuse throughout the summer, and there were rumblings of plots against the

government. In August, Peter and Ivan, supported by their sister Sofia, summoned the leading nobles of Russia to the Troika Monastery outside Moscow. There, on September 17, they announced that Prince Ivan Khovanski, a favorite of the *streltsy*, had been plotting against the government. He was executed immediately.

This broke *streltsy* resistance. The patriarch of Moscow brokered a surrender wherein the *streltsy* received a pardon in exchange for their pledge of fealty to the new czars, and their sister Sofia, who had emerged as Ivan's guardian. Sofia, with the support of the boyar Vasily V. Golitsyn, effectively ruled Russia as regent for the next seven years. There is little convincing evidence though, that either she or Golitsyn was behind the initial *streltsy* rebellion. The incident nonetheless made an indelible impression on Peter, who took steps to ensure such an incident would never again occur after he took power in 1689.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Golitsyn (Galitzine), Prince Vasily Vasilievich (1643–1714); Peter I ("the Great"; 1672–1725); *Streltsy*

Strypa River, First Battle of the (December 1915–January 1916)

Eastern Front battle between Russian and Austro-Hungarian forces along the Strypa River in Galicia. In November 1915, the Russian High Command (*Stavka*) ordered Southwestern Front commander General Nikolai Ivanov to advance into Galicia in hopes of reinvigorating the defeated Serbs. General Dmitry Shcherbachev's Seventh Army of three corps was shifted from the Black Sea coast to eastern Galicia on the Strypa River for this Bessarabia Offensive.

Then, on December 12, General Ivanov issued orders for the offensive, with General Platon Lechitsky's Ninth Army to cooperate. The attack was to occur along a nine-mile front from the River Prut to north of the Dniester. Opposing the Russians was the Austrian Seventh Army of eight infantry and five cavalry divisions commanded by General of Cavalry Baron Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin.

Ivanov assumed that the heavy preliminary Russian barrage by 1,000 guns would reduce the Austro-Hungarian defenses. The Russian attack by 18 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions began on December 27. The battle went on for two weeks but the Russian attack failed. The attackers were unfamiliar with the ground (Shcherbachev arrived only a week before the battle), artillery-infantry cooperation was poor, and the bulk of the Russian artillery supported only one corps. The Russians also placed their reserves too far to the rear, and the defending Austro-Hungarian artillery was well handled. In all, the Russians sustained some 50,000 casualties, 6,000 of them prisoners, for few gains.

The Russians would make another effort along the Strypa in the late spring of 1916 as part of the great Brusilov Offensive.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); Ivanov, Nikolai Yudovich (1851–1919); Shcherbachev, Dmitry Grigorievich (1857–1932)

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Strypa River, Second Battle of the (June 11–30, 1916)

Eastern Front battle, part of the great Brusilov Offensive of 1916. The Strypa River is located in eastern Galicia and was the main focus of the Brusilov Offensive launched on June 4 by Russian General Aleksei Brusilov with his Southwest Army Group against Austro-Hungarian forces. This Second Battle on the Strypa River pitted the XXII Corps of General Platon Lechitsky's Ninth Army against Lieutenant Field Marshal Baron Peter von Hofmann's Army Group Hofmann of Austro-Hungarian and German troops on the Volhynian Front.

The Russians crossed the Strypa River on June 9. The battle began two days later when Austro-Hungarian forces attacked the advancing Russians in an effort to regain control of the river. The Russian troops lost ground as the fighting continued, but the clash revealed that counterattacks were virtually useless against an enemy involved in a full-scale offensive. On June 21, the Russians finally took Austro-Hungarian positions beyond the Strypa. The battle ended on June 30 with the movement of the offensive beyond the Strypa and the surrounding countryside. The retreat of Austro-Hungarian units on Hofmann's right flank forced his units to withdraw further into Austrian territory.

Joseph J. DiDomenico

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916)

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Stürmer, Boris Vladimirovich (1848–1917)

Russian prime minister in 1916. Born July 27, 1848, in Tver Province into a Russian noble family of Austrian origin, Boris Stürmer trained in law at St. Petersburg University and spent the early part of his career as a minor functionary in the Ministry of Justice. Stürmer eventually served as a provincial governor and then was appointed a department director in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1902. In 1904, he became a member of the State Council.

A nonentity on the state council, the sycophantic Stürmer nevertheless was able to cultivate influential supporters at court. In particular, he associated himself with Grigory Rasputin, the informal advisor to the royal family, who recommended him to Czarina Alexandra. As a result, Stürmer was appointed to replace Ivan Goremykin as chairman of the council of ministers (or prime minister) in January 1916. Subsequently, he also served concurrently as foreign minister and as minister of internal affairs.

Members of the Duma and others who had applauded the downfall of the senile Goremykin were appalled at the choice of his successor. Vain, fawning, foolish, and dishonest, Stürmer was the nadir of incompetent and corrupt czarist officialdom. As Russia's war effort floundered at home and at the front, Stürmer became perhaps the nation's most despised public official. He was the inspiration for Pavel Miliukov's speech to the Duma on November 1, 1916, which questioned whether the government's many

wartime failures were the result of stupidity or treason. Although Miliukov had intended to persuade his audience that it was indeed stupidity, Stürmer's Germanic surname led many to conclude that he was part of a treasonous pro-German cabal around the czarina.

In November 1916, widespread opposition to Stürmer in the Duma and elsewhere forced Czar Nicholas II to ask for his resignation. Arrested after the March 1917 Revolution, Stürmer died in a Petrograd prison on September 2, 1917.

John M. Jennings

See also: Alexandra Fyodorovna, Czarina (1872–1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Goremykin, Ivan Logginovich (1839–1917); Miliukov, Pavel Nikolaevich (1859–1943); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich (1864?–1916)

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Sudeten Crisis (1938)

The Sudeten Crisis of May–September 1938 grew out of German leader Adolf Hitler's demands that Czechoslovakia turn over to Nazi Germany the predominately ethnic German Sudetenland—part of the new state Czechoslovakia created after World War I. The crisis led to a four-power conference (consisting of Germany, Italy, Britain, and France) on September 29–30, 1938 in which Britain and France agreed to the cession of this territory to Germany. The Munich

Conference is generally seen as the high-water mark of the British policy of appeasement. Despite British prime minister Neville Chamberlain's claim that the agreement assured "peace in our time," it only postponed war in Europe for less than a year.

Although the Munich conferees were conscious of the Soviet factor, Moscow was only marginally involved in the diplomacy of the crisis. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had signed a mutual defense agreement in 1935 to assist each other in case of a German attack but only in concert with action against Germany by France. Prague insisted on this escape clause to avoid being dragged into a German-Soviet war. Czech leaders intended this agreement to supplement the 1925 pact they signed with France and form a "little Entente." This network of treaties thus hinged on French willingness to fight Germany which, in turn, depended on whether or not Great Britain would support France.

The primary question surrounding Soviet's conduct during the Sudeten Crisis, as well as the distrust with which the Western powers viewed Soviet intentions, concerned Soviet military action in the event of war. When the crisis began, Soviet leaders reaffirmed their willingness to assist the Czechs. They warned the Germans that an invasion of Czechoslovakia could provoke a Soviet reaction. In addition, Soviet diplomats approached the British and the French about possible joint action against Germany—feelers that both London and Paris ignored.

The Soviets never specified what measures they were willing to take. Any Soviet military action on behalf of Czechoslovakia was loaded with difficulties. Czechoslovakia and the USSR did not share a common border, being separated by Polish and Romanian territory. One single-tracked railroad passing through Romania linked the Soviet Union to

the Czechoslovak border. Alternatively, the Red Army, with its primitive horse-based logistics would have had to pass through some 200 miles of Romanian or Polish territory. Given the traditional hostility both states felt toward their predatory neighbor, it is unlikely either the Poles or the Romanians would have granted transit rights to the Soviets. Much has been made of possible Soviet air support. Even had the Soviets been willing, a potential airlift would have been hampered by limited Soviet air supply capabilities and the small number of Czech airfields large enough to accommodate Soviet planes.

Domestic and other international considerations also hampered Moscow's ability to intervene effectively. All of the USSR's governing institutions, including the armed forces, were in chaos due to the Stalinist purges. With its chain of command shredded by the arrest of most of its senior officers, the Red Army was virtually paralyzed. In addition, the Soviets faced a threat from Japan in the Far East.

Recently opened Czech and Soviet archives indicate no solid evidence that Stalin and his cohorts sincerely wanted to help the Czechs. For days before the final Munich meeting, the Prague government and Czech president Eduard Benes presented Moscow with specific questions about what measures the Soviets were willing to take. Their questions went unanswered. Soviet silence was decisive in Prague's decision to acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. For many Czechs, Soviet inaction constituted a betrayal as bad as that of Britain and France at Munich. Stalin's behavior during the Sudeten Crisis typified the cynical diplomacy that culminated in the Nazi-Soviet Pact that cleared the way for Germany's attack on Poland at the onset of war less than a year later.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Prague Spring (1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Suez Crisis (1956)

On July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the strategic Suez Canal, sparking a major crisis in the Middle East. The United States had long recognized the importance of allies in this region. The Soviet Union, under the new leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, also began to appreciate Arab nationalism as a potential asset. Nasser, in turn, had been manipulating the two superpowers in an attempt to secure arms and finances. The Egyptian leader seized the canal when the U.S. Congress (and Great Britain) failed to pass legislation to fund the High Dam at Aswan, along the Nile River. Khrushchev was impressed with Nasser's defiance. The British and French, less impressed, responded to Nasser's move by plotting with Israel for a war that would allow them to regain control of the canal.

The Soviet response was delayed for several days after war broke out on October 29, 1956, for two reasons. First, the Soviet military was occupied with a Hungarian uprising.

More importantly, the Russians believed American opposition to the war was mere rhetoric, and that the United States stood firmly behind the Anglo-Franco-Israeli coalition. American opposition was soon verified through intercepted embassy cables in Moscow, however, and further substantiated by U.S. secretary of state John F. Dulles, who condemned the war at the United Nations.

Khrushchev, emboldened by this, launched an audacious diplomatic scheme. He sent letters to the aggressor countries threatening military action and implied a nuclear strike. At the same time, the Soviet leader suggested a joint Russo-U.S. peace mission to the area. Although rejected by the United States, the mere suggestion angered the Anglo-French-Israeli leadership. On November 5, 1956, Khrushchev publically announced that Soviet nuclear missile launches were an option if a cease-fire was not reached. Cessation of hostilities occurred two days later.

From the outset, the Anglo-French-Israeli coalition assumed that with the Russians bogged down in Hungary there would be no intervention in Egypt, which was viewed as the most Soviet-friendly state in the Middle East. The threat of nuclear weapons allowed Russia to keep troops in Hungary and still apply pressure to stop the attack on Egypt. That the cease-fire was established shortly after Khrushchev's public threat of nuclear attack gave the perception of a profound Soviet influence in stopping the crisis.

It was, in reality, behind-the-scenes pressure from the United States—especially financial compulsion on Great Britain—that halted the invasion quickly. Nasser admitted as much. Ironically, after resolving the crisis, the United States lost influence in the region, while Russia benefitted. Khrushchev, despite objections from the Presidium and influential advisors such as Vyacheslav Molotov, considered his handling of the Suez

Crisis one of his greatest diplomatic victories over the West. He defended his actions even in October 1964, when the Presidium was about to remove him from office. The Suez Crisis marked Khrushchev's realization that a nuclear threat was just as powerful as a nuclear strike.

William E. Whyte III

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Hungarian Rebellion (1956); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971)

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Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1848–1926)

Russian army general and minister of war (1909–1915). Born near Kovno on July 16, 1848, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov graduated from the Nikolaevsky Cavalry School in 1867. He spent most of his active service in the cavalry, graduating from the General Staff Academy in 1874.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Sukhomlinov distinguished himself in command of a cavalry division and won a number of decorations for bravery. During the next three decades, he continued to advance in a variety of academic, staff, and command positions. He achieved the rank of general in 1898. In March 1909, Czar Nicholas II appointed Sukhomlinov minister of war.

As minister of war, Sukhomlinov continued the reforms implemented after the disastrous 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, but with little success. He attempted to curtail the role of the cavalry in offensive operations and end Russia's reliance on its outmoded fortress system, but these served to antagonize the traditionally powerful cavalry and artillery arms. His emphasis on strengthening active forces at the expense of the reserves in anticipation of a short war proved to be disastrous for Russia during World War I. Sukhomlinov, a longtime advocate of preventative war with Germany, also played a major role in persuading the czar to order a general mobilization during the July Crisis of 1914, despite the army's lack of preparation for war.

By that time, Sukhomlinov had accumulated powerful enemies in the military, the government, and the Duma. An unconventional and expensive lifestyle (he had married three times) gave rise to rumors of personal and financial indiscretions. Sukhomlinov's enemies blamed him for Russia's early reversals at the front, and in 1915, they contrived to have his close associate Colonel S. N. Miasedov court-martialed and executed for treason, despite flimsy legal grounds. In July 1915, Nicholas was pressured into firing Sukhomlinov as part of a cabinet reshuffle. Impeached by the Duma for treason, Sukhomlinov was placed under house arrest. He managed to survive both of the 1917 Russian revolutions and died in exile in Berlin on February 2, 1926.

John M. Jennings

See also: Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov was a brilliant yet eccentric military theorist, tactician, and strategist who led Russia's forces in decisive victories in Turkey and Poland in the late 18th century. In 1799, his leadership of an Austro-Russian Army against France in northern Italy resulted in a near total loss of territory gained by future emperor Napoleon I during an early phase of the Napoleonic Wars. Despite all his successes, however, Suvorov is best remembered for a near-impossible retreat through the Swiss Alps, completed with the bulk of his troops intact.

Suvorov was born November 24, 1729, in Moscow, to a noble family with a long military tradition. He was educated at home, and in 1742, he enlisted in the Semenovskiy Guards, and in 1748, began active service. In 1754, he was commissioned a lieutenant in the infantry and saw his first military action during the Seven Years War. In 1762, he was promoted to colonel, and in 1770, major general. In 1775, he married Varvara Prozorovskaia, and eventually they had a daughter, Natalia. In 1784, the marriage crumbled when Suvorov refused to recognize Varvara's son, Arkady, as his own. A short, physically

unattractive man, Suvorov was at times self-conscious about his appearance and rough manners, though it did not affect his penchant for speaking out against Russia's rulers on matters of military theory.

Suvorov's most significant military service fell during the reign of Catherine II, who ruled Russia from 1762 until her death in 1796. With the help of generals like Suvorov, Catherine had great success internationally, expanded Russia's boundaries, added millions of Russian citizens, and made Russia an important presence in Europe. Catherine at first concentrated on internal affairs, but she was also attentive to foreign policy, and there was often trouble in both areas simultaneously, as demonstrated in the mid-1770s. In 1768, the Russo-Turkish War erupted when Russia sought to reach the Black Sea and reclaim what it saw as its natural southern boundary. In 1773, Suvorov joined the fight against the Turks on the Danube River and won two battles at Turtukai. On September 14, he brilliantly defended the fort at Hirsov, and then on June 19, 1774, he successfully directed his army against the much larger Turkish force during the Battle of Kozludzha.

Having proven himself an incomparable commander, Suvorov was called back to Russia to handle troubles at home resulting from the Legislative Commission, established by Catherine in 1767. The commission gave appointed and elected officials a voice in government, but it excluded many Russians, including serfs, the clerical class, and disparate groups that were quick to clash. The result of that "all-Russian ethnographic exhibition" was the Pugachev Rebellion, led by Emelian Pugachev in 1774.

Pugachev's Cossack armies marched on Russia's holdings in Eastern Europe, defeated other peasant armies, and even posed a threat to Moscow itself. Suvorov returned

and helped squelch the peasant revolt and escorted Pugachev to captivity, where he was tried and executed. After that incident, Suvorov's military career came to a near standstill. He commanded various divisions and corps in the Kuban, the Crimea, Finland, and Russia, but despite his reputation as a brilliant tactician he was not promoted to the rank of general for almost 15 years. He finally received it in 1787 before participating in the second Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792.

In 1787, when the previously defeated Turks demanded that Russia evacuate the Crimea and give up its holdings near the Black Sea, the Russians declared war on them again. Suvorov led Russian troops in a series of victories: he defended the coastal fortress at Kinburn against Turkish seaborne assaults in September and October 1787, stormed Ochakov in December 1788, and defeated Osman Pasha at Focsani in August 1789. In September, Suvorov was given the title Count Rymniksky after he drove a Turkish force away from the Rymnik River and disrupted the Turkish offensive. Most notably in 1790, Suvorov stormed the supposedly impenetrable fortress at Ismail and marched on Constantinople, where the Russians hoped to establish a Christian empire.

Unfortunately, the slaughters that followed those victories tainted Suvorov's reputation in many eyes, and there were allegations that he was drunk at the Siege of Ochakov. Rumors about his actions circulated, and in 1791, he was removed to Finland. His leadership in Turkey did gain Russia its second victory there, however, and when the war ended in 1792, Russia had reclaimed the Black Sea shore and the Crimea and had reached its natural boundaries to the south.

Suvorov became more and more eccentric as the court increasingly passed him by in favor of younger, less experienced military

leaders. In 1794, he was finally called to duty again to crush a nationalist movement in Poland. In 1772, after the first partition of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, Poland instigated some internal reforms and wrote a new constitution. Russia opposed the new document, however, and in 1793, its forces stormed into Poland, took most of Lithuania and the western portion of the Ukraine, and gained the ability to move troops in what remained of Poland and control foreign policy.

The Polish response to such action was a national uprising led by Thaddeus Kosciuszko in March 1794. Suvorov's command of the victorious Russian army against the insurgency was ruthless but efficient. He won battles at Krupshchitse, Brest-Litovsk, and Kobila. He then stormed the Warsaw suburb of Praga, slaughtered most of its inhabitants, and helped ensure a quick Russian victory. "I have shed rivers of blood," he confessed, "and this horrifies me." Thereafter Poland ceased to exist as an independent state, having been dissolved by Russia, Prussia, and Austria and thus adding significantly to those countries' lands, resources, and populations. Suvorov was promoted to field marshal for his actions.

Catherine II died in 1796, and Suvorov found himself out of favor with her successor, Czar Paul I. Suvorov had helped with the major accomplishments of Catherine's reign (the acquisition of southern Russia and the partition of Poland), but his outspokenness on his preferred military tactics were in direct contrast to Paul's. He had written a book, *Suzdal Regulations*, in 1763 that placed an emphasis on battle training instead of parade ground maneuvers, the latter being what Paul favored.

Suvorov's second book, *Science of Victory* (1797), was notable for its colloquial style and stressed the importance of speed, mobility, and the use of the bayonet. "Push hard

with the bayonet,” Suvorov wrote. “The ball may lose its way, the bayonet never. The ball is a fool; the bayonet is a hero.” Suvorov set about molding his army to those firmly held principles and refused to hide his opposition to Paul’s less innovative assertions. As a result, Suvorov was dismissed as commander in chief of the Southern Army in 1798, and he proceeded into retirement under suspicion of treason.

Suvorov’s most notable accomplishment was yet to come though, as supreme commander of the Russo-Austrian army during the wars associated with the French Revolution. Paul had entered Russian forces into the fighting in France shortly after taking over the throne and made his country a member of the Second Coalition—composed of Russia, Britain, Austria, Naples, Portugal, and Turkey—to fight against revolutionary France. The Russians fought in Belgium and Switzerland but most effectively in northern Italy, where Suvorov was called to duty in February 1799.

In 1797, Napoleon had taken over the ragtag French army in Italy, made it into an effective fighting force, and capably defeated the Austrian army in a series of battles. Napoleon drove his enemies completely out of Italy, and the Treaty of Campo Formio gave France a number of new territories in the region. A fierce anti-revolutionary, Suvorov quickly rose to the challenge of expelling the French. From April to August 1799, he led his Russo-Austrian troops in a series of rapid victories, captured Milan, and almost completely pushed France out of its newly acquired territory. Suvorov wanted to continue his push into France, but Austrian and British leaders feared that the Russians were growing too powerful. Instead, Suvorov was ordered to march over the Alps to join another Russian force in Switzerland.

Unbeknownst to Suvorov, the Russian force waiting for him under Aleksandr Rimsky-Korsakov was handily defeated by French

general André Masséna at Zurich, who on September 25, 1799, inflicted 8,000 casualties out of a 12,000-man force. Surrounded and lacking ammunition, Suvorov’s army of 23,000 was no match for the 80,000 victorious French troops, and Suvorov had no choice but to lead his men in an unparalleled withdrawal over the Alps. Snow began falling as the Russians proceeded through Prager Pass to Glarus.

Though old and sick, Suvorov encouraged his dispirited troops. The French beat the Russians to Glarus, however, and Suvorov had to redirect, taking instead a route through deep snows on Panixer Pass over a 9,000-foot mountain range. Thousands of men were lost to either the heights or cold and hunger, but Suvorov eventually reached Chur on the Rhine. Remarkably, the bulk of his army was intact—16,000 men survived the horrendous withdrawal, and the incident became mythical in the annals of war.

Suvorov was proclaimed the “Russian Hannibal” even by the French, but his relationship with Paul did not improve. He hoped to continue fighting, but after being promoted to generalissimo in January 1800 he was recalled to St. Petersburg. Inadequately supported by the coalition, Paul had switched loyalties and begun fighting for the French, thinking Napoleon a stable leader and his rise evidence of the end of revolution. Subsequently, Paul stripped Suvorov of his titles and cancelled his hero’s welcome. Tired, ill, and heartbroken, Suvorov died in St. Petersburg on May 18, 1800.

In death, Suvorov rose to become a halloved figure in Russian military history. His memory was well publicized by Josef Stalin after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, in hopes that his example would bring about a resurgence of patriotism. Monuments to Suvorov were erected, military academies and museums were established, and towns were renamed in his honor. A new

military medal—the three-grade Order of Suvorov—was also instituted.

Melissa Stallings

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Kozludzha (Kuludzha), Battle of (June 20, 1774); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Paul I (1754–1801); Pugachev (Cossack) Rebellion (1773–1775); Pugachev, Emelian (1742?–1775); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791); Rymnik, Battle of (1789); Second Coalition, War of the (1798–1802)

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Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 16, 1916)

Agreement reached between the British, French, and Russian governments regarding claims of territory belonging to the Ottoman Empire. In the spring of 1915, British high commissioner in Egypt Sir Henry McMahon promised Sharif Husayn of Mecca British support for an Arab state under Husayn in return for Arab military support against the Ottoman Empire. Confident in British support, in June 1915, Husayn proclaimed the Arab Revolt.

The French government was alarmed by this, however, and on October 24, McMahon informed Husayn of limitations on a post-war Arab state. Britain was to have direct control of the Baghdad-Basra region so that the area west of Hama, Homa, Aleppo, and

Damascus could not be under Arab control. Any Arab state east of the Hama-Damascus area would have to seek British advice. McMahon also warned Husayn that Britain could make no promises that would injure French interests.

Aware of the British agreement with Husayn, Paris pressed London for recognition of its own claims on the Ottoman Empire. Englishman Sir Mark Sykes and Frenchman François Georges Picot were appointed by their respective governments to conduct the negotiations, and, because discussions of the future of Asiatic Ottoman territory necessarily affected the Russians, the two proceeded to Petrograd in the early spring of 1916 and there presented their draft agreement. They secured Russian support in the formal Sazonov-Paléologue Agreement of April 26, 1916, named for Russian foreign minister Sergei D. Sazonov and French ambassador to Russia Georges Maurice Paléologue. It is most often known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, however. The agreement was officially concluded on May 16, 1916.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement provided extensive territorial concessions to all three powers at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was to receive the provinces of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis (known as Turkish Armenia) as well as northern Kurdistan from Mush, Sairt, Ibn Omar, and Amadiya to the border with Persia (Iran). France would secure the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and territory extending in the south from Aintab and Mardin to the future Russian border to a northern line drawn from Ala Dagħ through Kaisariya Ak-Dagħ, Jidiz-Dagħ, and Zara to Egin-Kharput (the area known as Cilicia). Britain would secure southern Mesopotamia with Baghdad as well as the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine.

The zone between the British and French territories would be formed into one or more

Arab states, but this was to be divided into British and French spheres of influence. The French sphere would include the Syrian hinterland and the Mosul province of Mesopotamia, while the British would have influence over the territory from Palestine to the Persian border. The agreement also provided that Alexandretta would become a free port while Palestine would be internationalized.

The parties involved agreed to maintain strict secrecy regarding the agreement. Despite this, the Italian government learned of its existence by early 1917 and forced the French and British governments to concede in the Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement of April 17, 1917, that Italy would receive a large tract of purely Turkish land in southern Anatolia and a sphere of influence north of Smyrna (Izmir). This was the final agreement among the Allies regarding the future partition of the Ottoman Empire. It was contingent on the approval of the Russian government, which was not forthcoming because of the revolutionary upheaval there. Husayn did not learn of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until December 1917, when the information was published by the Bolshevik government of Russia and relayed to Husayn by the Ottomans, who vainly hoped thereby to reverse his pro-British stance.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement proved a source of bitter conflict between France and England at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. French premier Georges Clemenceau expected to receive British support for French claims to Lebanon, Cilicia, and Syria. He based this belief on a December 2, 1918, meeting in London with British prime minister David Lloyd George, where, in a verbal understanding without witnesses, Clemenceau agreed to modify the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Recognizing the British role in victory in the Middle East, Clemenceau agreed that the oil-producing area of Mosul,

assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, would be transferred to the British sphere. Palestine, which had been slated for some form of international status, would also be assigned to the British. In return, Clemenceau believed that Lloyd George had promised British support for French claims to Syria and Cilicia.

At the Paris Peace Conference, however, Lloyd George jettisoned the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Appealing to U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's principles of national self-determination, he argued that the Arab Revolt entitled the peoples of Lebanon and Syria to self-rule. Lloyd George wanted Husayn's son Emir Faisal, who was under British control, to rule Lebanon and Syria. But Lloyd George also insisted that Britain retain control of Iraq and Palestine. Clemenceau protested.

The standoff was resolved on April 24, 1920, at the San Remo Conference, whereby the British and French governments reached agreement on mandates in the Middle East. Britain would receive Palestine and Iraq, while France secured Lebanon and Syria. Self-determination was thus rejected.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich (1860–1927); Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

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T

T-26 Tank

The T-26 was a Soviet light tank developed in the late 1920s. The tank went into production from 1931 to 1941. The T-26 was a Soviet version of the British Vickers six-ton light tank, developed by the Vickers-Armstrong company in the late 1920s. The Soviet Union used this design to strengthen their line of infantry support vehicles as the T-26 only massed between 8 and 11 tons. The T-26 served as the backbone of the Soviet armored corps in the 1930s and early 1940s. The most-produced model of the T-26, the T-26 model 1933, housed a 45-millimeter main gun and a 7.62 light machine gun. Previous models had twin turrets and only two machine guns. Overall, six different versions of the T-26 were produced in the Soviet Union. Each new version featured improvements such as more armor, upgraded weapons, and a more powerful engine.

From 1931 to 1933, the T-26 retained its twin-turreted design, with both turrets able to move independently to fire in both directions. The 1933 version adopted a single turret with a tank gun replacing the machine gun as the main armament. The T-26 could carry up to three additional 7.62 machine guns in coaxial, rear-firing, and antiaircraft mounts. Further improvements to the T-26 included upgrading the engines and the armor protection. The T-26 eventually entered service as the main tank for close support of combined arms units and tank units of the High Command Reserves on February 13, 1931. The T-26 was replaced in 1941 by the T-34 as the main Soviet battle tank.

The T-26 saw extensive use in the 1930s and 1940s in both Europe and Asia. The T-26 served in various conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Soviet-Japanese border war, World War II, and even in post-1945 conflicts such as the Chinese Civil War. The most important service for the T-26 came during the Spanish Civil War and during World War II. The Soviet government began to send the tanks to the Republican forces in October 1936. Fifty T-26s and Soviet crews arrived in Cartagena to strengthen the Republicans against the German Panzer I and the Italian CV-33 supplied to the Nationalists. The T-26 proved superior to both. Training and new tank shipments allowed the Republicans to field an all-Spanish armored force by November 1937. A total of approximately 300 T-26s served in Spain, these being the common 1933 version. The Nationalists prized this tank and offered rewards for any captured intact. The T-26 was the most effective tank of the Spanish Civil War but its weak armor protection was demonstrated time and again, leading to armor upgrades back in the Soviet Union.

The next big test for the T-26 came during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars in 1938 and 1939. The T-26 proved effective against Japanese tanks and infantry during the battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkin Gol. Again, the weak armor of the T-26 was in evidence but the survivability of the tank after multiple hits demonstrated the rugged nature of the tank.

The Winter War of 1939–1940 demonstrated the obsolescence of the T-26. The

Finnish antitank guns easily penetrated the armor, and the tanks became easy prey for the Finnish ambushes along the Mannerheim Line. Poor coordination with Soviet infantry led to the destruction and capture of many T-26s but the combined arms tactics of the Soviets improved toward war's end. Almost 1,000 T-26s were captured or destroyed during the course of the Winter War.

The T-26 nonetheless remained the backbone of the Soviet Armored Corp through the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The T-26 faced off against comparable German tanks but could not stand up to the German artillery and air strikes, which destroyed most of the approximately 11,000 T-26s on the front lines. The T-26 proved effective in the Battle of Moscow, on the Leningrad Front, in the Crimea, and at Stalingrad. The Battle of Stalingrad saw the last use of the T-26 as the main frontline tank of the Soviet Armored Corps, as the T-34 became the main battle tank of the Soviet forces. The T-26 was relegated to a support role and later saw action in the Soviet's 1945 invasion of Manchuria.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); Chinese Civil War (1911–1949); Home Front (Soviet Union), World War II (1941–1945); Japan, Border Incidents with (1938–1939); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Lake Khasan, Battle of; Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); ; Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Tanks, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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T-34 Tank

Russian medium tank. When the T-34 appeared on the battlefield in 1941, it embodied a huge stride forward in tank design. Its armor, firepower, and mobility surpassed all existing medium tanks. Yet, as with many things, this advantage would not last. Even though the T-34 would undergo a series of improvements in 1943, the Germans would overcome the technological advantage with the *Panzerkampfwagen* (PzKpfw, literally armored fighting wagon, usually translated as “tank”) V Panther. In addition, when the T-34 was introduced in 1941, the Soviet Army's armored force was weak and poorly trained. By 1943, though the Germans countered with more powerful tanks, the Russian armored forces were matured in combat and scored a major victory at Kursk. The T-34 and its successor, the T-34/85, would become the most manufactured Allied tanks in World War II.

Clashes in the Spanish Civil War and with the Japanese in the Far East during the 1930s revealed weaknesses in the Soviet T-26 and BT-5 tanks. The existing armor was inadequate against German 37-millimeter (mm) antitank guns, for instance. Although the Red Army prevailed in the East, the BT-5 gasoline-fueled engines were susceptible to catastrophic fires caused by Japanese artillery and mines. By the end of 1937, three projects were underway to replace the outdated tanks. One design proved to be archaic and was discarded. Two survived: the A-20 and A-32. The A-20 had a 20-mm frontal armor and mounted a 45-mm gun, while

the A-32 had a 32-mm frontal armor with a short-barrel 76-mm gun. Both had diesel engines as well as steeply angled side and turret armor. In 1938, both designs were accepted by the Defense Committee and Soviet premier Josef Stalin, and construction of the prototypes was ordered.

Following tests in the summer of 1939, both turned in similar performances. The A-32 proved more acceptable due to its thicker armor and greater firepower. The new tank was designated T-34, and the first two prototypes were completed in January 1940. The production goal for 1940 was 600 tanks, but due to political meddling, only 115 were produced.

As a result of the 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviets were able to obtain several PzKpfw III tanks for testing and comparison with the T-34. While the T-34 was superior in armor and armament, some problems were revealed. The PzKpfw III had a three-man turret, a commander's cupola that afforded excellent vision of the surroundings, and an interior communications system connecting the entire crew. The T-34 turret was cramped for two, the commander/gunner and loader. Only the commander and driver were linked by the interphone system. The PzKpfw III also held a speed advantage, topping out at 43 miles per hour (mph) versus 30 mph for the T-34; was less noisy; and had a better suspension system.

Modifications to many of the 1941 T-34 tanks addressed some of the deficiencies. Torsion bars replaced the Christie suspension system. The frontal- and side-armor thickness was increased, and a commander's cupola was added to the turret. In an effort to simplify production, a cast turret was developed to replace the original cold-rolled, welded turret. The long-barreled F-34 76-mm gun enhanced its effectiveness.

Even though the first production T-34 tanks appeared in the fall of 1940, combat

crew training was not scheduled to commence until the spring of 1941. The Soviet Army purges and numerous reorganizations of the armored forces had a negative impact on the readiness and training of tank crews. Crews assigned to the new KV heavy tank and the T-34 were trained in T-26 and BT cavalry tanks.

At the time of Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Red Army's nine mechanized corps were equipped with 19, 221 tanks, the majority of which were the older T-26 light and BT cavalry tanks. Previously proved to be unreliable after 100 hours of running time, most were in need of major overhaul and/or rebuilding. Many would break down in the first days of combat. Only five of the corps had received a significant number of the new KV heavy and T-34 medium tanks, yet here too problems came to light. Due to production delays, many tanks went into combat with only high-explosive rounds, no armor-piercing rounds, or without a full inventory of ammunition. In the rush to get the new tanks into the field, no thought had been given to producing spare parts. A lack of trained drivers resulted in clutch and transmission breakdowns, which was compounded by a lack of adequate recovery vehicles.

A revival of the Soviet Army's tank forces occurred in 1942. With the addition of new tank manufacturing plants and a reorganization of the armored force from corps to divisions and brigades, better support of the infantry and overall army operations was realized. Soviet tank commanders preferred the fast and reliable T-34 over the KV heavy and new T-60 light tanks. Improvements continued to be made to the T-34. Included was a new hexagonal turret, increased frontal and side armor, an increase in ammunition stowage, a new five-speed transmission, and new external fuel canisters.

The peak performance for the T-34 came at the Battle of Kursk and in the Ukraine in 1943. Greater numbers and combined arms forces would prevail. Tank-versus-tank battles were few, and mostly it was the T-34 engaging the German antitank units. From 1943 to 1945, the majority of Soviet tank losses were to antitank weapons.

In 1944, T-34/76 tank production would shrink dramatically as the improved T-34/85 came on line. The T-34/76 would remain in use with the Red Army until the 1950s, a bit longer with other allies. The T-34/85 became popular with Soviet allies and third-world countries. Poland and Czechoslovakia were licensed to manufacture the T-34/85 after World War II. It was last used in the combat in Africa in the early 1990s.

Gordon Lewis Kaufman

See also: Army, Soviet (Red Army; 1918–1991); BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); KV-1 Tank; T-26 Tank; Tanks, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945).

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Table of Ranks (1722)

Framework for state bureaucracy created by Czar Peter I (the Great) in 1722. Considered a critical reform in Peter's program of Westernization because it fully instituted a system of state service based on merit rather than aristocratic status. For the first time in

Russian history, commoners could formally serve the state and the czar.

Based on European models reviewed by the czar, the table itself was a relatively simple chart that established 14 ranks of the bureaucracy. It was divided into four columns, one each for the army, navy, civil service, and court service. At the bottom, with the 14th rank, were the most junior officers; at the top were the generals, admirals, and privy councilors. The new system governed by the table mandated that all servitors, regardless of social status, enter at the lowest level with the lowest rank. Through experience and merit, the servitor would advance up the ladder of ranks. The commoner in the army and navy would become a hereditary noble at the eighth rank, allowing him all the benefits of this social estate, including the right to have his sons begin their service career as a noble with the eighth rank. Commoners in the civil and court services had to wait until they reached the eighth rank to achieve noble status. As Peter had hoped, the table codified the central service ethos at the heart of the new, Westernized Russian state in which the aristocracy was subordinated to the ruling regime. Put simply, noble status was now defined by service to the state, not by birth into an aristocratic family.

The Table of Ranks remained the foundation of the service state until the fall of the czarist regime in 1917. Accordingly, the czarist bureaucracy retained its openness to men of merit and ability. The Imperial Army and Navy especially benefitted from the commoners who became the backbone of the officer corps by the early 19th century.

Peter's successors, however, made changes that eroded his original vision. In the 1730s, revisions that equated to sumptuary laws limited the display of certain luxuries to the top ranks. Gradually, Peter's insistence that all nobles begin service in the

lowest ranks was diluted as sons of the established aristocratic clans were “enlisted” in the army before their 10th year, a practice that allowed the young men to begin their actual military career as an officer rather than a common soldier.

The most dramatic change came in 1762, under Czar Peter III, with the promulgation of a manifesto on the freedom of the nobility, legislation that freed nobles from compulsory service in either the military or the civil bureaucracy.

Donald P. Wright

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (ca. 1500–1918); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Peter III, Czar (1728–1762)

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Tajikistan Civil War (1992–1997)

Power struggle in the newly independent republic.

The Russian military played a decisive role in the 1992–1997 civil war in Tajikistan. Following the declared independence of Tajikistan in September 1991, the only professional armed forces in the republic were the remnants of the Soviet military under the control of Moscow. This included the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), which was composed of the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) in Kulob, the 191th MRR in Qurghonteppa, and the 92nd MRR, 410th

Tank Regiment, and 998th Artillery Regiment in Dushanbe—the capital. In addition, Russian border troops, headquartered in Dushanbe, had five detachments located at Panj, Moskovsky, Qalai Khumb, Khorugh, and Murghob. These forces were composed of local conscripts and often were undermanned and poorly armed, but throughout the war, the Russian military was the largest and most lethal contingent of armed forces in Tajikistan.

The origins of the war lay in the political divisions that formed following the independence of Tajikistan. In November 1991, President Rahmon Nabiev won a disputed victory in the country’s first presidential election largely through the support of voters from the regions of Khujand and Kulob. The political opposition was primarily urban intelligentsia, migrants from Gharm in central



A Russian Mi-8 helicopter carrying supplies for Russian border guards on the Tajik-Afghan border is guided by a smoke flare to a landing pad in this mountainous territory, August 1, 1996. (AP Photo)

Tajikistan, and Pamiri Ismailis from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province. During the winter and spring of 1992, Tajikistan, the poorest of the former Soviet Republics, experienced economic free fall; progovernment and opposition supporters staged rival rallies in the capital and other urban centers. In May 1992, armed supporters of President Nabiev began targeting opposition members for murder. By the summer of 1992, progovernment militias composed of Kulobis and Uzbeks from Hissar were battling armed bands of Gharmis and Pamiris for the control of collective farms in the provinces of Qurogentepa and Kulob.

During the initial months of the civil war, the Russian military units stationed in Tajikistan refrained from direct participation, as they were plagued by the mass defection of local conscripts. There were, however, several strategic reasons for Moscow to remain engaged in Tajikistan. In March 1992, the Communist government in Kabul collapsed, eliciting fears in Moscow that the warring factions in Afghanistan, particularly Islamic fundamentalist groups, would turn their attention toward Tajikistan. This was coupled with the Kremlin's "Near Abroad" policy of protecting the interests of ethnic Russians in former Soviet Republics—including 300,000 Russians in Tajikistan—in hopes of stemming mass migration to Russia, where jobs and housing were in short supply. Russia and Tajikistan were also among the signatories of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security in May 1992, which made Dushanbe eligible for military assistance. Moreover, Moscow garnered political and military support for intervention in Tajikistan through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization of former Soviet republics.

By the fall of 1992, the war had arrived in Dushanbe. In September, President Nabiev

fled and was replaced by an opposition figure. Moscow then laid the groundwork for decisive military intervention. In October, 1,200 reinforcements were dispatched from Russia to shore up the MRD. In November, Emomali Rakhmonov, a Kulobi and supporter of the old regime, was appointed as leader of Tajikistan by the national assembly. That same month, the Russian minister of defense met with his Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek counterparts and agreed to the formation of a "peacekeeping force" in Tajikistan. In December, progovernment militias with arms, equipment, and air support from Uzbekistan routed opposition forces in Dushanbe and drove the remaining insurgents and their families into Afghanistan and Gorno-Badakhshan.

In 1993, the Russian military began to supply the Tajik military with weapons and equipment. As the war shifted to the Afghan-Tajik frontier, Russian border troops saw increased engagements with militants crossing the border from Afghanistan. By the end of 1993, Russian troops had engaged in hundreds of armed confrontations with intruders from Afghanistan. The deadliest incident was in July 1993 when a border detachment of 47 Russian soldiers was overrun by opposition forces, resulting in the deaths of two dozen Russian troops. The Russian military responded with rocket fire, and fixed-wing aircraft stationed in Uzbekistan bombed the positions in Afghanistan.

This attack increased resolve within the Kremlin to reinforce Russia's presence in Tajikistan and, in August 1993, Russian president Boris Yeltsin declared that the border of Tajikistan was essentially the border of Russia. That month, the CIS agreed to deploy a peace-keeping force to Tajikistan. Russia and Kazakhstan failed to gain United Nations' recognition for the CIS peacekeeping force, which was deployed nonetheless in October 1993.

The government of Tajikistan was never able to field more than a few thousand soldiers, thus the burden of war fell on the Russian military. Russian border troops fought not only insurgents but were also the front line for intercepting armed Afghan drug smugglers. From the summer of 1994 to the winter of 1995, Russian border forces suffered a number of casualties during cross-border raids by the Tajik opposition and their Afghan allies. Russian border forces retaliated with artillery and airstrikes against targets in neighboring Afghanistan. By the conclusion of the war, Russian forces in Tajikistan had suffered roughly 200 dead. Russian diplomacy was instrumental in bringing the warring factions to the negotiating table and, in July 1997, the opposition and government of Tajikistan signed a peace accord ending the war. In 2004, Dushanbe and Moscow signed an accord to withdraw by 2006 most of the Russian troops guarding the Afghan-Tajik border. The same agreement secured Moscow an extension of base rights for the 201st MRD.

David P. Straub

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Basmachi Insurgency (1918–1933)

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Tambov Rebellion (1920–1922)

Peasant rebellion during the Russian Civil War.

The Russian Civil War was a brutal affair. Both the Bolsheviks (Reds) and their opponents (Whites) requisitioned grain and other foodstuffs from peasants at gunpoint, impressed men—and sometimes women—into their fighting formations, and generally used terror as a weapon. While the entire nation suffered from the conflict, poor agricultural provinces like Tambov, some 250 miles southeast of Moscow in the black soil belt of Russia, suffered perhaps more. More than 90 percent of the 3.5 million people who lived in the Tambov Province farmed for a living, and worked less than 15 acres, usually with wooden farm implements. Deep and abiding poverty was the rule rather than the exception in Tambov.

Nevertheless, as the war drew to a close, men flocked to Tambov Province—not for its wealth or opportunities, but because they were army deserters, and the eastern portion of the province was covered in thick forests that had for centuries been home to bandits and runaways. In the spring of 1918, they became so numerous that they began to form bands; known as "Greens," they represented a fairly broad political and cultural spectrum, but had no real program other than survival and opposition to the military authorities, be they Red or White. They did, however, have loose connections with the Union of the Working Peasantry backed by the old Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR)—or what was left of it, after the Bolsheviks had crushed an SR rising in July 1918.

By 1920, their ranks swelled with peasants displaced by the scorched-earth tactics of White general Anton Denikin, or impoverished by the Bolshevik requisitioning detachments; the Greens had developed into a

sizeable force under the leadership of Aleksandr Antonov. In his mid-30s, Antonov was a former Socialist Revolutionary. He had been arrested after the Revolution of 1905 and sent to Siberia. During the 1917 revolutions, he aligned himself with the Bolsheviks as the more active party, but when his SR background came to light, he had fled to Tambov. Now, in summer 1920, as the White forces of Pyotr Wrangel approached from the north, Antonov organized large-scale raids against the Bolsheviks.

With the bulk of the Red Army occupied by the war with Poland, Antonov's Greens roamed the countryside massacring any Bolshevik requisitioning detachments they encountered. Antonov and his men were not content simply to kill the Bolsheviks, however; they tortured them and committed many acts of unspeakable savagery. The villagers of Tambov supported the Greens, seeing them as avengers, and Antonov as a modern Robin Hood. By autumn, they effectively controlled much of the province.

Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership could hardly let this pass and, accordingly, as forces became available in September and October, they were sent to Tambov with orders to repay the Greens in kind. Led by Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, known as "Bayonet," Red forces proceeded to burn any village suspected of supporting the Greens. By spring, some 40,000 Red Army forces under the command of Mikhail Tukhachevsky were in Tambov Province, sweeping the forests with machine guns, aircraft, and dozens of field guns. Even as Antonov-Ovseenko continued to inflict collective punishment on the villagers, Tukhachevsky announced an end to grain requisitioning in favor of a tax in kind of 25 percent in an attempt to quell resistance. Anyone accepting these terms would be amnestied.

Few trusted the Bolsheviks enough to surrender, and the bitter fight dragged on

through 1921 and 1922. Green forces, unable to draw on fresh supplies or reinforcements, grew steadily smaller. Antonov was reportedly killed in July 1922, though there were also reports that he had fled to the Saratov Province. Regardless, the rebellion had been mercilessly crushed by the end of 1922. The fierceness with which it had been fought, and the doggedness of the peasants in protecting their grain, however, had taught Lenin and the Bolsheviks a lesson. They abandoned "War Communism" and its attendant requisitioning as a result of such resistance, though it would return in 1928 when the Party had a firmer grip on power.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

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Tanks, Soviet, World War II (1939–1945)

Development of Soviet tanks began in the 1920s. Though it was one of the last European states to build tanks, the Soviet Union was no stranger to armored vehicles, principally armored trains and armored cars, during the Russian Civil War. The Soviet Union had almost no indigenous automotive

industry, and no czarist heavy manufacturing patterns were suited for mass production. At first using French and early German designs as models, by the late 1930s, Soviet armor designers were on a completely different path. After importing American and German technologies and methods, and adapting what could be made to work under Soviet conditions, Stalin's tank force, the largest in the world in 1941, was inferior to none in overall effectiveness by 1945.

Soviet Armor Theory, Roadblocks, and Early Development

The constraints on Soviet armor in the early days were somewhat more severe than in the West. Russia had no automotive industry to speak of to provide vehicle design expertise. Like other armor pioneers, the Russians' early emphasis was on the tracklaying drive-train that minimizes ground pressure, following the Holt and Caterpillar tractors of the early 1900s. What heavy manufacturing there was under the czars was not rationalized, moreover, and could not easily provide the complex marriage of subassemblies that had become routine in the West's automotive and heavy equipment industries. Armored fighting vehicles are now and have always been incredibly complex Industrial Age machines: fighter aircraft of World War II (WWII) averaged 4,000–5,000 discrete parts; tanks of the time averaged 10 times that.

Finally, the Soviet Union's blend of dozens of ethnic groups, traditions, languages, and educational formats hindered the creation of teams of crewmen, mechanics, and builders to support an armored force of any size based on vehicles as complex as the Renault PT or the German A7V. The USSR could not hope, realistically, to manufacture or maintain a Vickers E vehicle on an effective and deployable scale. The Soviet

armored force had to go in the same direction as the air forces: robust simplicity that in some cases bordered on crude.

The main element behind any armored force design, however, is neither related to manufacturing nor to education, but to doctrine: what to do with the tanks once they had them. The evidence of World War I was mixed, but the popular trend seemed clear in the 1920s: tanks were to act as supports to the infantry (and cavalry if fast enough) to prevent them from getting bogged down at enemy strongpoints. It was on this basis that the pre-1935 Soviet armored force was designed. But the Chaco War, the Spanish Civil War, and Japanese experience in China seemed to show that using tanks as a breakthrough force was the ideal, supplanting cavalry altogether and even, in some British minds, replacing the infantry. This was the position held by Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, but in the late 1930s, this would have required the complete reorganization of Soviet ground forces. In Stalin's Soviet Union, new and radical ideas were not always met with enthusiasm, regardless of merit, and Tukhachevsky was shot for treason in 1937 during the Great Purge.

Events, however, proved Tukhachevsky correct. The fall of Poland in 1939, the disastrous 1940–1941 Soviet war with Finland, and the fall of France and the Low Countries in mere weeks to German armored fists were enough to compel the Red Army to change, but the damage was done. The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 caught the Soviets in the midst of their reorganization; at least half of their armored force was light tanks in small units. As Soviet units were destroyed wholesale early in the war though, it was easier for the Soviets to rebuild the army in a pattern better suited to meet the German threat.

The Soviets used four main categories of armored vehicle: light, medium, and heavy tanks, and self-propelled guns. The dividing line between a light and medium tank is a matter of taste, but the best gauge is the intended role for the vehicle. Soviet light armored vehicles were intended for reconnaissance and infantry support, while their medium armor was for the exploitation of breakthroughs, which was why the BT “fast” tanks were also called “cavalry tanks.”

Heavy tanks generally have an odd history, being somewhere in armor theory between a moving pillbox and a breakthrough combat vehicle. Soviet heavy tanks served as muscle for breakthroughs, and as roadblocks for retreats. A third role, as tank destroyers, would have been ideal had there been more of them. “Assault guns” in WWII were a case where fashion met pragmatism, and where confusion between these and tank destroyers and self-propelled artillery makes distinctions even muddier. All these vehicles were guns on tank chassis with fixed or open turrets. Their main attraction was that they were faster to make, cheaper, and with generally larger guns and more ammunition storage than conventional armored fighting vehicles. Without the mechanical requirements of a moving turret, armor could get either heavier or lighter, depending on the role. In the Soviet case, their artillery doctrine put a large percentage (about one-third) of the guns forward with the infantry for direct fire support. This practice made assault guns and tank destroyers a stopgap for the production-strapped Germans and Americans, but interesting tank variants for the Soviets.

Armored Cars and Light Tanks

Because the Soviet automotive industry was far behind the West, many Russian roads

were more rutted tracks than thoroughfares. For this reason, the Soviets only produced one-wheeled armored car in appreciable numbers during WWII that was marginally successful. The BA-10 series armored car was based on the earlier BA-3/6 series from the 1920s, and was rarely seen on primary fronts after the winter of 1941–1942. The BAs were supplanted by light tanks and vanished from Soviet service completely after the war.

In reconnaissance and light armor roles, the Soviets began WWII with the T-37/38/40 series amphibious tanks based on the French AMR-33. Very early Soviet light armor was supposed to be used in novel ways, some even air-delivered by Tupolev bombers to join airborne troops. To do this, armament and armor had to be sacrificed, making them little better than tracked armored cars. As the limitations of airborne troops became clear and the light amphibians were destroyed or captured in large numbers early in the war, the T-37/38/40 gave way to the more heavily armed T-50/60 and finally the T-70/80 series in 1941.

The T-26 series was the Soviet version of the license-built British Vickers E six-ton tank combined with the homegrown T-19 design made from 1930 onward. They appeared in large numbers and in a tremendous number of variants from 1931 to 1945 in Spain, China, and Turkey, as well as in the Soviet Union. The T-26 was able to stand up to the early marks of the German Pzkw I and II, but its time in frontline service was limited since antitank guns easily penetrated their armor. Light tank development resources were shifted to the T-70/80 series in 1941.

The T-50 was a short-lived, problem-prone project that produced less than 70 examples of a complex vehicle that was generally unsatisfactory and discontinued in January

1942. The T-60, developed at about the same time, produced a little over 6,000 units in 1941–1942, but was abandoned in favor of the T-70/80 in 1942. By then the very idea of light, scout, or infantry tanks with one- or two-man turrets (the T-80 was a two-man turret variant of the T-70) was becoming impractical as older but upgunned German tanks were able to engage the ubiquitous T-34s successfully. Production of the T-70 stopped in 1942 after a few more than 8,000 were made, but they remained in service (mostly on secondary fronts) until after the war.

Medium Tanks

Based on a design by Walter Christie, the BT tank was the direct ancestor of the T-34, and was made from 1932 to 1941. The numbers are in dispute, but as many as 10,000 were made, serving Soviet forces and clients from the Spanish Civil War (where it was the most successful tank) and until the end of WWII in China, by which time it was obsolete in Europe but adequate against Japanese armor. The T-24 was the first Soviet attempt at a medium tank design, but was less successful as a tank than it was as the basis for the KhPZ *Komintern* artillery tractor. The T-28, based on the Vickers Independent tank, was another interim design, of which just over 500 were built. A pioneering design for the Soviets, it sported a 76.2-millimeter (mm) main gun and anti-aircraft mounts for machine guns on the roof, and was the first Soviet tank to have a radio as standard equipment. Like many other Soviet tanks, it was a design dead-end, but it did inform the creation of the T-34.

The T-34 was the most successful Soviet tank, and certainly the most numerous. By 1942, the German 75-mm KwK-40 gun triggered the design of the T-43, essentially an

up-armored T-34 with a bigger gun. After the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the T-43's 85-mm gun turret was adapted to the T-34 hull, and the T-43 project was scrapped. By 1944, the T-34 had reached its limit as a gun platform, and a new type, the T-44, was begun as its replacement, which in development bounced between an 85-mm gun and several 100-mm weapons. Less than a thousand, mostly 85-mm-gun-armed T-44s were produced before the end of the war.

Heavy Tanks and Assault Guns

The bizarre T-35 was a five-turreted behemoth with a cranky transmission of which just over 60 were built by the time of the German invasion. Those that went into combat in 1941 were mostly destroyed by their crews after mechanical breakdowns: enemy fire didn't affect them much. The basic concept of a robust hull and massive turret led to the KV series, named after Kliment Voroshilov, then the Soviet defense commissar. Until 1942, no German tank could destroy these vehicles at range in one-to-one gunfights; the Germans had to rely on mines, artillery, and mass attacks to stop the KV-1, KV-2, or KV-85. But Soviet resources were thin, and it made little sense to make heavy tanks when the T-34 was so successful, cheaper, and required fewer crewmen. Yet the KV series remained in limited production and development until the spring of 1944, after about 250 were made, and they stayed in service until the end of the war.

The Soviet IS (or JS, for Josef Stalin) heavy tank series was developed as a KV follow-on at first to meet the growing threat of the German 88-mm gun in the Tiger and the long-barrel 75 mm gun in the Panther and others. But once the T-34/85 was made in large numbers, the heavies reverted to their

older roles of battering in defenses. About 3,800 IS-1 and IS-2 tanks with a 122-mm high-explosive firing gun were made before the end of the war.

The best known and most common Soviet assault guns were the SU series, with the SU-76 being the most produced at over 14,000 units. (The SU and ISU series were identified by their gun size: the SU-76 sported a 76.2-mm main gun; the SU-152 a 152-mm howitzer.) Based on the T-70 chassis, the SU-76 was used in infantry support and tank destroyer roles right up to the end of the war.

The SU-122 was a parallel development with the SU-76, used in a direct-fire role with its larger gun. A little over a thousand were made between the end of 1942 and mid-1944. A little over 2,000 SU-85s were made in 1943 and 1944. This was a smaller gun stopgap version of the SU-122, made before the T-34/85 became available. The SU-100 was an improved, up-gunned version of the SU-85, of which more than 2,600 were made. The SU-100 survived in Soviet and client service well after 1945.

The SU/ISU-152 was a self-propelled artillery piece/gun with the armor to be a tank or a tank destroyer, and pretty much succeeded at all these roles due to its imposing gun size that could smash anything it could see despite a low rate of fire. An unknown number of units were made during the war, and they served the Soviets until 1954. The ISU-152 was a follow-on platform for the SU-152, of which somewhat less than 4,000 units were made before 1945. The ISU-122 was the ISU-152 chassis with a smaller gun. Slightly more than 2,000 ISU-122s were made, and were somewhat less successful despite a higher rate of fire.

With a huge array of armor models, variants, and capacities to select from, the Soviets survived the war with some of the

best—and a few of the worst—tanks in military service. The success and sheer numbers of T-34s have overshadowed other Soviet armor types and innovations, primarily in track design and power plants. What is remarkable is that Soviet designers always seemed to find some improvements for existing designs, and could always find enough flexibility to innovate.

John Beatty

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Chinese Civil War (1911–1949); Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); Deep Battle; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); KV-1 Tank; Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); T-26 Tank; T-34 Tank; Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

First major World War I battle between the German and the Russian armies. Fought during August 26–31, 1914, the battle ended in a major tactical victory for the Germans, but it arguably had greater mythic significance than military importance.

Taking into account the virtual certainty of a two-front war against France and Russia, German war plans by 1914 called for a holding operation against Russia by minimum forces, concentrated in the vulnerable province of East Prussia, until victory over France would allow the transfer of large forces to the eastern theater. Russia for its part grew increasingly committed to the principle of an immediate strategic offensive against the Central Powers. In part this was an instrumental decision—to make sure France was not forced from the war. That concern in turn legitimated taking risks at the operational level. The long-standing question of whether the offensive should concentrate against Germany or Austria-Hungary was, by 1914, resolved by asserting that the Russian Empire had sufficient strength to pursue both options simultaneously.

Russia's war plan against Germany involved sending two armies against the East Prussian salient. The first would advance west across the Niemen River, and the second would move northwest from the Russian Poland. The objective was to cut off


and destroy German forces in the province. Though a higher headquarters—the Northwestern Front—existed, coordination between the two armies was poor. Problems arose, less because of the often-mentioned and essentially imaginary hostility between their commanding generals, Pavel Rennenkampf and Aleksandr Samsonov, than from inadequate communications, poor staff work, and the geographic barrier of the Masurian Lakes.

Nevertheless, the Russian plan of using their significantly superior numbers to envelop the German Eighth Army had good prospects of success. German chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke (“the younger”) had insisted on the importance of preserving German soil from “Asian barbarity,” while at the same time he specified “no defense under any circumstances, but offensive, offensive, offensive.”

The Russian First Army had 9 divisions, and the Second Army had 10; all were first-line formations. The Germans had altogether nine divisions, and three of them were reservists. Even if the Eighth Army managed to concentrate its full strength against one of its opponents, even odds were a poor predictor of victory in any attack.

General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, commander of the Eighth Army, was cautious by temperament and experience. Maneuvered by an aggressive subordinate into striking Rennenkampf at Gumbinnen on August 20, Prittwitz interpreted a hard-fought drawn battle as a defeat and not only abandoned the field but also informed Moltke by telephone that he proposed to withdraw the entire Eighth Army toward the Vistula.

Apart from the political consequences of abandoning an entire province, especially one of historic significance, Moltke considered it vital to maintain a presence east of the Vistula as a springboard for the eventual full-scale



counterattack against Russia. He responded first by ordering two corps withdrawn from his offensive sweep into Belgium and sending them eastward as reinforcements. Moltke then relieved Prittwitz and his chief of staff,

replacing them respectively with Paul von Hindenburg, a retired general with a reputation for imperturbability, and Erich Ludendorff, a brilliant but abrasive and high-strung General Staff officer.

On the train ride east, the new command team evaluated the situation and decided that above all the Eighth Army must be kept east of the Vistula. To that end, its main units would be sent not west but south and concentrated against the Russian Second Army. The Eighth Army's staff, headed by Colonel Max Hoffmann, acting independently, had reached a similar conclusion a few hours earlier. In fact, the initial orders for the move had been issued by the time Hindenburg and Ludendorff reached army headquarters on August 23.

The development of essentially the same response to the Eighth Army's operational problem by two sets of planners was less remarkable than it first seems. The defense of East Prussia had for years been the subject of staff rides and maneuvers. In almost every hypothetical situation when the Russians eschewed a single thrust in favor of an advance on both sides of the Masurian Lakes, striking one of their armies before they could unite was a favored solution. The Russians also proved an obliging enemy. Specifically, a disorganized First Army lost touch with the Germans retreating from Gumbinnen, while the Second Army's advance bogged down on poor roads along a front that so steadily increased in width that Samsonov's corps found it first difficult, then impossible, to maintain contact.

The Germans took advantage of the well-developed East Prussian rail network and of the march discipline of their infantry to concentrate virtually undisturbed against the Russian Second Army. On August 26, after several days' hard marching in summer heat, XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps surprised the Russian VI Corps on Samsonov's right wing, so thoroughly defeating it that its commander failed for eight hours to inform his superior of what had happened. The next day, the I Corps, commanded by General

Hermann von François, crushed its Russian counterpart on the Second Army's left and pressed forward into Samsonov's rear.

The two corps of Samsonov's center were now threatened with a double envelopment. Instead of retreating, however, Samsonov continued to advance in the hope of disrupting the German movements. The heaviest fighting of the campaign took place in the center sector on August 28, and the Russians gave their opponents more than sufficient opposition before the attack stalled in the face of heavy German artillery fire.

With his center blocked and his flanks unraveling, Samsonov finally ordered a retreat. This movement rapidly became a rout as exhausted Russians found German patrols and German machine guns everywhere they expected clear roads home. Samsonov, after a futile attempt to take personal command, became lost and committed suicide.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff had the far more pleasant task of reporting their victory. Ludendorff originally dated it from the village of Froegenau. One of his staff officers suggested he use instead the name of another nearby village: Tannenberg. Five centuries earlier, a Polish/Lithuanian army had smashed the forces of the Teutonic Knights there, in a battle symbolizing the end of Germany's eastward expansion. Now an ancient defeat would be eradicated by a modern victory.

By any name Tannenberg seemed victory enough: 50,000 Russians dead and wounded, another 90,000 prisoners, and the equipment of an entire army, including 500 guns, captured. German losses were fewer than 15,000. If Moltke's reinforcements arrived too late to share the glory, they played a critical role in the subsequent battle at the Masurian Lakes, which sent Rennenkampf reeling back over the border by September 14.

Tannenberg became an instant myth in a Germany hungry for victories, and it set

Hindenburg and Ludendorff on a road to supreme power in the Second Empire. But it did not drive Russia from the war. Instead, Tannenberg established a model of victory that discouraged realistic assessments of what was possible by military means under the tactical conditions of 1914–1918.

Dennis Showalter

See also: Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15, 1914); *Rennenkampf*, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); *Samsonov*, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1859–1914); Schedule 19 (Plan 19); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Tatars (Mongols)

Tatars are a Turkic, mainly Muslim people, who are the descendants of the nomadic tribes of northeastern Mongolia. Today, they live mainly in the Russian federal republic of Tatarstan; in central Asia, where Soviet leader Josef Stalin deported many Tatars from what is now Ukraine in 1944; and in southwestern Siberia.

In the 13th century, Genghis Khan conquered the Tatars and forced them to fight in his invasion of Eastern Europe. In 1240, a Tatar-Mongol army led by Genghis Khan's grandson Batu conquered Kiev, which was then the regional power. Numerous

Russian principalities became vassals of the so-called Golden Horde, the western division of the Mongol Empire. Contact with Ottoman Turks led the Tatars, who settled in large numbers along the Volga River and the northern coast of the Black Sea, to convert to Sunni Islam. Several factors—the black plague, resistance from the Tatars' Slavic subjects, and the invasions of the conqueror Timur—led the Golden Horde into a slow decline beginning in the mid-1300s, and by the 1440s, the Golden Horde had disintegrated into numerous Tatar khanates. Of these, only four khanates—Kazan and Astrakhan on the Volga River, the Black Sea khanate of Crimea, and the Khanate of Siber to the east of the Ural Mountains—remained powerful. By 1478, the Ottoman Empire had made Crimea its vassal.

In the late 1400s, the Principality of Moscow expanded and took control of its rival Russian principalities, including Tver and Novgorod. Grand Prince Ivan IV (the Terrible) of Moscow proclaimed himself czar of a unified Russia in 1547, and launched the first campaigns against non-Russian states to expand his empire. Russia first conquered Kazan, the most powerful of the Tatar khanates, on October 14, 1552, followed by Astrakhan in 1556 and Siber in 1582. In the 16th century, members of the Kazan nobility joined the Russian nobility. Tatar artisans and traders developed alliances with the expanding Russian Empire.

The Crimean Tatars, however, remained powerful, battling Poland and Lithuania, which controlled a large part of what is now Ukraine, and invading Moscow in 1572 with devastating results. In 1593, Russian czar Fyodor I ordered the destruction of all mosques in Kazan. Russian policy toward the Tatars later eased slightly: in 1708, Peter I (the Great) officially established the Kazan Province, and in 1766, Catherine II (the Great)

annulled the ban on building mosques. In 1783, however, Russia annexed the Crimea, which was the last independent Tatar state. A large number of Crimean Tatars later emigrated to Turkey during the Crimean War of the 1850s. Despite their decreasing numbers, the Tatars had a tremendous influence on Russian nobility, government, and customs.

During the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent Russian Civil War, Vladimir Lenin encouraged Muslim nationalism. In response, on November 19, 1917, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and part of the Orenburg Province held a national assembly and established a state in the Ural Mountains. The communists, however, opposed the state. In an effort to dilute Tatar nationalism, the communist leaders formed the Bashkir Autonomous Republic on March 23, 1919, and the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on May 27, 1920. The formation of these states made 75 percent of Tatars live outside Tatarstan. In 1921, the Soviet Union formed the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was controlled mostly by Crimean Tatars, who numbered approximately 200,000. During the remainder of the decade, the Soviets killed all members of the Tatarstan government and most of its intellectual community.

Josef Stalin accused the Crimean Tatars of aiding Germany during World War II and deported them to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Tatar language was forbidden in those areas until 1956, when de-Stalinization allowed the return of some cultural practices. The Tatars, however, were forbidden to return to the Crimea, which was now a part of Ukraine. Many Tatars were then displaced by economic factors.

Tatarstan declared its sovereignty on August 30, 1990, and the following April, the Tatar Parliament declared that Tatar laws were dominant over Soviet laws. Following

the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan held a referendum on sovereignty in 1992 that was passed by 61 percent of the voters, but only two years later, Tatarstan signed a treaty with the Russian Federation, placing itself under the joint administration of the local and federal governments. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Crimean Tatars returned to the Crimea. Today, Kazan Tatars in the Volga and Ural areas number more than 1.5 million. There are approximately 270,000 Tatars in the Crimea, about 1 million in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and approximately 100,000 in Siberia. Overall, there are about 5.5 million Tatars.

Philip J. MacFarlane

See also: Catherine II (“the Great”; 1729–1796); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); February (March) Revolution (1917); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); October (November) Revolution (1917); Peter I (“the Great”; 1672–1725); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Tbilisi Riots (1989)

Crackdown of the peaceful anti-Soviet demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, a watershed event in the history of Soviet Georgia and the Georgian national liberation movement.

The 1980s saw the resurgence of Georgian national liberation societies, although initially they functioned underground. Taking advantage of Mikhail Gorbachev's liberal policies, leading Georgian dissidents such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava organized a series of protests in late 1988. The most important issues facing them were those of language and national self-determination. This was especially true in late 1988 and early 1989 when the Abkhaz nationalists called for Abkhazian independence from Georgia.

On April 4, some 150 Georgian nationalist activists began a hunger strike in front of the Supreme Soviet in Tbilisi. They demanded full independence for Georgia and complete integration of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia within Georgia. Two days later, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of the capital and demonstrated their solidarity with the hunger strikers; they were joined by hundreds of supporters from the countryside. By then, the idea of non-violent protest against the Soviet authorities was predominant.

To quell the demonstrations, the Georgian Communist authorities called for reinforcements, and military forces were deployed in the streets of Tbilisi. The crowd showed no signs of violence; many demonstrators danced and sang national songs and religious hymns. In a remarkable show of unity, the crowd numbering in the thousands joined the patriarch in a public prayer.

The Soviet authorities decided to use force to disperse the demonstrators. At dawn on April 9, the troops attacked demonstrators with armored vehicles, sharpened spades, and toxic gases, killing 19 demonstrators, mostly women and teens. The brutality of the Soviet forces against the peaceful demonstrators was recorded, and when the tape was broadcast, it shocked the entire Soviet

Union. On April 10, Tbilisi was placed under military curfew, but tensions between the residents and Soviet troops remained high; a violent confrontation was barely avoided at Tbilisi State University, which was surrounded by the military.

The roles of the politburo in Moscow and the Georgian Communist leadership in Tbilisi in making the decision to use troops against the demonstration are still a matter of debate. Eduard Shevardnadze, then the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and other politburo members maintained that there had been no politburo discussion of the situation in Georgia, and they had no knowledge of the decision. Shevardnadze canceled his visit to Germany and immediately flew to Tbilisi to investigate the incident. Gorbachev was infuriated with the inability of Jumber Patiashvili (the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party) to reach an understanding with the demonstrators.

Following the Tbilisi massacre, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR set up a special investigation commission led by the mayor of Leningrad, Anatoly Sobchak. Initially, the commander of the Soviet troops in Transcaucasia, General Igor Rodionov, popularly nicknamed "the Butcher of Tbilisi," categorically denied the use of toxic gas. The refusal of the Soviet military authorities to release any information to the medical community hindered the treatment of hundreds of victims. Only two weeks after the event, it was concluded, on the basis of clinical and toxicological evidence, that the Soviet troops had used three gas agents: CN and CS, which are forms of tear gas, and chloropicrin. Andrey Sakharov was instrumental in obtaining information on these gases to cure the victims. Unable to get further information from the Russian military, Sakharov contacted the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to inquire about the antidote to the CS tear gas.

The massacre of April 9, 1989, in Tbilisi had a major influence on the future of Georgia and the Soviet Union. Although there were protests in various republics prior to 1989, most of them were suppressed by the local authorities without public exposure. It was the April 9 demonstration in Tbilisi, with its attendant bloodshed and widespread publicity that sparked renewed nationalism throughout the Soviet Union. The national liberation movements in the Baltic states were already underway, and the tragic events in Tbilisi gave them greater credibility and strengthened their demands for sovereignty.

Despite its tragic nature, the event played a crucial role in uniting the Georgians, especially the youth, around the cause of independence. In the weeks after the tragedy, hundreds of thousands rallied in the streets of Tbilisi, wearing black as a sign of grief and carrying national banners. A huge crowd of tens of thousands of Georgians marched through the center of Tbilisi on April 26 to celebrate the anniversary of the declaration of independence of the Georgian Democratic Republic in 1918. Another series of demonstrations took place in May–July, when thousands of demonstrators shouting “Down with the Russian Empire” marched through the streets of Tbilisi demanding independence. April 9 became a symbol of both mourning and tribute; following successful elections, the new Georgian authorities led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, adopted the Declaration of Independence on April 9, 1990.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baltic Rebellions (1991); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–)

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Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943)

Usually overshadowed by the 1945 Yalta Conference, the meeting at Tehran was equally or more important because of the decisions made there. Attending were the “Big Three”—U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston L.S. Churchill, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin. It was the first face-to-face meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin.

The Soviet leader claimed that his wartime responsibilities would not allow him to travel far, so the conference, code-named EUREKA, took place at Tehran, Iran; the journey to Tehran was Stalin’s first trip abroad since 1912. Held from November 28 to December 1, 1943, the conference was immediately preceded by a meeting at Cairo (code-named SEXTANT) that involved Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and featured a discussion of the Allied effort against Japan. Because the Soviet Union was not then at war with Japan, Stalin had refused to attend that meeting.

Roosevelt was convinced he could win over Stalin and secure the Soviet leader’s confidence. Roosevelt therefore deliberately distanced himself from Churchill, a serious mistake. The Western leaders also labored under a number of disadvantages at Tehran. The first involved the strategic military situation. British and U.S. troops were then

fighting the Germans only in Italy with 14 divisions, whereas the Soviet Union had 178 divisions locked in combat. In addition, the Western leaders feared that Stalin might yet seek a diplomatic accommodation with Adolf Hitler, and Roosevelt was anxious to secure Soviet assistance against Japan.

Stalin pressured the West on an early date for an Allied invasion of France. The Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, had counseled Stalin to do so in order to secure additional Lend-Lease aid. Stalin insisted on learning the name of the commander of Operation OVERLORD as proof that the Western Allies were serious about a cross-channel invasion. The three leaders also discussed Germany and its possible future division. Roosevelt suggested splitting Germany into five states and internationalizing the Ruhr and other areas. Churchill, fearful of potential Soviet expansion into Europe, thought Prussia might be detached from the rest of Germany.

Discussions over Poland were more controversial. All three leaders agreed on the Oder River as the future Polish-German boundary, but the Western leaders rejected the Soviet demand that a tributary of the Oder, the Western Neisse River, be the southern demarcation line. Nor did they sanction Poland securing the important port of Stettin. They did agree Poland would receive most of East Prussia, although the Soviet Union claimed the Baltic port of Königsberg (Kaliningrad) and land to the northeast.

The Western leaders could hardly oppose the Curzon Line, established at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, as the eastern boundary of Poland. The British did object, however, to the Soviet seizure of the predominantly Polish city of L'viv (Lvov). Churchill pointed out to Stalin that Britain had gone to war over Poland, but Stalin insisted the Red Army needed security in its rear areas and that a primary goal of the war

was to protect the Soviet Union against future German attack.

Stalin also demanded the Soviet Union be allowed to keep its 1939–1940 acquisitions of Bessarabia, the Karelian Isthmus, and the Baltic states. Although these acquisitions were clear violations of the Atlantic Charter, the siege of Leningrad gave Stalin a strong argument for a security zone there. He also insisted that Finland cede its Arctic port of Petsamo, pay heavy reparations, and provide space for a base to protect sea approaches to Leningrad. In return, he promised to respect Finland's independence, assuming that country behaved properly.

Stalin reassured Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. He also stressed the importance of an Allied invasion of France to relieve pressure on the Red Army. Further, Stalin expressed the view that a landing in southern France would be helpful. He was pleased when the Western leaders told him that the invasion of northern France (Operation OVERLORD) was scheduled for May 1944. He promised to launch a Soviet ground offensive to coincide with it. The three leaders also agreed that after the war, Iran, which was serving as a supply corridor to the Soviet Union and occupied by Allied troops, would be restored to full territorial integrity and sovereignty, and all troops would be withdrawn.

Although the Tehran Conference served to dissipate tensions between the Western leaders and Stalin, sharp differences on the conduct of the war and the composition of postwar Europe remained. These differences were very much in evidence at the February 1945 Yalta Conference.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Cairo Conference (November 23–26 and December 3–7, 1943); Lend-Lease (March

1941–August 1945); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Telissu (Vafangkou, Wafangkou), Battle of (June 14–15, 1904)

Major land engagement between the Japanese Second Army and I Siberian Corps.

Following the Russian defeat at Nanshan (Nanshon), which sealed the Japanese siege of Port Arthur, both Czar Nicholas II and Viceroy Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, commander of Russian forces in the Far East, forced General Aleksei Kuropatkin to take a more aggressive posture. Kuropatkin was reluctant to do so, but finally designated Lieutenant General Georgy Stakelberg (Shtakelberg) to lead a strike south from the town of Telissu. In addition to the 27,000 men in I Siberian Corps, Stakelberg could deploy some 5,000 cavalry under Lieutenant General Simonov and 98 artillery pieces. Advancing against this force was General Yasukata Oku's Second Army, comprised of three divisions (3rd, 4th, and 5th) totaling about 35,000 men, 2,000 cavalry, and 216 guns.

In early June, Kuropatkin ordered Stakelberg to move south, retake Nanshan, and open the route to Port Arthur. At the same time, however, Kuropatkin gave Stakelberg instructions to avoid any decisive action. This early foray thus turned into nothing more than a short ride south for the

Russians, marked with a few small infantry skirmishes. It convinced Kuropatkin, however, that Oku's force was moving south with the objective of taking Port Arthur. He therefore shifted Stakelberg's forces south of Telissu, positioning the infantry astride the north-south rail line. Stakelberg had two infantry regiments holding the mountain passes on his left, with the cavalry on the extreme right wing. Kuropatkin, commanding a reserve force slightly larger than Stakelberg's, was a day's march away at Liaoyang. The attack was to take place on June 15, but when Stakelberg got wind of a Japanese advance, he abandoned any offensive plans.

The Japanese struck in the afternoon of June 14; their deployment mirrored the Russians', with one division on each side of the railway and the third moving against Stakelberg's right flank. Oku's superior numbers allowed him to outflank the Russian force quickly after an initial artillery barrage and place the center of their line, along the railway, under enfilading fire. Stakelberg, fearing his weaker left flank might collapse, took advantage of darkness to shift his reserve there and bring up seven fresh battalions to form a new reserve. To counter, Oku threw three of his five reserve battalions into the fray.

The Japanese thus renewed the attack shortly after midnight, concentrating their effort against Stakelberg's right wing. The Russians dithered; Stakelberg ordered a counterattack, but his subordinates could not agree on a time until Oku's advance was well underway. By that time, Stakelberg had decided to cancel the offensive, but his order only reached the troops west of the railway. The Russian left wing, therefore, made repeated vigorous attacks that very nearly turned the Japanese flank. At the same time though, Oku's forces managed to overwhelm the Russians' right flank, forcing Stakelberg to deploy his reserve there. When

those forces failed to stem the tide by noon on June 15, Stakelberg ordered a general retreat. This uncovered the flank of the Russian forces still attacking in the east and nearly led to disaster. Fortunately, a blinding rainstorm set in and covered the Russian withdrawal.

Neither side suffered more than about 2,000 dead and wounded in the encounter at Telissu; however, Russian morale had taken a severe blow. After months of steady, calculated retreats, they had finally attacked and fought well—but lost nonetheless. The ineptitude of their commanders, combined with the inability of the Russian artillery to provide effective cover, created a sense of fatalism. Kuropatkin now withdrew his forces north to Liaoyang, where both sides expected a decisive battle.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alekseev, Evgeny I. (1843–1917); Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904); Nanshan, Battle of (May 1904); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Third Coalition, War of the (1805)

Although the Treaty of Amiens, concluded in March 1802, returned peace to the European

continent after a decade of war, it proved no more than a fragile peace, and was broken within 14 months of its signature when Britain declared war on May 18, 1803. Britain immediately reimposed a naval blockade of French ports, while Napoleon Bonaparte (a year later to become the Emperor Napoleon I) resumed the preparations to cross the English Channel and invade Britain that had been interrupted by Amiens. Invasion would be impossible without either the defeat of the Royal Navy or the diversion of sufficient numbers of British ships away from the Channel so that the French could effect a crossing. Apart from the French occupation of Hanover in 1803 though, a British patrimony as a result of George III's German ancestry, there were no operations on the European continent until 1805, the war being confined to minor naval operations between Britain and France.

Britain would not acquiesce to a French-controlled Europe and, by 1805, had found allies for a new coalition against Napoleon. Russia, Austria, and Sweden joined with Britain in April, August, and October, respectively, making circumstances apparently auspicious for the allies. The bulk of French forces, some 200,000 men in the *Grande Armée*, were encamped along the English Channel, near Boulogne, preparing for the long-awaited invasion of Britain. Marshal André Masséna had 50,000 men in northern Italy and, of course, there remained reserve forces in France. The allies had a simple and seemingly effective plan. They would move first to destroy Masséna's army, and then move north of the Alps, cross the Rhine, and invade France while Napoleon and his main army remained in quarters along the Channel.

When Napoleon realized his enemies' plan, he moved swiftly. On August 27, the *Grande Armée* quietly left its camps around

Boulogne and, marching swiftly, crossed the Rhine by September 26. Continuing its rapid advance, Napoleon's army reached the Danube by October 6; the speed of its advance upset allied calculations and put the bulk of the *Grande Armée* in the rear of an Austrian army near Ulm commanded by *Feldmarschalleutnant* Karl Leiberich von Mack. In doing so, Napoleon cut Mack's lines of communications, supply, and retreat to Vienna.

The allies continued with their original plan, unaware of the trap that awaited. Mack's 50,000 men moved toward Ulm with the purpose of guarding the northern flank of the main advance into northern Italy that was to defeat Masséna's army. The Archduke Charles of Austria had 100,000 men, and he intended to move against Masséna as a prelude to a subsequent advance north of the Alps, across the Rhine, and into France. A Russian army of 120,000 men was moving westward into Germany, while to the north, Sweden was preparing to send an army to Pomerania, Sweden's only continental possession. All these offensives, operating along different lines of advance into eastern France, were designed to overwhelm Napoleon's forces.

As the allies moved at a somewhat leisurely pace but with superior numbers, Napoleon raced to the critical point. As French cavalry emerging from the Black Forest in southern Germany demonstrated in front of Mack's Austrians at Ulm (the French moved back and forth out of the Black Forest, confusing the Austrians), Napoleon's infantry advanced in six great columns in a wide arc around to the north and then east of Mack's position. The French infantry averaged some 18 miles a day—an astounding speed of advance.

By September 30, Mack, realizing that he was in danger of being encircled, tried to break out and open a line of retreat toward

Vienna. He attacked the French twice: at Haslach and again at Elchingen. At Haslach, 4,000 French troops commanded by General Pierre Dupont managed to withstand an assault by 25,000 Austrians, while at Elchingen, Marshal Michel Ney sought to regain the town the French had only recently abandoned. As French reinforcements arrived, the Austrians retreated. Napoleon's unexpected advance demoralized Mack and his army, a demoralization made more complete by the fact that the promised Russian support was too slow in coming.

Two groups did break out of the encirclement, only to surrender later: the Archduke Ferdinand, with 13,000 cavalry eventually capitulated at Trochtelfingen, while another 12,000 men wound up laying down their arms at Neustadt. Mack surrendered his army, consisting of some 30,000 men and 65 pieces of artillery, at Ulm on October 20. For Napoleon this constituted a great strategic rather than tactical victory, demonstrating the value of superior use of the principles behind maneuver and surprise.

Napoleon moved quickly to follow up this overwhelming success. He detached troops to prevent archdukes Charles and John from moving across the Alps from northern Italy, while he drove eastward toward Vienna. Masséna in Italy followed Charles and sought to keep him engaged, to prevent Charles from concentrating on moving through the Alps and contesting Napoleon's drive for the Austrian capital. On October 30, Masséna's and Charles's armies met at Caldiero. Charles made a spoiling attack to create time for his baggage and slowly moving forces to retreat farther eastward. After the battle, he and the main body of his army safely retreated across the Julian Alps into the broad Hungarian plain.

Driving the Russians under General Mikhail Kutuzov in front of him, Napoleon

gained the Austrian capital on November 14, though the Russian army had fought an effective delaying action at Dürnstein on November 11 and later under Prince Pyotr Bagration at Hollabrunn on November 15 and 16. With only 7,000 men, Bagration held off the advancing French and, although he lost half his men, enabled the main body of the Russian army to escape.

Napoleon continued north, his army becoming progressively weaker as it moved away from Vienna. He had to detach troops to guard an ever-lengthening line of communications back to France, and other units to occupy Vienna. He began to concentrate his men around Brünn, several days' march north of the capital. When troops from the formations under marshals Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte and Louis Davout joined Napoleon's army, the emperor commanded about 73,000 men.

The allies were not idle. To Napoleon's northwest was Archduke Ferdinand with 18,000 men at Prague; to the northeast, Czar Alexander I of Russia and Emperor Francis of Austria had some 90,000 men near Olmütz; and archdukes Charles and John were still trying to break through the French units defending the southern Alps. The allied plan was clear—to concentrate their superior forces and trap Napoleon far from France. The French, therefore, needed to strike before the opposing armies could combine to overwhelm him.

The result was a tactical masterpiece (as opposed to the strategic masterpiece of Ulm), achieved on December 2. Napoleon was setting a trap, as he concentrated his army just east of the village of Austerlitz. He deployed his men on low ground, which normally would be a disastrous decision, and greatly extended his right wing in plain sight of his gathering opponents. He wanted them to concentrate their attention on the apparent

vulnerability of his overextended right wing, and to fix in their minds a sense of the weakness of the overall French position. The French right wing seemed an irresistible target, for if the combined Austro-Russian army could break Napoleon's right, the allies could sever his line of retreat to Vienna and then to France, and trap him for the winter in Bohemia.

Napoleon was betting that late-arriving reinforcements would strengthen his right sufficiently to hold while he delivered the decisive blow elsewhere. He initially had placed his men on the hills to the east, the Pratzen Heights, for he recognized that this was the critical point for the battle. When he moved westward to lower ground and weakened his right, he planned to have Davout's 8,000 men support that flank in the event of the expected Austrian attack. Further, he planned a coup de main to destroy the critical hinge of the allied position.

The Austrian attack began early on December 2 on a battlefield shrouded in mist, and by mid-morning it had succeeded in bending the French position. In retreating from the hills though, Napoleon had had his men stamp the snow on the slope to allow for an easier climb when they returned. He waited as perhaps one-third of the allied army moved across his front to attack the French right. In doing so, the allied center was stretched and weakened to maintain the tempo of the attack on the French right.

At the critical moment, around 9:30 a.m., Napoleon sent Marshal Nicolas Soult's corps forward against the allied center. The mist burned off, and the so-called Sun of Austerlitz lit the battlefield as the French troops seized the heights. The French split the allies in two, and the French right now moved around the Austrian left to surround it. To further complicate matters, French artillery sent round shot onto the frozen

ponds behind the Russian position on the allied right, breaking through the ice and thus making movement and retreat difficult. There were many desperate and furious attacks and counterattacks, including those by the Russian Imperial Guard and by the French Imperial Guard—together some of the best infantry and cavalry in the world. The French, including the Mameluke cavalry Napoleon had incorporated into his forces after his campaign in Egypt in 1798, held the vital center, eventually driving the Russians off.

Napoleon had outmaneuvered his opponents and gained a great victory. At a cost of 9,000 French casualties, he inflicted more than 27,000 casualties on the allies. In the course of the fighting, Napoleon had caused his enemies to divide their larger army in two, which he had then been able to overwhelm by seizing the central position—the Pratzen Heights. He had destroyed the Austrian left and driven off the Russian right in what was to become one of the greatest battlefield victories of the Napoleonic Wars, and perhaps of all military history.

Two days after Austerlitz, the Austrian emperor agreed to an armistice, and the Russian armies marched east. On December 26, Austria made clear the extent of its defeat by signing the Treaty of Pressburg. By the terms of that treaty, Austria withdrew from the Third Coalition and accepted French control over northern Italy, and western and southern Germany. Pressburg marked the high point of Napoleon's domination on the European continent until the treaties of Tilsit were concluded with Russia and Prussia, respectively, 18 months later.

French victories on the Continent did not affect British mastery of the seas though. Britain maintained its naval superiority with Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar on October 21, 1805. In the spring

and summer of 1805, a French fleet commanded by Admiral Pierre de Villeneuve eluded the British blockade of the French port of Toulon, rendezvoused with a small Spanish fleet, and made for the West Indies. Vice Admiral Horatio, Viscount Nelson, in command of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, pursued Villeneuve's fleet to the West Indies and back to Europe, where it sought shelter in Cádiz on the southwestern coast of Spain. By late August, with Austria and Russia confronting him, Napoleon broke up the invasion camp at Boulogne and marched his army to the Danube. He then ordered Villeneuve to leave Cádiz and steer for the Mediterranean in order to provide flank protection for Masséna's army in northern Italy.

When Villeneuve emerged from Cádiz, Nelson confronted him on October 21 off Cape Trafalgar. While Villeneuve's fleet of 33 ships was arranged in a single file (line ahead), Nelson divided his smaller fleet, of 27 ships, into two squadrons that he used to pierce the Franco-Spanish line—a risky maneuver, but one that in the event worked extraordinarily well. A weak wind meant the British had to approach very slowly, allowing French gunners to pummel the lead British ship in each squadron, Nelson's *Victory* and the *Royal Sovereign*, under the second in command Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood. Yet the British held their course, and the two columns drove into the long line of Franco-Spanish ships. For five hours the battle raged, in the course of which Nelson was killed by a musket shot. Seventeen ships of the Combined Fleet were captured and one was destroyed; no British ship was lost. Nelson's flagship returned his body to Britain for a lavish ceremonial burial in St. Paul's Cathedral. France never again contested British control of the seas.

Nevertheless, the Third Coalition lay in tatters, for Napoleon stood as the most powerful individual on the European continent.

Charles M. Dobbs

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815)

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Thirteen Years' War (Russo-Polish War, First Northern War, War for Ukraine; 1654–1667)

Russian attempt to take western Russia and Ukraine from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

When Aleksei Mikhailovich came to the Russian throne in 1654, he took the additional titles “Autocrat of Little and Great Russia,” “Prince of Chernigov,” and “Prince of Kiev”; he then set about justifying these through conquest, ostensibly supporting the Cossack rebellion of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In May 1654, three Russian *polk* (armies) invaded Lithuania. The northern

force, commanded by V.P. Sheremetev, departed from Novgorod with 15,000 men. The southern force, with like strength, marched from Briansk under the command of Aleksei Trubetskoy. In the center was a force of some 40,000 comprised of a vanguard under Nikita Odoevsky, the main body under Iakov Cherkassy, and a rear-guard led by M. M Tenkin-Rostovsky. The Czar's Corps, under the direct command of Aleksei Mikhailovich, marched with the center army. Taken together, the three *polk* disposed of roughly 4,000 guns; they were supported by about 20,000 Cossacks coming north from Starodub under Khmelnytsky.

The early campaign was marked by a series of easy successes. Commonwealth forces in the area amounted to little more than 6,000 men and some small garrisons. The Russians took Dorogobuzh in June, Mogilev and Vilnius in August, Smolensk in September, and Vitebsk by November. Though most actions were small, Aleksei Mikhailovich gave his commanders the authority to execute those who failed to surrender immediately or to convert to Orthodoxy upon surrender; at both Amtsislavl and Mstislavl, massacres resulted.

After driving off a half-hearted Tatar attack on their winter quarters near Drizipole in January 1655, the Russians renewed the campaign in July expecting to repeat their success. A 14,000-man force under Vasily Baturlin and Grigory Romodanovsky sent to occupy the Lithuanians' Tatar allies by threatening Azov was prevented from moving in that direction by an outbreak of plague, however, and resorted to raiding around Kerch through early September. They then turned toward L'vov and, joined by Transylvanian troops under Prince Georgy II Rackoczi, drove off a Polish defending force, and laid siege to the city. Unable to take the city, the Russians broke off

the siege in exchange for 50,000 gold zloty on October 28, Baturlin and Romodanovsky then divided their forces into two columns and began marching toward Brest, where they were to join Trubetskoy's army.

Meanwhile, Sweden had entered the war against the Commonwealth, launching a two-pronged attack from Pomerania and Brandenburg. The Swedes did not, however, view the Russians as allies, since Aleksei Mikhailovich had clear designs on Swedish territories in the Baltics. In May 1656, therefore, the czar sent a force to besiege Riga. Without a fleet though, the Russians could not compel the Swedes to surrender, and the siege ended in failure in October. The Russian czar, seeing the Swedes as the greater threat, then concluded a truce with the Commonwealth at Niemicz in October 1656. In return, the Poles agreed to recognize Aleksei as the Commonwealth's heir presumptive.

The arrangement was soon superceded, as the Cossack hetman died in June 1657 and his successor, Ivan Vyhovsky, quit the Russian alliance to join the Commonwealth side. The Cossacks, supported by some 40,000 Tatar horsemen, quickly defeated a small Russian force at Poltava and then moved toward Kiev. Aleksei Mikhailovich, having already sent Romodanovsky south at the head of an army, now moved to reinforce Kiev with 6,000 soldiers; however, he was unable to provide either supplies or subsidies for them in timely fashion. The city nevertheless held out through August, when a series of successful night sorties drove off the besiegers. Romodanovsky's force of 20,000 arrived in the autumn and established winter quarters at Lokhvitsa, where they were joined by a corps commanded by Trubetskoi. The Russians were routed in the April 1659 Battle of Konotop though, and driven from Ukraine.

The renewed threat in the south drove Aleksei Mikhailovich to make a three-year

truce with Sweden in December 1658. Under its terms—which would become permanent in the 1661 Treaty of Kardis—Russia surrendered all gains it had made since 1656 and recognized Swedish control of Livonia.

The war with Poland-Lithuania continued at a much-reduced intensity. The Commonwealth blockaded Vilnius in late 1658, and though Aleksei launched a counterattack that relieved the city, there were no serious actions during 1659 as both sides regrouped. The 1660 Treaty of Olivia between Sweden and Poland-Lithuania also allowed the Commonwealth to focus its efforts against Russia.

Aleksei Mikhailovich took the initiative, however, sending a force of 27,000 men under Sheremetev northwest from Kiev in August 1660. Supported by 20,000 Cossack infantry and 20 field guns, Sheremetev was to join with a second Cossack force of some 35,000 at Slobodishche before moving on Krakow. Before they could reach the meeting point, however, Sheremetev's forces were struck by the vanguard of a Commonwealth force under Stanislaw Potocki. The Russians lost 600 dead, and were forced to halt in order to fend off the assault. While they waited for messengers to bring the Cossack force to join them, the main Polish force of nearly 30,000 men (10,000 infantry) arrived on the scene supported by 15,000 Crimean Tatars.

Sheremetev, seeing the numbers against him, attempted to escape by cutting a passage through the woods to his rear while fighting a defensive action forward. He succeeded, at the cost of nearly 1,000 supply wagons, but the Poles pursued his forces closely. The move also allowed the Tatars, accompanied by a Polish vanguard, to sweep around the Russian flank and get between Sheremetev and the Cossack relief force. The Cossacks, unaware of developments,

moved into the ambush and were forced to surrender; Sheremetev managed to break out of the initial trap, but a series of running battles depleted his forces until he too, was forced to surrender. He agreed to evacuate Ukraine and give himself over, along with 200 officers, as hostage to this pledge.

Both sides were now seriously depleted. Tatar raids continued through 1661 and 1662, and in 1663, Commonwealth forces mounted a minor offensive against the smaller Russian garrisons in Ukraine. They managed to take several before Russian forces brought them to battle in February 1664; that action, added to the outbreak of a civil war in the Commonwealth, ended the Thirteen Years' War for all intents and purposes. The formal settlement did not come until the 1666 Treaty of Andrusovo though. In the agreement, Moscow gained the Smolensk and Seversk districts, along with Chernigov and part of the Vitebsk palatinate—thus supporting Aleksei Mikhailovich's original claims to a large extent. Russia also retained control of Kiev for two years, and would govern the Zaporozhenian Sich jointly with the Commonwealth. Poland-Lithuania received all of Lithuania, Belorussia, and Right-bank Ukraine. Most of those gains would be contested again by Russia in the Wars of the Holy League.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Aleksei Mikhailovich, Czar (1629–1676); Holy League, Wars of the (1686–1696); Khmelnytsky, Bohdan (1595–1657); Konotop, Battle of (June 29, 1659)

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Tilsit, Treaty of

The Treaty of Tilsit ended hostilities between the Empire of France and the Empire of Russia in 1807, at the end of the War of the Fourth Coalition (1806–1807). Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte and Czar Alexander I signed the treaty on July 7 in the town of Tilsit in East Prussia (now called Sovetsk, in the Kaliningrad Oblast). The catalyst was the Russian defeat at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. Alexander I feared such a defeat could lead to a revolution; he felt betrayed by his British allies, moreover, and believed Russia could not stand alone against France. The Russian court did not approve of the treaty but had little choice, considering that French forces were poised on the Russian border at the time.

Both sides saw a benefit to ending hostilities though. Russian forces, instead of fighting Napoleon and his allies, now fought for Napoleon against the English, Ottoman, and Finnish forces who opposed the Continental System. This allowed Russia to end its war against the Ottomans favorably (although not until 1812). Napoleon could concentrate his forces elsewhere, especially in the conquering of Portugal and Spain in the autumn of 1807. The treaty solidified Napoleon's hold over the heart of Europe and disrupted the alliances England had been building against France.

Under its terms, the two countries secretly agreed to aid each other in disputes, with France pledging to aid Russia against the Ottomans and Russia joining the Continental System against England. Napoleon also convinced Alexander to begin

an Anglo-Russian War (1807–1812), and commence hostilities to force Sweden to join the Continental System (1808–1809). Alexander also agreed to evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia, as well as the Ionian Islands and Kotor (Dalmatia), and turn these over to France. Russian forces had captured these territories in 1806 as part of the Russo-Turkish War. In return, Napoleon guaranteed the sovereignty of the Duchy of Oldenburg and several other small states ruled by Alexander I's German relatives. This allowed Alexander I to switch forces from the Eastern European theater to face Ottoman forces in the south. Russian victories at sea in May–June 1807 could now be augmented by Russian victories on land.

The Treaty of Tilsit lasted until the June 1812 invasion of Russia by Napoleon's *Grand Armée*. A June 22, 1812 decree by Napoleon stated that Russia had violated its oaths to France, and that Alexander coveted the Duchy of Warsaw. He believed that the invasion would protect his client state and punish Alexander I. Russia had been secretly trading with England, in violation of the Continental System, and in March 1812, Alexander I signed a secret treaty with Sweden (Treaty of St. Petersburg) against France. He signed another secret treaty (Treaty of Bucharest) in May with the Ottoman Empire, ending the Russo-Turkish War. The invasion of Russia signaled the official end of the Treaty of Tilsit, and with the signing of the Treaty of Orebro with England in July 1812, also ended the hostilities begun as a result of the initial signing in Tilsit.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Russo-Swedish War (February 21, 1808–September 17, 1809); Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812)

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Time of Troubles

Period of unrest between the end of the Rurikid and the beginning of the Romanov Dynasty.

The damage Ivan IV “the Terrible” did to Russia, and the consequences of his reign of terror in Moscow left the country into a period of dynastic and social instability. From 1598 to 1613, the period known as the Time of Troubles, Russia plunged into anarchy, enduring rebellions, civil war, and the famine and disease that accompanied them. There were also invasions by Sweden and Poland during the Time of Troubles; five czars ruled in Moscow in the span of 15 years.

After the son of Ivan IV, Czar Fyodor I (Theodore I), died without issue in 1598, his brother-in-law and chief advisor, Boris Godunov, engineered his own election as czar. Godunov's reign was marked by increased harassment of nobles who opposed him, famine, and peasant uprisings. In 1604, a Polish army, Cossacks, and disenfranchised Russians invaded Russia in support of a pretender to the throne, known as the False Dmitry. This pretender claimed to be Dmitry of Uglich, Feodor's younger brother, who supposedly died in mysterious circumstances in 1591. Many blamed his death on Godunov.

When Godunov died in April 1605, his 16-year-old son Fyodor succeeded him as

czar but was unable to gain the allegiance of the boyars who had supported his father. In June 1605, as the armies of the False Dmitry advanced on Moscow, a group of boyars murdered Fyodor II and his mother.

Dmitry I ruled for only one year with the support of influential boyars and Polish forces. The pretender alienated his new subjects, however, by inviting numerous Poles to Moscow and barring Russian peasants from the Kremlin grounds. Several boyars claimed that Dmitri was not the true czar after all and, in 1606, organized an army led by Prince Vasily Shuisky to overthrow him. Shusky's agents assassinated Dmitry following the czar's marriage to a Polish princess; mob violence followed. A crowd of nobles and commoners gathered at Red Square to proclaim Shuisky czar, and he ruled for the next four years.

By this time though, conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that Shuisky found it impossible to maintain order. Warfare raged in several regions, banditry was rampant, and both Poland and Sweden intervened in Russian affairs. During the next two years, several new pretenders appeared, all of whom rallied some support among disaffected Russians of various social classes.

In 1608, a second False Dmitry appeared in Poland. This new pretender marched into Russia and encamped in Tushino, nine miles from Moscow. There he set up a government and laid siege to Moscow. Two czars now vied for supremacy, and many nobles who held a grievance against Shuisky moved to the "second capital" at Tushino. A sizable group of boyars, known as the *perelety*, regularly shuttled back and forth between the two czars; their allegiance at any particular moment depended on the attractiveness of the promises, privileges, and land grants made by the rulers.

The pretender did not remain in Tushino long. His relentless plundering of the countryside turned people against him, and in

December 1609, they drove him from the town. To add to the confusion, a rebellious force deposed Shuisky in 1610 and offered the crown to Władysław, son of King Sigismund of Poland, on the understanding that he would convert to Orthodoxy. Sigismund wanted the crown for himself though, and sent an army against Russia. He captured Smolensk, and then entrenched himself in the Kremlin after burning Moscow. At the same time, the Swedes occupied Novgorod and offered one of their princes as a candidate for the throne. By 1611, Russia was in complete chaos.

Salvation came from an unexpected source; a well-to-do merchant from Smolensk named Kuzma Minin took it upon himself to form a national movement to remove the enemy from Russia. Other cities soon joined in the effort, and many of the lesser nobles who suffered from the chaos provided support. Prince Dmitry Pozharski was to lead the nationalist army.

After months of preparation, Minin and Pozharski joined with a Cossack force and advanced on Moscow. Their force of 10,000 men faced a Polish force of 15,000, but the Russians seized Moscow for three months before launching an attack in October 1612. The assault gave them control of every part of Moscow except the Kremlin, where the Poles held out. Cut off from supplies, the Poles surrendered after only five days, and Russia entered a critical stage.

To reestablish legitimate authority and rule, a czar was needed whom the people would accept. In January 1613, a *zemsky Sobor* (council of the lands) convened and, after much discussion, the delegates elected 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov, grandnephew of the first wife of Ivan IV. The family tie to the old dynasty endowed Romanov with legitimacy but under the influence of his father, the Patriarch Filaret, he initially

refused the honor. Only after a delegation assured him the nation stood ready to obey, he agreed to serve as czar. In July 1613, Mikhail Romanov was formally crowned czar of Russia, ending the Time of Troubles and establishing a dynasty that would rule Russia for the next 300 years.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Godunov, Boris (1552–1605); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Kolomenskoe, Battle of (December 2, 1606); Minin, Kuzma (late 1500s–1616); Pozharski, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich (1578–1642); Romanov, Czar Mikhail; Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Tula, Siege of (June–October 1607)

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Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970)

Soviet marshal who had numerous commands during the war and served as defense commissar between 1940 and 1941.

Born in the village of Furmanka, near Odessa in Ukraine, on February 18, 1895, Semen Timoshenko was drafted into the Russian army in 1915. He served as a machine gunner and was decorated. In 1917, then a noncommissioned officer, he was jailed for striking an officer, but he was freed during the Russian Revolution. Timoshenko joined

the Red Army in April 1918 and earned his military reputation in the Russian Civil War, fighting at Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad), near Warsaw, and in the Crimea under Semen Budenny. A man of great personal courage, he also developed a friendship with Josef Stalin, to whom he remained intensely loyal.

Virtually illiterate until he began his military schooling, Timoshenko duly graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1922, from cavalry schools, and from the Lenin Political Academy in 1930. He then held a succession of military commands. In August 1933, he was appointed deputy commander of the Belorussia Military District. He went on to head the Northern Caucasus (1937), Kharkov (1937), and Kiev (1935 and 1938) district commands. In 1939, Timoshenko gained command of the entire western



Semen Timoshenko was a nonentity as a battlefield commander in World War II, but a favorite collaborator of Josef Stalin during the Great Purges. (Corbis)

border region. He escaped persecution in the Great Purges and certainly benefited from the execution of thousands of fellow officers. Stalin often used Timoshenko to fill key commands of purged officers until a suitable replacement could be found.

A member of the Supreme Soviet on its creation in 1937, Timoshenko retained this position for life. In September 1939, he commanded the Ukrainian Front (Army Group) in the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. When Soviet forces performed poorly under Marshal Kliment Voroshilov in the early stages of the Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War) of 1939–1940, Stalin appointed Timoshenko to command in Finland on January 7, 1940.

One day after being promoted to marshal, on May 8, 1940, Timoshenko succeeded Kliment Voroshilov as defense commissar. Rough and blunt, he was, in many ways, unsuited for higher command. He worked to rebuild the Red Army, increasing the number of tanks and the degree of mechanization in general. Timoshenko slavishly followed Stalin's guidelines, however; thus he must bear, along with Stalin, responsibility for the military debacle that followed the German invasion of June 22, 1941. Initially, Timoshenko refused authorization for Soviet commanders to return fire. On July 21, he yielded the post of defense commissar to Stalin and became commander in chief of the Western Front, where he had some success in delaying the German advance.

Transferred to command the Southwestern Front in September 1941, Timoshenko failed to prevent a German breakthrough to the Crimea and the disaster of the Kiev encirclement, which, however, could be blamed on Stalin's refusal to allow a withdrawal. He was transferred to the Finnish Front in January 1942 and remained there through May; then he was back in the Ukraine, where his

offensive at Kharkov that month failed. Stalin subsequently replaced Timoshenko with Georgy Zhukov, moving Timoshenko into the role of overall commander at Stalingrad. During the remainder of the war, Timoshenko served in lesser assignments and, at one point or another, commanded operations on the Northern Caucasus, Second and Third Baltic, and Second, Third, and Fourth Ukrainian fronts.

After the war, Timoshenko commanded the South Ural Military District between 1946 and 1949 and the Belorussian Military District in 1946 and again from 1949 to 1960. Timoshenko died in Moscow on March 31, 1970.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

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Todorov, Georgy (1858–1934)

Bulgarian army general. Born in Bolgrad (now Bohlrad, in southwestern Ukraine) on November 16, 1858, Georgy Todorov volunteered for the Bulgarian Corps that fought with the Russians against the Ottoman army in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War, after which Bulgaria was recognized as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire. He then graduated with the first class of the Military School in Sofia in 1879. He entered the Saint Petersburg Military Academy

beginning in 1882 but failed to graduate because he returned to Bulgaria to take part in the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, in which Bulgaria was victorious. Todorov was involved in the army putsch that forced the abdication of Bulgarian prince Alexander and was dismissed from the army in 1886. He was reinstated in 1887 and promoted to major that August, however. In January 1896, Todorov was promoted to colonel. He subsequently commanded the Sevlievo garrison.

On January 1, 1910, Todorov was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 7th Infantry Division, commanding it in the First Balkan War (1912–1913) and in the defeat of Ottoman forces in the Battle of Bulair (January 26, 1913). In the Second Balkan War (1913), he fought with his division in the Battle of Kalimanci (July 18–19), in which the Bulgarians defeated the Serbs.

Todorov commanded the Bulgarian Second Army when Bulgaria entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915. He led Bulgarian operations in Macedonia that prevented the Serbs from linking up with the Allied force that had landed at Salonika. In late 1916, he commanded the Bulgarian Third Army in conjunction with German forces operating in Romania and driving Romanian forces from the Dobrudja. With General Nikola Zhkov's illness, Todorov assumed temporary command of the Bulgarian army on September 8, 1918 and was thus present and commanding Bulgarian forces in their crushing defeat at the hands of the Allies in the Battle of Dobro Pole (September 15).

Todorov left the army in 1919. He died in Sofia on November 16, 1934.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

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Tokarev, Fyodor Vasilievich (1871–1968)

Russian and Soviet weapons designer.

Fyodor V. Tokarev was born into a poor Cossack family in the village of Egorlykskaya. Apprenticed to a blacksmith at 11 and to a gunsmith at 14, he demonstrated his mechanical ability and interest in firearms early. After military school, Tokarev joined the 12th Don Cossack Regiment as a noncommissioned officer armorer. A master armorer instructor by 25, he continued his education at the military technical school, returning to his regiment as a 29-year-old commissioned officer and master gunsmith.

Within a few years, the army was testing his designs for a semiautomatic version of the Mosin-Nagan rifle. During World War I, Tokarev worked at the Imperial Small Arms Factory at Sestrotetsk, rising to technical director. One of the rare souls who seemed to transition easily from czarist to Soviet rule, Tokarev became senior engineer at the Soviet small arms factory at Izhevsk in 1919. Two years later, he was sent to the giant facility at Tula, where he would design his masterpieces.

The TT-30/33 pistol triumphed over all others to become the issue pistol for the Red Army. By 1936, Tula had manufactured

about 93,000; it was reliable, rugged, and relatively easy to produce. Tokarev eventually perfected a semiautomatic main battle rifle, the SVT-40, which was used until eclipsed by the AK-47.

Tokarev was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet, and a Hero of Socialist labor, and wrote articles and commentary on armaments up until his death at age 97. At his request, he was buried at Tula. Tokarev was the Russian arms design legend until Mikhail Kalashnikov surpassed him. Tokarev's TT-33 was produced in almost every Soviet satellite country for years, and modern caliber replicas are still produced in the United States.

James Selkirk Jr.

See also: Kalashnikov, Mikhail Timofeevich (1919–2013)

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Tolbukin, Fyodor I. (1894–1949)

Marshal of the Soviet Union and commander of the Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts during World War II. Born in Androniki, Yaroslavl Oblast, on June 16, 1894, Fyodor I. Tolbukin joined the Russian army in 1914 at the onset of World War I. Of peasant birth, during the war, he rose from private to captain, eventually commanding a battalion. In 1918, he enlisted in the Red Army. During the Civil War, he served on the Western

Front as chief of staff for the 56th Infantry Division and as chief of staff for army operations. After graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in 1934, Tolbukin served in several staff positions, then in 1937 commanded a division. In 1938, he became chief of staff for the Transcaucasus Military District, remaining there through the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

From August 1941 to March 1942 Tolbukin was chief of staff of the Crimean Front (army group), then assistant commander of the Stalingrad Military District through July 1942. Next he commanded the Fifty-Eighth Army through March 1943 and was involved in the defense of Stalingrad. His superior, Colonel General Andrei Yeremenko, praised his command organization and military prowess. Subsequently, Tolbukin took command of the Southern Front, renamed the Fourth Ukrainian Front in October 1943, where he supported General Rodion Malinovsky's Third Ukrainian Front during the Lower Dnieper and Dnieper-Carpathian offensives and the expulsion of the Germans from Soviet territory.

In May 1944, he was given command of Third Ukrainian Front. The following month, led by Malinovsky who had taken command of the larger Second Ukrainian Front, he invaded the Balkans. They conquered most of Romania, forcing an overthrow of its pro-German government and bringing it onto the Allied side. On September 12, 1944, Tolbukin was made a marshal of the Soviet Union. Thereafter, as Malinovsky drove through Yugoslavia into Hungary, Tolbukin occupied Bulgaria. During the winter, he liberated much of Yugoslavia and invaded southern Hungary.

At war's end, Tolbukin was commander in chief of the Southern Group of Forces, which covered the Balkans. In January 1947, Tolbukin became commander of the

Transcaucasus Military District, a post he held until his death on October 17, 1949.

Regarded as one of the Soviet Union's finest generals, Tolbukin received numerous awards including two Orders of Lenin and the Soviet Union's highest honors, the Order of Victory and Hero of the Soviet Union, posthumously on May 7, 1965.

Kevin S. Bemel

See also: Frunze Academy; Malinovsky Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich (1892–1970)

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Totleben, Eduard (1818–1884)

A master of improvisation, Eduard Ivanovich Totleben (also Todleben) was one of the most accomplished engineering officers in Russia's military history. His defense of Sevastopol during the Crimean War was masterful and established him at the forefront of his profession.

Totleben was born in the Baltic province of Kurland on May 20, 1818, the son of German immigrants. Despite his middle-class origins, he longed for a military career and attended the St. Petersburg Engineers School. Totleben was commissioned an ensign in 1836 and assigned to Russian garrison forces in Central Asia. By 1848, he had risen to captain and distinguished himself in combat against Shamil in the Caucasus from 1848 to 1852.

At that time, the Russian Empire had embarked on a period of expansion into the Balkan region at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Alarmed by what they considered a threat to their own interests, Great Britain and France sided with the Ottomans, thereby precipitating the bloody and indecisive Crimean War. Initially, Totleben was directed to help break the Turkish siege of Silistra, which he accomplished in 1853. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Crimean Peninsula, soon to be the focus of the allies' attention.

Crimea was the site of Sevastopol, home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Although strongly guarded from the seaside, it was relatively defenseless from a land approach, a condition that Totleben resolved to correct. He first prevailed upon superiors to sink Russian naval vessels at the mouth of the harbor to deny their use to the allied fleet. With that accomplished, the cannon were removed and placed upon the city's walls for added protection. The sailors were reorganized into 20 battalions of naval infantry to augment the army garrison of 37,000 under Prince Aleksandr Menshikov.

Totleben had only begun to entrench his defenses when an Anglo-French expeditionary force of some 50,000 men landed and spontaneously attacked the city. They handily defeated the ponderous Russian forces sent out of the city to defeat them and established formal siege positions to take the city itself on September 26, 1854. The Russians, however, under Totleben's supervision, had entrenched Sevastopol with earthen redoubts and breastworks.

As an engineer, Totleben rejected the notion of fixed, permanent defenses in favor of a more flexible approach. His defensive arrangements were accordingly modified, extended, or shortened according to the enemy's intentions. That approach to siege warfare greatly increased the Russian capacity to

resist, and whenever English and French forces attacked a portion of the works, they were invariably repulsed with heavy losses.

The Siege of Sevastopol continued into the winter months of 1854 and into the spring of 1855, as both sides endured horrific suffering. Allied forces continued their heavy bombardment and repeated attacks, but Totleben's line held fast. At length, he was wounded by an artillery shell on June 20, 1855, and was evacuated. In his absence, the French managed to storm the Malakhov position in the southeastern portion of town, which prompted the Russians to evacuate Sevastopol in September. The campaign ended soon thereafter with a total loss of 71,000 allied and 102,000 Russian casualties. During the course of the siege, Totleben rose by dint of good performance from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant general and emerged as a national hero.

Over the next two decades, Totleben was occupied with strengthening Russian defenses along the Dnieper River and the port of Kronstadt. In 1860, he rose to the rank of full general and served as assistant to Grand Duke Nicholas, the czar's cousin. In 1877, Turkish atrocities against Slavic populations in the Balkans resulted in the last of the Russo-Turkish wars. After some initial victories, the Russian army encountered the heavily fortified bastion of Plevna, Bulgaria, which stoutly resisted all attempts at capture. When three brazen frontal assaults over a period of several weeks resulted in Russian losses of nearly 30,000 men, Totleben was summoned from St. Petersburg to help end the siege.

As chief of staff to King Michael of Romania, the overall commander, Totleben decided that the least costly manner of taking Plevna was a blockade to starve the defenders out. He thereupon erected a series

of forts around the Turkish position, sealing them off. On December 10, 1877, Osman Nuri Pasa, the resolute Ottoman commander, made a determined sortie to break through the Russian siege lines. Totleben instantly brought up reserve troops and pushed the Turks back into their camp. Faced with imminent starvation, Osman surrendered Plevna that evening after a heroic defense of 143 days.

For the rest of the year, Totleben directed the reduction of several other Ottoman posts in Bulgaria, and the war was victoriously concluded the following spring. In February 1878, he briefly served as commander in chief of the Russian Army before being made count and appointed governor of Odessa. With his health in decline, Totleben subsequently served as governor of Vilnius from 1880 to 1883. He frequently visited German springs in an attempt to improve his health but died at Bad Soden (near Frankfurt) on July 1, 1884. He is still regarded as a leading exponent of the difficult art of siege warfare.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Menshikov, Prince Aleksandr Danilovich (1673–1729); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); Sevastopol, Siege of (October 1854–September 1855)

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Transdnestria

The area that became Transdnestria (“across the Dniester River”) was first recognized as a separate entity with the creation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR) in 1924. The Soviet regime hoped that the creation of the Moldavian ASSR would extend Soviet (communist) influence into the neighboring territories that had recently become part of Romania. The Soviet authorities made a great effort to craft a unique identity for the residents of the Moldavian ASSR, to set them apart from Romania. The USSR annexed Moldova in 1940 under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; the Romanians occupied the area from August 19, 1941 until the Soviets reconquered Moldova on January 29, 1944. After the war, the Soviets incorporated the Moldavian ASSR into the new Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, where it remained until 1990.

As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the former territory of the Moldavian ASSR declared its independence (1990) and adopted the name Pridnestrovian (“in front of the Dniester”) Moldavian Republic (PMR). Hostilities with what was then still the Moldavian SSR began immediately, as Moldavian forces attempted to enter the city of Dubossary, on the left bank of the Dniester but under Moldavian control, on November 2, 1990. PMR forces blocked the bridge into the city; Moldavian forces opened fire, killing three PMR soldiers—the first casualties of the so-called Transdnestria War. The Moldavian SSR declared its independence from the USSR on August 27, 1991, becoming the Republic of Moldova.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained a presence in the region of

Transdnestria in the form of the Fourteenth Army, numbering some 25,000 men. It was initially to be a peacekeeping force, superior to the PMR and Moldovan factions in both troop strength and weapons. On March 15, 1992, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozыrev proposed a multilateral negotiation. On March 28, however, Moldovan president Mircea Snegur announced a “state of emergency” in Moldova and demanded the disarmament of the PMR faction. Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoi proposed the Fourteenth Army intervene to protect ethnic Russians living in the PMR. Russian indecision and inaction allowed events on the ground to determine their course of action with regard to the PMR situation.

Factions affiliated with the PMR frequently stole weapons from the Russian forces, though some observers argued that the Russians were deliberately supplying them in this fashion. Fighting began in the area around Dubossary on March 2, 1992, and trench warfare set in near the city. Russian forces remained neutral despite the pressure of the situation. Moldovan forces entered Dubossary on May 18, 1992, yet Russia still refused to respond.

On June 19, 1992, however, Moldovan forces entered Bendery, on the west bank of the Dniester, and arrested the police commander, Major Yermakov. Combat between Moldovan and PMR forces ensued. With the PMR forces near their breaking point, Major General Aleksandr Lebed, the commander of Fourteenth Army, unilaterally ordered Russian intervention, claiming he could not evacuate his forces otherwise. Russian artillery opened fire on Moldovan forces in the Gerbovetsky forest, west of the city, killing 112 men. Moldovan forces withdrew the next day, and the military conflict was largely over. Human Rights Watch alleges

Russian forces killed many civilians during the fighting around Bendery, bringing the total casualty figure to over 500.

Over the next few weeks, Rutskoi brokered a settlement resulting in a cease-fire on July 21, 1992. Fourteenth Army was decommissioned in 1995 and reformed as a part the joint Russian-Moldovan peacekeeping known as the Joint Control Commission. On November 18, 2008, NATO issued Resolution 371, which “urge[d] Russia . . . to withdraw its illegal military presence” from Transdnistria, a demand to which Russia has yet to acquiesce; Russian peacekeeping forces remain in Transdnistria to the present day.

Dallas Michelbacher

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Lebed, Aleksandr (1950–2002); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Trans-Siberian Railway

The Trans-Siberian Railway is the longest railroad line in the world, running 5,571 miles

between Moscow and the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Built between 1891 and 1904, it remains European Russia’s main link to Siberia’s rich resource areas. National security considerations also drove its construction, and its existence has influenced the course of almost every war Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union fought in the 20th century.

The decision to build the Trans-Siberian Railway reflected a surge of Russian nationalism that appeared in the late 19th century. Two individuals—Czar Alexander III and his finance minister, Count Sergei Witte—played central roles in the building of the railroad. They and their supporters wanted the railroad for reasons of national security, international prestige, and economic advantage. The Trans-Siberian Railway would serve to strengthen Russia’s hold on Siberia, further the exploitation of Siberia’s resources, encourage the movement of settlers into Russia’s far eastern frontier, and enhance the Empire’s ability to move its armies into vulnerable areas near Russia’s border with China, where China’s increasingly apparent weaknesses presented opportunities for its European imperialist rivals, as well as Japan and the United States, to expand their spheres of influence at Russia’s expense.

Building a railroad across Siberia from European Russia was difficult not only because of its length but also because laborers would have to work thousands of miles from their supply bases, as there were as yet no iron and steel foundries in the remote areas of Siberia, no hardwood for railroad ties in the taiga, and stone for bridge piers and abutments would have to come from quarries in western Mongolia. The builders faced formidable natural barriers in the Ural Mountains, Siberia’s many rivers, and Lake Baikal. Finally, workers faced appalling working conditions and rampant diseases—including cholera, typhus, and smallpox—that killed

thousands. By 1901, after a massive effort, one track had been completed from Moscow to Vladivostok, not including a section circumventing Lake Baikal to the south. Workers completed that branch in 1905, an effort requiring the building of 38 tunnels.

Russia's move into the Far East and the imperial government's desire to ensure the security of the Trans-Siberian put the Empire on a collision course with another ambitious power with designs on Manchuria and Korea—Japan. This rivalry culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which ended in a humiliating Russian defeat. Ironically, one of the sources of Russian weakness was their inability to move troops along the Trans-Siberian's one track efficiently. The completion of the southern Lake Baikal track helped the Russians to move large reinforcements to Manchuria late in the war, however, preventing Japan from exploiting its victory even further.

The Trans-Siberian Railway's military value remained limited. During World War I, with European supply routes to Russia closed, Vladivostok became the primary entry point for Allied war matériel being shipped to Russia. The volume of this aid exceeded the Trans-Siberian Railway's capacity to efficiently deliver these supplies to the front in Europe. In the spring of 1917, the United States, having entered the war against Germany, sent a Railway Advisory Commission that eventually took over the management of Siberia's railways. By that time, however, the czarist regime had collapsed and all of Russia, including Siberia, was engulfed by the turmoil surrounding the Russian revolutions. Fighting in the Siberian theater of the ensuing Russian Civil War (1918–1921) centered around control of the Trans-Siberian Railway, beginning with the odyssey of the Czech Legion seeking to leave Russia by crossing Siberia and

embarking at Vladivostok, and ending with the collapse of Admiral Kolchak's White Armies in 1920.

The experience of World War I and the need to expand and modernize the Trans-Siberian Railway was not lost on the Soviet successors to the czarist regime. In the minds of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and his lieutenants, expanding and improving the railway was vital for developing Siberia's industry and natural resources, consolidating Soviet control of its Far Eastern territories, and moving troops and matériel from one end of the USSR to the other. The growing threats from Nazi Germany in Europe and Imperial Japan in Asia fueled their drive to expand the Trans-Siberian Railway at any cost. During the 1930s, forced laborers from the Gulag built a second track, along with additional trunk lines running through Soviet Central Asia.

In the late 1930s and later in World War II, after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, this expanded Trans-Siberian Railway proved vital in the rapid movement of troops and war material between the Soviet-German front and the Far East. In addition, the Soviet Union's improved east-west railroad capacity was key to the movement of factories from threatened areas in western Russia to beyond the Urals.

Since World War II, Stalin and his successors continued adding to the Trans-Siberian Railway in accordance with their dreams of developing and exploiting Siberia's resources and furthering their strategic interests in the region. In the early 21st century, 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Trans-Siberian Railway remains the busiest railroad in the world.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Czech Legion (August 1914–December 1919);

February (March) Revolution (1917); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

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Triandafillov, Vladimir Kiriakovich (1894–1931)

Vladimir Triandafillov was born to Greek parents on March 14, 1894 in Kars, then in Russia, but today in Turkey. He joined the Russian army in February 1915, and served briefly on the Southwestern Front. Sent to officer school, he graduated as an ensign in November 1915 and joined the 6th Finnish Rifle Regiment commanded by A.A. Svechin. Triandafillov rose to captain by early 1917. Following the February Revolution, he transferred to Seventh Army, on the Southwestern Front, where he commanded a battalion.

Triandafillov joined the Red Army in June 1918 and was given command of a cavalry squadron. He soon rose to command a brigade in the 27th Rifle Division, and saw action against the White forces of both Anton Denikin and Baron Wrangel during the Russian Civil War. Wounded in May 1919, Triandafillov joined the Communist Party while recuperating; in September, he became commandant of students at the military academy of the Red Army.

When the academy closed in 1923, Triandafillov was appointed chief of operations for

the Soviet General Staff, and deputy chief of the General Staff. During his time on the General Staff, Triandafillov authored two pieces that fundamentally altered Soviet military doctrine: *Scale of the Operations of Modern Armies* (1926) and *Characteristics of the Operations of Modern Armies*. These works laid the foundations for the concepts of “Deep Battle” and “Operational Art” that eventually dominated Soviet military thought.

In November 1929, he was appointed military commissar for the II Rifle Corps, returning to the General Staff in October 1930. He was killed on July 12, 1931, when a plane crashed into the platform of the railroad where Triandafillov was standing. His ashes are interred in the Kremlin wall in Moscow.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Deep Battle; Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Operational Art

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Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

Russian revolutionary, minister of war, and political leader. Born at Ivanovka, Ukraine, on October 26, 1879, into a well-to-do Jewish family, Leib (Lev) Davidovich Bronstein took the name of Leon Trotsky after he became a revolutionary. At age 17, Trotsky completed his formal education and began his revolutionary activities by helping found the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. An advocate of an end to the monarchy and emancipation of the people, Trotsky was arrested in 1898 and spent three years in Siberian exile.

Trotsky soon escaped and made his way to London, where he met Vladimir Lenin in 1902 and wrote for the newspaper *Iskra* (*Spark*) during 1902–1905. Trotsky established an independent reputation as a revolutionary, rejecting Lenin's rigid model. Trotsky, but not Lenin, then returned to St. Petersburg to take an active part in the establishment of a soviet (council) there during the Revolution of 1905. After the collapse of the revolution, Trotsky was again arrested. Again sent to Siberia, he escaped two years later to France. He spent the next decade as a writer, war correspondent, and revolutionary advocate, not only in Russia but also all over Europe.

Trotsky was a war correspondent in Turkey during 1912–1913. At the beginning of World War I, his calls for working-class people throughout Europe not to fight in a rich man's war led France and later Spain to expel him. He traveled to New York and there taught school until he heard of the Russian Revolution of February 1917. He returned to Petrograd in May. He and Lenin were in full agreement that the provisional government must be overthrown. They both assumed a successful Marxist revolution in Russia would soon spread to the other European industrialized nations.

Trotsky now joined cause with Lenin, and Trotsky, rather than Lenin, played the instrumental role in organizing and leading the Bolshevik Revolution on November 6–7, 1917. Trotsky became the new government's people's commissar for foreign affairs. He led the Russian delegation that negotiated with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. He opposed Lenin's policy of capitulation in order to protect the revolution, proclaiming a policy of no war, no peace. When the Germans resumed their military advance, Trotsky favored waging revolutionary war, but Lenin prevailed. Lenin believed it was better to

give in to German demands, which would not last because of worldwide communist revolution, and protect the revolution in Russia. Trotsky's policies thus led to harsher German terms in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

With the outbreak of the Russian Civil War (1918–1920), Trotsky assumed the position of commissar for war with responsibility for training, equipping, and directing the Red Army against the White forces supported by the Western Allies. He used to advantage Red control of interior lines and the railroad net. His unbounded energy and brilliance as a leader helped decide the war for the Reds. During the conflict, he traveled from trouble spot to trouble spot in a heavily armed train. Trotsky also directed, on Lenin's orders, the unsuccessful Russian war with Poland (1919–1920). Trotsky favored creation of a national militia rather than a professional army.

When Lenin died in January 1924, most experts believed Trotsky would assume power. Trotsky lost out, however, to Josef Stalin, who established absolute control and expelled Trotsky from the party. Trotsky was exiled to Kazakhstan in 1928 and then deported to Turkey in 1929. After wandering over Europe, he and his wife eventually found safe asylum at Coyoacan, near Mexico City, in 1936. From there he worked to create an anti-Stalinist movement, which he called the Fourth International. Stalin sent agents to kill him. Trotsky escaped one assassination attempt in May 1940, but on August 21, 1940, a young man carrying a false Canadian passport, who was supposedly a family friend of the homeowner, gained entry into Trotsky's heavily guarded house, pulled a mountain climbing ax from his coat as Trotsky read his paper, and struck him in the head. The wound was mortal.

An intellectual and revolutionary, Trotsky was also an exceptionally able minister

of war who built a highly effective fighting force to win the Russian Civil War and maintain the Bolsheviks in power.

William Head

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); October (November) Revolution (1917); Revolution of 1905

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Trumpeldor, Joseph (1880–1920)

Influential Zionist leader. Joseph Trumpeldor was born in 1880 at Piatigorsk, in the north Caucasus, Russia. In his youth, he was influenced by a commune established by followers of Russian writer Leo Tolstoy. Refused admission to high school because of the Russian government's imposed Jewish quota, Trumpeldor studied dentistry.

In 1902, he was drafted into the Russian Army. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Trumpeldor fought at Port Arthur, which was besieged by the Japanese. He was wounded and had his left arm amputated, but he refused to be demobilized upon his release from the hospital. He was awarded all four degrees of the Cross of St. George for bravery and became the most highly decorated Jewish soldier of the war.

In a Japanese prison camp, Trumpeldor helped establish educational courses for Russian soldiers and also organized a Zionist group for those Jews planning to emigrate to Palestine. In 1906, following his repatriation

to Russia, Trumpeldor was commissioned a lieutenant, one of the first Jewish officers in the Russian Army.

After graduating from a high school for adults, Trumpeldor studied first agriculture and then law at the University of St. Petersburg. He immigrated to Palestine in 1912, but his attempt to establish a commune at Migdal failed. He then worked as an agricultural laborer in Kibbutz Degania and assisted in the organization of the defenses of Jewish settlements in lower Galilee. Trumpeldor attended the Eleventh Zionist Conference in Vienna in 1913 and then traveled to Russia to recruit new members for communal settlements in Palestine.

Trumpeldor returned to Palestine, but at the beginning of World War I, Ottoman authorities deported him to Egypt when he refused to accept Ottoman citizenship. In Alexandria he met with Vladimir Jabotinsky, and the two men began a campaign to establish a Jewish military unit to fight on the British side. Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky were convinced that the Allies would win the war and that Britain would dominate the Middle East. They believed that if Jews actively aided the Allied war effort, it would advance the possibility of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In 1915, the two men formed the Zion Mule Corps, the first Jewish military organization of the war. The corps distinguished itself in the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915. Trumpeldor, as a captain, was the unit's deputy commander and was wounded in the shoulder during the fighting.

With the disbandment of the Zion Mule Corps at the end of the Gallipoli Campaign, Trumpeldor joined Jabotinsky in London. There the two men continued efforts to create a Jewish fighting unit. Following the Russian revolution of March 1917, Trumpeldor traveled to Russia with the goal of establishing a Jewish military unit of 100,000

men that would fight its way to Palestine via the Caucasus. While awaiting approval of this project from the government, he helped found the Zionist Socialist Party. He also founded the General Organization of Jewish Soldiers in Russia. With Jewish communities endangered as a consequence of the upheaval in Russia, Trumpeldor helped organize self-defense units until these were suppressed by the Bolsheviks after November 1917.

Trumpeldor also became a key figure in the emerging Hehalutz organization to train Jewish youths for emigration to Palestine, where they would work primarily in agriculture. Leaving Russia in August 1919, he returned to Palestine that autumn, where he offered to British lieutenant general Edmund H. H. Allenby to bring 10,000 Russian Jewish soldiers to Palestine; his offer was refused. Trumpeldor then busied himself with efforts to unite the Zionist Socialist movement in Palestine.

In January 1920, following Arab attacks on Jewish settlements in northern Galilee, Trumpeldor was called upon to organize their defense. Taking command at Tel Hai, he was killed in combat there, along with five others, on February 29, 1920. His last words were reported as, “Never mind; it is good to die for our country.” His passion for the establishment of a Jewish state and the circumstances of his death combined to make Trumpeldor a powerful symbol both for Zionism and for Jewish armed self-defense. To commemorate his colleague, Jabotinsky named the Revisionist Zionist youth movement *Betar* (a Hebrew acronym for B’rit Trumpeldor, the League of Joseph Trumpeldor).

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Army, Russian (1991–); Jabotinsky, Vladimir Yevgenievich (Ze’ev Yina) (1880–

1940); Jewish Battalions (Jewish Legion); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918)

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
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Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905)

Principal naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War and one of the decisive fleet engagements in history. In the summer of 1904, the Russian government decided on one last effort to win the war and sent the Baltic Fleet, renamed the 2nd Pacific Squadron, on a voyage around the world to the Far East. If the Russians could gain control of the sea, they could cut off Japanese forces in Manchuria and bombard Japanese coastal cities, forcing Japan from the war. On October 15, therefore, Rear Admiral Zinovy Petrovitch Rozhdestvenski’s 36 warships set out on a seven-month odyssey. The most powerful units were the four new 13,500-ton *Borodino*-class battleships: *Borodino*, *Alexander III*, *Orel*, and *Kniaz Suvarov* (flagship).

The voyage went badly from the start. On October 21, jittery Russian crews opened fire on their own cruiser, the *Aurora*, and the British Hull fishing fleet, mistaking them for Japanese torpedo boats and sinking several

BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA STRAIT, MAY 27-28, 1905



trawlers. After the fleet rounded Portugal, some ships proceeded eastward through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, while the main detachment continued south around Africa. With the British (a Japanese ally) refusing to supply coal, Rozhdestvenski ordered the ships to take on whatever they could, placing it in every possible space and precluding training and gunnery practice.

Reunited at Madagascar, on March 16, the fleet started across the Indian Ocean, refueling five times at sea—an unprecedented feat. Rozhdestvenski hoped to get to Vladivostok without battle, but the fleet made one last stop to take on supplies and coal at Cam Ranh Bay. The Russian ships then slowly made their way up the Chinese coast.

Rozhdestvenski sent most of his auxiliary vessels to anchor at the mouth of the Yangtze River, and he timed his advance through the Tsushima Straits to be at night. He also sent two cruisers toward the east coast of Japan in an attempt to persuade the Japanese that his entire fleet would follow. Japanese admiral Togo Heihachiro, however, gambled that Rozhdestvenski would choose the most direct route to Vladivostok, by means of the Tsushima Straits, and planned a trap there. The Japanese also had cut off Vladivostok by sowing 715 mines at the entrance to Peter the Great Bay.

On the night of May 26–27, Japanese picket ships sighted the Russian fleet in the straits. Togo's ships immediately left their bases, dumping coal to increase their speed. Togo relied on radio messages to keep informed of the location of the Russians. (Tsushima was the first naval battle in which the radio was used in action.) The Russian fleet consisted of eight battleships, eight cruisers, nine destroyers, and several smaller vessels. The Russians had a slight advantage in firepower, but this was offset by Japanese superiority in gunnery. Togo had 4 battleships, 8 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 60 torpedo boats. His ships

had been recently overhauled and repaired, and they possessed superior speed—on average, about 50 percent faster than the Russian vessels. Togo's men were fresh, eager, and battle-tested, sailing in their own waters, and led by highly skilled officers.

On the afternoon of May 27, trailed by Japanese cruisers, the 2nd Pacific Squadron sailed past Tsushima Island. When the Russian ships came out of some fog at 1:19 p.m., Togo in the battleship *Mikasa* at last sighted his prey. The Russian ships were steaming in two columns. Rozhdestvenski had his flag in the *Suvarov*, the lead ship in the starboard column.

The Russians assumed Togo would turn south and bridge the gap, allowing his battleships to fire on the weaker Russian divisions, but this would have left the Russian ships headed toward Vladivostok, with the Japanese moving in the opposite direction. Instead, Togo ordered his cruisers to make a 270-degree turn to the northeast to cut the Russians off from Vladivostok. This brought the Japanese ships onto a parallel course; with their superior speed they would turn east and cross the Russian "T" at leisure.

This maneuver carried grave risks, because during the long turn, Togo exposed his whole line of ships to the full broadside fire of the Russian fleet. Seconds after the *Mikasa* began its turn, the *Suvarov* opened fire at about 6,400 yards. Other Russian ships followed suit. As the fleets formed into two converging lines, they blasted away at each other. Rozhdestvenski altered course slightly to port, reducing the range, but the Russian fire rapidly deteriorated. Russian fire damaged three Japanese ships, hit many others, and forced a cruiser out of the battle line. But soon the *Suvarov* was on fire, and another battleship, the *Oshyabya*, was holed in its side. The Japanese concentrated their fire on these two crippled battleships, and their superior gunnery gradually told.

By nightfall, the Japanese victory was nearly complete. Wounded, Rozhdestvenski yielded command to Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov. Togo sent his destroyers and torpedo boats to finish off those Russian vessels not already sunk or that had escaped. Isolated fighting continued throughout the night. Of the 12 Russian ships in the battle line, 8 were sunk, including 3 battleships; the other 4 were captured. Four cruisers were sunk, one was scuttled, three limped into Manila and were interned, and one made it to Vladivostok. Four destroyers were sunk, one was captured, one was interned at Shanghai, and two reached Vladivostok. Three special service ships were sunk, one was interned at Shanghai, and one escaped to Madagascar. Togo lost only three torpedo boats. Although other ships suffered damage, all remained serviceable. The Russians lost 4,830 men killed or drowned and just under 7,000 taken prisoner. Japanese losses were 110 killed and 590 wounded.

Togo's victory at Tsushima forced the Russian decision to sue for peace. In just one day, Russia ceased to be a major Pacific power. Fifty years would pass before it regained status at sea. Although Russia might have raised new armies to continue the war, popular discontent and revolutionary outbreaks threatened the government's very survival. Ironically, the Battle of Tsushima was also the only major decisive fleet action in the history of the steel battleship.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Dogger Bank Incident (October 21, 1904); Rozhdestvensky (Rozhdestvensky), Zinovy Petrovich (1848–1909); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Tu-4 (Tupelov) Strategic Bomber

First Soviet nuclear-capable bomber.

The German invasion of 1941 forced the Soviet aviation industry to focus on producing large numbers of rugged, reliable aircraft designed to support troops in the field, not to strike distant industrial targets. Josef Stalin and other Soviet leaders nevertheless understood the potential of strategic bombing and sought advanced American Boeing B-29 Superfortresses through Lend-Lease, unsuccessfully.

In 1944, Stalin directed aircraft designer Andrei Tupolev to develop a strategic bomber. Progress proved slow. Another option came in the form of four B-29s; in 1944, one crashed and three landed intact on Soviet territory after suffering battle damage or mechanical failure during attacks on Japan. Though allied with the Americans against Germany, the Soviet Union was then still neutral in the Pacific war, and interned the bombers rather than returning them to the United States.

In 1946, Stalin became impatient with Tupolev and canceled his design. Instead, he ordered Tupolev to develop an exact copy of the B-29. To guarantee the project's priority, Stalin placed his secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria, in charge. Soviet engineers disassembled one B-29, and carefully measured and documented each item before shipping it to one of either 64 design institutes or 900 factories for duplication. Stalin insisted on complete duplication, an order his nervous subordinates carried out, copying even obvious flaws such as an unfinished paint job and small holes in a wing panel.

The reverse-engineering process presented formidable technical challenges. The

first lay in converting the English-system of B-29 Superfortresses to Soviet metric scales. Further issues arose with the standardization of aluminum skin panels, wiring gauges, landing gear, tires, and engines. The Soviets had considerable success in duplicating the B-29's remote-controlled gun system, air-borne radar, and bombsight.

After an intensive flight test program marred by many accidents, on August 3, 1947, the Tu-4 made its public debut at the Soviet Aviation Day parade. Western observers recognized the airplane's profile, but it became apparent these planes were Soviet-made, not B-29s, when a Tu-70 transport version of the Tu-4 flew overhead. While the Tu-4 was already approaching obsolescence, it could carry out a one-way strike on the continental United States while carrying a five-ton atomic bomb. The United States immediately began a crash program to improve air defenses.

Though the Tu-4 never flew in combat, it served in many variants until the 1960s. Duplicating what had been the world's most advanced aircraft accelerated the Soviet aviation industry, and the Tu-4 became the basis for later Soviet piston- and jet-engine strategic bombers that served successfully throughout the Cold War and beyond.

Grant T. Weller

See also: Air Forces, Soviet (1917–1991); Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Tupolev, Andrei Nikolaevich (1888–1972)

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Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937)

Soviet marshal whose theories on military strategy put him in conflict with dictator Josef Stalin.

Born on the Aleksandrovkoe estate 150 miles southwest of Moscow on February 16, 1893, Mikhail Tukhachevsky was the son of a nobleman and a servant girl. Debts forced the family to sell the estate and move to



Mikhail Tukhachevsky was one of the most brilliant military theoreticians of the 20th century. (Walter Daran/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Moscow in 1909. There Tukhachevsky entered the Alexandrovsky Military College, studying military thought and history. During World War I, as an officer in the elite Semenovsky Guards, he fought in Poland and won six decorations before being taken prisoner in 1915. After three attempts, he managed to escape in 1917.

In 1918, Tukhachevsky joined the Red Army, and as a protégé of Leon Trotsky, he became a prominent military commander during the Russian Civil War, leading the First Army and then the Eighth and Fifth armies. Appointed commander in the west in April 1920, he led the Russian invasion of Poland. Fighting here laid the seeds for future conflicts and hatreds between Tukhachevsky, and Stalin and Kliment Voroshilov. At one point during the 1920 Battle of Warsaw, Stalin withheld vitally needed troops from Tukhachevsky's command.

In March 1921, Tukhachevsky brutally suppressed the anti-Communist uprisings at Kronstadt, leading a dramatic charge across the frozen Neva to subdue the fortress. He also commanded the forces that crushed the Tambov Rebellion later that year. Between 1922 and 1924, he headed the Military Academy. In May 1924, he became deputy to Marshal Mikhail Frunze, chief of the General Staff. Following Frunze's death, he became chief of staff of the Red Army, occupying that post from 1926 to 1928.

Following disagreements with Defense Commissar Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky was commander of the Leningrad Military District between 1928 and 1931. There, he developed his theories of deep operations, the application of mechanization and armor along with air support to warfare, and the use of airborne troops, carrying out actual maneuvers with these forces. Tukhachevsky saw clearly the nature of the German threat, and he called for forward areas to be lightly

held, with large formations remaining back for subsequent reaction and deep-penetration operations. Voroshilov, an old-fashioned proponent of cavalry, opposed his theories. Stalin recognized the need for an industrialized military thought and, at least temporarily, supported Tukhachevsky.

Tukhachevsky returned to Moscow in 1931 as deputy commissar for military and naval affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and director of armaments. In November 1935, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union, and in January 1936, he headed the Soviet delegation at the funeral of British King George V.

In 1936, he was named first deputy commissar for military-naval affairs and director of the Department of Combat Training. So strong was his position that he reportedly was able to save the composer Dmitry Shostakovich, a close friend, from persecution by the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodni kommissariat vnutrikh del*, NKVD), the Soviet secret intelligence service. Foreign observers recognized Tukhachevsky's contribution in creating the most advanced armor and airborne divisions in the world.

Tukhachevsky strongly believed in the need to understand thoroughly the defensive aspects of war as a prerequisite for comprehending the operational level of war as a whole; Stalin—with the support of Voroshilov and the commandant of the Frunze Academy, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei I. Yegorov—demanded unilateral adherence to the offensive in war. Tukhachevsky also predicted that Adolf Hitler would cooperate with Japan and that Germany would invade both the West and the Soviet Union, and he argued for an end to cooperation with the Germans and a defense in depth. His meddling in such areas and the 1935 publication of these views

in an article entitled “The War Plans of Germany in Our Time” angered Stalin.

In April 1937, Tukhachevsky was removed from his posts and assigned to command the Volga Military District. He was arrested on May 26, 1937. Secretly tried and condemned on charges of spying for the Germans, he was executed by firing squad on the night of June 11–12 in Moscow. Tukhachevsky’s wife was shot as well, and most members of his family were either executed or sent to the Gulag. After the denunciation of Stalin’s terror by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, a Soviet investigation concluded that the charges against him had been fabricated, and he was formally rehabilitated. In 1989, the Soviet politburo announced new evidence indicating that the German intelligence service may have fabricated evidence implicating Tukhachevsky in order to discredit his work. Almost all of Tukhachevsky’s views were proven correct during World War II.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze, Mikhail (1885–1925); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); NKVD; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963); Warsaw, Battle for (August 16–25, 1920); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Yegeyev, Aleksandr Ilyich (1883–1939)

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Tula, Siege of (June–October 1607)

Action that ended the Bolotnikov Rebellion (1606–1607) and led to the capture of Czarévich Peter, pretender to the Russian throne.

From the moment his assassins killed Czar Dmitry (“the False”) in May 1606, Czar Vasily IV Shuisky had faced opposition in the southern and southwestern regions of Muscovy. Dmitry’s supporters had risen in rebellion in July and, under the command of Ivan Bolotnikov, rapidly seized the fortresses of Putivl, Kromy, Orel, Elets, and Kaluga. By the end of September 1606, Bolotnikov’s forces were at Serpukhov, only 90 kilometers from Moscow. Vasily’s forces prevailed at the Battle of Kolomenskoye in November 1606, however, and Bolotnikov retreated to Kaluga.

Vasily’s attempts to drive the rebels back further were stymied by the appearance of a large Cossack force under Czarévich Peter in February 1607. This pretender, who claimed to be the grandson of Ivan IV, fronted a Cossack rebellion with some support from the Polish and Lithuanian magnates who had backed the False Dmitry. Peter’s forces had occupied Tula as their base, and attempted to reinforce Bolotnikov. The czar’s forces defeated all three efforts by early May, but had been so weakened by the clashes with Peter—suffering an estimated 15,000 casualties—that the czar lifted the siege of Kaluga and returned to Serpukhov to plan a new campaign.

The czar raised a new force of some 100,000 men, including many Chuvash and Tatar irregulars, that set out from Moscow on May 21, 1607. Advance scouts from Bolotnikov's forces soon spotted the czar's army near Kashira. Bolotnikov had only 30,000–40,000 men at his disposal, but nonetheless launched a frontal assault as the main body attempted to cross the Vozma River. In a four-hour battle, the rebels drove the imperial forces back across the river with heavy losses. Unfortunately, the Tatar cavalry had managed to cross the river at a different place and now took the rebel force in the flank, causing a panic. Nearly 2,000 rebels were taken prisoner; the remaining forces now fell back on Tula.

Czar Vasily pursued them slowly, as he feared leaving Kaluga unattended to his rear and wanted to gather reinforcements. By June 12, he had concentrated seven regiments at Pushino, about 25 kilometers north of Tula on the Voronia River. Bolotnikov's forces made a preemptive strike to deflect them there, but Vasily's forces simply spread along the river banks and, after two days, outflanked the rebels and drove them back to Tula.

Bolotnikov and Czarevich Peter thus commanded some 20,000 men at Tula, which featured a large kremlin with stone walls five meters high; at some places, an additional 5 or 10 meters of brickwork extended upward. A wooden palisade with 14 towers and 5 gates extended around the town to the Upa River on either end.

Vasily deployed some 30,000–35,000 soldiers in the siege of Tula, in addition to several thousand peasant laborers. He established his headquarters west of the city at the juncture of the Upa and the Voronia rivers, while his main force took a position south-southwest of Tula to cut off the road to Kaluga. Although he had siege

guns positioned on either side of the rebel fort, Vasily initially tried to take the city by storm. After some 20 attempts resulted only in about 2,000 casualties, the czar resigned himself to a siege and set his forces to gathering supplies across the region. His plan would take time, for Vasily intended to build a dam just past the confluence of the two rivers west of Tula and flood the rebels out—which his engineers estimated required no less than two months.

Even as Vasily's forces settled in, however, a new threat was arising. A second Dmitry appeared in the west in July 1607, and by September he was marching toward Bryansk with an army of some 3,000–5,000 men with the objective of establishing a base from which to relieve Kaluga and Tula. Fearing that any triumph of this new Dmitry would rouse the people against him, Vasily sent forces from Tula to halt the pretender. The czar was not entirely successful, as Dmitry's forces took Kozelsk and Belev, but he did prevent the relief of Tula and gave his plan time to work.

Bolotnikov and his troops could only watch as the dam grew; many deserted. As the dam was completed and Tula gradually flooded, Bolotnikov negotiated the surrender of the city. In return for allowing the soldiers to depart unharmed, Bolotnikov and Peter surrendered to Vasily, who promised to spare their lives. The czar had Peter tortured and hanged within three months, however, while Bolotnikov survived a year in prison before Vasily had him murdered secretly.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bolotnikov, Ivan Isaevich (?–1608); Bolotnikov Rebellion; Dmitry, False (1582?–1606); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Kolomenskoe, Battle of (December 2, 1606); Peter, False (?–1607); Shuisky, Prince Vasily (Czar Vasily IV; 1552–1612); Time of Troubles

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Tupolev, Andrei Nikolaevich (1888–1972)

Leading Soviet aircraft designer during World War II.

Born on November 10, 1888, in Pustomazovo, Korchevsky District, Tver Province, Andrei Tupolev demonstrated a special interest in mathematics and physics at an early age. He studied natural sciences at the Imperial Technical Institute in Moscow. Under the supervision of Russian aerodynamics engineer Nikolai Y. Zhukovsky, Tupolev built a wind tunnel for the institute, and he exhibited a model airplane, the *Antoinette*, at the aeronautics exhibition in Moscow in 1910. Arrested for anti-czarist activities in 1911, he was released and worked at the Dax aircraft factory in Moscow. He was not allowed to return to the institute until 1914.

During World War I, Tupolev was a lecturer at the Imperial Technical Institute and held that military aviation was a prerequisite for prosecuting a successful war. After the war, the new Soviet government began to reconstruct an air arm. As many engineers

had left the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks entrusted Zhukovsky, Tupolev, and others with establishing the Central Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Research Institute in Moscow. Tupolev served as its director from 1918 to 1935, and remained one of the leading researchers and designers there until his death. The institute produced all the leading Soviet aircraft designers.

In 1927, Tupolev designed the first Soviet all-metal aircraft, the ANT-3, and in 1930, he produced the TB-3 four-engine bomber. The most advanced heavy bomber of its day, it was armed with six machine guns, had a maximum speed of 180 mph and a range of 1,800 miles, and could carry 2.5 tons of bombs. TB-3s saw combat in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, in the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol against the Japanese, and against the Mannerheim Line in the Soviet-Finnish War (Winter War). Tupolev also designed the twin-engine SB-2 ground-support bomber; armed with four machine guns, it was capable of a speed of 280 miles per hour, carried 1,320 pounds of bombs, and fulfilled a variety of wartime roles.

Although Tupolev was the most prominent Soviet aircraft designer, he was arrested in October 1937 during the Great Purges and accused of passing technical secrets to the Germans. The Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*, or NKVD; the Soviet secret police) and the government ran their own aircraft design bureau in a Moscow prison, and there Tupolev continued his work. Many of his colleagues perished, but Tupolev moved to an NKVD laboratory for designers on the outskirts of the city. In 1940, Tupolev was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 10 years. In the summer of 1941, with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the aircraft design bureau was evacuated to the west Siberian city of Omsk. While there,

he reverse-engineered the American B-29 bomber, using three planes that landed in Siberia after bombing Japan. His copy, the Tu-4, provided the Soviet Union with its first nuclear delivery platform. Tupolev was released from prison in 1944.

After the war, Tupolev designed many passenger planes and bombers. Among these are the Tu-104 (the world's second jetliner), Tu-114, Tu-124, Tu-134, and Tu-154. His son, Aleksei Tupolev, designed the supersonic Tu-144. When Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, one of Tupolev's champions, fell from power in 1964 though, Tupolev's influence within the aeronautics design industry began to wane. The Soviet Union's foremost aircraft designer, Tupolev died in Moscow on December 23, 1972. Both the Royal Aeronautics Society of Great Britain and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics recognized his achievements by awarding Tupolev honorary memberships.

Eva-Maria Stolberg

See also: Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); NKVD; Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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U

Ukraine Campaign (November 1943–July 1944)

Between August and November 1943, the Soviet First, Second, Third, and Fourth Ukrainian fronts pushed back German field marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South from the Donets River to the Dnieper River. On November 6, General Nikolai Vatutin's First Ukrainian Front took Kiev, and by the beginning of December, Soviet forces had crossed the Dnieper in a number of places, forcing the Germans from their hastily prepared positions. The Soviets committed massive resources to liberate the remainder of Ukraine, including 70 percent of their armor and more than half of their air strength. The Soviet advantage in the air was especially glaring: a 4–1 superiority in numbers.

On November 11, 1943, German units launched a counterattack toward Kiev, and on November 20, they retook Zhitomir. Although fighting seesawed, the First Ukrainian Front launched a major assault on the First and Fourth Panzer armies on December 24. By December 31, the Red Army again held Zhitomir.

As Soviet pressure mounted, Manstein requested permission from German leader Adolf Hitler to withdraw from the Dnieper bend. Hitler refused, and on January 5, 1944, General Ivan Konev's Second Ukrainian Front drove southwest from the vicinity of Cherkassy. Over the next three weeks, the Soviets trapped 70,000–80,000 German troops of XI and XLII corps in a pocket near Korsun. The Germans lost 44 Ju-52 transport aircraft in a vain attempt to supply the

pocket by air. Manstein's efforts to break through failed, and the Soviets continued to reduce the pocket.

On February 15, Hitler finally authorized a breakout, and on the night of February 16–17, some 30,000 Germans managed to escape, although they abandoned their wounded and heavy equipment. The Germans sustained 20,000 deaths in the Korsun pocket, and the Soviets captured another 17,000 German troops, including 1,500 wounded. The victory led to Konev's promotion to marshal of the Soviet Union.

Simultaneous with Konev's attack, part of the First Ukrainian Front began the Rovno-Lutsk operation on January 27, 1944, to separate Army Group South from Army Group Center. On February 2, Rovno fell, and nine days later, the Soviets took the major railroad junction at Shepetovka. To the south on February 7, Colonel General Fyodor Tolbukhin's Fourth Ukrainian Front occupied Nikopol on the east bank of the Dnieper. It then turned south into the Crimean Peninsula, and on February 22, General Rodion Malinovsky's Third Ukrainian Front took Krivoy Rog, with its important metallurgical deposits.

On February 29, Vatutin was fatally wounded by Ukrainian partisans while on an inspection tour north of Kiev. Marshal Georgy Zhukov then took command of the First Ukrainian Front, and on March 4, began an offensive toward the juncture between the First and Fourth Panzer armies. On March 5, the Second Ukrainian Front drove southwest toward Uman, joined the next day by the Third Ukrainian Front. Vast quantities of



A Soviet soldier runs past a burning German tank in the battle for Kiev. (Corbis)

U.S. Lend-Lease trucks provided the mobility previously lacking in Soviet offensive operations.

The First Ukrainian Front entered Tarnopol on March 9, outflanking the Germans on the Bug River, which Konev's Second Ukrainian Front forces reached three days later. Striking south from Tarnopol into the rear of the First Panzer Army, Zhukov's First Ukrainian Front reached the Dniester River at the end of March. Meanwhile, the Second Ukrainian Front gained the Prut River by March 26, and when tank units of both fronts linked up, they completely isolated the First Panzer Army. Farther south, the Third Ukrainian Front drove back the German Sixth Army to the Bug, sealing off the Crimean Peninsula.

On March 25, Manstein convinced Hitler to allow the First Panzer Army to break free of its encirclement, but on March 30, the Führer replaced Manstein with Field Marshal Walther Model. Hitler also renamed the two army groups in the south. Army Group South became Army Group North Ukraine,

and Army Group A became Army Group South Ukraine. First Panzer Army managed to break free, and Model then launched a counteroffensive along the Dniester River.

For several months, the front remained static, although Zhukov's armor reached the Carpathian Mountains, cutting the German front in two. Having gained the Romanian border, the Second Ukrainian Front turned south and joined with Malinovsky's Third Ukrainian Front in a night attack led by General Vasily Chuikov's Eighth Guards Army to retake Odessa, which Sixth Army abandoned on April 10.

On April 8, 1944, Soviet forces launched an offensive into the Crimea. Too late, Hitler authorized an evacuation. By the evening of May 9, the Soviets had retaken Sevastopol, capturing another 30,000 Axis troops. The Soviets now controlled most of the Ukraine, including its key industrial and agricultural areas. *Stavka* (the Soviet High Command) had employed all six of its tank armies in the Ukrainian operation but now began to transfer units, including four tank armies,

to Operation BAGRATION—the destruction of Army Group Center in Belorussia—which began on June 22, 1944. The Soviets retook the remainder of the Ukraine in July.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967); Tolbukin, Fyodor I. (1894–1949); Vatutin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1901–1944); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Union of Salvation. *See* Decembrist Movement and Rebellion (1825)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR; 1924–1991). *See* Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991)

URANUS, Operation. *See* Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

Ushakov, Fyodor Fyodorovich (1744–1817)

Born to a minor noble family in the region of Yaroslavl on February 15, 1745, Fyodor Ushakov joined the Russian Imperial Navy in 1761 and served initially on a galley in the Black Sea. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, he served in the Don Flotilla in the Sea of Azov. He later commanded the personal yacht of Czarina Catherine II, and

in 1783, she appointed him to supervise the construction of a naval base at Sevastopol, in the Crimea, and of docks at Kherson—both recent Russian acquisitions.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792, Ushakov led Russian naval forces in a string of victories that earned him a reputation as a master tactician and innovative strategist. He set great store in artillery training, and developed a system of unified fighting orders that combined fire and maneuver to effect the destruction of the enemy. Ushakov's forces never lost a ship, much less a battle.

He was promoted to admiral in 1798 and dispatched to the Mediterranean, where he was to support the Italian campaign of General Aleksandr Suvorov. Ushakov again proved his mastery of strategy and tactics, seizing Corfu, blockading the French base at Genoa, and aiding in attacks on Rome and Naples. Czar Paul I then ordered him to take over the siege of Malta from the British, but politics resulted instead in Ushakov's recall to Russia, where he languished for several years.

Ushakov finally resigned his commission in 1807, and retired to a monastery. He was asked to serve as commander of the militia there during 1812, but declined. Ushakov died in the monastery, near Tambov, on October 14, 1817. He was memorialized in the Order of Ushakov, one of the highest honors bestowed by the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation, and with several warships named after him. In 2000, the Russian Orthodox Church proclaimed him the patron saint of the Russian navy; in 2005, he was also named the patron saint of Russian strategic bombers.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774); Russo-Turkish War (1787–1791); Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1729–1800)

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Ussuri River Conflict (1969)

Relations between the Soviet Union and China steadily worsened throughout the 1960s. Early on March 2, 1969, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), supported by artillery, occupied Zhenbao Island (known to the Russians as Demansky Island). Shortly thereafter Russian guards organized and expelled the Chinese soldiers. Russian deaths numbered between 30 and 60, and Russian reports claimed that bodies were mutilated by the Chinese.

On the morning of March 14–15, 1969, the Russians bombarded concentrations of Chinese troops across the river. They also sent four T-62 tanks across the river to disrupt Chinese patrols. The Chinese responded by attacking with more than a regiment, or about 2,000 men. The PLA supported this attack with heavy artillery that targeted the east side of the river, hoping to prevent the movement of the tanks across the ice. The Russians defended against the human wave with machine-gun fire from the armored vehicles, but withdrew when they realized the size of the attack.

By the afternoon, the Soviets counterattacked with a heavy barrage of artillery, hitting positions as far as four miles inland. They advanced toward Chinese positions with tanks, armored cars and armored personnel carrier-mounted infantry. The first two attacks failed due to lack of ammunition, but the third broke through. The Chinese retreated to their side of the river with their

dead and wounded. The encounter ended at 7:00 p.m., having lasted for over nine hours, and resulted in 60 Russian deaths and about 800 Chinese casualties.

Sporadic fighting continued for the next several days over Russian tanks stuck in the river. Armed raids erupted near the Goldinsky (Pacha) Island in the Amur River through July and August of 1969. Military and political tension also increased along the Xinjiang-Khazakstan border.

Both sides declared victory after the Zhenbao Island incident. Dramatic accounts of the battle were published in China, and anti-Soviet demonstrations increased. In Moscow, protestors marched outside the Chinese embassy. The crowds supposedly equaled those of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Both sides mobilized for a full-scale war, as both tensions and negotiations continued throughout the 1970s.

Morgan Deane

See also: Brezhnev Doctrine; Sino-Soviet Border Conflict (1969); Xianjiang, Battle of (1937)

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Ustinov, Dmitry Fyodorovich (1908–1984)

Soviet arms industry manager, minister of the defense industry (1953–1957), and defense minister (1976–1984).

Born on October 17, 1908 in Samara, Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov served in the

Soviet Red Army during 1922–1923, attended a technical institute in Makarov, and joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1927. Following work as a fitter, he was selected for the Leningrad Military Mechanical Institute, graduating in 1934 as an artillery designer. He worked for three years at the Naval Artillery Research Institute in Leningrad before moving to the Bolshevik Arms Factory, where he was director during 1938–1941.

Named people's commissar for armaments in 1941, Ustinov directed the production of small arms and artillery during World War II and oversaw the relocation of arms factories beyond the Urals during the German invasion. He remained in this post (renamed minister of armaments after the war) until 1953. He received the rank of colonel general of engineering artillery in 1944 and was named a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1952. Appointed minister of the defense industry in 1953, he served until 1957, when he joined the Council of Ministers, becoming deputy chairman the next year and first deputy chairman in 1963.

During this time, he played a major role in the modernization of Soviet forces. Following Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Ustinov was appointed to the Defense Council and became a candidate member of the Presidium (politburo). In 1965, he became Central Committee secretary responsible for armaments. Over the next decade, he continued his involvement in the expansion of Soviet defense production.

In April 1976, Ustinov was named defense minister following the death of Andrei Grechko and held that post until his death in 1984. As minister, Ustinov oversaw the continued growth of Soviet ground forces and the integration of air assault helicopter brigades into the force structure, although economic decline beginning in the late



Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov, minister of defense of the USSR. (Bettmann/Corbis)

1970s would lead to a leveling off in defense procurement.

He was reluctant to support détente, only grudgingly accepted the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations, and was a strong advocate of intervention in Afghanistan. Abandoning his traditional abstention from political battles, he supported Yuri Andropov over Konstantin Chernenko to succeed Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, but supported Chernenko following Andropov's death in February 1984. In ill health for many years, Ustinov died in Moscow on December 20, 1984.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Grechko, Andrei (1903–1976); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); SALT I (November 1969–May

1972); SALT II (1972–1979); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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V

Vannikov, Boris Lvovich (1897–1962)

Long-time Soviet commissar of munitions.

Borris Lvovich Vannikov was born on August 26, 1897, in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. He rose to the rank of three-star general in the Red Army; much of his contribution to the army came in the field of munitions. Vannikov purportedly wrote memoirs outlining his role in the procurement and implementation of munitions ranging from small arms, missiles, and nuclear weapons before, during, and after World War II. Although there is currently no complete manuscript, portions of the memoirs have been published in the leading journal of Russian military history, *Voprosy Istorii*.

In the late 1930s, Vannikov was instrumental in the procurement of an automatic rifle for the Red Army. His promotion of the Simonov (versus the Tokarev) rifle was disregarded, however; the test commission, which included Josef Stalin, favored the Tokarev. In April 1941, Vannikov was serving as people's commissar of armaments. His opposition to mounting tanks with 107-millimeter cannon resulted in his dismissal, followed by a report for insubordination to Stalin and, ultimately, his imprisonment. After being released he was appointed as the people's commissar of ammunition.

During World War II, Vannikov helped establish the Soviet long-range missile program, and lead the research and development of reactive technology. He set up State Central Design Bureau No. 1, which became

the final destination for equipment captured from the Nazis' V-1 and V-2 flying bomb facilities in Peenemünde and the focal point for long-range rocket research in the Soviet Union.

After the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan in August 1945, Vannikov again was relieved of his duties as commissar of ammunition and promoted to a top-secret Special Committee for Defense and head of the First Main Directorate, in charge of research and development for atomic energy, under Lavrenty Beria. Vannikov earned three Hero of Socialist Labor awards and two Stalin Prizes for his work. Following Beria's arrest and execution in 1953, however, Vannikov was demoted to first deputy minister for middle machinery. Vannikov retired in 1958 and died in Moscow on February 22, 1962.

Andrea E. Searor

See also: Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Kapustin Yar; Kurchatov, Igor (1903–1960); Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989); Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)

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***Variag* (Varyag; Cruiser)**

Symbol of heroism for Russia during the Russo-Japanese War.

Built in Philadelphia and commissioned in 1901, the protected cruiser *Variag* was specifically designed for operations in the Pacific. The ship was 425 feet in length, and 52 feet across; it displaced 6,500 tons, with deck armor 5.1 centimeter (cm) thick, and had a top speed of 23.2 knots. It began service at Port Arthur in February 1902, but left for the Korean port of Chemulpo on December 27, 1903; there it joined the gunboat *Koreets* as Russia's naval presence in Korea.

On February 8, 1904, a Japanese naval force appeared at Chemulpo and requested the surrender of the Russian vessels, although war had not yet been declared. Captain Vsevolod Rudnev, commanding the *Variag*, refused; though massively outgunned by the Japanese, he weighed anchor and, accompanied by the *Koreets*, went out to meet the enemy with flags flying and the band playing.

In the ensuing battle, the *Variag* was heavily damaged; despite taking five hits below the waterline, it was not sunk. All 32 of the ship's guns (twelve 15.2-cm guns, twelve 11-pounders, two 1-pounders, and six 3.8-cm guns) were put out of commission though, and 31 crew members were killed. Another 91 were severely wounded, and more than 100 others of the 580-man crew suffered slight wounds.

The *Variag* nonetheless limped back to port, where it was scuttled rather than surrender. The crew took shelter in neutral vessels, and then made their way back to Russia. On August 8, 1905, following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese navy salvaged the ship and recommissioned it as the *Soya*. It served as a training ship and, during World War I, was sold back to Russia.

Rechristened the *Variag*, the ship set out for Murmansk in June 1916. Arriving

five months later, it then left for Liverpool, where it was refitted in February 1917. While in port, news of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution arrived, and the crew of the *Variag* hoisted the red flag; a crew of British soldiers later stormed the ship and took the flag down. The British navy confiscated the ship, sending the crew home.

In 1918, the *Variag* went aground off the Irish coast, but was refloated for use as a hulk until 1919. It was sold for scrap in 1920, but went aground off the Scottish coast en route, and lay there from 1923 to 1925, being steadily scrapped.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

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Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977)

Soviet marshal and chief of staff of the Red Army. Born in Novaia Golchikha in the Volga region on September 30, 1895, Aleksandr Vasilevsky was the son of an Orthodox priest and attended a seminary before entering the czar's army and rising to captain. He was drafted into the Red Army in 1919 and, during the Russian Civil War, he was elected commander of a rifle regiment. Vasilevsky then commanded the 143rd Regiment of the Moscow Military District and was chief of the Red Army's Combat Training Directorate from 1931 to 1934. In 1935, he was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Volga Military District. Between 1936 and 1937, he

attended the Frunze General Staff Academy and taught tactics there for several months.

Vasilevsky was then attached to the General Staff as chief of the Operations Training Section. Admitted to the Communist Party as a full member in 1938, he was deputy chief of operations of the General Staff in 1939 and 1940, and then chief of the Operational Department in 1941. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, Vasilevsky became invaluable to *Stavka* (the Soviet High Command) in his visits to and coordination of the various military fronts. Only General Georgy Zhukov, with whom he worked out the successful 1942–1943 Soviet winter offensives, was more active in this regard. Appointed chief of the General Staff in June 1942, Vasilevsky was promoted to full general in January 1943, and to marshal of the Soviet Union in February 1943.

Vasilevsky coordinated the Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts (army groups) from Kursk through the advance from the Dnieper River to the Dniester and Prut rivers. He subsequently coordinated operations for the First Baltic and Second Belorussian fronts in East Prussia. In February 1945, he stepped down as chief of the General Staff to take command of the Third Belorussian Front following the death of its commander, General Ivan Cherniakhovsky.

Less volatile than Zhukov, Vasilevsky is said to have been a “rational influence” on Josef Stalin, who selected him in July 1945 for the singular honor of being the first Soviet theater commander against the Japanese. Vasilevsky’s Manchurian campaign was a lightning operation that required the coordination of three fronts from three directions, with the object of penetrating into central Manchuria to destroy the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army. The campaign was a complete success.

In November 1948, Vasilevsky was reappointed chief of the General Staff, and in

March 1949, he became minister of defense. He retired from public life following Stalin’s death in March 1953. Vasilevsky was one of 11 Soviets to receive the five-star ruby Order of Victory and was twice named Hero of the Soviet Union. He published his war memoirs, *Delo Vsei Zhizni* (“A Lifelong Cause”), in 1973. The work revealed Stalin’s failure to follow the recommendations of his military advisers in the opening and disastrous stages of the German invasion. Vasilevsky died on December 5, 1977, and was interred in the Kremlin wall in Moscow.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Cherniakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich (1906–1945); Frunze Academy; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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Vatutin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1901–1944)

Soviet army general who, as commander of the Voronezh Front, played a major role in the 1943 Battle of Kursk.

Born in Chepukhino, Russia, near Belgorod, on December 16, 1901, Nikolai Vatutin enlisted in the Red Army in April 1920 and joined the Bolshevik Party in 1921. He



Marshal of the Soviet Union and commander of the First Ukrainian Front, Nikolai F. Vatutin. (Corbis)

graduated in turn from the Poltava Infantry School (1922), the Frunze Military Academy (1929), and the General Staff Academy (1937). Vatutin served as chief of staff of the Kiev Military District and went to Poland in 1939 as chief of staff of the Ukrainian Front (army group). He next served on the General Staff Operations Directorate, and by June 1940, he was the first deputy chief of the General Staff.

Shortly after the German army invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Vatutin became chief of staff of the Northwestern Front. In September 1941, he represented *Stavka* (the Soviet High Command) at Leningrad. In the critical defense of Moscow, he served as chief of staff to General Ivan Konev, commanding an operational group. Winning recognition in the Soviet winter counteroffensive, Vatutin returned to the Northwestern Front and remained with it until May 1942, when he went back to his post with the General Staff in Moscow. He then commanded the collapsing Voronezh

Front, which lost Voronezh in early July 1942, although he was promoted to colonel general less than a week later.

Vatutin received command of the new Southwestern Front at Stalingrad in October 1942. The next month, his men drove 75 miles in three days on the north side of the double envelopment of the Sixth German Army at Stalingrad. Vatutin then commanded the outer encirclement forces and advanced into the Donets Basin to fight Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Fourth Panzer Army.

Promoted to general of the army in February 1943, Vatutin boldly advanced his forces at great cost to the outskirts of Zaporozhe before being struck by Manstein's counterattack. He commanded the Voronezh Front and stopped Manstein's attack in the July 1943 Battle of Kursk with the help of the reserve Steppe Front. He brought his front across the Dnieper, where it became the First Ukrainian Front on October 20. The front recaptured Kiev on the night of November 4–5, 1943, and participated in the Korsun-Shevchenkivsky

operation that encircled 57,000 Germans in the Cherkassy Bulge.

On February 29, 1944, Vatutin was shot and seriously wounded by Bandera guerrillas (Ukrainian partisans) in the Korotzen area, 75 miles north of Kiev, while on a trip to visit his Sixtieth Army. He died on April 15, 1944, in Kiev. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov, who had been his *Stavka* coordinator, admired Vatutin's industry and strategic thinking.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Frunze Academy; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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
Vienna, Congress of (September 1814–1815)

The Congress of Vienna addressed the issues facing Europe after the upheavals of the Napoleonic Wars. One of the most important objectives was to end the conflicts over

boundaries in Europe. Other concerns revolved around the nationalism and liberalism stirred by the French Revolution. The preservation of monarchies was a key tenet, but the participants also hoped to establish a balance of power that would lead to a lasting peace.

The Congress largely consisted of informal discussions between the Great Powers. Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich of Austria served as the principal negotiator for the Habsburg Empire, as well as chairman of the Congress. Viscount Castlereagh; Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington; and the Earl of Clacarty each represented England in turn, while Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode and Prince Karl August von Hardenberg headed the Russian and Prussian delegations, respectively. Both Czar Alexander I and King Frederick William III attended the conference, but only Alexander took on a public role. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord represented France, circumventing early attempts to exclude him. More than 200 other nations were also present during the Congress; while they clearly did not have the influence of the five major powers, it made for a lively social scene. The Congress lasted from September 1814 to June 1815.

The Great Powers had settled some border disputes in the Treaty of Paris (May 1814) and the Treaty of Kiel (January 1814). The Congress of Vienna confirmed these redrawn borders and made further adjustments to maintain a balance of power. The Duchy of Warsaw, for instance, was a Napoleonic vassal state created from sections of Prussia and Russia. Both countries claimed the duchy, but a compromise divided the territory. The Russians received the greater part, which was transformed into the Kingdom of Poland (albeit under Russian rule). Russia also retained the territories of Finland (taken from Sweden in 1808), and Bessarabia (captured from the Ottomans in 1812). Other territorial changes, such as adding Westphalia



Delegates assemble at the Congress of Vienna, held from September 1814 to June 1815, to restore the balance of power in Europe after the fall of French emperor Napoleon I. (Library of Congress)

and the northern Rhineland to Prussia and the enlargement of the Netherlands, aimed at the containment of France. The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, signed on June 9, 1815, also created a German Confederation from the remains of the Holy Roman Empire, in an attempt to stabilize central Europe.

The Congress also provided for further meetings of the Great Powers to preserve the peace of Europe, the so-called Concert of Europe. Czar Alexander I augmented this with his own creation, the Holy Alliance, which was dedicated to preserving Christian, monarchic principles in Europe. While the Congress has been widely criticized for suppressing civil liberties and ignoring ethnic and national boundaries, it did function to keep the general peace in Europe for nearly a century.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Holy Alliance (1815); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815)

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Vietnam War(s), Soviet Union and (1945–1975)

The Soviet Union's involvement in the Vietnam Wars—both the French Indochina War (1945–1954) and the American War (1961–1975)—was governed more by its

international interests and the rivalry with Red China than by ideological affinity with the Vietnamese Communists. Ho Chi Minh and his followers, although grateful for the help Red China and the Soviets provided them, distrusted their communist allies.

Ho began his career as a revolutionary nationalist in 1913 seeking to free Vietnam (then part of French Indochina) from French rule. He was drawn to communism and the Russian Revolution by Lenin's promise to support third world, anticolonialist movements. When he travelled to the Soviet Union in 1923, however, Ho found little interest in his message after Lenin's death. Nevertheless, in 1924 the Communist International (Comintern) sent Ho to Hong Kong where, with Soviet funding, he founded the Indochinese Communist Party. For several years thereafter, Ho traveled between the USSR and southern China. Plagued by the suspicions of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin that he was too independent, Ho received virtually no help from the USSR.

During World War II, the USSR, consumed by the war against Nazi Germany, ignored communist movements in Asia. However, the upheavals caused by the war presented Ho and his lieutenants with an opening to develop an indigenous revolutionary movement. In January 1941, in a cave near the Chinese border, Ho and several of his followers founded the Revolution League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh for short). Ironically, they received more support from the United States than from the Soviet Union. The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), looking for movements willing to fight the Japanese, contacted Ho in March 1945 and offered him arms and money.

From 1943 on, the Viet Minh grew rapidly, particularly in the northern areas of Vietnam (Tonkin), largely because of the

brutal policies of the Japanese and pro-Vichy French authorities. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Viet Minh controlled most of the area between the Red River and the Chinese frontier. Ho was strong enough to proclaim the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Hanoi on September 2, 1945.

The Vietnamese Communists were unique in that they seized control of an indigenous third world independence movement. Nevertheless, in the early postwar years, they were weak and isolated. Stalin and the Soviet leadership continued to be indifferent. In 1945 and 1946, Stalin's priorities were the consolidation of Soviet control in eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. As in the 1930s, Stalin was suspicious of Ho's independence. Even the French Communist Party, anxious to appear patriotic to the French electorate, initially ignored Ho's pleas for support. Washington also tacitly supported France.

The onset of all-out war in Indochina in January 1947 and the development of the Cold War hardened divisions on both sides and prompted the Soviets to reconsider their stance toward Indochina. The French Communists moved into opposition to the Indochina War in 1947. The turning point came in 1949, when the Chinese Civil War ended in victory for Mao Tse-Tung's Communists over the Nationalist regime and with the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). With the arrival of Chinese Communist troops on the China/Vietnam frontier, the way was open for direct aid to the Viet Minh and a radical change in the balance of forces in the war itself.

Red China granted the Viet Minh diplomatic recognition on January 6, 1950. Stalin, not wanting to lose prestige to Mao and seeking to expand Soviet influence in Asia, did the same on January 30. The outbreak of

the Korean War in June 1950 strengthened these trends in Soviet policy. Between January 1950 and March 1953 the Korean War competed with Indochina for Sino-Soviet resources. Perceiving the wars in Indochina and Korea as part of a wider Soviet conspiracy to dominate Asia, the United States moved from tacit support for the French to direct material support. The Indochina War had become a battlefield in the Cold War.

Despite the Korean War, enough Communist-bloc aid flowed to the Viet Minh to help them make major gains in northern Laos, and central and southern Vietnam. Viet Minh troops virtually excluded French forces from the area around the Sino-Vietnam border. Most of the Soviet military aid came through the Chinese. Military hardware included American-made small arms and artillery Mao's forces seized from the defeated Nationalists but also rugged Soviet-made Molotova trucks, 37-millimeter antiaircraft guns, and Katyusha multiple-rocket launchers. Chinese advisors provided training in sanctuaries in southern China. These advantages became apparent as General Vo Nguyen Giap's forces lay siege to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in northwest Vietnam in the spring of 1954. Despite American help, it was increasingly apparent the French were losing the war.

Despite Viet Minh's successes, the Soviets and the Chinese did not desire a confrontation with the West in Indochina. With Stalin's death in March 1953 and the end of the Korean War that July, both communist powers sought improved relations with the United States and its allies. It was in this context that representatives of the United States, Britain, France, the USSR, and Red China met in Geneva in May 1954. The Soviets and the Chinese bluntly advised the DRV delegation that they would have to accept a partition of Vietnam pending unification

elections and to withdraw Viet Minh forces from southern Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Ho reluctantly agreed. Despite the spectacular Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu, they were exhausted and in no position to defy their allies.

Between 1954 and 1959, Moscow did little to encourage any insurgency in South Vietnam. Détente with the West remained their priority. The Soviets did nothing when the American-supported regime in Saigon, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, blocked the unification elections scheduled for 1956. Moscow pressured Hanoi to exercise restraint even though Diem was vigorously pursuing southern communists who had remained in their home districts following the Geneva peace.

The Soviets provided some 200 million rubles in aid to North Vietnam between 1953 and 1964—most of which was economic. The Central Intelligence Agency estimated Soviet military aid during the same period at 70 million rubles. Most military aid went to help the North Vietnamese Army to modernize. When Hanoi decided to support a guerrilla insurgency in South Vietnam in 1959, it sent small cadres of mostly southern-born organizers to their home districts. The southern insurgents (known as the Viet Cong) depended mostly on American weapons captured from the South Vietnamese. The Soviets provided no direct aid.

As the second Vietnam War intensified and American involvement deepened with the dispatch of military "advisors" by the administration of John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s, the Soviets maintained a low profile. They continuously sought to restrain Ho and the North Vietnamese leadership. In the summer of 1961, in the midst of a dangerous crisis in Berlin, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev declined Ho's invitation to visit Hanoi. Again, in January 1964, the Soviets bluntly warned a high-level North

Vietnamese delegation visiting Moscow not to provoke direct American military intervention. Between 1961 and 1964, both to mollify their ally while minimizing damage to Soviet-American relations, the Soviets sent North Vietnam limited military aid in the form of East German-made weapons (mostly small arms and artillery).

Events outside of Vietnam transformed the Vietnamese conflict. President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 brought the more hawkish Lyndon Johnson to the presidency, Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 by a clique led by Leonid Brezhnev in October 1964 brought a more aggressive leadership to the Kremlin. Finally, the commencement of American bombing of North Vietnam and the deployment of American combat troops to South Vietnam in March 1965 propelled the United States directly into the war and obliged the Soviets to take action to avoid losing their credibility in the communist world, to strengthen their influence in North Vietnam and Asia vis-à-vis the Chinese, and to mollify the "hawks" among the Soviet leadership.

Moscow's military presence in North Vietnam grew accordingly. Between January 1965 and March 1967, the USSR delivered an estimated \$675 million in military aid to North Vietnam. Over the course of the entire war, almost 85 percent of Soviet military aid came in the form of air defense systems including surface-to-air missiles, sophisticated radar systems, antiaircraft artillery, and MiG 21 jet fighters. The Soviets also sent nearly 10,000 technicians and advisors to North Vietnam over the same period. Initially, the Soviets offered Hanoi pilots and maintenance crews with the MiGs but Hanoi preferred its own crews. The Soviets agreed to bring them to the USSR for training.

With these strengthened air defenses, the North Vietnamese inflicted heavy losses

on American planes and aircrews, making airstrikes more costly and less effective. Soviet- and Chinese-made trucks—along with thousands of Chinese and Vietnamese laborers who widened the roads in North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos—facilitated the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and material into South Vietnam and helped Hanoi increase its control and direction of the war. In the war's latter stages between 1965 and 1975, additional aid including heavy tanks and artillery enhanced the communist forces' conventional capabilities and was instrumental in their massive "Easter Offensive" in the spring of 1972 and the subsequent "victory" offensive in spring 1975, which brought about the final collapse of South Vietnam.

Internationally, the Vietnam War stimulated a return to more revolutionary Leninist tendencies in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow stepped up its encouragement of "wars of national liberation" and increased aid to sympathetic governments and revolutionary movements in the Third World. Soviet diplomacy regarding the Vietnam War, however, remained ambivalent. Although they welcomed the diversion of U.S. resources away from Europe and the build-up of strategic forces that directly threatened the USSR, the Soviets feared an escalation of the war that might draw the United States and the USSR into a direct confrontation.

The Soviets did not participate directly in the Paris peace talks that began in spring 1968 but continually urged Hanoi and the National Liberation negotiators to be flexible. To their continuing frustration, Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho and the North Vietnamese delegation stubbornly refused to make any serious concessions to the United States. President Richard M. Nixon, who took office in January 1969, linked improved Soviet-U.S. relations to a perceived

Soviet ability to force Hanoi into a more flexible stance on issues such as NVA regulars in South Vietnam, prisoners of war, and recognition of the Saigon government, but the Soviets did not have any such leverage with their Vietnamese allies.

Neither the Soviets nor the United States allowed the war to get in the way of talks aimed at Strategic Arms Limitation. Although Moscow condemned the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, the Operation **LINEBACKER** raids against North Vietnam that President Nixon launched in the wake of North Vietnam's March 1972 offensive against the South, and the Christmas bombings that Nixon ordered that December, the Soviets did not allow these developments to scuttle détente with the Americans.

In the end, the massive aid the USSR provided the Vietnamese Communists did little to further Soviet control of North Vietnam's war effort or of Hanoi's strategy or diplomacy. Following the communist victory in spring 1975, the strategic benefits to the Soviet Union were minimal. The Soviet rivalry with Red China in Southeast Asia influenced policy in Southeast Asia and was the primary factor in the USSR's maintenance of its status as communist Vietnam's main benefactor. Soviet influence, however, did not prevent war between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge (Cambodia's communist movement)-dominated state in Cambodia between 1975 and 1988. The Soviet Union risked much but gained little in Vietnam.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Chinese Civil War (1911–1949); Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Korean War (1950–1954); Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Vistula River (Warsaw), Battle of the (September 29–October 31, 1914)

At the outbreak of World War I, Russian forces failed in their attempts to conquer East Prussia in August and early September 1914. They fared better in Galicia, as Russian forces forced the Austro-Hungarian armies out of that region and ruled over eastern (Austrian) Galicia for a period of almost nine months, beginning in September 1914.

In late September 1914, Russian mobilization reached peak strength. The Russian Army was well provisioned with arms and equipment. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolae-vich, commander in chief of all Russian forces, at a conference at Kholm (south of St. Petersburg) on September 22 called for a new offensive on the Eastern Front to begin in mid-October. Morale in the Russian Army was high, as the victories over the Austro-Hungarian armies eased the memories of the disastrous East Prussian campaign and the losses to the Germans at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes during the opening months of World War I. Grand Duke Nikolai's plan called for a frontal attack against Austria-Hungary on the Galician Front and

against the Germans in Western Poland. The Russian forces would then advance into the German industrial region of Upper Silesia and deal a crushing blow to the German war effort. With Germany demoralized and reeling, the forces of Austria-Hungary could be easily crushed by a strengthened Russian Army. The Austro-Hungarian forces under the command of Colonel General Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, would face utter defeat at the end of September 1914.

Six Russian armies under the command of General Nikolai Iudovich Ivanov and containing around 1.5 million men faced off against four Austro-Hungarian armies and one German army, numbering approximately 500,000 men in total, in these sectors. The Austro-Hungarian forces were in disarray and regrouping after being defeated by the Russians in the Battle of Galicia in late August and early September. The opening Russian assault hit the four Habsburg armies in western Galicia and initially pushed them back to a line running from Lodz in the north to Tarnów in the south. The Austro-Hungarian armies successfully fought a holding action in the Krakow-Tarnów-Gorlice sector, however, while Przemyśl held out against the oncoming Russian forces. Russian armies were unable to properly coordinate their attacks thereafter, and they fell back to the Vistula River by November 1. One of the main reasons the Austro-Hungarian forces had been able to hold the line though, was German success in the north.

Colonel General Viktor Dankl von Krasnik commanded the Austro-Hungarian forces in western Galicia and Colonel General Paul von Hindenburg commanded the German forces in Silesia. Hindenburg ordered the newly formed Ninth Army, under Colonel General August von Mackensen, to attack the Russian forces in the northwest corner

of Poland to help relieve the beleaguered Austro-Hungarian forces in the south. The initial Russian gains of late September and early October crumbled as the Germans advanced, reaching the Vistula River by October 9. The German Ninth Army under Mackensen reached within 12 miles of Warsaw. The Central Powers' attack stalled there, however, because of inferior numbers, supply problems, exhaustion, and unfamiliarity with the terrain. Mackensen's force had lost approximately 40,000 men in their drive to Warsaw, and Hindenburg ordered a retreat starting on October 17. By the end of October, the Germans had withdrawn to their initial starting points and were preparing to repel a Russian offensive into Silesia.

The result of the Battle of the Vistula River was a Russian tactical victory but a strategic defeat. Both the Russians and the Austro-Hungarian forces suffered at least 250,000 casualties and almost 100,000 prisoners each in the fighting. German losses added 250,000 to the total of casualties for these two months. The lack of coordination between the Central Powers' forces, and the resulting poor performance in the months of September and October led to a new joint command for the Austro-Hungarian and German forces on November 1, 1914.

The Battle of the Vistula River was one in a series of battles designed by all three combatants to be the decisive battle to end the war. Neither the Russians nor the Central Powers were able to achieve a strategic breakthrough, however, and this battle just proved to be one in a long, bloody series of clashes that bled all armies white and dispelled the myth of a quick end to World War I.

Jason M. Sokiera

See also: Casualties, Russian, World War I (1914–1917); Galicia, Battle of (1914); Masurian Lakes, First Battle of (September 8–15,

1914); Przemyśl, Siege of (September 24, 1914–March 22, 1915); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Vitgeft, Villem (Vilgelm) Karlovich (1847–1904)

Russian naval officer and commander of the Port Arthur naval squadron during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905).

Born in Odessa on October 14, 1847, Vitgeft graduated from the Russian Naval Academy in 1868, and after circumnavigating the globe as an officer candidate, became a warrant officer in 1870. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1873, and underwent training in naval mines. In 1885, Vitgeft was promoted to captain second rank, and given command of the gunboat *Groza*. After a stint as chief inspector of naval mines, he commanded the torpedo gunboat *Voevoda* in 1892, and was promoted to captain first rank in 1894. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1899, and served as the head of the naval department in the Russian Far East under Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. On April 1, 1904, two months after the Russo-Japanese War began, Vitgeft

was appointed chief of naval staff for the Supreme Command in the Far East. He served only two weeks in that post before replacing Vice Admiral Stepan Makarov, who was killed in battle, as commander of the Port Arthur Squadron.

Where Makarov had been an aggressive commander who sought to infuse the sailors of Port Arthur with a fighting spirit, Vitgeft was passive. He was Alekseev's third choice, appointed only because other commanders could not reach Port Arthur; at the first meeting of his staff, Vitgeft confessed he felt unsuited to the post. Under his direction, the Russian naval squadron remained safely anchored under the guns of the Port Arthur fortifications until mid-June 1904, when Vitgeft reluctantly attempted to escape to Vladivostok and join the rest of the Russian Pacific Squadron. The attempt was half-hearted, as Vitgeft ordered his vessels back to port shortly after sighting the Japanese fleet. A second attempt on August 10, made under pressure from Alekseev, led to the Battle of the Yellow Sea and Vitgeft's death.

His flagship, the battleship *Tsarevich*, was hit by several Japanese shells as the indecisive battle came to a close; Vitgeft, standing on the deck during the long-distance exchange of fire, was struck and killed by shrapnel. His chief of staff, Rear Admiral Nikolai Matusevich, and the ship's helmsman were wounded in the explosion, and the *Tsarevich* wheeled about aimlessly. Lacking direction, the Russian squadron headed back to Port Arthur, continuing Vitgeft's legacy of passivity.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alekseev, Evgeny I. (1843–1917); Makarov, Stepan Ossipovich (1848–1904); Port Arthur; Port Arthur, Siege of (May 26, 1904–January 2, 1905); Russo-Japanese War

(1904–1905); Tsushima, Battle of (May 27, 1905); Vladivostok

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Vladivostok

Founded in 1860, Vladivostok is a city (current population 663,000) and port in the Far East, located at the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian Railway on the Muravyov-Amursky Peninsula and the Sea of Japan. The name is derived from the Russian for “conquer the east.” The city gained significance as an important harbor for trade with inner Asia, a supply base for expeditions into Siberia, and as military bridgehead in wars since 1875, when it became a military fort.

In World War I, Allied states shipped military equipment, weapons, supplies, and troops to the Eastern Front through Vladivostok since 1914. After the abdication of the czar in March 1917, the Provisional Government pledged to continue the allied effort. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power, however, and took Russia out of the war, endangering the Allies' position on the Western Front.

When the United States entered the war in April 1917, Vladivostok had become an important supply port, processing technical, military, and economic supplies. Now the United States shifted its support to “White,” anti-Bolshevik troops in an effort to reestablish an eastern front in Europe. Even after the war in Europe ended, Allied intervention

supplied through Vladivostok continued in an attempt to defeat Bolshevism.

During World War II, the harbor was of great importance to assignment of cargo shipped from the United States to the USSR under the Allied Lend-Lease Agreement. Its location on the Pacific Ocean, far away from German bomber commands, provided a short, safe transfer of American weaponry and army supplies to the Soviet Union. About one-fourth of the war material and oil tankers provided to the Soviet Union was processed through Vladivostok by 1941. After the United States entered the war in December 1941, only freighters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet headquartered at Vladivostok, delivered between the United States and USSR and made this route a principal sea lane of the Lend-Lease exchange. Since 1945, the continued presence of the Soviet and Russian flotillas has emphasized the importance of the city and harbor.

Vladivostok is still the largest Russian port on the Pacific Ocean and a vital economic hub in the Pacific realm, linking to North American markets to the east and to the rising Asian economic powers to the south. In 2012, Vladivostok hosted the 24th Summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The harbor will likely be one of the most important hubs for transnational economic development in the Pacific region.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922); Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); February (March) Revolution (1917); Japanese Intervention in Siberia (1918–1922); Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (1881–1970); Lend-Lease (March 1941–August 1945); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Trans-Siberian Railway; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Vlasov, Andrei Andreevich (1901–1946)

Soviet army general who headed the German-sponsored Russian Liberation Army.

Born December 16, 1901, in Chepukhimo, Nizhni-Novgorod Province, Russia (now Kursk Oblast), Andrei Vlasov fought in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. In 1928, he attended a course in infantry tactics in Moscow, and two years later, he became an instructor at the Leningrad Artillery Officers' School. Between 1937 and 1938, Vlasov was a military adviser in China to Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). He returned to the Soviet Union and, as a major general, led the 90th Infantry Division into Bessarabia.

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Vlasov assumed command of IV Mechanized Corps in delaying actions around Przemyśl and L'viv (Lvov). In August, he had charge of Thirty-Seventh Army in the defense of Kiev. In December 1941, Vlasov, now a lieutenant general, commanded the reinforced Twentieth Army before Moscow and was regarded as one of the principal heroes of the battle that drove the Germans from the Soviet capital city. In January 1942, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Vlasov was one of Josef Stalin's favorite generals, and in March 1942, the Soviet

dictator sent him to beleaguered Leningrad as second in command of the new Volkhov Front (army group). The next month, Vlasov took over the Second Guards Army. Under heavy German attack, their supply lines severed, he and his unit were surrounded. Stalin had denied permission to retreat until it was too late. Vlasov ordered his troops to split into small units and fend for themselves. He himself was taken prisoner in July 1942.

Vlasov's hatred of Stalin for his disastrous mismanagement of the military situation led German intelligence officers to seek his cooperation in heading an army of Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) committed to fight against the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet POWs were already serving as auxiliaries to the German army in non-combat roles, many of them simply trying to stay alive. Vlasov worked out a political program for a non-Communist Russian state, but this flew in the face of Adolf Hitler's policy of subjugating and colonizing the Soviet Union. Although German intelligence officers proceeded to create the Russian Liberation Army (*Russkaia Osvoboditel'naia Armia*; ROA), Hitler refused it any combat role, and it became a device only to encourage Red Army desertions.

German SS chief Heinrich Himmler met with Vlasov in September 1944 and promised him a combat role. Himmler also arranged for the creation of the multi-ethnic Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, which was announced in Prague that November. Two divisions of the ROA came into being, one of which was sent along the Oder River in mid-April 1945 but retreated before the Red Army. The "Vlasov Army" then changed sides. Cooperating with the Czech resistance, it helped liberate Prague and disarmed 10,000 German soldiers, hoping to be recognized by the Western Allies.

At the end of the war, Soviet authorities demanded Vlasov's return in accordance with repatriation agreements reached at the Yalta Conference, and on May 12, 1945, U.S. units handed him over, together with other ROA POWs. On August 13, 1946, the Soviet Supreme Court condemned Vlasov as a "German collaborator" and an "enemy of the Russian people" and imposed the death penalty. He was executed the same day.

*Eva-Maria Stolberg and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Vlasov Army

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Vlasov Army

Soviet citizens who served during World War II in the German forces against the Stalin regime generally or, more precisely, the

few military organizations actually under General Andrei A. Vlasov's command.

The story of the Soviet citizens in the German forces is complex. Generally, Adolf Hitler and other Nazi leaders opposed military recruitment in the Soviet Union because they planned to exterminate much of the population and enslave the survivors. Even Hitler tolerated some recruitment, however, especially from minority groups, such as the Georgians.

Nevertheless, thousands of Soviet citizens entered the German forces, often covertly. Estimates of their number vary considerably. A figure of 1 million is often cited. Enlistment went through several stages. By early 1942, large numbers of Soviet nationals had joined the German forces because of their anticommunist convictions, or because of the utter destitution they faced in either the occupied Soviet Union or German prison camps.

For some time, the Third Reich did little to exploit the political possibilities of the fact that many Soviet nationals were willing to assist the Germans. A significant change came in late 1942, after the capture of Soviet General Andrei A. Vlasov, who wanted to lead a movement allied with Germany to oppose the Soviet government. For propaganda purposes, the Germans began to portray Vlasov as the leader of such a movement, but the reality was quite different.

Formations of Soviet nationals were rarely organized above the battalion level, and those battalions mostly were kept behind the front line. As the Germans retreated from the Soviet Union, desertions of Soviet nationals to the partisans increased. On October 10, 1943, Hitler therefore ordered the abolition of many units, and the transfer of those deemed trustworthy out of the Soviet Union to other occupied areas, such as France. This order was not implemented wholly, but many transfers did occur.

In 1944, as the Axis military situation worsened, the Vlasov movement received more favorable consideration. Even archrascal Heinrich Himmler began to support Vlasov, although insincerely. Meanwhile, Vlasov had become more receptive to a larger degree of autonomy, but not independence, for the minority peoples of the Soviet Union. Conflict between anti-Soviet Russians and minority group members had been a stumbling block to effective action against Stalin.

The 599th Infantry Brigade, and the 600th and 650th infantry divisions of the German army, made up of Russians, became part of the Russian Liberation Army—*Russkaia Osvoboditel'naia Armiia* (ROA)—under the command of General Vlasov, in 1944–1945. Only the 600th division went into battle. In an effort to win favor with the Western Allies, the Vlasov Army assisted Czech forces that had risen against the Germans in Prague in May 1945.

Despite this action and the army's surrender to the U.S. troops, its members were repatriated to the Soviet Union. Vlasov Army leaders, including General Vlasov, were executed, and Vlasov's followers spent years at hard labor.

Benjamin R. Beede

See also: Cold War, Soviet Union in (1924–1991); Vlasov, Andrei Andreevich (1901–1946); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Voronov, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1899–1968)

Soviet army marshal who became the commander of artillery in 1943. Born in Saint Petersburg on May 5, 1899, Nikolai Voronov joined the Red Army in 1918 and the Bolshevik Party in 1919. A specialist in artillery, he rose to command a battery during the Russian Civil War. He was taken prisoner during the 1920 war with Poland. Voronov then held a variety of assignments that included both battalion and regimental commands.

Voronov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1930 and served as director of the Leningrad Artillery Officers' School from 1934 to 1936. He was a military adviser to the Republican side in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War and commanded the artillery of a front during the 1939–1940 Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). A favorite of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, Voronov served as chief of artillery of the Soviet army, deputy commander of the artillery directorate, and commander of national air defense forces, as well as assistant commissar of defense.

As commander of artillery from 1943, Voronov played a key role in planning all major Soviet campaigns. To maximize artillery effectiveness, he insisted on concentrating artillery rather than scattering it among smaller units. Voronov introduced both artillery divisions and artillery brigades for assault divisions, and he pushed mechanization. He was decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union, and in 1943, became the first of three officers promoted during the war to the rank of marshal of artillery. Voronov served as commander of Soviet artillery until 1950.

Voronov became a strong advocate of military missiles and, as president of the Academy of Artillery Sciences between 1950 and

1953, he oversaw the development of strategic nuclear weapons. He then commanded the Artillery Academy until his retirement in 1958. Voronov died in Moscow on February 28, 1968.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze Academy; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

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Vorontsov, Mikhail S. (1782–1856)

Mikhail Vorontsov was born into a prominent Russian family of princes, the son of Général-en-chef Semen Vorontsov, Russian ambassador to London. He began service in 1786 and rose to sublieutenant in 1801. After serving in the Caucasus, he served with General Tolstoy's corps in Pomerania in 1805. In 1806–1807, he served in Poland and distinguished himself at the battles of Pultusk (promoted to colonel on January 26, 1807) and Friedland. In late 1807, Vorontsov took command of the 1st Battalion of the elite Life Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment. Two years later, he was appointed chief of the Narva Musketeer Regiment in the Army of Moldavia and fought the Turks at Bazardjik (promoted to major general on June 26, 1810), Shumla, Ruse, and Viddin.

In early 1812, Vorontsov was given command of the 2nd Grenadier Division in Prince Pyotr Bagration's Second Western Army. As Napoleon's *Grande Armée* invaded Russia, Vorontsov participated in Bagration's fighting retreat and fought at Saltanovka, Smolensk, and Borodino, where he lost two-thirds of his division defending the fleches and was seriously wounded. After recuperating, he took command of the advance guard of the Third Western Army and fought at Bromberg, Rogazen, and Poznan in early 1813; for his exploits, Vorontsov was promoted to lieutenant general on February 20, 1813. In 1813–1814, he served in the Army of the North and finished the war triumphantly in Paris.

After Napoleon's abdication, Vorontsov commanded the Russian Occupation Corps in France, where he remained for three years. He was appointed the governor general of Novorossiysk and the viceroy of Bessarabia on May 19, 1823, and played an important role in the economic revival of this region. In 1828–1829, he participated in the Russo-Turkish War.

In 1845, Vorontsov became the viceroy and commander in chief of the Russian troops in the Caucasus. Over the next 10 years, he undertook many administrative and social reforms in the Transcaucasian provinces, and launched massive offensives against the Chechens led by Imam Shamil. Vorontsov received the title of prince on April 14, 1852. Two years later, he resigned from all his positions and returned to private life, although during the coronation of Emperor Alexander II on September 5, 1856, he was granted the rank of general field marshal. Vorontsov passed away in November 1856 and was buried at the Preobrazhensky Cathedral in Odessa (Ukraine).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812; Saltanovka, Battle of (July 23, 1812); Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18, 1812); Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829)

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Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963)

Head of state, politburo member, marshal of the Soviet Union. Born near Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine on February 4, 1881, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, the son of a railway worker, went to work in a steel mill at age 15. Three years later, he was fired and arrested for organizing a strike, after which he moved to Lugansk, joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903, and led another strike two years later. He met Josef Stalin in 1906, developing a friendship that remained steadfast and served him well until shortly before Stalin's death in 1953. In 1907, Voroshilov attended the Fifth Party Congress of the Communist Party in London. Over the next seven years, he was arrested and exiled several times, during which he married Ekaterina Davidovna, whom he met in Arkhangel'sk. Later they adopted a four-year-old boy and the children of Mikhail Frunze, after his death.

Following military service in World War I and the overthrow of the monarchy in 1917, Voroshilov was named commissar of Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and helped form the *Cheka*—the Soviet secret police. He gained

military acclaim in 1918 when he led the Red Army in Lugansk through German lines to relieve the Reds at Tsaritsyn. His forces formed the core of the Tenth Army that he led with Stalin for the rest of the Civil War.

After helping crush the Kronstadt revolt in 1921, Voroshilov became a member of the Central Committee that same year. In 1925, he was given the chief military post, commissar for military and naval affairs (later commissar for defense). Over the next 15 years, he was principally responsible for modernizing the Red Army and for moving war industries east, measures that allowed the Soviets to defeat the German invasion in World War II.

In 1926, Voroshilov became a member of the politburo, a position he held for over three decades. In 1935, he was made a marshal of the Soviet Union. He demonstrated his loyalty to Stalin by taking an active role in the military purges of 1937, attacking his opponents and ordering the execution of many.

At the beginning of World War II, in 1939, Voroshilov commanded the invasion of Finland, where the Red Army suffered at least 125,000 casualties, resulting in his removal as commissar of defense in 1940. When the Germans invaded in June 1941, he commanded the short-lived Northwest Direction, then, a few months later, the Leningrad Front. Despite displaying considerable personal bravery, he failed to prevent the city's encirclement and on September 8, 1941, was replaced by General Georgy Zhukov. Nonetheless, he continued to serve in senior positions throughout the war including as a member of the Committee for Defense, which ran the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944. He travelled to Tehran with Stalin in 1943 to plan the Soviet's entry into the war against Japan.

After the war, Voroshilov was named director of the Allied Control Commission

in Hungary and, from 1945 to 1947, organized the country's formation of a Communist government. Having apparently fallen into disfavor with Stalin by 1953, Voroshilov was most likely saved by the premier's death. He succeeded Stalin in part, ironically, becoming chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in March 1953. At that time, Nikita Khrushchev was approved as first secretary of the Communist Party. In 1957, Voroshilov took part in an attempt to oust Khrushchev, who thereafter expelled most of the old Stalinists from government. Voroshilov survived but on May 7, 1960, he retired as chairman of the Presidium and two months later was removed from the Party Presidium, the successor to the politburo. In October 1961, he was excluded from the Central Committee, ending his 40-year term; however, he was reappointed to that body in 1966 when Leonid Brezhnev came to power.

Voroshilov died on December 2, 1969, in Moscow and was buried with a full state funeral in the Kremlin wall necropolis. During his lifetime Voroshilov was awarded numerous honors, including the Order of the Red Banner six times, the Order of Lenin eight times, Hero of Socialist Labor, and Hero of the Soviet Union twice. Other honors included the naming of the KV series of World War II tanks after him.

Kevin S. Bemel

See also: *Cheka (Chrezvychaynayakomissiya)*; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945); Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

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A favorite of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov was nonetheless an inept commander during World War II. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

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Vorotinsky, Prince Mikhail Ivanovich (1516?–1573)

Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotinsky was a prince, statesman, and a military leader in the realm

of Muscovy. He served as a high-ranking army commander, was elevated to the status of boyar (noble), and enjoyed the honorary title of *sluga gosudarev* (server of the czar) given by the czar only to his closest associates. Vorotinsky was among the close advisors to Czar Ivan IV (“the Terrible,” 1530–1584).

A descendant of the Chernigov Ruriks, Vorotinsky was the son of the prominent Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotinsky (died 1535). Vorotinsky’s father turned to the service to Grand Prince Ivan III (1440–1505) after the family estate fell into the possession of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under Grand Prince Vasily III (1479–1533), Ivan Vorotinsky occupied a high position in the Grand Prince’s court (*dvor*). In the Muscovite society of the 16th century, where hereditary rule was a major factor in determining the social and service ranks of state and military officials, the noble origins of Ivan Vorotinsky and his service achievements (he was also granted a title of *sluga gosudarev*) played a major role in the advancement of Mikhail Vorotinsky’s career.

The exact date of birth of Vorotinsky is disputed, and could be as early as 1510. More recent historians, however, are inclined to use a later date, closer to 1516. The first historical mention of Vorotinsky is found in the military “deployment books” (*Razriadnye knigi*) as a *voevoda* (regimental commander) of the town of Belev in 1543. Among the major early sources that mention his military and political activities are the records of the Russian-Polish and Russian-Swedish diplomatic relations and chronicles (*Nikonovskaya letopis*, *Piskarevskii letopisets*, and *Solovetskii letopisets*). Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbsky, a contemporary, wrote about Vorotinsky in his *History of the Grand Prince of Moscow*.

The two main campaigns of Vorotinsky’s military career are the Siege of Kazan (1552), which led to the fall of the Kazan Khanate;

and the Battle of Molodi (1572), the decisive military action in the long-standing war between Muscovy and the Crimean Khanate. At Kazan, Vorotinsky led the siege and capture of the city. His division was the first to break into the city, capturing the Arskaia Tower and leading the fall of Kazan as the khanate’s capital.

Against the Crimean Tatars, Vorotinsky led the Muscovite army in the Battle at Molodi. This was the final and deciding battle of the Crimean War (1552–1576). Outnumbered, Vorotinsky won the battle using strategically planned military action and a set of techniques and technologies, the most prominent of which was the *guliai-gorod*, a movable fortification with openings for firing.

Between 1566–1571, Vorotinsky headed the work of the *Boiarskaia Duma* (council of boyars, the czar’s legislative and advisory body) with Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Belski and Prince Ivan Fyodorovich Mstislavsky. As head of the state defense service, Vorotinsky led the preparation of the first Russian military field manual, *O Stanichnoi i Polevoi Sluzhbe* (*On Garrison and Field Service*, 1571), and the creation of the state border defense system. This development played a significant role in the Battle at Molodi, and helped defend the borders of the Muscovite territory for many years to come. According to some historians, Czar Ivan IV was afraid of Vorotinsky’s popularity, so he decided to send Vorotinsky into exile. Vorotinsky died on December 6, 1573, on his way to exile in Cyril-Belozersky Monastery.

Thomas Gosart

See also: *Guliai-gorod* (*gulyaygorod*, *gulyaygorod*, or *gulai-gorod*); Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505); Ivan IV (“the Terrible”; 1530–1584); Kazan, Siege of (August–October 1552); Molodi, Battle of (July 26–August 3, 1572); Tatars (Mongols)

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Vozha River, Battle of the (August 11, 1378)

The Battle of the Vozha River marks, mythically at least, the end of the Mongol hold over Russia.

In the century after the death of their great leader Alexander Nevsky, the Russians remained under the rule of the Golden Horde of Mongols (Tatars) of the southwest. The Russians' growing strength, however, and solidarity among the principalities made this domination hard to maintain. In 1377, the grand prince of Muscovy, Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoi, openly challenged a Mongol khanate weakened by civil war and dynastic rivalries; he consolidated power in Muscovy and the mid-Volga region, and denied tribute payments to the Mongol chief, Mamai. In response, Mamai sent a force commanded by General Begich against the Russians in 1378 to reassert order and to strengthen his financial position, which had been weakened by lack of tribute and customs fees.

The forces of Grand Prince Dmitry met the Mongol force under General Begich on the Vozha River, a tributary of the Oka River,

in the Riazan principality. Dmitry held the advantage; he occupied defensive positions in the hills above the Vozha River and controlled the ford the Mongol forces intended to use to cross the Vozha. On August 11, Begich tried to move his forces across the Vozha and was repelled. Dmitry's counterattack sent the Mongol army into a disorderly retreat; many of them drowned in the Vozha. Dmitry's military victory over the Mongols at the Vozha River marked the first time a Russian force defeated a Mongol army and signaled a change in the pattern of Mongol rule and Russian subordination.

Mamai launched another attack against Moscow 1380. Dmitry's forces met the Mongols at Kulikovo in September 1380 and, armed with the knowledge of Mongol tactics from two years prior, he soundly defeated a second and much larger Mongol army. The mystique of Mongol military might and power over Russia was over, and the gradual rise of Russia began. Another century of struggle remained, however, before Ivan III established the first sovereign nation of Russia. Dmitry Donskoi is sometimes recognized as the liberator, and first true Russian ruler of Muscovy.

Edward C. Krattli

See also: Donskoi, Dmitry (October 12, 1350–May 19, 1389); Ivan III (“the Great”; 1440–1505); Kulikovo, Battle of (1380); Nevsky, Alexander (1220–1263); Tatars (Mongols)

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Vyazmitinov, Sergei Kuzmich (1744–1819)

First defense minister of Russia.

Born October 7, 1744, Sergei Vyazmitinov was descended from an ancient and noble Ruthenian family. He enrolled in the Russian military service as a corporal in June 1759, and served in the Ukrainian Corps beginning in 1761. Vyazmitinov soon became involved in military administration, managing the cavalry stables in 1862, and then serving as aide-de-camp to the vice president of the War Collegium. In 1770, he became an auditor of military affairs for General Pyotr Rumiantsev's army with the rank of major. Promoted to colonel in 1777, Vyazmitinov was appointed commander of an infantry regiment in Astrakhan.

In 1786, Vyazmitinov was promoted to major general and commander of a grenadier regiment, still in Astrakhan. He led his forces in the capture of Khotin and Bendery during the Russo-Turkish War of 1786–1792, and in 1790, he was appointed commander of the Belorussian Chasseur Corps. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1793, Vyazmitinov became a senator in 1794, as well as governor general of Simbirsk.

Vyazmitinov was appointed commander of the Orenburg Corps in 1795, and led those forces in putting down a rebellion in Kyrgyz. He then became military governor of Orenburg, Kamenets-Podolsky, and Malorossiya in rapid succession, with a brief stint as commander of the Peter-Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg in early 1797 before transferring to command the commissariat. Vyazmitinov was summarily dismissed at the end of 1797, however, probably on charges of corruption.

Vyazmitinov became civil governor of Malorossiya in 1801, and returned to St. Petersburg as vice president of the War

Collegium, a senator, and member of the Permanent Council in 1802. When Czar Alexander I created a ministry of land forces, Vyazmitinov was appointed as, essentially, the first defense minister of Russia. Alexander then designated Vyazmitinov as commander in chief of St. Petersburg while he commanded Russian forces in the field against Napoleon in 1805–1808. When the czar returned, however, he again dismissed Vyazmitinov from service, again likely for corruption.

Vyazmitinov reentered service in April 1811, and during 1812, he was once again commander in chief of St. Petersburg during the czar's absence. Following the Patriotic War, he became chairman of the committee of ministers and, from 1816, military governor of St. Petersburg. Alexander ennobled him with the title of count in 1818. Vyazmitinov died in St. Petersburg on October 15, 1819.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Vyborg

Vyborg is located on the Karelian Isthmus, approximately 80 miles north of St. Petersburg in the Leningrad Oblast of Russia and 24 miles south of the Finnish border. It was

dominated by Sweden after the 1323 Treaty of Nöteborg. During the Great Northern War, in 1710, Czar Peter I (“the Great”) captured Vyborg. With the 1721 Treaty of Nystad, Vyborg and parts of Finland were incorporated into Russia. In the Russian-Swedish War (1788–1790), one of the largest naval battles, Vyborg Bay (1790), saw the Swedish fleet retire before the Russians. Vyborg became part of the Grand Duchy of Finland, a personal fiefdom of the czar, in 1812.

During the Russian Civil War, Vyborg was controlled by the Finnish Red Guards until April 29, 1918, when they were defeated by a White Guard army. The city nonetheless became part of an independent Finland. During the Winter War (1939–1940), Vyborg and its bay were bombed and eventually evacuated. The 1940 Peace of Moscow ceded Vyborg, minus all its inhabitants, and the Karelian Isthmus to the Soviet Union.

With the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), the Finnish government aligned itself with the German invaders. On August 29, Vyborg was recaptured by Finnish troops, along with other territory lost in 1940, and the town’s former Finnish residents trickled back. By June 1944, Vyborg’s 28,000 people had returned to claim their lost homes. The Soviets Vyborg-Petrozavodsk

Offensive, however began in the area of Vyborg on June 9, 1944. The Soviet Air Force’s Thirteenth Air Army, conducted bombing operations, coupled with massive artillery and naval support of the Baltic Fleet. Vyborg was again evacuated. The Soviets captured Vyborg on June 20, 1944. With the Moscow Armistice signed on September 19, 1944, Vyborg again became part of the Soviet Union. Finland formally renounced its claims to Vyborg in the run-up to the Paris Peace treaties of 1947.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Continuation War (Finnish-Soviet War; June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944); Great Northern War (1700–1721); Peter I (“the Great”); 1672–1725); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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W

War Communism

War Communism was an economic system that existed in Russia between 1918 and March 1921. Intended, partially, to function as a response to the stress brought on by the Civil War, its main features included grain requisitioning, a ban on private trade, nationalization of industry, labor discipline, rationing, and the attempt to abolish money. Lenin employed the system to discredit opposition in the conflict between the Bolsheviks (Reds) and anti-Bolshevik forces, such as those supporting a restoration of the czar or middle-class interests (Whites) or the peasants (Greens). The term was first popularized by L. Krittman, its most vocal spokesman. The earliest official use of the term *War Communism* dates to the spring of 1921, when its policies were being abandoned for the more liberal New Economic Policy (NEP).

War Communism commenced as Russia found itself in a deep economic crisis in early 1919. Industrial production had fallen dramatically due to supply and transport problems, paired with a dwindling population of urban-based workers who had fled to rural areas to appropriate land. The severe economic crisis was exacerbated by the aggregate strains of World War I and the disastrous agricultural and industrial deficits caused by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918.

The signing of the treaty signaled the end of World War I for Russia, but at the cost of vast areas of highly productive farmland, such as the Ukraine, ceded to Germany.

Grain requisitioning, in which grain was taken from the peasants as a tax-in-kind, had to be introduced subsequently in Russia. When the Civil War started in earnest in May of that year, the Food Supplies Commissariat and Red Army were created, and the forcible requisitioning of grain became standard policy.

Naturally the peasants vehemently opposed both measures. At the start of 1919, another decree required all food surpluses to be handed over to requisitioning squads. It was met, in part, by severe civil unrest. The Tambov Rebellion, which was the most serious of the uprisings that broke out across Russia, began in July 1920.

The resulting shortages led the Bolsheviks to introduce a class-based system of rationing within War Communism. Priority was given to the industrial labor force (the Bolsheviks' social and political base), along with Red Army soldiers. Smaller rations were given to civil servants and professional people such as medical doctors. The smallest rations, perhaps a quarter of those granted to workers and often barely enough to live on, were allotted to what had been the middle class (bourgeoisie), who were referred to as *former people*.

The middle class was driven out of the workforce, effectively, as the Bolsheviks sought to move to a "true communist economy." By June 1918, most large-scale industries had been nationalized, signaling the implementation of War Communism in full. All major industry was centrally administered by the Supreme Council of National Economy (*Vesenkha*). In November, a

decree banned all private trade. By November 1920, nationalization of industry was extended to all businesses with more than five employees.

Bolshevik policies encouraged mass participation by workers in running plants through factory committees, while ensuring that factories were not liquidated by their own owners. “Worker control,” as the Bolsheviks called it, proved disastrously ineffective, however. Factory worker committees voted themselves huge raises, and few workers possessed the skills and experience to manage even a shift. Machinery broke down, supply chains ceased to function, and the monetary and wage systems simply ceased to function. The Bolsheviks responded by formally abolishing currency and implementing a barter economy. The workers, in turn, simply took the goods they produced in lieu of wages and traded them on the black market.

In the face of such chaos, and lacking the administrative tools to cope with such dire problems, the Bolsheviks frequently resorted to terror. The *Cheka* (secret police) was active in the countryside, where they helped requisitioning brigades to collect grain from the peasants. The Bolsheviks also sent units of Red Guards and soldiers to the countryside to find grain for hard-pressed cities. Discipline was brought back to the workplace, with fines for lateness and absenteeism. Internal passports were introduced to stop people fleeing to the countryside. Piece-work rates were reestablished, accompanied by bonuses and a workbook that was required to receive rations.

Many Bolsheviks believed that, while War Communism was in part a necessary rejoinder to the economic issues facing Russia in 1919, their policies also were generating a true communist state. It certainly was not, however, an ideological device fully

conceptualized prior to introduction. War Communism essentially was an impromptu series of measures pushed upon the Bolsheviks because of the failure of state capitalism and the onset of civil war. The system—if it may be called such—provided just enough resources to sustain the Bolsheviks in the Civil War.

War Communism ended in March of 1921, after sailors at the Petrograd naval base of Kronstadt rebelled in protest over Bolshevik economic policies and restrictions on democracy. The sailors had been some of the most loyal supporters of the October Revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks therefore abandoned War Communism for the NEP, which would last for seven years.

Dustin Garlitz

See also: Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (March 3, 1918); *Cheka* (*Chrezvychaynayakomissiya*); Commissars, Military (1917–1991); Home Front (Russia), World War I (1914–1917); Kronstadt Rebellion (March 1921); Lenin, Vladimir I. (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924); October (November) Revolution (1917); Red Guards; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Tambov Rebellion (1920–1922); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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War Crimes, Soviet, World War II

War crimes are violations of the internationally recognized laws and usages of war to protect civilian lives and prevent military aggression. War crimes law was enforced as honor law in the military tradition. Since the 1899 Hague Convention, war crimes have been applicable international law. This concept includes the murder, the ill-treatment or deportation of civilian residents of an occupied territory, violations of international agreements on the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), deportations of POWs and civilians to labor and concentration camps, the killing of hostages, and destruction not justified by military necessity.

Excesses during World War II led to new interpretations of war crimes. An allied treaty declared that charges against German war criminals would include "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity," and that individuals would be held responsible. This was not international law until the Charter of the United Nations recognized aggressive warfare as a "crime against peace" in October 1945; the International Criminal Court at The Hague assumed jurisdiction for "genocide and crimes against humanity" in July 2002.

The gruesome evidence of German war crimes tabled at Nuremberg obscured the

fact that the forces of the Allies also committed war crimes, and that Stalin used the mayhem of the war to liquidate political prisoners. The most harrowing historical evidence concerns crimes committed by Stalin's secret service, the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*, or NKVD). These operations included genocide, state-organized ethnic cleansings, forced resettlement of ethnic groups, deportations to concentration and forced labor camps, and summary executions of political prisoners and members of ethnic minority groups.

Before the arrival of the German troops, Ukrainian and Polish political prisoners held in NKVD camps were executed. Thousands of civilians were executed at Lvov, Luck, Dobromil, Dubno, and Vitebsk, among other places. Massacres of civilians also occurred in German settlements like Nemmersdorf, Winniza, and Treuenbrietzen. The execution of German POWs and army nurses also occurred, for example, in Broniki, Feodosina, or Grischino.

Genocidal doctrines and ethnic cleansings were carried out through forced resettlements of whole ethnic groups. A "Special Settlers" department was created within the NKVD that organized the deportation of ethnic groups declared "enemies of the Soviet peoples" from their homelands. The NKVD deported not only Germans from Bessarabia (now Ukraine) and the Volga region but also destroyed autonomous republics within the Soviet empire. About 96,000 Greeks, Ukrainians, Turk-Meskhethians, Kurds, Khemshils, and Azeris were deported from Georgia to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Some 90,000 Kalmyks and 56,000 Balts were sent to Siberia or, with over 96,000 Finns, to Kazakhstan.

Many ethnic groups disintegrated and their communities became extinct. Of the more than 1,000,000 ethnic Germans from

the Ukraine, and 1,070,000 Volga Germans deported to the barren wastes of Siberia and Kazakhstan, 20 percent died en route or immediately after their arrival. Other ethnic minorities were executed in secret massacres, generally ordered by NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria and approved by Stalin. In total, close to 800,000 civilians died in these ethnic cleansing operations.

The biggest operations took place in Crimea, where close to 20 percent of the population was murdered or deported after being charged with treason. Whole villages were cleansed, with Tatars, Greeks, Armenians, Italians, and Bulgarians deported. German colonies and Tatar villages in the Ukraine and Bessarabia were completely destroyed. The head of the NKVD's Special Settlement Department, Colonel Malkov, issued a decree denying them food, supplies for shelter, clothes, shoes, and medical treatment. In May 1944, Beria issued a plan to deport all Crimean Tatars, and personally oversaw its execution. About 183,000 peoples were sent to the Barents Sea and 151,000 were sent to Uzbekistan.

After the war, as a result of similar resettlement policies and the allied agreements on the territorial reorganization of Europe, over 15 million Germans were deported or forcibly resettled. More than 2 million of them died. These and other allied crimes were never internationally recognized or condemned. The reverberations of these wholesale deportations and resettlements can still be felt today. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, new sources of Russian military records became available to scholars and will help to verify existing accounts and contribute to a revised historiography.

In Russia, the imposition of ethnic enclaves still spawns conflicts from Eastern Europe to Central Asia, where once brutally enforced policies are now contested by

shifting national influences within the Russian empire in the post-Soviet era.

Christiane Grieb

See also: Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953); Crimea (Crimean Peninsula); German Colonies in Russia (1763–1993); Holocaust in the Soviet Union; Katyn Forest Massacre (1940); NKVD; Nuremberg Trial (and Others); Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tatars (Mongols); Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

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Warsaw, Battle for (August 16–25, 1920)

The Battle for Warsaw in 1920 was the most important engagement of the Russo-Polish War of 1920–1921. Poland had disappeared at the end of the 18th century, absorbed by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. During World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's call for a "free and independent Poland with access to the sea" became an Allied war aim and, after the war, Poland reappeared as a legal entity. The matter of its frontiers, especially those to the east, remained open, however.

Poland's leaders opted to resolve their security problems through territorial expansion to recover the borders of before the partitions. The Polish Corridor that provided access to the sea across East Prussia led to

animosity with Germany that was exacerbated by Poland's seizure of Upper Silesia. Poland's seizure of Vilnius caused bitter hostility with Lithuania. Poland also forcibly took eastern Galicia over the opposition of its majority Ukrainian population, and Poland's seizure of part of Teschen embittered relations with Czechoslovakia.

There were also border disputes with Russia. A Paris Peace Conference commission at the end of 1919 set Poland's eastern borders along general ethnographic lines (the "Curzon Line"), but Poland took advantage of the civil war in Russia to occupy areas of mixed Polish-Russian population in the undefined area bordering Belorussia (Belarus) and Ukraine. The Poles refused to cooperate with the anti-Bolshevik White opposition though.

In 1920, when the Red (Bolshevik) armies at last triumphed over the Whites, the Bolshevik government turned its attention to the Poles. It presented an ultimatum that would have meant a Russian protectorate; there was no chance Poland would accept. While the Russians massed military forces in the west, the Poles decided not to wait to be attacked but to seize the initiative.

Russian commander Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky's Western Front (army group) was located north of the Pripet Marshes. Opposing it was a smaller Polish army under General Wladyslaw E. Sikorski. South of the Pripet Marshes was Russian general Aleksandr I. Yegorov's Southwestern Front. Opposing it was a Polish force commanded by Marshal Josef Pilsudski, the overall Polish commander. Each side fielded about 200,000 troops.

The campaign began on April 25, 1920, when Pilsudski launched an offensive that lasted until May 7. His force drove for Kiev, supported on its right flank by a mixed force of anti-Bolshevik Ukrainians under Simon

Petlyura. Capturing Kiev on May 7, Pilsudski prepared to swing north behind the Pripet Marshes to hit Tukhachevsky in the rear, but this proved too ambitious for the forces and logistical support available.

Tukhachevsky's Western Front, meanwhile, pushed southwest, pinning back Pilsudski's left. At the same time, First Cavalry Army commander Semen M. Budyonny of Yegorov's army drove northwest with a cavalry corps of some 16,000 men and 48 guns against Pilsudski's right flank. Budyonny reached Zitomir, southwest of Kiev, almost taking Pilsudski's right wing. By June 13, the Polish left was also in full retreat and Cossacks swept to the outskirts of L'viv. North of the Pripet Marshes, Tukhachevsky reached Vilnius on July 14 and Grodno on July 19, while Budyonny kept up pressure on the southern front. By July 25, the Polish forces lay in two groups—one around L'viv and the other near Warsaw, whose fall appeared imminent. Tukhachevsky expected to take the Polish capital on August 14.

Pilsudski knew through radio intercepts, however, that the Russians had outrun their supply lines and were short of almost everything, including food. So while the seemingly irresistible Russian right pushed forward, passing to the north of Warsaw, Pilsudski ordered a daring counterattack against Tukhachevsky's left. Signal intercepts had revealed that as the Russian weak point.

On the orders of Josef Stalin, chief political officer of the Southwestern Front's Revolutionary Military Council, Budyonny's army was moving to take L'viv rather than advancing to support Tukhachevsky's drive on Warsaw. Tukhachevsky desperately needed Budyonny's assistance, and he pleaded with Red Army headquarters to provide reinforcements. Headquarters ordered Budyonny to join Tukhachevsky, but Stalin directed Budyonny to ignore the order.

With his weight concentrated at Deblin, 50 miles southeast of Warsaw, on August 16, 1920, Pilsudski opened the Battle of Warsaw by driving against the weakly held Russian Western Front's left along the Warsaw to Brest-Litovsk road. The Polish breakthrough was swift. Pilsudski ignored Russian elements to the south to swing northward and encircle the bulk of the Russian forces by linking with the Polish drive from the north under Sikorski.

Caught between the Polish pincers, Tukhachevsky's command disintegrated. Some 30,000 Russians made it across the frontier into East Prussia, there to be disarmed by the Germans. Before Tukhachevsky could rally his forces on August 25, the Poles had captured 66,000 prisoners, more than 230 guns, 1,000 machine guns, and 10,000 vehicles. Russian casualties totaled 150,000 men. The stunning Polish victory was one of the decisive battles of the 20th century, marking the first check to westward Bolshevik expansion.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Budyonny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); Yegerov, Aleksandr Ilyich (1883–1939)

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Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organization; WTO)

Political-military alliance among the Soviet Union and its East European satellite states.

The multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed on May 14, 1955, in Warsaw, Poland, formally institutionalized the East European alliance system, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), known as the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Treaty was identical to bilateral treaties concluded during 1945–1949 between the Soviet Union and its East European client states to assure Moscow's continued military presence on their territory. The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia pledged to defend each other if one or more of the members were attacked.

The Warsaw Pact was created as a political instrument for Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's Cold War policy in Europe. The immediate triggers were the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on May 5, 1955, and the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, which provided for Austrian neutrality and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The creation of the Warsaw Pact sent important signals to both Eastern Europe and the West. On the one hand, the Soviet Union made clear to its satellite states that Austria's neutral status would not likewise be granted to them. On the other hand, Khrushchev lured the West with a standing offer to disband the Warsaw Pact simultaneously with NATO, contingent upon East-West agreement on a new collective security system in Europe.

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was established as the Soviet

alliance's highest governing body, consisting of the member states' party leaders. The PCC met almost annually in one of the capitals of the Warsaw Pact states. On the military side, a unified command and a joint staff were created to organize the actual defense of the Warsaw Treaty states. Soviet marshal Ivan G. Konev was appointed as the first supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces. The Warsaw Pact's supreme commander usually served as a deputy defense minister in the USSR as well. Konev was followed in the post by Marshal Andrei Grechko (1960–1967), Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky (1967–1976), Marshal Viktor Kulikov (1976–1989), and General Pyotr Lushev (1989–1991).

In its early years, the Warsaw Pact served primarily as a Soviet propaganda tool in East-West diplomacy. Khrushchev used the PCC to publicize his disarmament, disengagement, and peace offensives and to accord them a multilateral umbrella. The first concrete military step taken was the admission of the East German Army (*Volksarmee*, or People's Army) into the unified command, but not until the Berlin Crisis (1958–1961) was there a systematic militarization of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet General Staff and the Warsaw Pact's unified command prepared East European armies for a possible military conflict in Central Europe. In 1961, the Soviets replaced the old defensive strategy of Soviet leader Josef Stalin with an offensive strategy that provided for a deep thrust into Western Europe. In the early 1960s, the Warsaw Pact began to conduct joint military exercises to prepare for fighting a nuclear war in Europe. The new strategy remained in place until 1987. Despite détente, the militarization of the Warsaw Pact accelerated under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s.

Behind the facade of unity, however, growing differences hounded the Eastern

alliance. Following Khrushchev's campaign of de-Stalinization, Poles and Hungarians in the fall of 1956 demanded a reform of the Warsaw Pact to reduce overwhelming Soviet dominance within the alliance. Polish generals issued a memorandum that proposed modeling the Warsaw Pact more after NATO, while Hungary's new Communist Party leader, Imre Nagy, declared his country's neutrality and plans to leave the Warsaw Pact. In November 1956, the Soviet Army invaded Hungary and soon crushed all resistance.

In 1958, Romania demanded the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and military advisors from its territory. To cover Soviet embarrassment, Khrushchev termed this a unilateral troop reduction contributing to greater European security. At the height of the Berlin Crisis (1961), the Warsaw Pact's weakest and strategically least important country, Albania, stopped supporting the pact; it formally withdrew from the alliance in 1968.

The Warsaw Pact was left in ignorance when Khrushchev provoked the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Only after the crisis ended did East European leaders learn in a secret meeting that a nuclear war had been narrowly avoided. Romania reacted promptly; in 1963, the Romanian government gave secret assurances to the United States that it would remain neutral in the event of a confrontation between the superpowers. In the same year, Romanian and Polish opposition prevented Khrushchev's plan to admit Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact.

In the mid-1960s, the Warsaw Pact, like NATO, underwent a major crisis. The 1965 PCC meeting, convened by East Germany, demonstrated profound disagreements among Warsaw Pact allies on matters such as the German question, nuclear weapons sharing, nuclear nonproliferation, and the

Sino-Soviet split. In early 1966, Brezhnev proposed a plan to reform and institutionalize the Warsaw Pact. Resistance by Moscow's allies prevented the implementation of the scheme for more than three years.

In 1968, the Prague Spring seriously threatened the cohesion of the alliance. While the Soviet Union tried to intimidate Alexander Dubček's liberal Czechoslovak government with multilateral Warsaw Pact military maneuvers, the invading forces sent in on August 20, 1968, were mostly from the Soviet Union with token Polish, Hungarian, and East German contingents, but no Romanian troops. Romania denounced the invasion as a violation of international law and demanded the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and military advisors from its territory. It also refused to allow additional Soviet forces to cross or conduct exercises on its territory.

The consolidation that resulted from the PCC session in Budapest in March 1969 transformed the Warsaw Pact into a more consultative organization. It established a committee of defense ministers, a military council, and a committee on technology. With these three new joint bodies, the Warsaw Pact finally became a genuine multilateral military alliance.

In 1976, previous informal gatherings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers were institutionalized into a committee of ministers of foreign affairs. In the 1970s, consultations within Warsaw Pact bodies primarily dealt with the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. Despite détente, preparations for a deep offensive thrust into Western Europe accelerated and intensified during numerous military exercises. In 1979, a statute on the command of the alliance in wartime was finally accepted by all but Romania after a year-long controversy.

During 1980–1981, the Solidarity Crisis in Poland heralded the end of Moscow's

domination of Eastern Europe. Yet it did not pose a serious threat to the Warsaw Pact's integrity. At first, Moscow was tempted to threaten the opposition with military exercises and, eventually, military intervention. To avoid the high political costs of such a move, however, Moscow in the end trusted that the loyal Polish military would suppress the opposition on its own. The imposition of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski was a major success for Moscow, as it demonstrated that the Moscow-educated Polish generals were protecting the interests of the Warsaw Pact even against their own people.

During the renewed Cold War of the 1980s, internal disputes in the Warsaw Pact increased. Romania demanded cuts in nuclear and conventional forces as well as in national defense budgets. It also called for the dissolution of both Cold War alliances and for the withdrawal of both U.S. and Soviet forces from Europe.

The issue of an appropriate Warsaw Pact response to NATO's 1983 deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, matching Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) aimed at West European targets, proved to be most divisive for the Eastern alliance. In 1983, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania engaged in a damage control exercise to maintain their ties with the West, which they had established during the era of détente in the 1970s.

At the time of the Warsaw Pact's 30th anniversary in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader and improved the role of Warsaw Pact consultations on the desired nuclear and conventional cuts in the Eastern alliance. At the PCC meeting in Berlin in May 1987, he changed Warsaw Pact military doctrine from offensive to defensive. In the late 1980s, however, East Germany, Bulgaria, and—in a reversal of its

earlier opposition—even Romania proposed to strengthen the Warsaw Pact by improving its intra-bloc political consultative functions.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, East and West at first saw merit in keeping both Cold War alliances in place. In January and February 1991, however, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria declared that they would withdraw all support by July 1 of that year. The Warsaw Pact thus came to an end on March 31, 1991, and was officially dissolved at a meeting in Prague on July 1, 1991.

Christian Nuenlist

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Hungarian Rebellion (1956); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973); Prague Spring (1968); SALT I (November 1969–May 1972); SALT II (1972–1979); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Warsaw Uprising (August 1–October 2, 1944)

Attempt of Polish nationalists to gain control of Warsaw and possibly independence;

not to be confused with the Warsaw Ghetto Rising of 1943, an act of Jewish resistance against the Germans.

By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had pushed the German army almost completely out of the Soviet Union and was moving west across German-occupied Poland. The Soviets had split with the London-based Polish government-in-exile and on July 21, 1944, established their own provisional government, the so-called Lublin Committee, under the auspices of the Polish State National Council at Cholm. This body was under the full, direct control of the Soviet Union. As the Red Army advanced, therefore, it disarmed the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, or AK), a branch of the London-based government. On July 26, the London Poles ordered AK commander General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski to capture Warsaw from the Germans before the Soviets arrived. Radio programs from Moscow were calling for an uprising to aid the approaching Red Army, but the Poles' aim was self-liberation followed by a proclamation of independence.

The AK had around 40,000 fighters in Warsaw, and they were desperately short of arms and ammunition. Although they had some clandestine arms factories in the city, their total armament amounted to little more than 2,000 pistols, 1,000 rifles, 25,000 homemade grenades, and a handful of anti-tank rifles. The German garrison in Warsaw numbered more than 21,000 well-equipped, combat-experienced troops, including three *Waffen-SS* divisions and two *Wehrmacht* Panzer divisions. Lieutenant General Reiner Stahel had command of German combat units around Warsaw.

Operation BURZA (“Tempest”) began on August 1, 1944. The lead units of the Red Army were only about 12 miles away and closing on the east bank of the Vistula River.

Red Army commander General Konstantin Rokossovsky, however, ignored attempts by the AK to make radio contact. Soviet forces engaged strong German armored forces in fierce battles to establish and maintain bridgeheads both north and south of Warsaw, but they did not cross the rivers or press forward in the center. On the first day of the uprising, the AK gained control of most of the west bank of the Vistula, but the Poles never managed to take the bridges. Fighting back, the Germans took Warsaw's Old Town on August 2. By the next day, German reinforcements were pouring into the battle, and the Luftwaffe had begun round-the-clock bombing of the Polish-controlled areas.

The savage street fighting ground on for weeks, with the Polish insurgents using the city's sewers for lines of communication and as routes of escape. SS Chief Heinrich Himmler ordered that the entire city should be "razed to the ground" and all its inhabitants killed as an object lesson. On September 10, Red Army units under Rokossovsky finally moved into Warsaw's Praga district on the east bank of the Vistula. After five days of heavy fighting, the Soviets consolidated their positions on the east bank and ceased to advance. The city was not essential to Soviet military plans, and the Red Army simply may not have been strong enough to provide effective support.

Not only did the Soviets provide no further support to AK forces fighting desperately on the other side of the river though, they also refused permission for Western Allied aircraft to land on Soviet airfields after making supply drops to the beleaguered insurgents. The British RAF and units of the Polish Air Force nonetheless carried out more than 200 supply sorties, using airfields in the United Kingdom and in Italy.

Under pressure from U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Soviets finally allowed

a single wing of 110 U.S. B-17 bombers to refuel at Poltava for a supply drop on September 18. The United States lost two planes, with a further seven damaged, and managed to deliver only 20 tons of supplies to the insurgents. The Soviets then refused permission for additional flights until September 30. The Red Air Force did undertake some 2,000 sorties of its own though, dropping over 200 tons of food and thousands of weapons. Because most of the missions were flown at night, in small Polikarpov bi-planes, only about half of the supplies reached the insurgents. The German defenders also shot down some 30 planes with about 250 Polish, British, and South African airmen.

On September 30, as the Germans systematically reduced the pocket of Polish resistance, Bór-Komorowski appointed General Leopold Okulicki as his successor in command of the AK. Bór-Komorowski and his surviving fighters finally surrendered on October 2, after 63 days of fierce resistance. Some 15,000 insurgents and 150,000 Polish civilians died during the rising. Another 150,000 of Warsaw's inhabitants were sent to concentration or slave labor camps, where 45,000 later died. Approximately 93 percent of the city was a featureless pile of rubble.

The Germans lost about 10,000 killed during the fighting. Shortly after suppressing the rising, the German army withdrew from Warsaw at its own pace, and the Red Army followed it into the city. Soviet commanders later claimed that stiff German resistance and the lack of supplies had prevented them from giving the AK any more support. Many historians, however, have suggested that the Soviet commanders were following specific orders from their leader, Josef Stalin, who wanted the German army to eliminate any Polish opposition to the establishment of a postwar government under Moscow's control.

David T. Zabecki

See also: Belorussia Offensive (June 23–August 29, 1944); Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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White Armies in the Russian Civil War (1917–1922)

There was no single White Army during the Russian Civil War. Instead, various forces formed to oppose the Bolshevik seizure of power during the Russian Revolution of 1917. Some favored a restoration of the monarchy, others a return to the parliamentary democracy (or the promise thereof) represented by the Provisional Government. Very seldom did they agree on aims, strategies, or tactics. Supported by the French, British, and American governments, the White armies initially appeared capable of winning the Russian Civil War. With the advantage of interior lines of movement and communication, however, the more disciplined and focused Russian Red Army defeated the last White force remnants by 1922. The defeat of the White armies can be attributed in no small part to their elitism and inability to win popular support.

White armies formed around all the borders of the old Russian Empire as various ethnic

groups and political movements rejected the Bolshevik government of Vladimir Lenin. Opponents included loyal czarists, social revolutionaries, and Social Democrats, as well as Cossacks, Czechs, and other ethnic minorities. The ideological heterogeneity of the White armies made leaders hesitant to declare favor for republicanism, democracy, or land reform though. Many of the armies' military leaders were avowed czarists who intended to restore the discredited monarchy of the Romanovs. This prevented them from gaining sympathy from many moderate workers or peasants who might have otherwise joined their forces. The White armies were also hampered by a reliance on foreign weapons, since the Red Army retained control of industrial regions; this led many Russians to suspect the Whites were simply puppets of the Western Allies. At the same time, the corruption, elitism, and brutality of many former czarist officers alienated Russians in the territories they occupied.

The largest White Army formed in the southern territory of the Don Cossacks, while others formed in Siberia, the Baltic States, and the Ukraine. The British, French, Americans, Germans, and Japanese sent troops into Russia and supplied the White Armies with money and armaments. These support efforts were seriously hampered by lack of coordination and national rivalries. General Lavr Kornilov and General Anton Denikin, a former czarist chief of staff, led the large White army in the south, but its advance on Moscow crumbled when Leon Trotsky enforced greater discipline, ruthlessness, and purpose in the Red Army.

Another White army advanced from Estonia but failed to take Petrograd from the Reds. Denikin then resigned his position and handed control over to General Pyotr Wrangel. The Red Army promptly defeated Wrangel in 1920, and his forces evacuated

the southern territories. By 1922, the Red Army had captured Vladivostok, the last stronghold of the White army of Siberia led by Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak. The remaining White forces disintegrated, leaving supporters facing prison, execution, or exile.

Thomas Edsall

See also: Allied Intervention in Russia (1918–1922); Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilievich (1874–1920); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

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Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940)

Regional conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union.

In late 1939, Soviet leader Josef Stalin was concerned with the sharp increase in German power following the conquest of Poland, and he sought to acquire additional territory to protect portions of the Soviet Union from possible German attack through Finland. He was especially anxious to protect approaches to Leningrad, which was only 20 miles from the



A Finnish ski patrol looking for Russian troops on the Petsamo front in northern Finland during the Finnish-Soviet War of 1939–1940, also known as the “Winter War.” (Library of Congress)

Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus. According to the secret terms of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, Finland fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. No one, however, had told the Finns.

These security concerns nevertheless prompted Stalin to demand that Finland cede much of the isthmus, destroy all fortifications there, cede certain islands in the gulf, and grant the Soviet Union land for a naval base to the west on the Hango Peninsula. Stalin was prepared to give the Finns in exchange more territory than he demanded—2,134 square miles in return for 1,066—but the Soviet territory Stalin offered was in the less desirable north, in East Karelia above Lake Ladoga.

With a population of only 3.6 million people (the Soviet population was 193 million in 1941), Finland hardly seemed in position to reject Stalin's demands. Although the Finns were open to some compromise regarding territory above Leningrad, they were upset about demands for the destruction of their fortifications and for the naval base on the Hango Peninsula. Tough negotiations continued for two months without result. Finnish leaders believed that Stalin was bluffing, but after a contrived border incident on November 26, Stalin ordered the invasion, which began on November 30, 1939, without a declaration of war.

It was not one of Stalin's finer military exploits. Despite overwhelming superiority in manpower, resources, and equipment, it took the Red Army nearly four months to crush its tiny opponent. The Finns did hold the advantages of a harsh and difficult-to-penetrate climate, their soldiers' familiarity with the area, superior military leadership and training, and high morale. The Finns, after all, were fighting for their homeland and rallied almost to a man behind the central government. The abundant forests provided good cover amid sparse settlements and poor trails. Only the Karelian Isthmus had developed towns and

farming areas with roads. This environment worked against mechanized operations and gave the advantage to mobile forces equipped with skis. Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish forces, possessed keen insight regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army as a former officer of the Imperial Russian Army and a veteran of both the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Civil War. Finnish commissioned and noncommissioned officers were also well trained and exhibited considerable initiative.

In all, the Finns fielded about 300,000 men. They had only 422 artillery pieces, 32 tanks, and a few aircraft. Many independent battalions and separate companies were dispersed throughout the country. The Finns lacked equipment of all sorts, and what they had was a mixed variety provided from different countries. The soldiers were well acclimated, however, and wore white camouflage uniforms to facilitate swift movement. The Finns also did what they could to strengthen their natural defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus by constructing obstacles, trenches, and bunkers.

For the initial invasion, Stalin employed only 20 Soviet divisions (450,000 men) against 16 Finnish divisions, and he must bear the brunt of responsibility for the initial Soviet military failure in Finland. Fresh from the Red Army's relatively bloodless triumph in Poland, Stalin personally intervened to reject the plan advanced by his chief of staff, Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, which entailed a careful buildup and use of the best Soviet troops, even those from the Far East. Stalin rebuked Shaposhnikov for overestimating the Finns and underestimating the Red Army. The new plan, worked out on Stalin's orders and confirmed by Stalin, led to the fiasco of the early Soviet defeats.

The Soviet military was in wretched shape; recent purges had decimated the

officer corps and left in command unqualified men who were reluctant to take the initiative. The soldiers were poorly trained in winter fighting and breaching fortified lines. The standard Soviet rifle division was well manned and equipped, but the heavy material was not suited to such a primitive operational environment. The Soviets did have an advantage in heavy artillery, but little coordination had been developed between the arms, so attacks were not synchronized for effectiveness. A severe lack of communications equipment added to the problems of coordination and tactical flexibility. Among the rank and file, morale was poor. These factors mitigated overwhelming Soviet advantages in manpower and quantities of equipment. The USSR had at least 3 times as many men under arms as the Finns did, had 30 times the number of Finnish aircraft, and probably 100 times the number of tanks.

Thus limited, the Finns could only plan a defensive struggle; however, they had supplies for only about two months. Their main force, the Army of the Isthmus, contained six divisions under the command of General Hugo Osterman. It held some 200 defensive strongpoints linking lakes and other natural obstacles, the so-called Mannerheim Line, across the isthmus. North of Lake Ladoga the Finns had only the two divisions of IV Corps and, in the far north, a collection of border guards and conscripted reservists known as the North Finland Group. Against them, the Soviets deployed their Seventh Army, with three tank brigades, on the Karelian Isthmus, and stationed Eighth Army, with a single tank brigade, north of Lake Ladoga. While the Soviet Ninth Army drove into central Finland, Eighth would flank the Finnish defensive line and strike the enemy's rear. Fourteenth Army, in the far north, would secure the arctic ports.

The Finns nevertheless halted the main Russian thrust across the Karelian Isthmus at the Mannerheim Line in December

1939. The Finns gained an early advantage when they obtained the Soviet tactical codes through the corps level. Thus they could monitor Soviet radio communications and decrypt Soviet units' locations. This intelligence became a force multiplier and helped the Finns to detect, outmaneuver, and defeat far larger Soviet formations.

Using a forward force of some 20,000 men, the Finns would cut off the enemy line of communications, separate the road-bound columns into pockets called *mottis* (*motti* is the Finnish word for a pile of logs held together by stakes ready to be chopped into firewood), and then destroy them piecemeal. By moving quickly, firing from concealed positions, and rapidly eliminating Soviet patrols, the Finns produced fear that reduced the ability of Soviet forces to react. The Finns also showed great ability in improvisation (as with the gasoline bomb in a bottle hurled at Russian tanks dubbed "Molotov cocktail"), by their effective use of ski troops, and by fitting largely antiquated biplane aircraft with skis so that they could operate in snow. The Soviets did not help their own cause by using simple frontal charges time and again.

By December 6, the Finns had inflicted severe damage on the Soviet tank formations and withdrawn to the cover of the Mannerheim Line. The Soviets attacked the Finnish defenses at Taipale, beginning with a two-day artillery barrage and following up with infantry charges across the open ground for the next four days. These were repulsed with heavy casualties. The Red Army brought up a second division, with even more artillery, and attacked again; again they were driven back. The Soviets threw a third division into the fray on December 14, but the attacks failed miserably.

After similar, decisive tactical defeats destroyed several Red Army divisions north of Lake Ladoga at Tolvajärvi and in the far north at Suomussalmi, the Soviets brought in at least 15 new divisions (about 250,000 men)

and 6 or 7 new tank brigades. They spent almost a month training intensively in tactics to develop better coordination among infantry, tanks, and artillery. They focused on better close-air support and the development of mobile reserves to exploit breakthroughs. At the small-unit level, special assault groups were organized to destroy Finnish bunkers efficiently. At the command level, Shaposhnikov now gained full authority over the Finnish theater, while Semen Timoshenko replaced Stalin's favorite, Kliment Voroshilov as commander of Soviet forces. They shifted the emphasis of the attack to the Karelian Peninsula, and decided to concentrate their armored units to achieve a breakthrough.

Not until February 1940, however, did Soviet forces mount an effective assault on the Mannerheim Line. They doubled their strength against the Mannerheim Line with the Northwest Front, commanded by Timoshenko, and concentrated more than 35 divisions, which included heavy artillery and new-model tanks, against the weakened Finns. Even after weeks of practice against mock-ups of the Finnish defenses, it was really sheer weight of numbers that enabled the Soviets to break through the Finnish line at Summa on February 11. It had taken 10 days of near-constant artillery barrages punctuated by combined armor and infantry assaults. Once the Mannerheim Line was breached, however, the Finns were done. On February 15, Mannerheim gave permission for a general retreat. Secret peace negotiations were already underway. By March 8, the Finns, having suffered heavy casualties, were almost incapable of defense. The Soviets had captured part of the key Finnish defensive anchor at Viipuri (Vyborg), and no foreign assistance was in sight.

Stalin then dictated a peace settlement. Stalin did not annex Finland, or even Helsinki, but he exacted territorial concessions well in excess of those sought before the

war. The Finns were forced to yield some 25,000 square miles of territory, including the Karelian Isthmus. The war also displaced some 400,000 Finns, for virtually all left the territory ceded to the Soviet Union.

Although Soviet terms were regarded as harsh by the Finns and by Finland's many international supporters, they were mild compared with those the Soviet Union imposed on the other three Baltic countries. In the case of Finland, Stalin may have been deterred by strong anti-Soviet sentiment that the invasion had aroused throughout the world. Indeed, 11,500 volunteers went to Finland to fight against the Soviets. Britain and France actually considered military intervention against the Soviet Union, including bombing strikes against the Caucasian oil fields and an "un-invited landing" in Norway as a preliminary step to sending troops to Finland. Seen in retrospect, such a step would have been disastrous to the Allied war effort. Stalin may also have been restrained by his desire to keep open the option of a possible alliance with the west against Hitler and to minimize the many disadvantages resulting from the Soviet aggression. One consequence for the Soviet Union of its invasion, expulsion from the League of Nations, was not a major blow.

Ultimately, the Soviets threw 1.5 million men (almost half their army in Europe), 3,000 aircraft, and nearly as many tanks against Finland. The Soviets suffered 230,000 to 270,000 dead—many the result of the cold and poor Soviet medical services—and a comparable number of wounded. They also lost 1,800 tanks and 634 aircraft. The Finns sustained far fewer casualties (22,425 killed and 43,557 wounded), and 62 of the 162 planes of their largely antiquated air force were lost.

One of the war's most important effects was the damage to Soviet military prestige. Many observers believed that the Soviet Union was incapable of waging a large-scale war. This was a conclusion Hitler was too

quick to draw. Another consequence was the Soviet decision to adopt the Finnish automatic sidearm. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland waged war against the Soviet Union as a co-belligerent of Germany, a decision that led to it unfairly being branded as an Axis power and to its second defeat in 1944.

*Steven J. Rauch and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression) Pact (August 24, 1939); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich (1882–1945); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich (1895–1970); Voroshilov, Kliment Y. (1881–1963)

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Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1849–1915)

Sergei Yulevich Witte, minister of finance and chairman of the Council of Ministers for Russia, initiated a program of industrialization during the reign of Czar Nicholas II and implemented a number of critical political reforms during the Russian Revolution of 1905. Russia's first constitutional prime minister, Witte attempted to reconcile Nicholas's authoritarian regime and industrial capitalism. Although a brilliant innovator

and administrator, he proved ineffectual in modernizing Russia.

Witte was born into hereditary nobility on June 29, 1849, in the Russian province of Georgia. Until the age of 16, Witte lived in the Caucasus. He studied mathematics at Novorossisk University in Odessa. In 1871, after contemplating a career in academia, Witte joined the state bureaucracy. His first job was in the governor general's chancellery in Odessa. After only a few months, he transferred to the local railway administration. Six years later, Witte left and started an independent career with the Southwestern Railway Company. Witte had enormous success, progressing rapidly to the directorship of the company and making important contacts with prominent political and business figures.

In the 1880s, Witte played a key role in developing legislation for Russia's railroad system. In 1889, he was appointed as the director of the new railroad department in the Ministry of Communications. Czar Alexander III, learning of Witte's reluctance to accept the position, doubled his salary and promoted him from the ninth to the fourth rank of state service. Witte's success led to promotion as minister of communications in February 1892. In August, Witte was also named minister of finance.

Witte attempted to industrialize and modernize Russia's economy through a series of reforms, most notably railroad construction. He sought to improve service on Russia's existing rail lines and to expand Russia's railroads by constructing the Trans-Siberian line, a major addition that would boost trade. His system also emphasized protectionism and foreign investment. Witte called upon Russian merchant groups to play an instrumental role in developing the necessary infrastructure. He created a state bank, encouraged the development of private banks, helped reform company laws, and worked to ease the convertibility of the ruble. He negotiated foreign

loans from such countries as France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Witte also focused on education so that by 1905, 39 new committees had been established to assist with technical education and encourage businessmen to expand their networks.

Witte's policies were costly and unpopular with conservatives in Russia. His relationship with Nicholas II was tenuous, and the two frequently disagreed on policy. By 1899, when Russia was experiencing a severe economic depression and labor disputes spread to St. Petersburg and Moscow, Witte's critics were convinced his policies were the cause of the unrest and the economic depression. In 1903, Nicholas II requested Witte's resignation. Witte complied and was appointed to the honorific post of chairman of the Committee of Ministers.

Removed from a role in state affairs, Witte helplessly watched the Russian government blunder into the Russo-Japanese War. It is a mark of the respect he had abroad that he was asked to represent Russia at the ensuing peace talks, and he secured amazingly good terms for Russia. Nicholas II had no choice but to recall him.

After the Revolution of 1905, Witte convinced Nicholas II to issue the October Manifesto, promising a greater degree of representative government, although he personally despised constitutional monarchy. Ironically, Witte then served as the first prime minister; he diligently weeded out the leaders of the revolution and worked to suppress social and political unrest in Russia. His most important contribution was to negotiate a series of desperately needed loans to stabilize Russia's economy. Nicholas II never fully trusted Witte, however, and after the immediate danger of revolution had passed, he forced Witte from office in April 1906.

In the last years of his life, Witte reorganized the State Council but no longer had his former influence over policy. When World War I started in August 1914, he urged the



Sergei Witte attempted to industrialize and reform Russia during his terms as minister of finance and chairman of the Council of Ministers, but he never had the full support of the czar. (Library of Congress)

Russian government to stay out of the conflict, but to no avail. Witte did not live to see Russia's collapse; he died on March 13, 1915.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Alexander III, Czar (1845–1894); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Revolution of 1905; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Trans-Siberian Railway; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter (1769–1843)

Russian general Ludwig Adolph Peter Wittgenstein was a senior commander during the Napoleonic Wars. Though brave and experienced, he was unimaginative as a strategist and garnered little distinction for his many battles.

Wittgenstein was born in St. Petersburg in 1769, the son of a Prussian general serving in the Russian army. He entered the Russian Army at an early age, distinguished himself by fighting in the Polish War of 1794–1795, and later campaigned in the Caucasus. In 1805, Wittgenstein was serving as a major general in General Pyotr Bagration's division and fought at the disastrous Battle of Austerlitz. His conduct under intense enemy pressure was exemplary and enabled Bagration to withdraw his right wing intact. After additional campaigning against the Turks in 1806, Wittgenstein returned to fight against the French emperor Napoleon again at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. In 1809, he served well in the war with Sweden, where his actions assisted in Russia's acquisition of Finland.

During Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, Wittgenstein was entrusted with command of a corps of the First Western Army and ordered to protect the northern approaches to St. Petersburg. During Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow that winter, Wittgenstein ventured south and attempted to harass the enemy. After recapturing Polotsk and Vitebsk, he drove the remnants of the French force before him and gathered 30,000 recruits to attack the French as they crossed the Beresina River on November 25, 1812. Wittgenstein's army, like all Russian forces, moved slowly, allowing the bulk of Napoleon's men to escape over the next four days.

In the spring of 1813, the Russian army under General Mikhail Kutuzov crossed into

Poland to begin liberating Europe from French domination. Wittgenstein was deployed well to the north, where he was joined by defecting forces under Prussian generals Ludwig Yorck and Friedrich von Bülow. When Kutuzov died that April, Russian czar Alexander I appointed Wittgenstein to head the new coalition (Prussian, Russian, and Austrian) forces in the field. The Russian general moved cautiously, then attacked and defeated a French force at Mockern on April 3, 1813.

Encouraged by this success, Wittgenstein accelerated his drive westward across the Elbe River until he encountered the main French Army under Napoleon at Lutzen. The appearance of such a substantial French force came as quite a surprise to the coalition forces, which did not anticipate that the French could muster new armies so quickly. At the ensuing Battle of Lutzen on May 2, 1813, Wittgenstein ordered Prussian forces under Marshal Gebhard von Blücher to attack the village of Kaja, but his forces were quickly threatened by French envelopment. Wittgenstein was then hard-pressed to extricate his men from disaster, and after hard fighting, the disheartened coalition troops fell back to Bautzen. There, the Russians were reinforced by 13,000 men under General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly.

On May 20, Napoleon advanced with his whole army and attacked Bautzen with a wide enveloping move from his left. The coalition forces again resisted stubbornly, but Wittgenstein was forced to withdraw from the battle and cross the Elbe River to save the army. At this point, Czar Alexander I decided to replace him with Barclay de Tolly, and he assumed command of the reserve forces. Continuous movement and fighting continued all summer and into the fall, by which point the French had been driven back to the outskirts of Leipzig. Wittgenstein was part of this aggressive drive, which culminated in the Battle of Leipzig during October 16–19. The French

were defeated and driven out of Germany and back to their own frontiers. Wittgenstein played a major role in this encounter and was widely praised for conduct under fire.

By December, the coalition forces had decided to carry the war into France itself and invaded. Wittgenstein commanded a mixed Russian-Prussian corps as part of the Army of Bohemia under General Karl Schwarzenberg. Seriously wounded at Bar-sur-Aube in February 1814, he saw no further action but recovered sufficiently to witness the occupation of Paris, France, in April.

After the war, Wittgenstein returned to Russia, where he was promoted to field marshal in 1823. Five years later, he assumed command of Russian forces in a war with the Turks but resigned soon after on account of poor health. In 1834, Prussia's King Frederick William III, grateful for Wittgenstein's prior service in the liberation of Germany, made him a prince. Wittgenstein, a tenacious if unimaginative soldier, died on June 11, 1843.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Alexander I, Czar (1777–1825); Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Bautzen, Battle of (May 20–21, 1813); Friedland, Battle of (June 14, 1807); Kutuzov, Mikhail (1745–1813); Leipzig, Battle of (October 16–19, 1813); Lutzen, Battle of (May 2, 1813); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Patriotic War of 1812

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Women's Battalions of Death (1917)

All-female fighting units formed under the provisional government but dissolved by the Bolsheviks. Women had a long tradition of fighting in the Russian military, but until 1917 they had always done so as individuals. Between August 1914 and March 1917, at least 49 (and probably several hundred) Russian women had served in the army, some disguised as men but many openly and with imperial dispensation. Following the March 1917 revolution, the Provisional Government mooted the idea of creating female labor battalions. In May, a Congress of Delegates of the Southwestern Front proposed forming revolutionary shock units. Maria "Yashka" Bochkareva, who had been serving in V Corps (Second Army) since 1915 then suggested an all-female shock unit: the Women's Battalion of Death.

Duma president Mikhail Rodzianko and army chief of staff General Aleksei A. Brusilov supported the idea. They hoped the unit would inspire a wave of patriotism and support for the new regime; Bochkareva's aim was to shame Russian men into fighting. No one, however, anticipated the response Bochkareva got; over 2,000 women signed up to serve in the Women's Battalion of Death, and the movement quickly spread. Volunteers came from all regions and social classes. By mid-July, the General Staff had authorized 5 additional battalions of death, and at least 11 all-female units

existed by November 1917. The Moscow Women's Battalion of Death enrolled over 1,000 volunteers, while Petrograd formed two Women's Battalions of Death in addition to Bochkareva's. Valentina Petrovna, a veteran of the 21st Siberian Rifles Infantry Regiment, commanded the all-female Black Hussars of Death, and there was even an all-female naval battalion of death.

While Bochkareva commanded her own unit and all medics in the units were female, the other officers were men; the government required officers in the Women's Battalions of Death to have frontline experience. In other respects, the female units were treated no differently than male units. They were paid at the same rate as male volunteers, sent to the military academies for training as officers and noncommissioned officers, and their units were organized just like male battalions. The Moscow and Petrograd Women's

Battalions of Death received at least three months' training, to include rifle drill, night maneuvers, and parade. Bochkareva's unit trained for only five weeks before deploying, but Yashka drove them so hard that fewer than half the women completed the course.

About half the female units served in the rear, freeing male units for frontline duty, more than 5,000 women saw combat. Their experience was less than successful. Bochkareva's unit, part of Tenth Army, suffered 80 percent casualties in its only attack. The other female units incurred heavy casualties as well, sometimes via friendly fire from disgruntled male units. The Women's Battalions of Death were quickly withdrawn from combat; however, many continued to serve behind the lines. One unit was guarding the Winter Palace the night of the Bolshevik Revolution. Claiming that the women's volunteer movement had lost its "moral



Members of a Women's Battalion of Death stand at attention with their hats and bayonets. The units were created in 1917 at the behest of Maria "Yasha" Bochkareva. (Underwood & Underwood/Corbis)

significance,” the Bolsheviks disbanded the all-female units after taking power.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Bochkareva, Maria (Mariya or Yashka) (1889–1920); Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917)

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World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

For some eight decades, objective historical assessment and perspective on the one hand and Russia and its performance in World War I on the other hand have represented something of a contradiction of terms for two reasons. First, Russia was defeated and driven from the ranks of Germany’s enemies and thus had no direct part in that country’s defeat in the autumn of 1918. The whole question of its role and value in dividing the resources and attention of the Central Powers between 1914 and 1917 failed to attract the

historical attention it merited. Second, the Russian Revolution of November 1917, the ideological change that was embraced, and this ideological impact on World War II and the Cold War had the effect of lessening the historical impact of World War I, and indeed perhaps rightly so. The Russian historical experience in terms of World War I counted for little when set alongside the ordeal of the Great Patriotic War.

Russian involvement in the war was problematic from the start. While some historians have argued that Russia sought territorial gains in the Balkans and access to the Mediterranean, there was no clear strategic Russian objective. Ostensibly, Russia mobilized in defense of Serbia and Pan-Slavism. More concretely, Russia was fulfilling its treaty obligations to France, which were tied to financial considerations designed to boost the domestic economy. While most Russian military planners wanted an offensive in the southwest against Austria-Hungary, the czar had promised an invasion of East Prussia to relieve pressure on the Western Front. This was achieved at Tannenberg, though at a cost to Russia that more than offset the early victories against Austria-Hungary.

Russia thus was crucial to the Allied cause generally in the period 1914–1917, and specifically with the Brusilov Offensive in the summer of 1916, in terms of the support it afforded its Western allies in the form of offensives specifically intended to divide enemy resources and efforts. In the general period, Russia was able to inflict upon Austria-Hungary and Turkey a series of defeats, certainly in the case of the former, from which there arguably was no recovery. In these years, it also put together an amphibious effort in the Black Sea that enjoyed a success that contrasted sharply with the Gallipoli failure. But no amount of success on these fronts could ever compensate for defeat at German hands, and particularly the disaster of “the



Great Retreat” in the face of the Central Powers’ Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive.

In seeking to understand the basis of Russia’s defeat and collapse, the events of 1915 and the enforced withdrawal across Poland possessed notable significance. The

withdrawal itself was for the most part orderly, but Russian forces were obliged to destroy most of their stores and equipment, since they could not be moved. The withdrawal of the army was accompanied by the flight of tens of thousands of civilian refugees

to cities already unable to feed them. The result was mass starvation and what may be termed the start of the process of the unraveling of Russian morale. The problem herein, however, is that in August 1915 Czar Nicholas II assumed personal command of an army that did rally. The Great Retreat was ended, and the army undertook the Brusilov Offensive, which regained much of the territory lost in 1915. On the eve of the Russian Revolution of February 1917, the Russian army was better equipped than at any time since the start of the war, and one of the inescapable facts about the campaign on the Eastern Front is that half of all Russian casualties were sustained in the 12 months before the czar took personal command of the armies.

Where the elements of defeat came together was partly in the person of the czar. By taking direct command of the army, he was naturally tainted with and discredited by defeat. But what was equally important was the slow falling apart of Russian industry and society under the impact of war. The basic Russian problem was not inadequate production—as is often assumed—but problems of distribution on a transport system which simply could not move food for the cities, fuel and basic household goods for town and country, and troops and material for the army. Additionally, there was an increasingly widespread belief that the czar, the imperial family, and the state system were the real obstacles to both the proper professionalization of the army and the successful prosecution of the war. Increasingly, it was believed throughout Russia that victory under the existing czarist regime was impossible and that radical change was necessary for military success. As General Aleksei Brusilov stated, Russia could not win the war with its existing system of government.

Such was the background to the collapse of the imperial system in March 1917. Crucial in this process was a hopelessly inadequate

state administrative structure, the czar's basic refusal to work with representatives of the Duma (which only served to strengthen organizations and individuals "outside" the basic state system), and increasingly widespread and obvious corruption and self-indulgence within government and industrial establishments. The cities of Russia experienced sharp increases in recorded crime and public disorder, and certainly by the end of 1916, there was a conscious *fin de siècle* extravagance, which, alongside the demonization of the Romanov dynasty, pointed to a rising expectation of revolutionary change.

*Hedley P. Willmott and
Timothy C. Dowling*

See also: Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853–1926); Brusilov Offensive (June 4–September 1, 1916); February (March) Revolution (1917); Home Front (Russian), World War I (1914–1917); Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–December 1915); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Nicholas I, Czar (1796–1855); October (November) Revolution (1917); Schedule 19 (Plan 19); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

The European part of World War II was decided on the Eastern Front, where it had started. The Soviet Union naturally played a key role; though it is likely Hitler would

have invaded Poland regardless, the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 not only precluded a two-front war for Germany but it also gave the Nazis an ally in the east. The alliance was of course only temporary, but it bought the Soviets time to rebuild an army shattered by the Great Purges and to shift their industrial base east, away from German predations. When Hitler predictably turned on his erstwhile ally in 1941, therefore, the Soviets were at least able to weather the initial blow.


Once the Soviet Red Army gained its footing and stopped the Germans outside of Moscow, the balance began to shift. The outcome was by no means predetermined, but the sheer weight of the Red Army was telling. The British at sea and the Americans in the air contributed significantly to victory, and their armies likewise formed part of the effort that completed the Allied victory, but the main Anglo-American effort in northwestern Europe was made in the summer of 1944. The Soviet military superiority over German forces by mid-1944 was such that the Soviet Army would have completed Germany's defeat in or about mid-1945.

It is hard to resist the idea that in 1941 Germany could have defeated the Soviet Union, but in actuality Nazi Germany could not destroy the Soviet Union and could not destroy Russia. Certainly in autumn 1941, there was a Soviet faltering under the impact of massive defeats and the loss of non-Russian territories, but the point was that Nazism could promise only slavery and death to the peoples of the East, and Soviet resistance was thus compounded. In some ways a contradiction of this first point, one wonders if the German failure lay in its basic assumption that envisaged the destruction of the Soviet Union in a single campaigning season. The wetness of the winter and spring meant that the German offensive could not begin until June 22 and had to be conducted against shortening hours

of daylight, the onset of the autumn rains, and then the frosts. The question remains as to whether the Germans might have prevailed had they attempted a two-year effort, in the first, securing the Leningrad-Smolensk line, and perhaps securing Ukraine into the bargain, and then readying all lines of communication for a fully prepared effort to and beyond Moscow in 1942.

The theater of operations was one that presented massive logistical problems. By 1942, the front line extended over 2,000 miles between the Baltic Sea and Black Sea, and the theater was noted for its lack of roads and for a rail system of different gauge from the standard European system. By any token, a German invasion of the Soviet Union threatened to present a host of difficult problems in terms of definition of aim, selection of main directions of advance, and resupply.

In some ways, the Soviet system worked, particularly in regard to the evacuation of so much heavy industry into the Urals in 1941. By a ruthless system of priorities and almost complete abandonment of civil production, the Soviet Union was able to match German production and outproduce Germany in terms of tanks and artillery by an appreciable margin. Additionally, the Soviet military system worked, although the defeats of 1941–1942 have to be considered carefully. Before 1941, the basic Soviet military calculation was that a war with Germany could not be won in a single battle or campaign but would have to be fought over a minimum of three years and would be won only as a result of victory in a series of related offensives. It was a form of warfare more or less realized in 1944–1945, and in no small measure because the American supply of trucks placed the equivalent of seven armies on wheels and provided depth of assault that had been elusive in 1943–1944. One of the unfortunate by-products of the three-year idea was the importance of Ukraine in the



prosecution of a protracted war, hence the need to ensure its defense in depth. This in turn led to a concentration of formations in forward areas that only added to the scale of the defeats that were incurred during June–September 1941.

The Soviet military system came to embrace an impressive level of professionalism and technique. The conduct of the defensive Battle of Stalingrad and then the counteroffensive in November 1942 together represent the first occasion when the Soviet military

outthought and outfought the enemy. And by 1943 at Kursk, the Soviets were prepared to cede the initiative and fight a defensive battle in the belief that victory was assured. In 1944, the Soviets put together a series of offensives between the Baltic and Black seas notable for the sidestepping of the main German armor concentrations, a fact indicative of Soviet intelligence advantage and care in terms of deception and surprise. A token of Soviet professional technique is the fact that in the campaign in Manchuria and northern China in August 1945, one tank army advanced the distance equivalent from Normandy to Milan, over comparable ground, in just 11 days (and the Soviet starting point was some 400 miles from the nearest railhead). It was a remarkable achievement on the part of an army that was in such desperate straits in January 1942 that when it sought to raise a reserve tank army it was called the Fifth Tank Army because of the number of tanks at its disposal.

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See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Deep Battle; Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Kursk, Battle of (July 1943); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) Pact (August 24, 1939); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Poland, Invasion of (September 1–October 1, 1939); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943)

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Wrangel, Ferdinand Friedrich Georg Ludwig von (1797–1870)

Baron Ferdinand Friedrich Georg Ludwig von Wrangel is best known as the general manager of the Russian-American Company, essentially the governor of present-day Alaska, and as an arctic explorer and seaman. Several islands, bodies of water, and geographic features are named after him, including Wrangel Island and Mount Wrangel in Alaska.

Born in January 1797 (old calendar, December 1796) in Pskov to a German noble family, Wrangel graduated from the Russian naval college in 1815. He was a crew member on Vasily Golovnin's cruise around the world in 1817–1819. In 1820, Wrangel commanded an expedition to explore Russia's northern territories and arctic areas, eventually reaching beyond 72 degrees north latitude. He returned to St. Petersburg in 1824, having obtained new information about Russia's northern coastline, native peoples, and other scientific subjects. He commanded the world voyage of the vessel *Krotky* from 1825 to 1827.

Named general manager of the Russian-American Company in 1829, Wrangel married Elisabeth Teodora Natalia Karolina de Rossillon, the daughter of Baron Wilhelm de Rossillon, before assuming his duties, as required by the company's rules. As de facto governor of Alaska, Wrangel encouraged investment, built infrastructure, reformed the administration, and introduced cultivation of potato. He also conducted geographic and ethnographic surveys before being recalled to Russia in 1834.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1837, Wrangel became the director of the ship timber bureau of the navy, a position he held for 12 years. He became a vice admiral in 1847, but resigned in 1849 to become the president of the

Russian-American Company, having served as a member of the board of directors for the preceding nine years. In 1854, Wrangel rejoined the naval service and became the director of the hydrographic department. Czar Alexander II appointed him minister of the navy from 1855 to 1857, and in 1859 named Wrangel admiral and general aide-de-camp to the czar.

Wrangel retired in 1864. He resisted the sale of Alaska in 1867 to the United States and wrote several papers opposing the transfer. Wrangel authored a number of volumes regarding his arctic explorations and observations, some of which were translated into French and English. Wrangel died in Dorpat, Livonia, in June 1870.

Alan M. Anderson

See also: Alexander II, Czar (1818–1881); Navy, Imperial Russian (1700–1918)

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Wrangel, Pyotr Nikolaevich (1878–1928)

Pyotr Wrangel was a leading general of the White Russians, the counterrevolutionary forces that fought during the Russian Civil

War that followed the Russian Revolution of 1917. Ruthless and determined, he could not reverse the declining fortunes of his army in Russia and ended his life in exile.

Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel was born in St. Petersburg on August 27, 1878, into a noble family of Swedish extraction. In 1901, he graduated with a degree in mine engineering but nonetheless joined the Imperial Army. Deemed good enough for the Horse Guards, Wrangel served three years before resigning to accept an engineering post in eastern Siberia. When the Russo-Japanese War commenced in 1904, he was reassigned to a Cossack regiment and fought with distinction. After the war, Wrangel was allowed to serve again in the Horse Guards and attend the General Staff Academy in 1907.

When World War I began in August 1914, Wrangel headed a Cossack regiment and saw action throughout Galicia. His good conduct resulted in his promotion to general in 1917 and command of the Seventh Cavalry Division. Though aristocratic in outlook and behavior, Wrangel was unique among contemporaries in recognizing the need for democratic reforms and better treatment of soldiers. He fought well during the ill-fated Kerensky Offensive of August 1917 but resigned from the military when his superior, General Lavr Kornilov, attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg. Because Russia was then in the throes of the communist revolution, Wrangel retired to Yalta to await the outcome of events.

By August 1918, the Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin had begun a brutal campaign of political and military consolidation, and many former imperial officers like Wrangel took up arms to stop them. Given his prior military reputation, Wrangel became a lieutenant general in the counterrevolutionary army known as the Russian White Army, or Whites. Wrangel came to despise his superior, General Anton Denikin, but was nonetheless

accorded command of a cavalry division and ordered to drive the Russian Red Army (of the Bolshevik government) out of the Caucasus.

Wrangel tackled the job with ruthlessness and relish. After much hard fighting at Stavropol, he was told to recruit soldiers from the 3,000 prisoners taken. Wrangel lined them up, summarily executed the officers, and warned lesser ranks of a similar fate if they did not join the White cause. In January 1919, he rose to head of the White Army once Denikin appointed himself commander of the Armed Forces of South Russia. He was then sidelined with typhus for several months but eventually recovered and scored an important victory by capturing Tsaritsyn (Volgograd) from Bolshevik forces in June 1919.

The White troops under his command sustained a serious defeat at Saratov that November and this reverse, coupled with the failure of Denikin's ambitious Moscow campaign, spelled the doom of the White Russians. Wrangel tried to reorganize his shattered army around the vicinity of Kharkov prior to launching a new offensive, but when Denikin demanded his resignation in February 1920, he complied and traveled to Constantinople (Istanbul).

As White fortunes continued to sink, Wrangel returned to Russia following Denikin's resignation of April 1920. Assuming command of the remaining White forces in Crimea, he spent several months rebuilding their offensive spirit and capability. He was assisted greatly by the Poles, who were then locked in combat with Bolshevik forces along the eastern border of Russia.

Unlike previous White leaders, Wrangel tried to attract the support of the peasantry, the Cossacks, and even the Western Allies through extensive land reforms. He eventually assembled 40,000 men, stormed into Tauride, and drove northward into the Ukraine. In August,

however, his White armies suffered heavily at the hands of the Kuban Cossacks and failed to keep possession of Tauride. Wrangel withdrew back to Perekop Peninsula by November with 30,000 men, while the Red Army, 100,000 strong, slowly advanced upon him. Wrangel at this juncture realized that the end was near but refused to abandon his men. With consummate skill, he organized a remarkable evacuation that transported 146,000 soldiers and dependents to safety. Wrangel himself was among the last to depart aboard the cruiser *General Kornilov* for Western Europe.

While in exile, Wrangel immersed himself in refugee affairs and in 1924, founded the Union of Old Soldiers of Russia, which served as a focal point for anti-Bolshevik activities. He accepted work as a mining engineer in Belgium. Wrangel died suddenly in Brussels on April 25, 1928, among the most effective commanders of the doomed White movement.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Kerensky Offensive (July 1–19, 1917); Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870–1918); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Xianjiang, Battle of (1937)

The Battle of Xianjiang occurred in 1937 when the warlord Sheng Shicai ruled Xianjiang Province in China. Shicai was an active, pro-Soviet warlord who was considered to be utterly under the control of the Soviet Union. Shicai, though he ruled the province, was under the guidance and tutelage of the Urumqi (the capital of Xianjiang Province) Soviet consul general. Shicai's pro-Soviet sentiments resulted in his expulsion of some 20,000 Muslim Kazakhs from Xianjiang Province in 1936. In 1937, Shicai created and enforced a purge of the political and intellectual elite of Xianjiang Province to coincide with Josef Stalin's own Great Purges within the Soviet Union. This occurred in conjunction with the Xianjiang War of 1937.

The Xianjiang War was a direct result of both Shicai's purge and his expulsion of the Kazakhs. The Kazakhs, when forced from Xianjiang, went to the province of Qinghai, where General Ma Bufung led Chinese Muslims in a massacre of the displaced Kazakhs. In response to this massacre, and the purge conducted by Shicai, a group of 1,500 Muslim rebels led by Kichik Akhund launched a rebellion against Shicai's pro-Soviet forces.

Provincial troops loyal to Shicai attempted to stop the rising by moving into the south of Xianjiang province, but suffered a defeat in July 1937 near the town of Karashar. With this loss, Shicai's troops were unable to move any further into the south, and Shicai called upon the Soviet Union and others for assistance.

The Soviet Union sent some 5,000 troops as well as an armored regiment and an air unit. In addition to the Soviet Union's military assistance and the provincial troops, several thousand White Russian troops from the White Movement in China joined Shicai's cause. This group faced Akhund's rebels in August 1937, dealing them a powerful blow, and essentially destroying the Muslim rebellion. The rebel troops were not only defeated on the field in a battle near the city of Aksu but the retreating Muslim rebels also were strafed and bombed by the Soviet air compliment, turning the retreat into a rout, and then into a massacre. Roughly 200 of Akhund's 1,500-man force survived the encounter.

During the Battle of Xianjiang, a great deal of intrigue occurred within the upper echelons of Shicai's troops. Various commanders sought to use the rebellion as a means to wrest control of the southern portion of Xianjiang from Shicai. The Soviet elements that came to assist Shicai, however, helped to secure his position in Xianjiang Province. They also demonstrated the effective use of Soviet combined arms tactics and the development of aerial bombardment, as seen in the bombing of the Xianjiang city of Khotan.

The Republic of China's government was fully aware of the Soviet and White Russian troops fighting in Xianjiang Province. The rebellion of the Muslims in Xianjiang, however, happened to coincide with the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The invasion of the Japanese—and China's reliance upon Soviet military goods

and assistance—forced the Chinese government to turn a blind eye to the Soviet Union’s violation of its sovereignty, and to the fact that the White Movement of Russia had such a strong military presence in China.

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See also: Chinese Civil War (1927–1949); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953)

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Y

Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

In January 1944, the Allied powers' European Advisory Commission on Germany began meeting in London. It was decided that Germany's postwar government would be an Allied control council in Berlin, composed of commanders of the occupying forces of the various powers. But the commission members needed clarification from the Allied leaders on other matters. Between August and October 1944, delegates at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington worked to draft proposals for a postwar United Nations international organization. They also needed to decide several issues. To resolve these and other matters, a second and last meeting of the Big Three—British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin—and their staffs (some 700 people in all) occurred from February 4–11, 1945 in the Soviet Union, at Yalta in the Crimea.

The meeting at Yalta (code-named *ARGONAUT*) was less significant than either its detractors or supporters alleged. Many of the decisions confirmed there had already been taken during the earlier 1943 Tehran Conference and other meetings. At the time, its outcome generated considerable satisfaction. Only with the developing Cold War and the realization that Soviet help had not been necessary in the Pacific war did Yalta become such a fractious issue in U.S. politics, with Republican Party leaders charging that there had been a Democratic Party “give-away” to the Communists.

The bargaining position of the Western leaders had not appreciably improved since the Tehran Conference. Indeed, they had just suffered the humiliation of the initial German successes in the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). The Red Army, by contrast, had smashed the German Army Group Center and was then only 50 miles from Berlin.

Another factor at Yalta was Roosevelt's determination to draw Stalin “out of his shell” and bring the Soviet Union into postwar cooperation with the Western powers. As a result, he continued the conciliatory tactical approach he had employed at the Tehran Conference by making every effort to accommodate the Soviet leader. It did not enhance the Western bargaining position when Roosevelt announced that U.S. troops were unlikely to remain long in Europe. He also continued his practice of distancing himself from Churchill, most notably on colonial issues. Another factor at work was that Roosevelt and the United States had chosen to seek the speediest possible conclusion to the war with the least expenditure of American lives, rather than wage the war for certain geopolitical objectives, as Churchill had preferred.

Stalin, however, knew exactly what he wanted. After World War I, the Western Allies had sought to construct a cordon sanitaire (protective barrier) to contain Bolshevism. Stalin's goal was now the reverse—he wanted a belt of East European satellite states to exclude the West. This arrangement was to provide security against another German invasion and to protect a



British prime minister Winston Churchill (left), U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (center), and Soviet leader Josef Stalin (right) at the Yalta Conference. The “Big Three” met in Yalta, Crimea, on February 4–11, 1945. (Library of Congress)

severely wounded Soviet Union, which had suffered the deaths of as many as 27 million citizens and terrible material losses against the West and its influences.

Roosevelt secured Soviet agreement to the Declaration on Liberated Europe. The leaders pledged that the provisional governments of liberated areas would be “representative of all democratic elements” and that there would be “free elections . . . responsive to the will of the people.” But events would prove that such lofty phrases were subject to completely different interpretations.

In discussions on Germany, the Big Three agreed to government by an Allied control council. German occupation zones were also set, and at the suggestion of the

Western leaders, France was allowed a zone, although Stalin insisted it be carved from territory already assigned to Britain and the United States. The three leaders also agreed on steps to demilitarize Germany, dissolve the National Socialist Party, and punish war criminals. Further, in what would later be regarded as a controversial decision, they agreed that all nationals accused of being “deserters or traitors” were to be returned to their countries of origin.

The Soviets insisted on exacting heavy reparations from Germany for damages inflicted by that nation on the Soviet Union. The Western Allies, remembering the trouble caused by reparations after World War I and fearful they would be subsidizing Soviet

exactions, refused to set a specific amount but tentatively agreed to discuss the sum of \$20 billion. The Soviet Union was to receive half of any reparations.

Particularly important to Roosevelt was the establishment of a postwar United Nations organization. Well aware of this and not greatly interested in the organization himself, Stalin used it to secure concessions on other matters. The Big Three adopted recommendations from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference that the United Nations be organized on the lines of the old League of Nations, complete with the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat. It also set the composition of the Security Council. Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union might have three votes in the General Assembly. The most difficult matter to resolve was that of the veto in the Security Council, although this only became an issue in U.S. politics later, when the Soviet Union exercised that privilege so liberally. The U.S. Senate would not have approved American participation without the veto provision.

Poland was a particularly vexing matter for the two Western leaders, but the Red Army already occupied the country. Regarding boundaries, Stalin demanded and succeeded in establishing the Curzon Line, with slight modifications, as Poland's eastern border. The Allies were more strenuous in objecting to the Oder-Neisse Line as its western boundary, and there was no agreement on this matter at Yalta. Regarding the Polish government, Moscow had, only a month before Yalta, recognized the Lublin Poles as the official government of Poland. Stalin agreed to broaden this puppet government on a "democratic basis," and he pledged to hold "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." The

Western Allies secured the same concessions for Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The most controversial decisions taken at Yalta concerned the Far East. These decisions were kept secret from China. Stalin had already made it clear that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan sometime after the defeat of Germany. This matter was, in fact, never in doubt. The problem lay in the timing. Here, Stalin was in the same position enjoyed by the Allies before the invasion of northern France. Tardy Soviet entry into the Pacific war might mean heavy U.S. casualties in an invasion of the Japanese home islands. No one knew whether the atomic bomb would work and, even if it did, whether it would be decisive in bringing about Japan's defeat.

Stalin pledged to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany. In return, the Soviet Union would receive South Sakhalin Island, concessions in the port of Dairen, the return of Port Arthur as a naval base, control over railroads leading to these ports, and the Kurile Islands (which had never been Russian territory). Outer Mongolia would continue to be independent of China, but China would regain sovereignty over Manchuria. In effect, these concessions would replace Japanese imperialism with that of the Soviet Union, but the Western leaders believed they were necessary to secure the timing of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war. In future years, what Americans disliked most about Yalta was that these concessions turned out to be unnecessary.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II (1945–1948); Kurile Islands; Port Arthur; Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943)

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Yanushkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1868–1918)

Russian army general. Born in May 1868, Nikolai Nikolaevich Yanushkevich graduated from the Mikhailovsky Artillery School in 1888 and completed the General Staff Academy in 1896. He spent most of his pre-war career in the bureaucracy of the War

Ministry until becoming chief of the General Staff Academy in 1913. While he had not exhibited any exceptional talent, Yanushkevich appears to have skillfully navigated the political waters of the War Ministry and gained the favor of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Czar Nicholas II. Early in 1914, Yanushkevich was appointed chief of staff of the Russian Army.

During the July Crisis of 1914, Yanushkevich was one of the most outspoken voices in favor of early Russian mobilization, but after the start of the war in August 1914, he faded into the background, often deferring to his forceful deputy chief, General Yuri N. Danilov, on matters of strategy. Yanushkevich devoted most of his energies to civil administration of the large territory just behind the front that the Russian government had placed under military control. While fulfilling this role, he attempted to clear this terrain of “unreliable elements,” which became a program of harassment of Russian and Polish Jews. During the Russian retreat after the Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive (May–September 1915), he ordered the army to conduct a scorched-earth policy. The policy failed in part because the peasantry, already disillusioned with the czarist regime, resented the army’s forced destruction of crops and resources.

After the czar assumed command of the Russian forces in August 1915, Yanushkevich followed the grand duke to the Caucasus where he continued to serve as Nikolai Nikolaevich’s chief of staff. Following the abdication of the czar in March 1917, Yanushkevich resigned from the army. Little is known of his activities for the next year, but he appears to have died in the Caucasus sometime in 1918, perhaps while trying to join the growing anti-Bolshevik movement in the region.

Curtis S. King

See also: Army, Imperial Russian (c. 1500–1918); Caucasus Front, World War I; Danilov, Yuri Nikiforovich (1866–1937); February (March) Revolution (1917); Nicholas II, Czar (1868–1918); Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); October (November) Revolution (1917); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); *Stavka*

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Yazov, Dmitry (November 8, 1924–)

Last defense minister of the USSR. Dmitry Yazov, born on November 8, 1924, came from a farming family in the Oblast of Omsk. Yazov was drafted in November 1941, and in 1942, graduated from the Moscow Military School of Infantry as an officer. He was severely wounded in August and upon returning to the front, again in January 1943. Yazov was a company commander at the end of World War II.

Yazov remained in the army and, by 1953, attained the rank of major and became deputy battalion commander. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy with honors in

1956, and became a battalion commander in the 63rd Guards Division. Later he was sent to the Leningrad Military District, and promoted in 1960 to colonel. He was in Cuba in September 1962 as head of the Cuban armed forces training center, and tasked to protect the Soviet missile sites. At the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Yazov returned to the USSR as head of the 1st Division in the Leningrad Military District.

In 1967, Yazov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff, and was assigned to Transbaikalia. He then served as commander of the XXXII Army Corps in the Crimea (1971), and in December 1972, he was sent to Baku with the rank of lieutenant general and head of the Fourth Army. In 1975, Yazov was assigned to the Ministry of Defense and, in November 1977, to the Far Eastern Military District; by this time he had been promoted to colonel general.

After commanding troops in Czechoslovakia in 1979–1980, Yazov was assigned as commander of the Central Asian Military District. He was critical of Soviet operations in Afghanistan, but nevertheless became a candidate for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On May 30, 1987, Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev appointed him defense minister. Yazov was unprepared for the reforms Gorbachev was carrying out within the Soviet Union, and became one of the “Gang of Eight” that formed the Emergency State Committee in the failed August Coup of 1991. He ordered troops and tanks into Moscow to occupy key positions. When the coup failed, he was arrested and went to prison until May 6, 1994. He became a consultant to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1998, and was fully “rehabilitated” by Vladimir Putin in 2003.

Raymond D. Limbach

See also: Afghanistan War (December 25, 1979–February 15, 1989); August Coup (1991); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Putin, Vladimir V. (1952–); Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

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Yegerov, Aleksandr Ilyich (1883–1939)

Born into a peasant family near Samara on October 13, 1883, Aleksandr Yegerov rose to become a marshal of the Soviet Union and chief of the General Staff. He graduated from the Samara gymnasium in 1901, joined the Russian army in 1902, and qualified as a sublieutenant in 1905, when he helped put down the Revolution of 1905. Wounded five times while serving with the 132nd Infantry Battalion in World War I, he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

A member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs) since 1904, Yegerov fell in easily with the Bolshevik regime after the October Revolution. Promoted to colonel, he commanded the Bolshevik Tenth Army on the Southern Front from December 1918 to May 1919, when he was again wounded. Upon recovery, Yegerov took command of Fourteenth Army and played a central role in defeating the White forces of Anton Denikin in Ukraine. He subsequently served as commander of the Kiev Military District during 1920–1921, and then the Petrograd Military District.

In September 1921, Yegerov took command of the Soviet Southwestern Front

in the war against Poland. He worked closely with Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Semen Budyonny, and Josef Stalin during this campaign, which was ultimately unsuccessful. Yegerov then transferred to command of the Caucasus Red Army from February 1922 to May 1924, after which he took command of the Ukrainian Military District. During 1926–1927, Yegerov served as a military advisor in China; upon his return, he was appointed as commander of the Belorussian Military District.

In June 1931, Yegerov was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and deputy commissar for defense, though he was technically still only a colonel. In September 1935 though, Yegerov was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union when the rank was created. Two years later, he was demoted to commander and sent to the Transcaucas Military District.

Yegerov was arrested in February 1938, and died in prison on February 22, 1939. He was rehabilitated in 1956, having never been charged with any crimes.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973); Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947); Great Purges and the Military (1934–1938); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Polish War (February 1919–March 1921); Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937)

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Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007)

Soviet reform politician during the last years of the Soviet Union and first elected president of Russia (1991–1999).

Born February 1, 1931, in the town of Butka in the Sverdlovsk Oblast in the Ural Mountains, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin graduated from the Urals Polytechnical Institute in 1955 as a construction engineer. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1961 and worked on various construction projects in the Sverdlovsk area until 1968.

Yeltsin rose through the party ranks in the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee. He was elected the region's industry secretary in 1975 and first secretary in 1976. During 1976–1985, he moved through the national ranks of the CPSU. He served as a deputy in the Council of the Union (1978–1989), a member of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Transport and Communication (1979–1984), a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1984–1985), and chief of the Central Committee Department of Construction in 1985. The new CPSU general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, summoned Yeltsin to Moscow in April 1985 as part of a team of reform-minded party members.

Gorbachev asked Yeltsin to reform the Moscow City Committee. Yeltsin began to clear the city's Party Committee of corrupt officials, which endeared him to Muscovites. Eventually he became dissatisfied with the slow pace of the perestroika ("rebuilding") reforms and openly criticized CPSU officials. This directly threatened the power base of Yegor Ligachev, who endorsed a moderate Party-led reform, and Ligachev took Yeltsin to task in the politburo. In September 1987, Yeltsin resigned in an attempt



Russian president Boris Yeltsin outlines the principles of a new republic constitution to the Russian Parliament at the Kremlin in Moscow on November 2, 1991. (AP Photo/Boris Yurchenko)

to force Gorbachev to take sides. Gorbachev needed Yeltsin to counterbalance Ligachev's growing skepticism and rejected Yeltsin's resignation, asking him to curb his critiques.

Yeltsin ignored Gorbachev's plea. Gorbachev therefore allowed Ligachev to continue the campaign against Yeltsin, which finally led to Yeltsin's dismissal as first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. Yeltsin attempted suicide, in November 1987, as a result of this campaign. In 1988, Yeltsin was also expelled from the politburo, but he remained in Moscow as the first deputy chair of the State Committee for Construction.

Yeltsin went on to win a landslide victory in the newly established Congress of People's

Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in March 1989. In May 1990, he became chairman of the RSFSR. By June 12, 1990, the RSFSR, along with the other 14 Soviet republics, had declared its independence. Yeltsin resigned from the CPSU in July 1990. Yeltsin was directly elected to the newly created office of president of the now-independent RSFSR on June 12, 1991, winning some 57 percent of the popular vote. He then demanded Gorbachev's resignation. Gorbachev refused to step down but did agree to sign a new union treaty in late August 1991.

Hard-line conservative forces within the CPSU tried to prevent the signing of the treaty, which would lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On August 19, 1991, the conservatives dispatched troops to key positions around Moscow and held Gorbachev under house arrest. Yeltsin climbed atop one of the tanks surrounding the parliament building, denounced the CPSU coup as illegal, and called for a general strike. The troops sent to quell the demonstrations refused to take action against the demonstrators, instead joining them. Yeltsin and his supporters remained in the parliament building as they rallied international support. For three days, thousands of people demonstrated in front of parliament, holding off an expected attack on the building.

The failed putsch and massive street demonstrations quickly destroyed the credibility of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms. On December 24, 1991, the RSFSR and then later Russia took the Soviet Union's seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The next day, Gorbachev resigned, an act that officially dissolved the Soviet Union. Yeltsin, as president of Russia, immediately abolished the CPSU. In the meantime, he had negotiated with the

leaders of Ukraine and Belarus to form the Commonwealth of Independent States as a federation of most of the former Soviet republics.

With a stagnating economy and a hostile legislature and having survived an attempted coup (1993), Yeltsin was not expected to win re-election in 1996 but staged an amazing comeback. Under Yeltsin, Russia's foreign policy in the Middle East became something of a tightrope act. Russia's focus was on Iran and Turkey, which were crucial to Russian economic growth (trade, oil issues, and arms sales) and to the delicate balancing act Moscow employed in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The Russian war in Chechnya and a civil war in Tajikistan worried Russian policy makers greatly.

At the same time, the Kremlin sought to maintain influence in the Persian Gulf without alienating the United States, Iraq, and other nations in the region. Yeltsin's policies saw the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict as a distant third in its list of Middle East priorities, but by the end of the 1990s, the Kremlin viewed Israel as one of its strongest partners in the region, and by then the two nations were engaged in significant trade exchanges. Yeltsin's Kremlin also sought to stop the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, an endeavor in which Russia cooperated with Iran but to little effect.

Despite becoming increasingly unpopular and suffering from ill health due to years of alcoholism, Yeltsin continued as president of Russia until December 31, 1999, when he surprisingly named Vladimir Putin acting president. Yeltsin died in Moscow on April 23, 2007.

Frank Beyersdorf

See also: August Coup (1991); Chechen War, First (1994–1996); Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–); Tajikistan Civil War (1992–1997)

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Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich (1892–1970)

Soviet army marshal who was in command of the Fourth Ukrainian Front at the end of World War II. Born in Markovka, Russia, on October 14, 1892, Andrei Yeremenko was drafted into the Russian army in 1913. He fought in World War I as a junior officer. He joined the Red Guards in October 1917 and the Red Army and Bolshevik Party in 1918. Yeremenko fought as a cavalry officer in the Russian Civil War, ending that conflict as deputy commander of a regiment. He then commanded a regiment and attended the Military Political Academy and the Frunze Military Academy in 1935. Yeremenko commanded a cavalry division between 1935 and 1938, then the VI Cossack Cavalry Corps, which he led in the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939.

In June 1940, Yeremenko took command of a mechanized corps and was promoted to lieutenant general. When the German army invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, he was commanding the First Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Recalled to the west, he replaced General Dmitry Pavlov as Western



Marshal of the Soviet Union Andre Yeremenko.
(Lisa Larsen/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Front commander, helping restore a degree of stability. An outstanding tactician, he understood the importance of airpower and the need to mass armor.

In August 1941, Yeremenko assumed command of the new Briansk Front, where he was seriously wounded in October. After his recovery, he was promoted to colonel general and put in command of Fourth Shock Army in the defense of Moscow. Again seriously wounded in February 1942, Yeremenko took command of the Southeast Front, defending Stalingrad, in August. In January 1943, he assumed command of the Southern Front, pushing the Germans out of the Caucasus.

Transferred to command the Kalinin Front in April 1943, he was made general of the

army in August. Yeremenko commanded the First Baltic Front in October and November 1943 for the advance on Smolensk. He then led the Independent (Black Sea) Maritime Front in the eastern Crimea, before heading the Fourth Ukrainian Front from March to July 1945.

Following the end of the war, Yeremenko commanded, in turn, the Carpathian, West Siberian, and North Caucasus military districts until 1958. He next served as inspector general of the Ministry of Defense, until his death in Moscow on November 19, 1970.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Frunze Academy; Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Stalingrad, Battle of; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Yermolov (Ermolov), Aleksei Petrovich (1772–1861)

Prominent Russian general and statesman, notorious for his policies in the North Caucasus.

Yermolov was born into a Russian noble family from the Orlov Gubernia and, after graduating from the boarding school of the Moscow University, he enlisted in the Life Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment in 1787. In 1794, he received his baptism by fire in Poland, where he participated in the infamous assault on Praga and earned the Order of St. George (4th class). In 1799, he was unexpectedly arrested for alleged participation in conspiracy against Czar Paul I and spent two

years in exile before being recalled by Czar Alexander I.

During the War of the Third Coalition (1805), Yermolov distinguished himself in battles at Amstetten and Austerlitz, and was promoted to colonel. In 1807, he participated in the War of the Fourth Coalition, earning praise and rewards for his actions at Eylau, Heilsberg, and Friedland; in 1808, he was promoted to major general. During Napoleon's invasion of Russia, Yermolov became the chief of staff of the First Western Army and took part in the Russian retreat to Smolensk. He played an important role in the quarrel between generals Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, opposing Barclay's strategy of retreat and secretly intriguing for his removal. He distinguished himself at Lubino (Valutina Gora and was promoted to lieutenant general on November 12, 1812) and Borodino, where he was lightly wounded leading a counterattack that recaptured the Great Redoubt.

During the rest of campaign, he served as a duty officer in the headquarters of the main Russian army. In 1813, Yermolov was given command of the 2nd Guards Division and served with distinction in Germany and France. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he was appointed as commander in chief of the Russian forces in Georgia and commander of the Independent Georgian Corps on April 21, 1816. He proved himself an able administrator, introducing many administrative and economic reforms. In 1817, he traveled to Persia to negotiate with Fath Ali Shah and succeeded in confirming the Russian conquests recognized by the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813, for which he received promotion to general of infantry on March 4, 1818.

Yermolov's tenure in the Caucasus is, however, remembered chiefly for his colonialist policies in the North Caucasus. Unlike his predecessors, Yermolov rejected the

notion of indirect rule and instead adopted a strategy of systematic subjugation and expansion. He believed Russia “must reign by force, not by appeal” and proclaimed that “only executions can save the lives of hundreds of Russians and keep thousands of Muslims from betraying us.” He proved a ruthless ruler in the Caucasus and earned notoriety for brutally suppressing Chechen uprisings. Yermolov served in Georgia until his dismissal in April 1827 because of his disagreement with General Ivan Pashkevich, who was patronized by Czar Nicholas I. He spent the rest of his life at his estate before dying on April 23, 1861 in Moscow.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austerlitz, Battle of (December 2, 1805); Bagration, Pyotr (1765–1812); Barclay de Tolly, Prince Mikhail (1761–1818); Borodino, Battle of (September 7, 1812); Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815); Pashkevich, Ivan Fyodorovich (1782–1856); Patriotic War of 1812; Third Coalition, War of the (1805)

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Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973)

Soviet behavior during this conflict forced Moscow to confront the importance of its newly evolving policy of détente with the United States and its historic support for regional allies such as Egypt and Syria. This military support included supplying Egypt

with over 1,000 tanks, 1,000 armored personnel carriers, over 100 combat aircraft, 120 helicopters, and nearly 100 surface-to-air missile batteries between 1970 and 1973. This support was offset by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s July 1972 expulsion of Soviet’s 15,000 military personnel, which demonstrated the periodically recurring tension within this bilateral relationship stemming from Cairo’s displeasure at Soviet attempts to limit use of these weapons.

Soviet rhetoric emphasized the danger of war during 1973, but privately the Soviets avoided direct criticism of their Arab allies. Multiple factors contributed to this conflict, including deeply entrenched Arab-Israeli enmity, Sadat’s desire to reestablish Arab political and military credibility following the disastrous 1967 war, and proving that Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula was not permanent, as well as Syrian determination to recapture the Golan Heights. Bulgarian and Czechoslovak news agencies referred to Egyptian and Syrian attack preparations during October 2–4, while *Izvestia*, the official Soviet government newspaper, referred to Israeli troop concentrations on October 5. On October 4, 1973, the Soviets began airlifting their dependents out of Egypt and Syria as a precautionary measure.

Despite Israeli assurances that they would not attack first, as they had in 1967, the Arabs began their assault at 2:00 p.m. on October 6. The following day, the Soviets started airlifting supplies to Egypt, and the United States responded to serious Israeli battlefield losses with its own supply airlift and sealift which exceeded the Soviet efforts by 40,000 tons and continued throughout the war. Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin visited Cairo between October 16 and 19 to assist the Egyptian war effort.

There was tenuous consultation between Moscow and Washington involving policy

makers such as Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatolyn Dobrynin, U.S. president Richard Nixon, U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, and Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev. On October 20–21, Kissinger arrived in Moscow and attempted to negotiate a cease-fire. The Soviets wanted Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders while Kissinger wanted a cease-fire with Israeli troops in place and linked with United Nations Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory.

Negotiations stalled quickly though, and the Israelis expressed concern that Washington was negotiating at their expense. Tensions rose further on October 24 when Nixon received a note from Brezhnev saying Moscow was prepared to send troops to the region if the United States refused to participate in an international police action. This same day saw the Soviets move 40,000–50,000 airborne troops to staging areas in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine for possible deployment to the Mideast.

The Nixon administration responded by upgrading the alert status of U.S. military forces to Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3. On October 25, Kissinger expressed United States' willingness to defend Israel and United States' national interests in a press conference.

The Soviets had 95 naval ships in the Mediterranean during the Yom Kippur War and the United States had 60 naval ships, so a superpower conflict was possible if the crisis escalated. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis wanted a cease-fire, however, and they were prepared to negotiate prisoner exchanges and border changes by November 1973.

The Egyptians and Israelis also used the postwar environment to extract military and economic assistance from Washington, and Moscow benefitted from higher oil prices stemming from the temporary Arab oil embargo.

Overall results saw the Soviets increase their support for Arab policies without having to intervene militarily on behalf of Cairo or Damascus. The relative cooperation between Moscow and Washington kept the crisis from becoming a military conflict, despite diplomatic missteps by both sides, due to their desire to maintain détente and United States' reluctance to get involved in a military conflict stemming from the emerging Watergate crisis and public disillusionment with the Vietnam War. Although both Moscow and Washington wanted peace in the Mideast, each side had different visions on what it would look like. The Arabs and Israelis were not ready to take steps that would increase the possibility of broader regional peace. The end result was a bloody conflict reinforcing the regional status quo.

Bert Chapman

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1956); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982); Six-Day War (June 5–10, 1967)

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Yudenich, Nikolai (1862–1933)

Russian army general. Born to a noble family in Minsk Province on July 30, 1862, Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich graduated from the Aleksandrovsky Military College in 1881. He completed the General Staff Academy in 1887 and then served in a variety

of staff assignments until 1904. During the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Yudenich commanded first an infantry regiment and then a brigade. Promoted to major general in 1905, Yudenich was posted to the Caucasus where he was deputy chief of staff of the Caucasus Army in 1907. Advanced to chief of staff there by 1912, he was serving in that capacity on the outbreak of World War I.

Many Caucasus Army units were being relocated to other fronts at the beginning of the war when the Ottoman Third Army invaded. Yudenich resisted orders from Caucasus Army commander General Viktor Myshlaevsky that Russian forces withdraw. Instead Yudenich defended Sarikamiş, where he won a victory in late December and early January. In January 1915, Yudenich was advanced to lieutenant general and took command of the Caucasus Army. Known as a daring, resourceful commander, Yudenich defeated another Turkish advance, this one in the summer of 1915. The next year, he mounted a series of spoiling attacks that captured Erzurum, Trebizond, and Erzincan.

In March 1917, Yudenich replaced Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as supreme civil and military commander of the Caucasus Front. He himself was then recalled. He remained in Petrograd until the Bolshevik seizure of power that November, when he went into hiding.

In 1919, Yudenich joined anti-Bolshevik White forces near Petrograd and in October

became the commander of the Northwestern Front. That same month, his small White force of only some 14,000 men attacked from northeast Estonia and reached the outskirts of Petrograd. Short of supplies and equipment, it was driven back and forced to retire into Estonia. Yudenich went into exile in 1920 and died at Nice, France, on October 5, 1933.

Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke (1856–1929); Russian Civil War (1917–1922); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Z

Zaionchkovsky, Andrei Medarovich (1862–1926)

Russian army general. Born on December 20, 1862, to a noble family in Orel Province, Andrei Zaionchkovsky graduated from the Nikolaevsky Engineering School in 1883 and the General Staff Academy in 1888. During the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, he commanded first an infantry regiment and then a brigade. In 1912, he assumed command of the 37th Infantry Division, which he led at the beginning of World War I. In early 1915, he assumed command of a corps.

Zaionchkovsky first achieved prominence during the Romanian campaign of 1916. Under the prodding of France, Romania joined the war on the Allied side that August, whereupon Zaionchkovsky assumed command of the Dobrudja Detachment of three divisions to occupy the Romanian border province of Dobrudja that controlled the mouth of the Danube River. Chief of staff of the Russian Army General Mikhail Alekseev hoped that this token Russian military force would be sufficient to prevent Bulgaria from attacking Romania from the south. The Dobrudja Detachment consisted of two Russian divisions and one Serbian division. Zaionchkovsky expressed serious reservations about the size and composition of his force (while Bulgarians regarded the Russians as friends for their role in freeing Bulgaria from Ottoman rule, the Serbs and Bulgarians were long-standing enemies), but he was ordered to proceed.

As Zaionchkovsky feared, Bulgaria declared war on Romania in early September, whereupon a combined Bulgarian,

Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman force under Field Marshal August von Mackensen invaded the Dobrudja. Romanian-Russian military cooperation was virtually nonexistent, and by late October, Zaionchkovsky's forces had been forced to abandon the important seaport of Constanza. Romanian and Russian forces were caught in a vice, with the German Ninth Army under General Erich von Falkenhayn also driving into Romania from the west. Initially refused reinforcements, Zaionchkovsky found himself relieved of his command. Later, Alekseev was forced to commit 36 Russian divisions to the fight for Romania.

On his return to Russia, Zaionchkovsky took command of XVIII Corps. Promoted in 1917 to general of infantry, he was retired following the March 1917 revolution. Zaionchkovsky joined the Red Army in 1918 and, as chief of staff of the Thirtieth Army, and fought against the White forces in Ukraine. After the Russian Civil War, he lectured at the Red Army Military Academy. He also led the commission established to investigate the lessons of World War I. He also published extensively on the subject. Andrei Zaionchkovsky died in Moscow on March 22, 1926.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilievich (1857–1918); Romanian Campaign of 1916; World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Zaitsev, Vasily (1915–1991)

Famous Russian sniper during World War II, most remembered for his combat record in the Battle of Stalingrad (1942–1943).

It is difficult to separate fact from fiction with Zaitsev. Soviet propaganda mythologized soldiers such as Zaitsev to boost morale and promote communist ideals. One should read Zaitsev's memoirs with caution, since as with marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy K. Zhukov's original memoir, there is no doubt Soviet authorities peppered Zaitsev's text with falsehoods.

Zaitsev was born on March 23, 1915, in the Yelenovskoye agricultural district of the southern Ural Mountains. In the forests of the Urals, he received early training in rifle marksmanship when he hunted with his father and grandfather. He attended a technical school in Magnitogorsk and became a

member of the *Komsomol* (Young Communist League). In 1937, the government drafted him, and due to his 5'3" stature, he received an assignment with the Soviet navy's Pacific Fleet. While stationed at Vladivostok he finished his education at the Regional Military Economic School, graduating with honors. In 1942, Zaitsev petitioned for a transfer to defend Stalingrad against the German-led attack. He arrived in the city on September 21.

During the battle, he served with the 284th Siberian Rifle Division (renamed the 79th Guards Rifle Division on March 1, 1943, for its role at Stalingrad). A few weeks later, on October 5, Zaitsev shot three Germans at 600 yards, and became a sniper at the insistence of an officer. After three days of training with another sniper, Zaitsev claimed he shot four to five Germans a day in Stalingrad, totaling 242 kills, including 10 snipers.

Zaitsev's most legendary kill involved a supposed duel with an elite German sniper known as Major Konings, director of the Berlin Sniper School. When first interviewed by a Red Army reporter in December 1942, Zaitsev stated the encounter lasted five hours, and the German sniper had no special credentials. In his 1956 memoir, the duel became an epic struggle of nerves and cunning that lasted four days. Moreover, due to a captured German soldier, Zaitsev knew Konings was in Stalingrad pursuing him. Years later, during a television interview, Zaitsev stated the duel began over control of a water spring. This time, the contest lasted three days and the discovery that the German was the head of a Berlin sniper school shocked Zaitsev. To this day, Moscow's Central Armed Forces Museum displays Konings's telescopic rifle sight, recovered by Zaitsev.

Commander of the Sixty-Second Army Lieutenant General Vasily I. Chuikov's account mirrors Zaitsev's 1956 memoir, adding

the duel took place at the end of September. William Craig's book *Enemy at the Gates* (1973), David L. Robbins's novel *War of the Rats* (1999), and Jean-Jacques Annaud's film *Enemy at the Gates* (2001) have all further sensationalized the encounter. Antony Beevor's research, however, discredited the duel. According to Beevor, Director of the Soviet Information Bureau (*Sovinformburo*) Colonel General Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov's daily Stalingrad reports always glorified any sniper activity, but no mention of the duel exists within the reports. Not a single German source mentions Konings or a Berlin sniper school.

According to Soviet sources, before (and perhaps after) an enemy mortar shell injured him, Zaitsev taught many other troops the art of sniping, and aided in a massive sniper movement that flourished within in the Sixty-Second Army. Zaitsev ended the war as a captain, and the Red Army awarded him many decorations, including a Hero of the Soviet Union medal. Whatever occurred in Stalingrad, Zaitsev became an icon of Soviet idealism and heroism. Chuikov praised him as one of the finest heroes of Stalingrad—an unblinking, stoic man, with an iron grip. After the war, Zaitsev became director of an engineering school in Kiev, where he died on December 15, 1991. In 2006, Russia placed his body at Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), where his legend endures.

Edward A. Gutiérrez

See also: Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich (1900–1982); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War II, Soviet Union in (1939–1945)

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Zasulich, Mikhail Ivanovich (1843–1910)

Russian general and brother of revolutionary Vera Zasulich.

Mikhail Zasulich was born on December 24, 1843. He graduated from the Alexandrovsky School of Cadets and the Konstantinovsky Military College; in 1863, he commissioned a lieutenant in the 93rd Irkutsk Infantry Regiment. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Zasulich served with the Grenadier Regiment of the Life Guards. He earned several commendations for bravery, including the Order of St. Stanislaus (second class) for actions during the Battle of Philippopolis (1878). Zasulich was promoted to colonel in 1878.

In 1887, Zasulich took command of the 101st Infantry Regiment at Perm; he was promoted to major general in 1894 and received a command in the 9th Infantry Division. He soon transferred to the 2nd Grenadier Division, and in 1899, Zasulich took command of Osowiec Fortress in Russian Poland. He was promoted to lieutenant general and commander of the 6th Infantry Division in 1901.

When the Russo-Japanese War began in February 1904, Zasulich was in command of II Siberian Corps. As part of the Army of Manchuria, II Siberian was tasked with blocking Japanese forces at the Yalu River,

which formed the boundary between Manchuria and Korea. Zasulich concentrated his forces near the town of Antung and, despite reports of Japanese flanking movements, refused to alter his dispositions. The Japanese First Army quickly outflanked the Russians, forcing a hurried retreat.

The Russian defeat in the Battle of the Yalu (April 1904) caused a tremendous international sensation, but Zasulich continued in his post with minimal comment. He served throughout the war, seeing action at Liaoyang and Mukden, among other battles; Zasulich consistently adopted a defensive posture, frequently refused to follow directives from above, and suffered a string of humiliating defeats. Zasulich nonetheless retired in 1906 at the rank of general. He died in 1910.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848–1925); Liaoyang, Battle of (August 25–September 3, 1904); Mukden, Battle of (February 23–March 10, 1905); Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)

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Zhilinsky, Yakov Grigorevich (1853–1918)

Russian army general. Born in Mikhailov, Riazan Province, on March 27, 1853, Yakov

Grigorevich Zhilinsky completed the Nikolaevsky Cavalry School in 1876 and the General Staff Academy in 1883. He was an observer in Cuba during the Spanish-American War (1898) and a member of the delegation to the Hague Peace Conference in 1899. The following year, he became a major general.

During the first half of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Zhilinsky served as chief of the field staff of the Russian Far Eastern Army. Although his performance in this position was mediocre at best, Zhilinsky rose rapidly after the war to cavalry division commander (1906), commander of the Tenth Army (1907), and chief of staff of the Russian Army (1911). In this latter position, Zhilinsky conducted talks with the French and committed Russia to a major offensive in East Prussia.

Several months before World War I began, Zhilinsky gave up his position as chief of staff, but ironically he assumed command of the Warsaw Military District, which put him in charge of the Northwestern Front (army group) once war began—the very forces that he had previously designated for an attack against the Germans in East Prussia. As the front commander, Zhilinsky failed to appreciate the Germans' troop dispositions. He consistently urged General Aleksandr Samsonov's Second Army to accelerate its advance into the trap set by the main German forces at Tannenberg (August 26–31) while allowing General Pavel Rennenkampf's First Army to move leisurely against negligible resistance.

Zhilinsky's inept leadership led to his dismissal in late September 1914. He languished for about a year until being appointed as senior Russian representative to the French High Command. His performance in this new position was also marred by mistakes in judgment that led to conflicts

with French army commander General of Division Joseph J. C. Joffre and other French leaders.

Zhilinsky returned to Russia at the end of 1916 and then retired after the March 1917 revolution. He attempted to join the White movement after the Bolshevik Revolution on November 1917, but died in southern Russia sometime in 1918, likely murdered by the Bolsheviks.

Curtis S. King

See also: Gumbinnen, Battle of (August 20, 1914); Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich (1854–1918); Samsonov, Aleksandr Vsilievich (1859–1914); Schedule 19 (Plan 19); Stallupönen, Battle of (August 17, 1914); Tannenberg, Battle of (August 26–31, 1914)

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Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1917–1974)

Marshal of the Soviet Union and minister of defense (1955–1957).

Born in a peasant family in Strelkovka, Kaluga Province, Russia, on December 1,

1896, Georgy Zhukov was conscripted into the Russian army in 1915 and served in the 10th Novgorod Dragoon Regiment (cavalry) during World War I. He received a severe wound in late 1916 and did not participate in the fighting in 1917. He joined the Bolshevik Party after the November Revolution, commissioned in the Red Army in 1918, and rose to squadron commander during the Russian Civil War. Zhukov was decorated for his role in subduing the Tambov Rebellion of 1921.

In 1923, Zhukov took command of a cavalry regiment, and in 1930, of a brigade. He attended several service schools, including the Frunze Military Academy during 1929–1930, rising steadily in rank and responsibilities. In 1933, he had charge of a cavalry division, and in 1937, of a corps. He was one of the few senior officers to survive Josef Stalin's purge of the military leadership in



THEY FEARED THE GERMANS' MOSCOW RETREAT AIDS

Georgy Zhukov was perhaps the best Soviet general of World War II. He played a key role in the defense of both Moscow and Leningrad. (Library of Congress)

the late 1930s. In 1938, Zhukov was appointed deputy commander of the Bialystok Military District, and in June 1939, he received command of Soviet forces battling the Japanese in Mongolia. By the end of August, he had defeated the Japanese in the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol.

Promoted to full general, in June 1940, Zhukov took command of the Kiev Military District. In January 1941, he became chief of the General Staff, in effect Soviet dictator Stalin's chief military advisor. Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Zhukov took part in almost every major battle on the Eastern Front, earning the nickname "Stalin's Fireman." He participated in the unsuccessful defense of Smolensk in August and successfully organized the defense of Leningrad in October and of Moscow, launching the counteroffensive against the Germans there in December 1941. In the fall of 1942, Zhukov helped plan the counteroffensive that trapped the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union and appointed deputy supreme commander of the Red Army, he helped raise the siege of Leningrad in 1943, and that July he assisted in the defense of the Kursk salient.

In the summer and autumn of 1944, Zhukov directed the great Belorussian Campaign that destroyed the German Army Group Center, and in April 1945, he personally commanded the final Soviet assault on Berlin. He was the Soviet representative at the formal German surrender of May 8, 1945, and he remained in Germany to command Soviet occupation forces there and serve as the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission for Germany.

In March 1946, Zhukov was recalled to the Soviet Union as commander in chief of Soviet Land Forces and deputy defense minister, but he lasted only three months in

this post. In July, Stalin—no doubt jealous of Zhukov's popularity and viewing him as a potential threat—relegated Zhukov to a series of minor commands, first the Odessa Military District, and in February 1948, the Ural Military District.

Following Stalin's death in March 1953, Nikita Khrushchev brought Zhukov back to the senior leadership, apparently anxious to use Zhukov's status to ensure support from the armed forces. He became first deputy minister of defense in 1953 and defense minister in February 1955. During this period, he pushed modernization of the force structure, including the integration of missiles and nuclear weapons and improving the mobility of the armed forces. He also spearheaded major revisions in doctrine and strategy to exploit advances in technology and pursued a parallel effort to professionalize the officer corps.

Zhukov organized the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. In June 1957, Zhukov supported Khrushchev during an effort to oust the Soviet leader and was rewarded by appointment to the politburo, the first professional military man to reach this top-level leadership body. Khrushchev strongly opposed Zhukov's proposed military reorganization that would reduce political influence in the armed forces, and on October 26, 1957, dismissed Zhukov from his posts. He was rehabilitated after Khrushchev's fall from power in October 1964 but never again played a major role in policy making. Zhukov died in Moscow on June 18, 1974.

Jerome V. Martin and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22–December 5, 1941); Belorussia Offensive (June 23–August 29, 1944); Berlin, Battle for (April 16–May 2, 1945); Frunze Academy; Hungarian Rebellion (1956); Khalkin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971); Kursk, Battle

of (July 1943); Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944); Moscow, Battle for (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942); Smolensk, Battle of (August 16–18, 1812); Stalin, Josef V. (1878–1953); Stalingrad, Battle of (August 1942–February 1943); World War I, Russia in (1914–1917)

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Zorndorf, Battle of (August 25, 1758)

A battle during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) fought between the Russian army under Field Marshal Villim Fermor and the Prussian army of King Friedrich II (Frederick the Great) near the town of Zorndorf, East Prussia (today Poland). The battle was the culmination of Fermor's invasion of East Prussia.

In August 1758, a Russian army of nearly 50,000 invaded East Prussian territory to assist the Austrians, operating further south. Fermor reached the fortress of Kuestrin (today Kostrzyn) on August 5, 1758, and began siege operations. Friedrich, till now focused on the Austrians, assembled and led a relief force northward, causing Fermor to

abandon the siege. The Russians withdrew slowly to the east, the Prussians in pursuit.

By August 23, Fermor's army was consolidating its position around the small town of Zorndorf. The rolling farmland in the vicinity of Zorndorf is cut with steep-banked streams and marshes, which shaped the unique characteristics of this battle.

Outlying detachments had rejoined the main army, and the Russians now numbered 43,000 men, though the quality of some formations was not comparable with the Prussians. The Observation Corps, in particular, consisted of conscripts and was intended primarily for garrison duties. Friedrich, his army numbering 37,000 men, advanced within striking distance of the Russians by the afternoon of August 24. He planned to maneuver around the Russian right flank, attacking them from more open terrain to the south. He hoped to destroy the Russian army by forcing it into the Warta and Oder rivers.

During the morning of August 24, Fermor became aware of the Prussian flanking maneuver and wheeled his army 180 degrees to face his attackers. The Prussians planned to turn the Russian right, taking advantage of its relative isolation resulting from an area of steep gullies and brush known as the Galgengrund.

Friedrich began the attack with his left wing of 10,000 men, under Major General Manteuffel. Preliminary artillery fire shook the Russian defenders, and the Prussian infantry began a heavy musket fire as they closed with Fermor's line. The Russians held on stubbornly. Manteuffel inadvertently exposed his left during the attack, and Russian brigadier general Graugreben charged with his cavalry. Manteuffel's attack was smashed and his men retreated, causing a chain reaction that resulted in Friedrich's entire left wing retreating. Friedrich ordered his only reserve, the cavalry under Major

General Seydlitz, to attack the advancing Russians. Seydlitz charged and repulsed the Russians, driving them back in disorder into the marshes of Quartschen. Fermor accompanied the retreat, leaving the field, and leaving his subordinates leaderless.

Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., there was a lull as both sides rallied and reorganized. Friedrich renewed the attack, this time against the Russian left. Prussian artillery began bombarding the Russian lines. In response, Major General Browne, the Russian Army of Observation Corps commander, ordered his infantry and light cavalry to attack the Prussian guns, temporarily capturing them. Prussian reinforcements forced the Russians back to their original positions, however, which began a protracted exchange of musketry. On the Prussian left, Manteuffel again attacked the depleted Russian right wing.

Still shaken by their morning ordeal, Manteuffel's troops mistook their own cavalry under Seydlitz for attacking Russians, panicked, and fell back two kilometers before Friedrich could rally them. Seydlitz's cavalry continued to advance, however, and repulse the remaining Russian right wing troops. The Prussians captured several batteries of guns and the baggage train. On the Prussian right, Friedrich's remaining fresh troops continued to engage the Observation Corps. Browne's infantry continued to hold, despite their lack of training and experience.

Before long, both sides exhausted their ammunition. The battle ended at nightfall, sometime around 9 o'clock.

Casualties had been heavy on both sides. The Russians lost about 21,500 killed, wounded, and missing, along with their baggage train, whereas the Prussians lost about 11,300 men. Both sides lost approximately one-third of their strength. During the night of August 26–27, the Russians withdrew from the area, but the Prussians were too exhausted and too low on ammunition to launch an effective pursuit.

Though Friedrich II held the field, he had little to show for it. Fermor's army disengaged and withdrew back into Poland, still intact. The Russians would be back to invade Prussia in the spring of 1759.

Tim Wilson

See also: Fermor, William (ca. 1702–1771); Gross-Jaegersdorf, Battle of (August 30, 1757); Kunersdorf, Battle of (August 12, 1759); Seven Years' War (1754–1763)

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Chronology

- 862:** Rurik becomes the ruler of Novgorod, establishing the Rurikid Dynasty
- 882:** The Rurikid capital moves to Kiev
- 988:** Grand Prince Vladimir adopts Orthodox Christianity as the official religion of Kievan Rus'
- 1223:** Battle of the Kolka River; the first encounter with the Mongols
- Dec. 1237:** Mongol armies burn Moscow and enslave the population
- Jul. 1240:** Battle of the Neva River
- Dec.** Mongol armies take Kiev after a month's siege, completing the conquest of Kievan Rus'
- Apr. 1242:** Battle of the Ice; Novgorod, led by Alexander Nevsky, defeats the Teutonic Knights at Lake Peipus
- Nov. 1263:** Alexander Nevsky dies
- Nov. 1325:** Ivan I, "Kalita," becomes Grand Prince of Moscow
- 1328:** Ivan I becomes Grand Prince of Vladimir
- Mar. 1340:** Ivan I dies
- Nov. 1359:** Dmitry Donskoi becomes Grand Prince of Moscow and Vladimir
- 1378:** Battle of the Vozha River
- Sep. 1380:** Battle of Kulikovo; Donskoi's forces defeat the Mongols for the first time
- 1382:** The Mongols burn Moscow again
- May 1389:** Dmitri Donskoi dies
- Mar. 1462:** Ivan III ("the Great") becomes Grand Prince of Moscow and Vladimir
- 1476:** Ivan III refuses to pay tribute to the Mongols
- 1497:** Ivan III issues the first code of law for Muscovy, the *Sudebnik*
- Oct. 1505:** Ivan III dies
- Dec. 1533:** Ivan IV ("the Terrible") becomes Grand Prince of Moscow and Vladimir under the regency of Elena Glinskaya
- Jan. 1547:** Ivan IV has himself crowned as Czar of All the Russians

- Aug. 1552:** The Muscovite Siege of Kazan begins
- Oct.** Muscovite forces take Kazan and massacre the population
- 1558:** Livonian War begins
- Feb. 1565:** Ivan IV creates the *Oprichnina* and the *Oprichniki*
- 1572:** The *Oprichnina* and *Oprichniki* are abolished; Battle of Molodi
- 1583:** Livonian War ends
- Mar. 1584:** Ivan IV dies
- Jan. 1590:** Russo-Swedish War begins
- May 1591:** Ivan IV's son dies in Uglich
- May 1595:** Russo-Swedish War ends; Muscovy gains Ingria
- Feb. 1598:** Boris Godunov is elected czar, ending the Rurikid Dynasty
- Oct. 1604:** False Dmitry appears, beginning the Time of Troubles
- Apr. 1605:** Boris Godunov dies
- Jul.** False Dmitry is crowned as Czar Dmitry I
- May 1606:** Dmitry I is assassinated; Vasily Shuisky becomes Czar Vasily IV; Ivan Bolotnikov leads a rebellion against Vasily IV
- Dec.** Battle of Kolomenskoe
- Feb. 1609:** Polish forces conquer Muscovy
- Jul. 1610:** Vasily IV is deposed in favor of a Polish candidate
- Nov. 1612:** A popular rising forces the Poles from Moscow
- Jan. 1613:** Sweden invades Muscovy
- Feb.** Mikhail Romanov is elected as czar
- Feb. 1617:** Treaty of Stolbovo ends the Russo-Swedish War
- Dec. 1618:** Truce of Deulino ends the war with Poland-Lithuania
- Feb. 1619:** Filaret (Romanov) returns to Moscow
- Oct. 1632:** Smolensk War begins
- Jun. 1634:** Peace of Polianovka ends the Smolensk War
- Jul. 1645:** Mikhail I dies
- Jan. 1648:** Bohdan Khmelnytsky leads a Cossack uprising in Ukraine
- Dec.** Khmelnytsky enters Kiev
- Jan. 1649:** A new law code, the *Sobornoye Ulozhenie*, is ratified for Muscovy
- 1654:** Treaty of Pereiaslavl ends the Khmelnytsky Uprising
- Jul.** Muscovite forces invade Poland-Lithuania
- Jul. 1656:** Muscovite forces invade Ingria (Sweden)
- Dec. 1658:** Treaty of Valiesar ends the war with Sweden
- Jan. 1667:** Treaty of Andrusovo ends the war with Poland-Lithuania
- 1670:** Stenka Razin leads a rebellion in Ukraine
- 1671:** Stenka Razin is captured and executed
- 1676:** First Russo-Turkish War begins
- May 1682:** *Streltsy* regiments rebel and place Ivan V on the throne with Peter I as "junior czar" and his sister Sophia as

- regent; First Russo-Turkish War ends
- Jan. 1686:** Russia joins the Holy League with Austria, Poland, and Venice
- May 1687:** Vasily Golitsyn leads the first Crimean Campaign
- 1695:** Peter I leads the first Azov Campaign
- Jan. 1696:** Ivan V dies, leaving Peter I as czar, with Sophia as regent
- Apr.** Peter I leads the second Azov Campaign
- Jun. 1698:** The *Streltsy* Rising attempts to overthrow Peter I for Sophia
- Feb. 1700:** Russia signs Treaty of Constantinople, ending war of the Holy League
- Aug.** Muscovy declares war on Sweden, starting the Great Northern War
- Oct. 1706:** Battle of Kalisz
- Oct. 1707:** Bulavin's Rebellion begins in Ukraine
- Jul. 1708:** Kondraty Bulavin is shot, effectively ending the rebellion
- Oct.** Battle of Lesnaya
- Jun. 1709:** Battle of Poltava
- Nov. 1710:** Second Russo-Turkish War begins
- Jul. 1711:** Battle of the Pruth; Treaty of Pruth ends the Second Russo-Turkish War
- May 1713:** Peter I ("the Great") moves the Russian capital to St. Petersburg
- Aug. 1721:** Treaty of Nystad ends the Great Northern War
- Oct.** Peter I declares himself Emperor of Russia
- 1722:** Peter I introduces the Table of Ranks
- Jul.** First Russo-Persian (Russo-Iranian) War begins
- Sep. 1723:** Russo-Persian War ends with significant Russian gains on the Caspian
- Jan. 1725:** Peter I dies; his wife, Catherine I succeeds with Aleksandr Menshikov as her main advisor
- May 1727:** Catherine I dies, and Peter II becomes czar with Menshikov as regent
- Jan. 1730:** Peter II dies, and Ivan V's daughter Anna becomes czarina
- May 1735:** Third Russo-Turkish War begins at Perekop
- Aug. 1739:** Battle of Stavuchany; Treaty of Nissa ends the Third Russo-Turkish War
- Oct. 1740:** Anna I dies, leaving her grandnephew Ivan VI as czar with Ernst von Biron as regent
- Nov.** Burkhard Muennich orchestrates a coup to replace Biron with Ivan's mother, Anna Leopoldovna, niece of Empress Anna I
- Aug. 1741:** Sweden declares war on Russia
- Nov.** A palace coup places Peter I's daughter on the throne as Elizabeth I

- Aug. 1743:** Treaty of Abo ends the war with Sweden
- Aug. 1756:** The European component of the Seven Years' War begins
- May 1757:** Russia enters the Seven Years' War
- Aug.** Battle of Gross Jaegersdorf; Battle of Zorndorf
- Jul. 1759:** Battle of Paltzig
- Aug.** Battle of Kunersdorf
- Dec. 1761:** Elizabeth I dies; her successor, Peter III, takes Russia out of the Seven Years' War with the Treaty of St. Petersburg
- Jul. 1762:** Peter III is deposed in favor of his wife, Catherine II ("the Great")
- Sep. 1768:** Fifth Russo-Turkish War begins
- Jul. 1770:** Battle of Chesme; Battle of the Larga
- Aug. 1773:** Battle of Kagul; Emelian Pugachev leads a rebellion in the Ukraine
- Jun. 1774:** Battle of Kozludzha
- Jul.** Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji ends the fifth Russo-Turkish War
- Sep. 1788:** Pugachev Rebellion comes to an end
- 1788:** Sixth Russo-Turkish War begins
- Jun.** Sweden declares, but does not fight a war with Russia
- Aug. 1790:** The war with Sweden is declared over
- Jan 1792:** Treaty of Jassy ends the sixth Russo-Turkish War
- May** Russia invades Poland to put down a liberal revolution
- Jan. 1793:** Russia and Prussia agree on the Second Partition of Poland
- Mar. 1794:** Russia invades Poland to put down a liberal revolution
- Oct. 1795:** Russia, Prussia, and Austria agree on the Third Partition of Poland, which wipes out the Polish state
- Nov. 1796:** Catherine II dies; her son becomes Czar Paul I
- Mar. 1799:** Russia declares war on France as part of the Second Coalition
- Apr.** Russian troops campaign in Italy and Switzerland
- Mar. 1801:** A palace coup replaces Paul I with his son, Alexander I
- 1802:** Alexander I establishes the Ministry of Internal Affairs (secret police)
- 1804:** Second Russo-Persian (Russo-Iranian) war begins
- Apr. 1805:** Russia joins the Third Coalition against Napoleon
- Dec.** Battle of Austerlitz
- Oct. 1806:** Russia joins the Fourth Coalition against Napoleon; Battle of Jena; Battle of Auerstadt
- Dec.** Seventh Russo-Turkish War begins
- Feb. 1807:** Battle of Eylau
- Jun.** Battle of Friedland
- Jul.** Treaty of Tilsit ends Russian participation in the Napoleonic Wars
- Feb. 1808:** Russia invades Finland

- Sep. 1809:** Treaty of Fredriksham ends the war; Russia annexes Finland
- May 1812:** Treaty of Bucharest ends the seventh Russo-Turkish War
- Jun.** The *Grande Armée* of Napoleon Bonaparte invades Russia
- Jul.** Battle of Saltanovka (Mogilev)
- Aug.** Battle of Smolensk
- Sep.** Battle of Borodino; Napoleon enters Moscow
- Oct.** Napoleon departs Moscow; Battle of Maloyaroslavets
- Mar. 1813:** Russian troops enter Berlin
- May** Battle of Lutzen; Battle of Bautzen
- Aug.** Battle of Dresden
- Oct.** Battle of Leipzig; Treaty of Gulistan ends the second Russo-Persian War
- Mar. 1814:** Russian troops enter Paris
- Jun. 1815:** Congress of Vienna settlements are finalized
- Nov. 1825:** Alexander I dies and is succeeded by his son, Nicholas I
- Dec.** Decembrist Revolt in favor of Constantine is repressed
- Jul. 1826:** Third Russo-Persian (Russo-Iranian) war begins
- Oct. 1827:** Battle of Navarino Bay
- Feb. 1828:** Treaty of Turkmenchay ends the third Russo-Persian War
- Jun.** Eighth Russo-Turkish War begins
- Sep. 1829:** Treaty of Adrianople ends the eighth Russo-Turkish War
- Nov. 1830:** Polish Uprising begins
- Sep. 1831:** Russian troops capture Warsaw and end the Polish Uprising
- Oct. 1853:** Ninth Russo-Turkish War begins
- Nov.** Battle of Sinope
- Mar. 1854:** Britain and France enter the ninth Russo-Turkish War, extending it into the Crimean War
- Sep.** Battle of the Alma River; Siege of Sevastopol begins
- Oct.** Battle of Balaclava
- Nov.** Battle of Inkerman
- Feb. 1855:** Nicholas I dies; his son succeeds him as Alexander II
- Sep.** Russia evacuates Sevastopol
- Oct.** Allies capture Kinburn
- Mar. 1856:** Treaty of Paris ends the Crimean War
- Mar. 1861:** Alexander II signs the proclamation emancipating the serfs in Russia
- Jan. 1863:** Polish Rebellion begins, but is quickly crushed
- May 1864:** Russia conquers the Khanate of Kokand
- Jun. 1865:** Russia conquers Tashkent
- Mar. 1867:** Russia sells Alaska to the United States
- 1873:** Russia establishes protectorates over Khiva and Bokhara
- Apr. 1877:** Tenth Russo-Turkish War begins

- Jul.** Russia begins the Siege of Plevna
- Dec.** Russian forces take Plevna
- Mar. 1878:** Treaty of San Stefano ends the tenth Russo-Turkish War
- Jun.** Battle of Philippopolis (Plovdiv)
- Jul.** Congress of Berlin reverses many Russian gains
- Mar. 1881:** Alexander II is assassinated; his son succeeds him as Alexander III
- Nov. 1894:** Alexander III dies and is succeeded by his son, Nicholas II
- Jun. 1901:** The Russian and Finnish armies are unified
- Feb. 1904:** Russo-Japanese War begins; Siege of Port Arthur begins
- Apr.** Battle of Nanshan
- May** Battle of Telissu
- Aug.** Battle of Liaoyang
- Oct.** Dogger Bank Incident; Battle of the Sha-ho
- Jan. 1905:** Port Arthur surrenders; Bloody Sunday launches the Revolution of 1905; Battle of Sandepu
- Feb.** Battle of Mukden
- May** Battle of Tsushima
- Jun.** *Potemkin* Mutiny
- Sep.** Treaty of Portsmouth ends the Russo-Japanese War
- Oct.** Nicholas II signs the October Manifesto, ending the Revolution of 1905
- Jun. 1914:** Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary is assassinated in Sarajevo
- Jul.** Russia mobilizes its army to defend Serbia
- Aug.** Germany declares war on Russia, beginning World War I; Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia; Russian forces enter East Prussia; Battle of Stallüponen; Battle of Gumbinnen; Battle of Tannenberg; Battle of Krasnik; Battle of Komarow
- Sep.** Battle of Rava-Ruska; First Battle of the Masurian Lakes; Russian troops besiege the Austrian fortress of Przemysl; Battle of the Vistula (Warsaw)
- Nov.** Russia declares war on the Ottoman Empire; Battle of the Lodz
- Dec.** Battle of Limanowa; Battle of Qurna; Battle of Sarikamis; First Battle of the Strypa River
- Jan. 1915:** Russian forces begin the Carpathian Campaign
- Feb.** Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
- Mar.** Russians capture Przemysl
- May** Germany launches the Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive, starting what is known in Russia as “The Great Retreat”

Jun.	Russians evacuate Przemyśl; Second Battle of the Strypa River	Dec.	The Bolsheviks establish the <i>Cheka</i> to hunt down their political enemies. Former czarist generals create the Volunteer Army to fight the Bolsheviks, marking the beginning of the Russian Civil War
Jul.	Battle of Manzikert		
Aug.	Czar Nicholas II assumes field command of the Russian armies		
Oct.	Russia declares war on Bulgaria		
Jan. 1916:	Erzurum Offensive	Feb. 1918:	The Bolsheviks begin mass conscription in Moscow and Petrograd
Mar.	Battle of Lake Naroch		
Jun.	Russia begins the Brusilov Offensive; Battle of Lutsk; Attempts to conscript central Asians spark the Basmachi Revolt	Mar.	Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ends Russian participation in the First World War; Allied forces land in Murmansk, beginning the Allied Intervention against the Bolsheviks
Jul.	Battle of Erzincan; Battle of Kowel	May	The Czech Legion begins its revolt against the Bolsheviks
Aug.	Romania enters the war, and the Romanian Campaign begins	Jul.	Nicholas II and his family are executed by the Bolsheviks
Dec.	Grigory Rasputin is killed by Russian nobles	Nov.	Armistice ends World War I; Russia invades Estonia
Feb. 1917:	Demonstrations in Petrograd lead to the abdication of Nicholas II in the February Revolution	Jan. 1919:	Russia invades Latvia
		Feb.	Russo-Polish War begins
Jun.	The provisional government launches the Kerensky Offensive	Feb. 1920:	Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, leader of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia, is captured and executed
Aug.	General Lavr Kornilov leads a coup attempt	Apr.	Russia invades Azerbaijan
Oct.	Led by Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik Party stages the October Revolution	Jun.	Russia recognizes Lithuania as an independent nation
		Aug.	Russia recognizes Latvia as an independent nation; Battle of Warsaw

- Nov.** Russia invades Armenia
- Feb. 1921:** Russia invades Georgia; Kronstadt Rebellion breaks out
- Mar.** Red Army suppresses the Kronstadt Rebellion; Treaty of Riga ends the Russo-Polish War
- Oct.** Treaty of Kars ends war between Soviet Russia and Turkey
- Apr. 1922:** Russia signs the Treaty of Rapallo, normalizing relations with Germany
- Aug.** Basmachi Revolt comes to an end
- Jan. 1924:** Vladimir Lenin dies
- Aug. 1936:** The Trial of the Sixteen launches the Great Purges
- Jun. 1937:** Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and other military leaders are shot as part of the Great Purges
- Jul. 1938:** Battle of Lake Khasan
- Aug. 1939:** Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
- Sep.** The Soviet Union launches an Invasion of Poland; Battle of Khalkhin-Gol
- Oct.** USSR signs mutual assistance pacts with Latvia and Lithuania
- Nov.** The Soviet Union attacks Finland in the Winter War
- Mar. 1940:** Treaty of Moscow ends the Winter War
- Apr.** Katyn Forest Massacre
- Jun.** The Soviet Union occupies the Baltic states, Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina
- Apr. 1941:** Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact
- Jun.** Some 60,000 Baltic residents are deported to Siberia; Germany invades the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA; The Soviet Union attacks Finland, starting the Continuation War; Hungary and Slovakia declare war on the Soviet Union
- Aug.** Smolensk falls to the Germans; The Soviet Union invades Iran
- Sep.** Stalin orders the Volga Germans deported to Siberia; German troops capture Kiev; The Germans begin the Siege of Leningrad
- Oct.** Germany begins the Battle for Moscow; Over 500,000 Soviet soldiers are surrounded in the Vyazma Pocket
- Dec.** Battle of Sevastopol begins
- Mar. 1942:** Red Army offensive in the Crimea
- May** Red Army launches an attempt to retake Kharkov; Anglo-Soviet Treaty
- Jul.** The Germans capture Sevastopol, driving the Red Army from Crimea; Rostov-on-Don falls to the Germans
- Aug.** Battle of Stalingrad begins
- Nov.** The Red Army launches a counteroffensive at Stalingrad

- Jan. 1943:** Casablanca Conference; The Red Army recaptures Voronezh
- Feb.** The German Sixth Army surrenders, ending the Battle of Stalingrad; Soviet forces attempt to recapture Kharkov again
- Jul.** Battle of Kursk
- Sep.** Red Army recaptures Smolensk
- Nov.** Red Army liberates Kiev; Cairo Conference; Tehran Conference
- Jan. 1944:** Soviet forces enter Poland; The Red Army ends the Siege of Leningrad
- Feb.** The Red Army surrounds two German army corps in the Korsun Pocket
- May** Soviet forces liberate the Crimea
Operation BAGRATION begins
- Jul.** Minsk is liberated; Red Army enters Vilnius; Majdanek is the first concentration camp liberated by the Red Army; Red Army retakes Brest-Litovsk
- Aug.** Red Army enters East Prussia; Soviet offensive into Romania begins
- Sep.** Red Army invades Bulgaria, which then switches sides; Soviet forces launch an offensive in the Baltics; The Moscow Armistice ends the Continuation War
- Oct.** Soviet forces enter Yugoslavia; Churchill-Stalin meeting in Moscow
- Dec.** Battle for Budapest begins
- Jan. 1945:** Soviet forces liberate Auschwitz
- Feb.** Yalta Conference; Red Army liberates Budapest
- Mar.** Red Army enters Austria
- Apr.** Soviet forces liberate Vienna; Red Army captures Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad); Red Army opens the Battle for Berlin
- May** The Soviet Union captures Berlin; Red Army launches the Prague Offensive; Germany surrenders unconditionally
- Aug.** The Potsdam Conference establishes the Soviet Union's western border; First atomic bombs are dropped on Japan; The Soviet Union begins its Manchurian Operations
- Jun. 1948:** The Soviet Union initiates the Berlin Blockade
- Aug.** First successful atomic bomb test in the Soviet Union
- Jun. 1950:** North Korea invades South Korea, starting the Korean War
- Nov.** Soviet and American aircraft engage in the Korean War
- Mar. 1953:** Soviet leader Josef Stalin dies, Nikita Khrushchev succeeds him as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

- Jun.** Berlin Rising against Soviet domination of East Germany
- Jul.** Armistice ends the Korean War
- Jul. 1955:** The USSR agrees to provide aid to Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh
- Feb. 1956:** Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" launches a reform campaign in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
- Jun.** Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky uses the army to suppress demonstrations for greater liberalization in Poznan, Poland
- Oct.** The Hungarian Revolution begins
- Nov.** Soviet forces invade to end the Hungarian Revolution
- Apr. 1960:** Accusations of "revisionism" lead to the Sino-Soviet Split
- Aug. 1961:** Construction begins on the Berlin Wall
- Dec.** Fidel Castro announces Cuba will become Communist
- Jun. 1962:** Soviet troops fire on protestors in Novocherkassk, killing 25
- Oct.** The Cuban Missile Crisis occurs
- Oct. 1964:** Nikita Khrushchev is removed from office and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev
- Jan. 1968:** A reform movement known as the Prague Spring begins in Czechoslovakia
- Aug.** Warsaw Pact troops invade to crush the Prague Spring
- Mar. 1969:** The Zhenbao Incident opens a series of Sino-Soviet Border Clashes
- Jan. 1973:** The Paris Peace Accords begin the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam
- Oct.** Yom Kippur War
- Jan. 1975:** The USSR provides aid to Marxist rebels in the Angolan Civil War
- Apr.** Saigon falls to the Vietnamese Communists, ending the Vietnam Wars
- Dec. 1979:** The Soviet Union launches the Afghanistan War
- Nov. 1982:** Leonid Brezhnev dies and is replaced by Yuri Andropov
- Feb. 1984:** Yuri Andropov dies and is replaced by Konstantin Chernenko
- Mar. 1985:** Konstantin Chernenko dies and is replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev
- Apr. 1988:** The USSR signs the Geneva Accords, agreeing to withdraw from the Afghanistan War
- Jun.** Tbilisi Riots; An independence movement starts in Estonia
- Oct.** An independence movement starts in Lithuania
- Feb. 1989:** The last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan, ending the Afghanistan War
- Jun.** Free elections are held in Poland

- Oct.** Hungary declares itself an independent republic
- Nov.** East Germany opens the Berlin Wall.
The Czechoslovak Communist Party renounces its monopoly on political power
- Dec.** The Lithuanian Parliament ends the Communist Party's monopoly on political power
- Mar. 1990:** Lithuania declares its independence
- Aug.** Transnistria declares its independence
- Jan. 1991:** Baltic Rebellions are violently suppressed in Lithuania
- May** Moldavia declares its independence
- Aug.** Hard-line Soviet leaders attempt an August Coup against Mikhail Gorbachev; Estonia declares its independence; Latvia declares its independence; Ukraine declares its independence; Kyrgyzstan declares its independence
- Sep.** The Soviet Union recognizes Baltic independence
- Dec.** The Soviet Union dissolves itself
- Aug. 1994:** First Chechen War begins
- Dec.** Russian troops invade Chechenya and fight the Battle of Grozny
- Aug. 1996:** The Khasav-Yurt Accord ends the First Chechen War
- Aug. 1999:** Second Chechen War begins
- Sep.** A car bomb in Buynaksk kills 64 people
- Oct.** Russian ground troops enter Chechenya in the Second Chechen War
- Mar. 2000:** Vladimir Putin is elected president of Russia
- Aug.** Russian submarine *Kursk* explodes and sinks
- Oct. 2002:** Chechen rebels hold some 700 people hostage in a theater in Moscow; Russian special forces storm it, killing 42 rebels; 120 hostages also die
- Sep. 2004:** Chechen rebels take 1,300 people hostage at a school in Beslan; Russian forces storm the school; 31 rebels, 10 policemen, and 344 civilians die in the battle
- Oct. 2005:** Chechen rebels capture key buildings in Nalchik; Russian forces surround and storm the city; 136 people are killed in the battle
- Aug. 2008:** Georgian War
- May 2014:** Russia annexes Crimea; calls for independence in eastern Ukraine

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